@tangle-network/agent-app 0.60.191 → 0.60.193

package/dist/chat-routes/model-failover-stream.d.ts

@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
  *   byte-identical to no failover. A silent chain is now deliberately bounded.
  */
 import { ModelFailoverExhaustedError, type ModelFailoverAttempt } from '../model-resolution/failover';
+import type { ModelPolicy } from '../policy-filters/index';
 /**
  * True when `event` puts content in front of the user (or in the persisted
  * transcript), making a restart on another model unsafe.
@@ -118,6 +119,13 @@ export interface ModelFailoverStreamOptions {
     /** Preferred model first, then fallbacks in descending preference. */
     models: readonly string[];
     open: OpenModelStream;
+    /**
+     * Product admission policy applied to EVERY chain member before its stream
+     * is opened — see `runWithModelFailover`'s `policy`. A member the policy
+     * refuses is skipped (never opened, never sent the turn's data) and the walk
+     * continues; an all-refused chain ends in `ModelFailoverExhaustedError`.
+     */
+    policy?: ModelPolicy;
     /**
      * Maximum time to open/start one model's event source, including its first
      * iterator pull. Default 120 seconds, matching the sandbox provisioning

package/dist/chat-routes/resolve-attachments.d.ts

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
  */
 import { type ChatAttachmentPart } from '../chat-store/parts';
 import type { ReadAttachmentFn } from './attachment-store';
+import { type AttachmentPathCheck } from './attachment-validation';
 /** Resolve the result of chat attachment processing with success status and corresponding data or error */
 export type ResolveChatAttachmentsResult = {
     succeeded: true;
@@ -25,31 +26,6 @@ export type ResolveChatAttachmentsResult = {
     succeeded: false;
     error: string;
 };
-/** Verdict of a path check: OK, or a rejection naming why. Mirrors
- *  `SandboxMentionPathCheck` in `./wire`. */
-export type AttachmentPathCheck = {
-    succeeded: true;
-} | {
-    succeeded: false;
-    error: string;
-};
-/**
- * Default path validator when a caller supplies none. Rejects the ways a path
- * picked in a client can escape the store root — traversal (`..` segment),
- * absolute (leading `/`), backslashes, null bytes, control characters (see
- * {@link CONTROL_CHARS} — a path also feeds {@link buildAttachmentPromptBlock}'s
- * `(vault: ${path})` pointer, so it is exposed to the same injection surface as
- * `name`) — plus a dotfile/hidden segment (a leading `.` on any segment).
- * Generalized from gtm's `validateVaultFilePath`, in the spirit of
- * `validateSandboxMentionPath` (`/chat-routes`'s wire mention-path validator) —
- * but the dotfile rejection here is INTENTIONALLY stricter than that sibling:
- * an uploaded attachment path is sanitized store-relative storage the product
- * itself assigned, whereas a mention path points at a file that already exists
- * in the sandbox and may legitimately live under a dotfile segment. A caller
- * that needs gtm's exact (looser) rule can supply `validatePath` to override
- * this default entirely.
- */
-export declare function defaultValidateAttachmentPath(path: string): AttachmentPathCheck;
 /** Define options to resolve and validate chat attachments with size, count, and path constraints */
 export interface ResolveChatAttachmentsOptions {
     /** The product's workspace/tenant key, passed to `readAttachment`. */

package/dist/chat-routes/sandbox-producer.d.ts

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
  */
 import { type InteractionRequestWire } from '../interactions/contract';
 import { type JsonRecord } from '../stream/index';
+import type { ModelPolicy } from '../policy-filters/index';
 import { type EmptyTurnRetryInfo, type ModelFallbackInfo, type OpenModelStream } from './model-failover-stream';
 import type { ChatTurnRouteProducer } from './turn-routes';
 /** Outcome of a `promoteFilePart` attempt. `key`, when given, becomes the
@@ -80,6 +81,17 @@ export interface SandboxChatProducerOptions {
     /** Opt out of failover while still using {@link openEvents}. `false` collapses
      *  the chain to `model` alone. */
     modelFailover?: false;
+    /**
+     * Product admission policy applied to every chain member — the RESOLVED
+     * preferred model AND every fallback — before its stream is opened. This is
+     * the execution-time half of policy enforcement: it covers the model
+     * whatever its source (request body, env, product default), and it is what
+     * stops a compliant model's mid-turn 502 from re-running the turn's data
+     * through a non-compliant fallback. A refused member is skipped with the
+     * refusal recorded in `modelFailover().attempts`; an all-refused chain
+     * exhausts. Omit → availability only (today's behavior).
+     */
+    modelPolicy?: ModelPolicy;
     /** Maximum time to open/start one model event source through its first event.
      *  Default 120 seconds. This is separate from provider first-output latency
      *  so cold sandbox startup is not mislabeled as an inference failure. */

package/dist/chat-routes/turn-routes.d.ts

@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ import { type DraftPersistenceTuning } from './draft-persistence';
 import { type InteractionAnswerRoute, type InteractionAnswerRouteOptions } from '../interactions/route';
 import { type PersistedChatMessageForTurn, type TurnEventStore } from '../stream/index';
 import type { ModelFailoverAttempt } from '../model-resolution/failover';
+import { type ModelPolicy } from '../policy-filters/index';
 import { type TurnRoutePhase } from './turn-progress';
 import { type ChatTurnPartInput, type ChatTurnRequestPayload } from './wire';
 /** Usage receipt persisted onto the assistant message (the flattened
@@ -471,6 +472,19 @@ export interface CreateChatTurnRoutesOptions<TContext = void> {
      *  a plain response without the progress header, a `turn.response` event
      *  with it. Omit → nothing to prepare. */
     prepareTurn?(args: ChatTurnPrepareArgs<TContext>): ChatTurnPrepareResult | Promise<ChatTurnPrepareResult>;
+    /** Product admission policy over the model a turn NAMES. When the request
+     *  body carries a `model`, it is checked here — after `authorize`, before
+     *  the conversation loads, the lock is taken, or any row is written — and a
+     *  refusal answers 403 with the policy's reason. Fail-closed: a named model
+     *  carrying no policy metadata is refused.
+     *
+     *  This is half the enforcement. A body without `model` resolves to a
+     *  product default inside `produce`, which this seam never sees — enforce
+     *  that half at execution with `createSandboxChatProducer`'s `modelPolicy`
+     *  (or `runWithModelFailover`'s `policy` on a custom producer), which also
+     *  covers every fallback the turn could fail over to. Wire the SAME policy
+     *  object to both. Omit → no policy check (today's behavior). */
+    modelPolicy?: ModelPolicy;
     /** Thread/message persistence (`/chat-store`'s store or a product adapter). */
     store: ChatTurnMessageStore;
     /** Turn-event buffer (`createD1TurnEventStore(env.DB)` or `/turn-stream`'s

package/dist/chat-store/index.js

@@ -14,9 +14,9 @@ import {
   mentionInputToPart,
   mentionPartsFromMessageParts,
   toChatMessageParts
-} from "../chunk-TNWDYAFX.js";
-import "../chunk-YHRWZZJN.js";
+} from "../chunk-E6UTFXKQ.js";
 import "../chunk-ZVEEWGDK.js";
+import "../chunk-YHRWZZJN.js";
 import "../chunk-TXD5HXLE.js";
 import {
   attachmentPartKey

package/dist/{chunk-MSAGTFN4.js → chunk-6RFNLZCK.js}

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ import {
   checkAttachmentType,
   sanitizeAttachmentFileName,
   sniffBinary
-} from "./chunk-WTC6AOPL.js";
+} from "./chunk-PBQYVAB6.js";
 
 // src/web-react/use-dictation.ts
 import { useCallback, useEffect, useRef, useState } from "react";
@@ -1552,4 +1552,4 @@ export {
   ComposerModeControls,
   EntryComposer
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-MSAGTFN4.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-6RFNLZCK.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-TNWDYAFX.js → chunk-E6UTFXKQ.js}

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-import {
-  mentionKindForPath
-} from "./chunk-YHRWZZJN.js";
 import {
   persistedPartToWorkProduct
 } from "./chunk-ZVEEWGDK.js";
+import {
+  mentionKindForPath
+} from "./chunk-YHRWZZJN.js";
 import {
   persistedPartToInteraction
 } from "./chunk-6VQCFJWP.js";
@@ -135,4 +135,4 @@ export {
   buildAttachmentPromptBlock,
   historyContentWithAttachments
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-TNWDYAFX.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-E6UTFXKQ.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-Y2SOQOJE.js → chunk-KNTRS7OZ.js}

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ import {
 } from "./chunk-AVP5SNIG.js";
 import {
   attachmentPartsFromMessageParts
-} from "./chunk-TNWDYAFX.js";
+} from "./chunk-E6UTFXKQ.js";
 import {
   TURN_INTENT_EVENT,
   TURN_PHASE_EVENT,
@@ -7207,4 +7207,4 @@ export {
   useThinkingSeconds,
   ChatMessages
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-Y2SOQOJE.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-KNTRS7OZ.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-QAF7ZTO3.js → chunk-L5JLOC2F.js}

@@ -2,15 +2,15 @@ import {
   authenticateToolRequest,
   createMcpToolHandler
 } from "./chunk-6A7MYOUI.js";
+import {
+  assertRenderUiSchema
+} from "./chunk-2RCPPOQ4.js";
 import {
   base64UrlDecodeText,
   base64UrlEncodeText,
   constantTimeEqual,
   hmacSha256Base64Url
 } from "./chunk-S5SRJJQG.js";
-import {
-  assertRenderUiSchema
-} from "./chunk-2RCPPOQ4.js";
 import {
   buildAppToolOpenAITools,
   findCustomTool,
@@ -270,4 +270,4 @@ export {
   createAppToolRuntimeExecutor,
   handleAppToolRequest
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-QAF7ZTO3.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-L5JLOC2F.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-WTC6AOPL.js → chunk-PBQYVAB6.js}

@@ -364,6 +364,84 @@ function attachmentSizeErrorMessage(name, actualBytes, limitBytes) {
 function attachmentTotalSizeErrorMessage(totalBytes, limitBytes) {
   return `Attachments total ${formatBytes(totalBytes)}; each message is limited to ${formatBytes(limitBytes)}`;
 }
+var MAX_ATTACHMENT_NAME_LENGTH = 256;
+function isAttachmentKind(value) {
+  return value === "image" || value === "file";
+}
+var CONTROL_CHARS = /[\x00-\x1F\x7F]/;
+function defaultValidateAttachmentPath(path) {
+  if (path.includes("\0")) return { succeeded: false, error: "attachment path must not contain null bytes" };
+  if (path.includes("\\")) return { succeeded: false, error: "attachment path must not contain backslashes" };
+  if (CONTROL_CHARS.test(path)) return { succeeded: false, error: "attachment path must not contain control characters" };
+  if (path.startsWith("/")) return { succeeded: false, error: "attachment path must be store-relative, not absolute" };
+  const segments = path.split("/");
+  if (segments.some((segment) => segment === "..")) {
+    return { succeeded: false, error: 'attachment path must not contain ".." segments' };
+  }
+  if (segments.some((segment) => segment.startsWith("."))) {
+    return { succeeded: false, error: "attachment path must not contain a hidden (dotfile) segment" };
+  }
+  return { succeeded: true };
+}
+function parseAttachmentInput(value, index, validatePath) {
+  if (!value || typeof value !== "object" || Array.isArray(value)) {
+    return { succeeded: false, error: `attachments[${index}] must be an object` };
+  }
+  const record = value;
+  const path = record.path;
+  if (typeof path !== "string" || !path) {
+    return { succeeded: false, error: `attachments[${index}].path must be a non-empty string` };
+  }
+  const name = record.name;
+  if (typeof name !== "string" || !name.trim()) {
+    return { succeeded: false, error: `attachments[${index}].name must be a non-empty string` };
+  }
+  if (name.length > MAX_ATTACHMENT_NAME_LENGTH) {
+    return { succeeded: false, error: `attachments[${index}].name must not exceed ${MAX_ATTACHMENT_NAME_LENGTH} characters` };
+  }
+  if (CONTROL_CHARS.test(name)) {
+    return { succeeded: false, error: `attachments[${index}].name must not contain control characters` };
+  }
+  const size = record.size;
+  if (typeof size !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(size)) {
+    return { succeeded: false, error: `attachments[${index}].size must be a finite number` };
+  }
+  if (size < 0) {
+    return { succeeded: false, error: `attachments[${index}].size must not be negative` };
+  }
+  const mediaType = record.mediaType;
+  if (typeof mediaType !== "string") {
+    return { succeeded: false, error: `attachments[${index}].mediaType must be a string` };
+  }
+  const kind = record.kind;
+  if (!isAttachmentKind(kind)) {
+    return { succeeded: false, error: `attachments[${index}].kind must be "image" or "file"` };
+  }
+  const pathCheck = validatePath(path);
+  if (!pathCheck.succeeded) return { succeeded: false, error: pathCheck.error };
+  return { succeeded: true, value: { path, name, size, mediaType, kind } };
+}
+function parseChatAttachmentInputs(value, options = {}) {
+  const maxCount = options.maxCount ?? ATTACHMENT_MAX_COUNT;
+  const validatePath = options.validatePath ?? defaultValidateAttachmentPath;
+  if (value === void 0 || value === null) return { succeeded: true, value: [] };
+  if (!Array.isArray(value)) return { succeeded: false, error: "attachments must be an array" };
+  if (value.length > maxCount) {
+    return { succeeded: false, error: `attachments must not exceed ${maxCount} entries` };
+  }
+  const inputs = [];
+  const seenPaths = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  for (let index = 0; index < value.length; index += 1) {
+    const parsed = parseAttachmentInput(value[index], index, validatePath);
+    if (!parsed.succeeded) return parsed;
+    if (seenPaths.has(parsed.value.path)) {
+      return { succeeded: false, error: `attachments must not repeat a path: ${parsed.value.path}` };
+    }
+    seenPaths.add(parsed.value.path);
+    inputs.push(parsed.value);
+  }
+  return { succeeded: true, value: inputs };
+}
 
 export {
   OOXML_WORD_MIME,
@@ -384,6 +462,8 @@ export {
   checkAttachmentType,
   sanitizeAttachmentFileName,
   attachmentSizeErrorMessage,
-  attachmentTotalSizeErrorMessage
+  attachmentTotalSizeErrorMessage,
+  defaultValidateAttachmentPath,
+  parseChatAttachmentInputs
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-WTC6AOPL.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-PBQYVAB6.js.map

package/dist/chunk-PBQYVAB6.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/chat-routes/binary-sniff.ts","../src/chat-routes/attachment-validation.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Content-based binary/text classification, shared by the attachment upload\n * route (server) and the composer's client-side pre-validation (browser) —\n * both sides must agree on what counts as binary before a byte ever leaves\n * the client. Extension-based allowlists lie (a renamed `.docx`, a PNG saved\n * as `.txt`), so classification reads the actual bytes: a magic-byte table\n * for common binary formats first, then a UTF-8 decode attempt for\n * everything else. Three families need more than a fixed-offset signature and\n * get a reader of their own — ISO-BMFF brands (`sniffFtyp`), EBML containers\n * (`sniffEbml`), and OOXML Office packages, whose PKZIP container is shared\n * with every other `.zip` (`sniffOoxml`).\n *\n * Lifted near-verbatim from gtm-agent's `src/lib/binary-sniff.ts` (the\n * source PRs hardened this against real corruption/gate bugs: gtm#584,\n * gtm#592). Import-free by design — `/web-react` re-exports `/chat-routes`\n * modules into browser bundles (`tests/browser-safe-subpaths.test.ts` walks\n * the graph), so nothing here may reach a Node builtin or an engine package.\n */\n\nexport interface SniffResult {\n  binary: boolean\n  mime: string | null\n}\n\n/** Sniffed mime for a Word OOXML package (`.docx`). */\nexport const OOXML_WORD_MIME = 'application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document'\n\n/** Sniffed mime for an Excel OOXML package (`.xlsx`). */\nexport const OOXML_SPREADSHEET_MIME = 'application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet'\n\n/** Sniffed mime for a PowerPoint OOXML package (`.pptx`). */\nexport const OOXML_PRESENTATION_MIME = 'application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.presentationml.presentation'\n\n/** Sniffed mime for a macro-enabled Word package (`.docm`). Reported\n *  separately from {@link OOXML_WORD_MIME} so a package carrying a VBA project\n *  can never be admitted under the plain-document mime: a route that wants\n *  macro-enabled files opts in explicitly through its allowed-mime seam. */\nexport const OOXML_WORD_MACRO_ENABLED_MIME = 'application/vnd.ms-word.document.macroEnabled.12'\n\n/** Sniffed mime for a macro-enabled Excel package (`.xlsm`). */\nexport const OOXML_SPREADSHEET_MACRO_ENABLED_MIME = 'application/vnd.ms-excel.sheet.macroEnabled.12'\n\n/** Sniffed mime for a macro-enabled PowerPoint package (`.pptm`). */\nexport const OOXML_PRESENTATION_MACRO_ENABLED_MIME = 'application/vnd.ms-powerpoint.presentation.macroEnabled.12'\n\nfunction bytesStartWith(bytes: Uint8Array, offset: number, signature: number[]): boolean {\n  if (bytes.length < offset + signature.length) return false\n  for (let i = 0; i < signature.length; i++) {\n    if (bytes[offset + i] !== signature[i]) return false\n  }\n  return true\n}\n\nfunction asciiAt(bytes: Uint8Array, offset: number, text: string): boolean {\n  if (bytes.length < offset + text.length) return false\n  for (let i = 0; i < text.length; i++) {\n    if (bytes[offset + i] !== text.charCodeAt(i)) return false\n  }\n  return true\n}\n\n/** RIFF containers (WebP, WAV) share the `RIFF....<TYPE>` header; the type\n *  tag at byte offset 8 distinguishes them. */\nfunction sniffRiff(bytes: Uint8Array): string | null {\n  if (!asciiAt(bytes, 0, 'RIFF')) return null\n  if (asciiAt(bytes, 8, 'WEBP')) return 'image/webp'\n  if (asciiAt(bytes, 8, 'WAVE')) return 'audio/wav'\n  return null\n}\n\n/** MP4/MOV/AVIF/HEIC containers share an `ftyp` box at byte offset 4; the\n *  major brand at offset 8 tells them apart within the shared ISO-BMFF\n *  family. Brands outside this table (mp4, m4a, m4v, etc) fall back to\n *  `video/mp4`, the family's most common member. */\nfunction sniffFtyp(bytes: Uint8Array): string | null {\n  if (!asciiAt(bytes, 4, 'ftyp')) return null\n  if (asciiAt(bytes, 8, 'qt  ')) return 'video/quicktime'\n  if (asciiAt(bytes, 8, 'avif') || asciiAt(bytes, 8, 'avis')) return 'image/avif'\n  if (asciiAt(bytes, 8, 'heic') || asciiAt(bytes, 8, 'heix') || asciiAt(bytes, 8, 'hevc') || asciiAt(bytes, 8, 'hevx')) return 'image/heic'\n  if (asciiAt(bytes, 8, 'mif1') || asciiAt(bytes, 8, 'msf1')) return 'image/heif'\n  return 'video/mp4'\n}\n\nconst EBML_HEADER_ID = 0x1a45dfa3\nconst EBML_DOC_TYPE_ID = 0x4282\n/** A normal EBML header is only a few dozen bytes. This cap keeps a crafted\n *  header from choosing how much untrusted input the DocType reader scans. */\nconst EBML_HEADER_SCAN_BYTES = 4 * 1024\n\ninterface EbmlVint {\n  length: number\n  value: number\n}\n\n/** Read an EBML variable-width integer. Element IDs retain their marker bit;\n *  element sizes remove it. Values too large for exact JS integer arithmetic,\n *  unknown-size sentinels, and truncated encodings are rejected. */\nfunction readEbmlVint(\n  bytes: Uint8Array,\n  offset: number,\n  maxLength: number,\n  stripMarker: boolean,\n): EbmlVint | null {\n  const first = bytes[offset]\n  if (first === undefined || first === 0) return null\n\n  let marker = 0x80\n  let length = 1\n  while ((first & marker) === 0) {\n    marker >>= 1\n    length++\n  }\n  if (length > maxLength || offset + length > bytes.length) return null\n\n  if (stripMarker) {\n    let unknown = (first & (marker - 1)) === marker - 1\n    for (let index = 1; index < length; index++) unknown &&= bytes[offset + index] === 0xff\n    if (unknown) return null\n  }\n\n  let value = stripMarker ? first & (marker - 1) : first\n  for (let index = 1; index < length; index++) {\n    value = value * 0x100 + bytes[offset + index]!\n    if (!Number.isSafeInteger(value)) return null\n  }\n  return { length, value }\n}\n\n/** WebM and Matroska share the EBML magic. Their header's bounded DocType\n *  element is the distinguishing signal; other or malformed EBML containers\n *  remain recognized only as unknown binary. */\nfunction sniffEbml(bytes: Uint8Array): string | null {\n  const headerId = readEbmlVint(bytes, 0, 4, false)\n  if (headerId?.value !== EBML_HEADER_ID) return null\n\n  const headerSize = readEbmlVint(bytes, headerId.length, 8, true)\n  if (!headerSize) return null\n  const headerStart = headerId.length + headerSize.length\n  const headerEnd = headerStart + headerSize.value\n  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(headerEnd) || headerEnd > bytes.length) return null\n  const scanEnd = Math.min(headerEnd, headerStart + EBML_HEADER_SCAN_BYTES)\n\n  let cursor = headerStart\n  while (cursor < scanEnd) {\n    const id = readEbmlVint(bytes, cursor, 4, false)\n    if (!id) return null\n    const size = readEbmlVint(bytes, cursor + id.length, 8, true)\n    if (!size) return null\n    const valueStart = cursor + id.length + size.length\n    const valueEnd = valueStart + size.value\n    if (!Number.isSafeInteger(valueEnd) || valueEnd > headerEnd || valueEnd > scanEnd) return null\n\n    if (id.value === EBML_DOC_TYPE_ID) {\n      let docType = ''\n      for (let index = valueStart; index < valueEnd; index++) {\n        const byte = bytes[index]!\n        if (byte > 0x7f) return null\n        docType += String.fromCharCode(byte)\n      }\n      if (docType === 'webm') return 'video/webm'\n      if (docType === 'matroska') return 'video/x-matroska'\n      return null\n    }\n    cursor = valueEnd\n  }\n  return null\n}\n\n/** `BM` alone matches ordinary prose (\"BMW…\"), so require the BMP header's\n *  reserved bytes (offsets 6-9), which the format mandates to be zero. */\nfunction sniffBmp(bytes: Uint8Array): boolean {\n  return asciiAt(bytes, 0, 'BM')\n    && bytes.length >= 10\n    && bytes[6] === 0 && bytes[7] === 0 && bytes[8] === 0 && bytes[9] === 0\n}\n\n/** `ID3` alone matches ordinary prose (\"ID3 tags…\"), so require the ID3v2\n *  header shape: a plausible version byte and sync-safe size bytes. */\nfunction sniffId3(bytes: Uint8Array): boolean {\n  return asciiAt(bytes, 0, 'ID3')\n    && bytes.length >= 10\n    && bytes[3]! < 0x10\n    && bytes[6]! < 0x80 && bytes[7]! < 0x80 && bytes[8]! < 0x80 && bytes[9]! < 0x80\n}\n\nconst ZIP_LOCAL_FILE_HEADER_SIGNATURE = 0x04034b50\nconst ZIP_CENTRAL_FILE_HEADER_SIGNATURE = 0x02014b50\nconst ZIP_END_OF_CENTRAL_DIRECTORY_SIGNATURE = 0x06054b50\n/** Fixed part of an end-of-central-directory record, before its comment. */\nconst ZIP_END_OF_CENTRAL_DIRECTORY_BYTES = 22\n/** Fixed part of a central-directory file header, before name/extra/comment. */\nconst ZIP_CENTRAL_FILE_HEADER_BYTES = 46\n/** Fixed part of a local file header, before name/extra. */\nconst ZIP_LOCAL_FILE_HEADER_BYTES = 30\n/** A zip's trailing comment is a u16 length, so the end-of-central-directory\n *  record sits within this distance of the last byte. */\nconst ZIP_MAX_COMMENT_BYTES = 0xffff\n/** ZIP64 stores sentinels in the 16/32-bit fields and the real values in a\n *  separate record. Nothing that large rides an attachment cap, so a sentinel\n *  leaves the archive unclassified instead of half-parsed. */\nconst ZIP64_SENTINEL_U16 = 0xffff\nconst ZIP64_SENTINEL_U32 = 0xffffffff\n/** Deflate is the usual method; only method 0 (stored) can be read without an\n *  inflater, and this module has no decompression (it runs in the browser\n *  bundle and on the upload path, on untrusted bytes). */\nconst ZIP_METHOD_STORED = 0\n\n/** The OPC content-types part every OOXML package carries. */\nconst OPC_CONTENT_TYPES_PART = '[Content_Types].xml'\n\n/** The OPC package-relationships part. ECMA-376 Part 2 requires it in every\n *  conforming package, so an archive that borrowed the Office part NAMES\n *  without also carrying this one is not a package. Structural, like the\n *  content-types part: both are read from the zip's own uncompressed metadata,\n *  which is the only evidence available without an inflater. */\nconst OPC_PACKAGE_RELATIONSHIPS_PART = '_rels/.rels'\n\n/** Namespace a genuine content-types part declares. Only checkable when that\n *  part is STORED uncompressed — Word, Excel and PowerPoint all deflate it —\n *  so this narrows the crafted-archive surface where it applies and is silent\n *  where it does not. */\nconst OPC_CONTENT_TYPES_NAMESPACE = 'http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/content-types'\n\n/** Ceiling on how much of the content-types part is read when it happens to\n *  be stored uncompressed — the genuine part is a few hundred bytes, and a\n *  crafted archive must not be able to dictate how much text is scanned. */\nconst OPC_CONTENT_TYPES_SCAN_BYTES = 64 * 1024\n\ninterface OoxmlDeclaredMainPartType {\n  /** The content type as it appears in the content-types part. */\n  readonly declaredType: string\n  /** Reported mime when the package carries no VBA project. */\n  readonly mime: string\n  /** Reported mime for the same family once a VBA project is present. */\n  readonly macroEnabledMime: string\n  /** True when `declaredType` is itself one of the macro-enabled types. */\n  readonly macroEnabled: boolean\n}\n\n/** Content types a package DECLARES for its main part, in the content-types\n *  part itself — the authoritative signal when it is readable, because it\n *  distinguishes a document from a template or a macro-enabled sibling that\n *  share the same part layout. Each row carries its macro-enabled sibling\n *  because a declared type is only half the answer: the VBA-project scan can\n *  override it, and a package that carries one is macro-enabled whatever it\n *  declares. */\nconst OOXML_DECLARED_MAIN_PART_TYPES: ReadonlyArray<OoxmlDeclaredMainPartType> = [\n  {\n    declaredType: 'application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document.main+xml',\n    mime: OOXML_WORD_MIME,\n    macroEnabledMime: OOXML_WORD_MACRO_ENABLED_MIME,\n    macroEnabled: false,\n  },\n  {\n    declaredType: 'application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet.main+xml',\n    mime: OOXML_SPREADSHEET_MIME,\n    macroEnabledMime: OOXML_SPREADSHEET_MACRO_ENABLED_MIME,\n    macroEnabled: false,\n  },\n  {\n    declaredType: 'application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.presentationml.presentation.main+xml',\n    mime: OOXML_PRESENTATION_MIME,\n    macroEnabledMime: OOXML_PRESENTATION_MACRO_ENABLED_MIME,\n    macroEnabled: false,\n  },\n  {\n    declaredType: 'application/vnd.ms-word.document.macroEnabled.main+xml',\n    mime: OOXML_WORD_MACRO_ENABLED_MIME,\n    macroEnabledMime: OOXML_WORD_MACRO_ENABLED_MIME,\n    macroEnabled: true,\n  },\n  {\n    declaredType: 'application/vnd.ms-excel.sheet.macroEnabled.main+xml',\n    mime: OOXML_SPREADSHEET_MACRO_ENABLED_MIME,\n    macroEnabledMime: OOXML_SPREADSHEET_MACRO_ENABLED_MIME,\n    macroEnabled: true,\n  },\n  {\n    declaredType: 'application/vnd.ms-powerpoint.presentation.macroEnabled.main+xml',\n    mime: OOXML_PRESENTATION_MACRO_ENABLED_MIME,\n    macroEnabledMime: OOXML_PRESENTATION_MACRO_ENABLED_MIME,\n    macroEnabled: true,\n  },\n]\n\n/** Main part of each Office format, as it appears in the package's entry\n *  names — the structural signal used when the declared content types are\n *  compressed (the common case: Word, Excel and PowerPoint all deflate the\n *  content-types part). Entry names live in the zip's own uncompressed\n *  metadata, so reading them needs no inflater.\n *\n *  `directory` is the fallback for the packages that do not use the canonical\n *  main-part name — a repaired or converted Word file declares\n *  `word/document2.xml` — and it is only consulted for a package already\n *  confirmed to carry the OPC content-types part, where a `word/` part means\n *  a Word document and nothing else. The three directories never mix: an\n *  embedded workbook inside a `.docx` lives under `word/embeddings/`. */\nconst OOXML_MAIN_PARTS: ReadonlyArray<{ part: string; directory: string; mime: string; macroEnabledMime: string }> = [\n  { part: 'word/document.xml', directory: 'word/', mime: OOXML_WORD_MIME, macroEnabledMime: OOXML_WORD_MACRO_ENABLED_MIME },\n  { part: 'xl/workbook.xml', directory: 'xl/', mime: OOXML_SPREADSHEET_MIME, macroEnabledMime: OOXML_SPREADSHEET_MACRO_ENABLED_MIME },\n  { part: 'ppt/presentation.xml', directory: 'ppt/', mime: OOXML_PRESENTATION_MIME, macroEnabledMime: OOXML_PRESENTATION_MACRO_ENABLED_MIME },\n]\n\n/** A VBA project part means the package is macro-enabled whatever its\n *  extension claims. Matched by suffix rather than by exact path: naming the\n *  macro-enabled mime is the fail-closed answer (the default allow-list\n *  refuses it), so a part this misses is the expensive direction. */\nconst OOXML_VBA_PROJECT_PART_SUFFIX = 'vbaProject.bin'\n\ninterface ZipEntry {\n  name: string\n  compressionMethod: number\n  compressedBytes: number\n  localHeaderOffset: number\n}\n\nfunction readU16Le(bytes: Uint8Array, offset: number): number {\n  return bytes[offset]! | (bytes[offset + 1]! << 8)\n}\n\n/** Little-endian u32 as an unsigned JS number — the high byte is multiplied\n *  rather than shifted, because `<< 24` would produce a negative value. */\nfunction readU32Le(bytes: Uint8Array, offset: number): number {\n  return (bytes[offset]! | (bytes[offset + 1]! << 8) | (bytes[offset + 2]! << 16)) + bytes[offset + 3]! * 0x1000000\n}\n\n/** Entry names are raw bytes; only exact ASCII part names are compared here,\n *  so a non-ASCII byte becomes a character that can never match one. */\nfunction asciiEntryName(bytes: Uint8Array, offset: number, length: number): string {\n  let name = ''\n  for (let i = 0; i < length; i++) {\n    const byte = bytes[offset + i]!\n    name += byte < 0x80 ? String.fromCharCode(byte) : '\\uFFFD'\n  }\n  return name\n}\n\n/** Scan back from the tail for the end-of-central-directory record. The\n *  comment length must account for exactly the bytes that follow, or the\n *  \"signature\" is compressed data that happens to spell `PK\\x05\\x06`. */\nfunction findZipEndOfCentralDirectory(bytes: Uint8Array): number | null {\n  const lowest = Math.max(0, bytes.length - ZIP_END_OF_CENTRAL_DIRECTORY_BYTES - ZIP_MAX_COMMENT_BYTES)\n  for (let offset = bytes.length - ZIP_END_OF_CENTRAL_DIRECTORY_BYTES; offset >= lowest; offset--) {\n    if (readU32Le(bytes, offset) !== ZIP_END_OF_CENTRAL_DIRECTORY_SIGNATURE) continue\n    if (offset + ZIP_END_OF_CENTRAL_DIRECTORY_BYTES + readU16Le(bytes, offset + 20) === bytes.length) return offset\n  }\n  return null\n}\n\n/** Read the archive's central directory — the authoritative index a zip\n *  reader uses. Returns `null` for anything that is not a complete, in-bounds,\n *  non-ZIP64 directory: a truncated or crafted archive is left unclassified\n *  rather than guessed at from its first local header. */\nfunction readZipCentralDirectory(bytes: Uint8Array): ZipEntry[] | null {\n  const end = findZipEndOfCentralDirectory(bytes)\n  if (end === null) return null\n\n  const entryCount = readU16Le(bytes, end + 10)\n  const directoryBytes = readU32Le(bytes, end + 12)\n  const directoryOffset = readU32Le(bytes, end + 16)\n  if (entryCount === ZIP64_SENTINEL_U16) return null\n  if (directoryBytes === ZIP64_SENTINEL_U32 || directoryOffset === ZIP64_SENTINEL_U32) return null\n  if (directoryOffset + directoryBytes > bytes.length) return null\n\n  const entries: ZipEntry[] = []\n  let cursor = directoryOffset\n  for (let i = 0; i < entryCount; i++) {\n    if (cursor + ZIP_CENTRAL_FILE_HEADER_BYTES > bytes.length) return null\n    if (readU32Le(bytes, cursor) !== ZIP_CENTRAL_FILE_HEADER_SIGNATURE) return null\n    const nameLength = readU16Le(bytes, cursor + 28)\n    const extraLength = readU16Le(bytes, cursor + 30)\n    const commentLength = readU16Le(bytes, cursor + 32)\n    if (cursor + ZIP_CENTRAL_FILE_HEADER_BYTES + nameLength > bytes.length) return null\n    entries.push({\n      name: asciiEntryName(bytes, cursor + ZIP_CENTRAL_FILE_HEADER_BYTES, nameLength),\n      compressionMethod: readU16Le(bytes, cursor + 10),\n      compressedBytes: readU32Le(bytes, cursor + 20),\n      localHeaderOffset: readU32Le(bytes, cursor + 42),\n    })\n    cursor += ZIP_CENTRAL_FILE_HEADER_BYTES + nameLength + extraLength + commentLength\n  }\n  return entries\n}\n\n/** Text of an entry stored WITHOUT compression, or `null` for anything else.\n *  The data offset is computed from the local header (its extra field may be\n *  a different length than the central directory's copy). */\nfunction storedZipEntryText(bytes: Uint8Array, entry: ZipEntry): string | null {\n  if (entry.compressionMethod !== ZIP_METHOD_STORED) return null\n  const header = entry.localHeaderOffset\n  if (header + ZIP_LOCAL_FILE_HEADER_BYTES > bytes.length) return null\n  if (readU32Le(bytes, header) !== ZIP_LOCAL_FILE_HEADER_SIGNATURE) return null\n  const start = header + ZIP_LOCAL_FILE_HEADER_BYTES + readU16Le(bytes, header + 26) + readU16Le(bytes, header + 28)\n  const length = Math.min(entry.compressedBytes, OPC_CONTENT_TYPES_SCAN_BYTES)\n  if (length === 0 || start + length > bytes.length) return null\n  return new TextDecoder('utf-8').decode(bytes.subarray(start, start + length))\n}\n\n/**\n * Identify an OOXML (Office Open XML) package inside a PKZIP container, or\n * `null` for an archive that is not one.\n *\n * Every `.docx`/`.xlsx`/`.pptx` is a zip, so the zip signature alone says\n * nothing — matching on it would admit every `.zip` a user can produce. What\n * this reads is the archive's own uncompressed metadata: the central\n * directory's entry names, plus the content-types part's text in the one case\n * where a producer stored it uncompressed. Everything below follows from that\n * one constraint — the module ships into browser bundles and runs on untrusted\n * bytes, so it has no inflater and cannot read a deflated part.\n *\n * Structural preconditions (both required): the OPC content-types part\n * `[Content_Types].xml` AND the OPC package-relationships part `_rels/.rels`.\n * Which Office format it is comes from the content types the first part\n * DECLARES when it is readable, and otherwise from which main part the package\n * contains (`word/document.xml`, `xl/workbook.xml`, `ppt/presentation.xml`).\n * A package carrying a VBA project reports the macro-enabled mime — computed\n * BEFORE the declared lookup and applied to its answer, so a package that\n * declares the plain type and ships `vbaProject.bin` reports macro-enabled,\n * and a decoy `Override` cannot select the plainer of two declared types.\n *\n * **What this does NOT prove, and no name-only reader can.** A deflated part's\n * CONTENT is unreadable here, so an archive that names its entries like a\n * package and fills them with arbitrary bytes reports the Office mime. That is\n * the same standing as every other magic-byte family this module reports —\n * `%PDF-` followed by arbitrary bytes reports `application/pdf` — because a\n * content sniffer answers \"what format does this claim to be\", not \"is this\n * safe\". The attachment gate is a FORMAT gate; a product that needs the bytes\n * to be a real, parseable document gets that from `/documents`' extractor,\n * which fails loud on a package it cannot read.\n */\nfunction sniffOoxml(bytes: Uint8Array): string | null {\n  const entries = readZipCentralDirectory(bytes)\n  if (!entries) return null\n\n  const contentTypes = entries.find((entry) => entry.name === OPC_CONTENT_TYPES_PART)\n  if (!contentTypes) return null\n  const names = entries.map((entry) => entry.name)\n  if (!names.includes(OPC_PACKAGE_RELATIONSHIPS_PART)) return null\n\n  // Order is load-bearing: a VBA project part makes the package macro-enabled\n  // whatever its content-types part declares, and the declared lookup below\n  // RETURNS, so this has to be known before it runs.\n  const macroEnabled = names.some((name) => name.endsWith(OOXML_VBA_PROJECT_PART_SUFFIX))\n\n  const declared = storedZipEntryText(bytes, contentTypes)\n  if (declared !== null) {\n    if (!declared.includes(OPC_CONTENT_TYPES_NAMESPACE)) return null\n    // Every match, not the first: `includes` over the whole part means a decoy\n    // `Override` declaring a second main-part type is indistinguishable from\n    // the real one, so the macro-enabled reading wins whenever one is present.\n    const matches = OOXML_DECLARED_MAIN_PART_TYPES.filter((row) => declared.includes(row.declaredType))\n    const row = matches.find((candidate) => candidate.macroEnabled) ?? matches[0]\n    if (row) return macroEnabled || row.macroEnabled ? row.macroEnabledMime : row.mime\n  }\n\n  const canonical = OOXML_MAIN_PARTS.find((main) => names.includes(main.part))\n  const format = canonical ?? OOXML_MAIN_PARTS.find((main) => names.some((name) => name.startsWith(main.directory)))\n  if (!format) return null\n  return macroEnabled ? format.macroEnabledMime : format.mime\n}\n\nfunction sniffMagicBytes(bytes: Uint8Array): string | null {\n  if (bytesStartWith(bytes, 0, [0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a])) return 'image/png'\n  if (bytesStartWith(bytes, 0, [0xff, 0xd8, 0xff])) return 'image/jpeg'\n  if (asciiAt(bytes, 0, 'GIF87a') || asciiAt(bytes, 0, 'GIF89a')) return 'image/gif'\n  if (sniffBmp(bytes)) return 'image/bmp'\n  if (bytesStartWith(bytes, 0, [0x49, 0x49, 0x2a, 0x00])) return 'image/tiff' // little-endian\n  if (bytesStartWith(bytes, 0, [0x4d, 0x4d, 0x00, 0x2a])) return 'image/tiff' // big-endian\n  if (bytesStartWith(bytes, 0, [0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00])) return 'image/x-icon'\n  if (asciiAt(bytes, 0, '%PDF-')) return 'application/pdf'\n  // OOXML (.docx/.xlsx/.pptx) is a PKZIP container, so the container is\n  // inspected before an archive is reported as a generic one — see\n  // `sniffOoxml`. An archive that is not an Office package stays\n  // `application/zip`, which no default allow-list admits.\n  if (bytesStartWith(bytes, 0, [0x50, 0x4b, 0x03, 0x04])) return sniffOoxml(bytes) ?? 'application/zip'\n  if (bytesStartWith(bytes, 0, [0x1f, 0x8b])) return 'application/gzip'\n  if (sniffId3(bytes) || bytesStartWith(bytes, 0, [0xff, 0xfb])) return 'audio/mpeg'\n  if (asciiAt(bytes, 0, 'OggS')) return 'audio/ogg'\n\n  const ebml = sniffEbml(bytes)\n  if (ebml) return ebml\n\n  const riff = sniffRiff(bytes)\n  if (riff) return riff\n\n  const ftyp = sniffFtyp(bytes)\n  if (ftyp) return ftyp\n\n  return null\n}\n\n/** SVG is valid UTF-8 but must round-trip byte-identical (image tools read\n *  it from the box as a file), so it is classified binary. Conservative\n *  match: the document's first element is `<svg`, or an `<?xml` prolog is\n *  followed by an `<svg` element within the first ~1KB (comments/doctype may\n *  sit between). Plain XML without an svg root, or prose that merely\n *  mentions \"<svg\", stays text. */\nfunction sniffSvgText(decoded: string): boolean {\n  let text = decoded\n  if (text.charCodeAt(0) === 0xfeff) text = text.slice(1)\n  text = text.trimStart()\n  if (/^<svg[\\s>/]/.test(text)) return true\n  if (!text.startsWith('<?xml')) return false\n  return /<svg[\\s>/]/.test(text.slice(0, 1024))\n}\n\n/** Decide whether uploaded bytes are binary or text, and identify the mime\n *  type when it can be determined from content. Magic bytes are checked\n *  first; anything unmatched falls back to a fatal UTF-8 decode. A NUL byte\n *  or a decode failure means binary. Valid UTF-8 that is an SVG document is\n *  binary (byte-identity matters for image tooling). Content that matches\n *  nothing and does not decode as text is binary with an unknown mime —\n *  extension-based guessing happens at the call site, not here. */\nexport function sniffBinary(bytes: Uint8Array): SniffResult {\n  const mime = sniffMagicBytes(bytes)\n  if (mime) return { binary: true, mime }\n\n  if (bytes.includes(0x00)) return { binary: true, mime: null }\n\n  let decoded: string\n  try {\n    decoded = new TextDecoder('utf-8', { fatal: true }).decode(bytes)\n  } catch {\n    return { binary: true, mime: null }\n  }\n  if (sniffSvgText(decoded)) return { binary: true, mime: 'image/svg+xml' }\n  return { binary: false, mime: null }\n}\n","/**\n * Shared attachment validation core — constants, type-gate, and filename\n * sanitization used by BOTH the (server) attachment upload route and the\n * (browser) composer's client-side pre-validation, so a rejection never\n * differs depending on which side classified the bytes first. The structural\n * `attachments` parser lives here too, so the chat route and the operator API\n * refuse the same turn bodies without either pulling in the chat store.\n *\n * ≈ gtm-agent's `src/lib/attachment-limits.ts`, minus what agent-app already\n * has (`ATTACHMENT_MAX_COUNT`/`MAX_ATTACHMENT_TOTAL_BYTES`/\n * `attachmentTotalSizeErrorMessage` lived in `./resolve-attachments` and are\n * re-homed here so the whole validation vocabulary — count cap, size caps,\n * and type gate — has one address). Import-free besides `./wire`\n * (`formatBytes`) and `./binary-sniff` (`SniffResult`): `/web-react`\n * re-exports `/chat-routes` modules into browser bundles\n * (`tests/browser-safe-subpaths.test.ts` walks the graph), so nothing here\n * may reach a Node builtin or an engine package.\n */\n\nimport { formatBytes, type ChatAttachmentInput, type ChatAttachmentKind } from './wire'\nimport {\n  OOXML_PRESENTATION_MACRO_ENABLED_MIME,\n  OOXML_PRESENTATION_MIME,\n  OOXML_SPREADSHEET_MACRO_ENABLED_MIME,\n  OOXML_SPREADSHEET_MIME,\n  OOXML_WORD_MACRO_ENABLED_MIME,\n  OOXML_WORD_MIME,\n} from './binary-sniff'\nimport type { SniffResult } from './binary-sniff'\n\n/** Ceiling on a binary attachment's raw (pre-encoding) byte size. */\nexport const MAX_BINARY_ATTACHMENT_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024\n\n/** Ceiling on a text attachment's raw byte size. Text hydrates through\n *  inline prompt parts, a separate path that remains proxy-capped (see\n *  `INLINE_PARTS_MAX_BYTES` in `./wire`). */\nexport const MAX_TEXT_ATTACHMENT_BYTES = 950 * 1024\n\n/** Most files a single request may carry: the composer staging cap, the\n *  upload route's per-request cap, and the chat body's `attachments` cap. */\nexport const ATTACHMENT_MAX_COUNT = 10\n\n/** Aggregate raw-byte ceiling across one message's attachments. */\nexport const MAX_ATTACHMENT_TOTAL_BYTES = 25 * 1024 * 1024\n\n/**\n * Accept list for the composer file picker + type validation, same grammar as\n * the native `<input accept>` attribute. Images plus the text/doc types a\n * product's store actually reads.\n *\n * Every extension here is one the default {@link ALLOWED_ATTACHMENT_SNIFFED_MIMES}\n * actually admits — a picker that offers a format the gate then rejects is a\n * defect, so `tests/chat-routes/attachment-validation.test.ts` walks this\n * string and proves each entry uploads.\n */\nexport const ATTACHMENT_ACCEPT =\n  'image/*,.pdf,.docx,.xlsx,.pptx,.txt,.md,.csv,.json,.yaml,.yml,.html'\n\n/** The Office (OOXML) package mimes the default allow-list admits — the\n *  formats professionals actually send: Word contracts, Excel workpapers,\n *  PowerPoint decks. Admitting the format is a gate decision only; whether a\n *  product can EXTRACT text from one is that product's concern. */\nexport const OOXML_SNIFFED_MIMES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  OOXML_WORD_MIME,\n  OOXML_SPREADSHEET_MIME,\n  OOXML_PRESENTATION_MIME,\n])\n\n/** Macro-enabled Office package mimes (`.docm`/`.xlsm`/`.pptm`), reported by\n *  `sniffBinary` but deliberately NOT in the default allow-list: a package\n *  carrying a VBA project is a different risk decision than a plain document,\n *  and it is the product's to make. Opt in by widening the allow-list at the\n *  route's `allowedSniffedMimes` seam:\n *  `new Set([...ALLOWED_ATTACHMENT_SNIFFED_MIMES, ...MACRO_ENABLED_OOXML_SNIFFED_MIMES])`. */\nexport const MACRO_ENABLED_OOXML_SNIFFED_MIMES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  OOXML_WORD_MACRO_ENABLED_MIME,\n  OOXML_SPREADSHEET_MACRO_ENABLED_MIME,\n  OOXML_PRESENTATION_MACRO_ENABLED_MIME,\n])\n\n/** Sniffed-mime counterpart of `ATTACHMENT_ACCEPT`: the binary formats\n *  `sniffBinary` can identify from content among the accepted types.\n *  Values must match `sniffBinary`'s output strings verbatim, or every\n *  upload of that format fails the type gate — locked by the round-trip test\n *  that sniffs real bytes of every mime listed here. */\nexport const ALLOWED_ATTACHMENT_SNIFFED_MIMES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  'image/png',\n  'image/jpeg',\n  'image/gif',\n  'image/bmp',\n  'image/tiff',\n  'image/x-icon',\n  'image/webp',\n  'image/svg+xml',\n  'image/avif',\n  'image/heic',\n  'image/heif',\n  'application/pdf',\n  ...OOXML_SNIFFED_MIMES,\n])\n\n/** Extensions whose magic-byte family is unambiguous, mapped to the mime\n *  `sniffBinary` emits for genuine content of that format. Keep in sync with\n *  `ATTACHMENT_ACCEPT`: an extension only belongs here if its format has a\n *  detectable magic-byte signature. Text extensions (.txt/.md/.csv/.json/\n *  .yaml/.yml/.html) are deliberately absent — they have no magic bytes to\n *  compare against, so they ride the plain UTF-8 gate instead. AVIF/HEIC/HEIF\n *  extensions are also deliberately absent: the ISO-BMFF brand-to-extension\n *  mapping in that family isn't one-to-one (a legitimate `.heic` can carry a\n *  `mif1` brand), so an extension-implies-mime entry would reject genuine\n *  files. They still ride the allowlist gate below, which is what catches an\n *  mp4 renamed `.avif` (its content sniffs `video/mp4`, not an allowed mime).\n *  The Office extensions ARE here: a `.zip` renamed `.docx` sniffs\n *  `application/zip` (its container carries neither of the two OPC parts an\n *  Office package must have), so the entry turns a generic 415 into a mismatch\n *  that names what the file actually is. Sniffing answers what format the\n *  bytes CLAIM to be, not whether they are a readable document — see\n *  `sniffOoxml`'s note on what a reader with no inflater can and cannot prove.\n *  The macro-enabled and EBML-video extensions are listed for the same reason\n *  even though the default allow-list refuses them — a product that widens\n *  the allow-list gets the renamed-file check with it. */\nconst EXTENSION_IMPLIES_SNIFFED_MIME: Readonly<Record<string, string>> = {\n  png: 'image/png',\n  jpg: 'image/jpeg',\n  jpeg: 'image/jpeg',\n  gif: 'image/gif',\n  bmp: 'image/bmp',\n  tif: 'image/tiff',\n  tiff: 'image/tiff',\n  ico: 'image/x-icon',\n  webp: 'image/webp',\n  svg: 'image/svg+xml',\n  pdf: 'application/pdf',\n  docx: OOXML_WORD_MIME,\n  xlsx: OOXML_SPREADSHEET_MIME,\n  pptx: OOXML_PRESENTATION_MIME,\n  docm: OOXML_WORD_MACRO_ENABLED_MIME,\n  xlsm: OOXML_SPREADSHEET_MACRO_ENABLED_MIME,\n  pptm: OOXML_PRESENTATION_MACRO_ENABLED_MIME,\n  webm: 'video/webm',\n  mkv: 'video/x-matroska',\n}\n\n/** Represent the result of checking an attachment's type with success or specific failure details */\nexport type AttachmentTypeCheckResult =\n  | { succeeded: true }\n  | { succeeded: false; code: 'attachment_type_mismatch' | 'attachment_type_not_allowed'; message: string }\n\n/**\n * Cross-check a filename's extension against its sniffed content.\n *\n * Text content (`sniff.binary === false`) always passes here — it has no\n * magic bytes to compare, so it rides the existing UTF-8 gate instead. For\n * binary content: an extension with an unambiguous magic-byte family (e.g.\n * `.pdf`) must match the sniffed mime, or the upload is a mismatch (a\n * renamed file). Otherwise the sniffed mime must be one of `allowed`\n * (default {@link ALLOWED_ATTACHMENT_SNIFFED_MIMES}), or the upload is\n * rejected outright. The `allowed` param feeds a route's override seam (a\n * product accepting a narrower or wider set than the default).\n */\nexport function checkAttachmentType(\n  fileName: string,\n  sniff: SniffResult,\n  allowed: ReadonlySet<string> = ALLOWED_ATTACHMENT_SNIFFED_MIMES,\n): AttachmentTypeCheckResult {\n  if (sniff.binary === false) return { succeeded: true }\n\n  const extension = fileName.split('.').pop()?.toLowerCase() ?? ''\n  const impliedMime = EXTENSION_IMPLIES_SNIFFED_MIME[extension]\n  if (impliedMime && sniff.mime && sniff.mime !== impliedMime) {\n    return {\n      succeeded: false,\n      code: 'attachment_type_mismatch',\n      message: `${fileName} has a .${extension} extension, but its content is ${sniff.mime}`,\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (!sniff.mime || !allowed.has(sniff.mime)) {\n    return {\n      succeeded: false,\n      code: 'attachment_type_not_allowed',\n      message: sniff.mime\n        ? `${fileName}'s content (${sniff.mime}) is not an allowed attachment type`\n        : `${fileName}'s content is not a recognized attachment type`,\n    }\n  }\n\n  return { succeeded: true }\n}\n\n/**\n * Rewrite a filename into the store-path charset (`A-Za-z0-9._-` per\n * segment) — attachment paths double as store keys, sandbox file paths, and\n * in-message path references, none of which tolerate spaces or punctuation.\n * Runs of unsupported characters collapse to one `-`; leading dots/dashes are\n * stripped so the name can't read as a hidden segment. The original name is\n * preserved separately (the returned `ChatAttachmentInput.name`), so\n * sanitization loses nothing.\n */\nexport function sanitizeAttachmentFileName(name: string): string {\n  const sanitized = name\n    .trim()\n    .replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9._-]+/g, '-')\n    .replace(/^[.-]+/, '')\n  return sanitized || 'file'\n}\n\n/** Human-readable error naming both the actual size and the limit that was\n *  exceeded. Shared so the server route and the composer pre-check report\n *  the same message shape. */\nexport function attachmentSizeErrorMessage(name: string, actualBytes: number, limitBytes: number): string {\n  return `${name} is ${formatBytes(actualBytes)}; attachments are limited to ${formatBytes(limitBytes)}`\n}\n\n/** Human-readable error for a chat message whose combined attachments exceed\n *  the aggregate raw-byte ceiling. */\nexport function attachmentTotalSizeErrorMessage(totalBytes: number, limitBytes: number): string {\n  return `Attachments total ${formatBytes(totalBytes)}; each message is limited to ${formatBytes(limitBytes)}`\n}\n\n/** Verdict of a path check: OK, or a rejection naming why. Mirrors\n *  `SandboxMentionPathCheck` in `./wire`. */\nexport type AttachmentPathCheck =\n  | { succeeded: true }\n  | { succeeded: false; error: string }\n\n/** Longest attachment display name accepted — bounds what gets echoed into the\n *  prompt block and rendered as a chip label. */\nconst MAX_ATTACHMENT_NAME_LENGTH = 256\n\nfunction isAttachmentKind(value: unknown): value is ChatAttachmentKind {\n  return value === 'image' || value === 'file'\n}\n\n/** C0 control characters (0x00–0x1F) plus DEL (0x7F) — covers `\\n`/`\\r`/`\\t`.\n *  A `name` or `path` carrying one of these has no legitimate use here and\n *  everything to gain from an attacker: {@link buildAttachmentPromptBlock} in\n *  `/chat-store` renders both fields verbatim into the dispatched agent\n *  prompt, so an embedded newline fabricates new prompt lines (a\n *  prompt-injection vector) rather than naming a file. Rejected at this\n *  boundary — not merely neutralized downstream — so the wire never accepts\n *  the input in the first place; a legitimate name/path never contains one. */\nconst CONTROL_CHARS = /[\\x00-\\x1F\\x7F]/\n\n/**\n * Default path validator when a caller supplies none. Rejects the ways a path\n * picked in a client can escape the store root — traversal (`..` segment),\n * absolute (leading `/`), backslashes, null bytes, control characters (see\n * {@link CONTROL_CHARS} — a path also feeds {@link buildAttachmentPromptBlock}'s\n * `(vault: ${path})` pointer, so it is exposed to the same injection surface as\n * `name`) — plus a dotfile/hidden segment (a leading `.` on any segment).\n * Generalized from gtm's `validateVaultFilePath`, in the spirit of\n * `validateSandboxMentionPath` (`/chat-routes`'s wire mention-path validator) —\n * but the dotfile rejection here is INTENTIONALLY stricter than that sibling:\n * an uploaded attachment path is sanitized store-relative storage the product\n * itself assigned, whereas a mention path points at a file that already exists\n * in the sandbox and may legitimately live under a dotfile segment. A caller\n * that needs gtm's exact (looser) rule can supply `validatePath` to override\n * this default entirely.\n */\nexport function defaultValidateAttachmentPath(path: string): AttachmentPathCheck {\n  if (path.includes('\\0')) return { succeeded: false, error: 'attachment path must not contain null bytes' }\n  if (path.includes('\\\\')) return { succeeded: false, error: 'attachment path must not contain backslashes' }\n  if (CONTROL_CHARS.test(path)) return { succeeded: false, error: 'attachment path must not contain control characters' }\n  if (path.startsWith('/')) return { succeeded: false, error: 'attachment path must be store-relative, not absolute' }\n  const segments = path.split('/')\n  if (segments.some((segment) => segment === '..')) {\n    return { succeeded: false, error: 'attachment path must not contain \"..\" segments' }\n  }\n  if (segments.some((segment) => segment.startsWith('.'))) {\n    return { succeeded: false, error: 'attachment path must not contain a hidden (dotfile) segment' }\n  }\n  return { succeeded: true }\n}\n\nfunction parseAttachmentInput(\n  value: unknown,\n  index: number,\n  validatePath: (path: string) => AttachmentPathCheck,\n): { succeeded: true; value: ChatAttachmentInput } | { succeeded: false; error: string } {\n  if (!value || typeof value !== 'object' || Array.isArray(value)) {\n    return { succeeded: false, error: `attachments[${index}] must be an object` }\n  }\n  const record = value as Record<string, unknown>\n\n  const path = record.path\n  if (typeof path !== 'string' || !path) {\n    return { succeeded: false, error: `attachments[${index}].path must be a non-empty string` }\n  }\n  const name = record.name\n  if (typeof name !== 'string' || !name.trim()) {\n    return { succeeded: false, error: `attachments[${index}].name must be a non-empty string` }\n  }\n  if (name.length > MAX_ATTACHMENT_NAME_LENGTH) {\n    return { succeeded: false, error: `attachments[${index}].name must not exceed ${MAX_ATTACHMENT_NAME_LENGTH} characters` }\n  }\n  if (CONTROL_CHARS.test(name)) {\n    return { succeeded: false, error: `attachments[${index}].name must not contain control characters` }\n  }\n  const size = record.size\n  if (typeof size !== 'number' || !Number.isFinite(size)) {\n    return { succeeded: false, error: `attachments[${index}].size must be a finite number` }\n  }\n  if (size < 0) {\n    return { succeeded: false, error: `attachments[${index}].size must not be negative` }\n  }\n  const mediaType = record.mediaType\n  if (typeof mediaType !== 'string') {\n    return { succeeded: false, error: `attachments[${index}].mediaType must be a string` }\n  }\n  const kind = record.kind\n  if (!isAttachmentKind(kind)) {\n    return { succeeded: false, error: `attachments[${index}].kind must be \"image\" or \"file\"` }\n  }\n\n  const pathCheck = validatePath(path)\n  if (!pathCheck.succeeded) return { succeeded: false, error: pathCheck.error }\n\n  return { succeeded: true, value: { path, name, size, mediaType, kind } }\n}\n\n/** Structural limits for {@link parseChatAttachmentInputs}. */\nexport interface ParseChatAttachmentInputsOptions {\n  /** Most attachments one request may carry. Default {@link ATTACHMENT_MAX_COUNT}. */\n  maxCount?: number\n  /** Path validator override. Default {@link defaultValidateAttachmentPath}. */\n  validatePath?: (path: string) => AttachmentPathCheck\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate an `attachments` value's shape without reading the store: an\n * array of at most `maxCount` {@link ChatAttachmentInput}s with valid,\n * distinct paths. Absent (`undefined`/`null`) is an empty list. Sizes are\n * still client-reported here; {@link resolveChatAttachments} re-derives them\n * from the store.\n */\nexport function parseChatAttachmentInputs(\n  value: unknown,\n  options: ParseChatAttachmentInputsOptions = {},\n): { succeeded: true; value: ChatAttachmentInput[] } | { succeeded: false; error: string } {\n  const maxCount = options.maxCount ?? ATTACHMENT_MAX_COUNT\n  const validatePath = options.validatePath ?? defaultValidateAttachmentPath\n\n  if (value === undefined || value === null) return { succeeded: true, value: [] }\n  if (!Array.isArray(value)) return { succeeded: false, error: 'attachments must be an array' }\n  if (value.length > maxCount) {\n    return { succeeded: false, error: `attachments must not exceed ${maxCount} entries` }\n  }\n\n  const inputs: ChatAttachmentInput[] = []\n  const seenPaths = new Set<string>()\n  for (let index = 0; index < value.length; index += 1) {\n    const parsed = parseAttachmentInput(value[index], index, validatePath)\n    if (!parsed.succeeded) return parsed\n    if (seenPaths.has(parsed.value.path)) {\n      return { succeeded: false, error: `attachments must not repeat a path: ${parsed.value.path}` }\n    }\n    seenPaths.add(parsed.value.path)\n    inputs.push(parsed.value)\n  }\n  return { succeeded: true, value: inputs 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package/dist/chunk-XELWWXJJ.js

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+// src/policy-filters/index.ts
+function allOf(...filters) {
+  if (filters.length === 0) {
+    throw new Error("allOf() requires at least one filter \u2014 an empty allOf admits everything; use allowAll() to say so explicitly");
+  }
+  return async (item, context) => {
+    for (const filter of filters) {
+      if (!await filter(item, context)) return false;
+    }
+    return true;
+  };
+}
+function anyOf(...filters) {
+  return async (item, context) => {
+    for (const filter of filters) {
+      if (await filter(item, context)) return true;
+    }
+    return false;
+  };
+}
+function allowAll() {
+  return () => true;
+}
+var PolicyDeniedError = class extends Error {
+  code;
+  kind;
+  id;
+  constructor(code, kind, id, reason) {
+    super(reason);
+    this.name = "PolicyDeniedError";
+    this.code = code;
+    this.kind = kind;
+    this.id = id;
+  }
+};
+async function lookupPolicyInfo(catalog, id) {
+  if (typeof catalog === "function") return catalog(id);
+  const maybeMap = catalog;
+  if (typeof maybeMap.get === "function") return maybeMap.get(id);
+  for (const entry of catalog) {
+    if (entry.id === id) return entry;
+  }
+  return void 0;
+}
+function refusal(kind, id, code, detail) {
+  return { allowed: false, code, reason: `${kind} "${id}" is not admitted by policy: ${detail}` };
+}
+async function checkPolicy(input) {
+  const context = input.context ?? {};
+  let info;
+  try {
+    info = await lookupPolicyInfo(input.catalog, input.id);
+  } catch (err) {
+    const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
+    return refusal(input.kind, input.id, "policy-filter-error", `the policy catalog could not be read (${message})`);
+  }
+  if (!info) return refusal(input.kind, input.id, "policy-metadata-missing", "no policy metadata classifies it");
+  let admitted;
+  try {
+    admitted = await input.filter(info, context);
+  } catch (err) {
+    const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
+    return refusal(input.kind, input.id, "policy-filter-error", `the policy filter errored (${message})`);
+  }
+  return admitted ? { allowed: true, info } : refusal(input.kind, input.id, "policy-denied", "the policy filter rejected it");
+}
+async function assertPolicy(input) {
+  const result = await checkPolicy(input);
+  if (!result.allowed) throw new PolicyDeniedError(result.code, input.kind, input.id, result.reason);
+  return result.info;
+}
+function checkModelPolicy(id, catalog, filter, context) {
+  return checkPolicy({ kind: "model", id, catalog, filter, context });
+}
+async function filterItemsByPolicy(items, catalog, filter, context) {
+  const indexed = typeof catalog === "function" || typeof catalog.get === "function" ? catalog : indexPolicyCatalog(catalog);
+  const admitted = [];
+  for (const item of items) {
+    const result = await checkPolicy({ kind: "catalog item", id: item.id, catalog: indexed, filter, context });
+    if (result.allowed) admitted.push(item);
+  }
+  return admitted;
+}
+function indexPolicyCatalog(catalog) {
+  const index = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  for (const entry of catalog) index.set(entry.id, entry);
+  return index;
+}
+
+export {
+  allOf,
+  anyOf,
+  allowAll,
+  PolicyDeniedError,
+  checkPolicy,
+  assertPolicy,
+  checkModelPolicy,
+  filterItemsByPolicy,
+  indexPolicyCatalog
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-XELWWXJJ.js.map

package/dist/chunk-XELWWXJJ.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/policy-filters/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Policy filters — product-supplied admission policy over the models a\n * deployment will run.\n *\n * The engine owns the MECHANISM (a typed predicate, combinators, a fail-closed\n * enforcement seam, a catalog filter for pickers); the product owns the POLICY\n * (the metadata and the filter), supplied as data. Nothing here names a vendor,\n * a regulation, or a product — a HIPAA deployment's \"zero-data-retention,\n * BAA-eligible models only\" rule is one `PolicyFilter` over product-supplied\n * `ModelPolicyInfo`, and any other restriction composes the same way.\n *\n * Fail-closed contract, everywhere this module decides:\n *\n * - An item with NO policy metadata is refused (enforcement) or hidden\n *   (catalog filter). A policy that cannot classify an item does not admit it.\n * - A filter that THROWS is a refusal, never an admission — a broken policy\n *   check fails the turn instead of waving it through.\n * - Enforcement composes with availability, never replaces it: the\n *   `model-resolution` seam applies the policy AFTER its existing\n *   allowlist/env/catalog admission, on every path — a policy-filtered\n *   deployment cannot be bypassed through an operator-trusted lane.\n *\n * Browser-safe and dependency-free by construction: no imports at all, so UI\n * pickers (docs/ui-picker-canon.md) can filter the catalog they pass to\n * `ModelPicker` with the same filter the server enforces.\n */\n\n/** Arbitrary context a product threads to its filters (workspace, user, turn). */\nexport type PolicyFilterContext = Record<string, unknown>\n\n/**\n * A typed admission predicate over one catalog item. May be async (a product\n * can read its metadata from storage). Returning `false` denies; THROWING\n * denies too — enforcement treats a filter error as a refusal.\n */\nexport type PolicyFilter<T, C extends object = PolicyFilterContext> = (\n  item: T,\n  context: C,\n) => boolean | Promise<boolean>\n\n/**\n * Admit only items every filter admits.\n *\n * Throws at COMPOSITION time on an empty `allOf()`: an empty conjunction\n * admits everything, which reads as a policy that was never wired — the same\n * silent-admission class as a missing filter. Say \"no restriction\" out loud\n * with {@link allowAll} instead.\n */\nexport function allOf<T, C extends object = PolicyFilterContext>(\n  ...filters: Array<PolicyFilter<T, C>>\n): PolicyFilter<T, C> {\n  if (filters.length === 0) {\n    throw new Error('allOf() requires at least one filter — an empty allOf admits everything; use allowAll() to say so explicitly')\n  }\n  return async (item, context) => {\n    for (const filter of filters) {\n      if (!(await filter(item, context))) return false\n    }\n    return true\n  }\n}\n\n/** Admit items at least one filter admits. An empty `anyOf` admits nothing —\n *  already fail-closed, so it is allowed. */\nexport function anyOf<T, C extends object = PolicyFilterContext>(\n  ...filters: Array<PolicyFilter<T, C>>\n): PolicyFilter<T, C> {\n  return async (item, context) => {\n    for (const filter of filters) {\n      if (await filter(item, context)) return true\n    }\n    return false\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * The explicit \"no restriction\" filter — what an empty `allOf()` used to mean\n * silently. Admits every item; the catalog still must classify the id (a\n * policy of `allowAll` over an empty catalog admits nothing).\n */\nexport function allowAll<T, C extends object = PolicyFilterContext>(): PolicyFilter<T, C> {\n  return () => true\n}\n\n/**\n * Policy metadata for one model — DATA the product supplies (from its router\n * catalog, a compliance review, a vendor attestation), never engine policy.\n * The named fields are the common compliance dimensions; the index signature\n * carries any product-specific attribute a filter reads.\n */\nexport interface ModelPolicyInfo {\n  id: string\n  provider?: string\n  /** The provider retains no prompt/response data for this model. */\n  zeroDataRetention?: boolean\n  /** The vendor will sign a BAA covering this model. */\n  hipaaEligible?: boolean\n  [attribute: string]: unknown\n}\n\n/**\n * The policy a model-enforcement seam (`validateChatModelId`,\n * `runWithModelFailover`, `createChatTurnRoutes`, `createSandboxChatProducer`)\n * takes: which metadata to classify by, and which filter to apply. One shape,\n * threaded unchanged through every seam so a product states its admission\n * policy exactly once.\n */\nexport interface ModelPolicy<C extends object = PolicyFilterContext> {\n  filter: PolicyFilter<ModelPolicyInfo, C>\n  catalog: PolicyCatalog<ModelPolicyInfo>\n  /** Threaded to the filter unchanged. */\n  context?: C\n}\n\n/**\n * Where enforcement reads an item's metadata: an in-memory iterable, a\n * `ReadonlyMap` keyed by id, or a lookup (sync or async) keyed by the item's\n * id. Returning `undefined` means UNCLASSIFIED — enforcement refuses the item.\n *\n * Key the catalog by the EXACT id string the turn carries (see\n * docs/policy-filters.md § \"Ids are exact strings\"). Lookups never normalize.\n */\nexport type PolicyCatalog<T extends { id: string }> =\n  | Iterable<T>\n  | ReadonlyMap<string, T>\n  | ((id: string) => T | undefined | Promise<T | undefined>)\n\n/** Why a policy check refused, machine-readable on the result and on {@link PolicyDeniedError}. */\nexport type PolicyDeniedCode = 'policy-metadata-missing' | 'policy-denied' | 'policy-filter-error'\n\n/** The outcome of one policy check. Admission carries the item's metadata; a refusal carries a code and a reason. */\nexport type PolicyCheckResult<T = unknown> =\n  | { allowed: true; info: T }\n  | { allowed: false; code: PolicyDeniedCode; reason: string }\n\n/** The error {@link assertPolicy} throws on any refusal. */\nexport class PolicyDeniedError extends Error {\n  readonly code: PolicyDeniedCode\n  readonly kind: string\n  readonly id: string\n\n  constructor(code: PolicyDeniedCode, kind: string, id: string, reason: string) {\n    super(reason)\n    this.name = 'PolicyDeniedError'\n    this.code = code\n    this.kind = kind\n    this.id = id\n  }\n}\n\n/** Input to one policy check: what is being admitted, from which catalog, under which filter. */\nexport interface PolicyCheckInput<T extends { id: string }, C extends object = PolicyFilterContext> {\n  /** What is being admitted ('model' | 'harness' | 'profile' | …) — names the refusal. */\n  kind: string\n  /** The id being admitted. */\n  id: string\n  /** The product's policy metadata. */\n  catalog: PolicyCatalog<T>\n  /** The product's admission filter. */\n  filter: PolicyFilter<T, C>\n  /** Threaded to the filter unchanged. */\n  context?: C\n}\n\nasync function lookupPolicyInfo<T extends { id: string }>(\n  catalog: PolicyCatalog<T>,\n  id: string,\n): Promise<T | undefined> {\n  if (typeof catalog === 'function') return catalog(id)\n  // A ReadonlyMap answers by key — checked by its `get`, not `instanceof Map`,\n  // so a frozen or cross-realm map still counts.\n  const maybeMap = catalog as ReadonlyMap<string, T>\n  if (typeof maybeMap.get === 'function') return maybeMap.get(id)\n  for (const entry of catalog as Iterable<T>) {\n    if (entry.id === id) return entry\n  }\n  return undefined\n}\n\nfunction refusal<T>(kind: string, id: string, code: PolicyDeniedCode, detail: string): PolicyCheckResult<T> {\n  return { allowed: false, code, reason: `${kind} \"${id}\" is not admitted by policy: ${detail}` }\n}\n\n/**\n * Fail-closed policy check. Admits only when the catalog classifies the id AND\n * the filter accepts it. Unclassified ids and filter errors refuse.\n */\nexport async function checkPolicy<T extends { id: string }, C extends object = PolicyFilterContext>(\n  input: PolicyCheckInput<T, C>,\n): Promise<PolicyCheckResult<T>> {\n  const context = input.context ?? ({} as C)\n  let info: T | undefined\n  try {\n    info = await lookupPolicyInfo(input.catalog, input.id)\n  } catch (err) {\n    const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)\n    return refusal(input.kind, input.id, 'policy-filter-error', `the policy catalog could not be read (${message})`)\n  }\n  if (!info) return refusal(input.kind, input.id, 'policy-metadata-missing', 'no policy metadata classifies it')\n  let admitted: boolean\n  try {\n    admitted = await input.filter(info, context)\n  } catch (err) {\n    const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)\n    return refusal(input.kind, input.id, 'policy-filter-error', `the policy filter errored (${message})`)\n  }\n  return admitted\n    ? { allowed: true, info }\n    : refusal(input.kind, input.id, 'policy-denied', 'the policy filter rejected it')\n}\n\n/**\n * The throwing form of {@link checkPolicy} for enforcement seams that fail by\n * exception. Resolves with the item's metadata on admission; throws\n * {@link PolicyDeniedError} on any refusal.\n */\nexport async function assertPolicy<T extends { id: string }, C extends object = PolicyFilterContext>(\n  input: PolicyCheckInput<T, C>,\n): Promise<T> {\n  const result = await checkPolicy(input)\n  if (!result.allowed) throw new PolicyDeniedError(result.code, input.kind, input.id, result.reason)\n  return result.info\n}\n\n/** Policy check over a model id. See {@link checkPolicy}. */\nexport function checkModelPolicy<C extends object = PolicyFilterContext>(\n  id: string,\n  catalog: PolicyCatalog<ModelPolicyInfo>,\n  filter: PolicyFilter<ModelPolicyInfo, C>,\n  context?: C,\n): Promise<PolicyCheckResult<ModelPolicyInfo>> {\n  return checkPolicy({ kind: 'model', id, catalog, filter, context })\n}\n\n/**\n * Browser-safe catalog filter for pickers: keep only items the policy admits.\n * Items the catalog does not classify are dropped — a picker offers exactly\n * what a turn would run, and no more. Per docs/ui-picker-canon.md the picker\n * itself still reconciles an absent SAVED value under its own name; this\n * filter shapes the offered list, never the saved value.\n *\n * An iterable catalog is indexed ONCE into a Map up front: per-item rescans\n * are O(items × catalog) and silently return nothing on a one-shot iterable.\n */\nexport async function filterItemsByPolicy<\n  Item extends { id: string },\n  Info extends { id: string },\n  C extends object = PolicyFilterContext,\n>(\n  items: readonly Item[],\n  catalog: PolicyCatalog<Info>,\n  filter: PolicyFilter<Info, C>,\n  context?: C,\n): Promise<Item[]> {\n  const indexed: PolicyCatalog<Info> =\n    typeof catalog === 'function' || typeof (catalog as ReadonlyMap<string, Info>).get === 'function'\n      ? catalog\n      : indexPolicyCatalog(catalog as Iterable<Info>)\n  const admitted: Item[] = []\n  for (const item of items) {\n    const result = await checkPolicy({ kind: 'catalog item', id: item.id, catalog: indexed, filter, context })\n    if (result.allowed) admitted.push(item)\n  }\n  return admitted\n}\n\n/**\n * Index an iterable catalog into a `Map` keyed by exact id — the form to hold\n * when one catalog answers many lookups (a picker filter, a failover chain, a\n * busy route). Ids must be unique: a Map keeps the LAST entry for a repeated\n * id while a linear scan of the iterable finds the FIRST, and a catalog with\n * duplicate ids is a product bug either way.\n */\nexport function indexPolicyCatalog<T extends { id: string }>(catalog: Iterable<T>): Map<string, T> {\n  const index = new Map<string, T>()\n  for (const entry of catalog) index.set(entry.id, entry)\n  return index\n}\n"],"mappings":";AAgDO,SAAS,SACX,SACiB;AACpB,MAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,GAAG;AACxB,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,mHAA8G;AAAA,EAChI;AACA,SAAO,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY;AAC9B,eAAW,UAAU,SAAS;AAC5B,UAAI,CAAE,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO,EAAI,QAAO;AAAA,IAC7C;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAIO,SAAS,SACX,SACiB;AACpB,SAAO,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY;AAC9B,eAAW,UAAU,SAAS;AAC5B,UAAI,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO,EAAG,QAAO;AAAA,IAC1C;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAOO,SAAS,WAA0E;AACxF,SAAO,MAAM;AACf;AAsDO,IAAM,oBAAN,cAAgC,MAAM;AAAA,EAClC;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EAET,YAAY,MAAwB,MAAc,IAAY,QAAgB;AAC5E,UAAM,MAAM;AACZ,SAAK,OAAO;AACZ,SAAK,OAAO;AACZ,SAAK,OAAO;AACZ,SAAK,KAAK;AAAA,EACZ;AACF;AAgBA,eAAe,iBACb,SACA,IACwB;AACxB,MAAI,OAAO,YAAY,WAAY,QAAO,QAAQ,EAAE;AAGpD,QAAM,WAAW;AACjB,MAAI,OAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,WAAY,QAAO,SAAS,IAAI,EAAE;AAC9D,aAAW,SAAS,SAAwB;AAC1C,QAAI,MAAM,OAAO,GAAI,QAAO;AAAA,EAC9B;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,QAAW,MAAc,IAAY,MAAwB,QAAsC;AAC1G,SAAO,EAAE,SAAS,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,gCAAgC,MAAM,GAAG;AAChG;AAMA,eAAsB,YACpB,OAC+B;AAC/B,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,WAAY,CAAC;AACnC,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACF,WAAO,MAAM,iBAAiB,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE;AAAA,EACvD,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,UAAM,UAAU,eAAe,QAAQ,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO,GAAG;AAC/D,WAAO,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,uBAAuB,yCAAyC,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,EACjH;AACA,MAAI,CAAC,KAAM,QAAO,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,2BAA2B,kCAAkC;AAC7G,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACF,eAAW,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,EAC7C,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,UAAM,UAAU,eAAe,QAAQ,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO,GAAG;AAC/D,WAAO,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,uBAAuB,8BAA8B,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,EACtG;AACA,SAAO,WACH,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,IACtB,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,iBAAiB,+BAA+B;AACpF;AAOA,eAAsB,aACpB,OACY;AACZ,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,YAAY,KAAK;AACtC,MAAI,CAAC,OAAO,QAAS,OAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,OAAO,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM;AACjG,SAAO,OAAO;AAChB;AAGO,SAAS,iBACd,IACA,SACA,QACA,SAC6C;AAC7C,SAAO,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,SAAS,QAAQ,QAAQ,CAAC;AACpE;AAYA,eAAsB,oBAKpB,OACA,SACA,QACA,SACiB;AACjB,QAAM,UACJ,OAAO,YAAY,cAAc,OAAQ,QAAsC,QAAQ,aACnF,UACA,mBAAmB,OAAyB;AAClD,QAAM,WAAmB,CAAC;AAC1B,aAAW,QAAQ,OAAO;AACxB,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,SAAS,SAAS,QAAQ,QAAQ,CAAC;AACzG,QAAI,OAAO,QAAS,UAAS,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,EACxC;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AASO,SAAS,mBAA6C,SAAsC;AACjG,QAAM,QAAQ,oBAAI,IAAe;AACjC,aAAW,SAAS,QAAS,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK;AACtD,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}

package/dist/{chunk-J26IXWFK.js → chunk-XP77DJEF.js}

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ import {
 import {
   mentionInputToPart,
   toChatMessageParts
-} from "./chunk-TNWDYAFX.js";
+} from "./chunk-E6UTFXKQ.js";
 import {
   ChatTurnInputError,
   TURN_INTENT_EVENT,
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ import {
   parseFileMentions,
   turnResponseEventFor
 } from "./chunk-YHRWZZJN.js";
+import {
+  checkModelPolicy
+} from "./chunk-XELWWXJJ.js";
 
 // src/chat-routes/draft-persistence.ts
 var CONTENT_EVENT_TYPES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
@@ -392,6 +395,18 @@ function createChatTurnRoutes(options) {
     }
     const auth = await options.authorize({ request, intent: "turn", body: parsed.payload });
     if (!auth.ok) return { ok: false, response: auth.response };
+    const namedModel = typeof parsed.payload.model === "string" ? parsed.payload.model.trim() : "";
+    if (options.modelPolicy && namedModel) {
+      const decision = await checkModelPolicy(
+        namedModel,
+        options.modelPolicy.catalog,
+        options.modelPolicy.filter,
+        options.modelPolicy.context
+      );
+      if (!decision.allowed) {
+        return { ok: false, response: Response.json({ code: "model_policy_denied", error: decision.reason }, { status: 403 }) };
+      }
+    }
     return { ok: true, parsed, auth };
   }
   function progressFirstTurn(request, ctx, admitted) {
@@ -1270,4 +1285,4 @@ export {
   createChatTurnRoutes,
   streamChatRouteAsSandboxEvents
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-J26IXWFK.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-XP77DJEF.js.map