@synapta/skills 0.1.0 → 0.1.2

package/skills/secret-hygiene/references/remediation_guide.md

@@ -0,0 +1,530 @@
+# Secret Remediation Guide
+
+Comprehensive procedures for remediating exposed secrets detected by Gitleaks.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+- [Immediate Response](#immediate-response)
+- [Remediation Workflow](#remediation-workflow)
+- [Git History Cleanup](#git-history-cleanup)
+- [Cloud Provider Specific](#cloud-provider-specific)
+- [Database Credentials](#database-credentials)
+- [API Keys and Tokens](#api-keys-and-tokens)
+- [Post-Remediation](#post-remediation)
+
+## Immediate Response
+
+When secrets are detected, follow this priority order:
+
+### 1. Assess Exposure (0-15 minutes)
+
+**Questions to answer immediately:**
+- Is the repository public or private?
+- Has the commit been pushed to remote?
+- How long has the secret been exposed?
+- What systems does this credential access?
+
+**Actions:**
+```bash
+# Check if commit is pushed
+git log origin/main..HEAD  # If output, not yet pushed
+
+# Check repository visibility
+gh repo view --json visibility
+
+# Check commit age
+git log -1 --format="%ar" <commit-sha>
+```
+
+### 2. Rotate Credentials (0-30 minutes)
+
+**CRITICAL**: Rotate the exposed credential immediately, regardless of exposure duration.
+
+Priority order:
+1. **Production credentials** - Immediate rotation
+2. **Payment/financial systems** - Immediate rotation
+3. **Customer data access** - Immediate rotation
+4. **Development/test credentials** - Rotate within 24 hours
+
+### 3. Review Access Logs (30-60 minutes)
+
+Check for unauthorized access:
+- Cloud provider audit logs (CloudTrail, Cloud Audit Logs, Activity Log)
+- Application logs showing authentication attempts
+- Database connection logs
+- API usage logs
+
+### 4. Remove from Code (0-24 hours)
+
+Remove secret from current code and optionally from git history.
+
+## Remediation Workflow
+
+### Step 1: Rotate the Credential
+
+**Before removing from code**, rotate the credential to prevent race conditions.
+
+#### Cloud Providers
+
+**AWS**:
+```bash
+# Deactivate compromised key
+aws iam update-access-key \
+  --access-key-id AKIA... \
+  --status Inactive \
+  --user-name username
+
+# Create new key
+aws iam create-access-key --user-name username
+
+# Delete old key after updating applications
+aws iam delete-access-key \
+  --access-key-id AKIA... \
+  --user-name username
+```
+
+**GCP**:
+```bash
+# Delete service account key
+gcloud iam service-accounts keys delete KEY_ID \
+  --iam-account=SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EMAIL
+
+# Create new key
+gcloud iam service-accounts keys create new-key.json \
+  --iam-account=SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EMAIL
+```
+
+**Azure**:
+```bash
+# Regenerate storage account key
+az storage account keys renew \
+  --account-name ACCOUNT_NAME \
+  --key primary
+
+# List keys to verify
+az storage account keys list \
+  --account-name ACCOUNT_NAME
+```
+
+#### API Tokens
+
+**GitHub**:
+1. Navigate to Settings > Developer settings > Personal access tokens
+2. Find the compromised token (check "Last used" column)
+3. Click "Delete"
+4. Generate new token with minimal required scopes
+
+**Stripe**:
+1. Log into Stripe Dashboard
+2. Navigate to Developers > API keys
+3. Click "Roll" on the compromised key
+4. Update all applications with new key
+
+**Generic API Key**:
+1. Access provider's console/dashboard
+2. Locate API key management
+3. Revoke/delete compromised key
+4. Generate new key
+5. Update applications
+6. Test connectivity
+
+### Step 2: Remove from Current Code
+
+Replace hardcoded secrets with environment variables or secret management:
+
+**Before** (insecure):
+```python
+API_KEY = "sk_live_51ABC123..."
+db_password = "MyP@ssw0rd123"
+```
+
+**After** (secure):
+```python
+import os
+
+API_KEY = os.environ.get("STRIPE_API_KEY")
+if not API_KEY:
+    raise ValueError("STRIPE_API_KEY environment variable not set")
+
+db_password = os.environ.get("DB_PASSWORD")
+```
+
+**Using secret management**:
+```python
+from azure.keyvault.secrets import SecretClient
+from azure.identity import DefaultAzureCredential
+
+credential = DefaultAzureCredential()
+client = SecretClient(vault_url="https://myvault.vault.azure.net/", credential=credential)
+
+db_password = client.get_secret("database-password").value
+```
+
+### Step 3: Commit the Fix
+
+```bash
+# Add changes
+git add .
+
+# Commit with clear message
+git commit -m "refactor: Move API credentials to environment variables
+
+- Replace hardcoded Stripe API key with environment variable
+- Replace database password with AWS Secrets Manager reference
+- Add validation for required environment variables
+
+Addresses: Secret exposure detected by Gitleaks scan"
+
+# Push
+git push origin main
+```
+
+## Git History Cleanup
+
+If secrets are in pushed commits, consider removing from git history.
+
+### Decision Matrix
+
+| Scenario | Action | Reason |
+|----------|--------|--------|
+| Public repo, secret exposed | **Mandatory** history rewrite | Secret is public knowledge |
+| Private repo, < 24 hours, < 5 collaborators | **Recommended** history rewrite | Minimal disruption |
+| Private repo, > 1 week, > 10 collaborators | **Optional** - Rotate only | High coordination cost |
+| Production repo with CI/CD | **Coordinate carefully** | May break automation |
+
+### Method 1: git-filter-repo (Recommended)
+
+Install:
+```bash
+pip install git-filter-repo
+```
+
+Remove specific file from all history:
+```bash
+# Backup first
+git clone --mirror <repo-url> backup-repo.git
+
+# Remove file
+git filter-repo --path config/secrets.yaml --invert-paths
+
+# Force push
+git push origin --force --all
+```
+
+Remove secrets matching pattern:
+```bash
+# Use callback for complex filtering
+git filter-repo --replace-text <(echo 'regex:sk_live_[a-zA-Z0-9]{24}==>REDACTED')
+```
+
+### Method 2: BFG Repo-Cleaner
+
+Download:
+```bash
+# macOS
+brew install bfg
+
+# Or download JAR from https://rtyley.github.io/bfg-repo-cleaner/
+```
+
+Remove specific file:
+```bash
+# Clone mirror
+git clone --mirror <repo-url> repo-mirror.git
+cd repo-mirror.git
+
+# Remove file
+bfg --delete-files secrets.env
+
+# Clean up
+git reflog expire --expire=now --all
+git gc --prune=now --aggressive
+
+# Force push
+git push
+```
+
+Remove secrets by pattern:
+```bash
+# Create replacements.txt
+echo "PASSWORD1==>***REMOVED***" > replacements.txt
+echo "sk_live_51ABC==>***REMOVED***" >> replacements.txt
+
+# Run BFG
+bfg --replace-text replacements.txt repo-mirror.git
+```
+
+### Method 3: Interactive Rebase (Small Changes)
+
+For recent commits not yet widely distributed:
+
+```bash
+# Rebase last N commits
+git rebase -i HEAD~5
+
+# In editor, mark commits to 'edit'
+# When stopped at each commit:
+git rm config/secrets.yaml
+git commit --amend --no-edit
+git rebase --continue
+
+# Force push
+git push --force-with-lease
+```
+
+### Post-Rewrite Coordination
+
+After rewriting history:
+
+1. **Notify team immediately**:
+```text
+URGENT: Git history rewritten to remove exposed credentials.
+
+Action required for all developers:
+1. Commit/stash any local changes
+2. Run: git fetch origin && git reset --hard origin/main
+3. Delete and re-clone if issues persist
+
+Contact security team with questions.
+```
+
+2. **Update CI/CD**:
+   - Invalidate old caches
+   - May need to reconfigure webhooks
+   - Update any hardcoded commit references
+
+3. **Update branch protection**:
+   - May need to temporarily disable
+   - Re-enable after force push completes
+
+## Cloud Provider Specific
+
+### AWS
+
+**Check for unauthorized access**:
+```bash
+# List recent API calls for access key
+aws cloudtrail lookup-events \
+  --lookup-attributes AttributeKey=Username,AttributeValue=compromised-user \
+  --max-results 50 \
+  --start-time $(date -u -d '7 days ago' +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S)
+```
+
+**Revoke all sessions**:
+```bash
+# Attach policy to deny all actions
+aws iam put-user-policy \
+  --user-name compromised-user \
+  --policy-name DenyAll \
+  --policy-document '{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Deny","Action":"*","Resource":"*"}]}'
+```
+
+### GCP
+
+**Check audit logs**:
+```bash
+gcloud logging read "protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail=SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EMAIL" \
+  --limit 100 \
+  --format json
+```
+
+**Disable service account**:
+```bash
+gcloud iam service-accounts disable SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EMAIL
+```
+
+### Azure
+
+**Review activity logs**:
+```bash
+az monitor activity-log list \
+  --start-time 2024-01-01T00:00:00Z \
+  --resource-id /subscriptions/SUBSCRIPTION_ID
+```
+
+**Revoke access**:
+```bash
+# Regenerate keys
+az storage account keys renew \
+  --account-name STORAGE_ACCOUNT \
+  --key primary
+```
+
+## Database Credentials
+
+### PostgreSQL
+
+```sql
+-- Change password
+ALTER USER app_user WITH PASSWORD 'new_secure_password';
+
+-- View recent connections
+SELECT datname, usename, client_addr, backend_start
+FROM pg_stat_activity
+WHERE usename = 'app_user'
+ORDER BY backend_start DESC;
+
+-- Kill active connections (if suspicious)
+SELECT pg_terminate_backend(pid)
+FROM pg_stat_activity
+WHERE usename = 'app_user' AND client_addr != 'trusted_ip';
+```
+
+### MySQL
+
+```sql
+-- Change password
+ALTER USER 'app_user'@'%' IDENTIFIED BY 'new_secure_password';
+FLUSH PRIVILEGES;
+
+-- View recent connections
+SELECT * FROM information_schema.PROCESSLIST
+WHERE USER = 'app_user';
+
+-- Kill connections
+KILL CONNECTION process_id;
+```
+
+### MongoDB
+
+```javascript
+// Change password
+use admin
+db.changeUserPassword("app_user", "new_secure_password")
+
+// View recent operations
+db.currentOp({ "active": true })
+
+// Kill operation
+db.killOp(opid)
+```
+
+## API Keys and Tokens
+
+### GitHub
+
+**Audit unauthorized access**:
+```bash
+# List recent events for token
+gh api /users/{username}/events/public | jq '.[] | {type, repo: .repo.name, created_at}'
+```
+
+**Revoke all tokens** (if compromised account):
+1. Settings > Developer settings > Personal access tokens
+2. Select all tokens
+3. Click "Delete"
+
+### Slack
+
+**Check workspace audit logs**:
+1. Go to workspace settings (admin required)
+2. Navigate to Logs > Audit Logs
+3. Filter by token usage
+
+**Regenerate token**:
+1. Go to api.slack.com/apps
+2. Select your app
+3. Navigate to OAuth & Permissions
+4. Click "Regenerate" on token
+
+## Post-Remediation
+
+### 1. Implement Prevention
+
+**Pre-commit hooks**:
+```bash
+# Install Gitleaks pre-commit hook
+cd /path/to/repo
+cat << 'EOF' > .git/hooks/pre-commit
+#!/bin/sh
+gitleaks protect --verbose --redact --staged
+EOF
+chmod +x .git/hooks/pre-commit
+```
+
+**CI/CD checks**:
+```yaml
+# .github/workflows/secrets-scan.yml
+name: Secret Scanning
+on: [push, pull_request]
+jobs:
+  scan:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 0
+      - uses: gitleaks/gitleaks-action@v2
+        env:
+          GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+```
+
+### 2. Update Secret Management
+
+Migrate to proper secret management:
+
+**Environment variables** (minimal):
+```bash
+# .env (never commit!)
+DATABASE_URL=postgresql://user:pass@host:5432/db
+API_KEY=sk_live_...
+
+# .gitignore
+.env
+.env.local
+```
+
+**Secret management services**:
+- AWS: Secrets Manager, Systems Manager Parameter Store
+- GCP: Secret Manager
+- Azure: Key Vault
+- HashiCorp: Vault
+- Kubernetes: Secrets
+
+### 3. Document Incident
+
+Create incident report including:
+- **Timeline**: When secret was committed, detected, remediated
+- **Exposure**: Duration, repository visibility, access scope
+- **Impact**: Systems accessed, data at risk, unauthorized activity
+- **Response**: Rotation completed, logs reviewed, history cleaned
+- **Prevention**: Controls implemented to prevent recurrence
+
+### 4. Team Training
+
+Conduct training on:
+- Using environment variables and secret management
+- Pre-commit hooks and local scanning
+- Recognizing secrets in code review
+- Incident response procedures
+
+### 5. Compliance Notifications
+
+If required by regulations:
+- **GDPR**: Notify supervisory authority within 72 hours if personal data at risk
+- **PCI-DSS**: Notify card brands and processor if payment data affected
+- **SOC2**: Document in compliance report, may trigger audit
+- **HIPAA**: Notify covered entities if PHI exposed
+
+## Prevention Checklist
+
+- [ ] Credential rotated and old credential deactivated
+- [ ] Access logs reviewed for unauthorized activity
+- [ ] Secret removed from current code
+- [ ] Git history cleaned (if applicable)
+- [ ] Team notified of credential change
+- [ ] Applications updated with new credential
+- [ ] Pre-commit hooks installed
+- [ ] CI/CD secret scanning enabled
+- [ ] Secret management solution implemented
+- [ ] Incident documented
+- [ ] Compliance notifications sent (if required)
+- [ ] Team training scheduled
+
+## Emergency Contacts
+
+Maintain contact list for rapid response:
+- **Security Team**: security@company.com
+- **DevOps On-Call**: devops-oncall@company.com
+- **Cloud Provider Support**: Account-specific
+- **Compliance Officer**: compliance@company.com

package/skills/stack-selector/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+---
+name: stack-selector
+description: Map an ArchitectureDoc to concrete runtime, framework, database, queue/scheduler, and deployment target. Bias toward boring, popular, well-supported choices. Anti-pattern check on every selection.
+triggers: [synapta stack, stack selection, framework choice, runtime, database choice]
+network: off
+tools: []
+source:
+  origin: authored-by-synapta
+  reason: "Existing community skills are framework cheerleaders, not multi-axis selectors."
+  citation_patterns:
+    - "Choose Boring Technology — Dan McKinley"
+    - "Twelve-Factor App"
+---
+
+# Stack Selector
+
+Choose technologies the project will actually depend on. Bias hard toward boring and popular — more docs, easier hiring, fewer 3 AM surprises.
+
+## Axes
+
+| Axis | Default candidates | Avoid without justification |
+|---|---|---|
+| **Runtime** | Node 22 LTS, Bun 1.x, Python 3.12, Go 1.23 | bleeding-edge majors, unmaintained runtimes |
+| **Framework** | Next.js (web), Fastify/Hono (API), Django/FastAPI (Python), Gin (Go) | rolled-your-own HTTP, abandoned forks |
+| **Database** | Postgres | NoSQL for relational data; SQLite in distributed deploys |
+| **Queue/Scheduler** | none, then BullMQ / SQS / Temporal / Cron | bespoke queue implementations |
+| **Auth** | external IdP (Auth0, Clerk, Workos, Cognito) | rolled-your-own |
+| **Observability** | OpenTelemetry + a managed backend | grep-the-logs |
+| **Deployment** | one of `deploy-{vercel, fly, railway, cloudflare, docker, k8s, ssh}` adapters | mix-and-match providers across the same plane |
+
+## Process
+
+1. Read `ArchitectureDoc`. Note: tenancy, geo, latency budget, compliance, integrations.
+2. For each axis, propose the default; if rejecting, write one sentence justifying why.
+3. Cross-check the proposal against `deploy-*` skills' `preflightFor` to confirm the chosen deployment target supports the chosen runtime/framework.
+4. Output: `StackSelection` artifact (table + one-sentence justification per axis) and a list of decisions that need ADRs.
+
+## Default rejections (require explicit justification to override)
+
+- ORMs: prefer query builders or SQL strings + a thin migration tool over heavy ORM for new projects
+- GraphQL: don't introduce GraphQL unless there are ≥3 distinct clients with different field needs
+- Service mesh: don't introduce until you have ≥5 services actually communicating
+- Custom build tooling: don't write a bundler; use Vite/esbuild/tsup
+- Kubernetes for <3-service projects: use the platform tier instead
+
+## Output shape
+
+```yaml
+runtime: { choice: "Node 22 LTS", reason: "team familiarity + Synapta CLI ecosystem" }
+framework: { choice: "Fastify", reason: "Node, async, plugin model, used by gateway" }
+database: { choice: "Postgres 16", reason: "default; relational data; mature tooling" }
+queue: { choice: "none", reason: "no background work needed at v0" }
+auth: { choice: "Auth0", reason: "SOC2 boundary + existing IdP" }
+observability: { choice: "OpenTelemetry + Grafana Cloud", reason: "OSS protocol + managed backend" }
+deployment: { choice: "Fly.io", reason: "multi-region + persistent storage + secrets via flyctl" }
+```

package/skills/telegram-control/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+---
+name: telegram-control
+synapta_original_name: telegram-reminders
+triggers: [synapta telegram, BYO bot, approval bot, telegram allowlist]
+network: allowlist
+source:
+  origin: https://github.com/AlexSKuznetsov/claude-skill-telegram
+  path: /
+  commit: 06a7b02172c4
+  license: see source repo
+  adapted: light-touch
+  note: "Source skill is reminder-focused; Synapta uses it as a starting pattern for BYO-bot allowlisted command routing. Synapta does NOT use Convex; see Synapta gateway docs for the production wiring."
+description: Send reminders and messages to Telegram with cloud-based scheduling. Use when the user wants to send immediate messages or schedule future reminders to Telegram. Supports text messages, timestamp-based scheduling, recurring reminders, viewing and canceling scheduled messages, and message history.
+---
+
+# Telegram Reminders Skill
+
+Send immediate messages and schedule reminders to Telegram with cloud-based scheduling powered by Convex. Your reminders run 24/7 in Convex Cloud with zero infrastructure management.
+
+## Quick Reference
+
+IMPORTANT! Always use these commands in order:
+
+- Send now: `tsx scripts/send_message.ts [message_text]`
+- Send now with attachment: `tsx scripts/send_message.ts [message_text] /path/to/file.pdf`
+- Schedule: `tsx scripts/schedule_message.ts [time expression] [title] [message_text] [file_path]`
+- Schedule with attachment: `tsx scripts/schedule_message.ts [time expression] [title] [message_text] /path/to/file`
+- List pending: `tsx scripts/list_scheduled.ts`
+- Cancel: `tsx scripts/cancel_message.ts <message_id>`
+- History: `tsx scripts/view_history.ts [limit]`
+
+## Initial Setup
+
+**Prerequisites** (user must provide):
+
+1. **Bot Token**: Message [@BotFather](https://t.me/BotFather) → `/newbot` → copy token
+2. **User ID**: Message [@userinfobot](https://t.me/userinfobot) → copy numeric ID
+3. **Deploy Key**: [dashboard.convex.dev](https://dashboard.convex.dev) → Create project → Settings → Deploy Keys → Create "Production" key
+
+**Setup steps**:
+
+```bash
+# 1. Install dependencies
+cd /mnt/skills/user/telegram-reminders && npm install
+
+# 2. Save configuration
+mkdir -p /mnt/user-data/outputs
+cat > /mnt/user-data/outputs/telegram_config.json << 'EOF'
+{
+  "botToken": "YOUR_BOT_TOKEN",
+  "userId": "YOUR_USER_ID",
+  "deployKey": "YOUR_DEPLOY_KEY",
+  "setupDate": "CURRENT_DATE"
+}
+EOF
+
+# 3. Create .env.local
+cat > .env.local << 'EOF'
+CONVEX_DEPLOY_KEY=YOUR_DEPLOY_KEY
+EOF
+
+
+# 4. Set environment variables in Convex
+npx convex env set TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN "YOUR_BOT_TOKEN"
+npx convex env set TELEGRAM_USER_ID "YOUR_USER_ID"
+
+# 5. Deploy to Convex
+npx convex deploy
+
+# 6. Test with a message
+tsx scripts/send_message.ts "Setup complete!"
+```
+
+**Critical**: User must start a chat with their bot (search and press "Start") before the bot can send messages.
+
+## Core Operations
+
+### Send Immediate Message
+
+**Send text message**:
+
+```bash
+tsx scripts/send_message.ts "Your message text here"
+```
+
+**Example with special characters**:
+
+```bash
+tsx scripts/send_message.ts "Hello! Here's a test message 🚀"
+```
+
+## Timezone
+
+All times use user's configured timezone. The Convex backend stores UTC internally; client scripts handle conversion via chrono-node.
+
+## Limitations
+
+- Files sent as documents (not inline images)
+- Maximum file size: 50MB (Telegram limit)
+- Cron granularity: 1 minute minimum
+- No message editing (cancel and reschedule instead)
+- Rate limits: 20 messages/minute per user
+
+## References
+
+- [`references/initial_setup.md`](references/initial_setup.md) - Detailed setup process
+- [`references/architecture.md`](references/architecture.md) - System architecture
+- [`references/convex.md`](references/convex.md) - Convex platform details
+- [`references/telegram_api.md`](references/telegram_api.md) - Telegram Bot API
+- [`references/error_handling.md`](references/error_handling.md) - Error resolution guide