@sylphx/flow 2.7.0 → 2.8.0
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package/CHANGELOG.md
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# @sylphx/flow
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## 2.8.0 (2025-12-17)
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### ✨ Features
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- **commands:** add /saas-admin for admin platform review ([f67b74f](https://github.com/SylphxAI/flow/commit/f67b74f2cac978274ad546cc7c70912f3cd4700c))
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## 2.7.0 (2025-12-17)
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### ✨ Features
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---
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name: saas-admin
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description: SaaS admin platform review - RBAC, bootstrap, config, feature flags, ops
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agent: coder
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---
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# Admin Platform Review
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## Scope
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Review admin systems: RBAC, bootstrap flow, configuration management, feature flags governance, operational tooling, and impersonation.
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## Specification
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### Access Control (RBAC)
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* **Least privilege principle**: Users get minimum permissions needed.
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* Role hierarchy with clear inheritance.
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* Permission granularity (resource-level, action-level).
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* All authorization is **server-enforced**; no client-trust.
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* Role changes require appropriate privilege level and are audited.
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### Admin Bootstrap (Hard Requirement)
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* Admin bootstrap must **not rely on file seeding**.
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* Use a secure, auditable **first-login allowlist** for the initial SUPER_ADMIN.
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* **Permanently disable bootstrap** after completion — no re-entry.
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* All privilege grants must be server-enforced and recorded in the audit log.
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* The allowlist must be managed via **secure configuration (environment/secret store)**, not code or DB seeding.
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### Configuration Management
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* All **non-secret** product-level configuration must be manageable via admin (server-enforced).
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* Configuration changes require **validation and change history**.
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* Secrets/credentials are **environment-managed only**; admin may expose safe readiness/health visibility, not raw secrets.
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* Support for environment-specific overrides (dev/staging/prod).
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* Rollback capability for configuration changes.
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### Feature Flags Governance
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* Gradual rollout support (percentage-based, user segment-based).
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* A/B testing integration where applicable.
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* **Audit trail** for all flag changes (who/when/why).
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* Emergency **kill switches** for rapid disable.
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* Flag lifecycle management (created → active → deprecated → removed).
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* Server-enforced evaluation; no client-side flag source-of-truth.
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### Operational Management
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* **User/account management tools**:
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* Search, view, edit user profiles
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* Account status management (active, suspended, banned)
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* Manual verification/unverification
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* **Entitlements/access management**:
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* View and modify user entitlements
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* Grant/revoke access with audit trail
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* Bulk operations with safeguards
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* **Lifecycle actions**:
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* Account suspension/reactivation
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* Data export (for user requests)
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* Account deletion with proper cascade
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* **Issue resolution workflows**:
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* Support ticket integration
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* Action history per user
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* Notes and annotations
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* **Step-up controls** for sensitive actions:
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* Actions affecting money/credits require MFA
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* Actions affecting security posture require MFA
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* Destructive actions require confirmation + reason
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### Impersonation
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* Impersonation allowed **with explicit safeguards**:
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* Requires elevated privilege level
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* Time-limited sessions (auto-expire)
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* Full audit logging (start, actions, end)
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* Clear indicator in UI during impersonation
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* Cannot impersonate higher-privilege users
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* All actions during impersonation attributed to both impersonator and target.
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* Optional: Visible indicator to impersonated user that session was accessed.
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### Admin Audit Logging
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* **All admin actions must be auditable**:
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* Who performed the action
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* When (timestamp with timezone)
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* What action was taken
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* Why (required reason for sensitive actions)
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* Before/after state for mutations
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* Correlation to session/request
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* Audit logs must be:
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* Immutable (append-only)
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* Queryable and filterable
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* Exportable for compliance
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* Retained per data retention policy
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## Domain Discovery
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After reviewing compliance with spec, explore improvements:
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* **Admin UX**: Is the admin panel efficient for common tasks? Keyboard shortcuts? Bulk actions?
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* **Self-service vs admin**: What admin actions could be self-service for users?
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* **Automation**: What repetitive admin tasks could be automated? Scheduled jobs?
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* **Alerting**: Should certain admin actions trigger alerts? (e.g., mass deletions)
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* **Delegation**: Can some admin tasks be delegated to lower roles safely?
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* **Mobile admin**: Is there a need for mobile admin access? How to secure?
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## Domain Gates
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* [ ] RBAC implemented with least privilege
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* [ ] Bootstrap flow is secure and one-time only
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* [ ] Config changes are validated and audited
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* [ ] Feature flags have full audit trail
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* [ ] Sensitive actions require step-up (MFA)
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* [ ] Impersonation is time-limited and fully logged
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* [ ] All admin actions are auditable
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* [ ] Audit logs are immutable and queryable
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* [ ] No hardcoded admin credentials anywhere
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* [ ] Admin endpoints are rate-limited
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@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ Delegate each domain to a worker agent. Workers should review compliance with sp
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| Platform | `/saas-platform` | Design system, SEO, PWA, performance, a11y |
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| Security | `/saas-security` | OWASP, privacy, consent, observability, operability |
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| Growth | `/saas-growth` | Onboarding, referral, retention, guidance |
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| Admin | `/saas-admin` | RBAC, bootstrap, config, feature flags, ops tooling |
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### Phase 2: Strategic Discovery
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package/package.json
CHANGED
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{
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"name": "@sylphx/flow",
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"version": "2.
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"version": "2.8.0",
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"description": "One CLI to rule them all. Unified orchestration layer for Claude Code, OpenCode, Cursor and all AI development tools. Auto-detection, auto-installation, auto-upgrade.",
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"type": "module",
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"bin": {
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