@sysid/sandbox-runtime-improved 0.0.56-sysid.1 → 0.0.61-sysid.1

package/dist/sandbox/windows-sandbox-utils.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+export { containsGlobCharsWin, stripExtendedPathPrefix, } from './sandbox-utils.js';
 import type { SandboxDependencyCheck } from './linux-sandbox-utils.js';
 /**
  * Windows sandbox backend.
@@ -14,7 +15,12 @@ import type { SandboxDependencyCheck } from './linux-sandbox-utils.js';
  * token-membership check; WFP via providerData-tag enumeration under
  * the configured sublayer). There is no marker file.
  *
- * Filesystem restrictions are NOT enforced on Windows yet.
+ * Filesystem deny (`denyRead`/`denyWrite`) is enforced via
+ * `srt-win acl stamp` at session start: a broker-only DACL is
+ * applied to each listed file plus a `Modify`-minus-`FILE_DELETE_CHILD`
+ * allow-list on its immediate parent directory, with restore state
+ * sealed by an inert hash-ACE marker so the on-disk SD is
+ * self-authenticating. See {@link stampWindowsAcl}.
  */
 export declare const DEFAULT_WINDOWS_GROUP_NAME = "sandbox-runtime-net";
 export declare const DEFAULT_WINDOWS_PROXY_PORT_RANGE: readonly [number, number];
@@ -41,10 +47,97 @@ export interface WindowsWfpStatusResult {
     filters: number;
     /** `[low, high]` from the `permit-loopback` filter's tag, when present. */
     portRange?: [number, number];
+    /**
+     * Number of user-SID-keyed filters present (subset of `filters`).
+     * Zero on installs that predate the sandbox-user provisioning
+     * step, or when only `wfp install` (group set) was run.
+     */
+    userFilters: number;
+    /** Sandbox-user SID read from the first user-keyed filter tag. */
+    userSid?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * State of the `srt-sandbox` local account that `srt-win install`
+ * provisions. The sandboxed child eventually runs **as** this
+ * account; for now it is reported alongside the group/WFP status
+ * so callers can surface a "re-run install" diagnostic when the
+ * account is missing.
+ */
+export interface WindowsSandboxUserStatus {
+    /** The `srt-sandbox` local account exists. */
+    provisioned: boolean;
+    /** `S-1-5-21-…` of `srt-sandbox`, when provisioned. */
+    sid?: string;
+    /** The `sandbox-runtime-users` local group exists. */
+    groupExists: boolean;
+    /** `S-1-5-21-…` of `sandbox-runtime-users`, when it exists. */
+    groupSid?: string;
+    inBuiltinUsers: boolean;
+    inSandboxGroup: boolean;
+    hiddenFromLogon: boolean;
+    /**
+     * The credential row is present in `state.db` and readable by
+     * THIS process. False when not yet written, or when called from
+     * inside the sandbox (the state-DB directory carries an explicit
+     * DENY for `sandbox-runtime-users` — machine-scope DPAPI alone
+     * is not a confidentiality boundary).
+     */
+    credPresent: boolean;
+    /** Setup marker schema version, when the marker row exists. */
+    markerVersion?: number;
+    /**
+     * SHA-1 thumbprint of the install-time CA, when one was
+     * installed via `srt-win user trust-ca`. Uppercase hex.
+     */
+    caCertThumb?: string;
+    /** PEM-encoded install-time CA certificate, when present. */
+    caCertPem?: string;
 }
+/**
+ * Inner shell to run `command` under, inside the restricted-token
+ * sandbox. The discriminant picks both the executable and the flag
+ * shape (`/c` vs `-Command` vs `-c`); see
+ * {@link wrapCommandWithSandboxWindows}.
+ *
+ * For `kind: 'bash'`, `path` is the absolute Git Bash executable
+ * (no fixed install location). It MUST originate from trusted host
+ * configuration (user settings / install detection), NEVER from
+ * workspace or repository content — the inner shell runs INSIDE the
+ * restricted-token sandbox so an unexpected path is not a
+ * sandbox-escape vector, but it would still be an arbitrary-exec
+ * footgun if sourced from untrusted input.
+ */
+export type WindowsBinShell = {
+    kind: 'cmd';
+} | {
+    kind: 'powershell';
+} | {
+    kind: 'pwsh';
+} | {
+    kind: 'bash';
+    path: string;
+};
+/**
+ * Adapter from the cross-platform `binShell?: string` surface
+ * ({@link SandboxManager.wrapWithSandboxArgv}) to the Windows
+ * discriminated union. Throws on any value outside the recognised
+ * set — there is no silent fallback to cmd.exe.
+ *
+ * Uses `path.win32` explicitly so the function (and its unit test)
+ * is platform-independent.
+ */
+export declare function parseWindowsBinShell(raw?: string): WindowsBinShell;
 export interface WindowsSandboxParams {
     command: string;
     group: WindowsGroupRef;
+    /**
+     * Sublayer GUID under which the WFP filters were installed.
+     * `srt-win exec` checks `wfp status` against it and refuses to
+     * launch when no filter set is present (fail-closed network
+     * fence). When omitted, srt-win uses its compile-time default
+     * GUID — same as `srt-win install` with no `--sublayer-guid`.
+     */
+    sublayerGuid?: string;
     /** JS HTTP proxy port — fed to `generateProxyEnvVars` for the returned env. */
     httpProxyPort?: number;
     /** JS SOCKS proxy port — fed to `generateProxyEnvVars` for the returned env. */
@@ -52,20 +145,102 @@ export interface WindowsSandboxParams {
     /** Per-session proxy auth token; embedded in proxy env URLs. */
     proxyAuthToken?: string;
     /**
-     * Inner shell. `cmd` (default), `powershell`, or `pwsh`. The child's
-     * post-`/c` content is **passthrough** — `&` chains, `"…"` quotes
-     * exactly as written. The security boundary is at the OUTER spawn
-     * (this argv is spawned with `shell:false`); the inner cmd.exe runs
-     * INSIDE the sandbox so its metachars are the user's tool.
+     * Credential env vars to drop from the inherited environment
+     * (`mode: 'deny'`). Applied BEFORE the proxy assignments so the
+     * sandbox's own proxy plumbing survives even if a caller lists
+     * one of those names here — same precedence as the macOS/Linux
+     * `env -u … VAR=… sandbox-exec` order.
+     */
+    unsetEnvVars?: readonly string[];
+    /**
+     * Credential env vars to overwrite with a sentinel
+     * (`mode: 'mask'`). Applied BEFORE the proxy assignments for the
+     * same precedence reason as {@link unsetEnvVars}.
+     */
+    setEnvVars?: Readonly<Record<string, string>>;
+    /**
+     * PID of the long-lived host whose `srt-win acl stamp` holds
+     * this exec should run under. When set, `srt-win exec` opens a
+     * no-`FILE_SHARE_DELETE` handle on each of that holder's stamped
+     * directories and fenced files before spawning the child — the
+     * OS then refuses delete/rename of those, which the file's DACL
+     * alone cannot prevent. Omit for an exec with no file-deny
+     * session active.
+     */
+    holderPid?: number;
+    /**
+     * Per-exec read-deny paths, stamped under the `srt-win exec`
+     * process's own PID and restored after the child exits. Same
+     * disk-first chokepoint as the session-level
+     * {@link stampWindowsAcl}; same fail-closed semantics (exec
+     * fails if any path cannot be stamped).
+     *
+     * Pass RAW normalized paths. Do NOT pre-filter or pre-expand
+     * via {@link expandWindowsFsDenyPaths} — `srt-win exec`'s
+     * `canonicalize_deny_targets` is the sole authority for
+     * glob/dir/nonexistent rejection (hard-fail). A missing path
+     * is a caller error, not a skip; pre-filtering would silently
+     * drop it and run the child with the file readable.
+     */
+    denyRead?: readonly string[];
+    /** Per-exec write-deny paths — see {@link denyRead}. */
+    denyWrite?: readonly string[];
+    /**
+     * Run the child as the dedicated `srt-sandbox` user via the
+     * two-hop launch (broker → `CreateProcessWithLogonW(runner)` →
+     * runner → restricted-token child). Requires `srt-win install` to
+     * have provisioned the sandbox user. Opt-in — when `false` or
+     * omitted the same-user deny-only-group path is used. The
+     * separate-user path structurally closes the surrogate-spawn
+     * class (schtasks, `PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS`, BITS,
+     * RunAs="Interactive User" COM): the child's token carries a
+     * different user SID, so it cannot reach real-user processes,
+     * tasks register under `srt-sandbox`, and the user-SID WFP filter
+     * fences `srt-sandbox` egress regardless of how the child was
+     * spawned.
+     */
+    asSandboxUser?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * PEM-encoded CA certificate file. Same parameter macOS/Linux
+     * thread to {@link generateProxyEnvVars} for the env-var trust
+     * layer (`NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` etc.). NOT passed to `srt-win
+     * exec` — schannel-level trust under the sandbox user is set
+     * separately via `srt-win user trust-ca` /
+     * {@link windowsTrustCa}; per-exec only sets the env-var layer.
+     *
+     * **Under {@link asSandboxUser}**, this is currently NOT
+     * forwarded to the child: the bundle file lives in the broker's
+     * `%TEMP%`, which the `srt-sandbox` user cannot read, so OpenSSL
+     * clients (msys2 curl, openssl-backed git, node, python) would
+     * fail with `ACCESS_DENIED` on the bundle. The schannel-level
+     * trust set via {@link windowsTrustCa} is the only CA-trust path
+     * for the two-hop launch until working-tree/profile grants land.
      */
-    binShell?: string;
+    caCertPath?: string;
+    /**
+     * Inner shell. Defaults to `{ kind: 'cmd' }`. The child's post-`/c`
+     * (or `-Command` / `-c`) content is **passthrough** — `&` chains,
+     * `"…"`/`'…'` quotes exactly as written. The security boundary is at
+     * the OUTER spawn (this argv is spawned with `shell:false`); the
+     * inner shell runs INSIDE the sandbox so its metachars are the
+     * user's tool. See {@link parseWindowsBinShell} for the
+     * cross-platform string adapter.
+     */
+    binShell?: WindowsBinShell;
 }
 /**
  * Locate `srt-win.exe`. Resolution order:
  *   1. `SRT_WIN_PATH` env var (CI sets this to the freshly-built binary).
- *   2. `<repo>/vendor/srt-win/target/release/srt-win.exe` (local cargo build).
- *   3. `<repo>/dist/vendor/srt-win/target/release/srt-win.exe`
- *      (post-`npm run build` shape, when running from compiled output).
+ *   2. `<root>/vendor/srt-win/{arch}/srt-win.exe` (prebuilt — published npm
+ *      package, or after `npm run build:srt-win` locally).
+ *   3. `<root>/vendor/srt-win-src/target/release/srt-win.exe` (local
+ *      `cargo build --release` fallback for development).
+ *   4. `<root>/vendor/srt-win/target/release/srt-win.exe` (transitional:
+ *      stale local build from before the srt-win-src rename).
+ *
+ * `<root>` is {@link repoRoot} — `__dirname/../..`, which resolves to the
+ * repo root from `src/sandbox/` and `dist/sandbox/` alike, and to the
+ * package root when installed under `node_modules`.
  *
  * Resolution via the optional `@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime-win32-*`
  * platform packages is added separately.
@@ -90,6 +265,51 @@ export declare function getWindowsGroupStatus(ref: WindowsGroupRef): WindowsGrou
 export declare function getWindowsWfpStatus(opts?: {
     sublayerGuid?: string;
 }): WindowsWfpStatusResult;
+/**
+ * Query the sandbox user account's provisioning state. Each field
+ * is independently observed so a half-provisioned install (e.g.
+ * user exists but credential file missing) is distinguishable.
+ * Does not require elevation.
+ */
+export declare function getWindowsSandboxUserStatus(): WindowsSandboxUserStatus;
+/**
+ * Read back the persistent MITM CA the sandbox was installed with
+ * (via `srt-win user trust-ca` / {@link windowsTrustCa}).
+ * Returns `null` when no CA was installed. The PEM is what `srt-win
+ * user status` reconstructs from the DER stored in `state.db`.
+ *
+ * On Windows with `windows.asSandboxUser`, `tlsTerminate` requires
+ * this CA to be present in the sandbox user's `CurrentUser\Root`
+ * (schannel-level trust is an install-time concern, not
+ * per-session); the host calls this from `initialize()` to fail
+ * early with an actionable message when it isn't.
+ *
+ * @param status pass an already-fetched
+ *   {@link getWindowsSandboxUserStatus} result to avoid a second
+ *   `srt-win user status` spawn.
+ */
+export declare function getWindowsSandboxCaCert(status?: WindowsSandboxUserStatus): {
+    pem: string;
+    thumb: string;
+} | null;
+/**
+ * Install (or replace) the MITM CA in the **sandbox user's**
+ * `CurrentUser\Root` and record it in `state.db` (so
+ * {@link getWindowsSandboxCaCert} surfaces its thumbprint + PEM).
+ * Thin wrapper around `srt-win user trust-ca <path>`. Does NOT
+ * require elevation. Persistent until {@link uninstallWindowsSandbox}
+ * deletes the sandbox user's profile.
+ *
+ * The CA has a separate lifecycle from {@link installWindowsSandbox}
+ * — install provisions the account/filters and never touches the CA;
+ * call this AFTER install when `tlsTerminate` will be used with
+ * `windows.asSandboxUser`.
+ *
+ * @throws when the sandbox user is not provisioned, the file is not a
+ *   parseable X.509 certificate, or the registry write into the
+ *   sandbox user's hive fails.
+ */
+export declare function windowsTrustCa(caCertPath: string): void;
 export interface WindowsInstallOptions extends WindowsGroupRef {
     /** Add this user (instead of the current user) to the group. */
     userSid?: string;
@@ -114,6 +334,8 @@ export interface WindowsInstallResult {
     group: WindowsGroupStatusResult;
     /** Post-install WFP state. */
     wfp: WindowsWfpStatusResult;
+    /** Post-install sandbox-user state. */
+    user: WindowsSandboxUserStatus;
     /**
      * `true` if the user dismissed the UAC prompt. Not an error —
      * the install simply didn't happen. Re-run when the user is
@@ -153,10 +375,16 @@ export declare function installWindowsSandbox(opts?: WindowsInstallOptions): Win
  * re-do the logout dance on the next install. Call
  * {@link deleteWindowsGroup} explicitly if you want full teardown.
  *
+ * **Does** remove the `srt-sandbox` account, its credential file,
+ * and the setup marker, unless `keepUser` is set — the credential
+ * is useless without the account and vice versa, so they're
+ * treated as one unit.
+ *
  * @returns `{cancelled: true}` if the user dismissed UAC.
  */
 export declare function uninstallWindowsSandbox(opts?: {
     sublayerGuid?: string;
+    keepUser?: boolean;
 }): {
     cancelled?: true;
 };
@@ -189,6 +417,114 @@ export declare function createWindowsWfp(ref: WindowsGroupRef & {
     sublayerGuid?: string;
     proxyPortRange?: readonly [number, number];
 }): void;
+/**
+ * Per-file outcome from `srt-win acl restore --json`. `status:
+ * "restored"` covers both `Restored` and `AlreadyOriginal` on the
+ * Rust side (the host doesn't need to distinguish them); every
+ * other status keeps the snapshot row (fail-closed) and is
+ * surfaced to the user as an anomaly to investigate. Mirrors
+ * `restore_entry()` in `vendor/srt-win-src/src/main.rs`.
+ */
+export interface WindowsAclPathOutcome {
+    path: string;
+    status: 'restored' | 'relocated' | 'missing' | 'leftChanged' | 'leftUnreadable' | 'originalSdTampered' | 'originalSdLost' | 'stampedUnrecognized';
+    /** Hex `FILE_ID_INFO` recorded at stamp time. Present when `status ≠ "restored"`. */
+    expectedFileId?: string;
+    /** Where the protected file was found by `file_id`. Only on `relocated`. */
+    movedTo?: string;
+    /** `true` whenever `status ≠ "restored"` — the snapshot row was kept (restore not confirmed). */
+    leftStamped?: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Per-parent-directory outcome from `srt-win acl restore --json`.
+ * `stillHeld` is normal (another active session still references
+ * a file under this directory). Mirrors `parent_entries_from()` +
+ * `ParentRestoreOutcome::as_str()` in `vendor/srt-win-src/src/`.
+ */
+export interface WindowsAclParentOutcome {
+    path: string;
+    status: 'restored' | 'alreadyOriginal' | 'stillHeld' | 'leftChanged' | 'missing' | 'leftStamped';
+    /** Underlying error for `leftStamped`. */
+    error?: string;
+}
+/** Top-level shape of `srt-win acl restore --json`. */
+export interface WindowsAclRestoreResult {
+    paths: WindowsAclPathOutcome[];
+    parents: WindowsAclParentOutcome[];
+}
+/**
+ * Expand the `denyRead`/`denyWrite` input set to a flat list of
+ * existing FILE paths for `srt-win acl stamp`.
+ *
+ * Every input goes through {@link normalizePathForSandbox} (the
+ * single Windows-aware chokepoint: `\\?\`/UNC-strip, drive-letter
+ * case-fold, ~-expand, realpath). Globs (`*`/`?` only — `[`/`]`
+ * are legal Win32 filename chars) expand via the shared walker
+ * with case-insensitive matching (point-in-time: a file appearing
+ * after this returns is NOT covered). Each candidate is checked
+ * with one `statSync({throwIfNoEntry:false})`: missing → drop
+ * (the protection model covers files present at session start);
+ * directory → reject (the file stamp applies a per-file DACL plus
+ * a per-parent-directory allow-list; stamping a directory itself
+ * would touch every child); file → keep.
+ */
+export declare function expandWindowsFsDenyPaths(patterns: readonly string[]): string[];
+export interface WindowsAclStampOptions {
+    group: WindowsGroupRef;
+    /** Files the sandboxed child must not read. */
+    denyRead: readonly string[];
+    /** Files the sandboxed child must not write (read stays allowed). */
+    denyWrite: readonly string[];
+    /** Long-lived host PID the holds are tied to. Default: this process. */
+    holderPid?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Apply the file-deny stamp set for one host session. Idempotent
+ * via `srt-win`'s disk-first `ensure_stamped` chokepoint — calling
+ * this again with overlapping paths re-verifies the on-disk DACL
+ * against the hash-ACE marker rather than trusting state-DB rows.
+ *
+ * Inputs are passed verbatim to `srt-win` (which canonicalizes,
+ * rejects directories and globs, and stamps each file plus its
+ * immediate parent directory). Callers that accept globs should
+ * pre-expand via {@link expandWindowsFsDenyPaths}.
+ *
+ * @throws on exit ≠ 0 — including exit 2 (one or more inputs
+ *   skipped). srt-win stamps the resolvable inputs before exiting
+ *   2, so on throw the caller should call {@link restoreWindowsAcl}
+ *   to release whatever WAS stamped (fail-closed at session start
+ *   means tearing down a partial setup).
+ */
+export declare function stampWindowsAcl(opts: WindowsAclStampOptions): void;
+export interface WindowsAclRestoreOptions {
+    group: WindowsGroupRef;
+    /** Long-lived host PID whose holds to release. Default: this process. */
+    holderPid?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Release this holder's file-deny stamps and return per-path /
+ * per-parent outcomes. Best-effort: a non-`restored` entry means
+ * the file's stamp was LEFT in place (fail-closed) — see
+ * {@link WindowsAclPathOutcome} for the cases. Does not throw on
+ * anomalies; the caller decides whether to surface them.
+ *
+ * Returns `undefined` when `srt-win acl restore` itself failed
+ * (no JSON to parse) — the caller should log and move on rather
+ * than block teardown.
+ */
+export declare function restoreWindowsAcl(opts: WindowsAclRestoreOptions): WindowsAclRestoreResult | undefined;
+/**
+ * Per-path outcomes that mean the file's DACL was returned to its
+ * pre-stamp state (or was already there). Anything else left the
+ * stamp in place and should be surfaced to the user.
+ */
+export declare const WINDOWS_ACL_PATH_OK: Set<"restored" | "relocated" | "missing" | "leftChanged" | "leftUnreadable" | "originalSdTampered" | "originalSdLost" | "stampedUnrecognized">;
+/**
+ * Per-parent-directory outcomes that are expected during normal
+ * teardown. `stillHeld` is normal when another active session
+ * still references a file under this directory.
+ */
+export declare const WINDOWS_ACL_PARENT_OK: Set<"restored" | "missing" | "leftChanged" | "alreadyOriginal" | "stillHeld" | "leftStamped">;
 /**
  * Build the spawn descriptor for running `command` inside the Windows
  * sandbox: an `argv` array plus the `env` to spawn it with.
@@ -196,7 +532,7 @@ export declare function createWindowsWfp(ref: WindowsGroupRef & {
  * Caller MUST spawn the result with `{shell: false}` — that is the
  * security boundary that keeps untrusted bytes off the host's shell
  * (the inner `cmd.exe /c` runs INSIDE the sandbox; see
- * `vendor/srt-win/src/launch.rs` `build_cmdline` for the passthrough
+ * `vendor/srt-win-src/src/launch.rs` `build_cmdline` for the passthrough
  * rationale) — AND with the returned `env`.
  *
  * Proxy configuration is single-sourced by {@link generateProxyEnvVars}

package/dist/sandbox/windows-sandbox-utils.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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