@tangle-network/agent-app 0.45.8 → 0.45.9

package/dist/auth-Bulnsz3V.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+import { A as AppToolContext } from './types-DbU-oO5h.js';
+
+/**
+ * Header names carrying the server-set per-turn context + the capability token.
+ * Defaults are product-neutral (`X-Agent-App-*`); a product that already ships
+ * a header convention (e.g. `X-Acme-User-Id`) passes its own.
+ */
+interface ToolHeaderNames {
+    userId: string;
+    workspaceId: string;
+    threadId: string;
+}
+/** Provide default HTTP header names for user, workspace, and thread identification */
+declare const DEFAULT_HEADER_NAMES: ToolHeaderNames;
+/**
+ * Which identity the bearer is bound to.
+ *
+ * `'userId'` (default) is right when the product mints a token per user and can
+ * deliver it per turn.
+ *
+ * `'workspaceId'` is the only workable choice when the token has to survive in
+ * the BOX ENVIRONMENT. Since agent-interface 0.38 a credential may reach a
+ * profile only as a reference the sandbox resolves from that environment, and
+ * the environment is workspace-wide and written once at box creation. A
+ * per-user token therefore cannot be delivered at all — and a per-user token
+ * that IS written there was never per-user in any meaningful sense, because
+ * every member of that workspace's box can read it.
+ *
+ * Binding the bearer to the workspace does NOT collapse the identity: the user
+ * header is still required, still server-set, still returned on `ctx`, and is
+ * what downstream domain code attributes work to. Only the question "may this
+ * caller act at all" moves from the user to the workspace — which is what the
+ * shared box already implies.
+ */
+type CapabilitySubject = 'userId' | 'workspaceId';
+/** Define options to verify bearer tokens and customize authentication header names */
+interface AuthenticateOptions {
+    /** Verify the bearer capability token belongs to the subject named by
+     *  {@link AuthenticateOptions.subject}. The product's HMAC/JWT impl — the
+     *  seam that keeps token crypto out of this package. */
+    verifyToken: (subject: string, bearer: string) => Promise<boolean>;
+    headerNames?: ToolHeaderNames;
+    /** What the bearer is bound to. Defaults to `'userId'`, so an existing caller
+     *  is byte-unchanged. */
+    subject?: CapabilitySubject;
+}
+/** Represent the result of tool authentication with success context or failure response */
+type ToolAuthResult = {
+    ok: true;
+    ctx: AppToolContext;
+} | {
+    ok: false;
+    response: Response;
+};
+/**
+ * Recover + verify the trusted context for a tool request.
+ *
+ * Both the user and the workspace come from server-set headers — never from
+ * tool args — so the model can neither forge identity nor target another
+ * workspace. The bearer must verify against whichever of the two the product
+ * declares as its {@link CapabilitySubject}.
+ *
+ * Fail-closed, and deliberately in this order: a missing credential or a token
+ * minted for another subject yields 401 before anything else is read. When the
+ * subject is the workspace, its header is required BEFORE verification rather
+ * than after — verifying against an absent subject is not a check at all.
+ */
+declare function authenticateToolRequest(request: Request, opts: AuthenticateOptions): Promise<ToolAuthResult>;
+/** Read a tool's argument object from the request body, tolerant of MCP host
+ *  aliases (`args` / `arguments`) or a bare body. Returns null on non-JSON. */
+declare function readToolArgs<T>(request: Request): Promise<T | null>;
+
+export { type AuthenticateOptions as A, DEFAULT_HEADER_NAMES as D, type ToolHeaderNames as T, type ToolAuthResult as a, authenticateToolRequest as b, readToolArgs as r };

package/dist/chat-routes/index.d.ts

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ import '../contract-CQNvv5th.js';
 import '../types-CCeYywdS.js';
 import '../plans/index.js';
 import '@tangle-network/sandbox/core';
-import '../auth-DJs6lfAs.js';
+import '../auth-Bulnsz3V.js';
 import '../types-DbU-oO5h.js';
 import '../harness/index.js';
 import '../model-CdCDfBA9.js';

package/dist/chat-routes/index.js

@@ -100,11 +100,11 @@ import {
   flattenHistory,
   readSandboxBinaryBytes,
   statSandboxFileSize
-} from "../chunk-REUAPWUS.js";
+} from "../chunk-EPOPI77J.js";
 import "../chunk-73F3CKVK.js";
 import "../chunk-LWSJK546.js";
-import "../chunk-ITCINLSU.js";
-import "../chunk-IVEKCOM7.js";
+import "../chunk-C5OIABSB.js";
+import "../chunk-YOFQO4R6.js";
 import "../chunk-YEFFHORB.js";
 import "../chunk-S5SRJJQG.js";
 import "../chunk-JML7WKWU.js";

package/dist/{chunk-ITCINLSU.js → chunk-C5OIABSB.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   authenticateToolRequest
-} from "./chunk-IVEKCOM7.js";
+} from "./chunk-YOFQO4R6.js";
 import {
   ToolInputError,
   findCustomTool,
@@ -198,4 +198,4 @@ export {
   createAppToolRuntimeExecutor,
   handleAppToolRequest
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ITCINLSU.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-C5OIABSB.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-REUAPWUS.js → chunk-EPOPI77J.js}

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import {
 } from "./chunk-LWSJK546.js";
 import {
   buildAppToolMcpServer
-} from "./chunk-IVEKCOM7.js";
+} from "./chunk-YOFQO4R6.js";
 import {
   resolveTangleExecutionEnvironment,
   trimOrNull
@@ -2224,4 +2224,4 @@ export {
   isTerminalPromptEvent,
   detectInteractiveQuestion
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-REUAPWUS.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-EPOPI77J.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-IVEKCOM7.js → chunk-YOFQO4R6.js}

@@ -13,7 +13,11 @@ async function authenticateToolRequest(request, opts) {
   if (!userId || !bearer) {
     return { ok: false, response: Response.json({ error: "Missing capability credentials" }, { status: 401 }) };
   }
-  if (!await opts.verifyToken(userId, bearer)) {
+  const subject = opts.subject === "workspaceId" ? workspaceId : userId;
+  if (!subject) {
+    return { ok: false, response: Response.json({ error: "Missing workspace context" }, { status: 400 }) };
+  }
+  if (!await opts.verifyToken(subject, bearer)) {
     return { ok: false, response: Response.json({ error: "Invalid capability token" }, { status: 401 }) };
   }
   if (!workspaceId) {
@@ -268,4 +272,4 @@ export {
   MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSIONS,
   createMcpToolHandler
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-IVEKCOM7.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-YOFQO4R6.js.map

package/dist/chunk-YOFQO4R6.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/tools/auth.ts","../src/tools/mcp.ts","../src/tools/mcp-rpc.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { AppToolContext } from './types'\n\n/**\n * Header names carrying the server-set per-turn context + the capability token.\n * Defaults are product-neutral (`X-Agent-App-*`); a product that already ships\n * a header convention (e.g. `X-Acme-User-Id`) passes its own.\n */\nexport interface ToolHeaderNames {\n  userId: string\n  workspaceId: string\n  threadId: string\n}\n\n/** Provide default HTTP header names for user, workspace, and thread identification */\nexport const DEFAULT_HEADER_NAMES: ToolHeaderNames = {\n  userId: 'X-Agent-App-User-Id',\n  workspaceId: 'X-Agent-App-Workspace-Id',\n  threadId: 'X-Agent-App-Thread-Id',\n}\n\n/**\n * Which identity the bearer is bound to.\n *\n * `'userId'` (default) is right when the product mints a token per user and can\n * deliver it per turn.\n *\n * `'workspaceId'` is the only workable choice when the token has to survive in\n * the BOX ENVIRONMENT. Since agent-interface 0.38 a credential may reach a\n * profile only as a reference the sandbox resolves from that environment, and\n * the environment is workspace-wide and written once at box creation. A\n * per-user token therefore cannot be delivered at all — and a per-user token\n * that IS written there was never per-user in any meaningful sense, because\n * every member of that workspace's box can read it.\n *\n * Binding the bearer to the workspace does NOT collapse the identity: the user\n * header is still required, still server-set, still returned on `ctx`, and is\n * what downstream domain code attributes work to. Only the question \"may this\n * caller act at all\" moves from the user to the workspace — which is what the\n * shared box already implies.\n */\nexport type CapabilitySubject = 'userId' | 'workspaceId'\n\n/** Define options to verify bearer tokens and customize authentication header names */\nexport interface AuthenticateOptions {\n  /** Verify the bearer capability token belongs to the subject named by\n   *  {@link AuthenticateOptions.subject}. The product's HMAC/JWT impl — the\n   *  seam that keeps token crypto out of this package. */\n  verifyToken: (subject: string, bearer: string) => Promise<boolean>\n  headerNames?: ToolHeaderNames\n  /** What the bearer is bound to. Defaults to `'userId'`, so an existing caller\n   *  is byte-unchanged. */\n  subject?: CapabilitySubject\n}\n\n/** Represent the result of tool authentication with success context or failure response */\nexport type ToolAuthResult =\n  | { ok: true; ctx: AppToolContext }\n  | { ok: false; response: Response }\n\n/**\n * Recover + verify the trusted context for a tool request.\n *\n * Both the user and the workspace come from server-set headers — never from\n * tool args — so the model can neither forge identity nor target another\n * workspace. The bearer must verify against whichever of the two the product\n * declares as its {@link CapabilitySubject}.\n *\n * Fail-closed, and deliberately in this order: a missing credential or a token\n * minted for another subject yields 401 before anything else is read. When the\n * subject is the workspace, its header is required BEFORE verification rather\n * than after — verifying against an absent subject is not a check at all.\n */\nexport async function authenticateToolRequest(request: Request, opts: AuthenticateOptions): Promise<ToolAuthResult> {\n  const h = opts.headerNames ?? DEFAULT_HEADER_NAMES\n  const userId = request.headers.get(h.userId)?.trim()\n  const workspaceId = request.headers.get(h.workspaceId)?.trim()\n  const threadId = request.headers.get(h.threadId)?.trim() || null\n  const bearer = request.headers.get('authorization')?.match(/^Bearer\\s+(.+)$/i)?.[1]\n\n  if (!userId || !bearer) {\n    return { ok: false, response: Response.json({ error: 'Missing capability credentials' }, { status: 401 }) }\n  }\n  const subject = opts.subject === 'workspaceId' ? workspaceId : userId\n  if (!subject) {\n    return { ok: false, response: Response.json({ error: 'Missing workspace context' }, { status: 400 }) }\n  }\n  if (!(await opts.verifyToken(subject, bearer))) {\n    return { ok: false, response: Response.json({ error: 'Invalid capability token' }, { status: 401 }) }\n  }\n  if (!workspaceId) {\n    return { ok: false, response: Response.json({ error: 'Missing workspace context' }, { status: 400 }) }\n  }\n  return { ok: true, ctx: { userId, workspaceId, threadId } }\n}\n\n/** Read a tool's argument object from the request body, tolerant of MCP host\n *  aliases (`args` / `arguments`) or a bare body. Returns null on non-JSON. */\nexport async function readToolArgs<T>(request: Request): Promise<T | null> {\n  let body: { args?: T; arguments?: T }\n  try {\n    body = (await request.json()) as typeof body\n  } catch {\n    return null\n  }\n  return (body.args ?? body.arguments ?? (body as T)) as T\n}\n","/**\n * The tagged-configuration contract for every MCP server this package emits.\n *\n * An `AgentProfile` is digested, diffed, stored, and logged, so a credential\n * that rides it as plain text is a leak by construction. `@tangle-network/\n * agent-interface` closed that at **0.38.0**: `args`, `env`, and `headers` on\n * an `AgentProfileMcpServer` no longer take strings. Every value is either\n * deliberately public profile material (`defineAgentProfilePublicConfig`) or an\n * opaque reference to a credential (`defineAgentProfileSecretRef`) resolved\n * privately at materialization, validated by a `z.discriminatedUnion('kind')`.\n *\n * The schema also refuses to let a secret hide as public material: a `public`\n * value under a credential-bearing key name (`Authorization`, `*_TOKEN`,\n * `*_API_KEY`, `*_SECRET`, `Cookie`, …) is rejected with \"credential-bearing\n * config names require a secret-ref\", and any value whose bytes look like a\n * credential (`Bearer …`, `sk-…`, `ghp_…`) is rejected outright. So the\n * capability token this package used to inline as `Bearer <token>` cannot be\n * expressed at all — it must become a reference.\n *\n * **A reference resolves ONLY from an environment variable present on the box,\n * named by `key`.** That is why the builders below take a `tokenEnvKey` (the\n * box-env variable NAME) instead of a token VALUE: agent-app cannot guess the\n * name, and a reference to a key nothing places fails the turn at\n * materialization rather than running credential-less. The box env is what\n * `SandboxRuntimeConfig.env` (and the platform secret store via\n * `SandboxRuntimeConfig.secrets`) writes at sandbox creation, so the key must\n * name a variable one of those places — and it must therefore be a real\n * environment-variable name, which this module enforces.\n *\n * A per-request credential is only referenceable when the value written at box\n * creation is byte-identical to the one every later turn would mint (a\n * deterministic derivation such as an HMAC over the workspace id). A token\n * scoped narrower than the box — per-user, per-document — cannot be referenced\n * at all; {@link unresolvableSurfaceCredential} names that blocker instead of\n * emitting a reference that resolves to nothing.\n */\nimport {\n  agentProfileMcpServerSchema,\n  defineAgentProfilePublicConfig,\n  defineAgentProfileSecretRef,\n  type AgentProfileConfigValue,\n} from '@tangle-network/agent-interface'\nimport type { AppToolContext } from './types'\nimport type { AppToolName } from './openai'\nimport type { AppToolDefinition } from './registry'\nimport type { ToolHeaderNames } from './auth'\nimport { DEFAULT_HEADER_NAMES } from './auth'\n\n/** Default route path each app tool is served at. A product mounts its routes\n *  at these paths (or supplies its own via {@link BuildMcpServerOptions.paths}). */\nexport const DEFAULT_APP_TOOL_PATHS: Record<AppToolName, string> = {\n  submit_proposal: '/api/tools/propose',\n  schedule_followup: '/api/tools/followup',\n  render_ui: '/api/tools/render-ui',\n  add_citation: '/api/tools/citation',\n}\n\n/** The portable MCP server entry the sandbox SDK accepts (transport + url +\n *  tagged headers). Assignable to `AgentProfileMcpServer` without a cast —\n *  products spread it into their profile's `mcp` map. */\nexport interface AppToolMcpServer {\n  transport: 'http'\n  url: string\n  headers: Record<string, AgentProfileConfigValue>\n  enabled: true\n  metadata: { description: string }\n}\n\n/** POSIX environment-variable name — the same shape `agent-interface`'s\n *  `environmentNameSchema` accepts for an env key. A secret reference resolves\n *  from the box environment, so a key outside this shape can never resolve. */\nconst ENV_NAME_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$/\n\n/**\n * Reject a secret-reference key that names nothing the box can hold.\n *\n * `agent-interface` accepts any non-credential string as a reference key, so a\n * typo or a token VALUE passed where a key belongs validates against the\n * profile schema and fails much later, inside materialization, as an opaque\n * missing-secret error. Failing here names the parameter.\n */\nfunction assertSecretEnvKey(key: string, label: string): string {\n  if (!ENV_NAME_PATTERN.test(key)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `${label}: tokenEnvKey must be an environment-variable NAME the sandbox box carries ` +\n        `(e.g. 'APP_CAPABILITY_TOKEN'), not a token value — got ${JSON.stringify(key)}. ` +\n        'A profile may only REFERENCE a credential; the value is placed on the box by ' +\n        'SandboxRuntimeConfig.env or the platform secret store.',\n    )\n  }\n  return key\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate one emitted entry against the REAL `agentProfileMcpServerSchema`.\n *\n * The contract's rules (which key names demand a reference, which byte patterns\n * read as a credential) live in `agent-interface`. Re-implementing them here\n * would drift the moment that package moves — which it does: 0.36.0 → 0.40.0 in\n * three days. Running the shipped validator instead means a product that passes\n * a credential-bearing custom header name, a relative base URL, or a URL with\n * embedded credentials fails at the builder with the contract's own message.\n *\n * It is also the loud failure for a version skew: if the resolved\n * `@tangle-network/agent-interface` predates 0.38.0, its schema rejects the\n * tagged shape this package now emits, and that surfaces here instead of as a\n * sandbox provisioning error.\n */\nfunction assertProfileMcpServer<T extends AppToolMcpServer>(server: T, label: string): T {\n  const result = agentProfileMcpServerSchema.safeParse(server)\n  if (!result.success) {\n    const issues = result.error.issues\n      .map((issue) => `${issue.path.join('.') || '(root)'}: ${issue.message}`)\n      .join('; ')\n    throw new Error(\n      `${label} produced an MCP server the AgentProfile contract rejects: ${issues}. ` +\n        'Requires @tangle-network/agent-interface >= 0.38.0 (tagged MCP config values).',\n    )\n  }\n  return server\n}\n\n/**\n * Refuse to mount a surface whose credential is scoped narrower than the box.\n *\n * A per-user or per-resource capability token is minted per request. The box\n * environment is written once at sandbox creation and shared by every turn and\n * every member of the workspace, so such a token can neither be placed there\n * ahead of time nor referenced from a per-turn profile. Widening the channel to\n * a workspace-bound token is not a substitute when the route authenticates the\n * CALLER: the agent can read its own box env, so it could forge that identity.\n *\n * Mounting the surface anyway would emit a plain-string `Authorization` header\n * (rejected by the schema) or a reference to a key nothing places (rejected at\n * materialization). Throwing here names the actual blocker. Exported because\n * every product with per-document MCP surfaces hits it and was writing this\n * message itself.\n */\nexport function unresolvableSurfaceCredential(surface: string): never {\n  throw new Error(\n    `The ${surface} MCP surface cannot be mounted: its capability token is scoped to a single ` +\n      'user and resource, and an AgentProfile may only reference a credential the sandbox can ' +\n      'resolve from the box environment, which is workspace-wide and fixed at sandbox creation. ' +\n      'Mounting it needs a per-session secret channel on the sandbox API, or a route that ' +\n      'authenticates the workspace rather than the caller.',\n  )\n}\n\n/** Define configuration options for building an HTTP MCP server including path, baseUrl, token env key, context, and description */\nexport interface BuildHttpMcpServerOptions {\n  /** Route path on the app the sandbox POSTs to (e.g. `/api/tools/propose`). */\n  path: string\n  /** App base URL the sandbox reaches back to (no trailing slash required). */\n  baseUrl: string\n  /**\n   * NAME of the box-environment variable holding the capability token — never\n   * the token itself. The emitted `Authorization` header is a `secret-ref` to\n   * this key with `format: 'bearer'`, so the sandbox resolves the value\n   * privately and the profile carries only the name.\n   *\n   * The key MUST name a variable the box actually carries (placed by\n   * `SandboxRuntimeConfig.env` at creation, or injected from the platform\n   * secret store via `SandboxRuntimeConfig.secrets`), and the value written\n   * there must be the token this route will accept for every turn — which in\n   * practice means a deterministic derivation (e.g. an HMAC over the workspace\n   * id), not a freshly-random per-request mint. A token scoped narrower than\n   * the box is not referenceable: see {@link unresolvableSurfaceCredential}.\n   */\n  tokenEnvKey: string\n  ctx: AppToolContext\n  /** Tool description the model sees. */\n  description: string\n  headerNames?: ToolHeaderNames\n}\n\n/**\n * Build ONE HTTP MCP server entry — the generic agent→app bridge. The\n * capability token (as a secret reference) + the user/workspace/thread ids ride\n * in server-set headers (never tool args), so the model can't forge identity or\n * target another workspace. Workspace/thread headers are omitted when their\n * `ctx` value is empty/null (e.g. an integration-invoke bridge that's\n * user-scoped only). Used directly for non-app-tool bridges\n * (integration_invoke) and via {@link buildAppToolMcpServer} for the four app\n * tools.\n */\nexport function buildHttpMcpServer(opts: BuildHttpMcpServerOptions): AppToolMcpServer {\n  const base = opts.baseUrl.replace(/\\/+$/, '')\n  const h = opts.headerNames ?? DEFAULT_HEADER_NAMES\n  return assertProfileMcpServer(\n    {\n      transport: 'http',\n      url: `${base}${opts.path}`,\n      headers: {\n        Authorization: defineAgentProfileSecretRef(\n          assertSecretEnvKey(opts.tokenEnvKey, 'buildHttpMcpServer'),\n          'bearer',\n        ),\n        [h.userId]: defineAgentProfilePublicConfig(opts.ctx.userId),\n        ...(opts.ctx.workspaceId\n          ? { [h.workspaceId]: defineAgentProfilePublicConfig(opts.ctx.workspaceId) }\n          : {}),\n        ...(opts.ctx.threadId\n          ? { [h.threadId]: defineAgentProfilePublicConfig(opts.ctx.threadId) }\n          : {}),\n        'Content-Type': defineAgentProfilePublicConfig('application/json'),\n      },\n      enabled: true,\n      metadata: { description: opts.description },\n    },\n    'buildHttpMcpServer',\n  )\n}\n\n/** Options for a per-document/scoped MCP channel entry (design-canvas,\n *  sequences, …). The capability token + path scope ONE resource; the document\n *  id lives in the path, never a tool argument. */\nexport interface ScopedMcpServerEntryOptions {\n  /** App base URL the sandbox reaches back to (trailing slash tolerated). */\n  baseUrl: string\n  /** Product route serving the resource's MCP handler — id is part of the path. */\n  path: string\n  /**\n   * NAME of the box-environment variable holding this channel's capability\n   * token — never the token itself. See\n   * {@link BuildHttpMcpServerOptions.tokenEnvKey}.\n   *\n   * A per-(user, resource) token cannot satisfy this: the box environment is\n   * workspace-wide and fixed at sandbox creation. A product whose channel needs\n   * one calls {@link unresolvableSurfaceCredential} rather than mounting an\n   * entry that cannot resolve.\n   */\n  tokenEnvKey: string\n  /** Override the channel's default tool-server description. */\n  description?: string\n  /** Identity headers for products whose route recovers the user via\n   *  `authenticateToolRequest`. Omit when the bearer token is self-contained. */\n  ctx?: AppToolContext\n  headerNames?: ToolHeaderNames\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the `AgentProfileMcpServer`-shaped entry for a scoped, per-resource MCP\n * channel. The shared mechanism behind the per-domain entry builders\n * (`buildDesignCanvasMcpServerEntry`, `buildSequencesMcpServerEntry`): same\n * token/path guards, same description default, same ctx-vs-self-contained-token\n * branching. The domain is two parameters — `label` (for guard messages) and\n * `defaultDescription` — never baked.\n *\n * The no-`ctx` branch is a GENUINE behavioral path, not a shortcut: it emits a\n * self-contained-token entry with ONLY `Authorization` + `Content-Type`.\n * Routing it through {@link buildHttpMcpServer} would unconditionally write a\n * `userId` identity header (here `undefined`), so it stays a distinct branch.\n */\nexport function buildScopedMcpServerEntry(\n  opts: ScopedMcpServerEntryOptions & { label: string; defaultDescription: string },\n): AppToolMcpServer {\n  if (opts.tokenEnvKey.trim().length === 0) {\n    throw new Error(`${opts.label} requires a capability token env key — omit the MCP server when none is available`)\n  }\n  if (!opts.path.startsWith('/')) {\n    throw new Error(`${opts.label} path must start with \"/\" (got \"${opts.path}\")`)\n  }\n  const description = opts.description ?? opts.defaultDescription\n\n  if (opts.ctx) {\n    return buildHttpMcpServer({\n      path: opts.path,\n      baseUrl: opts.baseUrl,\n      tokenEnvKey: opts.tokenEnvKey,\n      ctx: opts.ctx,\n      description,\n      headerNames: opts.headerNames ?? DEFAULT_HEADER_NAMES,\n    })\n  }\n\n  return assertProfileMcpServer(\n    {\n      transport: 'http',\n      url: `${opts.baseUrl.replace(/\\/+$/, '')}${opts.path}`,\n      headers: {\n        Authorization: defineAgentProfileSecretRef(\n          assertSecretEnvKey(opts.tokenEnvKey, opts.label),\n          'bearer',\n        ),\n        'Content-Type': defineAgentProfilePublicConfig('application/json'),\n      },\n      enabled: true,\n      metadata: { description },\n    },\n    opts.label,\n  )\n}\n\n/** Define configuration options required to build an MCP server including tool, baseUrl, token, and context */\nexport interface BuildMcpServerOptions {\n  /** A built-in app tool name, or a product-registered {@link AppToolDefinition}.\n   *  A custom tool supplies its route via `AppToolDefinition.path` (or `paths`). */\n  tool: AppToolName | AppToolDefinition\n  baseUrl: string\n  /** NAME of the box-environment variable holding the capability token — see\n   *  {@link BuildHttpMcpServerOptions.tokenEnvKey}. */\n  tokenEnvKey: string\n  ctx: AppToolContext\n  description: string\n  headerNames?: ToolHeaderNames\n  paths?: Partial<Record<string, string>>\n}\n\n/** Build one app-tool MCP server entry — a thin wrapper over\n *  {@link buildHttpMcpServer} that resolves the tool's route path. Built-ins map\n *  through {@link DEFAULT_APP_TOOL_PATHS}; a custom tool uses its own `path`\n *  (or a `paths` override). */\nexport function buildAppToolMcpServer(opts: BuildMcpServerOptions): AppToolMcpServer {\n  const path =\n    typeof opts.tool === 'string'\n      ? opts.paths?.[opts.tool] ?? DEFAULT_APP_TOOL_PATHS[opts.tool]\n      : opts.paths?.[opts.tool.name] ?? opts.tool.path\n  if (!path) {\n    const name = typeof opts.tool === 'string' ? opts.tool : opts.tool.name\n    throw new Error(`buildAppToolMcpServer: tool \"${name}\" has no route path — set AppToolDefinition.path or pass it via opts.paths`)\n  }\n  return buildHttpMcpServer({\n    path,\n    baseUrl: opts.baseUrl,\n    tokenEnvKey: opts.tokenEnvKey,\n    ctx: opts.ctx,\n    description: opts.description,\n    headerNames: opts.headerNames,\n  })\n}\n","/**\n * Generic streamable-HTTP JSON-RPC 2.0 envelope for a tools-only MCP server.\n * Stateless, Workers-compatible: no session table, no SSE — every request gets\n * a single `application/json` response, which the streamable-HTTP transport\n * explicitly permits for tools-only servers.\n *\n * Protocol surface:\n *   initialize   → echo client's protocolVersion if supported, else latest\n *   ping         → empty result {}\n *   notifications/* (no `id`)  → 202 with no body\n *   tools/list   → tool manifest\n *   tools/call   → run + surface execution failures as isError text results\n *   anything else → -32601\n *\n * Execution failures (argument shape, validation, store throws) become `isError`\n * tool results carrying the thrown message verbatim — the model reads WHY and\n * retries. 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If your tools are\n   *  stateless (or carry state through closure) pass an empty builder:\n   *  `() => ({} as TEnv)`. */\n  buildEnv(request: Request): TEnv | Promise<TEnv>\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Internal helpers\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\ntype JsonRpcId = string | number | null\n\ninterface ToolCallContent {\n  content: Array<{ type: 'text'; text: string }>\n  isError?: true\n}\n\nfunction isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {\n  return typeof value === 'object' && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value)\n}\n\nfunction rpcResult(id: JsonRpcId, result: unknown): Response {\n  return Response.json({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id, result })\n}\n\nfunction rpcError(id: JsonRpcId, code: number, message: string, status = 200): Response {\n  return Response.json({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id, error: { code, message } }, { status })\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Factory\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Build a request handler for a tools-only MCP server. The returned function\n * accepts a standard `Request` and resolves to a `Response` — mount it on any\n * Cloudflare Worker route or Remix `loader`.\n *\n * The handler calls `buildEnv` exactly ONCE per `tools/call` request (after\n * the tool is found, before `run`) — non-`tools/call` paths skip it entirely\n * so metadata requests do not pay env-build cost.\n */\nexport function createMcpToolHandler<TEnv = Record<string, never>>(\n  opts: CreateMcpToolHandlerOptions<TEnv>,\n): (request: Request) => Promise<Response> {\n  const toolMap = new Map<string, McpToolDefinition<TEnv>>()\n  for (const tool of opts.tools) {\n    if (toolMap.has(tool.name)) throw new Error(`duplicate MCP tool name: ${tool.name}`)\n    toolMap.set(tool.name, tool)\n  }\n\n  return async (request: Request): Promise<Response> => {\n    if (request.method !== 'POST') {\n      return new Response('MCP server accepts JSON-RPC 2.0 over POST only', {\n        status: 405,\n        headers: { Allow: 'POST' },\n      })\n    }\n\n    let body: unknown\n    try {\n      body = await request.json()\n    } catch {\n      return rpcError(null, -32700, 'Parse error: request body is not valid JSON', 400)\n    }\n\n    if (Array.isArray(body)) {\n      return rpcError(null, -32600, 'Invalid request: JSON-RPC batching is not supported', 400)\n    }\n    if (!isRecord(body) || body.jsonrpc !== '2.0' || typeof body.method !== 'string') {\n      return rpcError(\n        null,\n        -32600,\n        'Invalid request: expected a JSON-RPC 2.0 object with jsonrpc \"2.0\" and a string method',\n        400,\n      )\n    }\n\n    const method = body.method\n    const params = isRecord(body.params) ? body.params : {}\n\n    // Notifications have no `id` — acknowledge without a JSON-RPC body.\n    if (!('id' in body) || body.id === undefined) {\n      return new Response(null, { status: 202 })\n    }\n    const id = body.id as JsonRpcId\n\n    switch (method) {\n      case 'initialize': {\n        const requested = typeof params.protocolVersion === 'string' ? params.protocolVersion : undefined\n        const protocolVersion =\n          requested !== undefined && (MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSIONS as readonly string[]).includes(requested)\n            ? requested\n            : LATEST_PROTOCOL_VERSION\n        return rpcResult(id, {\n          protocolVersion,\n          capabilities: { tools: { listChanged: false } },\n          serverInfo: opts.serverInfo,\n        })\n      }\n\n      case 'ping':\n        return rpcResult(id, {})\n\n      case 'tools/list':\n        return rpcResult(id, {\n          tools: opts.tools.map((tool) => ({\n            name: tool.name,\n            description: tool.description,\n            inputSchema: tool.inputSchema,\n          })),\n        })\n\n      case 'tools/call': {\n        const name = params.name\n        if (typeof name !== 'string' || name.length === 0) {\n          return rpcError(id, -32602, 'tools/call requires params.name (string)')\n        }\n        const tool = toolMap.get(name)\n        if (!tool) {\n          return rpcError(\n            id,\n            -32602,\n            `Unknown tool: ${name}. 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package/dist/design-canvas/index.d.ts

@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ import { a as SceneStore, N as NewSceneDecision, b as SceneDocumentRecord } from
 export { c as SceneDecision, d as SceneExportFormat, e as SceneExportRecord, S as SceneStoreScope } from '../store-CqfDtnPQ.js';
 export { C as CHANNEL_PRESETS, a as ChannelPreset, b as ChannelPresetId, c as ChannelScaleResult, E as EXPORT_PRESETS, d as ExportCropRect, e as ExportFormat, f as ExportPreset, S as SIZE_PRESETS, g as SizePreset, h as bleedAwareExportBounds, i as bleedAwareExportRect, j as findPreset, m as matchPreset, r as requireChannelPreset, s as scaleForPreset, k as scalePageForChannelPreset } from '../export-presets-mgVulRaV.js';
 import { a as McpToolDefinition } from '../mcp-rpc-CzU5LWWT.js';
-import { S as ScopedMcpServerEntryOptions, A as AppToolMcpServer } from '../mcp-BOgNWSED.js';
+import { S as ScopedMcpServerEntryOptions, A as AppToolMcpServer } from '../mcp-C-jV_Xe9.js';
 import '@tangle-network/agent-interface';
 import '../types-DbU-oO5h.js';
-import '../auth-DJs6lfAs.js';
+import '../auth-Bulnsz3V.js';
 
 /**
  * Pre-write validation for scene operations. Every rule runs against a

package/dist/design-canvas/index.js

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ import "../chunk-J25RST7G.js";
 import {
   buildScopedMcpServerEntry,
   createMcpToolHandler
-} from "../chunk-IVEKCOM7.js";
+} from "../chunk-YOFQO4R6.js";
 
 // src/design-canvas/operations.ts
 var SCENE_OPERATION_TYPES = [

package/dist/{mcp-BOgNWSED.d.ts → mcp-C-jV_Xe9.d.ts}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { AgentProfileConfigValue } from '@tangle-network/agent-interface';
 import { A as AppToolContext, a as AppToolName, b as AppToolDefinition } from './types-DbU-oO5h.js';
-import { T as ToolHeaderNames } from './auth-DJs6lfAs.js';
+import { T as ToolHeaderNames } from './auth-Bulnsz3V.js';
 
 /**
  * The tagged-configuration contract for every MCP server this package emits.

package/dist/runtime/index.d.ts

@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@ import * as _tangle_network_agent_runtime_tool_loop from '@tangle-network/agent-
 import { ToolLoopMessage } from '@tangle-network/agent-runtime/tool-loop';
 export { RunToolLoopOptions as AppToolLoopOptions, ToolLoopAssistantToolCall as LoopAssistantToolCall, ToolLoopMessage as LoopMessage, ToolLoopCall as LoopToolCall, StreamToolLoopOptions as StreamAppToolLoopOptions, StreamToolLoopYield as StreamLoopYield, ToolLoopEvent, ToolLoopResult, ToolLoopStopReason, runToolLoop as runAppToolLoop, streamToolLoop as streamAppToolLoop } from '@tangle-network/agent-runtime/tool-loop';
 import { CertifiedProfile } from '@tangle-network/agent-runtime/intelligence';
-import { A as AppToolMcpServer } from '../mcp-BOgNWSED.js';
+import { A as AppToolMcpServer } from '../mcp-C-jV_Xe9.js';
 import '@tangle-network/agent-interface';
 import '../types-DbU-oO5h.js';
-import '../auth-DJs6lfAs.js';
+import '../auth-Bulnsz3V.js';
 
 /**
  * Events the app's OpenAI-compat stream adapter ({@link toLoopEvents}) yields.

package/dist/sandbox/index.d.ts

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import { Sandbox } from '@tangle-network/sandbox/core';
 import { SandboxInstance, ProvisionEvent, EgressPolicy, StorageConfig, ScopedTokenScope, TurnDriveResult, MintScopedTokenOptions } from '@tangle-network/sandbox';
 export { StorageConfig } from '@tangle-network/sandbox';
 import { ReasoningEffort, AgentProfileMcpServer, AgentProfileFileMount, AgentProfile } from '@tangle-network/agent-interface';
-import { T as ToolHeaderNames } from '../auth-DJs6lfAs.js';
+import { T as ToolHeaderNames } from '../auth-Bulnsz3V.js';
 import { a as AppToolName, A as AppToolContext } from '../types-DbU-oO5h.js';
 import { Harness } from '../harness/index.js';
 import { a as TangleExecutionEnvironment } from '../model-CdCDfBA9.js';

package/dist/sandbox/index.js

@@ -85,11 +85,11 @@ import {
   workspaceSandboxRecoveryMessage,
   workspaceSandboxRecoveryRecommendedActions,
   writeProfileFilesToBox
-} from "../chunk-REUAPWUS.js";
+} from "../chunk-EPOPI77J.js";
 import "../chunk-73F3CKVK.js";
 import "../chunk-LWSJK546.js";
-import "../chunk-ITCINLSU.js";
-import "../chunk-IVEKCOM7.js";
+import "../chunk-C5OIABSB.js";
+import "../chunk-YOFQO4R6.js";
 import "../chunk-YEFFHORB.js";
 import "../chunk-S5SRJJQG.js";
 import "../chunk-JML7WKWU.js";

package/dist/sequences/index.d.ts

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 import { j as SequenceMediaKind, f as SequenceTimeline, k as TimelineInterval, b as SequenceStore } from '../store-B7LLlk9p.js';
 export { M as MIN_SEQUENCE_CLIP_FRAMES, N as NewSequenceClip, l as NewSequenceDecision, m as NewSequenceTrack, g as SequenceClip, a as SequenceClipMedia, n as SequenceClipPatch, o as SequenceDecision, d as SequenceExportFormat, h as SequenceExportRecord, p as SequenceExportStatus, q as SequenceFrameSnapshot, i as SequenceMeta, r as SequenceStatus, S as SequenceStoreScope, e as SequenceTrack, c as SequenceTrackKind, T as TimelineClipBounds, s as assertClipFitsSequence, t as chooseCaptionPlacement, u as clampClipDuration, v as clampClipStart, w as formatSeconds, x as formatTimecode, y as framesToSeconds, z as secondsToFrames, A as snapshotFrame, B as trackIntervals } from '../store-B7LLlk9p.js';
 export { A as AddCaptionOperation, C as CaptionTargetResolution, a as CreateTrackOperation, D as DeleteClipOperation, E as ExtendSequenceOperation, M as MoveClipOperation, P as PlaceClipOperation, Q as QueueExportOperation, S as SEQUENCE_OPERATION_TYPES, b as SequenceApplyResult, c as SequenceOperation, d as SequenceOperationContext, e as SequenceOperationType, f as SequencePlan, g as SetClipDisabledOperation, h as SetClipTextOperation, i as SplitClipOperation, T as TrimClipOperation, j as applySequenceOperation, k as applySequenceOperations, l as assertSequenceMediaUrl, m as captionTrackNameForLanguage, n as lastClipEndFrame, p as parseSequenceOperations, r as resolveCaptionPlacement, o as resolveCaptionTarget, q as resolvePlaceClipTrack, v as validateAddCaption, s as validateCreateTrack, t as validateDeleteClip, u as validateExtendSequence, w as validateMoveClip, x as validatePlaceClip, y as validateQueueExport, z as validateSequenceOperation, B as validateSequenceOperations, F as validateSetClipDisabled, G as validateSetClipText, H as validateSplitClip, I as validateTrimClip } from '../apply-6wlMOLf8.js';
-import { S as ScopedMcpServerEntryOptions, A as AppToolMcpServer } from '../mcp-BOgNWSED.js';
+import { S as ScopedMcpServerEntryOptions, A as AppToolMcpServer } from '../mcp-C-jV_Xe9.js';
 export { M as SEQUENCES_MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSIONS } from '../mcp-rpc-CzU5LWWT.js';
 import '@tangle-network/agent-interface';
 import '../types-DbU-oO5h.js';
-import '../auth-DJs6lfAs.js';
+import '../auth-Bulnsz3V.js';
 
 /**
  * Pure interchange-format builders over `SequenceTimeline` — SRT, WebVTT,

package/dist/sequences/index.js

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ import {
   MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSIONS,
   buildScopedMcpServerEntry,
   createMcpToolHandler
-} from "../chunk-IVEKCOM7.js";
+} from "../chunk-YOFQO4R6.js";
 
 // src/sequences/operations.ts
 var SEQUENCE_OPERATION_TYPES = [

package/dist/tools/index.d.ts

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-import { T as ToolHeaderNames } from '../auth-DJs6lfAs.js';
-export { A as AuthenticateOptions, D as DEFAULT_HEADER_NAMES, a as ToolAuthResult, b as authenticateToolRequest, r as readToolArgs } from '../auth-DJs6lfAs.js';
+import { T as ToolHeaderNames } from '../auth-Bulnsz3V.js';
+export { A as AuthenticateOptions, D as DEFAULT_HEADER_NAMES, a as ToolAuthResult, b as authenticateToolRequest, r as readToolArgs } from '../auth-Bulnsz3V.js';
 import { e as AppToolTaxonomy, d as AppToolHandlers, b as AppToolDefinition, A as AppToolContext, c as AppToolProducedEvent, f as AppToolOutcome, a as AppToolName } from '../types-DbU-oO5h.js';
 export { g as APP_TOOL_NAMES, h as AddCitationArgs, i as AddCitationResult, B as BuildAppToolsOptions, O as OpenAIFunctionTool, R as RenderUiArgs, j as RenderUiResult, S as ScheduleFollowupArgs, k as ScheduleFollowupResult, l as SubmitProposalArgs, m as SubmitProposalResult, n as buildAppToolOpenAITools, o as customToolToOpenAI, p as defineAppTool, q as findCustomTool, r as isAppToolName } from '../types-DbU-oO5h.js';
-export { A as AppToolMcpServer, B as BuildHttpMcpServerOptions, a as BuildMcpServerOptions, D as DEFAULT_APP_TOOL_PATHS, S as ScopedMcpServerEntryOptions, b as buildAppToolMcpServer, c as buildHttpMcpServer, d as buildScopedMcpServerEntry, u as unresolvableSurfaceCredential } from '../mcp-BOgNWSED.js';
+export { A as AppToolMcpServer, B as BuildHttpMcpServerOptions, a as BuildMcpServerOptions, D as DEFAULT_APP_TOOL_PATHS, S as ScopedMcpServerEntryOptions, b as buildAppToolMcpServer, c as buildHttpMcpServer, d as buildScopedMcpServerEntry, u as unresolvableSurfaceCredential } from '../mcp-C-jV_Xe9.js';
 export { C as CreateMcpToolHandlerOptions, M as MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSIONS, b as McpProtocolVersion, c as McpServerInfo, a as McpToolDefinition, d as createMcpToolHandler } from '../mcp-rpc-CzU5LWWT.js';
 import '@tangle-network/agent-interface';
 

package/dist/tools/index.js

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import {
   restrictTaxonomy,
   verifyCapabilityToken,
   verifyExpiringCapabilityToken
-} from "../chunk-ITCINLSU.js";
+} from "../chunk-C5OIABSB.js";
 import {
   DEFAULT_APP_TOOL_PATHS,
   DEFAULT_HEADER_NAMES,
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ import {
   createMcpToolHandler,
   readToolArgs,
   unresolvableSurfaceCredential
-} from "../chunk-IVEKCOM7.js";
+} from "../chunk-YOFQO4R6.js";
 import {
   APP_TOOL_NAMES,
   ToolInputError,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@tangle-network/agent-app",
-  "version": "0.45.8",
+  "version": "0.45.9",
   "packageManager": "pnpm@11.17.0",
   "description": "Build agent applications with typed chat, tools, sandboxes, integrations, billing, and evaluation.",
   "keywords": [

package/dist/auth-DJs6lfAs.d.ts

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-import { A as AppToolContext } from './types-DbU-oO5h.js';
-
-/**
- * Header names carrying the server-set per-turn context + the capability token.
- * Defaults are product-neutral (`X-Agent-App-*`); a product that already ships
- * a header convention (e.g. `X-Acme-User-Id`) passes its own.
- */
-interface ToolHeaderNames {
-    userId: string;
-    workspaceId: string;
-    threadId: string;
-}
-/** Provide default HTTP header names for user, workspace, and thread identification */
-declare const DEFAULT_HEADER_NAMES: ToolHeaderNames;
-/** Define options to verify bearer tokens and customize authentication header names */
-interface AuthenticateOptions {
-    /** Verify the bearer capability token belongs to `userId`. The product's
-     *  HMAC/JWT impl — the seam that keeps token crypto out of this package. */
-    verifyToken: (userId: string, bearer: string) => Promise<boolean>;
-    headerNames?: ToolHeaderNames;
-}
-/** Represent the result of tool authentication with success context or failure response */
-type ToolAuthResult = {
-    ok: true;
-    ctx: AppToolContext;
-} | {
-    ok: false;
-    response: Response;
-};
-/**
- * Recover + verify the trusted context for a tool request. The user comes from
- * a server-set header and the bearer token MUST verify against THAT user; the
- * workspace comes from a header too — never from tool args — so the model can
- * neither forge identity nor target another workspace. Fail-closed: any missing
- * credential or a token minted for another user yields a 401/400 Response.
- */
-declare function authenticateToolRequest(request: Request, opts: AuthenticateOptions): Promise<ToolAuthResult>;
-/** Read a tool's argument object from the request body, tolerant of MCP host
- *  aliases (`args` / `arguments`) or a bare body. Returns null on non-JSON. */
-declare function readToolArgs<T>(request: Request): Promise<T | null>;
-
-export { type AuthenticateOptions as A, DEFAULT_HEADER_NAMES as D, type ToolHeaderNames as T, type ToolAuthResult as a, authenticateToolRequest as b, readToolArgs as r };

package/dist/chunk-IVEKCOM7.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/tools/auth.ts","../src/tools/mcp.ts","../src/tools/mcp-rpc.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { AppToolContext } from './types'\n\n/**\n * Header names carrying the server-set per-turn context + the capability token.\n * Defaults are product-neutral (`X-Agent-App-*`); a product that already ships\n * a header convention (e.g. `X-Acme-User-Id`) passes its own.\n */\nexport interface ToolHeaderNames {\n  userId: string\n  workspaceId: string\n  threadId: string\n}\n\n/** Provide default HTTP header names for user, workspace, and thread identification */\nexport const DEFAULT_HEADER_NAMES: ToolHeaderNames = {\n  userId: 'X-Agent-App-User-Id',\n  workspaceId: 'X-Agent-App-Workspace-Id',\n  threadId: 'X-Agent-App-Thread-Id',\n}\n\n/** Define options to verify bearer tokens and customize authentication header names */\nexport interface AuthenticateOptions {\n  /** Verify the bearer capability token belongs to `userId`. The product's\n   *  HMAC/JWT impl — the seam that keeps token crypto out of this package. */\n  verifyToken: (userId: string, bearer: string) => Promise<boolean>\n  headerNames?: ToolHeaderNames\n}\n\n/** Represent the result of tool authentication with success context or failure response */\nexport type ToolAuthResult =\n  | { ok: true; ctx: AppToolContext }\n  | { ok: false; response: Response }\n\n/**\n * Recover + verify the trusted context for a tool request. The user comes from\n * a server-set header and the bearer token MUST verify against THAT user; the\n * workspace comes from a header too — never from tool args — so the model can\n * neither forge identity nor target another workspace. Fail-closed: any missing\n * credential or a token minted for another user yields a 401/400 Response.\n */\nexport async function authenticateToolRequest(request: Request, opts: AuthenticateOptions): Promise<ToolAuthResult> {\n  const h = opts.headerNames ?? DEFAULT_HEADER_NAMES\n  const userId = request.headers.get(h.userId)?.trim()\n  const workspaceId = request.headers.get(h.workspaceId)?.trim()\n  const threadId = request.headers.get(h.threadId)?.trim() || null\n  const bearer = request.headers.get('authorization')?.match(/^Bearer\\s+(.+)$/i)?.[1]\n\n  if (!userId || !bearer) {\n    return { ok: false, response: Response.json({ error: 'Missing capability credentials' }, { status: 401 }) }\n  }\n  if (!(await opts.verifyToken(userId, bearer))) {\n    return { ok: false, response: Response.json({ error: 'Invalid capability token' }, { status: 401 }) }\n  }\n  if (!workspaceId) {\n    return { ok: false, response: Response.json({ error: 'Missing workspace context' }, { status: 400 }) }\n  }\n  return { ok: true, ctx: { userId, workspaceId, threadId } }\n}\n\n/** Read a tool's argument object from the request body, tolerant of MCP host\n *  aliases (`args` / `arguments`) or a bare body. Returns null on non-JSON. */\nexport async function readToolArgs<T>(request: Request): Promise<T | null> {\n  let body: { args?: T; arguments?: T }\n  try {\n    body = (await request.json()) as typeof body\n  } catch {\n    return null\n  }\n  return (body.args ?? body.arguments ?? (body as T)) as T\n}\n","/**\n * The tagged-configuration contract for every MCP server this package emits.\n *\n * An `AgentProfile` is digested, diffed, stored, and logged, so a credential\n * that rides it as plain text is a leak by construction. `@tangle-network/\n * agent-interface` closed that at **0.38.0**: `args`, `env`, and `headers` on\n * an `AgentProfileMcpServer` no longer take strings. Every value is either\n * deliberately public profile material (`defineAgentProfilePublicConfig`) or an\n * opaque reference to a credential (`defineAgentProfileSecretRef`) resolved\n * privately at materialization, validated by a `z.discriminatedUnion('kind')`.\n *\n * The schema also refuses to let a secret hide as public material: a `public`\n * value under a credential-bearing key name (`Authorization`, `*_TOKEN`,\n * `*_API_KEY`, `*_SECRET`, `Cookie`, …) is rejected with \"credential-bearing\n * config names require a secret-ref\", and any value whose bytes look like a\n * credential (`Bearer …`, `sk-…`, `ghp_…`) is rejected outright. So the\n * capability token this package used to inline as `Bearer <token>` cannot be\n * expressed at all — it must become a reference.\n *\n * **A reference resolves ONLY from an environment variable present on the box,\n * named by `key`.** That is why the builders below take a `tokenEnvKey` (the\n * box-env variable NAME) instead of a token VALUE: agent-app cannot guess the\n * name, and a reference to a key nothing places fails the turn at\n * materialization rather than running credential-less. The box env is what\n * `SandboxRuntimeConfig.env` (and the platform secret store via\n * `SandboxRuntimeConfig.secrets`) writes at sandbox creation, so the key must\n * name a variable one of those places — and it must therefore be a real\n * environment-variable name, which this module enforces.\n *\n * A per-request credential is only referenceable when the value written at box\n * creation is byte-identical to the one every later turn would mint (a\n * deterministic derivation such as an HMAC over the workspace id). A token\n * scoped narrower than the box — per-user, per-document — cannot be referenced\n * at all; {@link unresolvableSurfaceCredential} names that blocker instead of\n * emitting a reference that resolves to nothing.\n */\nimport {\n  agentProfileMcpServerSchema,\n  defineAgentProfilePublicConfig,\n  defineAgentProfileSecretRef,\n  type AgentProfileConfigValue,\n} from '@tangle-network/agent-interface'\nimport type { AppToolContext } from './types'\nimport type { AppToolName } from './openai'\nimport type { AppToolDefinition } from './registry'\nimport type { ToolHeaderNames } from './auth'\nimport { DEFAULT_HEADER_NAMES } from './auth'\n\n/** Default route path each app tool is served at. A product mounts its routes\n *  at these paths (or supplies its own via {@link BuildMcpServerOptions.paths}). */\nexport const DEFAULT_APP_TOOL_PATHS: Record<AppToolName, string> = {\n  submit_proposal: '/api/tools/propose',\n  schedule_followup: '/api/tools/followup',\n  render_ui: '/api/tools/render-ui',\n  add_citation: '/api/tools/citation',\n}\n\n/** The portable MCP server entry the sandbox SDK accepts (transport + url +\n *  tagged headers). Assignable to `AgentProfileMcpServer` without a cast —\n *  products spread it into their profile's `mcp` map. */\nexport interface AppToolMcpServer {\n  transport: 'http'\n  url: string\n  headers: Record<string, AgentProfileConfigValue>\n  enabled: true\n  metadata: { description: string }\n}\n\n/** POSIX environment-variable name — the same shape `agent-interface`'s\n *  `environmentNameSchema` accepts for an env key. A secret reference resolves\n *  from the box environment, so a key outside this shape can never resolve. */\nconst ENV_NAME_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$/\n\n/**\n * Reject a secret-reference key that names nothing the box can hold.\n *\n * `agent-interface` accepts any non-credential string as a reference key, so a\n * typo or a token VALUE passed where a key belongs validates against the\n * profile schema and fails much later, inside materialization, as an opaque\n * missing-secret error. Failing here names the parameter.\n */\nfunction assertSecretEnvKey(key: string, label: string): string {\n  if (!ENV_NAME_PATTERN.test(key)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `${label}: tokenEnvKey must be an environment-variable NAME the sandbox box carries ` +\n        `(e.g. 'APP_CAPABILITY_TOKEN'), not a token value — got ${JSON.stringify(key)}. ` +\n        'A profile may only REFERENCE a credential; the value is placed on the box by ' +\n        'SandboxRuntimeConfig.env or the platform secret store.',\n    )\n  }\n  return key\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate one emitted entry against the REAL `agentProfileMcpServerSchema`.\n *\n * The contract's rules (which key names demand a reference, which byte patterns\n * read as a credential) live in `agent-interface`. Re-implementing them here\n * would drift the moment that package moves — which it does: 0.36.0 → 0.40.0 in\n * three days. Running the shipped validator instead means a product that passes\n * a credential-bearing custom header name, a relative base URL, or a URL with\n * embedded credentials fails at the builder with the contract's own message.\n *\n * It is also the loud failure for a version skew: if the resolved\n * `@tangle-network/agent-interface` predates 0.38.0, its schema rejects the\n * tagged shape this package now emits, and that surfaces here instead of as a\n * sandbox provisioning error.\n */\nfunction assertProfileMcpServer<T extends AppToolMcpServer>(server: T, label: string): T {\n  const result = agentProfileMcpServerSchema.safeParse(server)\n  if (!result.success) {\n    const issues = result.error.issues\n      .map((issue) => `${issue.path.join('.') || '(root)'}: ${issue.message}`)\n      .join('; ')\n    throw new Error(\n      `${label} produced an MCP server the AgentProfile contract rejects: ${issues}. ` +\n        'Requires @tangle-network/agent-interface >= 0.38.0 (tagged MCP config values).',\n    )\n  }\n  return server\n}\n\n/**\n * Refuse to mount a surface whose credential is scoped narrower than the box.\n *\n * A per-user or per-resource capability token is minted per request. The box\n * environment is written once at sandbox creation and shared by every turn and\n * every member of the workspace, so such a token can neither be placed there\n * ahead of time nor referenced from a per-turn profile. Widening the channel to\n * a workspace-bound token is not a substitute when the route authenticates the\n * CALLER: the agent can read its own box env, so it could forge that identity.\n *\n * Mounting the surface anyway would emit a plain-string `Authorization` header\n * (rejected by the schema) or a reference to a key nothing places (rejected at\n * materialization). Throwing here names the actual blocker. Exported because\n * every product with per-document MCP surfaces hits it and was writing this\n * message itself.\n */\nexport function unresolvableSurfaceCredential(surface: string): never {\n  throw new Error(\n    `The ${surface} MCP surface cannot be mounted: its capability token is scoped to a single ` +\n      'user and resource, and an AgentProfile may only reference a credential the sandbox can ' +\n      'resolve from the box environment, which is workspace-wide and fixed at sandbox creation. ' +\n      'Mounting it needs a per-session secret channel on the sandbox API, or a route that ' +\n      'authenticates the workspace rather than the caller.',\n  )\n}\n\n/** Define configuration options for building an HTTP MCP server including path, baseUrl, token env key, context, and description */\nexport interface BuildHttpMcpServerOptions {\n  /** Route path on the app the sandbox POSTs to (e.g. `/api/tools/propose`). */\n  path: string\n  /** App base URL the sandbox reaches back to (no trailing slash required). */\n  baseUrl: string\n  /**\n   * NAME of the box-environment variable holding the capability token — never\n   * the token itself. The emitted `Authorization` header is a `secret-ref` to\n   * this key with `format: 'bearer'`, so the sandbox resolves the value\n   * privately and the profile carries only the name.\n   *\n   * The key MUST name a variable the box actually carries (placed by\n   * `SandboxRuntimeConfig.env` at creation, or injected from the platform\n   * secret store via `SandboxRuntimeConfig.secrets`), and the value written\n   * there must be the token this route will accept for every turn — which in\n   * practice means a deterministic derivation (e.g. an HMAC over the workspace\n   * id), not a freshly-random per-request mint. A token scoped narrower than\n   * the box is not referenceable: see {@link unresolvableSurfaceCredential}.\n   */\n  tokenEnvKey: string\n  ctx: AppToolContext\n  /** Tool description the model sees. */\n  description: string\n  headerNames?: ToolHeaderNames\n}\n\n/**\n * Build ONE HTTP MCP server entry — the generic agent→app bridge. The\n * capability token (as a secret reference) + the user/workspace/thread ids ride\n * in server-set headers (never tool args), so the model can't forge identity or\n * target another workspace. Workspace/thread headers are omitted when their\n * `ctx` value is empty/null (e.g. an integration-invoke bridge that's\n * user-scoped only). Used directly for non-app-tool bridges\n * (integration_invoke) and via {@link buildAppToolMcpServer} for the four app\n * tools.\n */\nexport function buildHttpMcpServer(opts: BuildHttpMcpServerOptions): AppToolMcpServer {\n  const base = opts.baseUrl.replace(/\\/+$/, '')\n  const h = opts.headerNames ?? DEFAULT_HEADER_NAMES\n  return assertProfileMcpServer(\n    {\n      transport: 'http',\n      url: `${base}${opts.path}`,\n      headers: {\n        Authorization: defineAgentProfileSecretRef(\n          assertSecretEnvKey(opts.tokenEnvKey, 'buildHttpMcpServer'),\n          'bearer',\n        ),\n        [h.userId]: defineAgentProfilePublicConfig(opts.ctx.userId),\n        ...(opts.ctx.workspaceId\n          ? { [h.workspaceId]: defineAgentProfilePublicConfig(opts.ctx.workspaceId) }\n          : {}),\n        ...(opts.ctx.threadId\n          ? { [h.threadId]: defineAgentProfilePublicConfig(opts.ctx.threadId) }\n          : {}),\n        'Content-Type': defineAgentProfilePublicConfig('application/json'),\n      },\n      enabled: true,\n      metadata: { description: opts.description },\n    },\n    'buildHttpMcpServer',\n  )\n}\n\n/** Options for a per-document/scoped MCP channel entry (design-canvas,\n *  sequences, …). The capability token + path scope ONE resource; the document\n *  id lives in the path, never a tool argument. */\nexport interface ScopedMcpServerEntryOptions {\n  /** App base URL the sandbox reaches back to (trailing slash tolerated). */\n  baseUrl: string\n  /** Product route serving the resource's MCP handler — id is part of the path. */\n  path: string\n  /**\n   * NAME of the box-environment variable holding this channel's capability\n   * token — never the token itself. See\n   * {@link BuildHttpMcpServerOptions.tokenEnvKey}.\n   *\n   * A per-(user, resource) token cannot satisfy this: the box environment is\n   * workspace-wide and fixed at sandbox creation. A product whose channel needs\n   * one calls {@link unresolvableSurfaceCredential} rather than mounting an\n   * entry that cannot resolve.\n   */\n  tokenEnvKey: string\n  /** Override the channel's default tool-server description. */\n  description?: string\n  /** Identity headers for products whose route recovers the user via\n   *  `authenticateToolRequest`. Omit when the bearer token is self-contained. */\n  ctx?: AppToolContext\n  headerNames?: ToolHeaderNames\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the `AgentProfileMcpServer`-shaped entry for a scoped, per-resource MCP\n * channel. The shared mechanism behind the per-domain entry builders\n * (`buildDesignCanvasMcpServerEntry`, `buildSequencesMcpServerEntry`): same\n * token/path guards, same description default, same ctx-vs-self-contained-token\n * branching. The domain is two parameters — `label` (for guard messages) and\n * `defaultDescription` — never baked.\n *\n * The no-`ctx` branch is a GENUINE behavioral path, not a shortcut: it emits a\n * self-contained-token entry with ONLY `Authorization` + `Content-Type`.\n * Routing it through {@link buildHttpMcpServer} would unconditionally write a\n * `userId` identity header (here `undefined`), so it stays a distinct branch.\n */\nexport function buildScopedMcpServerEntry(\n  opts: ScopedMcpServerEntryOptions & { label: string; defaultDescription: string },\n): AppToolMcpServer {\n  if (opts.tokenEnvKey.trim().length === 0) {\n    throw new Error(`${opts.label} requires a capability token env key — omit the MCP server when none is available`)\n  }\n  if (!opts.path.startsWith('/')) {\n    throw new Error(`${opts.label} path must start with \"/\" (got \"${opts.path}\")`)\n  }\n  const description = opts.description ?? opts.defaultDescription\n\n  if (opts.ctx) {\n    return buildHttpMcpServer({\n      path: opts.path,\n      baseUrl: opts.baseUrl,\n      tokenEnvKey: opts.tokenEnvKey,\n      ctx: opts.ctx,\n      description,\n      headerNames: opts.headerNames ?? DEFAULT_HEADER_NAMES,\n    })\n  }\n\n  return assertProfileMcpServer(\n    {\n      transport: 'http',\n      url: `${opts.baseUrl.replace(/\\/+$/, '')}${opts.path}`,\n      headers: {\n        Authorization: defineAgentProfileSecretRef(\n          assertSecretEnvKey(opts.tokenEnvKey, opts.label),\n          'bearer',\n        ),\n        'Content-Type': defineAgentProfilePublicConfig('application/json'),\n      },\n      enabled: true,\n      metadata: { description },\n    },\n    opts.label,\n  )\n}\n\n/** Define configuration options required to build an MCP server including tool, baseUrl, token, and context */\nexport interface BuildMcpServerOptions {\n  /** A built-in app tool name, or a product-registered {@link AppToolDefinition}.\n   *  A custom tool supplies its route via `AppToolDefinition.path` (or `paths`). */\n  tool: AppToolName | AppToolDefinition\n  baseUrl: string\n  /** NAME of the box-environment variable holding the capability token — see\n   *  {@link BuildHttpMcpServerOptions.tokenEnvKey}. */\n  tokenEnvKey: string\n  ctx: AppToolContext\n  description: string\n  headerNames?: ToolHeaderNames\n  paths?: Partial<Record<string, string>>\n}\n\n/** Build one app-tool MCP server entry — a thin wrapper over\n *  {@link buildHttpMcpServer} that resolves the tool's route path. Built-ins map\n *  through {@link DEFAULT_APP_TOOL_PATHS}; a custom tool uses its own `path`\n *  (or a `paths` override). */\nexport function buildAppToolMcpServer(opts: BuildMcpServerOptions): AppToolMcpServer {\n  const path =\n    typeof opts.tool === 'string'\n      ? opts.paths?.[opts.tool] ?? DEFAULT_APP_TOOL_PATHS[opts.tool]\n      : opts.paths?.[opts.tool.name] ?? opts.tool.path\n  if (!path) {\n    const name = typeof opts.tool === 'string' ? opts.tool : opts.tool.name\n    throw new Error(`buildAppToolMcpServer: tool \"${name}\" has no route path — set AppToolDefinition.path or pass it via opts.paths`)\n  }\n  return buildHttpMcpServer({\n    path,\n    baseUrl: opts.baseUrl,\n    tokenEnvKey: opts.tokenEnvKey,\n    ctx: opts.ctx,\n    description: opts.description,\n    headerNames: opts.headerNames,\n  })\n}\n","/**\n * Generic streamable-HTTP JSON-RPC 2.0 envelope for a tools-only MCP server.\n * Stateless, Workers-compatible: no session table, no SSE — every request gets\n * a single `application/json` response, which the streamable-HTTP transport\n * explicitly permits for tools-only servers.\n *\n * Protocol surface:\n *   initialize   → echo client's protocolVersion if supported, else latest\n *   ping         → empty result {}\n *   notifications/* (no `id`)  → 202 with no body\n *   tools/list   → tool manifest\n *   tools/call   → run + surface execution failures as isError text results\n *   anything else → -32601\n *\n * Execution failures (argument shape, validation, store throws) become `isError`\n * tool results carrying the thrown message verbatim — the model reads WHY and\n * retries. 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