@swal/edge-mesh 0.0.0-stage → 0.1.1

package/dist/medico/malla.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+/**
+ * Wire format for the medical layer — the seam Phase 1 left open.
+ *
+ * ─── THE HOLE THIS FILE CLOSES ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+ *
+ * `src/medico/` defined the data model and its pure validation, but a
+ * `CredencialMedica` could not leave the node that made it: `TIPO_MENSAJE` had
+ * no member for it, and nothing could put one inside an `Envolvente`. The model
+ * existed; the road out of it did not. This file builds the road, and only the
+ * road — it invents no transport and edits no mesh file.
+ *
+ * ─── WHY THE BYTES ARE RE-ENCODED AND NOT JSON-SUMMONED ─────────────────────
+ *
+ * `cifrarPayload` seals `JSON.stringify(env.payload)`. `JSON.stringify` turns a
+ * `Uint8Array` into `{"0":12,"1":34,…}` — an object of indices, not bytes. A
+ * signature sealed that way could not be reconstructed on the far side, so every
+ * byte field (two ML-DSA signatures and the sealed licence number) is hex-encoded
+ * through `canonica.ts` before it enters the payload and decoded on the way out.
+ * `bytesAHex`/`hexABytes` are the same primitives `canonica.ts` already signs
+ * with, so "the bytes the signature covers" and "the bytes that travel" come out
+ * of one implementation instead of two that must agree.
+ *
+ * ─── ORDER OF OPERATIONS IS NOT A STYLE CHOICE ──────────────────────────────
+ *
+ * Serialise → SEAL → SIGN. `cifrarPayload` binds the envelope header into the
+ * AEAD, and `signEnvelope` signs `canonicalEnvelopeBytes`, which covers
+ * `payload`. Signing first would leave the ciphertext outside the signature and
+ * let anyone re-seal a payload under the same signature; so the seal happens
+ * first and the returned envelope is the one that gets signed. On the receiving
+ * side the order inverts: shape, then envelope signature, then decrypt, then the
+ * record's own signature.
+ *
+ * ─── WHAT IS DELIBERATELY NOT HERE ─────────────────────────────────────────
+ *
+ * There is no `transmitirCredencial` on the mesh, because writing one means
+ * editing `src/mesh/index.ts` next to `transmitirKarma`, which another owner
+ * owns. {@link aPayloadGossipMedico} produces exactly the object
+ * `MeshManager.transmitirConGossip(namespace, payload)` takes, so wiring it up is
+ * a one-line method on the mesh rather than a redesign.
+ *
+ * Pure and testable: the clock and the randomness live inside `createEnvelope`,
+ * and everything else is injected, so the whole roundtrip runs on fixtures with
+ * no network and no filesystem.
+ */
+import type { ParPublico, PostQuantumIdentity } from "../identity/index.js";
+import { GuardiaReplay, type SesionCifrada } from "../protocol/crypto.js";
+import type { Envolvente, NodoId } from "../types/index.js";
+import type { InstantaneaRegistroPais } from "./registro.js";
+import type { Aval, CredencialMedica } from "./types.js";
+/**
+ * Why a medical message was refused. Every value means the record was NOT
+ * applied. There is no third state — the same fail-closed rule as
+ * `validarCredencial`: a peer must never be able to tell "malformed" from
+ * "unknown" and act differently on the two.
+ */
+export declare const MOTIVO_RECHAZO_MALLA: {
+    /** The envelope shape itself is invalid (`validateEnvelope` failed). */
+    readonly ENVOLVENTE_INVALIDA: "envolvente_invalida";
+    /** The envelope's ML-DSA signature does not verify against the sender's key. */
+    readonly FIRMA_ENVOLVENTE_INVALIDA: "firma_envolvente_invalida";
+    /** The envelope is not a sealed payload, or the AEAD rejected it. */
+    readonly PAYLOAD_NO_CIFRADO: "payload_no_cifrado";
+    /** The plaintext payload is not the record type this message type declares. */
+    readonly PAYLOAD_MALFORMADO: "payload_malformado";
+    /** The record's own signature does not verify against its claimed issuer. */
+    readonly FIRMA_REGISTRO_INVALIDA: "firma_registro_invalida";
+};
+export type MotivoRechazoMalla = (typeof MOTIVO_RECHAZO_MALLA)[keyof typeof MOTIVO_RECHAZO_MALLA];
+/** Fail-closed outcome. `ok: true` is the only way a record reaches a caller. */
+export type ResultadoRecepcion<T> = {
+    readonly ok: true;
+    readonly registro: T;
+} | {
+    readonly ok: false;
+    readonly motivo: MotivoRechazoMalla;
+    readonly detalle: string;
+};
+/**
+ * `CredencialMedica` with `Uint8Array` fields as hex. An optional field that was
+ * absent stays absent: `hexABytes(undefined)` throws, and an absent optional must
+ * not come back as a present zero-length one.
+ */
+export interface CredencialMedicaWire {
+    readonly id: string;
+    readonly tipo: string;
+    readonly pais: string;
+    readonly autoridad: string;
+    readonly idLicencia: string;
+    readonly numeroLicenciaCifrado?: string;
+    readonly especialidad?: string;
+    readonly emitidoEn: number;
+    readonly vigenteHasta: number;
+    readonly estadoEmision: string;
+    readonly firma: string;
+    readonly emisor: NodoId;
+}
+export interface MetodoVerificacionWire {
+    readonly clase: string;
+    readonly pais?: string;
+    readonly versionRegistro?: string;
+    readonly ref?: string;
+    readonly desde?: number;
+    readonly hasta?: number;
+}
+export interface AvalWire {
+    readonly id: string;
+    readonly version: number;
+    readonly avalador: NodoId;
+    readonly avalado: NodoId;
+    readonly objetoAval: string;
+    readonly credencialRef: string;
+    readonly hashCredencial: string;
+    readonly metodoVerificacion: MetodoVerificacionWire;
+    readonly evidenciaHash: string;
+    readonly alcance: string;
+    readonly emitidoEn: number;
+    readonly vigenteHasta: number;
+    readonly revocable: true;
+    readonly firma: string;
+}
+/**
+ * A registry snapshot travels as a **sorted array of hashes**, never a `Set`.
+ *
+ * A `Set` is not JSON-serialisable, and its iteration order is insertion order —
+ * two nodes holding the same snapshot in a different insertion order would sign
+ * different bytes for identical content. Sorting is what makes the snapshot
+ * hash-addressable at all.
+ */
+export interface RegistroPaisWire {
+    readonly pais: string;
+    readonly version: string;
+    readonly hashes: readonly string[];
+}
+export declare function credencialAWire(credencial: CredencialMedica): CredencialMedicaWire;
+export declare function avalAWire(aval: Aval): AvalWire;
+export declare function registroAWire(instantanea: InstantaneaRegistroPais): RegistroPaisWire;
+/**
+ * Inverse of {@link credencialAWire}.
+ *
+ * Takes `unknown` on purpose. The value arrives from a decrypted payload, so it
+ * is attacker-influenced data: narrowing it by assertion here would push the
+ * check to the caller, and a caller that forgets becomes the hole. The shape
+ * assertion is cheap, and `validarCredencial` still runs before the record counts
+ * as anything.
+ *
+ * @throws TypeError on a malformed wire payload.
+ */
+export declare function wireACredencial(wire: unknown): CredencialMedica;
+/**
+ * Inverse of {@link avalAWire}. Takes `unknown` for the same trust-boundary
+ * reason as {@link wireACredencial}.
+ *
+ * @throws TypeError on a malformed wire payload.
+ */
+export declare function wireAAval(wire: unknown): Aval;
+/**
+ * What a sender needs: an identity to sign with and the encryption session the
+ * payload is sealed under. Injected rather than imported so this module never
+ * reaches into the mesh for a session it does not own.
+ */
+export interface OpcionesEmitir {
+    /** Signs the sealed envelope. */
+    readonly identidad: PostQuantumIdentity;
+    /** Session whose AEAD key the payload is sealed under. */
+    readonly sesion: SesionCifrada;
+    /** Addressed recipient. Defaults to `'*'` (gossip: anyone may relay). */
+    readonly destino?: NodoId;
+}
+/** A sealed, signed envelope plus the session advanced past it. */
+export interface EmisionMedica {
+    readonly env: Envolvente;
+    readonly sesion: SesionCifrada;
+}
+export declare function emitirCredencial(credencial: CredencialMedica, opciones: OpcionesEmitir): Promise<EmisionMedica>;
+export declare function emitirAval(aval: Aval, opciones: OpcionesEmitir): Promise<EmisionMedica>;
+export declare function emitirRegistro(instantanea: InstantaneaRegistroPais, opciones: OpcionesEmitir): Promise<EmisionMedica>;
+/** What a receiver needs to check a message it did not create. */
+export interface OpcionesRecibir {
+    readonly sesion: SesionCifrada;
+    /** Replay protection. Supply one to share a window across messages. */
+    readonly guardia?: GuardiaReplay;
+    /** The sender's identity, to verify the envelope signature. */
+    readonly identidadEmisor: PostQuantumIdentity;
+    readonly parPublicoEmisor: ParPublico;
+}
+/**
+ * Receive and fully verify a credential.
+ *
+ * @param verificarFirma pass `false` only when the caller has already established
+ *   the issuer's key by another route; the default re-checks the record's own
+ *   signature, which is what binds the claim to `emisor`.
+ */
+export declare function recibirCredencial(env: Envolvente, opciones: OpcionesRecibir, verificarFirma?: boolean): Promise<ResultadoRecepcion<CredencialMedica>>;
+/** Receive and fully verify an endorsement. Mirrors {@link recibirCredencial}. */
+export declare function recibirAval(env: Envolvente, opciones: OpcionesRecibir, verificarFirma?: boolean): Promise<ResultadoRecepcion<Aval>>;
+/**
+ * Discriminator for the gossip payload, mirroring `PAYLOAD_KARMA_TIPO` in
+ * `src/mesh/index.ts`. Namespaced so a medical message is never mistaken for
+ * another gossip payload kind by a listener that dispatches on `tipo`.
+ */
+export declare const PAYLOAD_MEDICO_TIPO: "medico:v1";
+/**
+ * Exactly the object `MeshManager.transmitirConGossip(namespace, payload)` already
+ * accepts, so wiring the medical layer into gossip is one method next to
+ * `transmitirKarma` — not a transport change, and not this file's job.
+ *
+ * The envelope travels **whole**, sealed and signed, because a gossip `payload`
+ * slot is opaque and the node that finally reads a relayed message is not
+ * necessarily the one the session was established with: it cannot open the
+ * ciphertext. Confidentiality therefore holds for the direct leg only, and a
+ * relayed credential arrives still sealed — which is why routing a relayed record
+ * needs per-hop re-sealing, not just a `transmitir` call.
+ */
+export declare function aPayloadGossipMedico(env: Envolvente): {
+    readonly tipo: typeof PAYLOAD_MEDICO_TIPO;
+    readonly env: Envolvente;
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=malla.d.ts.map

package/dist/medico/malla.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/medico/malla.js

@@ -0,0 +1,347 @@
+/**
+ * Wire format for the medical layer — the seam Phase 1 left open.
+ *
+ * ─── THE HOLE THIS FILE CLOSES ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+ *
+ * `src/medico/` defined the data model and its pure validation, but a
+ * `CredencialMedica` could not leave the node that made it: `TIPO_MENSAJE` had
+ * no member for it, and nothing could put one inside an `Envolvente`. The model
+ * existed; the road out of it did not. This file builds the road, and only the
+ * road — it invents no transport and edits no mesh file.
+ *
+ * ─── WHY THE BYTES ARE RE-ENCODED AND NOT JSON-SUMMONED ─────────────────────
+ *
+ * `cifrarPayload` seals `JSON.stringify(env.payload)`. `JSON.stringify` turns a
+ * `Uint8Array` into `{"0":12,"1":34,…}` — an object of indices, not bytes. A
+ * signature sealed that way could not be reconstructed on the far side, so every
+ * byte field (two ML-DSA signatures and the sealed licence number) is hex-encoded
+ * through `canonica.ts` before it enters the payload and decoded on the way out.
+ * `bytesAHex`/`hexABytes` are the same primitives `canonica.ts` already signs
+ * with, so "the bytes the signature covers" and "the bytes that travel" come out
+ * of one implementation instead of two that must agree.
+ *
+ * ─── ORDER OF OPERATIONS IS NOT A STYLE CHOICE ──────────────────────────────
+ *
+ * Serialise → SEAL → SIGN. `cifrarPayload` binds the envelope header into the
+ * AEAD, and `signEnvelope` signs `canonicalEnvelopeBytes`, which covers
+ * `payload`. Signing first would leave the ciphertext outside the signature and
+ * let anyone re-seal a payload under the same signature; so the seal happens
+ * first and the returned envelope is the one that gets signed. On the receiving
+ * side the order inverts: shape, then envelope signature, then decrypt, then the
+ * record's own signature.
+ *
+ * ─── WHAT IS DELIBERATELY NOT HERE ─────────────────────────────────────────
+ *
+ * There is no `transmitirCredencial` on the mesh, because writing one means
+ * editing `src/mesh/index.ts` next to `transmitirKarma`, which another owner
+ * owns. {@link aPayloadGossipMedico} produces exactly the object
+ * `MeshManager.transmitirConGossip(namespace, payload)` takes, so wiring it up is
+ * a one-line method on the mesh rather than a redesign.
+ *
+ * Pure and testable: the clock and the randomness live inside `createEnvelope`,
+ * and everything else is injected, so the whole roundtrip runs on fixtures with
+ * no network and no filesystem.
+ */
+import { abrirPayload, cifrarYSiguiente, GuardiaReplay, } from "../protocol/crypto.js";
+import { createEnvelope, signEnvelope, validateEnvelope, verifyEnvelopeSignature, } from "../protocol/index.js";
+import { TIPO_MENSAJE } from "../types/index.js";
+import { verificarFirmaAval } from "./aval.js";
+import { bytesAHex, hexABytes } from "./canonica.js";
+import { verificarFirmaCredencial } from "./credencial.js";
+// ─── REJECTION REASONS ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+/**
+ * Why a medical message was refused. Every value means the record was NOT
+ * applied. There is no third state — the same fail-closed rule as
+ * `validarCredencial`: a peer must never be able to tell "malformed" from
+ * "unknown" and act differently on the two.
+ */
+export const MOTIVO_RECHAZO_MALLA = {
+    /** The envelope shape itself is invalid (`validateEnvelope` failed). */
+    ENVOLVENTE_INVALIDA: "envolvente_invalida",
+    /** The envelope's ML-DSA signature does not verify against the sender's key. */
+    FIRMA_ENVOLVENTE_INVALIDA: "firma_envolvente_invalida",
+    /** The envelope is not a sealed payload, or the AEAD rejected it. */
+    PAYLOAD_NO_CIFRADO: "payload_no_cifrado",
+    /** The plaintext payload is not the record type this message type declares. */
+    PAYLOAD_MALFORMADO: "payload_malformado",
+    /** The record's own signature does not verify against its claimed issuer. */
+    FIRMA_REGISTRO_INVALIDA: "firma_registro_invalida",
+};
+function fallo(motivo, detalle) {
+    return { ok: false, motivo, detalle };
+}
+export function credencialAWire(credencial) {
+    return {
+        id: credencial.id,
+        tipo: credencial.tipo,
+        pais: credencial.pais,
+        autoridad: credencial.autoridad,
+        idLicencia: credencial.idLicencia,
+        ...(credencial.numeroLicenciaCifrado
+            ? { numeroLicenciaCifrado: bytesAHex(credencial.numeroLicenciaCifrado) }
+            : {}),
+        ...(credencial.especialidad === undefined
+            ? {}
+            : { especialidad: credencial.especialidad }),
+        emitidoEn: credencial.emitidoEn,
+        vigenteHasta: credencial.vigenteHasta,
+        estadoEmision: credencial.estadoEmision,
+        firma: bytesAHex(credencial.firma),
+        emisor: credencial.emisor,
+    };
+}
+export function avalAWire(aval) {
+    return {
+        id: aval.id,
+        version: aval.version,
+        avalador: aval.avalador,
+        avalado: aval.avalado,
+        objetoAval: aval.objetoAval,
+        credencialRef: aval.credencialRef,
+        hashCredencial: aval.hashCredencial,
+        metodoVerificacion: metodoAWire(aval.metodoVerificacion),
+        evidenciaHash: aval.evidenciaHash,
+        alcance: aval.alcance,
+        emitidoEn: aval.emitidoEn,
+        vigenteHasta: aval.vigenteHasta,
+        revocable: true,
+        firma: bytesAHex(aval.firma),
+    };
+}
+export function registroAWire(instantanea) {
+    return {
+        pais: instantanea.pais,
+        version: instantanea.version,
+        hashes: Array.from(instantanea.hashes).sort(),
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Rebuild the discriminated union from its wire form.
+ *
+ * An explicit switch over `clase`, not a generic key copy, so an unknown class
+ * fails loudly instead of silently becoming an object that still type-checks as
+ * `MetodoVerificacion`. A copy-through is exactly where
+ * `metodoVerificacion.clase: 'inventada'` would slip into a validated record.
+ */
+function wireAMetodo(wire) {
+    switch (wire.clase) {
+        case "registro_por_pais":
+            return {
+                clase: "registro_por_pais",
+                pais: wire.pais ?? "",
+                versionRegistro: wire.versionRegistro ?? "",
+            };
+        case "colegio_directo":
+            return { clase: "colegio_directo", ref: wire.ref ?? "" };
+        case "testimonio_directo":
+            return { clase: "testimonio_directo" };
+        case "supervision":
+            return {
+                clase: "supervision",
+                desde: wire.desde ?? 0,
+                hasta: wire.hasta ?? 0,
+            };
+        default:
+            throw new TypeError(`wireAMetodo: clase de verificación desconocida: ${String(wire.clase)}`);
+    }
+}
+function metodoAWire(metodo) {
+    switch (metodo.clase) {
+        case "registro_por_pais":
+            return {
+                clase: metodo.clase,
+                pais: metodo.pais,
+                versionRegistro: metodo.versionRegistro,
+            };
+        case "colegio_directo":
+            return { clase: metodo.clase, ref: metodo.ref };
+        case "testimonio_directo":
+            return { clase: metodo.clase };
+        case "supervision":
+            return { clase: metodo.clase, desde: metodo.desde, hasta: metodo.hasta };
+    }
+}
+function hexObligatorio(valor, campo) {
+    if (typeof valor !== "string" || valor.length === 0) {
+        throw new TypeError(`${campo}: se esperaba un string hex, recibido ${typeof valor}`);
+    }
+    return hexABytes(valor);
+}
+/**
+ * Inverse of {@link credencialAWire}.
+ *
+ * Takes `unknown` on purpose. The value arrives from a decrypted payload, so it
+ * is attacker-influenced data: narrowing it by assertion here would push the
+ * check to the caller, and a caller that forgets becomes the hole. The shape
+ * assertion is cheap, and `validarCredencial` still runs before the record counts
+ * as anything.
+ *
+ * @throws TypeError on a malformed wire payload.
+ */
+export function wireACredencial(wire) {
+    if (wire === null || typeof wire !== "object")
+        throw new TypeError("wireACredencial: payload no es un objeto");
+    const w = wire;
+    return {
+        id: w.id,
+        tipo: w.tipo,
+        pais: w.pais,
+        autoridad: w.autoridad,
+        idLicencia: w.idLicencia,
+        ...(w.numeroLicenciaCifrado
+            ? { numeroLicenciaCifrado: hexABytes(w.numeroLicenciaCifrado) }
+            : {}),
+        ...(w.especialidad === undefined ? {} : { especialidad: w.especialidad }),
+        emitidoEn: w.emitidoEn,
+        vigenteHasta: w.vigenteHasta,
+        estadoEmision: w.estadoEmision,
+        firma: hexObligatorio(w.firma, "credencial.firma"),
+        emisor: w.emisor,
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Inverse of {@link avalAWire}. Takes `unknown` for the same trust-boundary
+ * reason as {@link wireACredencial}.
+ *
+ * @throws TypeError on a malformed wire payload.
+ */
+export function wireAAval(wire) {
+    if (wire === null || typeof wire !== "object")
+        throw new TypeError("wireAAval: payload no es un objeto");
+    const w = wire;
+    return {
+        id: w.id,
+        version: w.version,
+        avalador: w.avalador,
+        avalado: w.avalado,
+        objetoAval: w.objetoAval,
+        credencialRef: w.credencialRef,
+        hashCredencial: w.hashCredencial,
+        metodoVerificacion: wireAMetodo(w.metodoVerificacion),
+        evidenciaHash: w.evidenciaHash,
+        alcance: w.alcance,
+        emitidoEn: w.emitidoEn,
+        vigenteHasta: w.vigenteHasta,
+        revocable: true,
+        firma: hexObligatorio(w.firma, "aval.firma"),
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Seal then sign. Shared by all three record types because the ordering
+ * constraint is identical for each; only the message type and the wire body
+ * vary.
+ */
+async function emitir(tipo, cuerpo, opciones) {
+    // `cifrarYSiguiente` rather than `cifrarPayload` + a manual increment: it is
+    // the same two lines, but it also runs `assertContadorLibre` FIRST, so a
+    // reused counter is refused before anything is sealed instead of after.
+    const { env, sesion } = cifrarYSiguiente(createEnvelope(tipo, opciones.identidad.nodoId, opciones.destino ?? "*", cuerpo), opciones.sesion);
+    // Sign AFTER sealing: the ML-DSA signature must cover the ciphertext, not the
+    // plaintext that was just replaced by it.
+    return { env: await signEnvelope(env, opciones.identidad), sesion };
+}
+export function emitirCredencial(credencial, opciones) {
+    return emitir(TIPO_MENSAJE.CREDENCIAL, credencialAWire(credencial), opciones);
+}
+export function emitirAval(aval, opciones) {
+    return emitir(TIPO_MENSAJE.AVAL, avalAWire(aval), opciones);
+}
+export function emitirRegistro(instantanea, opciones) {
+    return emitir(TIPO_MENSAJE.REGISTRO, registroAWire(instantanea), opciones);
+}
+/**
+ * The shared receive prologue: shape → envelope signature → decrypt → rehydrate.
+ *
+ * `aplicarGuardia: false` is deliberate. The record's own ML-DSA signature is
+ * checked immediately afterwards, and a record that fails that check has not been
+ * accepted in any sense worth burning a replay counter over — the counter is
+ * one-shot per direction, so spending it on an unauthenticated record is how a
+ * peer gets its session wedged by junk. `abrirPayload` still refuses an
+ * out-of-window counter when `aplicarGuardia` is left on; idempotency of the
+ * record itself is carried by `Aval.id`, the key `canonica.ts#idAval` exists to
+ * provide.
+ */
+async function recibir(env, tipoEsperado, opciones, aRegistro) {
+    // 1. Shape. Cheapest, and it refuses before any PQC work.
+    if (!validateEnvelope(env))
+        return fallo(MOTIVO_RECHAZO_MALLA.ENVOLVENTE_INVALIDA, "validateEnvelope rechazó la forma");
+    if (env.tipo !== tipoEsperado) {
+        return fallo(MOTIVO_RECHAZO_MALLA.PAYLOAD_MALFORMADO, `tipo ${env.tipo} donde se esperaba ${tipoEsperado}`);
+    }
+    // 2. Envelope signature, BEFORE decryption: an unsigned or forged envelope
+    //    must not cost a Poly1305 open, let alone reach the record.
+    const firmaOk = await verifyEnvelopeSignature(env, opciones.parPublicoEmisor, opciones.identidadEmisor);
+    if (!firmaOk) {
+        return fallo(MOTIVO_RECHAZO_MALLA.FIRMA_ENVOLVENTE_INVALIDA, "la firma del envolvente no verifica contra la clave del emisor");
+    }
+    // 3. Open the AEAD.
+    let abierto;
+    try {
+        abierto = abrirPayload(env, opciones.sesion, opciones.guardia ?? new GuardiaReplay(), { aplicarGuardia: false });
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        return fallo(MOTIVO_RECHAZO_MALLA.PAYLOAD_NO_CIFRADO, error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error));
+    }
+    // 4. Rehydrate. A malformed body is a refusal, never a partial object.
+    try {
+        return { ok: true, registro: aRegistro(abierto.payload) };
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        return fallo(MOTIVO_RECHAZO_MALLA.PAYLOAD_MALFORMADO, error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error));
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Receive and fully verify a credential.
+ *
+ * @param verificarFirma pass `false` only when the caller has already established
+ *   the issuer's key by another route; the default re-checks the record's own
+ *   signature, which is what binds the claim to `emisor`.
+ */
+export async function recibirCredencial(env, opciones, verificarFirma = true) {
+    const base = await recibir(env, TIPO_MENSAJE.CREDENCIAL, opciones, wireACredencial);
+    if (!base.ok)
+        return base;
+    if (!verificarFirma)
+        return base;
+    const firmaOk = await verificarFirmaCredencial(base.registro, opciones.identidadEmisor, opciones.parPublicoEmisor);
+    if (!firmaOk) {
+        return fallo(MOTIVO_RECHAZO_MALLA.FIRMA_REGISTRO_INVALIDA, `la firma de la credencial no verifica contra la clave de ${base.registro.emisor}`);
+    }
+    return base;
+}
+/** Receive and fully verify an endorsement. Mirrors {@link recibirCredencial}. */
+export async function recibirAval(env, opciones, verificarFirma = true) {
+    const base = await recibir(env, TIPO_MENSAJE.AVAL, opciones, wireAAval);
+    if (!base.ok)
+        return base;
+    if (!verificarFirma)
+        return base;
+    const firmaOk = await verificarFirmaAval(base.registro, opciones.identidadEmisor, opciones.parPublicoEmisor);
+    if (!firmaOk) {
+        return fallo(MOTIVO_RECHAZO_MALLA.FIRMA_REGISTRO_INVALIDA, `la firma del aval no verifica contra la clave de ${base.registro.avalador}`);
+    }
+    return base;
+}
+// ─── GOSSIP ADAPTER (no mesh file is edited) ────────────────────────────────
+/**
+ * Discriminator for the gossip payload, mirroring `PAYLOAD_KARMA_TIPO` in
+ * `src/mesh/index.ts`. Namespaced so a medical message is never mistaken for
+ * another gossip payload kind by a listener that dispatches on `tipo`.
+ */
+export const PAYLOAD_MEDICO_TIPO = "medico:v1";
+/**
+ * Exactly the object `MeshManager.transmitirConGossip(namespace, payload)` already
+ * accepts, so wiring the medical layer into gossip is one method next to
+ * `transmitirKarma` — not a transport change, and not this file's job.
+ *
+ * The envelope travels **whole**, sealed and signed, because a gossip `payload`
+ * slot is opaque and the node that finally reads a relayed message is not
+ * necessarily the one the session was established with: it cannot open the
+ * ciphertext. Confidentiality therefore holds for the direct leg only, and a
+ * relayed credential arrives still sealed — which is why routing a relayed record
+ * needs per-hop re-sealing, not just a `transmitir` call.
+ */
+export function aPayloadGossipMedico(env) {
+    return { tipo: PAYLOAD_MEDICO_TIPO, env };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=malla.js.map

package/dist/medico/malla.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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