@tangle-network/agent-app 0.49.3 → 0.49.4

package/dist/app-auth/index.js

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import {
   createAuthGuard,
   createBetterAuthSessionCookieMinter,
   createTangleSsoHandlers
-} from "../chunk-TWTLQWES.js";
+} from "../chunk-FXWNNHPC.js";
 import "../chunk-JML7WKWU.js";
 import "../chunk-EA4UVS4T.js";
 import "../chunk-TXD5HXLE.js";

package/dist/{chunk-TWTLQWES.js → chunk-FXWNNHPC.js}

@@ -157,9 +157,22 @@ function createBetterAuthSessionCookieMinter(auth, options = {}) {
     return cookies;
   };
 }
+var REDIRECT_REFERENCE_ORIGIN = "https://redirect-reference.invalid";
 function sanitizeRedirectPath(value, fallback) {
-  if (value && value.startsWith("/") && !value.startsWith("//")) return value;
-  return fallback;
+  if (!value || !value.startsWith("/") || /[\\\u0000-\u001f\u007f]/.test(value)) return fallback;
+  const path = resolveOnReferenceOrigin(value);
+  if (path === null || resolveOnReferenceOrigin(path) !== path) return fallback;
+  return path;
+}
+function resolveOnReferenceOrigin(value) {
+  let url;
+  try {
+    url = new URL(value, REDIRECT_REFERENCE_ORIGIN);
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+  if (url.origin !== REDIRECT_REFERENCE_ORIGIN) return null;
+  return `${url.pathname}${url.search}${url.hash}`;
 }
 function redirectResponse(location, headers = new Headers()) {
   headers.set("Location", location);
@@ -374,4 +387,4 @@ export {
   createAdminGuard,
   assertBillableBalance
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-TWTLQWES.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-FXWNNHPC.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-TWTLQWES.js.map → chunk-FXWNNHPC.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/platform/sso.ts","../src/platform/guards.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Cross-site Tangle SSO for agent apps: signed-state CSRF cookies plus the\n * full start/callback orchestration against the platform's /cross-site\n * bridge. The platform wire client and account persistence are structural\n * seams (`TangleSsoAuthClient` / `TangleSsoAccountStore`), so this module\n * never imports agent-runtime, an auth framework, or a database driver.\n * WebCrypto only — runs in workerd without node compatibility flags.\n */\n\nimport { clearCookieHeader, readCookieValue, serializeCookie } from '../web/index'\n\nconst DEFAULT_STATE_TTL_SECONDS = 600\nconst DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL_SECONDS = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7\nconst DEFAULT_REDIRECT_PATH = '/app'\nconst DEFAULT_LOGIN_PATH = '/login'\nconst DEFAULT_SESSION_COOKIE = 'better-auth.session_token'\n\n// ── Signed state ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Define configuration options for managing SSO state including secret, lifetime, and clock injection */\nexport interface SsoStateConfig {\n  /** HMAC-SHA256 secret (e.g. the app's auth secret). */\n  secret: string\n  /** State lifetime in ms. Default 600 000. */\n  ttlMs?: number\n  /** Injectable clock (ms since epoch). Default Date.now. */\n  now?: () => number\n}\n\nfunction randomHex(bytes: number): string {\n  const buf = new Uint8Array(bytes)\n  crypto.getRandomValues(buf)\n  return Array.from(buf, (b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('')\n}\n\nasync function hmacBytes(secret: string, value: string): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    new TextEncoder().encode(secret),\n    { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' },\n    false,\n    ['sign'],\n  )\n  return new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', key, new TextEncoder().encode(value)))\n}\n\nasync function hmacHex(secret: string, value: string): Promise<string> {\n  return Array.from(await hmacBytes(secret, value), (b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('')\n}\n\nfunction constantTimeEqual(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  if (a.length !== b.length) return false\n  let diff = 0\n  for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) diff |= a.charCodeAt(i) ^ b.charCodeAt(i)\n  return diff === 0\n}\n\n/** Mint a `<randomHex32>.<timestamp36>.<hmacHex>` state value. The timestamp\n *  is inside the signed payload, so expiry survives cookie-attribute tampering. */\nexport async function createSignedSsoState(config: SsoStateConfig): Promise<string> {\n  if (!config.secret) throw new Error('SsoStateConfig.secret is required')\n  const now = config.now ?? Date.now\n  const payload = `${randomHex(16)}.${now().toString(36)}`\n  return `${payload}.${await hmacHex(config.secret, payload)}`\n}\n\n/** Verify the MAC (constant-time) and the signed TTL. */\nexport async function verifySignedSsoState(state: string, config: SsoStateConfig): Promise<boolean> {\n  if (!config.secret) throw new Error('SsoStateConfig.secret is required')\n  const parts = state.split('.')\n  if (parts.length !== 3) return false\n  const [random, timestamp, mac] = parts\n  if (!random || !timestamp || !mac) return false\n  const expected = await hmacHex(config.secret, `${random}.${timestamp}`)\n  if (!constantTimeEqual(mac, expected)) return false\n  const mintedAt = parseInt(timestamp, 36)\n  if (!Number.isFinite(mintedAt)) return false\n  const now = config.now ?? Date.now\n  const ttlMs = config.ttlMs ?? DEFAULT_STATE_TTL_SECONDS * 1000\n  return now() - mintedAt <= ttlMs\n}\n\n// ── Seams ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Describe the result of exchanging SSO credentials including API key, user info, and optional plan details */\nexport interface TangleSsoExchangeResult {\n  apiKey: string\n  /** The platform's canonical verified-email proof. */\n  emailVerified: boolean\n  user: { id: string; email: string; name?: string | null }\n  plan?: { tier: string } | null\n}\n\n/** Structural mirror of the platform auth wire client — any object with these\n *  two methods satisfies it without this module importing the concrete class. */\nexport interface TangleSsoAuthClient {\n  authorizeUrl(options: { state: string; redirectUri?: string }): string\n  exchange(code: string): Promise<TangleSsoExchangeResult>\n}\n\n/** Local account shape required by the verified Tangle SSO account policy.\n * Consumers map their user/link tables into this shape before resolving an\n * exchange. */\nexport interface TangleSsoLocalAccount {\n  userId: string\n  email: string\n  emailVerified: boolean\n  platformUserId: string | null\n}\n\n/** Reasons a local account lookup must stop instead of linking an exchange. */\nexport type TangleSsoAccountConflictReason =\n  | 'ambiguous-platform-id'\n  | 'platform-id-email-conflict'\n  | 'unverified-email'\n  | 'email-platform-id-conflict'\n  | 'ambiguous-email'\n  | 'invalid-platform-id'\n  | 'invalid-email'\n  | 'platform-match-mismatch'\n  | 'email-match-mismatch'\n\n/** Result of applying the verified Tangle SSO account matching policy. */\nexport type TangleSsoAccountResolution =\n  | { kind: 'existing'; userId: string; matchedBy: 'platform-id' | 'verified-email' }\n  | { kind: 'create' }\n  | { kind: 'reject'; reason: TangleSsoAccountConflictReason }\n\n/** Inputs for {@link resolveTangleSsoAccount}. `platformUserId` is the\n * platform's stable identity. */\nexport interface TangleSsoAccountResolutionInput {\n  email: string\n  platformMatches: readonly TangleSsoLocalAccount[]\n  emailMatches: readonly TangleSsoLocalAccount[]\n  platformUserId: string\n}\n\n/** Normalize an email for comparisons and persistence queries. */\nexport function normalizeTangleSsoEmail(email: string): string {\n  return email.trim().toLowerCase()\n}\n\nfunction normalizedPlatformUserId(value: string | null | undefined): string | null {\n  const normalized = value?.trim()\n  return normalized ? normalized : null\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve a platform exchange against all local rows found by stable platform\n * identity and normalized email.\n *\n * A stable platform id takes precedence over email. Every ambiguous or\n * contradictory result rejects, and email fallback requires a verified local\n * email that is not already bound to another platform id. The resolver is\n * pure so each consumer can query its own schema, including schemas without\n * unique indexes, then rerun it after an insert race.\n */\nexport function resolveTangleSsoAccount(\n  input: TangleSsoAccountResolutionInput,\n): TangleSsoAccountResolution {\n  const email = normalizeTangleSsoEmail(input.email)\n  const platformUserId = normalizedPlatformUserId(input.platformUserId)\n  if (!email) return { kind: 'reject', reason: 'invalid-email' }\n  if (!platformUserId) return { kind: 'reject', reason: 'invalid-platform-id' }\n\n  if (input.platformMatches.length > 1) {\n    return { kind: 'reject', reason: 'ambiguous-platform-id' }\n  }\n  if (input.emailMatches.length > 1) {\n    return { kind: 'reject', reason: 'ambiguous-email' }\n  }\n\n  if (input.platformMatches.some((account) => normalizedPlatformUserId(account.platformUserId) !== platformUserId)) {\n    return { kind: 'reject', reason: 'platform-match-mismatch' }\n  }\n  if (input.emailMatches.some((account) => normalizeTangleSsoEmail(account.email) !== email)) {\n    return { kind: 'reject', reason: 'email-match-mismatch' }\n  }\n\n  const platformMatch = input.platformMatches[0]\n  const emailMatch = input.emailMatches[0]\n\n  if (platformMatch) {\n    if (emailMatch && emailMatch.userId !== platformMatch.userId) {\n      return { kind: 'reject', reason: 'platform-id-email-conflict' }\n    }\n    return { kind: 'existing', userId: platformMatch.userId, matchedBy: 'platform-id' }\n  }\n\n  if (!emailMatch) return { kind: 'create' }\n  const existingPlatformUserId = normalizedPlatformUserId(emailMatch.platformUserId)\n  if (existingPlatformUserId === platformUserId) {\n    return { kind: 'existing', userId: emailMatch.userId, matchedBy: 'platform-id' }\n  }\n  if (emailMatch.emailVerified !== true) {\n    return { kind: 'reject', reason: 'unverified-email' }\n  }\n\n  if (existingPlatformUserId && existingPlatformUserId !== platformUserId) {\n    return { kind: 'reject', reason: 'email-platform-id-conflict' }\n  }\n\n  // The platform proof is already verified. A verified local email row is safe\n  // to link when it is unbound or already carries this same platform id.\n  return { kind: 'existing', userId: emailMatch.userId, matchedBy: 'verified-email' }\n}\n\n/** Thrown by an account store when the verified SSO policy rejects a link. */\nexport class TangleSsoAccountConflictError extends Error {\n  readonly reason: TangleSsoAccountConflictReason\n\n  constructor(reason: TangleSsoAccountConflictReason, message = 'Tangle SSO account linking was rejected') {\n    super(message)\n    this.name = 'TangleSsoAccountConflictError'\n    this.reason = reason\n  }\n}\n\n/** Thrown by `upsertUserByEmail` when the app-local user row cannot be\n *  created; the callback handler maps it to `?error=tangle_user_create_failed`.\n *  Any other store error propagates. */\nexport class TangleSsoUserCreateError extends Error {\n  constructor(message = 'Failed to create local user for Tangle SSO') {\n    super(message)\n    this.name = 'TangleSsoUserCreateError'\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Account persistence seam. Covers both storage styles in use: link-table\n * apps (a per-user platform-link row) and session-column apps (the key on the\n * session row) — `saveTangleLink` receives both `userId` and `sessionToken`,\n * and each app persists with the key it needs. `createSession` runs first so\n * the token is always available to `saveTangleLink`.\n */\nexport interface TangleSsoAccountStore {\n  /** Resolve the local account before any user, session, or link write.\n   * Implementations must query every candidate by stable platform id and\n   * normalized email, then apply `resolveTangleSsoAccount` (or an equivalent\n   * fail-closed policy). The callback rejects `kind: 'reject'` results before\n   * it calls `upsertUserByEmail`. */\n  resolveAccount(input: { email: string; platformUserId: string }): Promise<TangleSsoAccountResolution>\n  /** Find-or-create the app-local user selected by `resolveAccount`.\n   * `tangleUserId` is the platform's stable user id — match on it first when\n   * the app stores it (emails are mutable on the platform; the id is not),\n   * falling back to email for first-time logins. */\n  upsertUserByEmail(input: {\n    email: string\n    name: string | null\n    tangleUserId: string\n    resolution: Exclude<TangleSsoAccountResolution, { kind: 'reject' }>\n  }): Promise<{ userId: string }>\n  /** Create an app session row; returns the session-cookie token value. */\n  createSession(input: {\n    userId: string\n    expiresAt: Date\n    ipAddress: string | null\n    userAgent: string | null\n  }): Promise<{ token: string }>\n  /** Persist the platform link (API key + platform identity). */\n  saveTangleLink(input: {\n    userId: string\n    sessionToken: string\n    tangleUserId: string\n    email: string\n    name: string | null\n    apiKey: string\n    planTier: string | null\n  }): Promise<void>\n}\n\n// ── Session cookie ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Successful-login context handed to the `setSessionCookie` seam. */\nexport interface TangleSsoSessionCookieArgs {\n  /** Session token returned by `store.createSession`. */\n  token: string\n  /** Session expiry (now + `sessionTtlSeconds`). */\n  expiresAt: Date\n  /** Mirrors `sessionTtlSeconds` after defaulting. */\n  ttlSeconds: number\n  /** Mirrors `TangleSsoHandlerOptions.secureCookies`. */\n  secure: boolean\n}\n\n/**\n * Sign a session token to better-call's signed-cookie contract — the value\n * better-auth's `getSignedCookie` verifies: `<token>.<signature>` where the\n * signature is the raw HMAC-SHA256 of the token under `secret`, encoded as\n * STANDARD base64 WITH padding (32 bytes → 44 chars ending `=`; better-call\n * rejects any other length or suffix, so url-safe/unpadded variants read back\n * as a null session). The joined value is percent-encoded once at cookie\n * serialization, matching better-call's `serializeSignedCookie` byte-exactly.\n */\nexport async function signSessionCookieValue(token: string, secret: string): Promise<string> {\n  if (!secret) throw new Error('signSessionCookieValue requires a non-empty secret')\n  const sig = await hmacBytes(secret, token)\n  let bin = ''\n  for (const byte of sig) bin += String.fromCharCode(byte)\n  return `${token}.${btoa(bin)}`\n}\n\n/** Structural slice of a `betterAuth()` instance — only what cookie minting\n *  reads. No better-auth import: the signing contract is implemented by\n *  `signSessionCookieValue`, byte-compatible with better-auth's own\n *  `makeSignature`. */\nexport interface BetterAuthSessionCookieSource {\n  $context: PromiseLike<{\n    secret: string\n    authCookies: {\n      sessionToken: {\n        /** Final cookie name — better-auth decides the `__Secure-` prefix\n         *  (and any `advanced.cookiePrefix`) once at `betterAuth()` init. */\n        name: string\n        attributes: {\n          secure?: boolean\n          sameSite?: string\n          path?: string\n          httpOnly?: boolean\n          domain?: string\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }>\n}\n\n/** Define options to customize warning behavior for shadowed cookie names in authentication sessions */\nexport interface BetterAuthSessionCookieMinterOptions {\n  /** Receives the shadowed-cookie-name warning (see below). Default\n   *  console.warn. */\n  warn?: (message: string) => void\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonical `setSessionCookie` wiring for better-auth apps: mint the session\n * Set-Cookie exactly as better-auth's own login flows do — name + attributes\n * from `auth.$context.authCookies.sessionToken` (better-auth stays\n * authoritative over prefix/name/attributes) and the value signed to\n * better-call's `getSignedCookie` contract. A raw unprefixed\n * `better-auth.session_token` left by an earlier login is explicitly expired\n * so it cannot shadow the real cookie.\n *\n * Warns when the app's session cookie still has better-auth's DEFAULT name:\n * the Tangle platform (id.tangle.tools) sets a `Domain=.tangle.tools` cookie\n * under that exact name, and equal-path cookies are sent oldest-first — the\n * platform's cookie is always older (the user signs in there before the app's\n * callback runs), so the app reads the platform's token, fails its own\n * signature check, and every fresh login lands logged-out. Per-app\n * `advanced.cookiePrefix` is the fix.\n *\n * Throws on a domain-scoped session cookie for the same reason: a\n * `Domain=`-wide session cookie is exactly the shadowing footgun.\n */\nexport function createBetterAuthSessionCookieMinter(\n  auth: BetterAuthSessionCookieSource,\n  options: BetterAuthSessionCookieMinterOptions = {},\n): (args: TangleSsoSessionCookieArgs) => Promise<string[]> {\n  const warn = options.warn ?? ((message: string) => console.warn(message))\n  return async ({ token, ttlSeconds }) => {\n    const ctx = await auth.$context\n    if (!ctx.secret) {\n      throw new Error('createBetterAuthSessionCookieMinter: auth context has no secret')\n    }\n    const { name, attributes } = ctx.authCookies.sessionToken\n    if (attributes.domain) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `createBetterAuthSessionCookieMinter: refusing a domain-scoped session cookie (Domain=${attributes.domain}) — ` +\n          'a domain-wide session cookie shadows sibling apps that share the parent domain',\n      )\n    }\n    if (name === DEFAULT_SESSION_COOKIE || name === `__Secure-${DEFAULT_SESSION_COOKIE}`) {\n      warn(\n        `[tangle-sso] session cookie is named \"${name}\" — better-auth's default. ` +\n          'The Tangle platform (id.tangle.tools) sets a Domain=.tangle.tools cookie under the same name, ' +\n          \"and the platform's (older) cookie wins the Cookie-header order, so this app's sessions read back null. \" +\n          \"Set a per-app prefix: betterAuth({ advanced: { cookiePrefix: '<app>' } }).\",\n      )\n    }\n    const sameSite = typeof attributes.sameSite === 'string' ? attributes.sameSite : 'lax'\n    const cookieOptions = {\n      name,\n      path: typeof attributes.path === 'string' ? attributes.path : '/',\n      httpOnly: attributes.httpOnly !== false,\n      sameSite: (sameSite.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + sameSite.slice(1)) as 'Lax' | 'Strict' | 'None',\n      secure: Boolean(attributes.secure) || name.startsWith('__Secure-'),\n      maxAgeSeconds: ttlSeconds,\n    }\n    const cookies = [serializeCookie(await signSessionCookieValue(token, ctx.secret), cookieOptions)]\n    if (name !== DEFAULT_SESSION_COOKIE) {\n      cookies.push(clearCookieHeader({ ...cookieOptions, name: DEFAULT_SESSION_COOKIE }))\n    }\n    return cookies\n  }\n}\n\n// ── Handlers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Define configuration options for handling Tangle SSO authentication and session management */\nexport interface TangleSsoHandlerOptions {\n  auth: TangleSsoAuthClient\n  store: TangleSsoAccountStore\n  /** HMAC secret for the state cookie. */\n  stateSecret: string\n  /** Absolute callback URL registered with the platform. */\n  callbackUrl: string\n  stateCookieName: string\n  /** Default 'better-auth.session_token'. Ignored when `setSessionCookie` is\n   *  provided. The default path prepends `__Secure-` iff `secureCookies`. */\n  sessionCookieName?: string\n  /** Mint the host auth framework's own session cookie(s); return complete\n   *  Set-Cookie header values (the handler appends them verbatim and sets no\n   *  session cookie itself). Supply this when the framework should stay\n   *  authoritative over name/prefix/signing/attributes — e.g. better-auth:\n   *  `auth.$context.authCookies.sessionToken` + `makeSignature`. */\n  setSessionCookie?: (\n    args: TangleSsoSessionCookieArgs,\n  ) => readonly string[] | Promise<readonly string[]>\n  /** HMAC-SHA256 secret the host auth framework verifies session cookies with\n   *  (better-auth: its `secret`). Required when `setSessionCookie` is absent —\n   *  the default cookie is minted to better-call's signed contract via\n   *  `signSessionCookieValue`; an unsigned or mis-signed value reads back as a\n   *  null session, so there is deliberately no fallback to `stateSecret`\n   *  (which is not guaranteed to be the auth secret). */\n  sessionCookieSecret?: string\n  /** Adds `Secure` to every cookie this module sets, and (default session\n   *  cookie only) the `__Secure-` name prefix. Must match the auth\n   *  framework's own secure-cookie decision (better-auth: https `baseURL` /\n   *  `advanced.useSecureCookies`), or it will look up a different cookie name\n   *  than the one set here. */\n  secureCookies: boolean\n  /** Default 604 800 (7 days). */\n  sessionTtlSeconds?: number\n  /** Default 600. Applies to both the cookie Max-Age and the signed TTL. */\n  stateTtlSeconds?: number\n  /** Default '/app'. */\n  defaultRedirectPath?: string\n  /** Default '/login'. */\n  loginPath?: string\n  /** Failure log hook (e.g. console.error). Default no-op. */\n  log?: (message: string, error?: unknown) => void\n  now?: () => number\n}\n\n/** Define handlers for SSO start and callback routes managing authentication flow and session cookies */\nexport interface TangleSsoHandlers {\n  /** GET start route: mint + sign state, set the state cookie, 302 to the\n   *  platform authorize URL. `?redirect=` carries the post-login path. */\n  start(request: Request): Promise<Response>\n  /** GET callback route: verify state, exchange the code, upsert the user,\n   *  create the session, save the platform link, set the session cookie\n   *  (via the `setSessionCookie` seam, else signed to better-call's contract\n   *  with `sessionCookieSecret`), 302 to the saved redirect. Every failure\n   *  302s to `loginPath?error=…` with the state cookie cleared. */\n  callback(request: Request): Promise<Response>\n}\n\n/** Accept only same-origin absolute paths (rejects `//host` protocol-relative URLs). */\nfunction sanitizeRedirectPath(value: string | null, fallback: string): string {\n  if (value && value.startsWith('/') && !value.startsWith('//')) return value\n  return fallback\n}\n\nfunction redirectResponse(location: string, headers = new Headers()): Response {\n  headers.set('Location', location)\n  return new Response(null, { status: 302, headers })\n}\n\n/** Real client IP: `CF-Connecting-IP` behind Cloudflare, else the first\n *  `x-forwarded-for` hop (the rest of the list is sender-controlled). */\nfunction clientIp(request: Request): string | null {\n  return (\n    request.headers.get('CF-Connecting-IP') ??\n    request.headers.get('x-forwarded-for')?.split(',')[0]?.trim() ??\n    null\n  )\n}\n\ninterface StateCookiePayload {\n  s: string\n  r: string\n}\n\nfunction parseStateCookiePayload(raw: string | null): StateCookiePayload | null {\n  if (!raw) return null\n  try {\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as unknown\n    if (parsed === null || typeof parsed !== 'object') return null\n    const { s, r } = parsed as Record<string, unknown>\n    if (typeof s !== 'string' || typeof r !== 'string') return null\n    return { s, r }\n  } catch {\n    return null\n  }\n}\n\n/** Create Tangle SSO handlers to manage authentication state, callbacks, and session cookies */\nexport function createTangleSsoHandlers(opts: TangleSsoHandlerOptions): TangleSsoHandlers {\n  if (!opts.stateSecret) throw new Error('TangleSsoHandlerOptions.stateSecret is required')\n  if (!opts.callbackUrl) throw new Error('TangleSsoHandlerOptions.callbackUrl is required')\n  if (!opts.stateCookieName) throw new Error('TangleSsoHandlerOptions.stateCookieName is required')\n\n  const sessionCookieName = opts.sessionCookieName ?? DEFAULT_SESSION_COOKIE\n\n  let mintSessionCookies: (args: TangleSsoSessionCookieArgs) => Promise<readonly string[]>\n  if (opts.setSessionCookie) {\n    const seam = opts.setSessionCookie\n    mintSessionCookies = async (args) => await seam(args)\n  } else if (opts.sessionCookieSecret) {\n    const secret = opts.sessionCookieSecret\n    mintSessionCookies = async ({ token, secure, ttlSeconds }) => [\n      serializeCookie(await signSessionCookieValue(token, secret), {\n        name: secure ? `__Secure-${sessionCookieName}` : sessionCookieName,\n        secure,\n        maxAgeSeconds: ttlSeconds,\n      }),\n    ]\n  } else {\n    throw new Error(\n      'TangleSsoHandlerOptions requires setSessionCookie or sessionCookieSecret: ' +\n        'better-auth only accepts HMAC-signed (and, on https, __Secure--prefixed) session cookies, ' +\n        'so an unsigned default would mint sessions that read back null',\n    )\n  }\n  const sessionTtlSeconds = opts.sessionTtlSeconds ?? DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL_SECONDS\n  const stateTtlSeconds = opts.stateTtlSeconds ?? DEFAULT_STATE_TTL_SECONDS\n  const defaultRedirectPath = opts.defaultRedirectPath ?? DEFAULT_REDIRECT_PATH\n  const loginPath = opts.loginPath ?? DEFAULT_LOGIN_PATH\n  const log = opts.log ?? (() => {})\n  const now = opts.now ?? Date.now\n  const stateConfig: SsoStateConfig = { secret: opts.stateSecret, ttlMs: stateTtlSeconds * 1000, now }\n\n  const stateCookieOpts = { name: opts.stateCookieName, secure: opts.secureCookies }\n\n  function loginErrorRedirect(code: string): Response {\n    const headers = new Headers()\n    headers.append('Set-Cookie', clearCookieHeader(stateCookieOpts))\n    return redirectResponse(`${loginPath}?error=${code}`, headers)\n  }\n\n  return {\n    async start(request) {\n      const url = new URL(request.url)\n      const redirectPath = sanitizeRedirectPath(url.searchParams.get('redirect'), defaultRedirectPath)\n      const state = await createSignedSsoState(stateConfig)\n      const cookie = serializeCookie(JSON.stringify({ s: state, r: redirectPath }), {\n        ...stateCookieOpts,\n        maxAgeSeconds: stateTtlSeconds,\n      })\n      const headers = new Headers()\n      headers.append('Set-Cookie', cookie)\n      return redirectResponse(opts.auth.authorizeUrl({ state, redirectUri: opts.callbackUrl }), headers)\n    },\n\n    async callback(request) {\n      const url = new URL(request.url)\n      const code = url.searchParams.get('code')\n      const stateFromPlatform = url.searchParams.get('state')\n      if (!code || !stateFromPlatform) return loginErrorRedirect('tangle_callback_missing')\n\n      const payload = parseStateCookiePayload(readCookieValue(request.headers.get('cookie'), opts.stateCookieName))\n      if (!payload || payload.s !== stateFromPlatform) return loginErrorRedirect('tangle_state_mismatch')\n      if (!(await verifySignedSsoState(payload.s, stateConfig))) return loginErrorRedirect('tangle_state_mismatch')\n\n      let exchanged: TangleSsoExchangeResult\n      try {\n        exchanged = await opts.auth.exchange(code)\n      } catch (err) {\n        log('[tangle-sso] exchange failed', err)\n        return loginErrorRedirect('tangle_exchange_failed')\n      }\n      if (exchanged.emailVerified !== true) {\n        log('[tangle-sso] exchange did not include a verified-email proof')\n        return loginErrorRedirect('tangle_exchange_failed')\n      }\n\n      let userId: string\n      try {\n        const email = normalizeTangleSsoEmail(exchanged.user.email)\n        const resolution = await opts.store.resolveAccount({\n          email,\n          platformUserId: exchanged.user.id,\n        })\n        if (resolution.kind === 'reject') {\n          throw new TangleSsoAccountConflictError(resolution.reason)\n        }\n        ;({ userId } = await opts.store.upsertUserByEmail({\n          email,\n          name: exchanged.user.name ?? null,\n          tangleUserId: exchanged.user.id,\n          resolution,\n        }))\n      } catch (err) {\n        if (err instanceof TangleSsoAccountConflictError) {\n          log('[tangle-sso] account linking conflict', err)\n          return loginErrorRedirect('tangle_account_conflict')\n        }\n        if (err instanceof TangleSsoUserCreateError) return loginErrorRedirect('tangle_user_create_failed')\n        throw err\n      }\n\n      const expiresAt = new Date(now() + sessionTtlSeconds * 1000)\n      const { token } = await opts.store.createSession({\n        userId,\n        expiresAt,\n        ipAddress: clientIp(request),\n        userAgent: request.headers.get('user-agent'),\n      })\n\n      await opts.store.saveTangleLink({\n        userId,\n        sessionToken: token,\n        tangleUserId: exchanged.user.id,\n        email: normalizeTangleSsoEmail(exchanged.user.email),\n        name: exchanged.user.name ?? null,\n        apiKey: exchanged.apiKey,\n        planTier: exchanged.plan?.tier ?? null,\n      })\n\n      const headers = new Headers()\n      headers.append('Set-Cookie', clearCookieHeader(stateCookieOpts))\n      const sessionCookies = await mintSessionCookies({\n        token,\n        expiresAt,\n        ttlSeconds: sessionTtlSeconds,\n        secure: opts.secureCookies,\n      })\n      for (const cookie of sessionCookies) headers.append('Set-Cookie', cookie)\n      return redirectResponse(sanitizeRedirectPath(payload.r, defaultRedirectPath), headers)\n    },\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Request guards for agent-app routes: session auth (302 redirect for pages,\n * JSON 401 for APIs), admin allowlisting (404 — the route stays invisible to\n * non-admins), and the billable-balance gate (402 with a stable code).\n * Session resolution is a seam; thrown Responses follow the router convention\n * of surfacing a thrown Response as the route result.\n */\n\nimport { isTangleBillingEnforcementDisabled } from '../runtime/model'\n\n/** Define options for configuring authentication guard behavior and session retrieval */\nexport interface AuthGuardOptions<Session> {\n  /** e.g. a better-auth `auth.api.getSession` wrapped by the app. */\n  getSession(request: Request): Promise<Session | null | undefined>\n  /** Default '/login'. */\n  loginPath?: string\n}\n\n/** Resolve user authentication and session requirements for page and API requests */\nexport interface AuthGuard<Session> {\n  /** Page guard — throws a 302 redirect Response to `loginPath`. */\n  requireUser(request: Request): Promise<Session>\n  /** API guard — throws JSON 401 `{ error: 'Unauthorized', code: 'auth.unauthenticated' }`. */\n  requireApiUser(request: Request): Promise<Session>\n  /** `apiResponse` selects the 401 JSON path over the redirect. */\n  requireSession(request: Request, opts?: { apiResponse?: boolean }): Promise<Session>\n  getOptionalSession(request: Request): Promise<Session | null>\n}\n\n/** Create an authentication guard that enforces session presence and handles unauthorized access responses */\nexport function createAuthGuard<Session>(opts: AuthGuardOptions<Session>): AuthGuard<Session> {\n  const loginPath = opts.loginPath ?? '/login'\n\n  async function requireSession(request: Request, o: { apiResponse?: boolean } = {}): Promise<Session> {\n    const session = await opts.getSession(request)\n    if (!session) {\n      if (o.apiResponse) {\n        throw Response.json({ error: 'Unauthorized', code: 'auth.unauthenticated' }, { status: 401 })\n      }\n      throw new Response(null, { status: 302, headers: { Location: loginPath } })\n    }\n    return session\n  }\n\n  return {\n    requireSession,\n    requireUser: (request) => requireSession(request),\n    requireApiUser: (request) => requireSession(request, { apiResponse: true }),\n    getOptionalSession: async (request) => (await opts.getSession(request)) ?? null,\n  }\n}\n\n/** Resolve a value or an HTTP response indicating failure in a guarded operation */\nexport type GuardResolution<T> = { ok: true; value: T } | { ok: false; response: Response }\n\n/**\n * Adapt a guard that THROWS a Response (the quartet above — the router\n * convention) to the `{ok: true, value} | {ok: false, response}` resolution\n * shape the route factories take (`/chat-routes` `authorize`,\n * `/interactions` `resolveConnection`, `/chat-routes` upload `authorize`).\n * Every product wrote this try/catch by hand; it lives here once.\n */\nexport async function guardResolution<T>(run: () => Promise<T>): Promise<GuardResolution<T>> {\n  try {\n    return { ok: true, value: await run() }\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof Response) return { ok: false, response: err }\n    throw err\n  }\n}\n\n/** Comma/whitespace separated → trimmed, lowercased, empties dropped. */\nexport function parseAdminEmails(raw: string | null | undefined): string[] {\n  return (raw ?? '')\n    .split(/[,\\s]+/)\n    .map((e) => e.trim().toLowerCase())\n    .filter(Boolean)\n}\n\n/** Define options to resolve user session and control access based on allowed admin emails */\nexport interface AdminGuardOptions<Session> {\n  requireUser(request: Request): Promise<Session>\n  emailOf(session: Session): string | null | undefined\n  /** Resolved per request; an EMPTY allowlist refuses everyone. */\n  allowedEmails(): string[]\n}\n\n/** Non-admins (and empty allowlists) get 404, keeping the route invisible —\n *  better than a \"forbidden\" footprint that advertises its existence. */\nexport function createAdminGuard<Session>(opts: AdminGuardOptions<Session>): (request: Request) => Promise<Session> {\n  return async (request) => {\n    const session = await opts.requireUser(request)\n    const allowed = opts.allowedEmails()\n    if (allowed.length === 0) throw new Response('Not found', { status: 404 })\n    const email = (opts.emailOf(session) ?? '').toLowerCase()\n    if (!allowed.includes(email)) throw new Response('Not found', { status: 404 })\n    return session\n  }\n}\n\n/** Describe the billable balance state including overage permission and remaining USD balance */\nexport interface BillableBalanceState {\n  overageAllowed: boolean\n  remainingBalanceUsd: number\n}\n\n/** Define options to assert and customize billable balance enforcement behavior */\nexport interface AssertBillableBalanceOptions {\n  env?: Record<string, string | undefined>\n  /** App-specific enforcement override flag (e.g. 'GTM_BILLING_ENFORCEMENT'),\n   *  fed to `isTangleBillingEnforcementDisabled`. */\n  enforcementEnvVar?: string\n  /** Default 'Add balance or upgrade your plan to invoke this agent.'. */\n  errorMessage?: string\n  /** Merged into the 402 JSON body (e.g. `{ organizationId }`). */\n  errorBody?: Record<string, unknown>\n}\n\n/**\n * Gate a billable turn: passes when enforcement is disabled (dev default),\n * the tier allows overage, or remaining balance is positive. Otherwise throws\n * a 402 Response with the stable `billing.balance_required` code so clients\n * can route to the billing screen.\n */\nexport function assertBillableBalance(state: BillableBalanceState, opts: AssertBillableBalanceOptions = {}): void {\n  if (isTangleBillingEnforcementDisabled({ env: opts.env, enforcementEnvVar: opts.enforcementEnvVar })) return\n  if (state.overageAllowed || state.remainingBalanceUsd > 0) return\n  // errorBody first: the stable error/code contract always wins over caller extras.\n  throw Response.json(\n    {\n      ...opts.errorBody,\n      error: opts.errorMessage ?? 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/platform/sso.ts","../src/platform/guards.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Cross-site Tangle SSO for agent apps: signed-state CSRF cookies plus the\n * full start/callback orchestration against the platform's /cross-site\n * bridge. The platform wire client and account persistence are structural\n * seams (`TangleSsoAuthClient` / `TangleSsoAccountStore`), so this module\n * never imports agent-runtime, an auth framework, or a database driver.\n * WebCrypto only — runs in workerd without node compatibility flags.\n */\n\nimport { clearCookieHeader, readCookieValue, serializeCookie } from '../web/index'\n\nconst DEFAULT_STATE_TTL_SECONDS = 600\nconst DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL_SECONDS = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7\nconst DEFAULT_REDIRECT_PATH = '/app'\nconst DEFAULT_LOGIN_PATH = '/login'\nconst DEFAULT_SESSION_COOKIE = 'better-auth.session_token'\n\n// ── Signed state ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Define configuration options for managing SSO state including secret, lifetime, and clock injection */\nexport interface SsoStateConfig {\n  /** HMAC-SHA256 secret (e.g. the app's auth secret). */\n  secret: string\n  /** State lifetime in ms. Default 600 000. */\n  ttlMs?: number\n  /** Injectable clock (ms since epoch). Default Date.now. */\n  now?: () => number\n}\n\nfunction randomHex(bytes: number): string {\n  const buf = new Uint8Array(bytes)\n  crypto.getRandomValues(buf)\n  return Array.from(buf, (b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('')\n}\n\nasync function hmacBytes(secret: string, value: string): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    new TextEncoder().encode(secret),\n    { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' },\n    false,\n    ['sign'],\n  )\n  return new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', key, new TextEncoder().encode(value)))\n}\n\nasync function hmacHex(secret: string, value: string): Promise<string> {\n  return Array.from(await hmacBytes(secret, value), (b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('')\n}\n\nfunction constantTimeEqual(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  if (a.length !== b.length) return false\n  let diff = 0\n  for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) diff |= a.charCodeAt(i) ^ b.charCodeAt(i)\n  return diff === 0\n}\n\n/** Mint a `<randomHex32>.<timestamp36>.<hmacHex>` state value. The timestamp\n *  is inside the signed payload, so expiry survives cookie-attribute tampering. */\nexport async function createSignedSsoState(config: SsoStateConfig): Promise<string> {\n  if (!config.secret) throw new Error('SsoStateConfig.secret is required')\n  const now = config.now ?? Date.now\n  const payload = `${randomHex(16)}.${now().toString(36)}`\n  return `${payload}.${await hmacHex(config.secret, payload)}`\n}\n\n/** Verify the MAC (constant-time) and the signed TTL. */\nexport async function verifySignedSsoState(state: string, config: SsoStateConfig): Promise<boolean> {\n  if (!config.secret) throw new Error('SsoStateConfig.secret is required')\n  const parts = state.split('.')\n  if (parts.length !== 3) return false\n  const [random, timestamp, mac] = parts\n  if (!random || !timestamp || !mac) return false\n  const expected = await hmacHex(config.secret, `${random}.${timestamp}`)\n  if (!constantTimeEqual(mac, expected)) return false\n  const mintedAt = parseInt(timestamp, 36)\n  if (!Number.isFinite(mintedAt)) return false\n  const now = config.now ?? Date.now\n  const ttlMs = config.ttlMs ?? DEFAULT_STATE_TTL_SECONDS * 1000\n  return now() - mintedAt <= ttlMs\n}\n\n// ── Seams ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Describe the result of exchanging SSO credentials including API key, user info, and optional plan details */\nexport interface TangleSsoExchangeResult {\n  apiKey: string\n  /** The platform's canonical verified-email proof. */\n  emailVerified: boolean\n  user: { id: string; email: string; name?: string | null }\n  plan?: { tier: string } | null\n}\n\n/** Structural mirror of the platform auth wire client — any object with these\n *  two methods satisfies it without this module importing the concrete class. */\nexport interface TangleSsoAuthClient {\n  authorizeUrl(options: { state: string; redirectUri?: string }): string\n  exchange(code: string): Promise<TangleSsoExchangeResult>\n}\n\n/** Local account shape required by the verified Tangle SSO account policy.\n * Consumers map their user/link tables into this shape before resolving an\n * exchange. */\nexport interface TangleSsoLocalAccount {\n  userId: string\n  email: string\n  emailVerified: boolean\n  platformUserId: string | null\n}\n\n/** Reasons a local account lookup must stop instead of linking an exchange. */\nexport type TangleSsoAccountConflictReason =\n  | 'ambiguous-platform-id'\n  | 'platform-id-email-conflict'\n  | 'unverified-email'\n  | 'email-platform-id-conflict'\n  | 'ambiguous-email'\n  | 'invalid-platform-id'\n  | 'invalid-email'\n  | 'platform-match-mismatch'\n  | 'email-match-mismatch'\n\n/** Result of applying the verified Tangle SSO account matching policy. */\nexport type TangleSsoAccountResolution =\n  | { kind: 'existing'; userId: string; matchedBy: 'platform-id' | 'verified-email' }\n  | { kind: 'create' }\n  | { kind: 'reject'; reason: TangleSsoAccountConflictReason }\n\n/** Inputs for {@link resolveTangleSsoAccount}. `platformUserId` is the\n * platform's stable identity. */\nexport interface TangleSsoAccountResolutionInput {\n  email: string\n  platformMatches: readonly TangleSsoLocalAccount[]\n  emailMatches: readonly TangleSsoLocalAccount[]\n  platformUserId: string\n}\n\n/** Normalize an email for comparisons and persistence queries. */\nexport function normalizeTangleSsoEmail(email: string): string {\n  return email.trim().toLowerCase()\n}\n\nfunction normalizedPlatformUserId(value: string | null | undefined): string | null {\n  const normalized = value?.trim()\n  return normalized ? normalized : null\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve a platform exchange against all local rows found by stable platform\n * identity and normalized email.\n *\n * A stable platform id takes precedence over email. Every ambiguous or\n * contradictory result rejects, and email fallback requires a verified local\n * email that is not already bound to another platform id. The resolver is\n * pure so each consumer can query its own schema, including schemas without\n * unique indexes, then rerun it after an insert race.\n */\nexport function resolveTangleSsoAccount(\n  input: TangleSsoAccountResolutionInput,\n): TangleSsoAccountResolution {\n  const email = normalizeTangleSsoEmail(input.email)\n  const platformUserId = normalizedPlatformUserId(input.platformUserId)\n  if (!email) return { kind: 'reject', reason: 'invalid-email' }\n  if (!platformUserId) return { kind: 'reject', reason: 'invalid-platform-id' }\n\n  if (input.platformMatches.length > 1) {\n    return { kind: 'reject', reason: 'ambiguous-platform-id' }\n  }\n  if (input.emailMatches.length > 1) {\n    return { kind: 'reject', reason: 'ambiguous-email' }\n  }\n\n  if (input.platformMatches.some((account) => normalizedPlatformUserId(account.platformUserId) !== platformUserId)) {\n    return { kind: 'reject', reason: 'platform-match-mismatch' }\n  }\n  if (input.emailMatches.some((account) => normalizeTangleSsoEmail(account.email) !== email)) {\n    return { kind: 'reject', reason: 'email-match-mismatch' }\n  }\n\n  const platformMatch = input.platformMatches[0]\n  const emailMatch = input.emailMatches[0]\n\n  if (platformMatch) {\n    if (emailMatch && emailMatch.userId !== platformMatch.userId) {\n      return { kind: 'reject', reason: 'platform-id-email-conflict' }\n    }\n    return { kind: 'existing', userId: platformMatch.userId, matchedBy: 'platform-id' }\n  }\n\n  if (!emailMatch) return { kind: 'create' }\n  const existingPlatformUserId = normalizedPlatformUserId(emailMatch.platformUserId)\n  if (existingPlatformUserId === platformUserId) {\n    return { kind: 'existing', userId: emailMatch.userId, matchedBy: 'platform-id' }\n  }\n  if (emailMatch.emailVerified !== true) {\n    return { kind: 'reject', reason: 'unverified-email' }\n  }\n\n  if (existingPlatformUserId && existingPlatformUserId !== platformUserId) {\n    return { kind: 'reject', reason: 'email-platform-id-conflict' }\n  }\n\n  // The platform proof is already verified. A verified local email row is safe\n  // to link when it is unbound or already carries this same platform id.\n  return { kind: 'existing', userId: emailMatch.userId, matchedBy: 'verified-email' }\n}\n\n/** Thrown by an account store when the verified SSO policy rejects a link. */\nexport class TangleSsoAccountConflictError extends Error {\n  readonly reason: TangleSsoAccountConflictReason\n\n  constructor(reason: TangleSsoAccountConflictReason, message = 'Tangle SSO account linking was rejected') {\n    super(message)\n    this.name = 'TangleSsoAccountConflictError'\n    this.reason = reason\n  }\n}\n\n/** Thrown by `upsertUserByEmail` when the app-local user row cannot be\n *  created; the callback handler maps it to `?error=tangle_user_create_failed`.\n *  Any other store error propagates. */\nexport class TangleSsoUserCreateError extends Error {\n  constructor(message = 'Failed to create local user for Tangle SSO') {\n    super(message)\n    this.name = 'TangleSsoUserCreateError'\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Account persistence seam. Covers both storage styles in use: link-table\n * apps (a per-user platform-link row) and session-column apps (the key on the\n * session row) — `saveTangleLink` receives both `userId` and `sessionToken`,\n * and each app persists with the key it needs. `createSession` runs first so\n * the token is always available to `saveTangleLink`.\n */\nexport interface TangleSsoAccountStore {\n  /** Resolve the local account before any user, session, or link write.\n   * Implementations must query every candidate by stable platform id and\n   * normalized email, then apply `resolveTangleSsoAccount` (or an equivalent\n   * fail-closed policy). The callback rejects `kind: 'reject'` results before\n   * it calls `upsertUserByEmail`. */\n  resolveAccount(input: { email: string; platformUserId: string }): Promise<TangleSsoAccountResolution>\n  /** Find-or-create the app-local user selected by `resolveAccount`.\n   * `tangleUserId` is the platform's stable user id — match on it first when\n   * the app stores it (emails are mutable on the platform; the id is not),\n   * falling back to email for first-time logins. */\n  upsertUserByEmail(input: {\n    email: string\n    name: string | null\n    tangleUserId: string\n    resolution: Exclude<TangleSsoAccountResolution, { kind: 'reject' }>\n  }): Promise<{ userId: string }>\n  /** Create an app session row; returns the session-cookie token value. */\n  createSession(input: {\n    userId: string\n    expiresAt: Date\n    ipAddress: string | null\n    userAgent: string | null\n  }): Promise<{ token: string }>\n  /** Persist the platform link (API key + platform identity). */\n  saveTangleLink(input: {\n    userId: string\n    sessionToken: string\n    tangleUserId: string\n    email: string\n    name: string | null\n    apiKey: string\n    planTier: string | null\n  }): Promise<void>\n}\n\n// ── Session cookie ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Successful-login context handed to the `setSessionCookie` seam. */\nexport interface TangleSsoSessionCookieArgs {\n  /** Session token returned by `store.createSession`. */\n  token: string\n  /** Session expiry (now + `sessionTtlSeconds`). */\n  expiresAt: Date\n  /** Mirrors `sessionTtlSeconds` after defaulting. */\n  ttlSeconds: number\n  /** Mirrors `TangleSsoHandlerOptions.secureCookies`. */\n  secure: boolean\n}\n\n/**\n * Sign a session token to better-call's signed-cookie contract — the value\n * better-auth's `getSignedCookie` verifies: `<token>.<signature>` where the\n * signature is the raw HMAC-SHA256 of the token under `secret`, encoded as\n * STANDARD base64 WITH padding (32 bytes → 44 chars ending `=`; better-call\n * rejects any other length or suffix, so url-safe/unpadded variants read back\n * as a null session). The joined value is percent-encoded once at cookie\n * serialization, matching better-call's `serializeSignedCookie` byte-exactly.\n */\nexport async function signSessionCookieValue(token: string, secret: string): Promise<string> {\n  if (!secret) throw new Error('signSessionCookieValue requires a non-empty secret')\n  const sig = await hmacBytes(secret, token)\n  let bin = ''\n  for (const byte of sig) bin += String.fromCharCode(byte)\n  return `${token}.${btoa(bin)}`\n}\n\n/** Structural slice of a `betterAuth()` instance — only what cookie minting\n *  reads. No better-auth import: the signing contract is implemented by\n *  `signSessionCookieValue`, byte-compatible with better-auth's own\n *  `makeSignature`. */\nexport interface BetterAuthSessionCookieSource {\n  $context: PromiseLike<{\n    secret: string\n    authCookies: {\n      sessionToken: {\n        /** Final cookie name — better-auth decides the `__Secure-` prefix\n         *  (and any `advanced.cookiePrefix`) once at `betterAuth()` init. */\n        name: string\n        attributes: {\n          secure?: boolean\n          sameSite?: string\n          path?: string\n          httpOnly?: boolean\n          domain?: string\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }>\n}\n\n/** Define options to customize warning behavior for shadowed cookie names in authentication sessions */\nexport interface BetterAuthSessionCookieMinterOptions {\n  /** Receives the shadowed-cookie-name warning (see below). Default\n   *  console.warn. */\n  warn?: (message: string) => void\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonical `setSessionCookie` wiring for better-auth apps: mint the session\n * Set-Cookie exactly as better-auth's own login flows do — name + attributes\n * from `auth.$context.authCookies.sessionToken` (better-auth stays\n * authoritative over prefix/name/attributes) and the value signed to\n * better-call's `getSignedCookie` contract. A raw unprefixed\n * `better-auth.session_token` left by an earlier login is explicitly expired\n * so it cannot shadow the real cookie.\n *\n * Warns when the app's session cookie still has better-auth's DEFAULT name:\n * the Tangle platform (id.tangle.tools) sets a `Domain=.tangle.tools` cookie\n * under that exact name, and equal-path cookies are sent oldest-first — the\n * platform's cookie is always older (the user signs in there before the app's\n * callback runs), so the app reads the platform's token, fails its own\n * signature check, and every fresh login lands logged-out. Per-app\n * `advanced.cookiePrefix` is the fix.\n *\n * Throws on a domain-scoped session cookie for the same reason: a\n * `Domain=`-wide session cookie is exactly the shadowing footgun.\n */\nexport function createBetterAuthSessionCookieMinter(\n  auth: BetterAuthSessionCookieSource,\n  options: BetterAuthSessionCookieMinterOptions = {},\n): (args: TangleSsoSessionCookieArgs) => Promise<string[]> {\n  const warn = options.warn ?? ((message: string) => console.warn(message))\n  return async ({ token, ttlSeconds }) => {\n    const ctx = await auth.$context\n    if (!ctx.secret) {\n      throw new Error('createBetterAuthSessionCookieMinter: auth context has no secret')\n    }\n    const { name, attributes } = ctx.authCookies.sessionToken\n    if (attributes.domain) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `createBetterAuthSessionCookieMinter: refusing a domain-scoped session cookie (Domain=${attributes.domain}) — ` +\n          'a domain-wide session cookie shadows sibling apps that share the parent domain',\n      )\n    }\n    if (name === DEFAULT_SESSION_COOKIE || name === `__Secure-${DEFAULT_SESSION_COOKIE}`) {\n      warn(\n        `[tangle-sso] session cookie is named \"${name}\" — better-auth's default. ` +\n          'The Tangle platform (id.tangle.tools) sets a Domain=.tangle.tools cookie under the same name, ' +\n          \"and the platform's (older) cookie wins the Cookie-header order, so this app's sessions read back null. \" +\n          \"Set a per-app prefix: betterAuth({ advanced: { cookiePrefix: '<app>' } }).\",\n      )\n    }\n    const sameSite = typeof attributes.sameSite === 'string' ? attributes.sameSite : 'lax'\n    const cookieOptions = {\n      name,\n      path: typeof attributes.path === 'string' ? attributes.path : '/',\n      httpOnly: attributes.httpOnly !== false,\n      sameSite: (sameSite.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + sameSite.slice(1)) as 'Lax' | 'Strict' | 'None',\n      secure: Boolean(attributes.secure) || name.startsWith('__Secure-'),\n      maxAgeSeconds: ttlSeconds,\n    }\n    const cookies = [serializeCookie(await signSessionCookieValue(token, ctx.secret), cookieOptions)]\n    if (name !== DEFAULT_SESSION_COOKIE) {\n      cookies.push(clearCookieHeader({ ...cookieOptions, name: DEFAULT_SESSION_COOKIE }))\n    }\n    return cookies\n  }\n}\n\n// ── Handlers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Define configuration options for handling Tangle SSO authentication and session management */\nexport interface TangleSsoHandlerOptions {\n  auth: TangleSsoAuthClient\n  store: TangleSsoAccountStore\n  /** HMAC secret for the state cookie. */\n  stateSecret: string\n  /** Absolute callback URL registered with the platform. */\n  callbackUrl: string\n  stateCookieName: string\n  /** Default 'better-auth.session_token'. Ignored when `setSessionCookie` is\n   *  provided. The default path prepends `__Secure-` iff `secureCookies`. */\n  sessionCookieName?: string\n  /** Mint the host auth framework's own session cookie(s); return complete\n   *  Set-Cookie header values (the handler appends them verbatim and sets no\n   *  session cookie itself). Supply this when the framework should stay\n   *  authoritative over name/prefix/signing/attributes — e.g. better-auth:\n   *  `auth.$context.authCookies.sessionToken` + `makeSignature`. */\n  setSessionCookie?: (\n    args: TangleSsoSessionCookieArgs,\n  ) => readonly string[] | Promise<readonly string[]>\n  /** HMAC-SHA256 secret the host auth framework verifies session cookies with\n   *  (better-auth: its `secret`). Required when `setSessionCookie` is absent —\n   *  the default cookie is minted to better-call's signed contract via\n   *  `signSessionCookieValue`; an unsigned or mis-signed value reads back as a\n   *  null session, so there is deliberately no fallback to `stateSecret`\n   *  (which is not guaranteed to be the auth secret). */\n  sessionCookieSecret?: string\n  /** Adds `Secure` to every cookie this module sets, and (default session\n   *  cookie only) the `__Secure-` name prefix. Must match the auth\n   *  framework's own secure-cookie decision (better-auth: https `baseURL` /\n   *  `advanced.useSecureCookies`), or it will look up a different cookie name\n   *  than the one set here. */\n  secureCookies: boolean\n  /** Default 604 800 (7 days). */\n  sessionTtlSeconds?: number\n  /** Default 600. Applies to both the cookie Max-Age and the signed TTL. */\n  stateTtlSeconds?: number\n  /** Default '/app'. */\n  defaultRedirectPath?: string\n  /** Default '/login'. */\n  loginPath?: string\n  /** Failure log hook (e.g. console.error). Default no-op. */\n  log?: (message: string, error?: unknown) => void\n  now?: () => number\n}\n\n/** Define handlers for SSO start and callback routes managing authentication flow and session cookies */\nexport interface TangleSsoHandlers {\n  /** GET start route: mint + sign state, set the state cookie, 302 to the\n   *  platform authorize URL. `?redirect=` carries the post-login path. */\n  start(request: Request): Promise<Response>\n  /** GET callback route: verify state, exchange the code, upsert the user,\n   *  create the session, save the platform link, set the session cookie\n   *  (via the `setSessionCookie` seam, else signed to better-call's contract\n   *  with `sessionCookieSecret`), 302 to the saved redirect. Every failure\n   *  302s to `loginPath?error=…` with the state cookie cleared. */\n  callback(request: Request): Promise<Response>\n}\n\n/** Redirect targets must stay on this app's origin. A prefix check on `/`\n *  and `//` is not enough: in the WHATWG parser a backslash is a path\n *  separator for special schemes, so `/\\host` resolves to `https://host/`,\n *  and tab or newline are stripped before parsing, so `/\\t/host` is `//host`.\n *  Parse the value against a fixed origin and accept it only when that origin\n *  survives; the result is the parser's normalised path, query and fragment.\n *  Backslash and control characters are rejected up front as well, so the\n *  decision does not rest on one parser's handling of them.\n *\n *  The input staying on-origin is not enough either: dot-segment removal\n *  turns `/.//host` or `/a/..//host` into the pathname `//host` with the\n *  origin intact, and a browser resolves that Location off-origin. So the\n *  emitted value must itself resolve on-origin and come back unchanged. */\nconst REDIRECT_REFERENCE_ORIGIN = 'https://redirect-reference.invalid'\n\nfunction sanitizeRedirectPath(value: string | null, fallback: string): string {\n  if (!value || !value.startsWith('/') || /[\\\\\\u0000-\\u001f\\u007f]/.test(value)) return fallback\n  const path = resolveOnReferenceOrigin(value)\n  if (path === null || resolveOnReferenceOrigin(path) !== path) return fallback\n  return path\n}\n\n/** `path + search + hash` of `value` resolved against the reference origin,\n *  or null when the parse fails or lands on another origin. */\nfunction resolveOnReferenceOrigin(value: string): string | null {\n  let url: URL\n  try {\n    url = new URL(value, REDIRECT_REFERENCE_ORIGIN)\n  } catch {\n    return null\n  }\n  if (url.origin !== REDIRECT_REFERENCE_ORIGIN) return null\n  return `${url.pathname}${url.search}${url.hash}`\n}\n\nfunction redirectResponse(location: string, headers = new Headers()): Response {\n  headers.set('Location', location)\n  return new Response(null, { status: 302, headers })\n}\n\n/** Real client IP: `CF-Connecting-IP` behind Cloudflare, else the first\n *  `x-forwarded-for` hop (the rest of the list is sender-controlled). */\nfunction clientIp(request: Request): string | null {\n  return (\n    request.headers.get('CF-Connecting-IP') ??\n    request.headers.get('x-forwarded-for')?.split(',')[0]?.trim() ??\n    null\n  )\n}\n\ninterface StateCookiePayload {\n  s: string\n  r: string\n}\n\nfunction parseStateCookiePayload(raw: string | null): StateCookiePayload | null {\n  if (!raw) return null\n  try {\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as unknown\n    if (parsed === null || typeof parsed !== 'object') return null\n    const { s, r } = parsed as Record<string, unknown>\n    if (typeof s !== 'string' || typeof r !== 'string') return null\n    return { s, r }\n  } catch {\n    return null\n  }\n}\n\n/** Create Tangle SSO handlers to manage authentication state, callbacks, and session cookies */\nexport function createTangleSsoHandlers(opts: TangleSsoHandlerOptions): TangleSsoHandlers {\n  if (!opts.stateSecret) throw new Error('TangleSsoHandlerOptions.stateSecret is required')\n  if (!opts.callbackUrl) throw new Error('TangleSsoHandlerOptions.callbackUrl is required')\n  if (!opts.stateCookieName) throw new Error('TangleSsoHandlerOptions.stateCookieName is required')\n\n  const sessionCookieName = opts.sessionCookieName ?? DEFAULT_SESSION_COOKIE\n\n  let mintSessionCookies: (args: TangleSsoSessionCookieArgs) => Promise<readonly string[]>\n  if (opts.setSessionCookie) {\n    const seam = opts.setSessionCookie\n    mintSessionCookies = async (args) => await seam(args)\n  } else if (opts.sessionCookieSecret) {\n    const secret = opts.sessionCookieSecret\n    mintSessionCookies = async ({ token, secure, ttlSeconds }) => [\n      serializeCookie(await signSessionCookieValue(token, secret), {\n        name: secure ? `__Secure-${sessionCookieName}` : sessionCookieName,\n        secure,\n        maxAgeSeconds: ttlSeconds,\n      }),\n    ]\n  } else {\n    throw new Error(\n      'TangleSsoHandlerOptions requires setSessionCookie or sessionCookieSecret: ' +\n        'better-auth only accepts HMAC-signed (and, on https, __Secure--prefixed) session cookies, ' +\n        'so an unsigned default would mint sessions that read back null',\n    )\n  }\n  const sessionTtlSeconds = opts.sessionTtlSeconds ?? DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL_SECONDS\n  const stateTtlSeconds = opts.stateTtlSeconds ?? DEFAULT_STATE_TTL_SECONDS\n  const defaultRedirectPath = opts.defaultRedirectPath ?? DEFAULT_REDIRECT_PATH\n  const loginPath = opts.loginPath ?? DEFAULT_LOGIN_PATH\n  const log = opts.log ?? (() => {})\n  const now = opts.now ?? Date.now\n  const stateConfig: SsoStateConfig = { secret: opts.stateSecret, ttlMs: stateTtlSeconds * 1000, now }\n\n  const stateCookieOpts = { name: opts.stateCookieName, secure: opts.secureCookies }\n\n  function loginErrorRedirect(code: string): Response {\n    const headers = new Headers()\n    headers.append('Set-Cookie', clearCookieHeader(stateCookieOpts))\n    return redirectResponse(`${loginPath}?error=${code}`, headers)\n  }\n\n  return {\n    async start(request) {\n      const url = new URL(request.url)\n      const redirectPath = sanitizeRedirectPath(url.searchParams.get('redirect'), defaultRedirectPath)\n      const state = await createSignedSsoState(stateConfig)\n      const cookie = serializeCookie(JSON.stringify({ s: state, r: redirectPath }), {\n        ...stateCookieOpts,\n        maxAgeSeconds: stateTtlSeconds,\n      })\n      const headers = new Headers()\n      headers.append('Set-Cookie', cookie)\n      return redirectResponse(opts.auth.authorizeUrl({ state, redirectUri: opts.callbackUrl }), headers)\n    },\n\n    async callback(request) {\n      const url = new URL(request.url)\n      const code = url.searchParams.get('code')\n      const stateFromPlatform = url.searchParams.get('state')\n      if (!code || !stateFromPlatform) return loginErrorRedirect('tangle_callback_missing')\n\n      const payload = parseStateCookiePayload(readCookieValue(request.headers.get('cookie'), opts.stateCookieName))\n      if (!payload || payload.s !== stateFromPlatform) return loginErrorRedirect('tangle_state_mismatch')\n      if (!(await verifySignedSsoState(payload.s, stateConfig))) return loginErrorRedirect('tangle_state_mismatch')\n\n      let exchanged: TangleSsoExchangeResult\n      try {\n        exchanged = await opts.auth.exchange(code)\n      } catch (err) {\n        log('[tangle-sso] exchange failed', err)\n        return loginErrorRedirect('tangle_exchange_failed')\n      }\n      if (exchanged.emailVerified !== true) {\n        log('[tangle-sso] exchange did not include a verified-email proof')\n        return loginErrorRedirect('tangle_exchange_failed')\n      }\n\n      let userId: string\n      try {\n        const email = normalizeTangleSsoEmail(exchanged.user.email)\n        const resolution = await opts.store.resolveAccount({\n          email,\n          platformUserId: exchanged.user.id,\n        })\n        if (resolution.kind === 'reject') {\n          throw new TangleSsoAccountConflictError(resolution.reason)\n        }\n        ;({ userId } = await opts.store.upsertUserByEmail({\n          email,\n          name: exchanged.user.name ?? null,\n          tangleUserId: exchanged.user.id,\n          resolution,\n        }))\n      } catch (err) {\n        if (err instanceof TangleSsoAccountConflictError) {\n          log('[tangle-sso] account linking conflict', err)\n          return loginErrorRedirect('tangle_account_conflict')\n        }\n        if (err instanceof TangleSsoUserCreateError) return loginErrorRedirect('tangle_user_create_failed')\n        throw err\n      }\n\n      const expiresAt = new Date(now() + sessionTtlSeconds * 1000)\n      const { token } = await opts.store.createSession({\n        userId,\n        expiresAt,\n        ipAddress: clientIp(request),\n        userAgent: request.headers.get('user-agent'),\n      })\n\n      await opts.store.saveTangleLink({\n        userId,\n        sessionToken: token,\n        tangleUserId: exchanged.user.id,\n        email: normalizeTangleSsoEmail(exchanged.user.email),\n        name: exchanged.user.name ?? null,\n        apiKey: exchanged.apiKey,\n        planTier: exchanged.plan?.tier ?? null,\n      })\n\n      const headers = new Headers()\n      headers.append('Set-Cookie', clearCookieHeader(stateCookieOpts))\n      const sessionCookies = await mintSessionCookies({\n        token,\n        expiresAt,\n        ttlSeconds: sessionTtlSeconds,\n        secure: opts.secureCookies,\n      })\n      for (const cookie of sessionCookies) headers.append('Set-Cookie', cookie)\n      return redirectResponse(sanitizeRedirectPath(payload.r, defaultRedirectPath), headers)\n    },\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Request guards for agent-app routes: session auth (302 redirect for pages,\n * JSON 401 for APIs), admin allowlisting (404 — the route stays invisible to\n * non-admins), and the billable-balance gate (402 with a stable code).\n * Session resolution is a seam; thrown Responses follow the router convention\n * of surfacing a thrown Response as the route result.\n */\n\nimport { isTangleBillingEnforcementDisabled } from '../runtime/model'\n\n/** Define options for configuring authentication guard behavior and session retrieval */\nexport interface AuthGuardOptions<Session> {\n  /** e.g. a better-auth `auth.api.getSession` wrapped by the app. */\n  getSession(request: Request): Promise<Session | null | undefined>\n  /** Default '/login'. */\n  loginPath?: string\n}\n\n/** Resolve user authentication and session requirements for page and API requests */\nexport interface AuthGuard<Session> {\n  /** Page guard — throws a 302 redirect Response to `loginPath`. */\n  requireUser(request: Request): Promise<Session>\n  /** API guard — throws JSON 401 `{ error: 'Unauthorized', code: 'auth.unauthenticated' }`. */\n  requireApiUser(request: Request): Promise<Session>\n  /** `apiResponse` selects the 401 JSON path over the redirect. */\n  requireSession(request: Request, opts?: { apiResponse?: boolean }): Promise<Session>\n  getOptionalSession(request: Request): Promise<Session | null>\n}\n\n/** Create an authentication guard that enforces session presence and handles unauthorized access responses */\nexport function createAuthGuard<Session>(opts: AuthGuardOptions<Session>): AuthGuard<Session> {\n  const loginPath = opts.loginPath ?? '/login'\n\n  async function requireSession(request: Request, o: { apiResponse?: boolean } = {}): Promise<Session> {\n    const session = await opts.getSession(request)\n    if (!session) {\n      if (o.apiResponse) {\n        throw Response.json({ error: 'Unauthorized', code: 'auth.unauthenticated' }, { status: 401 })\n      }\n      throw new Response(null, { status: 302, headers: { Location: loginPath } })\n    }\n    return session\n  }\n\n  return {\n    requireSession,\n    requireUser: (request) => requireSession(request),\n    requireApiUser: (request) => requireSession(request, { apiResponse: true }),\n    getOptionalSession: async (request) => (await opts.getSession(request)) ?? null,\n  }\n}\n\n/** Resolve a value or an HTTP response indicating failure in a guarded operation */\nexport type GuardResolution<T> = { ok: true; value: T } | { ok: false; response: Response }\n\n/**\n * Adapt a guard that THROWS a Response (the quartet above — the router\n * convention) to the `{ok: true, value} | {ok: false, response}` resolution\n * shape the route factories take (`/chat-routes` `authorize`,\n * `/interactions` `resolveConnection`, `/chat-routes` upload `authorize`).\n * Every product wrote this try/catch by hand; it lives here once.\n */\nexport async function guardResolution<T>(run: () => Promise<T>): Promise<GuardResolution<T>> {\n  try {\n    return { ok: true, value: await run() }\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof Response) return { ok: false, response: err }\n    throw err\n  }\n}\n\n/** Comma/whitespace separated → trimmed, lowercased, empties dropped. */\nexport function parseAdminEmails(raw: string | null | undefined): string[] {\n  return (raw ?? '')\n    .split(/[,\\s]+/)\n    .map((e) => e.trim().toLowerCase())\n    .filter(Boolean)\n}\n\n/** Define options to resolve user session and control access based on allowed admin emails */\nexport interface AdminGuardOptions<Session> {\n  requireUser(request: Request): Promise<Session>\n  emailOf(session: Session): string | null | undefined\n  /** Resolved per request; an EMPTY allowlist refuses everyone. */\n  allowedEmails(): string[]\n}\n\n/** Non-admins (and empty allowlists) get 404, keeping the route invisible —\n *  better than a \"forbidden\" footprint that advertises its existence. */\nexport function createAdminGuard<Session>(opts: AdminGuardOptions<Session>): (request: Request) => Promise<Session> {\n  return async (request) => {\n    const session = await opts.requireUser(request)\n    const allowed = opts.allowedEmails()\n    if (allowed.length === 0) throw new Response('Not found', { status: 404 })\n    const email = (opts.emailOf(session) ?? 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Otherwise throws\n * a 402 Response with the stable `billing.balance_required` code so clients\n * can route to the billing screen.\n */\nexport function assertBillableBalance(state: BillableBalanceState, opts: AssertBillableBalanceOptions = {}): void {\n  if (isTangleBillingEnforcementDisabled({ env: opts.env, enforcementEnvVar: opts.enforcementEnvVar })) return\n  if (state.overageAllowed || state.remainingBalanceUsd > 0) return\n  // errorBody first: the stable error/code contract always wins over caller extras.\n  throw Response.json(\n    {\n      ...opts.errorBody,\n      error: opts.errorMessage ?? 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package/dist/platform/index.js

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import {
   resolveTangleSsoAccount,
   signSessionCookieValue,
   verifySignedSsoState
-} from "../chunk-TWTLQWES.js";
+} from "../chunk-FXWNNHPC.js";
 import {
   resolveTangleDevOrUserKey,
   resolveTangleExecutionEnvironment

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@tangle-network/agent-app",
-  "version": "0.49.3",
+  "version": "0.49.4",
   "packageManager": "pnpm@11.24.0",
   "description": "Build agent applications with typed chat, tools, sandboxes, integrations, billing, and evaluation.",
   "keywords": [