@tangle-network/agent-eval 0.193.0 → 0.193.2

package/dist/{redact-B7rt9Zot.js → redact-Dk1ZdJEm.js}

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ const REDACTION_PROFILES = [
 * redaction behavior (saved optimizer inputs, per-span redaction stamps) keys
 * on it, so bump it whenever a detector, key list, cap or marker changes.
 */
-const REDACTION_VERSION = "2.2.0";
+const REDACTION_VERSION = "2.4.0";
 const KIB = 1024;
 const PROFILE_RULES = {
 	default: {
@@ -293,6 +293,17 @@ function classifyKey(key) {
 /**
 * High-confidence credential shapes. A hit replaces the whole string. Each
 * pattern is written without the `g` flag so `test` stays stateless.
+*
+* The provider-branded prefixes below (`sk-ant-`, `AIza`, `ghp_`, `xoxb-`,
+* `AKIA`, `hubcap_`, `eyJ`…) have no leading `\b`. A `\b` word-boundary
+* assertion does not fire between two word characters, so it silently passed
+* a real token when something else glued a word character directly in front
+* of it — a compound identifier like `env.GITHUB_TOKEN_ghp_<token>` (a `_`
+* before `ghp_`) or `BACKUP_AKIA<key>` (a `_` before `AKIA`). These prefixes
+* are distinctive enough on their own, so scanning without that boundary
+* catches the same real credential wherever it is glued, at the cost of no
+* meaningful new false positives (`scripts/redaction-corpus.json` covers
+* both).
 */
 const CREDENTIAL_DETECTORS = [
 	{
@@ -301,7 +312,7 @@ const CREDENTIAL_DETECTORS = [
 	},
 	{
 		id: "jwt",
-		pattern: /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/
+		pattern: /eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/
 	},
 	{
 		id: "bearer",
@@ -313,39 +324,39 @@ const CREDENTIAL_DETECTORS = [
 	},
 	{
 		id: "anthropic-key",
-		pattern: /\bsk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/
+		pattern: /sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/
 	},
 	{
 		id: "provider-key",
-		pattern: /\bsk-(?:proj-|tan-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/
+		pattern: /sk-(?:proj-|tan-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/
 	},
 	{
 		id: "stripe-key",
-		pattern: /\b(?:sk|rk)_(?:live|test)_[A-Za-z0-9_]{10,}/
+		pattern: /(?:sk|rk)_(?:live|test)_[A-Za-z0-9_]{10,}/
 	},
 	{
 		id: "google-api-key",
-		pattern: /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{20,}/
+		pattern: /AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{20,}/
 	},
 	{
 		id: "github-token",
-		pattern: /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,})/
+		pattern: /(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,})/
 	},
 	{
 		id: "slack-token",
-		pattern: /\bxox[abeoprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/
+		pattern: /xox[abeoprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/
 	},
 	{
 		id: "aws-access-key",
-		pattern: /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}\b/
+		pattern: /(?:AKIA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}\b/
 	},
 	{
 		id: "tangle-capability",
-		pattern: /\b(?:hubcap_|hct_)[A-Za-z0-9_=-]{8,}/
+		pattern: /(?:hubcap_|hct_)[A-Za-z0-9_=-]{8,}/
 	},
 	{
 		id: "url-credentials",
-		pattern: /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\/[^\s/:@]+:[^\s/@]+@/i
+		pattern: /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{0,31}:\/\/[^\s/:@]{1,512}:[^\s/@]{1,512}@/i
 	},
 	{
 		id: "url-secret-param",
@@ -353,7 +364,7 @@ const CREDENTIAL_DETECTORS = [
 	},
 	{
 		id: "secret-assignment",
-		pattern: /(?:api[_-]?key|apikey|access[_-]?key|secret[_-]?key|private[_-]?key|secret|token|password|passwd|passphrase|credentials?)["']?[ \t]*[:=][ \t]*["']?(?!encrypted:)(?![$`<[{(%])(?=[^\s"'`,;&|]*[0-9])(?=[^\s"'`,;&|]*[A-Za-z])[^\s"'`,;&|]{12,}/i
+		pattern: /(?:api[_-]?key|apikey|access[_-]?key|secret[_-]?key|private[_-]?key|secret|token|password|passwd|passphrase|credentials?)["']?[ \t]*[:=][ \t]*["']?(?!encrypted:)(?![$`<[{(%])(?=[^\s"'`,;&|]{0,512}[0-9])(?=[^\s"'`,;&|]{0,512}[A-Za-z])[^\s"'`,;&|]{12,512}/i
 	},
 	{
 		id: "json-secret",
@@ -365,27 +376,27 @@ const CREDENTIAL_DETECTORS = [
 	},
 	{
 		id: "huggingface-token",
-		pattern: /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/
+		pattern: /hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/
 	},
 	{
 		id: "npm-token",
-		pattern: /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/
+		pattern: /npm_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/
 	},
 	{
 		id: "gitlab-token",
-		pattern: /\bglpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/
+		pattern: /glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/
 	},
 	{
 		id: "groq-key",
-		pattern: /\bgsk_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/
+		pattern: /gsk_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/
 	},
 	{
 		id: "xai-key",
-		pattern: /\bxai-[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/
+		pattern: /xai-[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/
 	},
 	{
 		id: "bare-sk-key",
-		pattern: /\bsk_[A-Za-z0-9]{32,}\b/
+		pattern: /sk_[A-Za-z0-9]{32,}\b/
 	},
 	{
 		id: "cookie-header",
@@ -512,12 +523,22 @@ function knownSecretForms(values) {
 	return [...forms].sort((left, right) => right.length - left.length);
 }
 const BASE64_TEXT = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/_-]+={0,2}$/;
+const EMBEDDED_BASE64 = /[A-Za-z0-9+/]{16,4096}={0,2}/g;
 function containsKnownSecret(text, forms) {
 	if (forms.length === 0) return false;
 	if (forms.some((form) => text.includes(form))) return true;
-	if (text.length < 8 || !BASE64_TEXT.test(text)) return false;
-	const decoded = Buffer.from(text, text.includes("-") || text.includes("_") ? "base64url" : "base64").toString("utf8");
-	return forms.some((form) => decoded.includes(form));
+	if (text.length >= 8 && BASE64_TEXT.test(text)) {
+		const decoded = Buffer.from(text, text.includes("-") || text.includes("_") ? "base64url" : "base64").toString("utf8");
+		if (forms.some((form) => decoded.includes(form))) return true;
+	}
+	for (const match of text.matchAll(EMBEDDED_BASE64)) {
+		if (match[0] === text) continue;
+		try {
+			const decoded = Buffer.from(match[0], "base64").toString("utf8");
+			if (forms.some((form) => decoded.includes(form))) return true;
+		} catch {}
+	}
+	return false;
 }
 /** The detector that marks `text` as a credential: a known secret first, then the value shapes. */
 function credentialIn(text, knownSecrets) {
@@ -630,19 +651,23 @@ function redactStringAt(text, path, state) {
 		record(state, path, "media", "media", "redacted");
 		return marker("media");
 	}
-	const credential = credentialIn(output, state.knownSecrets);
+	const boundLen = Math.min(output.length, state.maxStringBytes);
+	let scanTarget = output.slice(0, boundLen);
+	const tail = output.slice(boundLen);
+	const credential = credentialIn(scanTarget, state.knownSecrets);
 	if (credential) {
 		record(state, path, "credential", credential, "redacted");
 		return marker(credential);
 	}
 	for (const detector of PERSONAL_DATA_DETECTORS) {
-		if (detector.requires && !output.includes(detector.requires)) continue;
-		output = output.replace(detector.pattern, (match) => {
+		if (detector.requires && !scanTarget.includes(detector.requires)) continue;
+		scanTarget = scanTarget.replace(detector.pattern, (match) => {
 			if (detector.accept && !detector.accept(match)) return match;
 			record(state, path, "personal-data", detector.id, "redacted");
 			return marker(detector.id);
 		});
 	}
+	output = scanTarget + tail;
 	const truncated = truncateUtf8(output, state.maxStringBytes);
 	if (truncated === void 0) return output;
 	record(state, path, "raw-content", "size-cap", "truncated");
@@ -702,10 +727,15 @@ function walk(value, path, depth, state) {
 		for (const [key, item] of Object.entries(value)) {
 			let outKey = key;
 			const keyCredential = credentialIn(key, state.knownSecrets);
+			const keyPersonalData = keyCredential ? void 0 : detectPersonalData(key)[0];
 			if (keyCredential) {
 				renamed += 1;
 				outKey = `${marker(keyCredential)}#${renamed}`;
 				record(state, pointer(path, outKey), "credential", keyCredential, "redacted");
+			} else if (keyPersonalData) {
+				renamed += 1;
+				outKey = `${marker(keyPersonalData)}#${renamed}`;
+				record(state, pointer(path, outKey), "personal-data", keyPersonalData, "redacted");
 			}
 			out[outKey] = redactKeyed(key, item, pointer(path, outKey), depth, state);
 		}
@@ -859,8 +889,11 @@ function scan(value, path, depth, state) {
 		}
 		for (const [key, item] of Object.entries(value)) {
 			const keyCredential = credentialIn(key, state.knownSecrets);
-			const segment = keyCredential ? marker(keyCredential) : key;
+			const keyPersonalData = keyCredential ? void 0 : detectPersonalData(key)[0];
+			const keyDetector = keyCredential ?? keyPersonalData;
+			const segment = keyDetector ? marker(keyDetector) : key;
 			if (keyCredential) flag(state, pointer(path, segment), "credential", keyCredential);
+			else if (keyPersonalData) flag(state, pointer(path, segment), "personal-data", keyPersonalData);
 			scanKeyed(key, item, pointer(path, segment), depth, state);
 		}
 	} finally {
@@ -941,4 +974,4 @@ function redactForShare(value, options = {}) {
 //#endregion
 export { combineVerdicts as a, emptyRedactionReport as c, redactForShare as d, redactText as f, classifyKey as i, normalizeKey as l, REDACTION_VERSION as n, detectCredential as o, shareAllowed as p, assessShareSafety as r, detectPersonalData as s, REDACTION_PROFILES as t, redact as u };
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=redact-B7rt9Zot.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=redact-Dk1ZdJEm.js.map

package/dist/redact-Dk1ZdJEm.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"redact-Dk1ZdJEm.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/trace/redact.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * The redaction core: the one place that decides what must not leave a\n * process or a machine. Every trace writer, exporter, uploader and share path\n * calls it.\n *\n * Three profiles, each a superset of the one before:\n *   - `default` removes credentials, found by key name and by value shape, and\n *     personal data (email addresses, card numbers, SSNs, phone numbers).\n *     Content is kept. Strings are capped at 1 MiB.\n *   - `share` also removes phone, IP and postal-address fields, replaces\n *     account, user, tenant, session and request identifiers with pseudonyms\n *     that stay consistent within one call, and caps strings at 64 KiB.\n *   - `strict` also removes prompt, completion, message, tool payload and other\n *     raw-content fields and embedded media, and caps strings at 4 KiB.\n *\n * A string that holds a credential is replaced whole with\n * `[REDACTED:<detector>]`. Replacing only the matched span can leave part of a\n * secret behind when a pattern's boundary is wrong. Personal data inside prose\n * is replaced in place, so the rest of the text stays readable.\n *\n * `assessShareSafety` reads a value without changing it and returns SAFE,\n * SAFE_WITH_WARNINGS, UNSAFE or UNKNOWN. UNKNOWN means the scanner could not\n * read part of the value (a cycle, binary data, nesting past the depth limit);\n * it is never reported as safe. `redactForShare` redacts and then assesses the\n * redacted output, so a detector gap shows up as UNSAFE instead of a leak.\n *\n * Reports and findings carry paths, categories and detector ids, never the\n * values they matched.\n *\n * The key classifier and the credential detector list are adapted from\n * agent-inspect (MIT, commit 3c3cbeda). `scripts/redaction-corpus.json` holds\n * the must-flag and must-not-flag cases, including the copied agent-inspect\n * safety corpus with its MIT notice; `pnpm redaction:corpus` runs this module\n * over every case.\n */\n\nimport { createHmac, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'\n\nexport type RedactionProfile = 'default' | 'share' | 'strict'\n\nexport const REDACTION_PROFILES: readonly RedactionProfile[] = ['default', 'share', 'strict']\n\n/** What a finding is about. `media` is embedded binary content (a `data:` URI) no text detector can read. */\nexport type SafetyCategory = 'credential' | 'personal-data' | 'identifier' | 'raw-content' | 'media'\n\n/**\n * Version of the detector set and profile rules. Stored work that depends on\n * redaction behavior (saved optimizer inputs, per-span redaction stamps) keys\n * on it, so bump it whenever a detector, key list, cap or marker changes.\n */\nexport const REDACTION_VERSION = '2.4.0'\n\nexport interface RedactionFinding {\n  /** JSON Pointer (RFC 6901) to the value or key that was changed. */\n  path: string\n  category: SafetyCategory\n  detector: string\n  action: 'redacted' | 'pseudonymized' | 'truncated'\n}\n\nexport interface RedactionReport {\n  version: string\n  profile: RedactionProfile\n  /** Values and keys replaced, pseudonymized or truncated. */\n  redactionCount: number\n  byDetector: Record<string, number>\n  truncatedCount: number\n  findings: RedactionFinding[]\n}\n\nexport interface RedactOptions {\n  /** Default `default`. */\n  profile?: RedactionProfile\n  /** Lower the profile's per-string cap. A value above the profile cap is ignored. */\n  maxStringBytes?: number\n  /**\n   * Exact values the caller knows are secret (an API key the run was given, a\n   * password from the environment), whatever shape they have. Each occurrence\n   * in a string, as written or base64, base64url or URL-encoded, becomes\n   * `[REDACTED:known-secret]` and the text around it is kept. A key that\n   * contains one, and a whole-string base64 payload that holds one at any byte\n   * offset, is replaced whole.\n   */\n  knownSecrets?: readonly string[]\n  /** Add this call's findings to an existing report instead of a new one. */\n  report?: RedactionReport\n}\n\nexport interface AssessOptions {\n  /** Default `default`. */\n  profile?: RedactionProfile\n  /** As in `RedactOptions`: any surviving occurrence makes the verdict UNSAFE. */\n  knownSecrets?: readonly string[]\n}\n\nexport type ShareSafetyStatus = 'SAFE' | 'SAFE_WITH_WARNINGS' | 'UNSAFE' | 'UNKNOWN'\n\nexport interface ShareSafetyFinding {\n  category: SafetyCategory\n  detector: string\n  severity: 'error' | 'warning'\n  count: number\n  /** Up to five JSON Pointers where the detector fired. */\n  paths: string[]\n}\n\nexport interface ShareSafetyVerdict {\n  status: ShareSafetyStatus\n  profile: RedactionProfile\n  findings: ShareSafetyFinding[]\n  /** Parts the scanner could not read, as `<path>: <reason>`. Any entry makes the status UNKNOWN. */\n  unreadable: string[]\n}\n\n// ── Profiles ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\ninterface ProfileRules {\n  maxStringBytes: number\n  /** Key categories whose values are removed or pseudonymized. */\n  redactKeys: ReadonlySet<'share-personal' | 'identifier' | 'raw-content'>\n  redactMedia: boolean\n  severity: Record<SafetyCategory, 'error' | 'warning' | undefined>\n}\n\nconst KIB = 1024\n\nconst PROFILE_RULES: Record<RedactionProfile, ProfileRules> = {\n  default: {\n    maxStringBytes: 1024 * KIB,\n    redactKeys: new Set(),\n    redactMedia: false,\n    severity: {\n      credential: 'error',\n      'personal-data': 'warning',\n      identifier: undefined,\n      'raw-content': 'warning',\n      media: 'warning',\n    },\n  },\n  share: {\n    maxStringBytes: 64 * KIB,\n    redactKeys: new Set(['share-personal', 'identifier']),\n    redactMedia: false,\n    severity: {\n      credential: 'error',\n      'personal-data': 'error',\n      identifier: 'warning',\n      'raw-content': 'warning',\n      media: 'warning',\n    },\n  },\n  strict: {\n    maxStringBytes: 4 * KIB,\n    redactKeys: new Set(['share-personal', 'identifier', 'raw-content']),\n    redactMedia: true,\n    severity: {\n      credential: 'error',\n      'personal-data': 'error',\n      identifier: 'warning',\n      'raw-content': 'error',\n      media: 'error',\n    },\n  },\n}\n\n// ── Key classifier ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Canonical snake_case form of a field name, so camelCase, kebab-case, dotted\n * and snake_case spellings match one list: `userPassword`, `user-password` and\n * `user.password` all become `user_password`.\n */\nexport function normalizeKey(key: string): string {\n  return key\n    .replace(/([a-z0-9])([A-Z])/g, '$1_$2')\n    .toLowerCase()\n    .replace(/[^a-z0-9]+/g, '_')\n    .replace(/^_+|_+$/g, '')\n}\n\n/** Counts, limits and model vocabulary that contain the word \"token\" but are not credentials. */\nconst NON_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_KEYS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  'tokens',\n  'max_tokens',\n  'min_tokens',\n  'ls_max_tokens',\n  'token_count',\n  'token_limit',\n  'token_budget',\n  'input_tokens',\n  'output_tokens',\n  'total_tokens',\n  'cached_tokens',\n  'prompt_tokens',\n  'completion_tokens',\n  'reasoning_tokens',\n  'bos_token',\n  'eos_token',\n  'pad_token',\n  'unk_token',\n  'sep_token',\n  'cls_token',\n  'mask_token',\n  'stop_token',\n  // Pagination cursors are opaque but not credentials.\n  'page_token',\n  'next_page_token',\n  'prev_page_token',\n  'next_token',\n  'continuation_token',\n  'cursor_token',\n  'sync_token',\n])\n\nconst CREDENTIAL_KEYS = [\n  'authorization',\n  'auth',\n  'cookie',\n  'api_key',\n  'apikey',\n  'api_token',\n  'access_key',\n  'secret_key',\n  'private_key',\n  'signing_key',\n  'encryption_key',\n  'master_key',\n  'session_key',\n  'client_secret',\n  'secret',\n  'password',\n  'passwd',\n  'passphrase',\n  'credential',\n  'credentials',\n  'bearer',\n  'dsn',\n  'database_url',\n  'connection_string',\n  'pat',\n] as const\n\n/** Email fields are personal data in every profile. */\nconst EMAIL_KEYS = ['email', 'email_address'] as const\n\n/** Personal-data fields removed by the share and strict profiles. */\nconst SHARE_PERSONAL_KEYS = [\n  'phone',\n  'phone_number',\n  'mobile',\n  'ip',\n  'ip_address',\n  'remote_addr',\n  'street_address',\n  'postal_address',\n  'home_address',\n  'billing_address',\n  'shipping_address',\n  'mailing_address',\n  'date_of_birth',\n  'dob',\n  'ssn',\n] as const\n\n/** Identifiers pseudonymized by the share and strict profiles. */\nconst IDENTIFIER_KEYS = [\n  'user_id',\n  'user_uuid',\n  'account_id',\n  'account_uuid',\n  'customer_id',\n  'tenant_id',\n  'org_id',\n  'organization_id',\n  'organisation_id',\n  'team_id',\n  'enduser_id',\n  'actor_id',\n  'principal_id',\n  'member_id',\n  'session_id',\n  'request_id',\n  'correlation_id',\n  'device_id',\n  'installation_id',\n] as const\n\n/** Fields that carry prompts, model output, tool payloads or other free text. Removed by `strict`. */\nconst RAW_CONTENT_KEYS = [\n  'prompt',\n  'prompts',\n  'system_prompt',\n  'completion',\n  'input',\n  'output',\n  'message',\n  'messages',\n  'content',\n  'text',\n  'thinking',\n  'reasoning',\n  'transcript',\n  'context',\n  'document',\n  'documents',\n  'chunk',\n  'chunks',\n  'retrieval',\n  'query',\n  'args',\n  'arguments',\n  'result',\n  'body',\n  'command',\n  'full_command',\n  'input_value',\n  'output_value',\n  'instructions',\n  'system_instructions',\n  'stdout',\n  'stderr',\n  'stacktrace',\n  'status_description',\n  'input_preview',\n  'output_preview',\n  'current_task',\n  'user_input',\n  'request_text',\n] as const\n\n/**\n * A key matches a list entry exactly or as a suffix (`openai_api_key`,\n * `db_password`, `tool_output`). Prefix compounds (`secret_name`,\n * `password_min_length`, `auth_type`, `content_type`) do not match: they name\n * or describe a value rather than hold it, and flagging them would make the\n * share verdict refuse ordinary traces. Value detectors still catch a\n * credential-shaped value under any key.\n */\nfunction matchesKeyList(normalized: string, keys: readonly string[]): boolean {\n  for (const key of keys) {\n    if (normalized === key || normalized.endsWith(`_${key}`)) return true\n  }\n  return false\n}\n\nfunction isTokenCredentialKey(normalized: string): boolean {\n  if (NON_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_KEYS.has(normalized)) return false\n  if (normalized === 'token') return true\n  // access_token and refreshToken are credentials; max_tokens and input_tokens are counts.\n  if (normalized.endsWith('tokens')) return false\n  return normalized.endsWith('token')\n}\n\ntype KeyClass = 'credential' | 'email' | 'share-personal' | 'identifier' | 'raw-content'\n\n/** Trace keys repeat on every span, so classifications are cached. */\nconst keyClassCache = new Map<string, KeyClass | null>()\n\nfunction classifyKeyName(key: string): KeyClass | undefined {\n  const cached = keyClassCache.get(key)\n  if (cached !== undefined) return cached ?? undefined\n  const kind = classifyNormalizedKey(normalizeKey(key))\n  if (keyClassCache.size >= 10_000) keyClassCache.clear()\n  keyClassCache.set(key, kind ?? null)\n  return kind\n}\n\nfunction classifyNormalizedKey(normalized: string): KeyClass | undefined {\n  if (!normalized || NON_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_KEYS.has(normalized)) return undefined\n  if (isTokenCredentialKey(normalized)) return 'credential'\n  if (matchesKeyList(normalized, CREDENTIAL_KEYS)) return 'credential'\n  if (matchesKeyList(normalized, EMAIL_KEYS)) return 'email'\n  if (matchesKeyList(normalized, SHARE_PERSONAL_KEYS)) return 'share-personal'\n  if (matchesKeyList(normalized, IDENTIFIER_KEYS)) return 'identifier'\n  if (matchesKeyList(normalized, RAW_CONTENT_KEYS)) return 'raw-content'\n  return undefined\n}\n\n/**\n * The safety category a field name puts its value in, or undefined for an\n * ordinary field. Token counts and model limits (`inputTokens`, `max_tokens`,\n * `token_count`) and names such as `author` are not credentials.\n */\nexport function classifyKey(key: string): SafetyCategory | undefined {\n  const kind = classifyKeyName(key)\n  if (kind === undefined) return undefined\n  if (kind === 'credential') return 'credential'\n  if (kind === 'identifier') return 'identifier'\n  if (kind === 'raw-content') return 'raw-content'\n  return 'personal-data'\n}\n\n// ── Value detectors ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\ninterface ValueDetector {\n  id: string\n  pattern: RegExp\n}\n\n/**\n * High-confidence credential shapes. A hit replaces the whole string. Each\n * pattern is written without the `g` flag so `test` stays stateless.\n *\n * The provider-branded prefixes below (`sk-ant-`, `AIza`, `ghp_`, `xoxb-`,\n * `AKIA`, `hubcap_`, `eyJ`…) have no leading `\\b`. A `\\b` word-boundary\n * assertion does not fire between two word characters, so it silently passed\n * a real token when something else glued a word character directly in front\n * of it — a compound identifier like `env.GITHUB_TOKEN_ghp_<token>` (a `_`\n * before `ghp_`) or `BACKUP_AKIA<key>` (a `_` before `AKIA`). These prefixes\n * are distinctive enough on their own, so scanning without that boundary\n * catches the same real credential wherever it is glued, at the cost of no\n * meaningful new false positives (`scripts/redaction-corpus.json` covers\n * both).\n */\nconst CREDENTIAL_DETECTORS: readonly ValueDetector[] = [\n  { id: 'private-key', pattern: /-----BEGIN [A-Z0-9 ]*PRIVATE KEY-----/ },\n  { id: 'jwt', pattern: /eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/ },\n  { id: 'bearer', pattern: /\\bbearer\\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{12,}/i },\n  {\n    id: 'authorization-header',\n    pattern: /^\\s*(?:basic|digest|apikey)\\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=:-]{8,}\\s*$/i,\n  },\n  { id: 'anthropic-key', pattern: /sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/ },\n  { id: 'provider-key', pattern: /sk-(?:proj-|tan-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/ },\n  { id: 'stripe-key', pattern: /(?:sk|rk)_(?:live|test)_[A-Za-z0-9_]{10,}/ },\n  { id: 'google-api-key', pattern: /AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{20,}/ },\n  { id: 'github-token', pattern: /(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,})/ },\n  { id: 'slack-token', pattern: /xox[abeoprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/ },\n  { id: 'aws-access-key', pattern: /(?:AKIA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}\\b/ },\n  { id: 'tangle-capability', pattern: /(?:hubcap_|hct_)[A-Za-z0-9_=-]{8,}/ },\n  {\n    // Scheme, userinfo user and password each bounded (32/512/512 chars): the\n    // unbounded `*`/`+` here made `detectCredential` catastrophically slow on\n    // adversarial text with no `://` at all — 256 KiB of `\"a.\"` took ~59s,\n    // measured before this fix (scratchpad/rv/before.ts). A real URL's scheme\n    // and userinfo are always far under these bounds.\n    id: 'url-credentials',\n    pattern: /\\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{0,31}:\\/\\/[^\\s/:@]{1,512}:[^\\s/@]{1,512}@/i,\n  },\n  {\n    id: 'url-secret-param',\n    pattern:\n      /[?&](?:access_token|api_key|apikey|auth|token|secret|password|sig|signature|x-amz-signature|x-goog-signature)=[^&\\s\"'#)]{8,}/i,\n  },\n  {\n    // `GH_TOKEN=…`, `--api-key=…`, `\"client_secret\": \"…\"`, `password: …` in free\n    // text. The value must mix letters and digits and be at least 12\n    // characters, so prose (`token: string`), variable references (`$TOKEN`)\n    // and dotenvx ciphertext (`encrypted:…`) pass. The pattern starts at the\n    // key word itself, with no identifier prefix, so it scans in linear time.\n    // The two mixed-content lookaheads and the value itself are bounded to\n    // 512 chars: unbounded, `'token='` repeated took ~20s at 256 KiB and\n    // `'password:x'` repeated took ~12s at 256 KiB (measured before this fix,\n    // scratchpad/rv/before.ts). A real credential value is always far under\n    // 512 chars.\n    id: 'secret-assignment',\n    pattern:\n      /(?:api[_-]?key|apikey|access[_-]?key|secret[_-]?key|private[_-]?key|secret|token|password|passwd|passphrase|credentials?)[\"']?[ \\t]*[:=][ \\t]*[\"']?(?!encrypted:)(?![$`<[{(%])(?=[^\\s\"'`,;&|]{0,512}[0-9])(?=[^\\s\"'`,;&|]{0,512}[A-Za-z])[^\\s\"'`,;&|]{12,512}/i,\n  },\n  {\n    // `{\"password\": \"hunter2\"}` or `'client_secret': '…'` inside serialized\n    // JSON, YAML or a log line. A quoted credential field name followed by a\n    // quoted value holds a secret whatever the value's shape or length. Bare\n    // `\"token\"` is left out: model logprob output uses it for text tokens.\n    // Placeholders (`[REDACTED…]`, `$VAR`, `{env:VAR}`, `***`, `<value>`) and\n    // prose with two or more spaces (a field description) do not match.\n    id: 'json-secret',\n    pattern:\n      /[\"'][A-Za-z0-9_.-]{0,40}?(?:api[_-]?key|apikey|access[_-]?key|secret[_-]?key|private[_-]?key|client[_-]?secret|secret|password|passwd|passphrase|credentials?|(?:access|refresh|id|auth|session|bearer|api|github|gh|slack|npm)[_-]?token)[\"'][ \\t]*:[ \\t]*[\"'](?!\\[REDACTED|[$*{<])(?![^\"'\\r\\n]* [^\"'\\r\\n]* )[^\"'\\r\\n]{3,}[\"']/i,\n  },\n  {\n    // `DB_PASSWORD=CorrectHorseBatteryStaple`, `PGPASSWORD=postgres`: unlike\n    // `secret-assignment` above, the all-upper-case env-var name ending in a\n    // credential word is itself the signal, so a letters-only or short real\n    // password still matches (no digit-mixing or 12-char minimum). Requires\n    // the name to be immediately followed by `=`, so `MAX_TOKENS=16` and\n    // `TOKEN_EXPIRY=…` (the word isn't the end of the name) do not match.\n    id: 'env-secret-assignment',\n    pattern:\n      /\\b[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*?(?:PASSWORD|PASSWD|SECRET|PASSPHRASE|APIKEY|API_KEY|TOKEN|CREDENTIALS?)[ \\t]*=[ \\t]*(?!\\$|<|\\*|\\{|%|encrypted:)[^\\s\"'`,;&|]{4,}/,\n  },\n  // Bare-key shapes not covered above. Each requires a distinctive prefix so\n  // it does not fire on ordinary identifiers — same reasoning as the\n  // provider-branded block above, and the same leading-`\\b` bug: a token\n  // glued to preceding text by a digit or underscore (`1ghp_…`, `_sk_live_…`)\n  // is invisible to an anchored detector.\n  { id: 'huggingface-token', pattern: /hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/ },\n  { id: 'npm-token', pattern: /npm_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/ },\n  { id: 'gitlab-token', pattern: /glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/ },\n  { id: 'groq-key', pattern: /gsk_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/ },\n  { id: 'xai-key', pattern: /xai-[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/ },\n  // ElevenLabs and similar bare `sk_<hex>` shapes — underscore, unlike the\n  // hyphenated `sk-…` `provider-key` pattern above, so the two never overlap.\n  { id: 'bare-sk-key', pattern: /sk_[A-Za-z0-9]{32,}\\b/ },\n  {\n    // `Cookie: sessionid=…; csrftoken=…` in free text or a captured header.\n    id: 'cookie-header',\n    pattern: /\\bcookie\\s*:\\s*[A-Za-z0-9_-]+=[^;\\r\\n]{3,}(?:;\\s*[A-Za-z0-9_-]+=[^;\\r\\n]{3,})*/i,\n  },\n]\n\n/** Personal-data shapes, replaced in place so the surrounding text survives. */\nconst PERSONAL_DATA_DETECTORS: readonly (ValueDetector & {\n  /** A substring the text must contain before the pattern runs. */\n  requires?: string\n  accept?: (match: string) => boolean\n})[] = [\n  {\n    id: 'email',\n    requires: '@',\n    pattern: /\\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+\\.[A-Za-z]{2,}\\b/g,\n    accept: isEmailAddress,\n  },\n  {\n    // Card numbers: a card-network prefix and a valid Luhn digit, written\n    // unbroken (13-19 digits) or in printed groups (4-4-4-4, 4-4-4-4-3, Amex\n    // 4-6-5). A word character or hyphen on either side rejects the match, so\n    // digits inside UUIDs, dated file names and hyphenated ids never match.\n    id: 'card-number',\n    pattern:\n      /(?<![\\w-])(?:\\d{13,19}|\\d{4}([ -])\\d{4}\\1\\d{4}\\1\\d{4}(?:\\1\\d{3})?|\\d{4}([ -])\\d{6}\\2\\d{5})(?![\\w-])/g,\n    accept: (match) => {\n      const digits = match.replace(/[ -]/g, '')\n      return CARD_PREFIX.test(digits) && luhnValid(digits)\n    },\n  },\n  { id: 'ssn', pattern: /\\b\\d{3}-\\d{2}-\\d{4}\\b/g },\n  {\n    // Separators are required: a bare ten-digit run is usually an epoch second or an id.\n    id: 'phone',\n    pattern: /(?:\\+1[-.\\s]?)?(?:\\(\\d{3}\\)\\s?|\\b\\d{3}[-.\\s])\\d{3}[-.\\s]\\d{4}\\b/g,\n  },\n]\n\n/** Visa, Mastercard, Amex, Diners, JCB, Discover and UnionPay issuer prefixes. */\nconst CARD_PREFIX = /^(?:4|5[1-5]|2[2-7]|3[04-9]|6(?:011|4[4-9]|5|2))/\n\n/**\n * Top-level domains that are file extensions: `icon@2x.png`, `worker@3.service`\n * and `notes@AGENTS.md` are not addresses.\n */\nconst NON_EMAIL_TLDS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  'md',\n  'mdx',\n  'txt',\n  'json',\n  'jsonl',\n  'yaml',\n  'yml',\n  'toml',\n  'lock',\n  'ts',\n  'tsx',\n  'js',\n  'jsx',\n  'mjs',\n  'cjs',\n  'py',\n  'rs',\n  'go',\n  'sh',\n  'css',\n  'html',\n  'svg',\n  'png',\n  'jpg',\n  'jpeg',\n  'gif',\n  'webp',\n  'service',\n  'socket',\n  'timer',\n  'mount',\n  'target',\n])\n\nfunction isEmailAddress(match: string): boolean {\n  // `git@github.com:org/repo` is an SSH remote, not a person.\n  if (match.toLowerCase().startsWith('git@')) return false\n  const tld = match.slice(match.lastIndexOf('.') + 1).toLowerCase()\n  return !NON_EMAIL_TLDS.has(tld)\n}\n\nfunction luhnValid(digits: string): boolean {\n  if (/^(\\d)\\1+$/.test(digits)) return false\n  let sum = 0\n  let double = false\n  for (let index = digits.length - 1; index >= 0; index -= 1) {\n    let digit = digits.charCodeAt(index) - 48\n    if (double) {\n      digit *= 2\n      if (digit > 9) digit -= 9\n    }\n    sum += digit\n    double = !double\n  }\n  return sum % 10 === 0\n}\n\n/** The first credential detector that matches, or undefined. */\nexport function detectCredential(text: string): string | undefined {\n  for (const detector of CREDENTIAL_DETECTORS) {\n    if (detector.pattern.test(text)) return detector.id\n  }\n  return undefined\n}\n\n/** Personal-data detector ids that match somewhere in `text`. */\nexport function detectPersonalData(text: string): string[] {\n  const hits: string[] = []\n  for (const detector of PERSONAL_DATA_DETECTORS) {\n    if (detector.requires && !text.includes(detector.requires)) continue\n    detector.pattern.lastIndex = 0\n    for (const match of text.matchAll(detector.pattern)) {\n      if (!detector.accept || detector.accept(match[0])) {\n        hits.push(detector.id)\n        break\n      }\n    }\n  }\n  return hits\n}\n\n/**\n * Every form in which a known secret can appear in a trace: as written,\n * base64, base64url and URL-encoded. Values shorter than 4 characters are\n * ignored; they would match ordinary text.\n */\nfunction knownSecretForms(values: readonly string[] | undefined): string[] {\n  const forms = new Set<string>()\n  for (const value of values ?? []) {\n    if (value.length < 4) continue\n    const bytes = Buffer.from(value, 'utf8')\n    forms.add(value)\n    forms.add(bytes.toString('base64'))\n    forms.add(bytes.toString('base64url'))\n    forms.add(encodeURIComponent(value))\n  }\n  // Longest first, so a secret that contains another is reported as itself.\n  return [...forms].sort((left, right) => right.length - left.length)\n}\n\nconst BASE64_TEXT = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/_-]+={0,2}$/\n\n// A base64 blob embedded in larger text — `Authorization: Basic <base64>` is\n// the common case — can hold a known secret without the WHOLE string being\n// base64. Bounded to 4096 chars per candidate: this scans in linear time (the\n// sum of candidate lengths is at most `text.length`), so no ReDoS risk.\nconst EMBEDDED_BASE64 = /[A-Za-z0-9+/]{16,4096}={0,2}/g\n\nfunction containsKnownSecret(text: string, forms: readonly string[]): boolean {\n  if (forms.length === 0) return false\n  if (forms.some((form) => text.includes(form))) return true\n  // A whole-string base64 payload can hold a secret at any byte offset.\n  if (text.length >= 8 && BASE64_TEXT.test(text)) {\n    const decoded = Buffer.from(\n      text,\n      text.includes('-') || text.includes('_') ? 'base64url' : 'base64',\n    ).toString('utf8')\n    if (forms.some((form) => decoded.includes(form))) return true\n  }\n  // `Basic <base64(user:key)>` jointly encodes the userinfo, so the secret's\n  // OWN base64 form (added to `forms` above) is generally not a substring of\n  // it — 3-byte base64 group alignment shifts with whatever precedes the\n  // secret in the original bytes. Decode any embedded base64-looking run and\n  // check its plaintext directly instead of relying on aligned forms.\n  for (const match of text.matchAll(EMBEDDED_BASE64)) {\n    if (match[0] === text) continue // already checked above\n    try {\n      const decoded = Buffer.from(match[0], 'base64').toString('utf8')\n      if (forms.some((form) => decoded.includes(form))) return true\n    } catch {\n      // Not valid base64 (e.g. wrong padding) — not a candidate.\n    }\n  }\n  return false\n}\n\n/** The detector that marks `text` as a credential: a known secret first, then the value shapes. */\nfunction credentialIn(text: string, knownSecrets: readonly string[]): string | undefined {\n  return containsKnownSecret(text, knownSecrets) ? 'known-secret' : detectCredential(text)\n}\n\nconst MARKER_PREFIX = '[REDACTED:'\n\nfunction marker(detector: string): string {\n  return `${MARKER_PREFIX}${detector}]`\n}\n\n/**\n * Placeholders other tools write for a removed value. A credential field that\n * holds one of these is already redacted and is not flagged again.\n */\nconst REDACTED_PLACEHOLDER =\n  /^(?:\\[(?:REDACTED|redacted)(?::[^\\]]*)?\\]|\\[ID:[0-9a-f]{12}\\]|\\*{3,}|<redacted>|«redacted»|\\[HASH:[0-9a-f]{8,}\\])$/\n\nfunction isPlaceholder(value: string): boolean {\n  return value === '' || REDACTED_PLACEHOLDER.test(value)\n}\n\n// The whole string must be the data URI — `$` at the end, not just a `^`\n// prefix check. A prefix-only check let `data:text/plain;base64,…\\n` PLUS\n// arbitrary trailing text through as unread \"media\", when the trailing text\n// (or, for text/json mimes, the payload itself once decoded) is exactly the\n// kind of prose a credential or personal-data detector should see.\nconst DATA_URI = /^data:([\\w.+-]+\\/[\\w.+-]+)(?:;[\\w.+-]+=[\\w.+-]+)*;base64,([A-Za-z0-9+/=\\s]*)$/i\n\n/** A data: URI's mime type and base64 payload, only when the whole string is the URI. */\nfunction matchDataUri(text: string): { mime: string; payload: string } | undefined {\n  const m = DATA_URI.exec(text)\n  if (!m) return undefined\n  return { mime: (m[1] ?? '').toLowerCase(), payload: m[2] ?? '' }\n}\n\n/** Decodes a data: URI's base64 payload to text, or undefined if it is not valid base64. */\nfunction decodeDataUriPayload(payload: string): string | undefined {\n  const cleaned = payload.replace(/\\s+/g, '')\n  if (cleaned.length === 0) return ''\n  if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9+/]*={0,2}$/.test(cleaned) || cleaned.length % 4 !== 0) return undefined\n  try {\n    return Buffer.from(cleaned, 'base64').toString('utf8')\n  } catch {\n    return undefined\n  }\n}\n\nconst READABLE_IMAGE_MIME = /^image\\//\n/** Mimes whose payload is text a detector can read once decoded. */\nconst DECODABLE_TEXT_MIME = /^text\\/|^application\\/json$/\n\n/** Whether a decoded data: URI payload holds a credential or personal data,\n *  by key name (for application/json) or by value shape (for any text). */\nfunction decodedPayloadIsUnsafe(\n  decoded: string,\n  mime: string,\n  knownSecrets: readonly string[],\n): boolean {\n  if (mime === 'application/json') {\n    try {\n      return jsonValueIsUnsafe(JSON.parse(decoded), knownSecrets)\n    } catch {\n      // Not actually valid JSON despite the mime type — fall through to plain text.\n    }\n  }\n  if (credentialIn(decoded, knownSecrets)) return true\n  return detectPersonalData(decoded).length > 0\n}\n\nfunction jsonValueIsUnsafe(value: unknown, knownSecrets: readonly string[]): boolean {\n  if (value === null || value === undefined) return false\n  if (typeof value === 'string')\n    return credentialIn(value, knownSecrets) !== undefined || detectPersonalData(value).length > 0\n  if (typeof value !== 'object') return false\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.some((item) => jsonValueIsUnsafe(item, knownSecrets))\n  for (const [key, item] of Object.entries(value as Record<string, unknown>)) {\n    const category = classifyKey(key)\n    if (category === 'credential') return true\n    if (category === 'personal-data' && (typeof item === 'string' || typeof item === 'number'))\n      return true\n    if (jsonValueIsUnsafe(item, knownSecrets)) return true\n  }\n  return false\n}\n\n// ── Redaction ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nconst MAX_DEPTH = 64\n\ninterface WalkState {\n  rules: ProfileRules\n  maxStringBytes: number\n  knownSecrets: string[]\n  report: RedactionReport\n  /** Created on first use: most calls pseudonymize nothing. */\n  pseudonymKey?: Buffer\n  seen: WeakSet<object>\n}\n\nfunction record(\n  state: WalkState,\n  path: string,\n  category: SafetyCategory,\n  detector: string,\n  action: RedactionFinding['action'],\n): void {\n  const report = state.report\n  if (action === 'truncated') report.truncatedCount += 1\n  report.redactionCount += 1\n  report.byDetector[detector] = (report.byDetector[detector] ?? 0) + 1\n  report.findings.push({ path, category, detector, action })\n}\n\nfunction pointer(parent: string, key: string | number): string {\n  return `${parent}/${String(key).replace(/~/g, '~0').replace(/\\//g, '~1')}`\n}\n\nfunction truncateUtf8(text: string, maxBytes: number): string | undefined {\n  if (text.length <= maxBytes / 4) return undefined\n  const bytes = Buffer.from(text, 'utf8')\n  if (bytes.length <= maxBytes) return undefined\n  // Step back to the first byte of a UTF-8 sequence so no character is split.\n  let cut = maxBytes\n  while (cut > 0 && ((bytes[cut] ?? 0) & 0xc0) === 0x80) cut -= 1\n  return `${bytes.subarray(0, cut).toString('utf8')}…[truncated ${bytes.length - cut} bytes]`\n}\n\nfunction redactStringAt(text: string, path: string, state: WalkState): string {\n  if (isPlaceholder(text)) return text\n  // A known secret is an exact value, so it is cut out where it stands and the\n  // text around it survives: an error message keeps its diagnosis.\n  let output = text\n  for (const form of state.knownSecrets) {\n    if (!output.includes(form)) continue\n    output = output.split(form).join(marker('known-secret'))\n    record(state, path, 'credential', 'known-secret', 'redacted')\n  }\n  const dataUri = matchDataUri(output)\n  if (dataUri) {\n    if (DECODABLE_TEXT_MIME.test(dataUri.mime)) {\n      const decoded = decodeDataUriPayload(dataUri.payload)\n      if (decoded === undefined) {\n        // Can't verify what an undecodable payload holds — fail closed rather\n        // than pass it through as if it were opaque, harmless media.\n        record(state, path, 'credential', 'data-uri-payload', 'redacted')\n        return marker('data-uri-payload')\n      }\n      if (decodedPayloadIsUnsafe(decoded, dataUri.mime, state.knownSecrets)) {\n        record(state, path, 'credential', 'data-uri-payload', 'redacted')\n        return marker('data-uri-payload')\n      }\n      // Decoded clean: still opaque bytes to a downstream reader once\n      // embedded, so it's subject to the ordinary media rule below, same as\n      // any other data URI.\n    }\n    if (!state.rules.redactMedia) return output\n    record(state, path, 'media', 'media', 'redacted')\n    return marker('media')\n  }\n  // A value shape, or a whole-string base64 payload that holds a known secret\n  // at any byte offset, replaces the whole string. The detectors themselves\n  // only ever see a bounded prefix (`boundForScan`): a credential that lives\n  // entirely beyond `maxStringBytes` would be truncated out of the output\n  // below anyway, so scanning past the bound costs time without changing\n  // what can leak. The untouched tail is reattached after the personal-data\n  // pass so later truncation still sees (and cuts) the full length.\n  const boundLen = Math.min(output.length, state.maxStringBytes)\n  let scanTarget = output.slice(0, boundLen)\n  const tail = output.slice(boundLen)\n  const credential = credentialIn(scanTarget, state.knownSecrets)\n  if (credential) {\n    record(state, path, 'credential', credential, 'redacted')\n    return marker(credential)\n  }\n  for (const detector of PERSONAL_DATA_DETECTORS) {\n    if (detector.requires && !scanTarget.includes(detector.requires)) continue\n    scanTarget = scanTarget.replace(detector.pattern, (match) => {\n      if (detector.accept && !detector.accept(match)) return match\n      record(state, path, 'personal-data', detector.id, 'redacted')\n      return marker(detector.id)\n    })\n  }\n  output = scanTarget + tail\n  const truncated = truncateUtf8(output, state.maxStringBytes)\n  if (truncated === undefined) return output\n  record(state, path, 'raw-content', 'size-cap', 'truncated')\n  return truncated\n}\n\nfunction pseudonym(value: string | number, state: WalkState): string {\n  state.pseudonymKey ??= randomBytes(32)\n  const digest = createHmac('sha256', state.pseudonymKey).update(String(value)).digest('hex')\n  return `[ID:${digest.slice(0, 12)}]`\n}\n\nfunction redactKeyed(\n  key: string,\n  value: unknown,\n  path: string,\n  depth: number,\n  state: WalkState,\n): unknown {\n  const kind = classifyKeyName(key)\n  if (value === null || value === undefined || typeof value === 'boolean') {\n    return value\n  }\n  if (typeof value === 'string' && isPlaceholder(value)) return value\n  // Numbers under a credential name are limits and counts (`password_max_age`), not secrets.\n  if (kind === 'credential' && typeof value !== 'number') {\n    record(state, path, 'credential', 'credential-key', 'redacted')\n    return marker('credential-key')\n  }\n  if (\n    kind === 'email' ||\n    (kind === 'share-personal' && state.rules.redactKeys.has('share-personal'))\n  ) {\n    if (typeof value === 'string' || typeof value === 'number') {\n      record(state, path, 'personal-data', 'personal-data-key', 'redacted')\n      return marker('personal-data-key')\n    }\n  }\n  if (kind === 'identifier' && state.rules.redactKeys.has('identifier')) {\n    if (typeof value === 'string' || typeof value === 'number') {\n      record(state, path, 'identifier', 'identifier-key', 'pseudonymized')\n      return pseudonym(value, state)\n    }\n  }\n  if (\n    kind === 'raw-content' &&\n    state.rules.redactKeys.has('raw-content') &&\n    typeof value !== 'number'\n  ) {\n    record(state, path, 'raw-content', 'raw-content-key', 'redacted')\n    return marker('raw-content-key')\n  }\n  return walk(value, path, depth + 1, state)\n}\n\nfunction walk(value: unknown, path: string, depth: number, state: WalkState): unknown {\n  if (typeof value === 'string') return redactStringAt(value, path, state)\n  if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') return value\n  if (ArrayBuffer.isView(value) || value instanceof ArrayBuffer) {\n    record(state, path, 'media', 'binary', 'redacted')\n    return marker('binary')\n  }\n  if (value instanceof Date) return value\n  if (depth > MAX_DEPTH) {\n    record(state, path, 'raw-content', 'depth-limit', 'truncated')\n    return marker('depth-limit')\n  }\n  if (state.seen.has(value)) {\n    record(state, path, 'raw-content', 'circular', 'redacted')\n    return marker('circular')\n  }\n  state.seen.add(value)\n  try {\n    if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n      return value.map((item, index) => walk(item, pointer(path, index), depth + 1, state))\n    }\n    const out: Record<string, unknown> = {}\n    let renamed = 0\n    for (const [key, item] of Object.entries(value as Record<string, unknown>)) {\n      let outKey = key\n      const keyCredential = credentialIn(key, state.knownSecrets)\n      // A personal-data value used AS a key (an email or card number mapping\n      // to something) is just as reachable as one in a value — walk() only\n      // ever inspects keys for a credential shape, so `{'alice@x.com': 3}`\n      // passed through unchanged with verdict SAFE.\n      const keyPersonalData = keyCredential ? undefined : detectPersonalData(key)[0]\n      if (keyCredential) {\n        renamed += 1\n        outKey = `${marker(keyCredential)}#${renamed}`\n        record(state, pointer(path, outKey), 'credential', keyCredential, 'redacted')\n      } else if (keyPersonalData) {\n        renamed += 1\n        outKey = `${marker(keyPersonalData)}#${renamed}`\n        record(state, pointer(path, outKey), 'personal-data', keyPersonalData, 'redacted')\n      }\n      out[outKey] = redactKeyed(key, item, pointer(path, outKey), depth, state)\n    }\n    return out\n  } finally {\n    state.seen.delete(value)\n  }\n}\n\nfunction newReport(profile: RedactionProfile): RedactionReport {\n  return {\n    version: REDACTION_VERSION,\n    profile,\n    redactionCount: 0,\n    byDetector: {},\n    truncatedCount: 0,\n    findings: [],\n  }\n}\n\nfunction newState(options: RedactOptions, report?: RedactionReport): WalkState {\n  const profile = options.profile ?? 'default'\n  const rules = PROFILE_RULES[profile]\n  if (!rules) throw new Error(`unknown redaction profile: ${String(profile)}`)\n  const requested = options.maxStringBytes\n  const maxStringBytes =\n    typeof requested === 'number' && Number.isFinite(requested) && requested >= 0\n      ? Math.min(Math.floor(requested), rules.maxStringBytes)\n      : rules.maxStringBytes\n  return {\n    rules,\n    maxStringBytes,\n    knownSecrets: knownSecretForms(options.knownSecrets),\n    report: report ?? newReport(profile),\n    seen: new WeakSet(),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Return a redacted deep copy of `value` and a report of what changed. Pure:\n * the input is not mutated. Never throws on the value's shape; cycles, binary\n * data and nesting past 64 levels are replaced with markers.\n */\nexport function redact<T>(\n  value: T,\n  options: RedactOptions = {},\n): { value: T; report: RedactionReport } {\n  const state = newState(options, options.report)\n  const out = walk(value, '', 0, state) as T\n  return { value: out, report: state.report }\n}\n\n/**\n * Redact one free-text string with the value detectors (no field name is\n * known). Pass `report` to accumulate counts across calls.\n */\nexport function redactText(text: string, options: RedactOptions = {}): string {\n  const state = newState(options, options.report)\n  return redactStringAt(text, '', state)\n}\n\n/** An empty report to accumulate `redactText` calls into. */\nexport function emptyRedactionReport(profile: RedactionProfile = 'default'): RedactionReport {\n  return newReport(profile)\n}\n\n// ── Share-safety assessment ──────────────────────────────────────────────\n\ninterface ScanState {\n  profile: RedactionProfile\n  rules: ProfileRules\n  knownSecrets: string[]\n  findings: Map<string, ShareSafetyFinding>\n  unreadable: string[]\n  seen: WeakSet<object>\n}\n\nfunction flag(state: ScanState, path: string, category: SafetyCategory, detector: string): void {\n  const severity = state.rules.severity[category]\n  if (!severity) return\n  const id = `${category}\\u0000${detector}`\n  const existing = state.findings.get(id)\n  if (existing) {\n    existing.count += 1\n    if (existing.paths.length < 5) existing.paths.push(path)\n    return\n  }\n  state.findings.set(id, { category, detector, severity, count: 1, paths: [path] })\n}\n\nfunction scanString(text: string, path: string, state: ScanState): void {\n  if (isPlaceholder(text)) return\n  const dataUri = matchDataUri(text)\n  if (dataUri) {\n    scanDataUri(dataUri, path, state)\n    return\n  }\n  const credential = credentialIn(text, state.knownSecrets)\n  if (credential) {\n    flag(state, path, 'credential', credential)\n    return\n  }\n  for (const detector of detectPersonalData(text)) flag(state, path, 'personal-data', detector)\n}\n\nfunction scanDataUri(\n  dataUri: { mime: string; payload: string },\n  path: string,\n  state: ScanState,\n): void {\n  if (READABLE_IMAGE_MIME.test(dataUri.mime)) {\n    flag(state, path, 'media', 'media')\n    return\n  }\n  if (DECODABLE_TEXT_MIME.test(dataUri.mime)) {\n    const decoded = decodeDataUriPayload(dataUri.payload)\n    if (decoded === undefined) {\n      state.unreadable.push(`${path || '/'}: data URI payload is not valid base64`)\n      return\n    }\n    if (dataUri.mime === 'application/json') {\n      try {\n        scan(JSON.parse(decoded), path, 0, state)\n        return\n      } catch {\n        // Not actually valid JSON despite the mime type — fall through to plain text.\n      }\n    }\n    scanString(decoded, path, state)\n    return\n  }\n  // audio/video/octet-stream/etc: bytes no text detector can read. A warning\n  // under `default` (matches the existing image rule); under `share` and\n  // `strict` — the profiles that actually gate whether something may be sent\n  // off the machine — treat it as unreadable so the verdict is UNKNOWN\n  // instead of silently allowing it through.\n  if (state.profile === 'default') {\n    flag(state, path, 'media', 'media')\n  } else {\n    state.unreadable.push(`${path || '/'}: ${dataUri.mime} data URI cannot be read`)\n  }\n}\n\nfunction scanKeyed(\n  key: string,\n  value: unknown,\n  path: string,\n  depth: number,\n  state: ScanState,\n): void {\n  if (value === null || value === undefined || typeof value === 'boolean') return\n  if (typeof value === 'string' && isPlaceholder(value)) return\n  const category = classifyKey(key)\n  if (category === 'credential' && typeof value !== 'number') {\n    flag(state, path, 'credential', 'credential-key')\n    return\n  }\n  const scalar = typeof value === 'string' || typeof value === 'number'\n  if (category === 'personal-data' && scalar) {\n    const kind = classifyKeyName(key)\n    // Phone, IP and address fields are flagged from the share profile up; email always.\n    if (kind === 'email' || state.profile !== 'default') {\n      flag(state, path, 'personal-data', 'personal-data-key')\n      return\n    }\n  }\n  if (category === 'identifier' && scalar) flag(state, path, 'identifier', 'identifier-key')\n  if (category === 'raw-content' && typeof value !== 'number')\n    flag(state, path, 'raw-content', 'raw-content-key')\n  scan(value, path, depth + 1, state)\n}\n\nfunction scan(value: unknown, path: string, depth: number, state: ScanState): void {\n  if (typeof value === 'string') {\n    scanString(value, path, state)\n    return\n  }\n  if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') return\n  if (ArrayBuffer.isView(value) || value instanceof ArrayBuffer) {\n    state.unreadable.push(`${path || '/'}: binary data`)\n    return\n  }\n  if (value instanceof Date) return\n  if (depth > MAX_DEPTH) {\n    state.unreadable.push(`${path || '/'}: nested deeper than ${MAX_DEPTH} levels`)\n    return\n  }\n  if (state.seen.has(value)) {\n    state.unreadable.push(`${path || '/'}: circular reference`)\n    return\n  }\n  state.seen.add(value)\n  try {\n    if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n      for (const [index, item] of value.entries())\n        scan(item, pointer(path, index), depth + 1, state)\n      return\n    }\n    for (const [key, item] of Object.entries(value as Record<string, unknown>)) {\n      // A credential or personal-data value used as a key must not reach the\n      // finding paths.\n      const keyCredential = credentialIn(key, state.knownSecrets)\n      const keyPersonalData = keyCredential ? undefined : detectPersonalData(key)[0]\n      const keyDetector = keyCredential ?? keyPersonalData\n      const segment = keyDetector ? marker(keyDetector) : key\n      if (keyCredential) flag(state, pointer(path, segment), 'credential', keyCredential)\n      else if (keyPersonalData)\n        flag(state, pointer(path, segment), 'personal-data', keyPersonalData)\n      scanKeyed(key, item, pointer(path, segment), depth, state)\n    }\n  } finally {\n    state.seen.delete(value)\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Read `value` without changing it and say whether it is safe to share under\n * `profile`. UNKNOWN when any part could not be read; UNSAFE when any\n * error-severity finding remains; SAFE_WITH_WARNINGS when only warnings\n * remain (raw content, embedded media, identifiers under `share`).\n */\nexport function assessShareSafety(value: unknown, options: AssessOptions = {}): ShareSafetyVerdict {\n  const profile = options.profile ?? 'default'\n  const rules = PROFILE_RULES[profile]\n  if (!rules) throw new Error(`unknown redaction profile: ${String(profile)}`)\n  const state: ScanState = {\n    profile,\n    rules,\n    knownSecrets: knownSecretForms(options.knownSecrets),\n    findings: new Map(),\n    unreadable: [],\n    seen: new WeakSet(),\n  }\n  scan(value, '', 0, state)\n  return verdictFrom(profile, [...state.findings.values()], state.unreadable)\n}\n\n/**\n * One verdict over several parts (files in a directory, spans in a bundle).\n * Callers prefix each part's paths with its source before combining.\n */\nexport function combineVerdicts(\n  profile: RedactionProfile,\n  verdicts: readonly ShareSafetyVerdict[],\n  unreadable: readonly string[] = [],\n): ShareSafetyVerdict {\n  const findings = new Map<string, ShareSafetyFinding>()\n  for (const verdict of verdicts) {\n    for (const finding of verdict.findings) {\n      const id = `${finding.category}\\u0000${finding.detector}`\n      const existing = findings.get(id)\n      if (!existing) {\n        findings.set(id, { ...finding, paths: [...finding.paths] })\n        continue\n      }\n      existing.count += finding.count\n      for (const path of finding.paths) if (existing.paths.length < 5) existing.paths.push(path)\n    }\n  }\n  return verdictFrom(\n    profile,\n    [...findings.values()],\n    [...verdicts.flatMap((verdict) => verdict.unreadable), ...unreadable],\n  )\n}\n\nfunction verdictFrom(\n  profile: RedactionProfile,\n  findings: readonly ShareSafetyFinding[],\n  unreadable: readonly string[],\n): ShareSafetyVerdict {\n  const status: ShareSafetyStatus =\n    unreadable.length > 0\n      ? 'UNKNOWN'\n      : findings.some((finding) => finding.severity === 'error')\n        ? 'UNSAFE'\n        : findings.length > 0\n          ? 'SAFE_WITH_WARNINGS'\n          : 'SAFE'\n  return { status, profile, findings: [...findings], unreadable: [...unreadable] }\n}\n\n/** Whether a verdict allows sharing: SAFE or SAFE_WITH_WARNINGS. UNSAFE and UNKNOWN refuse. */\nexport function shareAllowed(verdict: ShareSafetyVerdict): boolean {\n  return verdict.status === 'SAFE' || verdict.status === 'SAFE_WITH_WARNINGS'\n}\n\n/**\n * Redact `value` under `profile`, then assess the redacted output. The\n * verdict describes what would actually be shared: a detector that failed to\n * remove something shows up as UNSAFE here.\n */\nexport function redactForShare<T>(\n  value: T,\n  options: RedactOptions = {},\n): { value: T; report: RedactionReport; verdict: ShareSafetyVerdict } {\n  const redacted = redact(value, options)\n  const verdict = assessShareSafety(redacted.value, {\n    profile: options.profile,\n    knownSecrets: options.knownSecrets,\n  })\n  return { value: redacted.value, report: redacted.report, verdict 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package/dist/rl.js

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import { c as runTaskScore } from "./run-record-BRlM99rX.js";
 import { n as campaignCellToRunRecord } from "./run-record-tNnlQIrD.js";
 import { i as filterDeterministicallyRewarded, n as extractVerifiableReward, r as extractVerifiableRewardsFromRecords, t as detectRewardHacking } from "./reward-hacking-D0XwhVWE.js";
 import { n as InMemoryTraceStore } from "./store-DNe_Uv1Q.js";
-import { t as runEvalCampaign } from "./eval-campaign-CwsBn0Gm.js";
+import { t as runEvalCampaign } from "./eval-campaign-CXT2WYUe.js";
 import { s as assertRewardGate } from "./schema-C1aaAxTf.js";
 import { n as isTrainingLineEligible, s as toSftRows$1, t as isSplitEligible } from "./exporters-DEcXbvgO.js";
 import { t as mintRolloutRows } from "./mint-iCD-W43s.js";

package/dist/{semantic-concept-judge-Bg-560H0.js → semantic-concept-judge-Bh5lvKGg.js}

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 import { i as CostLedger } from "./cost-ledger-_IbkejCF.js";
 import { p as Mutex } from "./journal-DvKCvjty.js";
 import { N as RawAnalystFindingSchema } from "./kind-factory-CdPPHtGZ.js";
-import { c as extractJsonPayload } from "./llm-client-KYQBh9C8.js";
-import { n as paidJsonChat, t as paidChat } from "./chat-json-call-CXHBvUz8.js";
-import { n as decodeRawFindingArray } from "./dspy-rlm-engine-BX34vPVY.js";
+import { c as extractJsonPayload } from "./llm-client-c_bKHTXz.js";
+import { n as paidJsonChat, t as paidChat } from "./chat-json-call-DnlDjpco.js";
+import { n as decodeRawFindingArray } from "./dspy-rlm-engine-k_QdEBZo.js";
 import { appendFileSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";
 import { z } from "zod";
 import { dirname } from "node:path";
@@ -777,4 +777,4 @@ async function runSemanticConceptJudge(input, options) {
 //#endregion
 export { diffFindings as a, defaultIsMaterial as i, runSemanticConceptJudge as n, createChatTraceEngine as o, FindingsStore as r, SEMANTIC_CONCEPT_JUDGE_VERSION as t };
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=semantic-concept-judge-Bg-560H0.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=semantic-concept-judge-Bh5lvKGg.js.map