@synkro-sh/cli 1.6.86 → 1.6.87

package/dist/bootstrap.js

@@ -2173,8 +2173,68 @@ export function readSessionLog(sessionId: string): SessionAction[] {
   } catch { return []; }
 }
 
-export function compressSessionLog(actions: SessionAction[]): string {
+const RETRIEVAL_RECENT_N = 40;
+const PROCESS_KW = ['test', 'typecheck', 'tsc', 'lint', 'build', 'migrate', 'migration', 'deploy', 'publish', 'push', 'seed'];
+
+// Is this session action security- or rule-relevant (i.e. can it participate in a
+// violation)? Conservative net \u2014 uses substring checks (no regex, to stay safe
+// inside the materialized-hook template). Plus rule-awareness: an action that
+// performs a process keyword an active rule actually mentions (e.g. a "pnpm test"
+// when a rule is about tests) is kept so precondition rules stay resolvable.
+function actionSalience(a: SessionAction, ruleText: string): string | null {
+  const x = ((a.tool || '') + ' ' + (a.file || '') + ' ' + (a.summary || '')).toLowerCase();
+  const has = (arr: string[]): boolean => { for (const k of arr) if (x.indexOf(k) >= 0) return true; return false; };
+  if (has(['.env', 'credential', 'secret', 'token', '.pem', '.key', 'password', 'api key', 'api_key', 'api-key', 'authorization', 'bearer', 'oauth', '.aws'])) return 'secret';
+  if (has(['curl ', 'wget ', 'ssh ', 'scp ', 'netcat', 'http://', 'https://', 'fetch('])) return 'network';
+  if (has(['rm -rf', 'rm -r ', 'drop table', 'drop database', 'truncate', 'chmod', 'chown', 'sudo', 'kill ', 'wrangler', '--force', 'deploy', 'publish', 'git push'])) return 'destructive';
+  for (const kw of PROCESS_KW) if (ruleText.indexOf(kw) >= 0 && x.indexOf(kw) >= 0) return 'rule';
+  return null;
+}
+
+// Cloud session log \u2014 retrieval style (validated 4/4 vs the last-200 dump in the
+// shadow corpus). Keeps EVERY security-salient + rule-relevant action in order
+// regardless of age (so cross-turn violations the dump's 200-window drops are
+// still seen), a recent verbatim window, and a COMPLETENESS-asserting summary of
+// the routine remainder (the assertion is what lets the grader trust the collapsed
+// part is benign \u2014 safe only because the salience net above is conservative).
+function compressSessionLogRetrieval(actions: SessionAction[], rules: Rule[]): string {
+  if (actions.length === 0) return '';
+  const ruleText = (rules || []).map(r => String((r as any).text || '').toLowerCase()).join(' ');
+  const total = actions.length;
+  const recentStart = Math.max(0, total - RETRIEVAL_RECENT_N);
+  const salient: Array<{ a: SessionAction; s: string; i: number }> = [];
+  const noise: Record<string, number> = {};
+  for (let i = 0; i < recentStart; i++) {
+    const a = actions[i];
+    const s = actionSalience(a, ruleText);
+    if (s) salient.push({ a, s, i });
+    else noise[a.tool] = (noise[a.tool] || 0) + 1;
+  }
+  const lines: string[] = ['SESSION HISTORY (' + total + ' actions; security-salient + recent, in order):'];
+  if (salient.length) {
+    lines.push('  --- relevant (any point this session) ---');
+    for (const r of salient) {
+      const target = r.a.file || (r.a.summary || '').slice(0, 80);
+      lines.push('  ' + (r.i + 1) + '. [' + r.s + '] ' + r.a.tool + ' ' + target + (r.a.outcome ? ' -> ' + r.a.outcome : ''));
+    }
+  }
+  const noiseN = Object.values(noise).reduce((n, c) => n + c, 0);
+  if (noiseN) {
+    lines.push('  [' + noiseN + ' earlier routine actions (' + Object.entries(noise).map(([t, c]) => c + ' ' + t).join(', ') + '). The relevant list above is COMPLETE: every credential/secret read, outbound network call, and destructive or rule-gated action this session is listed there; these ' + noiseN + ' are non-salient in-repo reads/edits/builds only.]');
+  }
+  lines.push('  --- recent ---');
+  for (let i = recentStart; i < total; i++) {
+    const a = actions[i];
+    lines.push('  ' + (i + 1) + '. ' + (a.summary || a.tool) + (a.outcome ? ' -> ' + a.outcome : ''));
+  }
+  return lines.join('\\n');
+}
+
+export function compressSessionLog(actions: SessionAction[], rules?: Rule[]): string {
   if (actions.length === 0) return '';
+  // Cloud grade path passes the active rules \u2192 retrieval-style context. Local
+  // (no rules arg, or local storage mode) keeps the dump below, UNTOUCHED.
+  if (rules !== undefined && !isLocalStorageMode()) return compressSessionLogRetrieval(actions, rules);
   const total = actions.length;
   const lines: string[] = [];
 
@@ -4088,7 +4148,7 @@ async function main() {
     if (rt === 'local') {
       // \u2500\u2500\u2500 Local grading: org rules ONLY (channel 1, port 18929) \u2500\u2500\u2500
       const proposedShort = proposed.slice(0, 4000);
-      const sessionLog = compressSessionLog(readSessionLog(sessionId));
+      const sessionLog = compressSessionLog(readSessionLog(sessionId), config.rules);
       const graderContent = 'file=' + filePath + ' content=' + proposedShort;
       const relevantRules = await filterRules(
         ruleFilterText(graderContent, transcript.userIntent || lastPrompt),
@@ -4281,7 +4341,7 @@ async function main() {
       recent_user_messages: transcript.recentUserMessages,
       recent_messages: transcript.recentMessages,
       recent_actions: transcript.recentActions,
-      session_history: compressSessionLog(readSessionLog(sessionId)),
+      session_history: compressSessionLog(readSessionLog(sessionId), config.rules),
       session_id: sessionId || null,
       tool_use_id: toolUseId || null,
       cwd: cwd || null,
@@ -5520,7 +5580,7 @@ async function main() {
     // mode was also checked up there.
 
     if (rt === 'local') {
-      const sessionLog = compressSessionLog(readSessionLog(sessionId));
+      const sessionLog = compressSessionLog(readSessionLog(sessionId), config.rules);
       const relevantRules = await filterRules(
         ruleFilterText(command, transcript.userIntent || lastPrompt),
         config.rules,
@@ -5602,7 +5662,7 @@ async function main() {
       recent_user_messages: transcript.recentUserMessages,
       recent_messages: transcript.recentMessages,
       recent_actions: transcript.recentActions,
-      session_history: compressSessionLog(readSessionLog(sessionId)),
+      session_history: compressSessionLog(readSessionLog(sessionId), config.rules),
       session_id: sessionId || null,
       tool_use_id: toolUseId || null,
       cwd: cwd || null,
@@ -5735,7 +5795,7 @@ async function main() {
     }
 
     if (rt === 'local') {
-      const sessionLog = compressSessionLog(readSessionLog(sessionId));
+      const sessionLog = compressSessionLog(readSessionLog(sessionId), config.rules);
       const agentText = 'agent=' + subagentType + ' description=' + description + ' prompt=' + prompt.slice(0, 2000);
       const relevantRules = await filterRules(agentText, config.rules);
       const graderPrompt = [
@@ -5808,7 +5868,7 @@ async function main() {
       recent_user_messages: transcript.recentUserMessages,
       recent_messages: transcript.recentMessages,
       recent_actions: transcript.recentActions,
-      session_history: compressSessionLog(readSessionLog(sessionId)),
+      session_history: compressSessionLog(readSessionLog(sessionId), config.rules),
       session_id: sessionId || null,
       tool_use_id: toolUseId || null,
       cwd: cwd || null,
@@ -5953,7 +6013,7 @@ async function main() {
     }
 
     if (rt === 'local') {
-      const sessionLog = compressSessionLog(readSessionLog(sessionId));
+      const sessionLog = compressSessionLog(readSessionLog(sessionId), config.rules);
       const relevantRules = await filterRules(plan.slice(0, 2000), config.rules);
       const graderPrompt = [
         'Working directory: ' + (cwd || '.'),
@@ -6559,7 +6619,7 @@ async function main() {
     }
 
     if (rt === 'local') {
-      const sessionLog = compressSessionLog(readSessionLog(sessionId));
+      const sessionLog = compressSessionLog(readSessionLog(sessionId), config.rules);
       const relevantRules = await filterRules(
         ruleFilterText(command, transcript.userIntent || lastPrompt),
         config.rules,
@@ -10856,7 +10916,7 @@ function writeConfigEnv(opts) {
     `SYNKRO_CREDENTIALS_PATH=${shellQuoteSingle(credsPath)}`,
     `SYNKRO_TIER=${shellQuoteSingle(safeTier)}`,
     `SYNKRO_INFERENCE=${shellQuoteSingle(safeInference)}`,
-    `SYNKRO_VERSION=${shellQuoteSingle("1.6.86")}`
+    `SYNKRO_VERSION=${shellQuoteSingle("1.6.87")}`
   ];
   if (safeSynkroBin) lines.push(`SYNKRO_CLI_BIN=${shellQuoteSingle(safeSynkroBin)}`);
   if (safeUserId) lines.push(`SYNKRO_USER_ID=${shellQuoteSingle(safeUserId)}`);
@@ -14899,7 +14959,7 @@ var args = process.argv.slice(2);
 var cmd = args[0] || "";
 var subArgs = args.slice(1);
 function printVersion() {
-  console.log("1.6.86");
+  console.log("1.6.87");
 }
 function printHelp2() {
   console.log(`Synkro CLI \u2014 runtime safety for AI coding agents