@tangle-network/agent-integrations 0.49.0 → 0.51.0

package/dist/index.js

@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ import {
   validateIntegrationManifest,
   validateProviderPassthroughRequest,
   verifyCapabilityToken
-} from "./chunk-XECSOZRL.js";
+} from "./chunk-DRBW2FXU.js";
 import {
   InMemoryConnectStateStore,
   finishConnectFlow,
@@ -160,14 +160,24 @@ import {
   validateCredentialFormat,
   validateCredentialSet,
   validateIntegrationSpec
-} from "./chunk-IA5GCKM6.js";
+} from "./chunk-BS6LGM3V.js";
 import {
   buildIntegrationCoverageConnectors,
   integrationCoverageChecklistMarkdown,
   listIntegrationCoverageSpecs
 } from "./chunk-7P2LN4VT.js";
-import "./chunk-376UBTNB.js";
+import "./chunk-P4FFI752.js";
 import {
+  bundledApiKeyHint,
+  bundledAuthMode,
+  bundledOAuth2Auth,
+  getBundledAdapterManifest,
+  hasBundledAdapter,
+  listBundledAdapterKinds,
+  listBundledAdapterManifests
+} from "./chunk-PUXYDSXI.js";
+import {
+  CONNECTOR_ADAPTER_FACTORIES,
   InMemoryOAuthFlowStore,
   TELEGRAM_FILE_DOWNLOAD_ROOT,
   _resetPendingFlowsForTests,
@@ -582,6 +592,7 @@ import {
   refreshAccessToken,
   reoonVerifierConnector,
   replyIoConnector,
+  resolveConnectorAdapterFactoryOptions,
   retableConnector,
   retellAiConnector,
   ringcentralConnector,
@@ -714,7 +725,7 @@ import {
   zohoDeskConnector,
   zoominfoConnector,
   zuoraConnector
-} from "./chunk-EV7PFUCM.js";
+} from "./chunk-XEJKVCXB.js";
 import {
   DEFAULT_SIGNATURE_TOLERANCE_SECONDS,
   firstHeader,
@@ -745,6 +756,7 @@ export {
   ACTIVEPIECES_PUBLIC_CATALOG_URL,
   ApprovalBackedPolicyEngine,
   CANONICAL_INTEGRATION_ACTIONS,
+  CONNECTOR_ADAPTER_FACTORIES,
   CredentialsExpired,
   DEFAULT_INTEGRATION_BRIDGE_ENV,
   DEFAULT_SIGNATURE_TOLERANCE_SECONDS,
@@ -871,6 +883,9 @@ export {
   buildTangleCatalogRuntimePackageManifest,
   buildTangleIntegrationCatalogConnectors,
   builtwithConnector,
+  bundledApiKeyHint,
+  bundledAuthMode,
+  bundledOAuth2Auth,
   calComConnector,
   calendarExercisePlannerManifest,
   calendlyConnector,
@@ -1030,6 +1045,7 @@ export {
   gameballConnector,
   geminiConnector,
   getActivepiecesOverride,
+  getBundledAdapterManifest,
   getIntegrationFamily,
   getIntegrationSpec,
   getresponseConnector,
@@ -1074,6 +1090,7 @@ export {
   guideliteConnector,
   gustoConnector,
   harvestConnector,
+  hasBundledAdapter,
   hashiCorpVaultConnector,
   hastewireConnector,
   healthcheckRequest,
@@ -1149,6 +1166,8 @@ export {
   linkaConnector,
   linkupConnector,
   listActivepiecesCatalogEntries,
+  listBundledAdapterKinds,
+  listBundledAdapterManifests,
   listExecutableIntegrationSpecs,
   listIntegrationCoverageSpecs,
   listIntegrationSpecs,
@@ -1299,6 +1318,7 @@ export {
   replyIoConnector,
   requireTangleAuth,
   resolveConnectionCredentials,
+  resolveConnectorAdapterFactoryOptions,
   resolveConnectorAuthSpec,
   resolveIntegrationApproval,
   retableConnector,

package/dist/mcp.js

@@ -2,15 +2,16 @@ import {
   IntegrationError,
   createCatalogExecutorProvider,
   importMcpConnector
-} from "./chunk-XECSOZRL.js";
+} from "./chunk-DRBW2FXU.js";
 import "./chunk-S2BUASSV.js";
 import "./chunk-LA76XB7M.js";
 import "./chunk-H4XYLS7T.js";
 import "./chunk-VLVSP7SP.js";
-import "./chunk-IA5GCKM6.js";
+import "./chunk-BS6LGM3V.js";
 import "./chunk-7P2LN4VT.js";
-import "./chunk-376UBTNB.js";
-import "./chunk-EV7PFUCM.js";
+import "./chunk-P4FFI752.js";
+import "./chunk-PUXYDSXI.js";
+import "./chunk-XEJKVCXB.js";
 import "./chunk-XC54EOUQ.js";
 import "./chunk-UWF33ESC.js";
 import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";

package/dist/mcp.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/mcp.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Live MCP connector — attach a remote MCP (Model Context Protocol) server\n * as an {@link IntegrationProvider}, so its tools flow through the same\n * catalog / grants / approvals machinery as every other connector instead of\n * forming a parallel, ungoverned tool path.\n *\n * Transport is Streamable HTTP only (single POST endpoint, JSON or SSE\n * response framing) — this package runs in edge workers, so stdio servers are\n * out of scope; front them with any HTTP-bridging MCP host.\n *\n * Discovery reuses {@link importMcpConnector}: `tools/list` output becomes an\n * `IntegrationConnector` whose per-action risk comes from MCP tool\n * annotations (readOnlyHint / destructiveHint) with a text-heuristic\n * fallback, so non-read MCP tools default to `approvalRequired` — fail-closed\n * against servers that don't annotate.\n *\n * Credentials: the server's auth header is supplied at construction by the\n * product (which owns secret storage) and held in memory only. Connection\n * rows carry no MCP secrets.\n */\n\nimport { IntegrationError } from './core-error.js'\nimport type {\n  IntegrationActionResult,\n  IntegrationActionRisk,\n  IntegrationConnector,\n  IntegrationConnectorCategory,\n  IntegrationDataClass,\n  IntegrationProvider,\n} from './core-types.js'\nimport { createCatalogExecutorProvider } from './catalog-executor.js'\nimport { importMcpConnector, type McpCatalogTool } from './importers.js'\n\n/** Protocol revision sent on `initialize` and the `MCP-Protocol-Version`\n *  header. Servers negotiate down from this. */\nexport const MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION = '2025-06-18'\n\nexport interface McpServerConfig {\n  /** The server's single Streamable-HTTP endpoint. */\n  url: string\n  /** Static request headers — typically `{ Authorization: 'Bearer …' }`.\n   *  Held in memory only; never persisted by this module. */\n  headers?: Record<string, string>\n  protocolVersion?: string\n  clientInfo?: { name: string; version: string }\n  /** Injectable for tests / custom egress policies (SSRF pinning). */\n  fetchImpl?: typeof fetch\n}\n\nexport interface McpToolCallResult {\n  /** MCP content blocks (text, image, resource, …) verbatim. */\n  content: unknown[]\n  isError: boolean\n  /** `structuredContent` from servers that return it. */\n  structured?: unknown\n}\n\ninterface JsonRpcResponse {\n  jsonrpc: '2.0'\n  id?: number | string | null\n  result?: unknown\n  error?: { code: number; message: string; data?: unknown }\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimal Streamable-HTTP MCP client: `initialize` handshake (capturing the\n * server's `Mcp-Session-Id`), paginated `tools/list`, and `tools/call`.\n * Lazily initializes on first use; safe to share across calls within an\n * isolate.\n */\nexport class McpHttpClient {\n  private nextId = 1\n  private sessionId: string | undefined\n  private negotiatedVersion: string | undefined\n  private initializing: Promise<void> | undefined\n\n  constructor(private readonly config: McpServerConfig) {}\n\n  private get fetchImpl(): typeof fetch {\n    return this.config.fetchImpl ?? fetch\n  }\n\n  private async post(body: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<JsonRpcResponse | undefined> {\n    const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n      'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n      Accept: 'application/json, text/event-stream',\n      ...(this.config.headers ?? {}),\n    }\n    const version = this.negotiatedVersion ?? this.config.protocolVersion ?? MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION\n    headers['MCP-Protocol-Version'] = version\n    if (this.sessionId) headers['Mcp-Session-Id'] = this.sessionId\n\n    let response: Response\n    try {\n      response = await this.fetchImpl(this.config.url, {\n        method: 'POST',\n        headers,\n        body: JSON.stringify(body),\n      })\n    } catch (error) {\n      throw new IntegrationError(\n        `MCP server unreachable: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`,\n        'provider_failure',\n      )\n    }\n    const session = response.headers.get('mcp-session-id')\n    if (session) this.sessionId = session\n\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      throw new IntegrationError(`MCP server returned HTTP ${response.status}`, 'provider_failure')\n    }\n    // Notifications get 202/204 with no body.\n    if (body.id === undefined) return undefined\n    const contentType = response.headers.get('content-type') ?? ''\n    const text = await response.text()\n    const message = contentType.includes('text/event-stream')\n      ? findSseResponse(text, body.id as number)\n      : (JSON.parse(text) as JsonRpcResponse)\n    if (!message) {\n      throw new IntegrationError('MCP server response missing a result for the request', 'provider_failure')\n    }\n    if (message.error) {\n      throw new IntegrationError(`MCP error ${message.error.code}: ${message.error.message}`, 'provider_failure')\n    }\n    return message\n  }\n\n  private async request(method: string, params?: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<unknown> {\n    const response = await this.post({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: this.nextId++, method, ...(params ? { params } : {}) })\n    return response?.result\n  }\n\n  /** Idempotent handshake; concurrent callers share one in-flight init. */\n  async initialize(): Promise<void> {\n    if (this.negotiatedVersion) return\n    this.initializing ??= (async () => {\n      const result = (await this.request('initialize', {\n        protocolVersion: this.config.protocolVersion ?? MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION,\n        capabilities: {},\n        clientInfo: this.config.clientInfo ?? { name: 'tangle-agent-integrations', version: '1' },\n      })) as { protocolVersion?: string } | undefined\n      this.negotiatedVersion = result?.protocolVersion ?? this.config.protocolVersion ?? MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION\n      await this.post({ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'notifications/initialized' })\n    })().catch((error) => {\n      this.initializing = undefined\n      throw error\n    })\n    await this.initializing\n  }\n\n  /** Full tool catalog, following `nextCursor` pagination. */\n  async listTools(): Promise<McpCatalogTool[]> {\n    await this.initialize()\n    const tools: McpCatalogTool[] = []\n    let cursor: string | undefined\n    do {\n      const result = (await this.request('tools/list', cursor ? { cursor } : {})) as\n        | { tools?: McpCatalogTool[]; nextCursor?: string }\n        | undefined\n      tools.push(...(result?.tools ?? []))\n      cursor = result?.nextCursor\n    } while (cursor)\n    return tools\n  }\n\n  async callTool(name: string, args: unknown): Promise<McpToolCallResult> {\n    await this.initialize()\n    const result = (await this.request('tools/call', { name, arguments: args ?? {} })) as\n      | { content?: unknown[]; isError?: boolean; structuredContent?: unknown }\n      | undefined\n    return {\n      content: result?.content ?? [],\n      isError: result?.isError === true,\n      structured: result?.structuredContent,\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface CreateMcpProviderOptions {\n  /** Provider id, unique within the hub (e.g. `mcp:linear`). */\n  id: string\n  server: McpServerConfig\n  connectorId: string\n  connectorTitle: string\n  category?: IntegrationConnectorCategory\n  scopes?: string[]\n  dataClass?: IntegrationDataClass\n  /** Risk for tools whose annotations/name don't classify them. 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A tool\n * result with `isError` maps to `{ ok: false }` (the model sees the failure\n * content); transport and JSON-RPC failures throw {@link IntegrationError}.\n */\nexport async function createMcpProvider(options: CreateMcpProviderOptions): Promise<IntegrationProvider> {\n  const client = new McpHttpClient(options.server)\n  const connector = await discoverMcpConnector(client, options)\n  return createCatalogExecutorProvider({\n    id: options.id,\n    kind: 'mcp',\n    connectors: [connector],\n    async executeAction({ request, action }): Promise<IntegrationActionResult> {\n      const result = await client.callTool(action.id, request.input)\n      return {\n        ok: !result.isError,\n        action: action.id,\n        output: result.structured ?? result.content,\n        metadata: { mcp: true, ...(result.isError ? { isError: true } : {}) },\n      }\n    },\n  })\n}\n\nfunction findSseResponse(body: string, id: number): JsonRpcResponse | undefined {\n  for (const event of body.split(/\\n\\n/)) {\n    const data = event\n      .split('\\n')\n      .filter((line) => line.startsWith('data:'))\n      .map((line) => line.slice(5).trim())\n      .join('')\n    if (!data) continue\n    try {\n      const parsed = JSON.parse(data) as JsonRpcResponse\n      if (parsed.id === id) return parsed\n    } catch {\n      // non-JSON SSE frame (keepalive/comment) — skip\n    }\n  }\n  return undefined\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAmCO,IAAM,uBAAuB;AAmC7B,IAAM,gBAAN,MAAoB;AAAA,EAMzB,YAA6B,QAAyB;AAAzB;AAAA,EAA0B;AAAA,EAA1B;AAAA,EALrB,SAAS;AAAA,EACT;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EAIR,IAAY,YAA0B;AACpC,WAAO,KAAK,OAAO,aAAa;AAAA,EAClC;AAAA,EAEA,MAAc,KAAK,MAAqE;AACtF,UAAM,UAAkC;AAAA,MACtC,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,GAAI,KAAK,OAAO,WAAW,CAAC;AAAA,IAC9B;AACA,UAAM,UAAU,KAAK,qBAAqB,KAAK,OAAO,mBAAmB;AACzE,YAAQ,sBAAsB,IAAI;AAClC,QAAI,KAAK,UAAW,SAAQ,gBAAgB,IAAI,KAAK;AAErD,QAAI;AACJ,QAAI;AACF,iBAAW,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,QAC/C,QAAQ;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,IAAI;AAAA,MAC3B,CAAC;AAAA,IACH,SAAS,OAAO;AACd,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR,2BAA2B,iBAAiB,QAAQ,MAAM,UAAU,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,QACjF;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AACA,UAAM,UAAU,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI,gBAAgB;AACrD,QAAI,QAAS,MAAK,YAAY;AAE9B,QAAI,CAAC,SAAS,IAAI;AAChB,YAAM,IAAI,iBAAiB,4BAA4B,SAAS,MAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAC9F;AAEA,QAAI,KAAK,OAAO,OAAW,QAAO;AAClC,UAAM,cAAc,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI,cAAc,KAAK;AAC5D,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK;AACjC,UAAM,UAAU,YAAY,SAAS,mBAAmB,IACpD,gBAAgB,MAAM,KAAK,EAAY,IACtC,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AACpB,QAAI,CAAC,SAAS;AACZ,YAAM,IAAI,iBAAiB,wDAAwD,kBAAkB;AAAA,IACvG;AACA,QAAI,QAAQ,OAAO;AACjB,YAAM,IAAI,iBAAiB,aAAa,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM,OAAO,IAAI,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAC5G;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA,EAEA,MAAc,QAAQ,QAAgB,QAAoD;AACxF,UAAM,WAAW,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,UAAU,QAAQ,GAAI,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,EAAG,CAAC;AAC7G,WAAO,UAAU;AAAA,EACnB;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA,MAAM,aAA4B;AAChC,QAAI,KAAK,kBAAmB;AAC5B,SAAK,kBAAkB,YAAY;AACjC,YAAM,SAAU,MAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,cAAc;AAAA,QAC/C,iBAAiB,KAAK,OAAO,mBAAmB;AAAA,QAChD,cAAc,CAAC;AAAA,QACf,YAAY,KAAK,OAAO,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,6BAA6B,SAAS,IAAI;AAAA,MAC1F,CAAC;AACD,WAAK,oBAAoB,QAAQ,mBAAmB,KAAK,OAAO,mBAAmB;AACnF,YAAM,KAAK,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,4BAA4B,CAAC;AAAA,IACzE,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU;AACpB,WAAK,eAAe;AACpB,YAAM;AAAA,IACR,CAAC;AACD,UAAM,KAAK;AAAA,EACb;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA,MAAM,YAAuC;AAC3C,UAAM,KAAK,WAAW;AACtB,UAAM,QAA0B,CAAC;AACjC,QAAI;AACJ,OAAG;AACD,YAAM,SAAU,MAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,cAAc,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;AAGzE,YAAM,KAAK,GAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,CAAC,CAAE;AACnC,eAAS,QAAQ;AAAA,IACnB,SAAS;AACT,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,SAAS,MAAc,MAA2C;AACtE,UAAM,KAAK,WAAW;AACtB,UAAM,SAAU,MAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;AAGhF,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,SAAS,QAAQ,WAAW,CAAC;AAAA,MAC7B,SAAS,QAAQ,YAAY;AAAA,MAC7B,YAAY,QAAQ;AAAA,IACtB;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAiBA,eAAsB,qBACpB,QACA,SAC+B;AAC/B,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU;AACrC,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,EAAE,MAAM;AAAA,IACR;AAAA,MACE,YAAY,QAAQ;AAAA,MACpB,aAAa,QAAQ;AAAA,MACrB,gBAAgB,QAAQ;AAAA,MACxB,UAAU,QAAQ;AAAA,MAClB,MAAM;AAAA,MACN,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAAA,MAChB,WAAW,QAAQ;AAAA,MACnB,aAAa,QAAQ,eAAe;AAAA,IACtC;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAQA,eAAsB,kBAAkB,SAAiE;AACvG,QAAM,SAAS,IAAI,cAAc,QAAQ,MAAM;AAC/C,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM,qBAAqB,QAAQ,OAAO;AAC5D,SAAO,8BAA8B;AAAA,IACnC,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,IACZ,MAAM;AAAA,IACN,YAAY,CAAC,SAAS;AAAA,IACtB,MAAM,cAAc,EAAE,SAAS,OAAO,GAAqC;AACzE,YAAM,SAAS,MAAM,OAAO,SAAS,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,KAAK;AAC7D,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO;AAAA,QACZ,QAAQ,OAAO;AAAA,QACf,QAAQ,OAAO,cAAc,OAAO;AAAA,QACpC,UAAU,EAAE,KAAK,MAAM,GAAI,OAAO,UAAU,EAAE,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC,EAAG;AAAA,MACtE;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF,CAAC;AACH;AAEA,SAAS,gBAAgB,MAAc,IAAyC;AAC9E,aAAW,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG;AACtC,UAAM,OAAO,MACV,MAAM,IAAI,EACV,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,KAAK,WAAW,OAAO,CAAC,EACzC,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,EAClC,KAAK,EAAE;AACV,QAAI,CAAC,KAAM;AACX,QAAI;AACF,YAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AAC9B,UAAI,OAAO,OAAO,GAAI,QAAO;AAAA,IAC/B,QAAQ;AAAA,IAER;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/mcp.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Live MCP connector — attach a remote MCP (Model Context Protocol) server\n * as an {@link IntegrationProvider}, so its tools flow through the same\n * catalog / grants / approvals machinery as every other connector instead of\n * forming a parallel, ungoverned tool path.\n *\n * Transport is Streamable HTTP only (single POST endpoint, JSON or SSE\n * response framing) — this package runs in edge workers, so stdio servers are\n * out of scope; front them with any HTTP-bridging MCP host.\n *\n * Discovery reuses {@link importMcpConnector}: `tools/list` output becomes an\n * `IntegrationConnector` whose per-action risk comes from MCP tool\n * annotations (readOnlyHint / destructiveHint) with a text-heuristic\n * fallback, so non-read MCP tools default to `approvalRequired` — fail-closed\n * against servers that don't annotate.\n *\n * Credentials: the server's auth header is supplied at construction by the\n * product (which owns secret storage) and held in memory only. Connection\n * rows carry no MCP secrets.\n */\n\nimport { IntegrationError } from './core-error.js'\nimport type {\n  IntegrationActionResult,\n  IntegrationActionRisk,\n  IntegrationConnector,\n  IntegrationConnectorCategory,\n  IntegrationDataClass,\n  IntegrationProvider,\n} from './core-types.js'\nimport { createCatalogExecutorProvider } from './catalog-executor.js'\nimport { importMcpConnector, type McpCatalogTool } from './importers.js'\n\n/** Protocol revision sent on `initialize` and the `MCP-Protocol-Version`\n *  header. Servers negotiate down from this. */\nexport const MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION = '2025-06-18'\n\nexport interface McpServerConfig {\n  /** The server's single Streamable-HTTP endpoint. */\n  url: string\n  /** Static request headers — typically `{ Authorization: 'Bearer …' }`.\n   *  Held in memory only; never persisted by this module. */\n  headers?: Record<string, string>\n  protocolVersion?: string\n  clientInfo?: { name: string; version: string }\n  /** Injectable for tests / custom egress policies (SSRF pinning). */\n  fetchImpl?: typeof fetch\n}\n\nexport interface McpToolCallResult {\n  /** MCP content blocks (text, image, resource, …) verbatim. */\n  content: unknown[]\n  isError: boolean\n  /** `structuredContent` from servers that return it. */\n  structured?: unknown\n}\n\ninterface JsonRpcResponse {\n  jsonrpc: '2.0'\n  id?: number | string | null\n  result?: unknown\n  error?: { code: number; message: string; data?: unknown }\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimal Streamable-HTTP MCP client: `initialize` handshake (capturing the\n * server's `Mcp-Session-Id`), paginated `tools/list`, and `tools/call`.\n * Lazily initializes on first use; safe to share across calls within an\n * isolate.\n */\nexport class McpHttpClient {\n  private nextId = 1\n  private sessionId: string | undefined\n  private negotiatedVersion: string | undefined\n  private initializing: Promise<void> | undefined\n\n  constructor(private readonly config: McpServerConfig) {}\n\n  private get fetchImpl(): typeof fetch {\n    return this.config.fetchImpl ?? fetch\n  }\n\n  private async post(body: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<JsonRpcResponse | undefined> {\n    const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n      'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n      Accept: 'application/json, text/event-stream',\n      ...(this.config.headers ?? {}),\n    }\n    const version = this.negotiatedVersion ?? this.config.protocolVersion ?? MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION\n    headers['MCP-Protocol-Version'] = version\n    if (this.sessionId) headers['Mcp-Session-Id'] = this.sessionId\n\n    let response: Response\n    try {\n      response = await this.fetchImpl(this.config.url, {\n        method: 'POST',\n        headers,\n        body: JSON.stringify(body),\n      })\n    } catch (error) {\n      throw new IntegrationError(\n        `MCP server unreachable: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`,\n        'provider_failure',\n      )\n    }\n    const session = response.headers.get('mcp-session-id')\n    if (session) this.sessionId = session\n\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      throw new IntegrationError(`MCP server returned HTTP ${response.status}`, 'provider_failure')\n    }\n    // Notifications get 202/204 with no body.\n    if (body.id === undefined) return undefined\n    const contentType = response.headers.get('content-type') ?? ''\n    const text = await response.text()\n    const message = contentType.includes('text/event-stream')\n      ? findSseResponse(text, body.id as number)\n      : (JSON.parse(text) as JsonRpcResponse)\n    if (!message) {\n      throw new IntegrationError('MCP server response missing a result for the request', 'provider_failure')\n    }\n    if (message.error) {\n      throw new IntegrationError(`MCP error ${message.error.code}: ${message.error.message}`, 'provider_failure')\n    }\n    return message\n  }\n\n  private async request(method: string, params?: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<unknown> {\n    const response = await this.post({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: this.nextId++, method, ...(params ? { params } : {}) })\n    return response?.result\n  }\n\n  /** Idempotent handshake; concurrent callers share one in-flight init. */\n  async initialize(): Promise<void> {\n    if (this.negotiatedVersion) return\n    this.initializing ??= (async () => {\n      const result = (await this.request('initialize', {\n        protocolVersion: this.config.protocolVersion ?? MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION,\n        capabilities: {},\n        clientInfo: this.config.clientInfo ?? { name: 'tangle-agent-integrations', version: '1' },\n      })) as { protocolVersion?: string } | undefined\n      this.negotiatedVersion = result?.protocolVersion ?? this.config.protocolVersion ?? MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION\n      await this.post({ jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'notifications/initialized' })\n    })().catch((error) => {\n      this.initializing = undefined\n      throw error\n    })\n    await this.initializing\n  }\n\n  /** Full tool catalog, following `nextCursor` pagination. */\n  async listTools(): Promise<McpCatalogTool[]> {\n    await this.initialize()\n    const tools: McpCatalogTool[] = []\n    let cursor: string | undefined\n    do {\n      const result = (await this.request('tools/list', cursor ? { cursor } : {})) as\n        | { tools?: McpCatalogTool[]; nextCursor?: string }\n        | undefined\n      tools.push(...(result?.tools ?? []))\n      cursor = result?.nextCursor\n    } while (cursor)\n    return tools\n  }\n\n  async callTool(name: string, args: unknown): Promise<McpToolCallResult> {\n    await this.initialize()\n    const result = (await this.request('tools/call', { name, arguments: args ?? {} })) as\n      | { content?: unknown[]; isError?: boolean; structuredContent?: unknown }\n      | undefined\n    return {\n      content: result?.content ?? [],\n      isError: result?.isError === true,\n      structured: result?.structuredContent,\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface CreateMcpProviderOptions {\n  /** Provider id, unique within the hub (e.g. `mcp:linear`). */\n  id: string\n  server: McpServerConfig\n  connectorId: string\n  connectorTitle: string\n  category?: IntegrationConnectorCategory\n  scopes?: string[]\n  dataClass?: IntegrationDataClass\n  /** Risk for tools whose annotations/name don't classify them. Defaults to\n   *  'write' (⇒ approvalRequired) — fail-closed. */\n  defaultRisk?: IntegrationActionRisk\n}\n\n/** Discover a live MCP server's tools as an {@link IntegrationConnector}. */\nexport async function discoverMcpConnector(\n  client: McpHttpClient,\n  options: CreateMcpProviderOptions,\n): Promise<IntegrationConnector> {\n  const tools = await client.listTools()\n  return importMcpConnector(\n    { tools },\n    {\n      providerId: options.id,\n      connectorId: options.connectorId,\n      connectorTitle: options.connectorTitle,\n      category: options.category,\n      auth: 'custom',\n      scopes: options.scopes,\n      dataClass: options.dataClass,\n      defaultRisk: options.defaultRisk ?? 'write',\n    },\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an {@link IntegrationProvider} over one remote MCP server: live\n * `tools/list` discovery at construction, `tools/call` on invoke. 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package/dist/registry.js

@@ -5,15 +5,16 @@ import {
   composeIntegrationRegistry,
   inferIntegrationSupportTier,
   summarizeIntegrationRegistry
-} from "./chunk-XECSOZRL.js";
+} from "./chunk-DRBW2FXU.js";
 import "./chunk-S2BUASSV.js";
 import "./chunk-LA76XB7M.js";
 import "./chunk-H4XYLS7T.js";
 import "./chunk-VLVSP7SP.js";
-import "./chunk-IA5GCKM6.js";
+import "./chunk-BS6LGM3V.js";
 import "./chunk-7P2LN4VT.js";
-import "./chunk-376UBTNB.js";
-import "./chunk-EV7PFUCM.js";
+import "./chunk-P4FFI752.js";
+import "./chunk-PUXYDSXI.js";
+import "./chunk-XEJKVCXB.js";
 import "./chunk-XC54EOUQ.js";
 import "./chunk-UWF33ESC.js";
 import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";

package/dist/runtime.js

@@ -2,15 +2,16 @@ import {
   InMemoryIntegrationGrantStore,
   IntegrationRuntime,
   createIntegrationRuntime
-} from "./chunk-XECSOZRL.js";
+} from "./chunk-DRBW2FXU.js";
 import "./chunk-S2BUASSV.js";
 import "./chunk-LA76XB7M.js";
 import "./chunk-H4XYLS7T.js";
 import "./chunk-VLVSP7SP.js";
-import "./chunk-IA5GCKM6.js";
+import "./chunk-BS6LGM3V.js";
 import "./chunk-7P2LN4VT.js";
-import "./chunk-376UBTNB.js";
-import "./chunk-EV7PFUCM.js";
+import "./chunk-P4FFI752.js";
+import "./chunk-PUXYDSXI.js";
+import "./chunk-XEJKVCXB.js";
 import "./chunk-XC54EOUQ.js";
 import "./chunk-UWF33ESC.js";
 import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";

package/dist/specs.d.ts

@@ -23,8 +23,19 @@ interface IntegrationSpec {
 type IntegrationAuthSpec = OAuth2AuthSpec | ApiKeyAuthSpec | HmacAuthSpec | NoneAuthSpec | CustomAuthSpec;
 interface OAuth2AuthSpec {
     mode: 'oauth2';
-    authorizationUrl: string;
-    tokenUrl: string;
+    /** Authorization endpoint the connect flow sends the user to.
+     *
+     *  UNDEFINED when no shipped adapter and no family default supplies one —
+     *  i.e. the catalog knows the integration exists but nothing can currently
+     *  authenticate it. Callers must treat undefined as "not connectable" and
+     *  say so; this field was previously filled with
+     *  `https://example.invalid/<kind>/authorize`, a reserved TLD that can
+     *  never resolve, which made unconnectable integrations indistinguishable
+     *  from working ones. */
+    authorizationUrl?: string;
+    /** Token endpoint. Undefined under the same condition as
+     *  {@link authorizationUrl}. */
+    tokenUrl?: string;
     clientIdEnv?: string;
     clientSecretEnv?: string;
     scopes: ScopeDescriptor[];

package/dist/specs.js

@@ -16,8 +16,12 @@ import {
   validateCredentialFormat,
   validateCredentialSet,
   validateIntegrationSpec
-} from "./chunk-IA5GCKM6.js";
+} from "./chunk-BS6LGM3V.js";
 import "./chunk-7P2LN4VT.js";
+import "./chunk-PUXYDSXI.js";
+import "./chunk-XEJKVCXB.js";
+import "./chunk-XC54EOUQ.js";
+import "./chunk-UWF33ESC.js";
 import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 export {
   INTEGRATION_FAMILIES,

package/dist/webhooks/index.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import { W as WebhookProvider } from '../router-ddcgTV2y.js';
 export { S as SignatureVerification, T as TriggerEventCatalog, a as TriggerEventDescriptor, b as WebhookEnvelope, c as WebhookHeaders, d as WebhookIdempotencyStore, e as WebhookRouter, f as WebhookRouterOptions, g as WebhookRouterRequest, h as WebhookRouterResponse } from '../router-ddcgTV2y.js';
+export { InboundEmailPayload } from '../conversation-events/index.js';
 
 /**
  * Pre-built `WebhookProvider` implementations for the inbound surfaces
@@ -21,33 +22,6 @@ declare const stripeWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider;
 declare const slackWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider;
 /** DocuSeal webhook provider. Signature header `X-Docuseal-Signature`. */
 declare const docusealWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider;
-/** The normalized inbound-email payload the Tangle email edge posts and this
- *  provider surfaces on `WebhookEnvelope.payload`. `to` is the owner-resolution
- *  key — the platform matches it to a connection's provisioned inbound address;
- *  `messageId` is the idempotency key. */
-interface InboundEmailPayload {
-    /** RFC5322 Message-ID. */
-    messageId?: string;
-    /** Envelope sender — the firm/customer that emailed in. */
-    from: string;
-    /** The provisioned inbound address the message was delivered to (owner key). */
-    to: string;
-    subject?: string;
-    text?: string;
-    html?: string;
-    /** Selected headers the edge forwards (Reply-To, In-Reply-To, References…). */
-    headers?: Record<string, string>;
-    attachments?: Array<{
-        filename?: string;
-        contentType?: string;
-        /** Bytes as base64, OR a `url`/path the edge staged them at (large files). */
-        contentBase64?: string;
-        url?: string;
-        size?: number;
-    }>;
-    /** Epoch ms the edge received the message. */
-    receivedAt?: number;
-}
 /** Tangle inbound-email provider. Our own Cloudflare Email Routing worker parses
  *  the MIME, JSON-serializes it, timestamped-HMAC signs it with the
  *  per-connection secret, and POSTs it here — there is no upstream mail-vendor
@@ -99,4 +73,4 @@ declare function genericHmacWebhookProvider(options: {
     parse?: WebhookProvider['parse'];
 }): WebhookProvider;
 
-export { type InboundEmailPayload, WebhookProvider, clayWebhookProvider, docusealWebhookProvider, emailWebhookProvider, gdriveWebhookProvider, genericHmacWebhookProvider, gmailWebhookProvider, hellosignWebhookProvider, slackWebhookProvider, stripeWebhookProvider, telegramWebhookProvider };
+export { WebhookProvider, clayWebhookProvider, docusealWebhookProvider, emailWebhookProvider, gdriveWebhookProvider, genericHmacWebhookProvider, gmailWebhookProvider, hellosignWebhookProvider, slackWebhookProvider, stripeWebhookProvider, telegramWebhookProvider };

package/dist/webhooks/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/webhooks/router.ts","../../src/webhooks/providers.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @stable Provider-agnostic inbound webhook router.\n *\n * Consumer hooks a single HTTP handler at `/webhook/:provider/:event`\n * (or whatever pathing they prefer) and forwards the request through\n * `WebhookRouter.handle()`. The router:\n *\n *   1. Resolves the registered provider entry.\n *   2. Calls the provider's `verifySignature(rawBody, headers, secrets)`.\n *      Failure → 401 fast, no downstream work.\n *   3. Calls the provider's `parse(rawBody, headers)` to extract zero or\n *      more normalized events.\n *   4. Enqueues each event for async processing via the consumer-supplied\n *      `deliver(event)` callback (best-effort fire-and-forget — the\n *      router does NOT block the HTTP response on the consumer's work).\n *   5. Returns 200 fast with `{received: events.length}`.\n *\n * Replay protection: providers that sign timestamps (Stripe, Slack)\n * already reject stale signatures inside `verifySignature`. For providers\n * that don't (DocuSeal, GDrive push), the router exposes a pluggable\n * `idempotency` hook: if `idempotency.seen(providerEventId)` returns\n * true, the router 200s without invoking `deliver()`. Consumers wire\n * this to a durable kv (D1 / Redis / Postgres unique-index).\n *\n * Why a router and not a per-provider express app: the runtime contract\n * a product cares about is \"an inbound event came in, here's the\n * normalized envelope\". Verification, parsing, and idempotency-dedup\n * are mechanical and provider-specific — the router owns them. The\n * consumer's `deliver()` is the only place product logic runs.\n *\n * Stability: `@stable` — additions to `WebhookEnvelope` must be\n * additive; the router's HTTP contract (paths, status codes) is frozen\n * at 200 (ok), 400 (bad request), 401 (bad signature), 404 (unknown\n * provider), 405 (provider has no inbound surface).\n */\n\nexport interface WebhookHeaders {\n  [name: string]: string | string[] | undefined\n}\n\n/** Normalized inbound event the router emits after parsing. */\nexport interface WebhookEnvelope<TPayload = unknown> {\n  /** Provider id (matches the `:provider` path segment). */\n  provider: string\n  /** Optional event class — e.g., 'customer.subscription.deleted'. The\n   *  provider's parser decides. Used for routing inside `deliver()`. */\n  eventType: string\n  /** Provider-emitted event id, when present. Used for the idempotency\n   *  short-circuit. */\n  providerEventId?: string\n  /** Wall-clock receive time. */\n  receivedAt: number\n  /** Provider payload, normalized to the provider's documented event\n   *  shape. The router does NOT reshape this — `parse()` is the contract. */\n  payload: TPayload\n  /** Headers passed through for downstream handlers that want them\n   *  (e.g., to extract custom routing metadata). Always lowercased keys. */\n  headers: Record<string, string>\n}\n\nexport type SignatureVerification =\n  | { valid: true }\n  | { valid: false; reason: string }\n\n/** One declared triggerable event, in the runtime `eventType` namespace a\n *  provider's `parse` emits. */\nexport interface TriggerEventDescriptor {\n  /** The `eventType` a workflow `provider_event` trigger matches on\n   *  (`slack.app_mention`, `charge.succeeded`). */\n  id: string\n  /** Short human label for authoring surfaces; optional. */\n  title?: string\n}\n\n/** The set of events a provider can deliver, for author-time validation of\n *  workflow `provider_event` triggers. Co-located with the provider's `parse`\n *  (the source of the runtime namespace) so the two cannot drift — see the\n *  per-provider drift tests. Consumers validate an authored event with two\n *  checks: it must carry `namespace` (a prefix-less event on a namespaced\n *  provider can never be delivered), and — only when `closed` — be one of\n *  `events` (an exhaustive set makes an unlisted event an authoring error). */\nexport interface TriggerEventCatalog {\n  /** Required prefix every `parse`-emitted `eventType` carries (`slack.`,\n   *  `telegram.`), or `null` when the provider emits raw event names (stripe). */\n  namespace: string | null\n  /** Declared events. Exhaustive iff `closed`; otherwise authoring hints for an\n   *  open, provider-owned vocabulary. */\n  events: readonly TriggerEventDescriptor[]\n  /** True when `events` is the COMPLETE deliverable set, so an event outside it\n   *  is rejected. False when the provider owns an open-ended vocabulary it keeps\n   *  adding to (Stripe's ~250 types, Slack's Events API) and only `namespace`\n   *  can be authoritatively enforced. */\n  closed: boolean\n}\n\n/** Per-provider plug-in. Stateless — the router calls `verifySignature`\n *  then `parse` on every request. The provider's HTTP-shape concerns\n *  (e.g., raw body required) are documented per provider. */\nexport interface WebhookProvider {\n  /** Stable provider id (`stripe`, `docuseal`, `gdrive`, ...). */\n  id: string\n  /** Verify the inbound signature. Receives the EXACT raw body string —\n   *  consumers MUST preserve raw bytes through their HTTP server (do not\n   *  parse JSON before forwarding here). */\n  verifySignature(input: {\n    rawBody: string\n    headers: WebhookHeaders\n    secret: string\n  }): SignatureVerification\n  /** Parse the validated raw body into zero or more normalized events.\n   *  A single push payload may carry multiple events (e.g., Slack bulk\n   *  delivery). Return [] to ack the push as a no-op. */\n  parse(input: {\n    rawBody: string\n    headers: WebhookHeaders\n    now?: number\n  }): WebhookEnvelope[] | Promise<WebhookEnvelope[]>\n  /** Optional provider-specific 200 ACK the router returns on a verified\n   *  delivery, in place of the default `{ received, total }` JSON. Dropbox Sign\n   *  acknowledges a delivery only when the body is exactly\n   *  'Hello API Event Received' and retries otherwise; this lets such a\n   *  provider declare the body/headers it needs. The frozen status contract is\n   *  unchanged — only the 200 body/headers are customized. */\n  successResponse?: { body: string; headers?: Record<string, string> }\n  /** Declared triggerable-event catalog, for author-time validation of workflow\n   *  `provider_event` triggers. Optional: a provider without one is left\n   *  unvalidated by consumers (the trigger still installs). */\n  eventCatalog?: TriggerEventCatalog\n}\n\nexport interface WebhookIdempotencyStore {\n  /** Returns true if this providerEventId has been processed already.\n   *  Implementations should be O(1) (Redis SETNX, D1 UNIQUE constraint). */\n  seen(providerEventId: string): Promise<boolean> | boolean\n  /** Marks a providerEventId as processed. Called AFTER `deliver()` has\n   *  been invoked. */\n  remember(providerEventId: string, ttlMs: number): Promise<void> | void\n}\n\nexport interface WebhookRouterOptions {\n  /** Provider registry. Pass any number of providers; routing is by id. */\n  providers: WebhookProvider[]\n  /** Async callback invoked with every accepted event. Fire-and-forget\n   *  from the router's perspective — the HTTP response is sent before\n   *  this resolves. Throws are caught and reported via `onError`. */\n  deliver(event: WebhookEnvelope): Promise<void> | void\n  /** Resolve the signing secret for a provider id at request time. The\n   *  router never holds secrets — the consumer's vault resolves them. */\n  resolveSecret(providerId: string, headers: WebhookHeaders): Promise<string | null> | string | null\n  /** Optional idempotency-dedup hook. Required for providers that don't\n   *  sign timestamps in their signature scheme (DocuSeal, Drive push). */\n  idempotency?: WebhookIdempotencyStore\n  /** TTL on idempotency entries. Default 7 days — long enough that a\n   *  provider's normal retry-window can't re-deliver. */\n  idempotencyTtlMs?: number\n  /** Surface delivery errors. Default: console.error. */\n  onError?(err: unknown, context: { provider: string; eventType?: string; providerEventId?: string }): void\n  /** Override `now()` for tests. */\n  now?(): number\n}\n\nexport interface WebhookRouterRequest {\n  providerId: string\n  rawBody: string\n  headers: WebhookHeaders\n}\n\nexport interface WebhookRouterResponse {\n  status: number\n  body: unknown\n  headers?: Record<string, string>\n}\n\n/**\n * Router instance. Stateless aside from the provider registry — safe to\n * share across requests; build once per process.\n */\nexport class WebhookRouter {\n  private readonly providers: Map<string, WebhookProvider>\n  private readonly deliver: WebhookRouterOptions['deliver']\n  private readonly resolveSecret: WebhookRouterOptions['resolveSecret']\n  private readonly idempotency?: WebhookIdempotencyStore\n  private readonly idempotencyTtlMs: number\n  private readonly onError: NonNullable<WebhookRouterOptions['onError']>\n  private readonly nowFn: () => number\n\n  constructor(opts: WebhookRouterOptions) {\n    this.providers = new Map(opts.providers.map((p) => [p.id, p]))\n    this.deliver = opts.deliver\n    this.resolveSecret = opts.resolveSecret\n    this.idempotency = opts.idempotency\n    this.idempotencyTtlMs = opts.idempotencyTtlMs ?? 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000\n    this.onError = opts.onError ?? defaultOnError\n    this.nowFn = opts.now ?? Date.now\n  }\n\n  /** Process one inbound webhook request. Pure with respect to side-\n   *  effects on the router instance — safe to call concurrently. */\n  async handle(request: WebhookRouterRequest): Promise<WebhookRouterResponse> {\n    const provider = this.providers.get(request.providerId)\n    if (!provider) {\n      return { status: 404, body: { error: 'unknown_provider', provider: request.providerId } }\n    }\n    const secret = await this.resolveSecret(provider.id, request.headers)\n    if (!secret) {\n      return { status: 401, body: { error: 'missing_secret', provider: provider.id } }\n    }\n    const verification = provider.verifySignature({\n      rawBody: request.rawBody,\n      headers: request.headers,\n      secret,\n    })\n    if (!verification.valid) {\n      return { status: 401, body: { error: 'invalid_signature', reason: verification.reason } }\n    }\n\n    let events: WebhookEnvelope[]\n    try {\n      events = await provider.parse({ rawBody: request.rawBody, headers: request.headers, now: this.nowFn() })\n    } catch (err) {\n      this.onError(err, { provider: provider.id })\n      return { status: 400, body: { error: 'parse_error', message: errMessage(err) } }\n    }\n\n    const accepted: WebhookEnvelope[] = []\n    for (const event of events) {\n      if (event.providerEventId && this.idempotency) {\n        const already = await this.idempotency.seen(event.providerEventId)\n        if (already) continue\n      }\n      accepted.push(event)\n    }\n\n    // Deliver async — do NOT block the HTTP response. Errors land in\n    // `onError`; the provider already got its 200 by then so it will\n    // not retry.\n    queueMicrotask(() => {\n      void this.deliverEach(accepted)\n    })\n\n    if (provider.successResponse) {\n      return {\n        status: 200,\n        body: provider.successResponse.body,\n        headers: provider.successResponse.headers,\n      }\n    }\n    return { status: 200, body: { received: accepted.length, total: events.length } }\n  }\n\n  private async deliverEach(events: WebhookEnvelope[]): Promise<void> {\n    for (const event of events) {\n      try {\n        await this.deliver(event)\n        if (event.providerEventId && this.idempotency) {\n          await this.idempotency.remember(event.providerEventId, this.idempotencyTtlMs)\n        }\n      } catch (err) {\n        this.onError(err, {\n          provider: event.provider,\n          eventType: event.eventType,\n          providerEventId: event.providerEventId,\n        })\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nfunction defaultOnError(err: unknown, context: { provider: string; eventType?: string; providerEventId?: string }): void {\n  // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n  console.error('[WebhookRouter]', context, err)\n}\n\nfunction errMessage(err: unknown): string {\n  return err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)\n}\n","/**\n * Pre-built `WebhookProvider` implementations for the inbound surfaces\n * the substrate ships first-party verifiers for.\n *\n * Each provider implementation is intentionally thin: it delegates\n * signature verification to the corresponding pure function in\n * `connectors/webhooks.ts` and parses the body into one or more\n * normalized `WebhookEnvelope` rows. Anything provider-specific that\n * doesn't fit cleanly (Slack URL-verification handshake, etc.) is\n * surfaced via the envelope `eventType` so the consumer's `deliver()`\n * can branch.\n */\n\nimport {\n  firstHeader,\n  verifyEmailSignature,\n  verifyHmacSignature,\n  verifySlackSignature,\n  verifyStripeSignature,\n} from '../connectors/webhooks.js'\nimport type { WebhookEnvelope, WebhookHeaders, WebhookProvider, SignatureVerification } from './router.js'\nimport { createHash, createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto'\n\n/** Stripe webhook provider. Signature header `Stripe-Signature`. */\nexport const stripeWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'stripe',\n  verifySignature({ rawBody, headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const sig = firstHeader(headers, 'stripe-signature')\n    if (!sig) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_stripe_signature' }\n    return verifyStripeSignature(rawBody, sig, secret)\n      ? { valid: true }\n      : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const evt = safeJson(rawBody)\n    if (!evt || typeof evt !== 'object') return []\n    const e = evt as { id?: unknown; type?: unknown }\n    return [\n      {\n        provider: 'stripe',\n        eventType: typeof e.type === 'string' ? e.type : 'stripe.unknown',\n        providerEventId: typeof e.id === 'string' ? e.id : undefined,\n        receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n        payload: evt,\n        headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n      },\n    ]\n  },\n  eventCatalog: {\n    // Stripe emits the raw event `type` (`charge.succeeded`) — no namespace, and\n    // an OPEN, versioned vocabulary (~250 types), so these are authoring hints,\n    // not a gate.\n    namespace: null,\n    closed: false,\n    events: [\n      { id: 'checkout.session.completed' },\n      { id: 'checkout.session.expired' },\n      { id: 'customer.subscription.created' },\n      { id: 'customer.subscription.updated' },\n      { id: 'customer.subscription.deleted' },\n      { id: 'invoice.paid' },\n      { id: 'invoice.payment_failed' },\n      { id: 'payment_intent.succeeded' },\n      { id: 'payment_intent.payment_failed' },\n      { id: 'charge.succeeded' },\n      { id: 'charge.refunded' },\n    ],\n  },\n}\n\n/** Slack Events API provider. Handles the `url_verification` handshake\n *  by emitting a synthetic event the consumer's `deliver()` can echo. */\nexport const slackWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'slack',\n  verifySignature({ rawBody, headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const sig = firstHeader(headers, 'x-slack-signature')\n    const ts = firstHeader(headers, 'x-slack-request-timestamp')\n    if (!sig || !ts) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_slack_signature_or_timestamp' }\n    return verifySlackSignature(rawBody, sig, ts, secret)\n      ? { valid: true }\n      : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const evt = safeJson(rawBody) as { type?: string; event_id?: string; event?: { type?: string } } | null\n    if (!evt || typeof evt !== 'object') return []\n    if (evt.type === 'url_verification') {\n      return [{\n        provider: 'slack',\n        eventType: 'slack.url_verification',\n        receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n        payload: evt,\n        headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n      }]\n    }\n    const eventType = `slack.${evt.event?.type ?? evt.type ?? 'unknown'}`\n    return [{\n      provider: 'slack',\n      eventType,\n      providerEventId: typeof evt.event_id === 'string' ? evt.event_id : undefined,\n      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n      payload: evt,\n      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n    }]\n  },\n  eventCatalog: {\n    // Slack namespaces every event `slack.<events-api-type>`, so a prefix-less\n    // event is provably dead. The Events API vocabulary is open (Slack adds\n    // types), so `events` are hints, not a gate. `slack.url_verification` (the\n    // config handshake) is intentionally excluded — it carries no workflow\n    // meaning and is answered before dispatch.\n    namespace: 'slack.',\n    closed: false,\n    events: [\n      { id: 'slack.message' },\n      { id: 'slack.app_mention' },\n      { id: 'slack.reaction_added' },\n      { id: 'slack.reaction_removed' },\n      { id: 'slack.channel_created' },\n      { id: 'slack.member_joined_channel' },\n      { id: 'slack.team_join' },\n      { id: 'slack.app_home_opened' },\n      { id: 'slack.file_shared' },\n    ],\n  },\n}\n\n/** DocuSeal webhook provider. Signature header `X-Docuseal-Signature`. */\nexport const docusealWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'docuseal',\n  verifySignature({ rawBody, headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const sig = firstHeader(headers, 'x-docuseal-signature')\n    if (!sig) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_docuseal_signature' }\n    const expected = createHmac('sha256', secret).update(rawBody).digest('hex')\n    const a = Buffer.from(sig.toLowerCase(), 'utf-8')\n    const b = Buffer.from(expected, 'utf-8')\n    if (a.length !== b.length) return { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n    return timingSafeEqual(a, b) ? { valid: true } : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const evt = safeJson(rawBody) as { event_type?: string; event_id?: string } | null\n    if (!evt || typeof evt !== 'object') return []\n    return [{\n      provider: 'docuseal',\n      eventType: `docuseal.${evt.event_type ?? 'unknown'}`,\n      providerEventId: typeof evt.event_id === 'string' ? evt.event_id : undefined,\n      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n      payload: evt,\n      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n    }]\n  },\n  eventCatalog: {\n    // DocuSeal namespaces every event `docuseal.<event_type>`. The documented\n    // set is small but not derivable from `parse`, so it stays open (namespace\n    // is the authoritative gate) with the documented types as hints.\n    namespace: 'docuseal.',\n    closed: false,\n    events: [\n      { id: 'docuseal.form.viewed' },\n      { id: 'docuseal.form.started' },\n      { id: 'docuseal.form.completed' },\n      { id: 'docuseal.form.declined' },\n      { id: 'docuseal.submission.created' },\n      { id: 'docuseal.submission.completed' },\n      { id: 'docuseal.submission.expired' },\n      { id: 'docuseal.submission.archived' },\n    ],\n  },\n}\n\n/** The normalized inbound-email payload the Tangle email edge posts and this\n *  provider surfaces on `WebhookEnvelope.payload`. `to` is the owner-resolution\n *  key — the platform matches it to a connection's provisioned inbound address;\n *  `messageId` is the idempotency key. */\nexport interface InboundEmailPayload {\n  /** RFC5322 Message-ID. */\n  messageId?: string\n  /** Envelope sender — the firm/customer that emailed in. */\n  from: string\n  /** The provisioned inbound address the message was delivered to (owner key). */\n  to: string\n  subject?: string\n  text?: string\n  html?: string\n  /** Selected headers the edge forwards (Reply-To, In-Reply-To, References…). */\n  headers?: Record<string, string>\n  attachments?: Array<{\n    filename?: string\n    contentType?: string\n    /** Bytes as base64, OR a `url`/path the edge staged them at (large files). */\n    contentBase64?: string\n    url?: string\n    size?: number\n  }>\n  /** Epoch ms the edge received the message. */\n  receivedAt?: number\n}\n\n/** Tangle inbound-email provider. Our own Cloudflare Email Routing worker parses\n *  the MIME, JSON-serializes it, timestamped-HMAC signs it with the\n *  per-connection secret, and POSTs it here — there is no upstream mail-vendor\n *  signature, we are both signer and verifier. One inbound message → one\n *  `email.received` envelope; `payload.to` carries the owner-resolution address. */\nexport const emailWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'email',\n  verifySignature({ rawBody, headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const sig = firstHeader(headers, 'x-tangle-email-signature')\n    if (!sig) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_email_signature' }\n    const ts = firstHeader(headers, 'x-tangle-email-timestamp')\n    if (!ts) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_email_timestamp' }\n    return verifyEmailSignature(rawBody, sig, ts, secret)\n      ? { valid: true }\n      : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const msg = safeJson(rawBody) as Partial<InboundEmailPayload> | null\n    if (!msg || typeof msg !== 'object') return []\n    // `from` + `to` are load-bearing (owner resolution keys off `to`); a body\n    // missing either is a malformed edge post — ack as a no-op rather than\n    // dispatch an unroutable event.\n    if (typeof msg.from !== 'string' || typeof msg.to !== 'string') return []\n    return [{\n      provider: 'email',\n      eventType: 'email.received',\n      providerEventId: typeof msg.messageId === 'string' ? msg.messageId : undefined,\n      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n      payload: msg as InboundEmailPayload,\n      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n    }]\n  },\n  eventCatalog: {\n    // We own the edge, so the inbound surface is exactly one closed event.\n    namespace: 'email.',\n    closed: true,\n    events: [{ id: 'email.received' }],\n  },\n}\n\n/** Gmail push provider. Cloud Pub/Sub posts a JWT-signed envelope; the\n *  *payload* is base64 JSON describing the changed history range. The\n *  signature scheme here is the Pub/Sub JWT auth header — when supplied,\n *  consumers SHOULD verify the JWT against Google's well-known\n *  certificates. We accept the simpler \"Bearer <pubsub-shared-secret>\"\n *  variant by default (matching `verifyHmacSignature`). */\nexport const gmailWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'gmail',\n  verifySignature({ headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const auth = firstHeader(headers, 'authorization')\n    if (!auth) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_authorization' }\n    // Accept either \"Bearer <secret>\" or \"Token <secret>\" formats. This\n    // is the simple per-tenant shared-secret path; JWT verification is\n    // left to the consumer's `deliver()` when they need full Google JWT\n    // chain validation.\n    const m = /^(?:Bearer|Token)\\s+(.+)$/i.exec(auth)\n    if (!m) return { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_authorization_format' }\n    const a = Buffer.from(m[1]!, 'utf-8')\n    const b = Buffer.from(secret, 'utf-8')\n    if (a.length !== b.length) return { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n    return timingSafeEqual(a, b) ? { valid: true } : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const envelope = safeJson(rawBody) as { message?: { data?: string; messageId?: string; publishTime?: string } } | null\n    if (!envelope?.message?.data) return []\n    let payload: unknown\n    try {\n      payload = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(envelope.message.data, 'base64').toString('utf-8'))\n    } catch {\n      return []\n    }\n    const inner = payload as { historyId?: number | string; emailAddress?: string }\n    return [{\n      provider: 'gmail',\n      eventType: 'gmail.history_changed',\n      providerEventId: envelope.message.messageId,\n      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n      payload: { ...inner, publishTime: envelope.message.publishTime },\n      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n    }]\n  },\n}\n\n/** Google Drive push provider. Drive does NOT sign the body — it uses\n *  the per-channel token (`X-Goog-Channel-Token`) as the shared secret.\n *  The router compares it constant-time against the resolved secret. */\nexport const gdriveWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'gdrive',\n  verifySignature({ headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const token = firstHeader(headers, 'x-goog-channel-token')\n    if (!token) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_channel_token' }\n    const a = Buffer.from(token, 'utf-8')\n    const b = Buffer.from(secret, 'utf-8')\n    if (a.length !== b.length) return { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n    return timingSafeEqual(a, b) ? { valid: true } : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const resourceId = firstHeader(headers, 'x-goog-resource-id')\n    const resourceState = firstHeader(headers, 'x-goog-resource-state') ?? 'unknown'\n    const channelId = firstHeader(headers, 'x-goog-channel-id')\n    const messageNumber = firstHeader(headers, 'x-goog-message-number')\n    if (resourceState === 'sync') {\n      return [{\n        provider: 'gdrive',\n        eventType: 'gdrive.channel.sync',\n        providerEventId: messageNumber ? `${channelId}-${messageNumber}` : undefined,\n        receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n        payload: { channelId, resourceId, resourceState },\n        headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n      }]\n    }\n    return [{\n      provider: 'gdrive',\n      eventType: `gdrive.resource.${resourceState}`,\n      providerEventId: messageNumber ? `${channelId}-${messageNumber}` : undefined,\n      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n      payload: { channelId, resourceId, resourceState },\n      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n    }]\n  },\n}\n\n/** The Telegram update keys, in resolution order — the first present key names\n *  the update kind (`telegram.message`, `telegram.callback_query`, …). */\nconst TELEGRAM_UPDATE_KEYS = [\n  'message',\n  'edited_message',\n  'channel_post',\n  'edited_channel_post',\n  'business_connection',\n  'business_message',\n  'edited_business_message',\n  'deleted_business_messages',\n  'message_reaction',\n  'message_reaction_count',\n  'inline_query',\n  'chosen_inline_result',\n  'callback_query',\n  'shipping_query',\n  'pre_checkout_query',\n  'purchased_paid_media',\n  'poll',\n  'poll_answer',\n  'my_chat_member',\n  'chat_member',\n  'chat_join_request',\n  'chat_boost',\n  'removed_chat_boost',\n] as const\n\n/** Telegram Bot API webhook provider. Telegram does NOT sign the body — it\n *  authenticates by echoing the `secret_token` set at `setWebhook` time in the\n *  `X-Telegram-Bot-Api-Secret-Token` header. We compare it constant-time to the\n *  per-connection secret. `update_id` is the idempotency anchor. */\nexport const telegramWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'telegram',\n  verifySignature({ headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const token = firstHeader(headers, 'x-telegram-bot-api-secret-token')\n    if (!token) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_telegram_secret_token' }\n    const a = Buffer.from(token, 'utf-8')\n    const b = Buffer.from(secret, 'utf-8')\n    if (a.length !== b.length) return { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_secret_token' }\n    return timingSafeEqual(a, b) ? { valid: true } : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_secret_token' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const evt = safeJson(rawBody) as ({ update_id?: number } & Record<string, unknown>) | null\n    if (!evt || typeof evt !== 'object') return []\n    const kind = TELEGRAM_UPDATE_KEYS.find((k) => k in evt) ?? 'unknown'\n    return [{\n      provider: 'telegram',\n      eventType: `telegram.${kind}`,\n      providerEventId: typeof evt.update_id === 'number' ? String(evt.update_id) : undefined,\n      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n      payload: evt,\n      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n    }]\n  },\n  eventCatalog: {\n    // Derived from the SAME TELEGRAM_UPDATE_KEYS `parse` matches on, so the\n    // catalog is exhaustive and cannot drift — hence `closed`. (`telegram.unknown`,\n    // parse's fallback for an update with no recognized key, is intentionally\n    // excluded: it is not a triggerable event.)\n    namespace: 'telegram.',\n    closed: true,\n    events: TELEGRAM_UPDATE_KEYS.map((k) => ({ id: `telegram.${k}` })),\n  },\n}\n\n/** Dropbox Sign (HelloSign) webhook provider. There is NO signature header:\n *  the body carries `event.event_hash = HMAC_SHA256(apiKey, event_time +\n *  event_type)` (hex), so the `secret` here is the account's API key (the\n *  caller resolves it from the connection credential). The body is JSON, or a\n *  `json=`/multipart `name=\"json\"` form field on older apps. */\nexport const hellosignWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'hellosign',\n  // Dropbox Sign acknowledges a delivery only when the response body is exactly\n  // 'Hello API Event Received'; any other body makes it retry the event.\n  successResponse: { body: 'Hello API Event Received', headers: { 'content-type': 'text/plain' } },\n  verifySignature({ rawBody, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const body = parseHelloSignBody(rawBody)\n    const event = body?.event\n    if (\n      !event ||\n      typeof event.event_time !== 'string' ||\n      typeof event.event_type !== 'string' ||\n      typeof event.event_hash !== 'string'\n    ) {\n      return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_event_fields' }\n    }\n    const expected = createHmac('sha256', secret)\n      .update(`${event.event_time}${event.event_type}`)\n      .digest('hex')\n    const a = Buffer.from(event.event_hash.toLowerCase(), 'utf-8')\n    const b = Buffer.from(expected.toLowerCase(), 'utf-8')\n    if (a.length !== b.length) return { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n    return timingSafeEqual(a, b) ? { valid: true } : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const body = parseHelloSignBody(rawBody)\n    const event = body?.event\n    if (!event) return []\n    return [{\n      provider: 'hellosign',\n      eventType: `hellosign.${event.event_type ?? 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Documented\n    // set as hints; namespace is the authoritative gate. `callback_test` (the\n    // app-config ping) is intentionally excluded — it is not a workflow event.\n    namespace: 'hellosign.',\n    closed: false,\n    events: [\n      { id: 'hellosign.signature_request_sent' },\n      { id: 'hellosign.signature_request_viewed' },\n      { id: 'hellosign.signature_request_signed' },\n      { id: 'hellosign.signature_request_all_signed' },\n      { id: 'hellosign.signature_request_declined' },\n      { id: 'hellosign.signature_request_reassigned' },\n      { id: 'hellosign.signature_request_remind' },\n      { id: 'hellosign.signature_request_canceled' },\n      { id: 'hellosign.signature_request_expired' },\n    ],\n  },\n}\n\n/** Keys Clay HTTP-API-action payloads commonly carry that can anchor\n *  idempotency, in resolution order. Clay bodies are operator-defined, so we\n *  fall back to a digest of the raw body when none is present. */\nconst CLAY_EVENT_ID_KEYS = ['id', 'rowId', 'recordId', 'clayRowId', 'eventId'] as const\n\n/** Clay webhook provider — receives rows Clay delivers via its outbound \"HTTP\n *  API\" action. Clay does NOT sign its requests and adds no proprietary\n *  headers (the `x-clay-signature: sha256=...` header seen in some third-party\n *  code is unverified inference, not in Clay's docs). Authentication is\n *  therefore a pre-shared secret the operator adds as a header on the Clay\n *  action; we compare it constant-time against the per-connection secret.\n *  Header: `x-clay-webhook-secret`. The body is whatever columns the operator\n *  mapped (free-form JSON with no canonical event id), so idempotency anchors\n *  on a common id field when present, else a sha256 of the raw body. */\nexport const clayWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'clay',\n  verifySignature({ headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const token = firstHeader(headers, 'x-clay-webhook-secret')\n    if (!token) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_clay_webhook_secret' }\n    const a = Buffer.from(token, 'utf-8')\n    const b = Buffer.from(secret, 'utf-8')\n    if (a.length !== b.length) return { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n    return timingSafeEqual(a, b) ? { valid: true } : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const evt = safeJson(rawBody)\n    if (!evt || typeof evt !== 'object') return []\n    const record = evt as Record<string, unknown>\n    const idKey = CLAY_EVENT_ID_KEYS.find(\n      (k) => typeof record[k] === 'string' || typeof record[k] === 'number',\n    )\n    const providerEventId = idKey\n      ? String(record[idKey])\n      : createHash('sha256').update(rawBody).digest('hex')\n    const eventType =\n      typeof record.event === 'string'\n        ? `clay.${record.event}`\n        : typeof record.type === 'string'\n          ? `clay.${record.type}`\n          : 'clay.row'\n    return [{\n      provider: 'clay',\n      eventType,\n      providerEventId,\n      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n      payload: evt,\n      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n    }]\n  },\n}\n\ninterface HelloSignInboundBody {\n  event?: {\n    event_time?: string\n    event_type?: string\n    event_hash?: string\n    event_id?: string\n  }\n}\n\n/** Dropbox Sign posts JSON, a form-urlencoded `json=` field, or a\n *  multipart `name=\"json\"` part depending on app vintage. Mirrors the\n *  connector adapter's body extraction. */\nfunction parseHelloSignBody(rawBody: string): HelloSignInboundBody | null {\n  try {\n    const json = JSON.parse(rawBody) as HelloSignInboundBody\n    if (json && typeof json === 'object') return json\n  } catch {\n    // fall through to form-data extraction\n  }\n  // application/x-www-form-urlencoded `json=` field. URLSearchParams decodes\n  // `+` as a space (decodeURIComponent leaves it literal) and resolves\n  // percent-escapes, so space-bearing string fields aren't corrupted.\n  const formJson = new URLSearchParams(rawBody).get('json')\n  if (formJson) {\n    try {\n      return JSON.parse(formJson) as HelloSignInboundBody\n    } catch {\n      return null\n    }\n  }\n  // multipart/form-data with a `name=\"json\"` part. Extract linearly (indexOf +\n  // fixed-shape separator probes, no unbounded lazy regex) so a hostile body\n  // can't drive quadratic backtracking on this public ingress.\n  return extractMultipartJsonField(rawBody)\n}\n\n/** Pull the `json` part out of a multipart/form-data body without an\n *  unbounded backtracking regex. Returns null if the part isn't present or\n *  isn't valid JSON. The separator probes (`\\r?\\n\\r?\\n`, `\\r?\\n--`) are\n *  fixed-shape (no `*`/`+`), so each runs in a single linear scan. */\nfunction extractMultipartJsonField(rawBody: string): HelloSignInboundBody | null {\n  const nameIdx = rawBody.indexOf('name=\"json\"')\n  if (nameIdx === -1) return null\n  const afterName = rawBody.slice(nameIdx)\n  const sep = /\\r?\\n\\r?\\n/.exec(afterName)\n  if (!sep) return null\n  const partBody = afterName.slice(sep.index + sep[0].length)\n  const end = /\\r?\\n--/.exec(partBody)\n  if (!end) return null\n  try {\n    return JSON.parse(partBody.slice(0, end.index)) as HelloSignInboundBody\n  } catch {\n    return null\n  }\n}\n\n/** Generic HMAC provider — for the long-tail webhook source where the\n *  caller has standardised on a single sha256-of-body scheme. Header\n *  `X-Signature` by default; override at provider-build time if needed. */\nexport function genericHmacWebhookProvider(options: {\n  id: string\n  signatureHeader?: string\n  algorithm?: 'sha256' | 'sha1' | 'sha512'\n  signaturePrefix?: string\n  /** Parser to convert the raw body into envelopes. Defaults to\n   *  \"one event with eventType=<provider>.event and payload=JSON\". */\n  parse?: WebhookProvider['parse']\n}): WebhookProvider {\n  const header = options.signatureHeader ?? 'x-signature'\n  return {\n    id: options.id,\n    verifySignature({ rawBody, headers, secret }) {\n      const sig = firstHeader(headers, header)\n      if (!sig) return { valid: false, reason: `missing_${header}` }\n      return verifyHmacSignature(rawBody, sig, secret, {\n        algorithm: options.algorithm ?? 'sha256',\n        signaturePrefix: options.signaturePrefix,\n      })\n        ? { valid: true }\n        : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n    },\n    parse:\n      options.parse ??\n      (({ rawBody, headers, now }) => {\n        const evt = safeJson(rawBody) ?? rawBody\n        return [{\n          provider: options.id,\n          eventType: `${options.id}.event`,\n          receivedAt: now ?? 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Returns 200 fast with `{received: events.length}`.\n *\n * Replay protection: providers that sign timestamps (Stripe, Slack)\n * already reject stale signatures inside `verifySignature`. For providers\n * that don't (DocuSeal, GDrive push), the router exposes a pluggable\n * `idempotency` hook: if `idempotency.seen(providerEventId)` returns\n * true, the router 200s without invoking `deliver()`. Consumers wire\n * this to a durable kv (D1 / Redis / Postgres unique-index).\n *\n * Why a router and not a per-provider express app: the runtime contract\n * a product cares about is \"an inbound event came in, here's the\n * normalized envelope\". Verification, parsing, and idempotency-dedup\n * are mechanical and provider-specific — the router owns them. The\n * consumer's `deliver()` is the only place product logic runs.\n *\n * Stability: `@stable` — additions to `WebhookEnvelope` must be\n * additive; the router's HTTP contract (paths, status codes) is frozen\n * at 200 (ok), 400 (bad request), 401 (bad signature), 404 (unknown\n * provider), 405 (provider has no inbound surface).\n */\n\nexport interface WebhookHeaders {\n  [name: string]: string | string[] | undefined\n}\n\n/** Normalized inbound event the router emits after parsing. */\nexport interface WebhookEnvelope<TPayload = unknown> {\n  /** Provider id (matches the `:provider` path segment). */\n  provider: string\n  /** Optional event class — e.g., 'customer.subscription.deleted'. The\n   *  provider's parser decides. Used for routing inside `deliver()`. */\n  eventType: string\n  /** Provider-emitted event id, when present. Used for the idempotency\n   *  short-circuit. */\n  providerEventId?: string\n  /** Wall-clock receive time. */\n  receivedAt: number\n  /** Provider payload, normalized to the provider's documented event\n   *  shape. The router does NOT reshape this — `parse()` is the contract. */\n  payload: TPayload\n  /** Headers passed through for downstream handlers that want them\n   *  (e.g., to extract custom routing metadata). Always lowercased keys. */\n  headers: Record<string, string>\n}\n\nexport type SignatureVerification =\n  | { valid: true }\n  | { valid: false; reason: string }\n\n/** One declared triggerable event, in the runtime `eventType` namespace a\n *  provider's `parse` emits. */\nexport interface TriggerEventDescriptor {\n  /** The `eventType` a workflow `provider_event` trigger matches on\n   *  (`slack.app_mention`, `charge.succeeded`). */\n  id: string\n  /** Short human label for authoring surfaces; optional. */\n  title?: string\n}\n\n/** The set of events a provider can deliver, for author-time validation of\n *  workflow `provider_event` triggers. Co-located with the provider's `parse`\n *  (the source of the runtime namespace) so the two cannot drift — see the\n *  per-provider drift tests. Consumers validate an authored event with two\n *  checks: it must carry `namespace` (a prefix-less event on a namespaced\n *  provider can never be delivered), and — only when `closed` — be one of\n *  `events` (an exhaustive set makes an unlisted event an authoring error). */\nexport interface TriggerEventCatalog {\n  /** Required prefix every `parse`-emitted `eventType` carries (`slack.`,\n   *  `telegram.`), or `null` when the provider emits raw event names (stripe). */\n  namespace: string | null\n  /** Declared events. Exhaustive iff `closed`; otherwise authoring hints for an\n   *  open, provider-owned vocabulary. */\n  events: readonly TriggerEventDescriptor[]\n  /** True when `events` is the COMPLETE deliverable set, so an event outside it\n   *  is rejected. False when the provider owns an open-ended vocabulary it keeps\n   *  adding to (Stripe's ~250 types, Slack's Events API) and only `namespace`\n   *  can be authoritatively enforced. */\n  closed: boolean\n}\n\n/** Per-provider plug-in. Stateless — the router calls `verifySignature`\n *  then `parse` on every request. The provider's HTTP-shape concerns\n *  (e.g., raw body required) are documented per provider. */\nexport interface WebhookProvider {\n  /** Stable provider id (`stripe`, `docuseal`, `gdrive`, ...). */\n  id: string\n  /** Verify the inbound signature. Receives the EXACT raw body string —\n   *  consumers MUST preserve raw bytes through their HTTP server (do not\n   *  parse JSON before forwarding here). */\n  verifySignature(input: {\n    rawBody: string\n    headers: WebhookHeaders\n    secret: string\n  }): SignatureVerification\n  /** Parse the validated raw body into zero or more normalized events.\n   *  A single push payload may carry multiple events (e.g., Slack bulk\n   *  delivery). Return [] to ack the push as a no-op. */\n  parse(input: {\n    rawBody: string\n    headers: WebhookHeaders\n    now?: number\n  }): WebhookEnvelope[] | Promise<WebhookEnvelope[]>\n  /** Optional provider-specific 200 ACK the router returns on a verified\n   *  delivery, in place of the default `{ received, total }` JSON. Dropbox Sign\n   *  acknowledges a delivery only when the body is exactly\n   *  'Hello API Event Received' and retries otherwise; this lets such a\n   *  provider declare the body/headers it needs. The frozen status contract is\n   *  unchanged — only the 200 body/headers are customized. */\n  successResponse?: { body: string; headers?: Record<string, string> }\n  /** Declared triggerable-event catalog, for author-time validation of workflow\n   *  `provider_event` triggers. Optional: a provider without one is left\n   *  unvalidated by consumers (the trigger still installs). */\n  eventCatalog?: TriggerEventCatalog\n}\n\nexport interface WebhookIdempotencyStore {\n  /** Returns true if this providerEventId has been processed already.\n   *  Implementations should be O(1) (Redis SETNX, D1 UNIQUE constraint). */\n  seen(providerEventId: string): Promise<boolean> | boolean\n  /** Marks a providerEventId as processed. Called AFTER `deliver()` has\n   *  been invoked. */\n  remember(providerEventId: string, ttlMs: number): Promise<void> | void\n}\n\nexport interface WebhookRouterOptions {\n  /** Provider registry. Pass any number of providers; routing is by id. */\n  providers: WebhookProvider[]\n  /** Async callback invoked with every accepted event. Fire-and-forget\n   *  from the router's perspective — the HTTP response is sent before\n   *  this resolves. Throws are caught and reported via `onError`. */\n  deliver(event: WebhookEnvelope): Promise<void> | void\n  /** Resolve the signing secret for a provider id at request time. The\n   *  router never holds secrets — the consumer's vault resolves them. */\n  resolveSecret(providerId: string, headers: WebhookHeaders): Promise<string | null> | string | null\n  /** Optional idempotency-dedup hook. Required for providers that don't\n   *  sign timestamps in their signature scheme (DocuSeal, Drive push). */\n  idempotency?: WebhookIdempotencyStore\n  /** TTL on idempotency entries. Default 7 days — long enough that a\n   *  provider's normal retry-window can't re-deliver. */\n  idempotencyTtlMs?: number\n  /** Surface delivery errors. Default: console.error. */\n  onError?(err: unknown, context: { provider: string; eventType?: string; providerEventId?: string }): void\n  /** Override `now()` for tests. */\n  now?(): number\n}\n\nexport interface WebhookRouterRequest {\n  providerId: string\n  rawBody: string\n  headers: WebhookHeaders\n}\n\nexport interface WebhookRouterResponse {\n  status: number\n  body: unknown\n  headers?: Record<string, string>\n}\n\n/**\n * Router instance. Stateless aside from the provider registry — safe to\n * share across requests; build once per process.\n */\nexport class WebhookRouter {\n  private readonly providers: Map<string, WebhookProvider>\n  private readonly deliver: WebhookRouterOptions['deliver']\n  private readonly resolveSecret: WebhookRouterOptions['resolveSecret']\n  private readonly idempotency?: WebhookIdempotencyStore\n  private readonly idempotencyTtlMs: number\n  private readonly onError: NonNullable<WebhookRouterOptions['onError']>\n  private readonly nowFn: () => number\n\n  constructor(opts: WebhookRouterOptions) {\n    this.providers = new Map(opts.providers.map((p) => [p.id, p]))\n    this.deliver = opts.deliver\n    this.resolveSecret = opts.resolveSecret\n    this.idempotency = opts.idempotency\n    this.idempotencyTtlMs = opts.idempotencyTtlMs ?? 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000\n    this.onError = opts.onError ?? defaultOnError\n    this.nowFn = opts.now ?? Date.now\n  }\n\n  /** Process one inbound webhook request. Pure with respect to side-\n   *  effects on the router instance — safe to call concurrently. */\n  async handle(request: WebhookRouterRequest): Promise<WebhookRouterResponse> {\n    const provider = this.providers.get(request.providerId)\n    if (!provider) {\n      return { status: 404, body: { error: 'unknown_provider', provider: request.providerId } }\n    }\n    const secret = await this.resolveSecret(provider.id, request.headers)\n    if (!secret) {\n      return { status: 401, body: { error: 'missing_secret', provider: provider.id } }\n    }\n    const verification = provider.verifySignature({\n      rawBody: request.rawBody,\n      headers: request.headers,\n      secret,\n    })\n    if (!verification.valid) {\n      return { status: 401, body: { error: 'invalid_signature', reason: verification.reason } }\n    }\n\n    let events: WebhookEnvelope[]\n    try {\n      events = await provider.parse({ rawBody: request.rawBody, headers: request.headers, now: this.nowFn() })\n    } catch (err) {\n      this.onError(err, { provider: provider.id })\n      return { status: 400, body: { error: 'parse_error', message: errMessage(err) } }\n    }\n\n    const accepted: WebhookEnvelope[] = []\n    for (const event of events) {\n      if (event.providerEventId && this.idempotency) {\n        const already = await this.idempotency.seen(event.providerEventId)\n        if (already) continue\n      }\n      accepted.push(event)\n    }\n\n    // Deliver async — do NOT block the HTTP response. Errors land in\n    // `onError`; the provider already got its 200 by then so it will\n    // not retry.\n    queueMicrotask(() => {\n      void this.deliverEach(accepted)\n    })\n\n    if (provider.successResponse) {\n      return {\n        status: 200,\n        body: provider.successResponse.body,\n        headers: provider.successResponse.headers,\n      }\n    }\n    return { status: 200, body: { received: accepted.length, total: events.length } }\n  }\n\n  private async deliverEach(events: WebhookEnvelope[]): Promise<void> {\n    for (const event of events) {\n      try {\n        await this.deliver(event)\n        if (event.providerEventId && this.idempotency) {\n          await this.idempotency.remember(event.providerEventId, this.idempotencyTtlMs)\n        }\n      } catch (err) {\n        this.onError(err, {\n          provider: event.provider,\n          eventType: event.eventType,\n          providerEventId: event.providerEventId,\n        })\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nfunction defaultOnError(err: unknown, context: { provider: string; eventType?: string; providerEventId?: string }): void {\n  // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n  console.error('[WebhookRouter]', context, err)\n}\n\nfunction errMessage(err: unknown): string {\n  return err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)\n}\n","/**\n * Pre-built `WebhookProvider` implementations for the inbound surfaces\n * the substrate ships first-party verifiers for.\n *\n * Each provider implementation is intentionally thin: it delegates\n * signature verification to the corresponding pure function in\n * `connectors/webhooks.ts` and parses the body into one or more\n * normalized `WebhookEnvelope` rows. Anything provider-specific that\n * doesn't fit cleanly (Slack URL-verification handshake, etc.) is\n * surfaced via the envelope `eventType` so the consumer's `deliver()`\n * can branch.\n */\n\nimport {\n  firstHeader,\n  verifyEmailSignature,\n  verifyHmacSignature,\n  verifySlackSignature,\n  verifyStripeSignature,\n} from '../connectors/webhooks.js'\nimport type { WebhookEnvelope, WebhookHeaders, WebhookProvider, SignatureVerification } from './router.js'\nimport { createHash, createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto'\nimport type { InboundEmailPayload } from '../conversation-events/index.js'\n\nexport type { InboundEmailPayload } from '../conversation-events/index.js'\n\n/** Stripe webhook provider. Signature header `Stripe-Signature`. */\nexport const stripeWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'stripe',\n  verifySignature({ rawBody, headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const sig = firstHeader(headers, 'stripe-signature')\n    if (!sig) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_stripe_signature' }\n    return verifyStripeSignature(rawBody, sig, secret)\n      ? { valid: true }\n      : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const evt = safeJson(rawBody)\n    if (!evt || typeof evt !== 'object') return []\n    const e = evt as { id?: unknown; type?: unknown }\n    return [\n      {\n        provider: 'stripe',\n        eventType: typeof e.type === 'string' ? e.type : 'stripe.unknown',\n        providerEventId: typeof e.id === 'string' ? e.id : undefined,\n        receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n        payload: evt,\n        headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n      },\n    ]\n  },\n  eventCatalog: {\n    // Stripe emits the raw event `type` (`charge.succeeded`) — no namespace, and\n    // an OPEN, versioned vocabulary (~250 types), so these are authoring hints,\n    // not a gate.\n    namespace: null,\n    closed: false,\n    events: [\n      { id: 'checkout.session.completed' },\n      { id: 'checkout.session.expired' },\n      { id: 'customer.subscription.created' },\n      { id: 'customer.subscription.updated' },\n      { id: 'customer.subscription.deleted' },\n      { id: 'invoice.paid' },\n      { id: 'invoice.payment_failed' },\n      { id: 'payment_intent.succeeded' },\n      { id: 'payment_intent.payment_failed' },\n      { id: 'charge.succeeded' },\n      { id: 'charge.refunded' },\n    ],\n  },\n}\n\n/** Slack Events API provider. Handles the `url_verification` handshake\n *  by emitting a synthetic event the consumer's `deliver()` can echo. */\nexport const slackWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'slack',\n  verifySignature({ rawBody, headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const sig = firstHeader(headers, 'x-slack-signature')\n    const ts = firstHeader(headers, 'x-slack-request-timestamp')\n    if (!sig || !ts) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_slack_signature_or_timestamp' }\n    return verifySlackSignature(rawBody, sig, ts, secret)\n      ? { valid: true }\n      : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const evt = safeJson(rawBody) as { type?: string; event_id?: string; event?: { type?: string } } | null\n    if (!evt || typeof evt !== 'object') return []\n    if (evt.type === 'url_verification') {\n      return [{\n        provider: 'slack',\n        eventType: 'slack.url_verification',\n        receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n        payload: evt,\n        headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n      }]\n    }\n    const eventType = `slack.${evt.event?.type ?? evt.type ?? 'unknown'}`\n    return [{\n      provider: 'slack',\n      eventType,\n      providerEventId: typeof evt.event_id === 'string' ? evt.event_id : undefined,\n      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n      payload: evt,\n      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n    }]\n  },\n  eventCatalog: {\n    // Slack namespaces every event `slack.<events-api-type>`, so a prefix-less\n    // event is provably dead. The Events API vocabulary is open (Slack adds\n    // types), so `events` are hints, not a gate. `slack.url_verification` (the\n    // config handshake) is intentionally excluded — it carries no workflow\n    // meaning and is answered before dispatch.\n    namespace: 'slack.',\n    closed: false,\n    events: [\n      { id: 'slack.message' },\n      { id: 'slack.app_mention' },\n      { id: 'slack.reaction_added' },\n      { id: 'slack.reaction_removed' },\n      { id: 'slack.channel_created' },\n      { id: 'slack.member_joined_channel' },\n      { id: 'slack.team_join' },\n      { id: 'slack.app_home_opened' },\n      { id: 'slack.file_shared' },\n    ],\n  },\n}\n\n/** DocuSeal webhook provider. Signature header `X-Docuseal-Signature`. */\nexport const docusealWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'docuseal',\n  verifySignature({ rawBody, headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const sig = firstHeader(headers, 'x-docuseal-signature')\n    if (!sig) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_docuseal_signature' }\n    const expected = createHmac('sha256', secret).update(rawBody).digest('hex')\n    const a = Buffer.from(sig.toLowerCase(), 'utf-8')\n    const b = Buffer.from(expected, 'utf-8')\n    if (a.length !== b.length) return { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n    return timingSafeEqual(a, b) ? { valid: true } : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const evt = safeJson(rawBody) as { event_type?: string; event_id?: string } | null\n    if (!evt || typeof evt !== 'object') return []\n    return [{\n      provider: 'docuseal',\n      eventType: `docuseal.${evt.event_type ?? 'unknown'}`,\n      providerEventId: typeof evt.event_id === 'string' ? evt.event_id : undefined,\n      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n      payload: evt,\n      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n    }]\n  },\n  eventCatalog: {\n    // DocuSeal namespaces every event `docuseal.<event_type>`. The documented\n    // set is small but not derivable from `parse`, so it stays open (namespace\n    // is the authoritative gate) with the documented types as hints.\n    namespace: 'docuseal.',\n    closed: false,\n    events: [\n      { id: 'docuseal.form.viewed' },\n      { id: 'docuseal.form.started' },\n      { id: 'docuseal.form.completed' },\n      { id: 'docuseal.form.declined' },\n      { id: 'docuseal.submission.created' },\n      { id: 'docuseal.submission.completed' },\n      { id: 'docuseal.submission.expired' },\n      { id: 'docuseal.submission.archived' },\n    ],\n  },\n}\n\n/** Tangle inbound-email provider. Our own Cloudflare Email Routing worker parses\n *  the MIME, JSON-serializes it, timestamped-HMAC signs it with the\n *  per-connection secret, and POSTs it here — there is no upstream mail-vendor\n *  signature, we are both signer and verifier. One inbound message → one\n *  `email.received` envelope; `payload.to` carries the owner-resolution address. */\nexport const emailWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'email',\n  verifySignature({ rawBody, headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const sig = firstHeader(headers, 'x-tangle-email-signature')\n    if (!sig) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_email_signature' }\n    const ts = firstHeader(headers, 'x-tangle-email-timestamp')\n    if (!ts) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_email_timestamp' }\n    return verifyEmailSignature(rawBody, sig, ts, secret)\n      ? { valid: true }\n      : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const msg = safeJson(rawBody) as Partial<InboundEmailPayload> | null\n    if (!msg || typeof msg !== 'object') return []\n    // `from` + `to` are load-bearing (owner resolution keys off `to`); a body\n    // missing either is a malformed edge post — ack as a no-op rather than\n    // dispatch an unroutable event.\n    if (typeof msg.from !== 'string' || typeof msg.to !== 'string') return []\n    return [{\n      provider: 'email',\n      eventType: 'email.received',\n      providerEventId: typeof msg.messageId === 'string' ? msg.messageId : undefined,\n      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n      payload: msg as InboundEmailPayload,\n      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n    }]\n  },\n  eventCatalog: {\n    // We own the edge, so the inbound surface is exactly one closed event.\n    namespace: 'email.',\n    closed: true,\n    events: [{ id: 'email.received' }],\n  },\n}\n\n/** Gmail push provider. Cloud Pub/Sub posts a JWT-signed envelope; the\n *  *payload* is base64 JSON describing the changed history range. The\n *  signature scheme here is the Pub/Sub JWT auth header — when supplied,\n *  consumers SHOULD verify the JWT against Google's well-known\n *  certificates. We accept the simpler \"Bearer <pubsub-shared-secret>\"\n *  variant by default (matching `verifyHmacSignature`). */\nexport const gmailWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'gmail',\n  verifySignature({ headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const auth = firstHeader(headers, 'authorization')\n    if (!auth) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_authorization' }\n    // Accept either \"Bearer <secret>\" or \"Token <secret>\" formats. This\n    // is the simple per-tenant shared-secret path; JWT verification is\n    // left to the consumer's `deliver()` when they need full Google JWT\n    // chain validation.\n    const m = /^(?:Bearer|Token)\\s+(.+)$/i.exec(auth)\n    if (!m) return { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_authorization_format' }\n    const a = Buffer.from(m[1]!, 'utf-8')\n    const b = Buffer.from(secret, 'utf-8')\n    if (a.length !== b.length) return { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n    return timingSafeEqual(a, b) ? { valid: true } : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const envelope = safeJson(rawBody) as { message?: { data?: string; messageId?: string; publishTime?: string } } | null\n    if (!envelope?.message?.data) return []\n    let payload: unknown\n    try {\n      payload = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(envelope.message.data, 'base64').toString('utf-8'))\n    } catch {\n      return []\n    }\n    const inner = payload as { historyId?: number | string; emailAddress?: string }\n    return [{\n      provider: 'gmail',\n      eventType: 'gmail.history_changed',\n      providerEventId: envelope.message.messageId,\n      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n      payload: { ...inner, publishTime: envelope.message.publishTime },\n      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n    }]\n  },\n}\n\n/** Google Drive push provider. Drive does NOT sign the body — it uses\n *  the per-channel token (`X-Goog-Channel-Token`) as the shared secret.\n *  The router compares it constant-time against the resolved secret. */\nexport const gdriveWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'gdrive',\n  verifySignature({ headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const token = firstHeader(headers, 'x-goog-channel-token')\n    if (!token) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_channel_token' }\n    const a = Buffer.from(token, 'utf-8')\n    const b = Buffer.from(secret, 'utf-8')\n    if (a.length !== b.length) return { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n    return timingSafeEqual(a, b) ? { valid: true } : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const resourceId = firstHeader(headers, 'x-goog-resource-id')\n    const resourceState = firstHeader(headers, 'x-goog-resource-state') ?? 'unknown'\n    const channelId = firstHeader(headers, 'x-goog-channel-id')\n    const messageNumber = firstHeader(headers, 'x-goog-message-number')\n    if (resourceState === 'sync') {\n      return [{\n        provider: 'gdrive',\n        eventType: 'gdrive.channel.sync',\n        providerEventId: messageNumber ? `${channelId}-${messageNumber}` : undefined,\n        receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n        payload: { channelId, resourceId, resourceState },\n        headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n      }]\n    }\n    return [{\n      provider: 'gdrive',\n      eventType: `gdrive.resource.${resourceState}`,\n      providerEventId: messageNumber ? `${channelId}-${messageNumber}` : undefined,\n      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n      payload: { channelId, resourceId, resourceState },\n      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n    }]\n  },\n}\n\n/** The Telegram update keys, in resolution order — the first present key names\n *  the update kind (`telegram.message`, `telegram.callback_query`, …). */\nconst TELEGRAM_UPDATE_KEYS = [\n  'message',\n  'edited_message',\n  'channel_post',\n  'edited_channel_post',\n  'business_connection',\n  'business_message',\n  'edited_business_message',\n  'deleted_business_messages',\n  'message_reaction',\n  'message_reaction_count',\n  'inline_query',\n  'chosen_inline_result',\n  'callback_query',\n  'shipping_query',\n  'pre_checkout_query',\n  'purchased_paid_media',\n  'poll',\n  'poll_answer',\n  'my_chat_member',\n  'chat_member',\n  'chat_join_request',\n  'chat_boost',\n  'removed_chat_boost',\n] as const\n\n/** Telegram Bot API webhook provider. Telegram does NOT sign the body — it\n *  authenticates by echoing the `secret_token` set at `setWebhook` time in the\n *  `X-Telegram-Bot-Api-Secret-Token` header. We compare it constant-time to the\n *  per-connection secret. `update_id` is the idempotency anchor. */\nexport const telegramWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'telegram',\n  verifySignature({ headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const token = firstHeader(headers, 'x-telegram-bot-api-secret-token')\n    if (!token) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_telegram_secret_token' }\n    const a = Buffer.from(token, 'utf-8')\n    const b = Buffer.from(secret, 'utf-8')\n    if (a.length !== b.length) return { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_secret_token' }\n    return timingSafeEqual(a, b) ? { valid: true } : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_secret_token' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const evt = safeJson(rawBody) as ({ update_id?: number } & Record<string, unknown>) | null\n    if (!evt || typeof evt !== 'object') return []\n    const kind = TELEGRAM_UPDATE_KEYS.find((k) => k in evt) ?? 'unknown'\n    return [{\n      provider: 'telegram',\n      eventType: `telegram.${kind}`,\n      providerEventId: typeof evt.update_id === 'number' ? String(evt.update_id) : undefined,\n      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n      payload: evt,\n      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n    }]\n  },\n  eventCatalog: {\n    // Derived from the SAME TELEGRAM_UPDATE_KEYS `parse` matches on, so the\n    // catalog is exhaustive and cannot drift — hence `closed`. (`telegram.unknown`,\n    // parse's fallback for an update with no recognized key, is intentionally\n    // excluded: it is not a triggerable event.)\n    namespace: 'telegram.',\n    closed: true,\n    events: TELEGRAM_UPDATE_KEYS.map((k) => ({ id: `telegram.${k}` })),\n  },\n}\n\n/** Dropbox Sign (HelloSign) webhook provider. There is NO signature header:\n *  the body carries `event.event_hash = HMAC_SHA256(apiKey, event_time +\n *  event_type)` (hex), so the `secret` here is the account's API key (the\n *  caller resolves it from the connection credential). The body is JSON, or a\n *  `json=`/multipart `name=\"json\"` form field on older apps. */\nexport const hellosignWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'hellosign',\n  // Dropbox Sign acknowledges a delivery only when the response body is exactly\n  // 'Hello API Event Received'; any other body makes it retry the event.\n  successResponse: { body: 'Hello API Event Received', headers: { 'content-type': 'text/plain' } },\n  verifySignature({ rawBody, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const body = parseHelloSignBody(rawBody)\n    const event = body?.event\n    if (\n      !event ||\n      typeof event.event_time !== 'string' ||\n      typeof event.event_type !== 'string' ||\n      typeof event.event_hash !== 'string'\n    ) {\n      return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_event_fields' }\n    }\n    const expected = createHmac('sha256', secret)\n      .update(`${event.event_time}${event.event_type}`)\n      .digest('hex')\n    const a = Buffer.from(event.event_hash.toLowerCase(), 'utf-8')\n    const b = Buffer.from(expected.toLowerCase(), 'utf-8')\n    if (a.length !== b.length) return { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n    return timingSafeEqual(a, b) ? { valid: true } : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const body = parseHelloSignBody(rawBody)\n    const event = body?.event\n    if (!event) return []\n    return [{\n      provider: 'hellosign',\n      eventType: `hellosign.${event.event_type ?? 'unknown'}`,\n      // Prefer Dropbox Sign's canonical `event.event_id` (stable across\n      // redeliveries, correlates with the provider). Fall back to a digest of\n      // the parsed body when it's absent: `event_hash` = HMAC(apiKey,\n      // event_time + event_type), so two distinct same-type events in the same\n      // second share it — the body digest stays distinct across differing\n      // events and identical across redeliveries of one event.\n      providerEventId:\n        typeof event.event_id === 'string' && event.event_id.length > 0\n          ? event.event_id\n          : createHash('sha256').update(JSON.stringify(body)).digest('hex'),\n      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n      payload: body,\n      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n    }]\n  },\n  eventCatalog: {\n    // Dropbox Sign namespaces every event `hellosign.<event_type>`. Documented\n    // set as hints; namespace is the authoritative gate. `callback_test` (the\n    // app-config ping) is intentionally excluded — it is not a workflow event.\n    namespace: 'hellosign.',\n    closed: false,\n    events: [\n      { id: 'hellosign.signature_request_sent' },\n      { id: 'hellosign.signature_request_viewed' },\n      { id: 'hellosign.signature_request_signed' },\n      { id: 'hellosign.signature_request_all_signed' },\n      { id: 'hellosign.signature_request_declined' },\n      { id: 'hellosign.signature_request_reassigned' },\n      { id: 'hellosign.signature_request_remind' },\n      { id: 'hellosign.signature_request_canceled' },\n      { id: 'hellosign.signature_request_expired' },\n    ],\n  },\n}\n\n/** Keys Clay HTTP-API-action payloads commonly carry that can anchor\n *  idempotency, in resolution order. Clay bodies are operator-defined, so we\n *  fall back to a digest of the raw body when none is present. */\nconst CLAY_EVENT_ID_KEYS = ['id', 'rowId', 'recordId', 'clayRowId', 'eventId'] as const\n\n/** Clay webhook provider — receives rows Clay delivers via its outbound \"HTTP\n *  API\" action. Clay does NOT sign its requests and adds no proprietary\n *  headers (the `x-clay-signature: sha256=...` header seen in some third-party\n *  code is unverified inference, not in Clay's docs). Authentication is\n *  therefore a pre-shared secret the operator adds as a header on the Clay\n *  action; we compare it constant-time against the per-connection secret.\n *  Header: `x-clay-webhook-secret`. The body is whatever columns the operator\n *  mapped (free-form JSON with no canonical event id), so idempotency anchors\n *  on a common id field when present, else a sha256 of the raw body. */\nexport const clayWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'clay',\n  verifySignature({ headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const token = firstHeader(headers, 'x-clay-webhook-secret')\n    if (!token) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_clay_webhook_secret' }\n    const a = Buffer.from(token, 'utf-8')\n    const b = Buffer.from(secret, 'utf-8')\n    if (a.length !== b.length) return { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n    return timingSafeEqual(a, b) ? { valid: true } : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const evt = safeJson(rawBody)\n    if (!evt || typeof evt !== 'object') return []\n    const record = evt as Record<string, unknown>\n    const idKey = CLAY_EVENT_ID_KEYS.find(\n      (k) => typeof record[k] === 'string' || typeof record[k] === 'number',\n    )\n    const providerEventId = idKey\n      ? String(record[idKey])\n      : createHash('sha256').update(rawBody).digest('hex')\n    const eventType =\n      typeof record.event === 'string'\n        ? `clay.${record.event}`\n        : typeof record.type === 'string'\n          ? `clay.${record.type}`\n          : 'clay.row'\n    return [{\n      provider: 'clay',\n      eventType,\n      providerEventId,\n      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n      payload: evt,\n      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n    }]\n  },\n}\n\ninterface HelloSignInboundBody {\n  event?: {\n    event_time?: string\n    event_type?: string\n    event_hash?: string\n    event_id?: string\n  }\n}\n\n/** Dropbox Sign posts JSON, a form-urlencoded `json=` field, or a\n *  multipart `name=\"json\"` part depending on app vintage. Mirrors the\n *  connector adapter's body extraction. */\nfunction parseHelloSignBody(rawBody: string): HelloSignInboundBody | null {\n  try {\n    const json = JSON.parse(rawBody) as HelloSignInboundBody\n    if (json && typeof json === 'object') return json\n  } catch {\n    // fall through to form-data extraction\n  }\n  // application/x-www-form-urlencoded `json=` field. URLSearchParams decodes\n  // `+` as a space (decodeURIComponent leaves it literal) and resolves\n  // percent-escapes, so space-bearing string fields aren't corrupted.\n  const formJson = new URLSearchParams(rawBody).get('json')\n  if (formJson) {\n    try {\n      return JSON.parse(formJson) as HelloSignInboundBody\n    } catch {\n      return null\n    }\n  }\n  // multipart/form-data with a `name=\"json\"` part. Extract linearly (indexOf +\n  // fixed-shape separator probes, no unbounded lazy regex) so a hostile body\n  // can't drive quadratic backtracking on this public ingress.\n  return extractMultipartJsonField(rawBody)\n}\n\n/** Pull the `json` part out of a multipart/form-data body without an\n *  unbounded backtracking regex. Returns null if the part isn't present or\n *  isn't valid JSON. The separator probes (`\\r?\\n\\r?\\n`, `\\r?\\n--`) are\n *  fixed-shape (no `*`/`+`), so each runs in a single linear scan. */\nfunction extractMultipartJsonField(rawBody: string): HelloSignInboundBody | null {\n  const nameIdx = rawBody.indexOf('name=\"json\"')\n  if (nameIdx === -1) return null\n  const afterName = rawBody.slice(nameIdx)\n  const sep = /\\r?\\n\\r?\\n/.exec(afterName)\n  if (!sep) return null\n  const partBody = afterName.slice(sep.index + sep[0].length)\n  const end = /\\r?\\n--/.exec(partBody)\n  if (!end) return null\n  try {\n    return JSON.parse(partBody.slice(0, end.index)) as HelloSignInboundBody\n  } catch {\n    return null\n  }\n}\n\n/** Generic HMAC provider — for the long-tail webhook source where the\n *  caller has standardised on a single sha256-of-body scheme. Header\n *  `X-Signature` by default; override at provider-build time if needed. */\nexport function genericHmacWebhookProvider(options: {\n  id: string\n  signatureHeader?: string\n  algorithm?: 'sha256' | 'sha1' | 'sha512'\n  signaturePrefix?: string\n  /** Parser to convert the raw body into envelopes. Defaults to\n   *  \"one event with eventType=<provider>.event and payload=JSON\". */\n  parse?: WebhookProvider['parse']\n}): WebhookProvider {\n  const header = options.signatureHeader ?? 'x-signature'\n  return {\n    id: options.id,\n    verifySignature({ rawBody, headers, secret }) {\n      const sig = firstHeader(headers, header)\n      if (!sig) return { valid: false, reason: `missing_${header}` }\n      return verifyHmacSignature(rawBody, sig, secret, {\n        algorithm: options.algorithm ?? 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