@synkro-sh/cli 1.1.3 → 1.1.5

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package/dist/bootstrap.js CHANGED
@@ -801,11 +801,13 @@ if [ "$SYNKRO_INFERENCE_TIER" = "free" ] && command -v claude >/dev/null 2>&1; t
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  # ~14s for cold \`claude --print\`. Falls back to direct \`claude --print\`
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  # if the daemon binary or primer is missing.
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- # Fetch the caller's visible org rules so the grader can evaluate against
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- # custom policies, not just the primer's hardcoded baseline. Without this,
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- # audit-mode rules silently pass on free tier \u2014 the rule exists in the DB
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- # but never reaches the model. Bounded at 1.5s; on failure proceed with
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- # an empty rules array (degrades to baseline-only judging).
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+ # Fetch the caller's visible org rules and inject into the grader prompt.
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+ # On-demand MCP retrieval inside the grader was the cleaner architecture
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+ # but added 20+ seconds of latency per grade because the model has to
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+ # call get_guardrails, wait for cosine ranking, then reason. For free-tier
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+ # local CC inference that's unacceptable. Pre-stuffing the rules costs
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+ # tokens but keeps grade latency in the 1-3s range. Bounded at 1.5s; on
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+ # failure proceed with empty rules (degrades to baseline-only judging).
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  ORG_RULES=$(curl -sS "\${GATEWAY_URL}/api/v1/cli/pr-rules" \\
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  -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" \\
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  --max-time 1.5 2>/dev/null \\
@@ -1637,14 +1639,16 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
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  EACH GRADING REQUEST INCLUDES:
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  - File: the path being written
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  - User intent: what the user told the agent to do
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- - Org rules: a JSON array of this organization's active policies, each with rule_id, text, severity, category. THESE ARE THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF TRUTH. If a rule's text describes behavior that matches the diff, flag it. Use that rule's rule_id verbatim, not a synthesized one.
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+ - Org rules: a JSON array of this organization's active policies, each with rule_id, text, severity, category. These are the org's primary source of truth \u2014 apply them.
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  - Diff: the proposed file content
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- PRIORITY ORDER:
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- 1. ORG RULES first. If the diff matches the prose of any org rule, that's a violation \u2014 emit the rule's rule_id, the rule's severity, and a one-line reason citing file:line + the matching behavior + a concrete fix. Don't second-guess the org's rules \u2014 if the rule says "Agents must not iterate 1Password vaults" and the diff loops over \`op item list\`, that's a hit.
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- 2. BASELINE security issues (hardcoded real-looking secrets, eval/exec on user input, SQL string concat, MD5/SHA1 for security, unsafe deserialization, command injection, path traversal, env-dump logging). Flag these even if no org rule covers them \u2014 they're universally bad. Use a sensible snake_case rule_id like \`no-hardcoded-secrets\`, \`eval-on-user-input\`.
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+ JUDGING PRIORITY:
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+ 1. ORG RULES first. If the diff matches the prose of any rule in the Org rules array, flag it \u2014 emit the rule's rule_id verbatim and the rule's severity. A rule that bans an action class covers ALL forms of that action: splitting arguments across function calls, wrapping in helpers, renaming a variable, using a different invocation pattern \u2014 none of those bypass the rule. Match on semantic intent of the rule's prose, not literal substring.
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+ 2. BASELINE security issues \u2014 hardcoded real-looking secrets, eval/exec on user input, SQL string concat with untrusted input, MD5/SHA1 for security-sensitive purposes, unsafe deserialization, command injection, path traversal, missing auth on routes that mutate user/billing data, weak random for tokens, broken JWT verification, CORS misconfig, env-dump logging. Flag these even if no org rule covers them \u2014 they're universally bad. Use a sensible snake_case rule_id like \`no-hardcoded-secrets\`, \`eval-on-user-input\`, \`sql-string-concat\`.
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  3. Stylistic issues, placeholder fixtures, test files (path under /tests/, /__tests__/, *.test.*), and config-only files are NOT security issues \u2014 return ok=true.
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+ INDEPENDENCE: Each grade request is INDEPENDENT. Even if you can see prior turns in your context (the daemon reuses one process across grades), treat them as irrelevant. Judge ONLY the current request's File / User intent / Org rules / Diff. Prior "allows" do NOT authorize the current request \u2014 re-evaluate fresh against the rules in THIS prompt.
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+
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  OUTPUT RULES \u2014 strictest possible, no exceptions:
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  1. NO reasoning. NO preamble. NO commentary.
@@ -2079,7 +2083,7 @@ function writeConfigEnv(opts) {
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  `SYNKRO_GATEWAY_URL=${shellQuoteSingle(safeGateway)}`,
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  `SYNKRO_CREDENTIALS_PATH=${shellQuoteSingle(credsPath)}`,
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  `SYNKRO_TIER=${shellQuoteSingle(safeTier)}`,
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- `SYNKRO_VERSION=${shellQuoteSingle("1.1.3")}`
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+ `SYNKRO_VERSION=${shellQuoteSingle("1.1.5")}`
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  ];
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  if (safeUserId) lines.push(`SYNKRO_USER_ID=${shellQuoteSingle(safeUserId)}`);
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  if (safeOrgId) lines.push(`SYNKRO_ORG_ID=${shellQuoteSingle(safeOrgId)}`);