@tanstack/ai-client 0.31.0 → 0.32.0

package/README.md

@@ -202,19 +202,20 @@ Learn more in the
 
 Official adapters include:
 
-| Package                                                                              | Use it for                                                                     |
-| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
-| [`@tanstack/ai-openrouter`](https://tanstack.com/ai/latest/docs/adapters/openrouter) | 300+ models through one OpenRouter API, with per-request cost tracking         |
-| [`@tanstack/ai-openai`](https://tanstack.com/ai/latest/docs/adapters/openai)         | OpenAI chat, image, video, speech, transcription, realtime, and provider tools |
-| [`@tanstack/ai-anthropic`](https://tanstack.com/ai/latest/docs/adapters/anthropic)   | Anthropic Claude chat, thinking, tools, structured outputs, and Vertex Claude  |
-| [`@tanstack/ai-gemini`](https://tanstack.com/ai/latest/docs/adapters/gemini)         | Google Gemini chat, image, speech, and audio generation                        |
-| [`@tanstack/ai-vertex`](https://tanstack.com/ai/latest/docs/adapters/vertex)         | Gemini on Vertex AI with regional endpoints and Google Cloud credentials       |
-| [`@tanstack/ai-ollama`](https://tanstack.com/ai/latest/docs/adapters/ollama)         | Local Ollama models                                                            |
-| [`@tanstack/ai-grok`](https://tanstack.com/ai/latest/docs/adapters/grok)             | xAI Grok chat, images, and realtime                                            |
-| [`@tanstack/ai-groq`](https://tanstack.com/ai/latest/docs/adapters/groq)             | Groq low-latency inference                                                     |
-| [`@tanstack/ai-elevenlabs`](https://tanstack.com/ai/latest/docs/adapters/elevenlabs) | ElevenLabs realtime voice, speech, transcription, music, and sound effects     |
-| [`@tanstack/ai-byteplus`](https://tanstack.com/ai/latest/docs/adapters/byteplus)     | BytePlus Seed chat, Seedance video, Seedream image, and Seed Speech TTS/ASR    |
-| [`@tanstack/ai-fal`](https://tanstack.com/ai/latest/docs/adapters/fal)               | fal.ai image, video, audio, speech, and transcription models                   |
+| Package                                                                              | Use it for                                                                           |
+| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| [`@tanstack/ai-openrouter`](https://tanstack.com/ai/latest/docs/adapters/openrouter) | 300+ models through one OpenRouter API, with per-request cost tracking               |
+| [`@tanstack/ai-openai`](https://tanstack.com/ai/latest/docs/adapters/openai)         | OpenAI chat, image, video, speech, transcription, realtime, and provider tools       |
+| [`@tanstack/ai-anthropic`](https://tanstack.com/ai/latest/docs/adapters/anthropic)   | Anthropic Claude chat, thinking, tools, structured outputs, and Vertex Claude        |
+| [`@tanstack/ai-gemini`](https://tanstack.com/ai/latest/docs/adapters/gemini)         | Google Gemini chat, image, speech, and audio generation                              |
+| [`@tanstack/ai-vertex`](https://tanstack.com/ai/latest/docs/adapters/vertex)         | Gemini on Vertex AI with regional endpoints and Google Cloud credentials             |
+| [`@tanstack/ai-ollama`](https://tanstack.com/ai/latest/docs/adapters/ollama)         | Local Ollama models                                                                  |
+| [`@tanstack/ai-grok`](https://tanstack.com/ai/latest/docs/adapters/grok)             | xAI Grok chat, images, and realtime                                                  |
+| [`@tanstack/ai-groq`](https://tanstack.com/ai/latest/docs/adapters/groq)             | Groq low-latency inference                                                           |
+| [`@tanstack/ai-elevenlabs`](https://tanstack.com/ai/latest/docs/adapters/elevenlabs) | ElevenLabs realtime voice, speech, transcription, music, and sound effects           |
+| [`@tanstack/ai-byteplus`](https://tanstack.com/ai/latest/docs/adapters/byteplus)     | BytePlus Seed chat, Seedance video, Seedream image, and Seed Speech TTS/ASR          |
+| [`@tanstack/ai-fal`](https://tanstack.com/ai/latest/docs/adapters/fal)               | fal.ai image, video, audio, speech, and transcription models                         |
+| [`@tanstack/ai-cloudflare`](https://tanstack.com/ai/latest/docs/adapters/cloudflare) | Cloudflare Workers AI chat, embeddings, image, speech, transcription, and AI Gateway |
 
 The adapter system is tree-shakeable by activity. Import `openaiText` for chat,
 `openaiImage` for images, `falVideo` for video, `geminiSpeech` for TTS, and so

package/dist/esm/byok/passkey.js

@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ function isPasskeyStorageSupported() {
 }
 /** Derive a non-extractable AES-256-GCM key from a 32-byte PRF output. */
 async function deriveAesKey(prfOutput) {
+	if (Array.isArray(prfOutput)) {
+		if (prfOutput.length !== 32 || !Array.from(prfOutput).every((byte) => typeof byte === "number" && Number.isInteger(byte) && byte >= 0 && byte <= 255)) throw new Error("Invalid passkey PRF byte array");
+		prfOutput = new Uint8Array(prfOutput);
+	}
 	const base = await crypto.subtle.importKey("raw", prfOutput, "HKDF", false, ["deriveKey"]);
 	return crypto.subtle.deriveKey({
 		name: "HKDF",
@@ -111,6 +115,17 @@ function requirePublicKeyCredential(credential, action) {
 	if (!(credential instanceof PublicKeyCredential)) throw new Error(`Unexpected credential type during ${action}`);
 	return credential;
 }
+/**
+* Some browsers (Dia, Safari) silently suppress `navigator.credentials.get()`
+* — no prompt, never resolves — when it runs without transient user activation.
+* The activation from a click expires (~5s) and is lost across enough async
+* work, so an unlock buried deep in a send pipeline just hangs. Fail fast with
+* a clear, catchable error so the app can re-run it from a fresh gesture.
+*/
+function requireUserActivation(action) {
+	const activation = globalThis.navigator?.userActivation;
+	if (activation && activation.isActive === false) throw new Error(`Passkey ${action} needs a fresh user action (e.g. a click). Run it directly from the event handler, before awaiting other work.`);
+}
 async function registerPasskey(rpName, userName, rpId) {
 	const salt = crypto.getRandomValues(/* @__PURE__ */ new Uint8Array(32));
 	const credential = requirePublicKeyCredential(await navigator.credentials.create({ publicKey: {
@@ -178,6 +193,7 @@ function passkeyStorage(options = {}) {
 		};
 		const existing = await idbGet(dbName);
 		if (existing) {
+			requireUserActivation("unlock");
 			cachedKey = await deriveAesKey(await evaluatePrf(existing.credentialId, existing.salt));
 			cachedMeta = {
 				credentialId: existing.credentialId,

package/dist/esm/byok/passkey.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"passkey.js","names":[],"sources":["../../../src/byok/passkey.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { isProviderId } from '@tanstack/ai/byok'\nimport { memoryStorage } from './storage'\nimport type { KeyPreview, Keyring, KeyringStorage } from './storage'\n\n/**\n * Passkey-encrypted keyring storage (WebAuthn PRF → HKDF → AES-256-GCM).\n *\n * The keyring is encrypted at rest in IndexedDB with an AES-256-GCM key derived\n * from a passkey's PRF output, unwrapped on demand with a biometric/PIN tap.\n * Decryption happens entirely client-side with the user present — no server,\n * no custodian.\n *\n * Honest scope: this protects against at-rest theft (stolen device,\n * storage-dumping extension, backups). It does NOT defeat live in-page XSS —\n * an attacker running JS in the origin after the user unlocks can read the\n * decrypted keys from memory.\n */\n\nconst STORE_NAME = 'keyring'\nconst RECORD_ID = 'default'\nconst HKDF_INFO = 'byok:keyring:v1'\nconst DEFAULT_DB = 'byok'\n\ninterface StoredRecord {\n  id: string\n  /** The passkey's raw credential id, replayed in the unlock ceremony. */\n  credentialId: ArrayBuffer\n  /** Fixed per-install PRF evaluation input (not secret). */\n  salt: ArrayBuffer\n  /** AES-GCM initialization vector for this ciphertext. */\n  iv: ArrayBuffer\n  /** Encrypted keyring JSON. */\n  ciphertext: ArrayBuffer\n  /**\n   * Unencrypted presence metadata (`provider → last 4`). Non-sensitive, so it\n   * can be read via {@link KeyringStorage.peek} without an unlock ceremony to\n   * show saved keys as \"locked\" after a refresh.\n   */\n  preview: KeyPreview\n}\n\nfunction sanitizeKeyring(value: unknown): Keyring {\n  if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) return {}\n  const keys: Keyring = {}\n  for (const [provider, key] of Object.entries(value)) {\n    if (isProviderId(provider) && typeof key === 'string' && key.length > 0) {\n      keys[provider] = key\n    }\n  }\n  return keys\n}\n\n/** Build the non-sensitive `provider → last 4` preview from a keyring. */\nfunction previewOf(keys: Keyring): KeyPreview {\n  const preview: KeyPreview = {}\n  for (const [provider, key] of Object.entries(keys)) {\n    if (!key || !isProviderId(provider)) continue\n    // Keys of length ≤ 4 would make last-4 the whole secret — store presence only.\n    preview[provider] = key.length > 4 ? key.slice(-4) : ''\n  }\n  return preview\n}\n\n/**\n * Whether the current environment exposes WebAuthn. Actual PRF support can\n * only be confirmed during registration; `passkeyStorage` throws if the\n * chosen authenticator does not support PRF.\n */\nexport function isPasskeyStorageSupported(): boolean {\n  return (\n    typeof globalThis !== 'undefined' &&\n    typeof globalThis.PublicKeyCredential !== 'undefined' &&\n    typeof globalThis.navigator !== 'undefined' &&\n    typeof globalThis.navigator.credentials.create === 'function'\n  )\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Crypto (exported for testing; the WebAuthn ceremony below feeds `deriveAesKey`)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Derive a non-extractable AES-256-GCM key from a 32-byte PRF output. */\nexport async function deriveAesKey(\n  prfOutput: BufferSource,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const base = await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', prfOutput, 'HKDF', false, [\n    'deriveKey',\n  ])\n  return crypto.subtle.deriveKey(\n    {\n      name: 'HKDF',\n      hash: 'SHA-256',\n      salt: new Uint8Array(0),\n      info: new TextEncoder().encode(HKDF_INFO),\n    },\n    base,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\nexport async function encryptKeyring(\n  key: CryptoKey,\n  keys: Keyring,\n): Promise<{ iv: ArrayBuffer; ciphertext: ArrayBuffer }> {\n  const iv = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12))\n  const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(keys))\n  const ciphertext = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv },\n    key,\n    plaintext,\n  )\n  return { iv: iv.buffer, ciphertext }\n}\n\nexport async function decryptKeyring(\n  key: CryptoKey,\n  iv: BufferSource,\n  ciphertext: BufferSource,\n): Promise<Keyring> {\n  const plaintext = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv },\n    key,\n    ciphertext,\n  )\n  const parsed: unknown = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext))\n  return sanitizeKeyring(parsed)\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// IndexedDB\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nfunction openDb(dbName: string): Promise<IDBDatabase> {\n  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n    const request = indexedDB.open(dbName, 1)\n    request.onupgradeneeded = () => {\n      request.result.createObjectStore(STORE_NAME, { keyPath: 'id' })\n    }\n    request.onsuccess = () => resolve(request.result)\n    request.onerror = () => reject(request.error)\n  })\n}\n\nfunction idbGet(dbName: string): Promise<StoredRecord | null> {\n  return openDb(dbName).then(\n    (db) =>\n      new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n        const request = db\n          .transaction(STORE_NAME, 'readonly')\n          .objectStore(STORE_NAME)\n          .get(RECORD_ID)\n        request.onsuccess = () => resolve(request.result ?? null)\n        request.onerror = () => reject(request.error)\n      }),\n  )\n}\n\nfunction idbPut(dbName: string, record: StoredRecord): Promise<void> {\n  return openDb(dbName).then(\n    (db) =>\n      new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n        const tx = db.transaction(STORE_NAME, 'readwrite')\n        tx.objectStore(STORE_NAME).put(record)\n        tx.oncomplete = () => resolve()\n        tx.onerror = () => reject(tx.error)\n      }),\n  )\n}\n\nfunction idbClear(dbName: string): Promise<void> {\n  return openDb(dbName).then(\n    (db) =>\n      new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n        const tx = db.transaction(STORE_NAME, 'readwrite')\n        tx.objectStore(STORE_NAME).delete(RECORD_ID)\n        tx.oncomplete = () => resolve()\n        tx.onerror = () => reject(tx.error)\n      }),\n  )\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// WebAuthn ceremonies\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nfunction requirePublicKeyCredential(\n  credential: Credential | null,\n  action: string,\n): PublicKeyCredential {\n  if (!credential) throw new Error(`Passkey ${action} was cancelled`)\n  if (!(credential instanceof PublicKeyCredential)) {\n    throw new Error(`Unexpected credential type during ${action}`)\n  }\n  return credential\n}\n\nasync function registerPasskey(\n  rpName: string,\n  userName: string,\n  rpId?: string,\n): Promise<{\n  credentialId: ArrayBuffer\n  salt: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>\n  prf?: BufferSource\n}> {\n  const salt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32))\n  const credential = requirePublicKeyCredential(\n    await navigator.credentials.create({\n      publicKey: {\n        challenge: crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)),\n        // Omit `id` to let the browser bind the passkey to the current origin's\n        // effective domain; set it to scope across subdomains of a self-host.\n        rp: rpId ? { name: rpName, id: rpId } : { name: rpName },\n        user: {\n          id: crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16)),\n          name: userName,\n          displayName: userName,\n        },\n        pubKeyCredParams: [\n          { type: 'public-key', alg: -7 },\n          { type: 'public-key', alg: -257 },\n        ],\n        authenticatorSelection: {\n          residentKey: 'required',\n          userVerification: 'required',\n        },\n        extensions: { prf: { eval: { first: salt } } },\n      },\n    }),\n    'registration',\n  )\n\n  const prf = credential.getClientExtensionResults().prf\n  if (!prf?.enabled) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'This authenticator does not support the WebAuthn PRF extension',\n    )\n  }\n  return { credentialId: credential.rawId, salt, prf: prf.results?.first }\n}\n\nasync function evaluatePrf(\n  credentialId: BufferSource,\n  salt: BufferSource,\n): Promise<BufferSource> {\n  const credential = requirePublicKeyCredential(\n    await navigator.credentials.get({\n      publicKey: {\n        challenge: crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)),\n        allowCredentials: [{ type: 'public-key', id: credentialId }],\n        userVerification: 'required',\n        extensions: { prf: { eval: { first: salt } } },\n      },\n    }),\n    'unlock',\n  )\n  const result = credential.getClientExtensionResults().prf?.results?.first\n  if (!result) {\n    throw new Error('Authenticator did not return a PRF result')\n  }\n  return result\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Storage strategy\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface PasskeyStorageOptions {\n  /** Relying-party name shown in the passkey prompt. */\n  rpName?: string\n  /** Username label attached to the created passkey. */\n  userName?: string\n  /**\n   * WebAuthn Relying Party ID. Omit to bind the passkey to the current origin's\n   * effective domain (the default — no central/hardcoded domain). Set it to a\n   * registrable parent domain to share the credential across subdomains of your\n   * own deployment. The encrypted keyring is never portable across unrelated\n   * domains.\n   */\n  rpId?: string\n  /** IndexedDB database name. Defaults to `byok`. */\n  dbName?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Passkey-encrypted persistence. `ByokClient` treats this as `unlockable`, so\n * nothing is decrypted until the user calls `unlock()` (or saves a key, which\n * registers a passkey on first use). The derived key is cached in memory for\n * the session so repeated saves don't re-prompt.\n */\nexport function passkeyStorage(\n  options: PasskeyStorageOptions = {},\n): KeyringStorage {\n  const rpName = options.rpName ?? 'BYOK'\n  const userName = options.userName ?? 'byok-keyring'\n  const { rpId } = options\n  const dbName = options.dbName ?? DEFAULT_DB\n\n  let cachedKey: CryptoKey | null = null\n  let cachedMeta: {\n    credentialId: ArrayBuffer\n    salt: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>\n  } | null = null\n\n  // Obtain the AES key, running exactly one WebAuthn ceremony if it isn't\n  // already cached for this session (unlock if a passkey exists, else register).\n  async function ensureKey(): Promise<{\n    key: CryptoKey\n    credentialId: ArrayBuffer\n    salt: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>\n  }> {\n    if (cachedKey && cachedMeta) {\n      return { key: cachedKey, ...cachedMeta }\n    }\n    const existing = await idbGet(dbName)\n    if (existing) {\n      const prf = await evaluatePrf(existing.credentialId, existing.salt)\n      cachedKey = await deriveAesKey(prf)\n      cachedMeta = {\n        credentialId: existing.credentialId,\n        salt: new Uint8Array(existing.salt),\n      }\n    } else {\n      const reg = await registerPasskey(rpName, userName, rpId)\n      const prf = reg.prf ?? (await evaluatePrf(reg.credentialId, reg.salt))\n      cachedKey = await deriveAesKey(prf)\n      cachedMeta = { credentialId: reg.credentialId, salt: reg.salt }\n    }\n    return { key: cachedKey, ...cachedMeta }\n  }\n\n  return {\n    id: 'passkey',\n    label: 'Passkey-encrypted (this device)',\n    persistent: true,\n    unlockable: true,\n    warning:\n      'Keys are encrypted with your passkey and unlocked with biometrics. ' +\n      'This protects saved keys if your device is stolen, but not against code ' +\n      'running on this page after you unlock.',\n    peek: async () => {\n      // Unencrypted last-4 sidecar — no key material, no unlock ceremony.\n      const existing = await idbGet(dbName)\n      return existing?.preview ?? {}\n    },\n    load: async () => {\n      const existing = await idbGet(dbName)\n      if (!existing) return {}\n      const { key } = await ensureKey()\n      return decryptKeyring(key, existing.iv, existing.ciphertext)\n    },\n    save: async (keys) => {\n      const existing = await idbGet(dbName)\n      const hasKeys = Object.values(keys).some(Boolean)\n      // First save with an empty keyring is a no-op — avoids a passkey ceremony\n      // when another storage tier writes an empty ring.\n      if (!hasKeys && !existing) return\n\n      const { key, credentialId, salt } = await ensureKey()\n      const { iv, ciphertext } = await encryptKeyring(key, keys)\n      await idbPut(dbName, {\n        id: RECORD_ID,\n        credentialId,\n        salt: salt.buffer,\n        iv,\n        ciphertext,\n        preview: previewOf(keys),\n      })\n    },\n    clear: async () => {\n      cachedKey = null\n      cachedMeta = null\n      await idbClear(dbName)\n    },\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Passkey-encrypted storage when WebAuthn is available in a secure context.\n * Otherwise session memory, with a warning — this is not an automatic PRF\n * fallback. First save still throws if the authenticator lacks PRF.\n */\nexport function defaultByokStorage(\n  options?: PasskeyStorageOptions,\n): KeyringStorage {\n  const secure =\n    typeof globalThis.isSecureContext !== 'boolean' ||\n    globalThis.isSecureContext\n  if (!isPasskeyStorageSupported() || !secure) {\n    return {\n      ...memoryStorage(),\n      warning:\n        'Passkeys are unavailable in this context. Keys stay in memory for this tab only.',\n    }\n  }\n  return 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+{"version":3,"file":"passkey.js","names":[],"sources":["../../../src/byok/passkey.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { isProviderId } from '@tanstack/ai/byok'\nimport { memoryStorage } from './storage'\nimport type { KeyPreview, Keyring, KeyringStorage } from './storage'\n\n/**\n * Passkey-encrypted keyring storage (WebAuthn PRF → HKDF → AES-256-GCM).\n *\n * The keyring is encrypted at rest in IndexedDB with an AES-256-GCM key derived\n * from a passkey's PRF output, unwrapped on demand with a biometric/PIN tap.\n * Decryption happens entirely client-side with the user present — no server,\n * no custodian.\n *\n * Honest scope: this protects against at-rest theft (stolen device,\n * storage-dumping extension, backups). It does NOT defeat live in-page XSS —\n * an attacker running JS in the origin after the user unlocks can read the\n * decrypted keys from memory.\n */\n\nconst STORE_NAME = 'keyring'\nconst RECORD_ID = 'default'\nconst HKDF_INFO = 'byok:keyring:v1'\nconst DEFAULT_DB = 'byok'\n\ninterface StoredRecord {\n  id: string\n  /** The passkey's raw credential id, replayed in the unlock ceremony. */\n  credentialId: ArrayBuffer\n  /** Fixed per-install PRF evaluation input (not secret). */\n  salt: ArrayBuffer\n  /** AES-GCM initialization vector for this ciphertext. */\n  iv: ArrayBuffer\n  /** Encrypted keyring JSON. */\n  ciphertext: ArrayBuffer\n  /**\n   * Unencrypted presence metadata (`provider → last 4`). Non-sensitive, so it\n   * can be read via {@link KeyringStorage.peek} without an unlock ceremony to\n   * show saved keys as \"locked\" after a refresh.\n   */\n  preview: KeyPreview\n}\n\nfunction sanitizeKeyring(value: unknown): Keyring {\n  if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) return {}\n  const keys: Keyring = {}\n  for (const [provider, key] of Object.entries(value)) {\n    if (isProviderId(provider) && typeof key === 'string' && key.length > 0) {\n      keys[provider] = key\n    }\n  }\n  return keys\n}\n\n/** Build the non-sensitive `provider → last 4` preview from a keyring. */\nfunction previewOf(keys: Keyring): KeyPreview {\n  const preview: KeyPreview = {}\n  for (const [provider, key] of Object.entries(keys)) {\n    if (!key || !isProviderId(provider)) continue\n    // Keys of length ≤ 4 would make last-4 the whole secret — store presence only.\n    preview[provider] = key.length > 4 ? key.slice(-4) : ''\n  }\n  return preview\n}\n\n/**\n * Whether the current environment exposes WebAuthn. Actual PRF support can\n * only be confirmed during registration; `passkeyStorage` throws if the\n * chosen authenticator does not support PRF.\n */\nexport function isPasskeyStorageSupported(): boolean {\n  return (\n    typeof globalThis !== 'undefined' &&\n    typeof globalThis.PublicKeyCredential !== 'undefined' &&\n    typeof globalThis.navigator !== 'undefined' &&\n    typeof globalThis.navigator.credentials.create === 'function'\n  )\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Crypto (exported for testing; the WebAuthn ceremony below feeds `deriveAesKey`)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Derive a non-extractable AES-256-GCM key from a 32-byte PRF output. */\nexport async function deriveAesKey(\n  prfOutput: BufferSource,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  // Some passkey providers return a plain byte array instead of BufferSource.\n  if (Array.isArray(prfOutput)) {\n    if (\n      prfOutput.length !== 32 ||\n      !Array.from(prfOutput).every(\n        (byte: unknown) =>\n          typeof byte === 'number' &&\n          Number.isInteger(byte) &&\n          byte >= 0 &&\n          byte <= 255,\n      )\n    ) {\n      throw new Error('Invalid passkey PRF byte array')\n    }\n    prfOutput = new Uint8Array(prfOutput)\n  }\n  const base = await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', prfOutput, 'HKDF', false, [\n    'deriveKey',\n  ])\n  return crypto.subtle.deriveKey(\n    {\n      name: 'HKDF',\n      hash: 'SHA-256',\n      salt: new Uint8Array(0),\n      info: new TextEncoder().encode(HKDF_INFO),\n    },\n    base,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\nexport async function encryptKeyring(\n  key: CryptoKey,\n  keys: Keyring,\n): Promise<{ iv: ArrayBuffer; ciphertext: ArrayBuffer }> {\n  const iv = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12))\n  const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(keys))\n  const ciphertext = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv },\n    key,\n    plaintext,\n  )\n  return { iv: iv.buffer, ciphertext }\n}\n\nexport async function decryptKeyring(\n  key: CryptoKey,\n  iv: BufferSource,\n  ciphertext: BufferSource,\n): Promise<Keyring> {\n  const plaintext = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv },\n    key,\n    ciphertext,\n  )\n  const parsed: unknown = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext))\n  return sanitizeKeyring(parsed)\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// IndexedDB\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nfunction openDb(dbName: string): Promise<IDBDatabase> {\n  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n    const request = indexedDB.open(dbName, 1)\n    request.onupgradeneeded = () => {\n      request.result.createObjectStore(STORE_NAME, { keyPath: 'id' })\n    }\n    request.onsuccess = () => resolve(request.result)\n    request.onerror = () => reject(request.error)\n  })\n}\n\nfunction idbGet(dbName: string): Promise<StoredRecord | null> {\n  return openDb(dbName).then(\n    (db) =>\n      new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n        const request = db\n          .transaction(STORE_NAME, 'readonly')\n          .objectStore(STORE_NAME)\n          .get(RECORD_ID)\n        request.onsuccess = () => resolve(request.result ?? null)\n        request.onerror = () => reject(request.error)\n      }),\n  )\n}\n\nfunction idbPut(dbName: string, record: StoredRecord): Promise<void> {\n  return openDb(dbName).then(\n    (db) =>\n      new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n        const tx = db.transaction(STORE_NAME, 'readwrite')\n        tx.objectStore(STORE_NAME).put(record)\n        tx.oncomplete = () => resolve()\n        tx.onerror = () => reject(tx.error)\n      }),\n  )\n}\n\nfunction idbClear(dbName: string): Promise<void> {\n  return openDb(dbName).then(\n    (db) =>\n      new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n        const tx = db.transaction(STORE_NAME, 'readwrite')\n        tx.objectStore(STORE_NAME).delete(RECORD_ID)\n        tx.oncomplete = () => resolve()\n        tx.onerror = () => reject(tx.error)\n      }),\n  )\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// WebAuthn ceremonies\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nfunction requirePublicKeyCredential(\n  credential: Credential | null,\n  action: string,\n): PublicKeyCredential {\n  if (!credential) throw new Error(`Passkey ${action} was cancelled`)\n  if (!(credential instanceof PublicKeyCredential)) {\n    throw new Error(`Unexpected credential type during ${action}`)\n  }\n  return credential\n}\n\n/**\n * Some browsers (Dia, Safari) silently suppress `navigator.credentials.get()`\n * — no prompt, never resolves — when it runs without transient user activation.\n * The activation from a click expires (~5s) and is lost across enough async\n * work, so an unlock buried deep in a send pipeline just hangs. Fail fast with\n * a clear, catchable error so the app can re-run it from a fresh gesture.\n */\nfunction requireUserActivation(action: string): void {\n  // ponytail: only enforce where the API exists; absent means \"can't tell\", so\n  // fall through rather than block a ceremony that would have worked.\n  const activation = globalThis.navigator?.userActivation\n  if (activation && activation.isActive === false) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Passkey ${action} needs a fresh user action (e.g. a click). Run it ` +\n        'directly from the event handler, before awaiting other work.',\n    )\n  }\n}\n\nasync function registerPasskey(\n  rpName: string,\n  userName: string,\n  rpId?: string,\n): Promise<{\n  credentialId: ArrayBuffer\n  salt: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>\n  prf?: BufferSource\n}> {\n  const salt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32))\n  const credential = requirePublicKeyCredential(\n    await navigator.credentials.create({\n      publicKey: {\n        challenge: crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)),\n        // Omit `id` to let the browser bind the passkey to the current origin's\n        // effective domain; set it to scope across subdomains of a self-host.\n        rp: rpId ? { name: rpName, id: rpId } : { name: rpName },\n        user: {\n          id: crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16)),\n          name: userName,\n          displayName: userName,\n        },\n        pubKeyCredParams: [\n          { type: 'public-key', alg: -7 },\n          { type: 'public-key', alg: -257 },\n        ],\n        authenticatorSelection: {\n          residentKey: 'required',\n          userVerification: 'required',\n        },\n        extensions: { prf: { eval: { first: salt } } },\n      },\n    }),\n    'registration',\n  )\n\n  const prf = credential.getClientExtensionResults().prf\n  if (!prf?.enabled) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'This authenticator does not support the WebAuthn PRF extension',\n    )\n  }\n  return { credentialId: credential.rawId, salt, prf: prf.results?.first }\n}\n\nasync function evaluatePrf(\n  credentialId: BufferSource,\n  salt: BufferSource,\n): Promise<BufferSource> {\n  const credential = requirePublicKeyCredential(\n    await navigator.credentials.get({\n      publicKey: {\n        challenge: crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)),\n        allowCredentials: [{ type: 'public-key', id: credentialId }],\n        userVerification: 'required',\n        extensions: { prf: { eval: { first: salt } } },\n      },\n    }),\n    'unlock',\n  )\n  const result = credential.getClientExtensionResults().prf?.results?.first\n  if (!result) {\n    throw new Error('Authenticator did not return a PRF result')\n  }\n  return result\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Storage strategy\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface PasskeyStorageOptions {\n  /** Relying-party name shown in the passkey prompt. */\n  rpName?: string\n  /** Username label attached to the created passkey. */\n  userName?: string\n  /**\n   * WebAuthn Relying Party ID. Omit to bind the passkey to the current origin's\n   * effective domain (the default — no central/hardcoded domain). Set it to a\n   * registrable parent domain to share the credential across subdomains of your\n   * own deployment. The encrypted keyring is never portable across unrelated\n   * domains.\n   */\n  rpId?: string\n  /** IndexedDB database name. Defaults to `byok`. */\n  dbName?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Passkey-encrypted persistence. `ByokClient` treats this as `unlockable`, so\n * nothing is decrypted until the user calls `unlock()` (or saves a key, which\n * registers a passkey on first use). The derived key is cached in memory for\n * the session so repeated saves don't re-prompt.\n */\nexport function passkeyStorage(\n  options: PasskeyStorageOptions = {},\n): KeyringStorage {\n  const rpName = options.rpName ?? 'BYOK'\n  const userName = options.userName ?? 'byok-keyring'\n  const { rpId } = options\n  const dbName = options.dbName ?? DEFAULT_DB\n\n  let cachedKey: CryptoKey | null = null\n  let cachedMeta: {\n    credentialId: ArrayBuffer\n    salt: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>\n  } | null = null\n\n  // Obtain the AES key, running exactly one WebAuthn ceremony if it isn't\n  // already cached for this session (unlock if a passkey exists, else register).\n  async function ensureKey(): Promise<{\n    key: CryptoKey\n    credentialId: ArrayBuffer\n    salt: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>\n  }> {\n    if (cachedKey && cachedMeta) {\n      return { key: cachedKey, ...cachedMeta }\n    }\n    const existing = await idbGet(dbName)\n    if (existing) {\n      requireUserActivation('unlock')\n      const prf = await evaluatePrf(existing.credentialId, existing.salt)\n      cachedKey = await deriveAesKey(prf)\n      cachedMeta = {\n        credentialId: existing.credentialId,\n        salt: new Uint8Array(existing.salt),\n      }\n    } else {\n      const reg = await registerPasskey(rpName, userName, rpId)\n      // Registration can consume activation. Let the browser handle its\n      // follow-up PRF ceremony rather than rejecting a valid new-key save.\n      const prf = reg.prf ?? (await evaluatePrf(reg.credentialId, reg.salt))\n      cachedKey = await deriveAesKey(prf)\n      cachedMeta = { credentialId: reg.credentialId, salt: reg.salt }\n    }\n    return { key: cachedKey, ...cachedMeta }\n  }\n\n  return {\n    id: 'passkey',\n    label: 'Passkey-encrypted (this device)',\n    persistent: true,\n    unlockable: true,\n    warning:\n      'Keys are encrypted with your passkey and unlocked with biometrics. ' +\n      'This protects saved keys if your device is stolen, but not against code ' +\n      'running on this page after you unlock.',\n    peek: async () => {\n      // Unencrypted last-4 sidecar — no key material, no unlock ceremony.\n      const existing = await idbGet(dbName)\n      return existing?.preview ?? {}\n    },\n    load: async () => {\n      const existing = await idbGet(dbName)\n      if (!existing) return {}\n      const { key } = await ensureKey()\n      return decryptKeyring(key, existing.iv, existing.ciphertext)\n    },\n    save: async (keys) => {\n      const existing = await idbGet(dbName)\n      const hasKeys = Object.values(keys).some(Boolean)\n      // First save with an empty keyring is a no-op — avoids a passkey ceremony\n      // when another storage tier writes an empty ring.\n      if (!hasKeys && !existing) return\n\n      const { key, credentialId, salt } = await ensureKey()\n      const { iv, ciphertext } = await encryptKeyring(key, keys)\n      await idbPut(dbName, {\n        id: RECORD_ID,\n        credentialId,\n        salt: salt.buffer,\n        iv,\n        ciphertext,\n        preview: previewOf(keys),\n      })\n    },\n    clear: async () => {\n      cachedKey = null\n      cachedMeta = null\n      await idbClear(dbName)\n    },\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Passkey-encrypted storage when WebAuthn is available in a secure context.\n * Otherwise session memory, with a warning — this is not an automatic PRF\n * fallback. First save still throws if the authenticator lacks PRF.\n */\nexport function defaultByokStorage(\n  options?: PasskeyStorageOptions,\n): KeyringStorage {\n  const secure =\n    typeof globalThis.isSecureContext !== 'boolean' ||\n    globalThis.isSecureContext\n  if (!isPasskeyStorageSupported() || !secure) {\n    return {\n      ...memoryStorage(),\n      warning:\n        'Passkeys are unavailable in this context. Keys stay in memory for this tab only.',\n    }\n  }\n  return 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package/dist/esm/chat-client.d.ts

@@ -144,6 +144,16 @@ export declare class ChatClient<TTools extends ReadonlyArray<AnyClientTool> = an
     /** Constructor inputs `attach()` needs on every re-attach, not just the first. */
     private readonly rejoinRunId;
     private readonly cachesMessages;
+    /**
+     * Newest-window size from `history.pageSize`. Only set when
+     * `persistence === true`.
+     */
+    private readonly historyPageSize;
+    private hasOlderMessages;
+    private olderMessagesCursor;
+    private readonly knownServerMessageIds;
+    private loadOlderMessagesInFlight;
+    private historyGeneration;
     private devtoolsMounted;
     private readonly callbacksRef;
     constructor(options: ChatClientOptions<TTools, TContext, TInterrupts>);
@@ -470,6 +480,23 @@ export declare class ChatClient<TTools extends ReadonlyArray<AnyClientTool> = an
      * Get current messages
      */
     getMessages(): Array<UIMessage<TTools>>;
+    /**
+     * True when the last hydrate or older-page response said more messages exist.
+     */
+    getHasOlderMessages(): boolean;
+    /**
+     * Fetch the next older window and put it in front of the painted messages.
+     *
+     * No-op when there is no older page, no cursor, or a page load is already
+     * running. A network failure rejects and leaves the painted messages as they
+     * are; {@link getHasOlderMessages} stays true.
+     */
+    loadOlderMessages(): Promise<void>;
+    private resetHistoryPaging;
+    private applyHydrationPage;
+    private rememberServerMessageIds;
+    private rememberProcessorMessageIds;
+    private messagesForSend;
     /**
      * True when an interrupt (or another direct send) claimed the client during
      * a drain. Read via a method so cross-await mutations are not constant-folded

package/dist/esm/chat-client.js

@@ -235,6 +235,16 @@ var ChatClient = class {
 	/** Constructor inputs `attach()` needs on every re-attach, not just the first. */
 	rejoinRunId;
 	cachesMessages;
+	/**
+	* Newest-window size from `history.pageSize`. Only set when
+	* `persistence === true`.
+	*/
+	historyPageSize;
+	hasOlderMessages = false;
+	olderMessagesCursor;
+	knownServerMessageIds = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+	loadOlderMessagesInFlight = false;
+	historyGeneration = 0;
 	devtoolsMounted = false;
 	callbacksRef;
 	constructor(options) {
@@ -245,10 +255,12 @@ var ChatClient = class {
 		if (options.persistence === true) {
 			if (!options.threadId) throw new Error("[TanStack AI] persistence needs a stable `threadId` to key on. Pass a threadId from your app (for example support-42).");
 			cachesMessages = false;
+			this.historyPageSize = options.history?.pageSize;
 		} else if (options.persistence) {
 			if (!options.threadId) throw new Error("[TanStack AI] persistence needs a stable `threadId` to key on. Pass a threadId from your app (for example support-42).");
 			this.persistor = new ChatPersistor(options.persistence, options.threadId, (messages) => this.processor.setMessages(messages), (snapshot) => this.applyPersistedResume(snapshot));
-		}
+			this.historyPageSize = void 0;
+		} else this.historyPageSize = void 0;
 		this.bodyOption = options.body || {};
 		this.forwardedPropsOption = options.forwardedProps || {};
 		this.byok = options.byok;
@@ -506,16 +518,25 @@ var ChatClient = class {
 		if (!hydrate) return;
 		if (this.isLoading || this.abortController) return;
 		if (this.disposed) return;
+		const pageSize = this.historyPageSize;
+		const hydrateOptions = pageSize === void 0 ? void 0 : { limit: pageSize };
 		(async () => {
 			let result;
+			const generation = this.historyGeneration;
 			try {
-				result = await hydrate(this.threadId);
+				result = await hydrate(this.threadId, hydrateOptions);
 			} catch {
 				return;
 			}
+			if (generation !== this.historyGeneration) return;
 			if (this.disposed || !this.tailing) return;
 			if (this.isLoading || this.abortController) return;
-			if (result.messages.length > 0) this.processor.setMessages(normalizeMessagesDates(result.messages));
+			this.applyHydrationPage(result.page);
+			if (result.messages.length > 0) {
+				const windowMessages = normalizeMessagesDates(result.messages);
+				this.processor.setMessages(windowMessages);
+				this.rememberServerMessageIds(windowMessages);
+			}
 			if (result.interrupts && result.interrupts.pending.length > 0) this.applyResumeSnapshot({
 				resumeState: {
 					threadId: this.threadId,
@@ -1275,7 +1296,7 @@ var ChatClient = class {
 		let activeDevtoolsRunId = null;
 		let runTerminalEventEmitted = false;
 		try {
-			const messages = this.processor.getMessages();
+			const messages = this.messagesForSend(this.processor.getMessages());
 			const clientTools = new Map(this.clientToolsRef.current);
 			const runtimeContext = this.context;
 			await this.callbacksRef.current.onResponse();
@@ -1368,6 +1389,7 @@ var ChatClient = class {
 				}
 				await this.drainPostStreamActions();
 				if (streamCompletedSuccessfully) {
+					this.rememberProcessorMessageIds();
 					if (this.status !== "ready") this.setStatus("ready");
 					if (!this.messageQueueDraining) await this.drainQueue();
 				} else this.flushQueue();
@@ -1446,6 +1468,7 @@ var ChatClient = class {
 		} else if (this.activeRunIds.size > 0) this.resetSessionGenerating({ preserveClearedStreamTracking: true });
 		this.persistor?.beginClear();
 		this.processor.clearMessages();
+		this.resetHistoryPaging();
 		this.discardPendingSends();
 		this.persistor?.remove();
 		this.lastResume = null;
@@ -1586,6 +1609,79 @@ var ChatClient = class {
 		return this.processor.getMessages();
 	}
 	/**
+	* True when the last hydrate or older-page response said more messages exist.
+	*/
+	getHasOlderMessages() {
+		return this.hasOlderMessages;
+	}
+	/**
+	* Fetch the next older window and put it in front of the painted messages.
+	*
+	* No-op when there is no older page, no cursor, or a page load is already
+	* running. A network failure rejects and leaves the painted messages as they
+	* are; {@link getHasOlderMessages} stays true.
+	*/
+	async loadOlderMessages() {
+		const hydrate = this.connection.hydrate;
+		if (hydrate === void 0) return;
+		if (this.disposed) return;
+		if (!this.hasOlderMessages) return;
+		const cursor = this.olderMessagesCursor;
+		if (cursor === void 0) return;
+		if (this.loadOlderMessagesInFlight) return;
+		const hydrateOptions = { before: cursor };
+		if (this.historyPageSize !== void 0) hydrateOptions.limit = this.historyPageSize;
+		this.loadOlderMessagesInFlight = true;
+		const generation = this.historyGeneration;
+		try {
+			const result = await hydrate(this.threadId, hydrateOptions);
+			if (this.disposed) return;
+			if (generation !== this.historyGeneration) return;
+			const olderMessages = normalizeMessagesDates(result.messages);
+			if (olderMessages.length === 0) throw new Error("Older page was empty");
+			this.applyHydrationPage(result.page);
+			this.processor.prependMessages(olderMessages);
+			this.rememberServerMessageIds(olderMessages);
+		} finally {
+			this.loadOlderMessagesInFlight = false;
+		}
+	}
+	resetHistoryPaging() {
+		this.hasOlderMessages = false;
+		this.olderMessagesCursor = void 0;
+		this.knownServerMessageIds.clear();
+		this.historyGeneration++;
+	}
+	applyHydrationPage(page) {
+		if (page?.truncated === true) {
+			this.hasOlderMessages = true;
+			this.olderMessagesCursor = page.cursor;
+			return;
+		}
+		this.hasOlderMessages = false;
+		this.olderMessagesCursor = void 0;
+	}
+	rememberServerMessageIds(messages) {
+		const ids = messages.map((message) => message.id);
+		for (const id of ids) this.knownServerMessageIds.add(id);
+	}
+	rememberProcessorMessageIds() {
+		if (this.historyPageSize === void 0) return;
+		this.rememberServerMessageIds(this.processor.getMessages());
+	}
+	messagesForSend(messages) {
+		if (this.historyPageSize === void 0) return messages;
+		const unknownMessages = [];
+		for (const message of messages) {
+			if (this.knownServerMessageIds.has(message.id)) continue;
+			unknownMessages.push(message);
+		}
+		if (unknownMessages.length > 0) return unknownMessages;
+		const lastUserIndex = messages.findLastIndex((message) => message.role === "user");
+		if (lastUserIndex === -1) return [];
+		return messages.slice(lastUserIndex);
+	}
+	/**
 	* True when an interrupt (or another direct send) claimed the client during
 	* a drain. Read via a method so cross-await mutations are not constant-folded
 	* by control-flow analysis.