@tangle-network/agent-integrations 0.39.0 → 0.40.1

package/dist/connectors/adapters/index.d.ts

@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ interface RestConnectorSpec {
     credentialPlacement?: RestCredentialPlacement;
     defaultHeaders?: Record<string, string>;
     capabilities: RestOperationSpec[];
-    test?: RestRequestSpec;
+    test?: RestTestSpec;
 }
 interface RestOperationSpec {
     name: string;
@@ -423,6 +423,13 @@ interface RestRequestSpec {
     headers?: Record<string, string>;
     body?: 'args' | string | Record<string, unknown>;
 }
+interface RestTestSpec extends RestRequestSpec {
+    expectResponse?: RestResponseExpectation | RestResponseExpectation[];
+}
+interface RestResponseExpectation {
+    path: string;
+    equals: unknown;
+}
 declare function declarativeRestConnector(spec: RestConnectorSpec): ConnectorAdapter;
 
 /**

package/dist/connectors/adapters/index.js

@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ import {
   zohoCrmConnector,
   zohoDeskConnector,
   zuoraConnector
-} from "../../chunk-6MUBOVI4.js";
+} from "../../chunk-JXXPAUCX.js";
 import "../../chunk-2TW2QKGZ.js";
 import {
   DEFAULT_TANGLE_PLATFORM_URL,

package/dist/connectors/index.js

@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ import {
   zohoCrmConnector,
   zohoDeskConnector,
   zuoraConnector
-} from "../chunk-6MUBOVI4.js";
+} from "../chunk-JXXPAUCX.js";
 import {
   DEFAULT_SIGNATURE_TOLERANCE_SECONDS,
   firstHeader,

package/dist/index.js

@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ import {
   validateIntegrationManifest,
   validateProviderPassthroughRequest,
   verifyCapabilityToken
-} from "./chunk-P3RWMLK3.js";
+} from "./chunk-5QU3YCGR.js";
 import {
   InMemoryConnectStateStore,
   finishConnectFlow,
@@ -663,7 +663,7 @@ import {
   zohoCrmConnector,
   zohoDeskConnector,
   zuoraConnector
-} from "./chunk-6MUBOVI4.js";
+} from "./chunk-JXXPAUCX.js";
 import {
   DEFAULT_SIGNATURE_TOLERANCE_SECONDS,
   firstHeader,

package/dist/mcp.js

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import {
   IntegrationError,
   createCatalogExecutorProvider,
   importMcpConnector
-} from "./chunk-P3RWMLK3.js";
+} from "./chunk-5QU3YCGR.js";
 import "./chunk-TC5OMANJ.js";
 import "./chunk-IKCXDQVP.js";
 import "./chunk-H4XYLS7T.js";
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import "./chunk-FAFQZJPZ.js";
 import "./chunk-IA5GCKM6.js";
 import "./chunk-7P2LN4VT.js";
 import "./chunk-376UBTNB.js";
-import "./chunk-6MUBOVI4.js";
+import "./chunk-JXXPAUCX.js";
 import "./chunk-2TW2QKGZ.js";
 import "./chunk-OMLQCESJ.js";
 import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";

package/dist/registry.js

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import {
   composeIntegrationRegistry,
   inferIntegrationSupportTier,
   summarizeIntegrationRegistry
-} from "./chunk-P3RWMLK3.js";
+} from "./chunk-5QU3YCGR.js";
 import "./chunk-TC5OMANJ.js";
 import "./chunk-IKCXDQVP.js";
 import "./chunk-H4XYLS7T.js";
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import "./chunk-FAFQZJPZ.js";
 import "./chunk-IA5GCKM6.js";
 import "./chunk-7P2LN4VT.js";
 import "./chunk-376UBTNB.js";
-import "./chunk-6MUBOVI4.js";
+import "./chunk-JXXPAUCX.js";
 import "./chunk-2TW2QKGZ.js";
 import "./chunk-OMLQCESJ.js";
 import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";

package/dist/{router-BncoovUh.d.ts → router-S0Dadv2x.d.ts}

@@ -83,6 +83,16 @@ interface WebhookProvider {
         headers: WebhookHeaders;
         now?: number;
     }): WebhookEnvelope[] | Promise<WebhookEnvelope[]>;
+    /** Optional provider-specific 200 ACK the router returns on a verified
+     *  delivery, in place of the default `{ received, total }` JSON. Dropbox Sign
+     *  acknowledges a delivery only when the body is exactly
+     *  'Hello API Event Received' and retries otherwise; this lets such a
+     *  provider declare the body/headers it needs. The frozen status contract is
+     *  unchanged — only the 200 body/headers are customized. */
+    successResponse?: {
+        body: string;
+        headers?: Record<string, string>;
+    };
 }
 interface WebhookIdempotencyStore {
     /** Returns true if this providerEventId has been processed already.

package/dist/runtime.js

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import {
   InMemoryIntegrationGrantStore,
   IntegrationRuntime,
   createIntegrationRuntime
-} from "./chunk-P3RWMLK3.js";
+} from "./chunk-5QU3YCGR.js";
 import "./chunk-TC5OMANJ.js";
 import "./chunk-IKCXDQVP.js";
 import "./chunk-H4XYLS7T.js";
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import "./chunk-FAFQZJPZ.js";
 import "./chunk-IA5GCKM6.js";
 import "./chunk-7P2LN4VT.js";
 import "./chunk-376UBTNB.js";
-import "./chunk-6MUBOVI4.js";
+import "./chunk-JXXPAUCX.js";
 import "./chunk-2TW2QKGZ.js";
 import "./chunk-OMLQCESJ.js";
 import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";

package/dist/stripe/index.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { I as IntegrationRuntimeError, a as IntegrationUserAction } from '../errors-Bg3_rxnQ.js';
-import { a as WebhookEnvelope } from '../router-BncoovUh.js';
+import { a as WebhookEnvelope } from '../router-S0Dadv2x.js';
 
 /**
  * Subscription state machine.

package/dist/webhooks/index.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { W as WebhookProvider } from '../router-BncoovUh.js';
-export { S as SignatureVerification, a as WebhookEnvelope, b as WebhookHeaders, c as WebhookIdempotencyStore, d as WebhookRouter, e as WebhookRouterOptions, f as WebhookRouterRequest, g as WebhookRouterResponse } from '../router-BncoovUh.js';
+import { W as WebhookProvider } from '../router-S0Dadv2x.js';
+export { S as SignatureVerification, a as WebhookEnvelope, b as WebhookHeaders, c as WebhookIdempotencyStore, d as WebhookRouter, e as WebhookRouterOptions, f as WebhookRouterRequest, g as WebhookRouterResponse } from '../router-S0Dadv2x.js';
 
 /**
  * Pre-built `WebhookProvider` implementations for the inbound surfaces
@@ -32,6 +32,17 @@ declare const gmailWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider;
  *  the per-channel token (`X-Goog-Channel-Token`) as the shared secret.
  *  The router compares it constant-time against the resolved secret. */
 declare const gdriveWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider;
+/** Telegram Bot API webhook provider. Telegram does NOT sign the body — it
+ *  authenticates by echoing the `secret_token` set at `setWebhook` time in the
+ *  `X-Telegram-Bot-Api-Secret-Token` header. We compare it constant-time to the
+ *  per-connection secret. `update_id` is the idempotency anchor. */
+declare const telegramWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider;
+/** Dropbox Sign (HelloSign) webhook provider. There is NO signature header:
+ *  the body carries `event.event_hash = HMAC_SHA256(apiKey, event_time +
+ *  event_type)` (hex), so the `secret` here is the account's API key (the
+ *  caller resolves it from the connection credential). The body is JSON, or a
+ *  `json=`/multipart `name="json"` form field on older apps. */
+declare const hellosignWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider;
 /** Generic HMAC provider — for the long-tail webhook source where the
  *  caller has standardised on a single sha256-of-body scheme. Header
  *  `X-Signature` by default; override at provider-build time if needed. */
@@ -45,4 +56,4 @@ declare function genericHmacWebhookProvider(options: {
     parse?: WebhookProvider['parse'];
 }): WebhookProvider;
 
-export { WebhookProvider, docusealWebhookProvider, gdriveWebhookProvider, genericHmacWebhookProvider, gmailWebhookProvider, slackWebhookProvider, stripeWebhookProvider };
+export { WebhookProvider, docusealWebhookProvider, gdriveWebhookProvider, genericHmacWebhookProvider, gmailWebhookProvider, hellosignWebhookProvider, slackWebhookProvider, stripeWebhookProvider, telegramWebhookProvider };

package/dist/webhooks/index.js

@@ -61,6 +61,13 @@ var WebhookRouter = class {
     queueMicrotask(() => {
       void this.deliverEach(accepted);
     });
+    if (provider.successResponse) {
+      return {
+        status: 200,
+        body: provider.successResponse.body,
+        headers: provider.successResponse.headers
+      };
+    }
     return { status: 200, body: { received: accepted.length, total: events.length } };
   }
   async deliverEach(events) {
@@ -88,7 +95,7 @@ function errMessage(err) {
 }
 
 // src/webhooks/providers.ts
-import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from "crypto";
+import { createHash, createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from "crypto";
 var stripeWebhookProvider = {
   id: "stripe",
   verifySignature({ rawBody, headers, secret }) {
@@ -234,6 +241,123 @@ var gdriveWebhookProvider = {
     }];
   }
 };
+var TELEGRAM_UPDATE_KEYS = [
+  "message",
+  "edited_message",
+  "channel_post",
+  "edited_channel_post",
+  "business_connection",
+  "business_message",
+  "edited_business_message",
+  "deleted_business_messages",
+  "message_reaction",
+  "message_reaction_count",
+  "inline_query",
+  "chosen_inline_result",
+  "callback_query",
+  "shipping_query",
+  "pre_checkout_query",
+  "purchased_paid_media",
+  "poll",
+  "poll_answer",
+  "my_chat_member",
+  "chat_member",
+  "chat_join_request",
+  "chat_boost",
+  "removed_chat_boost"
+];
+var telegramWebhookProvider = {
+  id: "telegram",
+  verifySignature({ headers, secret }) {
+    const token = firstHeader(headers, "x-telegram-bot-api-secret-token");
+    if (!token) return { valid: false, reason: "missing_telegram_secret_token" };
+    const a = Buffer.from(token, "utf-8");
+    const b = Buffer.from(secret, "utf-8");
+    if (a.length !== b.length) return { valid: false, reason: "invalid_secret_token" };
+    return timingSafeEqual(a, b) ? { valid: true } : { valid: false, reason: "invalid_secret_token" };
+  },
+  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }) {
+    const evt = safeJson(rawBody);
+    if (!evt || typeof evt !== "object") return [];
+    const kind = TELEGRAM_UPDATE_KEYS.find((k) => k in evt) ?? "unknown";
+    return [{
+      provider: "telegram",
+      eventType: `telegram.${kind}`,
+      providerEventId: typeof evt.update_id === "number" ? String(evt.update_id) : void 0,
+      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),
+      payload: evt,
+      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers)
+    }];
+  }
+};
+var hellosignWebhookProvider = {
+  id: "hellosign",
+  // Dropbox Sign acknowledges a delivery only when the response body is exactly
+  // 'Hello API Event Received'; any other body makes it retry the event.
+  successResponse: { body: "Hello API Event Received", headers: { "content-type": "text/plain" } },
+  verifySignature({ rawBody, secret }) {
+    const body = parseHelloSignBody(rawBody);
+    const event = body?.event;
+    if (!event || typeof event.event_time !== "string" || typeof event.event_type !== "string" || typeof event.event_hash !== "string") {
+      return { valid: false, reason: "missing_event_fields" };
+    }
+    const expected = createHmac("sha256", secret).update(`${event.event_time}${event.event_type}`).digest("hex");
+    const a = Buffer.from(event.event_hash.toLowerCase(), "utf-8");
+    const b = Buffer.from(expected.toLowerCase(), "utf-8");
+    if (a.length !== b.length) return { valid: false, reason: "invalid_signature" };
+    return timingSafeEqual(a, b) ? { valid: true } : { valid: false, reason: "invalid_signature" };
+  },
+  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }) {
+    const body = parseHelloSignBody(rawBody);
+    const event = body?.event;
+    if (!event) return [];
+    return [{
+      provider: "hellosign",
+      eventType: `hellosign.${event.event_type ?? "unknown"}`,
+      // Prefer Dropbox Sign's canonical `event.event_id` (stable across
+      // redeliveries, correlates with the provider). Fall back to a digest of
+      // the parsed body when it's absent: `event_hash` = HMAC(apiKey,
+      // event_time + event_type), so two distinct same-type events in the same
+      // second share it — the body digest stays distinct across differing
+      // events and identical across redeliveries of one event.
+      providerEventId: typeof event.event_id === "string" && event.event_id.length > 0 ? event.event_id : createHash("sha256").update(JSON.stringify(body)).digest("hex"),
+      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),
+      payload: body,
+      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers)
+    }];
+  }
+};
+function parseHelloSignBody(rawBody) {
+  try {
+    const json = JSON.parse(rawBody);
+    if (json && typeof json === "object") return json;
+  } catch {
+  }
+  const formJson = new URLSearchParams(rawBody).get("json");
+  if (formJson) {
+    try {
+      return JSON.parse(formJson);
+    } catch {
+      return null;
+    }
+  }
+  return extractMultipartJsonField(rawBody);
+}
+function extractMultipartJsonField(rawBody) {
+  const nameIdx = rawBody.indexOf('name="json"');
+  if (nameIdx === -1) return null;
+  const afterName = rawBody.slice(nameIdx);
+  const sep = /\r?\n\r?\n/.exec(afterName);
+  if (!sep) return null;
+  const partBody = afterName.slice(sep.index + sep[0].length);
+  const end = /\r?\n--/.exec(partBody);
+  if (!end) return null;
+  try {
+    return JSON.parse(partBody.slice(0, end.index));
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
 function genericHmacWebhookProvider(options) {
   const header = options.signatureHeader ?? "x-signature";
   return {
@@ -280,7 +404,9 @@ export {
   gdriveWebhookProvider,
   genericHmacWebhookProvider,
   gmailWebhookProvider,
+  hellosignWebhookProvider,
   slackWebhookProvider,
-  stripeWebhookProvider
+  stripeWebhookProvider,
+  telegramWebhookProvider
 };
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/webhooks/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/webhooks/router.ts","../../src/webhooks/providers.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @stable Provider-agnostic inbound webhook router.\n *\n * Consumer hooks a single HTTP handler at `/webhook/:provider/:event`\n * (or whatever pathing they prefer) and forwards the request through\n * `WebhookRouter.handle()`. The router:\n *\n *   1. Resolves the registered provider entry.\n *   2. Calls the provider's `verifySignature(rawBody, headers, secrets)`.\n *      Failure → 401 fast, no downstream work.\n *   3. Calls the provider's `parse(rawBody, headers)` to extract zero or\n *      more normalized events.\n *   4. Enqueues each event for async processing via the consumer-supplied\n *      `deliver(event)` callback (best-effort fire-and-forget — the\n *      router does NOT block the HTTP response on the consumer's work).\n *   5. Returns 200 fast with `{received: events.length}`.\n *\n * Replay protection: providers that sign timestamps (Stripe, Slack)\n * already reject stale signatures inside `verifySignature`. For providers\n * that don't (DocuSeal, GDrive push), the router exposes a pluggable\n * `idempotency` hook: if `idempotency.seen(providerEventId)` returns\n * true, the router 200s without invoking `deliver()`. Consumers wire\n * this to a durable kv (D1 / Redis / Postgres unique-index).\n *\n * Why a router and not a per-provider express app: the runtime contract\n * a product cares about is \"an inbound event came in, here's the\n * normalized envelope\". Verification, parsing, and idempotency-dedup\n * are mechanical and provider-specific — the router owns them. The\n * consumer's `deliver()` is the only place product logic runs.\n *\n * Stability: `@stable` — additions to `WebhookEnvelope` must be\n * additive; the router's HTTP contract (paths, status codes) is frozen\n * at 200 (ok), 400 (bad request), 401 (bad signature), 404 (unknown\n * provider), 405 (provider has no inbound surface).\n */\n\nexport interface WebhookHeaders {\n  [name: string]: string | string[] | undefined\n}\n\n/** Normalized inbound event the router emits after parsing. */\nexport interface WebhookEnvelope<TPayload = unknown> {\n  /** Provider id (matches the `:provider` path segment). */\n  provider: string\n  /** Optional event class — e.g., 'customer.subscription.deleted'. The\n   *  provider's parser decides. Used for routing inside `deliver()`. */\n  eventType: string\n  /** Provider-emitted event id, when present. Used for the idempotency\n   *  short-circuit. */\n  providerEventId?: string\n  /** Wall-clock receive time. */\n  receivedAt: number\n  /** Provider payload, normalized to the provider's documented event\n   *  shape. The router does NOT reshape this — `parse()` is the contract. */\n  payload: TPayload\n  /** Headers passed through for downstream handlers that want them\n   *  (e.g., to extract custom routing metadata). Always lowercased keys. */\n  headers: Record<string, string>\n}\n\nexport type SignatureVerification =\n  | { valid: true }\n  | { valid: false; reason: string }\n\n/** Per-provider plug-in. Stateless — the router calls `verifySignature`\n *  then `parse` on every request. The provider's HTTP-shape concerns\n *  (e.g., raw body required) are documented per provider. */\nexport interface WebhookProvider {\n  /** Stable provider id (`stripe`, `docuseal`, `gdrive`, ...). */\n  id: string\n  /** Verify the inbound signature. Receives the EXACT raw body string —\n   *  consumers MUST preserve raw bytes through their HTTP server (do not\n   *  parse JSON before forwarding here). */\n  verifySignature(input: {\n    rawBody: string\n    headers: WebhookHeaders\n    secret: string\n  }): SignatureVerification\n  /** Parse the validated raw body into zero or more normalized events.\n   *  A single push payload may carry multiple events (e.g., Slack bulk\n   *  delivery). Return [] to ack the push as a no-op. */\n  parse(input: {\n    rawBody: string\n    headers: WebhookHeaders\n    now?: number\n  }): WebhookEnvelope[] | Promise<WebhookEnvelope[]>\n}\n\nexport interface WebhookIdempotencyStore {\n  /** Returns true if this providerEventId has been processed already.\n   *  Implementations should be O(1) (Redis SETNX, D1 UNIQUE constraint). */\n  seen(providerEventId: string): Promise<boolean> | boolean\n  /** Marks a providerEventId as processed. Called AFTER `deliver()` has\n   *  been invoked. */\n  remember(providerEventId: string, ttlMs: number): Promise<void> | void\n}\n\nexport interface WebhookRouterOptions {\n  /** Provider registry. Pass any number of providers; routing is by id. */\n  providers: WebhookProvider[]\n  /** Async callback invoked with every accepted event. Fire-and-forget\n   *  from the router's perspective — the HTTP response is sent before\n   *  this resolves. Throws are caught and reported via `onError`. */\n  deliver(event: WebhookEnvelope): Promise<void> | void\n  /** Resolve the signing secret for a provider id at request time. The\n   *  router never holds secrets — the consumer's vault resolves them. */\n  resolveSecret(providerId: string, headers: WebhookHeaders): Promise<string | null> | string | null\n  /** Optional idempotency-dedup hook. Required for providers that don't\n   *  sign timestamps in their signature scheme (DocuSeal, Drive push). */\n  idempotency?: WebhookIdempotencyStore\n  /** TTL on idempotency entries. Default 7 days — long enough that a\n   *  provider's normal retry-window can't re-deliver. */\n  idempotencyTtlMs?: number\n  /** Surface delivery errors. Default: console.error. */\n  onError?(err: unknown, context: { provider: string; eventType?: string; providerEventId?: string }): void\n  /** Override `now()` for tests. */\n  now?(): number\n}\n\nexport interface WebhookRouterRequest {\n  providerId: string\n  rawBody: string\n  headers: WebhookHeaders\n}\n\nexport interface WebhookRouterResponse {\n  status: number\n  body: unknown\n  headers?: Record<string, string>\n}\n\n/**\n * Router instance. Stateless aside from the provider registry — safe to\n * share across requests; build once per process.\n */\nexport class WebhookRouter {\n  private readonly providers: Map<string, WebhookProvider>\n  private readonly deliver: WebhookRouterOptions['deliver']\n  private readonly resolveSecret: WebhookRouterOptions['resolveSecret']\n  private readonly idempotency?: WebhookIdempotencyStore\n  private readonly idempotencyTtlMs: number\n  private readonly onError: NonNullable<WebhookRouterOptions['onError']>\n  private readonly nowFn: () => number\n\n  constructor(opts: WebhookRouterOptions) {\n    this.providers = new Map(opts.providers.map((p) => [p.id, p]))\n    this.deliver = opts.deliver\n    this.resolveSecret = opts.resolveSecret\n    this.idempotency = opts.idempotency\n    this.idempotencyTtlMs = opts.idempotencyTtlMs ?? 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000\n    this.onError = opts.onError ?? defaultOnError\n    this.nowFn = opts.now ?? Date.now\n  }\n\n  /** Process one inbound webhook request. Pure with respect to side-\n   *  effects on the router instance — safe to call concurrently. */\n  async handle(request: WebhookRouterRequest): Promise<WebhookRouterResponse> {\n    const provider = this.providers.get(request.providerId)\n    if (!provider) {\n      return { status: 404, body: { error: 'unknown_provider', provider: request.providerId } }\n    }\n    const secret = await this.resolveSecret(provider.id, request.headers)\n    if (!secret) {\n      return { status: 401, body: { error: 'missing_secret', provider: provider.id } }\n    }\n    const verification = provider.verifySignature({\n      rawBody: request.rawBody,\n      headers: request.headers,\n      secret,\n    })\n    if (!verification.valid) {\n      return { status: 401, body: { error: 'invalid_signature', reason: verification.reason } }\n    }\n\n    let events: WebhookEnvelope[]\n    try {\n      events = await provider.parse({ rawBody: request.rawBody, headers: request.headers, now: this.nowFn() })\n    } catch (err) {\n      this.onError(err, { provider: provider.id })\n      return { status: 400, body: { error: 'parse_error', message: errMessage(err) } }\n    }\n\n    const accepted: WebhookEnvelope[] = []\n    for (const event of events) {\n      if (event.providerEventId && this.idempotency) {\n        const already = await this.idempotency.seen(event.providerEventId)\n        if (already) continue\n      }\n      accepted.push(event)\n    }\n\n    // Deliver async — do NOT block the HTTP response. Errors land in\n    // `onError`; the provider already got its 200 by then so it will\n    // not retry.\n    queueMicrotask(() => {\n      void this.deliverEach(accepted)\n    })\n\n    return { status: 200, body: { received: accepted.length, total: events.length } }\n  }\n\n  private async deliverEach(events: WebhookEnvelope[]): Promise<void> {\n    for (const event of events) {\n      try {\n        await this.deliver(event)\n        if (event.providerEventId && this.idempotency) {\n          await this.idempotency.remember(event.providerEventId, this.idempotencyTtlMs)\n        }\n      } catch (err) {\n        this.onError(err, {\n          provider: event.provider,\n          eventType: event.eventType,\n          providerEventId: event.providerEventId,\n        })\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nfunction defaultOnError(err: unknown, context: { provider: string; eventType?: string; providerEventId?: string }): void {\n  // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n  console.error('[WebhookRouter]', context, err)\n}\n\nfunction errMessage(err: unknown): string {\n  return err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)\n}\n","/**\n * Pre-built `WebhookProvider` implementations for the inbound surfaces\n * the substrate ships first-party verifiers for.\n *\n * Each provider implementation is intentionally thin: it delegates\n * signature verification to the corresponding pure function in\n * `connectors/webhooks.ts` and parses the body into one or more\n * normalized `WebhookEnvelope` rows. Anything provider-specific that\n * doesn't fit cleanly (Slack URL-verification handshake, etc.) is\n * surfaced via the envelope `eventType` so the consumer's `deliver()`\n * can branch.\n */\n\nimport {\n  firstHeader,\n  verifyHmacSignature,\n  verifySlackSignature,\n  verifyStripeSignature,\n} from '../connectors/webhooks.js'\nimport type { WebhookEnvelope, WebhookHeaders, WebhookProvider, SignatureVerification } from './router.js'\nimport { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto'\n\n/** Stripe webhook provider. Signature header `Stripe-Signature`. */\nexport const stripeWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'stripe',\n  verifySignature({ rawBody, headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const sig = firstHeader(headers, 'stripe-signature')\n    if (!sig) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_stripe_signature' }\n    return verifyStripeSignature(rawBody, sig, secret)\n      ? { valid: true }\n      : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const evt = safeJson(rawBody)\n    if (!evt || typeof evt !== 'object') return []\n    const e = evt as { id?: unknown; type?: unknown }\n    return [\n      {\n        provider: 'stripe',\n        eventType: typeof e.type === 'string' ? e.type : 'stripe.unknown',\n        providerEventId: typeof e.id === 'string' ? e.id : undefined,\n        receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n        payload: evt,\n        headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n      },\n    ]\n  },\n}\n\n/** Slack Events API provider. Handles the `url_verification` handshake\n *  by emitting a synthetic event the consumer's `deliver()` can echo. */\nexport const slackWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'slack',\n  verifySignature({ rawBody, headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const sig = firstHeader(headers, 'x-slack-signature')\n    const ts = firstHeader(headers, 'x-slack-request-timestamp')\n    if (!sig || !ts) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_slack_signature_or_timestamp' }\n    return verifySlackSignature(rawBody, sig, ts, secret)\n      ? { valid: true }\n      : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const evt = safeJson(rawBody) as { type?: string; event_id?: string; event?: { type?: string } } | null\n    if (!evt || typeof evt !== 'object') return []\n    if (evt.type === 'url_verification') {\n      return [{\n        provider: 'slack',\n        eventType: 'slack.url_verification',\n        receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n        payload: evt,\n        headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n      }]\n    }\n    const eventType = `slack.${evt.event?.type ?? evt.type ?? 'unknown'}`\n    return [{\n      provider: 'slack',\n      eventType,\n      providerEventId: typeof evt.event_id === 'string' ? evt.event_id : undefined,\n      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n      payload: evt,\n      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n    }]\n  },\n}\n\n/** DocuSeal webhook provider. Signature header `X-Docuseal-Signature`. */\nexport const docusealWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'docuseal',\n  verifySignature({ rawBody, headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const sig = firstHeader(headers, 'x-docuseal-signature')\n    if (!sig) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_docuseal_signature' }\n    const expected = createHmac('sha256', secret).update(rawBody).digest('hex')\n    const a = Buffer.from(sig.toLowerCase(), 'utf-8')\n    const b = Buffer.from(expected, 'utf-8')\n    if (a.length !== b.length) return { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n    return timingSafeEqual(a, b) ? { valid: true } : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const evt = safeJson(rawBody) as { event_type?: string; event_id?: string } | null\n    if (!evt || typeof evt !== 'object') return []\n    return [{\n      provider: 'docuseal',\n      eventType: `docuseal.${evt.event_type ?? 'unknown'}`,\n      providerEventId: typeof evt.event_id === 'string' ? evt.event_id : undefined,\n      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n      payload: evt,\n      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n    }]\n  },\n}\n\n/** Gmail push provider. Cloud Pub/Sub posts a JWT-signed envelope; the\n *  *payload* is base64 JSON describing the changed history range. The\n *  signature scheme here is the Pub/Sub JWT auth header — when supplied,\n *  consumers SHOULD verify the JWT against Google's well-known\n *  certificates. We accept the simpler \"Bearer <pubsub-shared-secret>\"\n *  variant by default (matching `verifyHmacSignature`). */\nexport const gmailWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'gmail',\n  verifySignature({ headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const auth = firstHeader(headers, 'authorization')\n    if (!auth) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_authorization' }\n    // Accept either \"Bearer <secret>\" or \"Token <secret>\" formats. 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Date.now(),\n      payload: { ...inner, publishTime: envelope.message.publishTime },\n      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n    }]\n  },\n}\n\n/** Google Drive push provider. Drive does NOT sign the body — it uses\n *  the per-channel token (`X-Goog-Channel-Token`) as the shared secret.\n *  The router compares it constant-time against the resolved secret. */\nexport const gdriveWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'gdrive',\n  verifySignature({ headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const token = firstHeader(headers, 'x-goog-channel-token')\n    if (!token) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_channel_token' }\n    const a = Buffer.from(token, 'utf-8')\n    const b = Buffer.from(secret, 'utf-8')\n    if (a.length !== b.length) return { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n    return timingSafeEqual(a, b) ? { valid: true } : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const resourceId = firstHeader(headers, 'x-goog-resource-id')\n    const resourceState = firstHeader(headers, 'x-goog-resource-state') ?? 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Header\n *  `X-Signature` by default; override at provider-build time if needed. */\nexport function genericHmacWebhookProvider(options: {\n  id: string\n  signatureHeader?: string\n  algorithm?: 'sha256' | 'sha1' | 'sha512'\n  signaturePrefix?: string\n  /** Parser to convert the raw body into envelopes. Defaults to\n   *  \"one event with eventType=<provider>.event and payload=JSON\". */\n  parse?: WebhookProvider['parse']\n}): WebhookProvider {\n  const header = options.signatureHeader ?? 'x-signature'\n  return {\n    id: options.id,\n    verifySignature({ rawBody, headers, secret }) {\n      const sig = firstHeader(headers, header)\n      if (!sig) return { valid: false, reason: `missing_${header}` }\n      return verifyHmacSignature(rawBody, sig, secret, {\n        algorithm: options.algorithm ?? 'sha256',\n        signaturePrefix: options.signaturePrefix,\n      })\n        ? { valid: true }\n        : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n    },\n    parse:\n      options.parse ??\n      (({ rawBody, headers, now }) => {\n        const evt = safeJson(rawBody) ?? rawBody\n        return [{\n          provider: options.id,\n          eventType: `${options.id}.event`,\n          receivedAt: now ?? 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Returns 200 fast with `{received: events.length}`.\n *\n * Replay protection: providers that sign timestamps (Stripe, Slack)\n * already reject stale signatures inside `verifySignature`. For providers\n * that don't (DocuSeal, GDrive push), the router exposes a pluggable\n * `idempotency` hook: if `idempotency.seen(providerEventId)` returns\n * true, the router 200s without invoking `deliver()`. Consumers wire\n * this to a durable kv (D1 / Redis / Postgres unique-index).\n *\n * Why a router and not a per-provider express app: the runtime contract\n * a product cares about is \"an inbound event came in, here's the\n * normalized envelope\". Verification, parsing, and idempotency-dedup\n * are mechanical and provider-specific — the router owns them. The\n * consumer's `deliver()` is the only place product logic runs.\n *\n * Stability: `@stable` — additions to `WebhookEnvelope` must be\n * additive; the router's HTTP contract (paths, status codes) is frozen\n * at 200 (ok), 400 (bad request), 401 (bad signature), 404 (unknown\n * provider), 405 (provider has no inbound surface).\n */\n\nexport interface WebhookHeaders {\n  [name: string]: string | string[] | undefined\n}\n\n/** Normalized inbound event the router emits after parsing. */\nexport interface WebhookEnvelope<TPayload = unknown> {\n  /** Provider id (matches the `:provider` path segment). */\n  provider: string\n  /** Optional event class — e.g., 'customer.subscription.deleted'. The\n   *  provider's parser decides. Used for routing inside `deliver()`. */\n  eventType: string\n  /** Provider-emitted event id, when present. Used for the idempotency\n   *  short-circuit. */\n  providerEventId?: string\n  /** Wall-clock receive time. */\n  receivedAt: number\n  /** Provider payload, normalized to the provider's documented event\n   *  shape. The router does NOT reshape this — `parse()` is the contract. */\n  payload: TPayload\n  /** Headers passed through for downstream handlers that want them\n   *  (e.g., to extract custom routing metadata). Always lowercased keys. */\n  headers: Record<string, string>\n}\n\nexport type SignatureVerification =\n  | { valid: true }\n  | { valid: false; reason: string }\n\n/** Per-provider plug-in. Stateless — the router calls `verifySignature`\n *  then `parse` on every request. The provider's HTTP-shape concerns\n *  (e.g., raw body required) are documented per provider. */\nexport interface WebhookProvider {\n  /** Stable provider id (`stripe`, `docuseal`, `gdrive`, ...). */\n  id: string\n  /** Verify the inbound signature. Receives the EXACT raw body string —\n   *  consumers MUST preserve raw bytes through their HTTP server (do not\n   *  parse JSON before forwarding here). */\n  verifySignature(input: {\n    rawBody: string\n    headers: WebhookHeaders\n    secret: string\n  }): SignatureVerification\n  /** Parse the validated raw body into zero or more normalized events.\n   *  A single push payload may carry multiple events (e.g., Slack bulk\n   *  delivery). Return [] to ack the push as a no-op. */\n  parse(input: {\n    rawBody: string\n    headers: WebhookHeaders\n    now?: number\n  }): WebhookEnvelope[] | Promise<WebhookEnvelope[]>\n  /** Optional provider-specific 200 ACK the router returns on a verified\n   *  delivery, in place of the default `{ received, total }` JSON. Dropbox Sign\n   *  acknowledges a delivery only when the body is exactly\n   *  'Hello API Event Received' and retries otherwise; this lets such a\n   *  provider declare the body/headers it needs. The frozen status contract is\n   *  unchanged — only the 200 body/headers are customized. */\n  successResponse?: { body: string; headers?: Record<string, string> }\n}\n\nexport interface WebhookIdempotencyStore {\n  /** Returns true if this providerEventId has been processed already.\n   *  Implementations should be O(1) (Redis SETNX, D1 UNIQUE constraint). */\n  seen(providerEventId: string): Promise<boolean> | boolean\n  /** Marks a providerEventId as processed. Called AFTER `deliver()` has\n   *  been invoked. */\n  remember(providerEventId: string, ttlMs: number): Promise<void> | void\n}\n\nexport interface WebhookRouterOptions {\n  /** Provider registry. Pass any number of providers; routing is by id. */\n  providers: WebhookProvider[]\n  /** Async callback invoked with every accepted event. Fire-and-forget\n   *  from the router's perspective — the HTTP response is sent before\n   *  this resolves. Throws are caught and reported via `onError`. */\n  deliver(event: WebhookEnvelope): Promise<void> | void\n  /** Resolve the signing secret for a provider id at request time. The\n   *  router never holds secrets — the consumer's vault resolves them. */\n  resolveSecret(providerId: string, headers: WebhookHeaders): Promise<string | null> | string | null\n  /** Optional idempotency-dedup hook. Required for providers that don't\n   *  sign timestamps in their signature scheme (DocuSeal, Drive push). */\n  idempotency?: WebhookIdempotencyStore\n  /** TTL on idempotency entries. Default 7 days — long enough that a\n   *  provider's normal retry-window can't re-deliver. */\n  idempotencyTtlMs?: number\n  /** Surface delivery errors. Default: console.error. */\n  onError?(err: unknown, context: { provider: string; eventType?: string; providerEventId?: string }): void\n  /** Override `now()` for tests. */\n  now?(): number\n}\n\nexport interface WebhookRouterRequest {\n  providerId: string\n  rawBody: string\n  headers: WebhookHeaders\n}\n\nexport interface WebhookRouterResponse {\n  status: number\n  body: unknown\n  headers?: Record<string, string>\n}\n\n/**\n * Router instance. Stateless aside from the provider registry — safe to\n * share across requests; build once per process.\n */\nexport class WebhookRouter {\n  private readonly providers: Map<string, WebhookProvider>\n  private readonly deliver: WebhookRouterOptions['deliver']\n  private readonly resolveSecret: WebhookRouterOptions['resolveSecret']\n  private readonly idempotency?: WebhookIdempotencyStore\n  private readonly idempotencyTtlMs: number\n  private readonly onError: NonNullable<WebhookRouterOptions['onError']>\n  private readonly nowFn: () => number\n\n  constructor(opts: WebhookRouterOptions) {\n    this.providers = new Map(opts.providers.map((p) => [p.id, p]))\n    this.deliver = opts.deliver\n    this.resolveSecret = opts.resolveSecret\n    this.idempotency = opts.idempotency\n    this.idempotencyTtlMs = opts.idempotencyTtlMs ?? 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000\n    this.onError = opts.onError ?? defaultOnError\n    this.nowFn = opts.now ?? Date.now\n  }\n\n  /** Process one inbound webhook request. Pure with respect to side-\n   *  effects on the router instance — safe to call concurrently. */\n  async handle(request: WebhookRouterRequest): Promise<WebhookRouterResponse> {\n    const provider = this.providers.get(request.providerId)\n    if (!provider) {\n      return { status: 404, body: { error: 'unknown_provider', provider: request.providerId } }\n    }\n    const secret = await this.resolveSecret(provider.id, request.headers)\n    if (!secret) {\n      return { status: 401, body: { error: 'missing_secret', provider: provider.id } }\n    }\n    const verification = provider.verifySignature({\n      rawBody: request.rawBody,\n      headers: request.headers,\n      secret,\n    })\n    if (!verification.valid) {\n      return { status: 401, body: { error: 'invalid_signature', reason: verification.reason } }\n    }\n\n    let events: WebhookEnvelope[]\n    try {\n      events = await provider.parse({ rawBody: request.rawBody, headers: request.headers, now: this.nowFn() })\n    } catch (err) {\n      this.onError(err, { provider: provider.id })\n      return { status: 400, body: { error: 'parse_error', message: errMessage(err) } }\n    }\n\n    const accepted: WebhookEnvelope[] = []\n    for (const event of events) {\n      if (event.providerEventId && this.idempotency) {\n        const already = await this.idempotency.seen(event.providerEventId)\n        if (already) continue\n      }\n      accepted.push(event)\n    }\n\n    // Deliver async — do NOT block the HTTP response. Errors land in\n    // `onError`; the provider already got its 200 by then so it will\n    // not retry.\n    queueMicrotask(() => {\n      void this.deliverEach(accepted)\n    })\n\n    if (provider.successResponse) {\n      return {\n        status: 200,\n        body: provider.successResponse.body,\n        headers: provider.successResponse.headers,\n      }\n    }\n    return { status: 200, body: { received: accepted.length, total: events.length } }\n  }\n\n  private async deliverEach(events: WebhookEnvelope[]): Promise<void> {\n    for (const event of events) {\n      try {\n        await this.deliver(event)\n        if (event.providerEventId && this.idempotency) {\n          await this.idempotency.remember(event.providerEventId, this.idempotencyTtlMs)\n        }\n      } catch (err) {\n        this.onError(err, {\n          provider: event.provider,\n          eventType: event.eventType,\n          providerEventId: event.providerEventId,\n        })\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nfunction defaultOnError(err: unknown, context: { provider: string; eventType?: string; providerEventId?: string }): void {\n  // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n  console.error('[WebhookRouter]', context, err)\n}\n\nfunction errMessage(err: unknown): string {\n  return err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)\n}\n","/**\n * Pre-built `WebhookProvider` implementations for the inbound surfaces\n * the substrate ships first-party verifiers for.\n *\n * Each provider implementation is intentionally thin: it delegates\n * signature verification to the corresponding pure function in\n * `connectors/webhooks.ts` and parses the body into one or more\n * normalized `WebhookEnvelope` rows. Anything provider-specific that\n * doesn't fit cleanly (Slack URL-verification handshake, etc.) is\n * surfaced via the envelope `eventType` so the consumer's `deliver()`\n * can branch.\n */\n\nimport {\n  firstHeader,\n  verifyHmacSignature,\n  verifySlackSignature,\n  verifyStripeSignature,\n} from '../connectors/webhooks.js'\nimport type { WebhookEnvelope, WebhookHeaders, WebhookProvider, SignatureVerification } from './router.js'\nimport { createHash, createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto'\n\n/** Stripe webhook provider. Signature header `Stripe-Signature`. */\nexport const stripeWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'stripe',\n  verifySignature({ rawBody, headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const sig = firstHeader(headers, 'stripe-signature')\n    if (!sig) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_stripe_signature' }\n    return verifyStripeSignature(rawBody, sig, secret)\n      ? { valid: true }\n      : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const evt = safeJson(rawBody)\n    if (!evt || typeof evt !== 'object') return []\n    const e = evt as { id?: unknown; type?: unknown }\n    return [\n      {\n        provider: 'stripe',\n        eventType: typeof e.type === 'string' ? e.type : 'stripe.unknown',\n        providerEventId: typeof e.id === 'string' ? e.id : undefined,\n        receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n        payload: evt,\n        headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n      },\n    ]\n  },\n}\n\n/** Slack Events API provider. Handles the `url_verification` handshake\n *  by emitting a synthetic event the consumer's `deliver()` can echo. */\nexport const slackWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'slack',\n  verifySignature({ rawBody, headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const sig = firstHeader(headers, 'x-slack-signature')\n    const ts = firstHeader(headers, 'x-slack-request-timestamp')\n    if (!sig || !ts) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_slack_signature_or_timestamp' }\n    return verifySlackSignature(rawBody, sig, ts, secret)\n      ? { valid: true }\n      : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const evt = safeJson(rawBody) as { type?: string; event_id?: string; event?: { type?: string } } | null\n    if (!evt || typeof evt !== 'object') return []\n    if (evt.type === 'url_verification') {\n      return [{\n        provider: 'slack',\n        eventType: 'slack.url_verification',\n        receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n        payload: evt,\n        headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n      }]\n    }\n    const eventType = `slack.${evt.event?.type ?? evt.type ?? 'unknown'}`\n    return [{\n      provider: 'slack',\n      eventType,\n      providerEventId: typeof evt.event_id === 'string' ? evt.event_id : undefined,\n      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n      payload: evt,\n      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n    }]\n  },\n}\n\n/** DocuSeal webhook provider. Signature header `X-Docuseal-Signature`. */\nexport const docusealWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'docuseal',\n  verifySignature({ rawBody, headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const sig = firstHeader(headers, 'x-docuseal-signature')\n    if (!sig) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_docuseal_signature' }\n    const expected = createHmac('sha256', secret).update(rawBody).digest('hex')\n    const a = Buffer.from(sig.toLowerCase(), 'utf-8')\n    const b = Buffer.from(expected, 'utf-8')\n    if (a.length !== b.length) return { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n    return timingSafeEqual(a, b) ? { valid: true } : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const evt = safeJson(rawBody) as { event_type?: string; event_id?: string } | null\n    if (!evt || typeof evt !== 'object') return []\n    return [{\n      provider: 'docuseal',\n      eventType: `docuseal.${evt.event_type ?? 'unknown'}`,\n      providerEventId: typeof evt.event_id === 'string' ? evt.event_id : undefined,\n      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n      payload: evt,\n      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n    }]\n  },\n}\n\n/** Gmail push provider. Cloud Pub/Sub posts a JWT-signed envelope; the\n *  *payload* is base64 JSON describing the changed history range. The\n *  signature scheme here is the Pub/Sub JWT auth header — when supplied,\n *  consumers SHOULD verify the JWT against Google's well-known\n *  certificates. We accept the simpler \"Bearer <pubsub-shared-secret>\"\n *  variant by default (matching `verifyHmacSignature`). */\nexport const gmailWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'gmail',\n  verifySignature({ headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const auth = firstHeader(headers, 'authorization')\n    if (!auth) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_authorization' }\n    // Accept either \"Bearer <secret>\" or \"Token <secret>\" formats. This\n    // is the simple per-tenant shared-secret path; JWT verification is\n    // left to the consumer's `deliver()` when they need full Google JWT\n    // chain validation.\n    const m = /^(?:Bearer|Token)\\s+(.+)$/i.exec(auth)\n    if (!m) return { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_authorization_format' }\n    const a = Buffer.from(m[1]!, 'utf-8')\n    const b = Buffer.from(secret, 'utf-8')\n    if (a.length !== b.length) return { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n    return timingSafeEqual(a, b) ? { valid: true } : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const envelope = safeJson(rawBody) as { message?: { data?: string; messageId?: string; publishTime?: string } } | null\n    if (!envelope?.message?.data) return []\n    let payload: unknown\n    try {\n      payload = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(envelope.message.data, 'base64').toString('utf-8'))\n    } catch {\n      return []\n    }\n    const inner = payload as { historyId?: number | string; emailAddress?: string }\n    return [{\n      provider: 'gmail',\n      eventType: 'gmail.history_changed',\n      providerEventId: envelope.message.messageId,\n      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n      payload: { ...inner, publishTime: envelope.message.publishTime },\n      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n    }]\n  },\n}\n\n/** Google Drive push provider. Drive does NOT sign the body — it uses\n *  the per-channel token (`X-Goog-Channel-Token`) as the shared secret.\n *  The router compares it constant-time against the resolved secret. */\nexport const gdriveWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'gdrive',\n  verifySignature({ headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const token = firstHeader(headers, 'x-goog-channel-token')\n    if (!token) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_channel_token' }\n    const a = Buffer.from(token, 'utf-8')\n    const b = Buffer.from(secret, 'utf-8')\n    if (a.length !== b.length) return { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n    return timingSafeEqual(a, b) ? { valid: true } : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const resourceId = firstHeader(headers, 'x-goog-resource-id')\n    const resourceState = firstHeader(headers, 'x-goog-resource-state') ?? 'unknown'\n    const channelId = firstHeader(headers, 'x-goog-channel-id')\n    const messageNumber = firstHeader(headers, 'x-goog-message-number')\n    if (resourceState === 'sync') {\n      return [{\n        provider: 'gdrive',\n        eventType: 'gdrive.channel.sync',\n        providerEventId: messageNumber ? `${channelId}-${messageNumber}` : undefined,\n        receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n        payload: { channelId, resourceId, resourceState },\n        headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n      }]\n    }\n    return [{\n      provider: 'gdrive',\n      eventType: `gdrive.resource.${resourceState}`,\n      providerEventId: messageNumber ? `${channelId}-${messageNumber}` : undefined,\n      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n      payload: { channelId, resourceId, resourceState },\n      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n    }]\n  },\n}\n\n/** The Telegram update keys, in resolution order — the first present key names\n *  the update kind (`telegram.message`, `telegram.callback_query`, …). */\nconst TELEGRAM_UPDATE_KEYS = [\n  'message',\n  'edited_message',\n  'channel_post',\n  'edited_channel_post',\n  'business_connection',\n  'business_message',\n  'edited_business_message',\n  'deleted_business_messages',\n  'message_reaction',\n  'message_reaction_count',\n  'inline_query',\n  'chosen_inline_result',\n  'callback_query',\n  'shipping_query',\n  'pre_checkout_query',\n  'purchased_paid_media',\n  'poll',\n  'poll_answer',\n  'my_chat_member',\n  'chat_member',\n  'chat_join_request',\n  'chat_boost',\n  'removed_chat_boost',\n] as const\n\n/** Telegram Bot API webhook provider. Telegram does NOT sign the body — it\n *  authenticates by echoing the `secret_token` set at `setWebhook` time in the\n *  `X-Telegram-Bot-Api-Secret-Token` header. We compare it constant-time to the\n *  per-connection secret. `update_id` is the idempotency anchor. */\nexport const telegramWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'telegram',\n  verifySignature({ headers, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const token = firstHeader(headers, 'x-telegram-bot-api-secret-token')\n    if (!token) return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_telegram_secret_token' }\n    const a = Buffer.from(token, 'utf-8')\n    const b = Buffer.from(secret, 'utf-8')\n    if (a.length !== b.length) return { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_secret_token' }\n    return timingSafeEqual(a, b) ? { valid: true } : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_secret_token' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const evt = safeJson(rawBody) as ({ update_id?: number } & Record<string, unknown>) | null\n    if (!evt || typeof evt !== 'object') return []\n    const kind = TELEGRAM_UPDATE_KEYS.find((k) => k in evt) ?? 'unknown'\n    return [{\n      provider: 'telegram',\n      eventType: `telegram.${kind}`,\n      providerEventId: typeof evt.update_id === 'number' ? String(evt.update_id) : undefined,\n      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n      payload: evt,\n      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n    }]\n  },\n}\n\n/** Dropbox Sign (HelloSign) webhook provider. There is NO signature header:\n *  the body carries `event.event_hash = HMAC_SHA256(apiKey, event_time +\n *  event_type)` (hex), so the `secret` here is the account's API key (the\n *  caller resolves it from the connection credential). The body is JSON, or a\n *  `json=`/multipart `name=\"json\"` form field on older apps. */\nexport const hellosignWebhookProvider: WebhookProvider = {\n  id: 'hellosign',\n  // Dropbox Sign acknowledges a delivery only when the response body is exactly\n  // 'Hello API Event Received'; any other body makes it retry the event.\n  successResponse: { body: 'Hello API Event Received', headers: { 'content-type': 'text/plain' } },\n  verifySignature({ rawBody, secret }): SignatureVerification {\n    const body = parseHelloSignBody(rawBody)\n    const event = body?.event\n    if (\n      !event ||\n      typeof event.event_time !== 'string' ||\n      typeof event.event_type !== 'string' ||\n      typeof event.event_hash !== 'string'\n    ) {\n      return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_event_fields' }\n    }\n    const expected = createHmac('sha256', secret)\n      .update(`${event.event_time}${event.event_type}`)\n      .digest('hex')\n    const a = Buffer.from(event.event_hash.toLowerCase(), 'utf-8')\n    const b = Buffer.from(expected.toLowerCase(), 'utf-8')\n    if (a.length !== b.length) return { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n    return timingSafeEqual(a, b) ? { valid: true } : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n  },\n  parse({ rawBody, headers, now }): WebhookEnvelope[] {\n    const body = parseHelloSignBody(rawBody)\n    const event = body?.event\n    if (!event) return []\n    return [{\n      provider: 'hellosign',\n      eventType: `hellosign.${event.event_type ?? 'unknown'}`,\n      // Prefer Dropbox Sign's canonical `event.event_id` (stable across\n      // redeliveries, correlates with the provider). Fall back to a digest of\n      // the parsed body when it's absent: `event_hash` = HMAC(apiKey,\n      // event_time + event_type), so two distinct same-type events in the same\n      // second share it — the body digest stays distinct across differing\n      // events and identical across redeliveries of one event.\n      providerEventId:\n        typeof event.event_id === 'string' && event.event_id.length > 0\n          ? event.event_id\n          : createHash('sha256').update(JSON.stringify(body)).digest('hex'),\n      receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n      payload: body,\n      headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n    }]\n  },\n}\n\ninterface HelloSignInboundBody {\n  event?: {\n    event_time?: string\n    event_type?: string\n    event_hash?: string\n    event_id?: string\n  }\n}\n\n/** Dropbox Sign posts JSON, a form-urlencoded `json=` field, or a\n *  multipart `name=\"json\"` part depending on app vintage. Mirrors the\n *  connector adapter's body extraction. */\nfunction parseHelloSignBody(rawBody: string): HelloSignInboundBody | null {\n  try {\n    const json = JSON.parse(rawBody) as HelloSignInboundBody\n    if (json && typeof json === 'object') return json\n  } catch {\n    // fall through to form-data extraction\n  }\n  // application/x-www-form-urlencoded `json=` field. URLSearchParams decodes\n  // `+` as a space (decodeURIComponent leaves it literal) and resolves\n  // percent-escapes, so space-bearing string fields aren't corrupted.\n  const formJson = new URLSearchParams(rawBody).get('json')\n  if (formJson) {\n    try {\n      return JSON.parse(formJson) as HelloSignInboundBody\n    } catch {\n      return null\n    }\n  }\n  // multipart/form-data with a `name=\"json\"` part. Extract linearly (indexOf +\n  // fixed-shape separator probes, no unbounded lazy regex) so a hostile body\n  // can't drive quadratic backtracking on this public ingress.\n  return extractMultipartJsonField(rawBody)\n}\n\n/** Pull the `json` part out of a multipart/form-data body without an\n *  unbounded backtracking regex. Returns null if the part isn't present or\n *  isn't valid JSON. The separator probes (`\\r?\\n\\r?\\n`, `\\r?\\n--`) are\n *  fixed-shape (no `*`/`+`), so each runs in a single linear scan. */\nfunction extractMultipartJsonField(rawBody: string): HelloSignInboundBody | null {\n  const nameIdx = rawBody.indexOf('name=\"json\"')\n  if (nameIdx === -1) return null\n  const afterName = rawBody.slice(nameIdx)\n  const sep = /\\r?\\n\\r?\\n/.exec(afterName)\n  if (!sep) return null\n  const partBody = afterName.slice(sep.index + sep[0].length)\n  const end = /\\r?\\n--/.exec(partBody)\n  if (!end) return null\n  try {\n    return JSON.parse(partBody.slice(0, end.index)) as HelloSignInboundBody\n  } catch {\n    return null\n  }\n}\n\n/** Generic HMAC provider — for the long-tail webhook source where the\n *  caller has standardised on a single sha256-of-body scheme. Header\n *  `X-Signature` by default; override at provider-build time if needed. */\nexport function genericHmacWebhookProvider(options: {\n  id: string\n  signatureHeader?: string\n  algorithm?: 'sha256' | 'sha1' | 'sha512'\n  signaturePrefix?: string\n  /** Parser to convert the raw body into envelopes. Defaults to\n   *  \"one event with eventType=<provider>.event and payload=JSON\". */\n  parse?: WebhookProvider['parse']\n}): WebhookProvider {\n  const header = options.signatureHeader ?? 'x-signature'\n  return {\n    id: options.id,\n    verifySignature({ rawBody, headers, secret }) {\n      const sig = firstHeader(headers, header)\n      if (!sig) return { valid: false, reason: `missing_${header}` }\n      return verifyHmacSignature(rawBody, sig, secret, {\n        algorithm: options.algorithm ?? 'sha256',\n        signaturePrefix: options.signaturePrefix,\n      })\n        ? { valid: true }\n        : { valid: false, reason: 'invalid_signature' }\n    },\n    parse:\n      options.parse ??\n      (({ rawBody, headers, now }) => {\n        const evt = safeJson(rawBody) ?? rawBody\n        return [{\n          provider: options.id,\n          eventType: `${options.id}.event`,\n          receivedAt: now ?? Date.now(),\n          payload: evt,\n          headers: normalizeHeaders(headers),\n        }]\n      }),\n  }\n}\n\nfunction safeJson(s: string): unknown {\n  try {\n    return JSON.parse(s)\n  } catch {\n    return null\n  }\n}\n\nfunction normalizeHeaders(headers: WebhookHeaders): Record<string, string> {\n  const out: Record<string, string> = {}\n  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (v === undefined) continue\n    const value = Array.isArray(v) ? v[0] : v\n    if (typeof value === 'string') out[k.toLowerCase()] = value\n  }\n  return 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package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@tangle-network/agent-integrations",
-  "version": "0.39.0",
+  "version": "0.40.1",
   "description": "Vendor-neutral integration contracts and runtime helpers for sandbox and agent apps.",
   "homepage": "https://github.com/tangle-network/agent-integrations#readme",
   "repository": {