@sweny-ai/core 0.1.112 → 0.1.113
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/skills/betterstack.d.ts +19 -0
- package/dist/skills/betterstack.js +59 -15
- package/dist/skills/github.d.ts +15 -0
- package/dist/skills/github.js +28 -2
- package/dist/skills/supabase.d.ts +11 -0
- package/dist/skills/supabase.js +99 -23
- package/package.json +1 -1
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@@ -5,4 +5,23 @@
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* CI-native alternative to the BetterStack MCP server.
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*/
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import type { Skill } from "../types.js";
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/**
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* Validate an LLM-chosen table name as a bare ClickHouse identifier.
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* Anything outside [A-Za-z0-9_] is rejected — table names from
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* BetterStack are always of the form t<id>_<name>.
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*/
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export declare function assertClickHouseIdentifier(name: string): string;
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/**
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* Best-effort read-only guard for `betterstack_query`.
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*
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* Accepts SELECT / WITH / DESCRIBE statements, rejects everything else,
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* rejects multi-statement input, and appends a LIMIT cap when the query
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* has none. Keyword checks ignore string literal contents so a log
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* message containing "LIMIT" doesn't skip the cap.
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*
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* This is UX, not a security boundary: a determined query can still do
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* anything the ClickHouse connection's role allows. Use a read-only
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* role for the configured credentials.
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*/
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export declare function prepareReadOnlyQuery(query: string): string;
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export declare const betterstack: Skill;
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@@ -37,6 +37,58 @@ async function bsQuery(sql, ctx) {
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.split("\n")
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.map((line) => JSON.parse(line));
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}
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// ─── Input hardening (issue #226) ──────────────────────────────
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//
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// Threat model: tool arguments are LLM-controlled at runtime and can be
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// steered by prompt-injected content (issue bodies, fetched logs). The
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// `table` argument reaches a ClickHouse query string, so it is strictly
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// validated as an identifier. The read-only query guard below is
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// best-effort UX — the real security boundary must be a read-only
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// ClickHouse role on the BETTERSTACK_QUERY_USERNAME connection.
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/**
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* Validate an LLM-chosen table name as a bare ClickHouse identifier.
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* Anything outside [A-Za-z0-9_] is rejected — table names from
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* BetterStack are always of the form t<id>_<name>.
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*/
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export function assertClickHouseIdentifier(name) {
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if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_]+$/.test(name)) {
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throw new Error(`[BetterStack] Invalid table identifier "${name}" — only letters, digits, and _ are allowed`);
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}
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return name;
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}
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/** Blank out string literal contents so keyword checks don't match inside them. */
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function stripStringLiterals(sql) {
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// Handles both '' (SQL) and \' (ClickHouse) quote escaping.
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return sql.replace(/'(?:[^'\\]|\\.|'')*'/g, "''");
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}
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/**
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* Best-effort read-only guard for `betterstack_query`.
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*
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* Accepts SELECT / WITH / DESCRIBE statements, rejects everything else,
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* rejects multi-statement input, and appends a LIMIT cap when the query
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* has none. Keyword checks ignore string literal contents so a log
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* message containing "LIMIT" doesn't skip the cap.
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*
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* This is UX, not a security boundary: a determined query can still do
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* anything the ClickHouse connection's role allows. Use a read-only
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* role for the configured credentials.
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*/
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export function prepareReadOnlyQuery(query) {
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let sql = query.trim().replace(/;\s*$/, "").trim();
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const stripped = stripStringLiterals(sql);
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if (stripped.includes(";")) {
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throw new Error("[BetterStack] Multi-statement queries are not allowed — send a single statement");
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}
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if (!/^(SELECT|WITH|DESCRIBE)\b/i.test(stripped)) {
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throw new Error("[BetterStack] Only read-only queries are allowed (SELECT, WITH, or DESCRIBE)");
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}
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// Append LIMIT if none present to prevent unbounded result sets.
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// DESCRIBE output is already bounded by the column count.
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if (!/^DESCRIBE\b/i.test(stripped) && !/\bLIMIT\b/i.test(stripped)) {
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sql = `${sql} LIMIT 500`;
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}
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return sql;
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}
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// ─── Skill definition ──────────────────────────────────────────
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export const betterstack = {
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id: "betterstack",
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@@ -55,7 +107,8 @@ export const betterstack = {
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env: "BETTERSTACK_QUERY_ENDPOINT",
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},
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BETTERSTACK_QUERY_USERNAME: {
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description: "ClickHouse connection username"
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description: "ClickHouse connection username. Use a read-only role — the in-skill query guard is best-effort, " +
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"not a security boundary",
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required: true,
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env: "BETTERSTACK_QUERY_USERNAME",
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},
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@@ -114,7 +167,7 @@ export const betterstack = {
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required: ["table"],
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},
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handler: async (input, ctx) => {
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return bsQuery(`DESCRIBE TABLE remote(${input.table}_logs)`, ctx);
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return bsQuery(`DESCRIBE TABLE remote(${assertClickHouseIdentifier(input.table)}_logs)`, ctx);
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},
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},
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{
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@@ -123,28 +176,19 @@ export const betterstack = {
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Tables: remote(TABLE_logs) for recent logs, s3Cluster(primary, TABLE_s3) for historical (add WHERE _row_type = 1).
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Key fields: dt (timestamp), raw (JSON blob with all log fields).
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Extract nested fields: JSONExtract(raw, 'field_name', 'Nullable(String)').
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Use betterstack_get_source_fields to discover available columns
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Use betterstack_get_source_fields to discover available columns.
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Only single SELECT / WITH / DESCRIBE statements are accepted.`,
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input_schema: {
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type: "object",
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properties: {
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query: { type: "string", description: "ClickHouse SQL query (SELECT
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query: { type: "string", description: "ClickHouse SQL query (single SELECT, WITH, or DESCRIBE statement)" },
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source_id: { type: "number", description: "Source ID (for context)" },
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table: { type: "string", description: "Table name (e.g. t273774_offload_ecs_production)" },
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},
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required: ["query", "source_id", "table"],
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},
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handler: async (input, ctx) => {
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const upper = trimmed.toUpperCase();
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if (!upper.startsWith("SELECT") && !upper.startsWith("DESCRIBE")) {
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throw new Error("[BetterStack] Only SELECT and DESCRIBE queries are allowed");
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}
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// Append LIMIT if none present to prevent unbounded result sets
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let sql = trimmed;
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if (!upper.includes("LIMIT")) {
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sql = `${sql} LIMIT 500`;
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}
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return bsQuery(sql, ctx);
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return bsQuery(prepareReadOnlyQuery(input.query), ctx);
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},
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},
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],
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package/dist/skills/github.d.ts
CHANGED
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* ~800 lines → ~120 lines
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*/
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import type { Skill } from "../types.js";
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/**
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* Encode an LLM-chosen repo file path for safe interpolation into a
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* GitHub API request path.
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*
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* Trust model (issue #226): tool arguments are runtime-controlled by the
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* model and can be steered by prompt-injected content. Without encoding,
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* a `path` containing `?` or `#` rewrites the request (injects query
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* params / truncates via fragment), and `..` segments walk out of the
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* `/contents/` endpoint entirely.
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*
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* Each `/`-separated segment is percent-encoded (so `/` between segments
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* is preserved); `.` and `..` segments are rejected outright because
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* URL normalization resolves them server-side even when encoded.
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*/
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export declare function encodeRepoFilePath(path: string): string;
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export declare const github: Skill;
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package/dist/skills/github.js
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return false;
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return /pull request already exists/i.test(err.body);
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}
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/**
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* Encode an LLM-chosen repo file path for safe interpolation into a
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* GitHub API request path.
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*
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* Trust model (issue #226): tool arguments are runtime-controlled by the
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* model and can be steered by prompt-injected content. Without encoding,
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* a `path` containing `?` or `#` rewrites the request (injects query
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* params / truncates via fragment), and `..` segments walk out of the
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* `/contents/` endpoint entirely.
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*
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* Each `/`-separated segment is percent-encoded (so `/` between segments
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* is preserved); `.` and `..` segments are rejected outright because
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* URL normalization resolves them server-side even when encoded.
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*/
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export function encodeRepoFilePath(path) {
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return path
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.split("/")
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.filter((segment) => segment !== "")
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.map((segment) => {
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if (segment === "." || segment === "..") {
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throw new Error(`[GitHub] Invalid path segment "${segment}" — relative path segments are not allowed`);
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}
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return encodeURIComponent(segment);
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})
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.join("/");
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}
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export const github = {
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id: "github",
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name: "GitHub",
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@@ -224,8 +250,8 @@ export const github = {
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required: ["repo", "path"],
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},
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handler: async (input, ctx) => {
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const ref = input.ref ? `?ref=${input.ref}` : "";
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const data = await gh(`/repos/${input.repo}/contents/${input.path}${ref}`, ctx);
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const ref = input.ref ? `?ref=${encodeURIComponent(input.ref)}` : "";
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const data = await gh(`/repos/${input.repo}/contents/${encodeRepoFilePath(input.path)}${ref}`, ctx);
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if (data.content && data.encoding === "base64") {
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return { ...data, decoded_content: Buffer.from(data.content, "base64").toString("utf-8") };
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}
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* and the Management API for project-level operations.
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import type { Skill } from "../types.js";
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/** Validate an LLM-chosen table/column name as a bare PostgREST identifier. */
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export declare function assertSupabaseIdentifier(name: string, label?: string): string;
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/** Validate an LLM-chosen RPC / edge function name (hyphens allowed for edge functions). */
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export declare function assertSupabaseFunctionName(name: string): string;
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/**
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* Append PostgREST filter strings ("column=op.value") to query params.
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* Each filter is split at its first `=`; the value side is appended as a
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* single parameter value so `&`/`=` inside it are percent-encoded rather
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* than interpreted as additional parameters.
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*/
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export declare function appendPostgrestFilters(params: URLSearchParams, filters: string[]): URLSearchParams;
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export declare const supabase: Skill;
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package/dist/skills/supabase.js
CHANGED
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* Uses the Supabase REST API (PostgREST) for data operations
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* and the Management API for project-level operations.
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*/
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// ─── Input hardening (issue #226) ──────────────────────────────
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//
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// Threat model: this skill runs with SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY, which
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// bypasses RLS entirely, and `table`, `filters[]`, and function names are
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// LLM-controlled at runtime (steerable by prompt-injected content).
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// Identifiers are validated before they reach the request path, filter
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// values are URL-encoded so one filter string cannot smuggle extra query
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// parameters, and the optional SUPABASE_ALLOWED_TABLES /
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// SUPABASE_ALLOWED_FUNCTIONS allowlists bound what the agent can touch.
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/** Validate an LLM-chosen table/column name as a bare PostgREST identifier. */
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export function assertSupabaseIdentifier(name, label = "table") {
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if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_]+$/.test(name)) {
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throw new Error(`[Supabase] Invalid ${label} identifier "${name}" — only letters, digits, and _ are allowed`);
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}
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return name;
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}
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/** Validate an LLM-chosen RPC / edge function name (hyphens allowed for edge functions). */
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export function assertSupabaseFunctionName(name) {
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if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(name)) {
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throw new Error(`[Supabase] Invalid function name "${name}" — only letters, digits, _ and - are allowed`);
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}
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return name;
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}
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/**
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* Append PostgREST filter strings ("column=op.value") to query params.
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* Each filter is split at its first `=`; the value side is appended as a
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* single parameter value so `&`/`=` inside it are percent-encoded rather
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* than interpreted as additional parameters.
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*/
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export function appendPostgrestFilters(params, filters) {
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for (const filter of filters) {
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const eq = filter.indexOf("=");
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if (eq <= 0) {
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throw new Error(`[Supabase] Invalid filter "${filter}" — expected "column=operator.value" (e.g. "id=eq.1")`);
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}
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params.append(filter.slice(0, eq), filter.slice(eq + 1));
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}
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return params;
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}
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/** Parse an optional comma-separated allowlist config value. Returns null when unset (no restriction). */
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function resolveAllowlist(config, key) {
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const raw = config[key];
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if (!raw || !raw.trim())
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return null;
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return new Set(raw
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.split(",")
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.map((entry) => entry.trim())
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.filter(Boolean));
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}
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/** Validate a table name and check it against SUPABASE_ALLOWED_TABLES (when configured). */
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function checkTable(table, ctx) {
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assertSupabaseIdentifier(table);
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const allowlist = resolveAllowlist(ctx.config, "SUPABASE_ALLOWED_TABLES");
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if (allowlist && !allowlist.has(table)) {
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throw new Error(`[Supabase] Table "${table}" is not on the SUPABASE_ALLOWED_TABLES allowlist (${[...allowlist].join(", ")})`);
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}
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return table;
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}
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/** Validate a function name and check it against SUPABASE_ALLOWED_FUNCTIONS (when configured). */
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function checkFunction(name, ctx) {
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assertSupabaseFunctionName(name);
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const allowlist = resolveAllowlist(ctx.config, "SUPABASE_ALLOWED_FUNCTIONS");
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if (allowlist && !allowlist.has(name)) {
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throw new Error(`[Supabase] Function "${name}" is not on the SUPABASE_ALLOWED_FUNCTIONS allowlist (${[...allowlist].join(", ")})`);
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}
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return name;
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}
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|
async function supabaseRest(path, ctx, init) {
|
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9
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const url = ctx.config.SUPABASE_URL;
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10
77
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const key = ctx.config.SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY;
|
|
@@ -54,10 +121,24 @@ export const supabase = {
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54
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env: "SUPABASE_URL",
|
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55
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},
|
|
56
123
|
SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY: {
|
|
57
|
-
description: "Supabase service role key (full access,
|
|
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|
+
description: "Supabase service role key (full access, bypasses RLS — high blast radius). " +
|
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+
"Prefer a scoped key where possible, and bound exposure with SUPABASE_ALLOWED_TABLES / " +
|
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|
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"SUPABASE_ALLOWED_FUNCTIONS",
|
|
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required: true,
|
|
59
128
|
env: "SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY",
|
|
60
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},
|
|
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|
+
SUPABASE_ALLOWED_TABLES: {
|
|
131
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+
description: "Optional comma-separated table allowlist. When set, data tools (query/count/insert/update/delete) " +
|
|
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|
+
"are restricted to these tables",
|
|
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|
+
required: false,
|
|
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|
+
env: "SUPABASE_ALLOWED_TABLES",
|
|
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|
+
},
|
|
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|
+
SUPABASE_ALLOWED_FUNCTIONS: {
|
|
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|
+
description: "Optional comma-separated function allowlist. When set, supabase_rpc and supabase_invoke_function " +
|
|
138
|
+
"are restricted to these RPC / edge function names",
|
|
139
|
+
required: false,
|
|
140
|
+
env: "SUPABASE_ALLOWED_FUNCTIONS",
|
|
141
|
+
},
|
|
61
142
|
},
|
|
62
143
|
tools: [
|
|
63
144
|
// ─── Read ────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
@@ -89,18 +170,14 @@ export const supabase = {
|
|
|
89
170
|
required: ["table"],
|
|
90
171
|
},
|
|
91
172
|
handler: async (input, ctx) => {
|
|
173
|
+
const table = checkTable(input.table, ctx);
|
|
92
174
|
const params = new URLSearchParams();
|
|
93
175
|
params.set("select", input.select || "*");
|
|
94
176
|
if (input.order)
|
|
95
177
|
params.set("order", input.order);
|
|
96
178
|
params.set("limit", String(input.limit || 100));
|
|
97
|
-
|
|
98
|
-
|
|
99
|
-
for (const f of input.filters) {
|
|
100
|
-
path += `&${f}`;
|
|
101
|
-
}
|
|
102
|
-
}
|
|
103
|
-
return supabaseRest(path, ctx);
|
|
179
|
+
appendPostgrestFilters(params, input.filters ?? []);
|
|
180
|
+
return supabaseRest(`/${table}?${params}`, ctx);
|
|
104
181
|
},
|
|
105
182
|
},
|
|
106
183
|
{
|
|
@@ -121,12 +198,10 @@ export const supabase = {
|
|
|
121
198
|
handler: async (input, ctx) => {
|
|
122
199
|
const url = ctx.config.SUPABASE_URL;
|
|
123
200
|
const key = ctx.config.SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY;
|
|
124
|
-
|
|
125
|
-
|
|
126
|
-
|
|
127
|
-
|
|
128
|
-
}
|
|
129
|
-
}
|
|
201
|
+
const table = checkTable(input.table, ctx);
|
|
202
|
+
const params = new URLSearchParams({ select: "count" });
|
|
203
|
+
appendPostgrestFilters(params, input.filters ?? []);
|
|
204
|
+
const path = `${url}/rest/v1/${table}?${params}`;
|
|
130
205
|
const res = await fetch(path, {
|
|
131
206
|
headers: {
|
|
132
207
|
apikey: key,
|
|
@@ -165,11 +240,12 @@ export const supabase = {
|
|
|
165
240
|
required: ["table", "rows"],
|
|
166
241
|
},
|
|
167
242
|
handler: async (input, ctx) => {
|
|
243
|
+
const table = checkTable(input.table, ctx);
|
|
168
244
|
const headers = {};
|
|
169
245
|
if (input.upsert) {
|
|
170
246
|
headers["Prefer"] = "resolution=merge-duplicates,return=representation";
|
|
171
247
|
}
|
|
172
|
-
return supabaseRest(`/${
|
|
248
|
+
return supabaseRest(`/${table}`, ctx, {
|
|
173
249
|
method: "POST",
|
|
174
250
|
headers,
|
|
175
251
|
body: JSON.stringify(input.rows),
|
|
@@ -199,10 +275,9 @@ export const supabase = {
|
|
|
199
275
|
if (!input.filters || input.filters.length === 0) {
|
|
200
276
|
throw new Error("Filters are required for update operations to prevent accidental full-table updates");
|
|
201
277
|
}
|
|
202
|
-
|
|
203
|
-
const
|
|
204
|
-
|
|
205
|
-
return supabaseRest(path, ctx, {
|
|
278
|
+
const table = checkTable(input.table, ctx);
|
|
279
|
+
const params = appendPostgrestFilters(new URLSearchParams(), input.filters);
|
|
280
|
+
return supabaseRest(`/${table}?${params}`, ctx, {
|
|
206
281
|
method: "PATCH",
|
|
207
282
|
body: JSON.stringify(input.data),
|
|
208
283
|
});
|
|
@@ -227,8 +302,9 @@ export const supabase = {
|
|
|
227
302
|
if (!input.filters || input.filters.length === 0) {
|
|
228
303
|
throw new Error("Filters are required for delete operations");
|
|
229
304
|
}
|
|
230
|
-
const
|
|
231
|
-
|
|
305
|
+
const table = checkTable(input.table, ctx);
|
|
306
|
+
const params = appendPostgrestFilters(new URLSearchParams(), input.filters);
|
|
307
|
+
return supabaseRest(`/${table}?${params}`, ctx, { method: "DELETE" });
|
|
232
308
|
},
|
|
233
309
|
},
|
|
234
310
|
// ─── RPC ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
@@ -247,7 +323,7 @@ export const supabase = {
|
|
|
247
323
|
required: ["function_name"],
|
|
248
324
|
},
|
|
249
325
|
handler: async (input, ctx) => {
|
|
250
|
-
return supabaseRest(`/rpc/${input.function_name}`, ctx, {
|
|
326
|
+
return supabaseRest(`/rpc/${checkFunction(input.function_name, ctx)}`, ctx, {
|
|
251
327
|
method: "POST",
|
|
252
328
|
body: JSON.stringify(input.params || {}),
|
|
253
329
|
});
|
|
@@ -272,7 +348,7 @@ export const supabase = {
|
|
|
272
348
|
required: ["function_name", "body"],
|
|
273
349
|
},
|
|
274
350
|
handler: async (input, ctx) => {
|
|
275
|
-
return supabaseEdgeFunction(input.function_name, input.body, ctx);
|
|
351
|
+
return supabaseEdgeFunction(checkFunction(input.function_name, ctx), input.body, ctx);
|
|
276
352
|
},
|
|
277
353
|
},
|
|
278
354
|
// ─── Auth Admin ──────────────────────────────────────────
|