@suveren/gateway 0.18.2 → 0.19.1

package/node_modules/@hap/core/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -315,6 +315,19 @@ interface ProfileBoundsField {
      * kinds, and the same boundType can carry different units.
      */
     unit?: FieldUnit;
+    /**
+     * The largest value a mandate may set for this (numeric) bound — a ceiling
+     * on what the owner can grant, declared by the profile. E.g. reporting@0.2
+     * `read_max_age_days: { maximum: 366 }`: no reporting mandate may read back
+     * further than a year.
+     *
+     * Distinct from the bound itself: the bound limits each ACTION; `maximum`
+     * limits the MANDATE. A value above it is not a valid mandate for this
+     * profile — the mandate editor caps its input, the issuing Authority Server
+     * should refuse it, and an enforcement point that reads the bound applies
+     * min(value, maximum). Absent → no ceiling.
+     */
+    maximum?: number;
     /** @deprecated v0.4: use boundType instead. */
     constraint?: FieldConstraint;
     /** @deprecated v0.4: use boundType: { kind: 'enum', values: [...] }. */

package/node_modules/@hap/core/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@humanagencyp/hap-core",
-  "version": "0.11.1",
+  "version": "0.11.2",
   "description": "Core types, cryptographic primitives, and verification logic for the Human Agency Protocol",
   "license": "MIT",
   "repository": {

package/node_modules/@hap/core/src/types.ts

@@ -320,6 +320,19 @@ export interface ProfileBoundsField {
    * kinds, and the same boundType can carry different units.
    */
   unit?: FieldUnit;
+  /**
+   * The largest value a mandate may set for this (numeric) bound — a ceiling
+   * on what the owner can grant, declared by the profile. E.g. reporting@0.2
+   * `read_max_age_days: { maximum: 366 }`: no reporting mandate may read back
+   * further than a year.
+   *
+   * Distinct from the bound itself: the bound limits each ACTION; `maximum`
+   * limits the MANDATE. A value above it is not a valid mandate for this
+   * profile — the mandate editor caps its input, the issuing Authority Server
+   * should refuse it, and an enforcement point that reads the bound applies
+   * min(value, maximum). Absent → no ceiling.
+   */
+  maximum?: number;
   /** @deprecated v0.4: use boundType instead. */
   constraint?: FieldConstraint;
   /** @deprecated v0.4: use boundType: { kind: 'enum', values: [...] }. */

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@suveren/gateway",
-  "version": "0.18.2",
+  "version": "0.19.1",
   "description": "Suveren gateway — local agent gateway built in compliance with the Human Agency Protocol (HAP). Runs the UI, control plane, and MCP server in one Node process.",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "server.js",

package/profiles/index.json

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
     "github.com/humanagencyprotocol/hap-profiles/sales@0.3": "sales/0.3.profile.json",
     "github.com/humanagencyprotocol/hap-profiles/purchase@0.6": "purchase/0.6.profile.json",
     "github.com/humanagencyprotocol/hap-profiles/reporting@0.1": "reporting/0.1.profile.json",
-    "github.com/humanagencyprotocol/hap-profiles/delegation@0.1": "delegation/0.1.profile.json"
+    "github.com/humanagencyprotocol/hap-profiles/delegation@0.1": "delegation/0.1.profile.json",
+    "github.com/humanagencyprotocol/hap-profiles/reporting@0.2": "reporting/0.2.profile.json"
   }
 }

package/profiles/reporting/0.2.profile.json

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+{
+  "id": "github.com/humanagencyprotocol/hap-profiles/reporting@0.2",
+  "name": "Reporting",
+  "version": "0.2",
+  "description": "Reporting authority — lets an agent read the evidence a gateway holds (tickets, approvals, mandates, records in the systems it connects) and write one report stored on that machine. Changes no system.",
+  "whatsNew": "Adds a reporting window: the agent only sees, opens and exports evidence from the last N days (read_max_age_days). Anything older is invisible to it and cannot enter a report or an export.",
+  "boundsSchema": {
+    "actionTypes": [
+      "report"
+    ],
+    "keyOrder": [
+      "profile",
+      "read_access",
+      "read_max_age_days",
+      "report_daily_max"
+    ],
+    "fields": {
+      "profile": {
+        "type": "string",
+        "required": true
+      },
+      "read_access": {
+        "type": "string",
+        "required": true,
+        "displayName": "Read evidence",
+        "description": "Allow the agent to read tickets, approvals, mandates and the records in connected systems, to build a report",
+        "boundType": {
+          "kind": "enum",
+          "values": [
+            "unlimited",
+            "none"
+          ]
+        },
+        "toolsDescription": "tickets, approvals, mandates, system records",
+        "default": "unlimited"
+      },
+      "read_max_age_days": {
+        "type": "number",
+        "required": true,
+        "displayName": "Reporting window (days)",
+        "description": "How far back the agent may read evidence for a report: tickets, approvals, mandates and records from the last N days, at most 366. Anything older is invisible to the agent and cannot enter a report or an export. Enforced locally by the gateway (reads carry no ticket); signed here so the window the owner approved is part of the mandate.",
+        "unit": "days",
+        "boundType": {
+          "kind": "per_transaction",
+          "of": "read_age_days"
+        },
+        "maximum": 366,
+        "default": 30
+      },
+      "report_daily_max": {
+        "type": "number",
+        "required": true,
+        "displayName": "Report updates per day",
+        "description": "Maximum times per day the agent may write or replace the report",
+        "unit": "count",
+        "boundType": {
+          "kind": "cumulative_count",
+          "window": "daily"
+        },
+        "appliesTo": [
+          "report"
+        ]
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "executionContextSchema": {
+    "fields": {
+      "report_count_daily": {
+        "source": "cumulative",
+        "cumulativeField": "_count",
+        "window": "daily",
+        "description": "Running daily count of report writes",
+        "required": true,
+        "constraint": {
+          "type": "number",
+          "enforceable": [
+            "max"
+          ]
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "requiredGates": [
+    "bounds",
+    "intent",
+    "commitment",
+    "decision_owner"
+  ],
+  "ttl": {
+    "default": 86400,
+    "max": 2592000
+  },
+  "retention_minimum": 7776000,
+  "content_binding": {
+    "version": "1",
+    "kind": "jcs"
+  }
+}

package/server.js

@@ -10,11 +10,12 @@
 import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
 import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
 import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { homedir, tmpdir, constants as osConstants } from 'node:os';
+import { tmpdir, constants as osConstants } from 'node:os';
 import { existsSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
 import { resolveCaFile, resolveProxyUrl, resolveSimulation } from './lib/config.mjs';
 import { readPolicy, isPolicyLocked } from './lib/policy.mjs';
 import { unsupportedNodeReason } from './lib/node-version.mjs';
+import { resolveInstallSettings } from './lib/install-settings.mjs';
 
 // Docker and the login service start this file directly, not through the CLI,
 // so it checks the Node version too (see lib/node-version.mjs).
@@ -63,7 +64,19 @@ function exitLikeChild(code, signal) {
 // MERGED into one combined PEM file instead. Comparing against that combined
 // path would never match the saved path alone, so the guard has to be a
 // dedicated marker, not a value comparison (which would also re-exec forever).
-const DATA_DIR = process.env.SUVEREN_DATA_DIR ?? join(homedir(), '.suveren');
+// Ports + data folder: IT policy > env > saved install setting > default
+// (see lib/install-settings.mjs). Resolved here, not just in the CLI,
+// because the login service starts this file directly. Refuses to start on
+// an invalid value rather than guessing a port or a folder.
+let INSTALL;
+try {
+  INSTALL = resolveInstallSettings();
+} catch (err) {
+  console.error(`[suveren-gateway] ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`);
+  console.error('[suveren-gateway] Fix it with `suveren-gateway config set …` (see `suveren-gateway config help`).');
+  process.exit(1);
+}
+const DATA_DIR = INSTALL.dataDir;
 const savedCaFile = resolveCaFile(DATA_DIR);
 if (savedCaFile && !process.env.SUVEREN_CA_REEXEC_DONE) {
   let effectiveCaFile = savedCaFile;
@@ -159,8 +172,8 @@ if (policyNoProxy) {
   process.env.NO_PROXY = policyNoProxy;
 }
 
-const CP_PORT = process.env.SUVEREN_CP_PORT ?? '3400';
-const MCP_PORT = process.env.SUVEREN_MCP_PORT ?? '3430';
+const CP_PORT = String(INSTALL.cpPort);
+const MCP_PORT = String(INSTALL.mcpPort);
 const UI_DIST = process.env.HAP_UI_DIST ?? join(__dirname, 'dist', 'ui');
 // Integration manifests + profile catalog ship inside the bundle so a
 // fresh `npm install -g` install has working integrations and profiles
@@ -176,6 +189,9 @@ const env = {
   NODE_ENV: 'production',
   SUVEREN_CP_PORT: CP_PORT,
   SUVEREN_MCP_PORT: MCP_PORT,
+  // Only when not the default: the control plane's one-time ~/.hap →
+  // ~/.suveren migration runs only while SUVEREN_DATA_DIR is unset.
+  ...(INSTALL.source.dataDir !== 'default' ? { SUVEREN_DATA_DIR: DATA_DIR } : {}),
   // The control plane talks to the MCP server over this URL. It defaults to
   // 127.0.0.1:3430 in mcp-bridge.ts, so if the user overrode SUVEREN_MCP_PORT
   // without also setting this, every CP→MCP internal call hit the wrong port