@substrat-run/connector-planima 0.2.0 → 0.2.1

package/dist/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,646 @@
+import { z } from 'zod';
+import { connectionActivity, connectionId as connectionIdSchema, instant, scopeId as scopeIdSchema, tenantId as tenantIdSchema, } from '@substrat-run/contracts';
+import { PlanimaApi, PlanimaApiError, PLANIMA_API_BASE, planimaSecret } from './api.js';
+import { actionFactIn, buildingFact, componentFact, facilityFact, planimaActionFact, planimaBuildingFact, planimaComponentFact, planimaFacilityFact, } from './plan.js';
+export { PlanimaApi, PlanimaApiError, PLANIMA_API_BASE, PLANIMA_ACCEPT, PLANIMA_MAX_PAGE, PLANIMA_ACTION_STATUSES, planimaSecret, } from './api.js';
+export { decimalOf, planimaActionFact, planimaBuildingFact, planimaComponentFact, planimaDecimal, planimaFacilityFact, } from './plan.js';
+export { PlanimaMock } from './mock.js';
+/**
+ * The Planima connector — the INBOUND half of maintenance-plan integration.
+ *
+ * [Planima](https://planima.se/) is a Swedish web application for planned facility
+ * maintenance (sv. *underhållsplan*). A plan is a tree — organization → facility →
+ * building → component — with **actions** hanging off it: dated, priced, categorized
+ * work a property owner intends to do in a given year.
+ *
+ * ## Poll-only, and that is a design fact rather than an omission
+ *
+ * Like `connector-fortnox` and unlike `connector-scrive`, this connector registers no
+ * event handler at all, because nothing inside a scope initiates the work. A vertical
+ * does not *ask* for next year's maintenance plan the way it asks for a signature; the
+ * plan changes in Planima — a surveyor walks a roof and moves an action from 2031 to
+ * 2027 — and the platform finds out by looking.
+ *
+ * So there is no `registerPlanimaConnector`. {@link sweepPlanimaPlan} is the whole
+ * trigger surface, and a deployment binds it into the platform sweeper exactly as it
+ * binds Fortnox's.
+ *
+ * ## Read-only, and the credential is why
+ *
+ * Planima's API can create and update organizations, facilities, buildings and
+ * components. This connector uses none of it. A Planima token carries the full access
+ * of the user who minted it — there are no scopes to narrow — so the narrowing that
+ * matters is operational: hand this connector a **read-only user's token** and the
+ * blast radius of a leaked credential is a maintenance plan someone could already see.
+ * A write path would forfeit that, and no vertical has asked for one; when one does,
+ * it belongs behind an event and a dispatch, in the shape `connector-scrive` already
+ * has.
+ *
+ * ## Where the data lands, and why the connector does not decide
+ *
+ * A sweep has no delivered event, so it has neither a scope to write to nor authority
+ * to write with. That is declared **once**, explicitly, by {@link bindPlanimaScope}:
+ * which scope, which operation to land the plan through, and which permission that
+ * operation checks.
+ *
+ * The operation is the *consumer's*, and that is deliberate. What comes out of Planima
+ * is neutral fact — a component, a year, a price, a status string. What a business
+ * *means* by them (which status counts as committed spend, which category rolls into
+ * which budget line, whether a deferred action still books) is vocabulary, and
+ * vocabulary is the vertical's layer.
+ */
+/**
+ * The standing grants this connector requires — deliberately EMPTY, with a mechanism
+ * in place of a declaration.
+ *
+ * The reasoning is `FORTNOX_CONNECTION_GRANTS`'s, and it applies here for the same
+ * reason: the permission this connector needs is whatever the *consumer's* landing
+ * operation checks, which differs per vertical and is unknown at this package's build
+ * time. So the check moves from build time to bind time — {@link bindPlanimaScope}
+ * verifies the connection actually holds the named permission in the named scope and
+ * **refuses the binding otherwise**, naming what is missing. A sweep can therefore
+ * never be configured into a state where it fetches a whole maintenance plan and
+ * cannot write it down.
+ */
+export const PLANIMA_CONNECTION_GRANTS = [];
+/** The connector-state key prefix every binding lives under — what the sweep enumerates. */
+const BINDING_PREFIX = 'planima:binding:';
+const bindingKey = (scope) => `${BINDING_PREFIX}${scope}`;
+/**
+ * The currency a Planima plan's prices are in — a DECLARED fact, because the API does
+ * not carry one.
+ *
+ * Planima sends `unit_price: 1200` and nothing else: no currency field on the action,
+ * the facility, the organization or the account. The product is Swedish and its prices
+ * are kronor, so `SEK` is the right default — but it is a default this connector chose,
+ * not a value it read, and Substrat money is a `{ amount, currency }` pair that cannot
+ * be built without one. Naming it on the binding is what keeps that choice visible and
+ * overridable instead of hard-coded three files down.
+ */
+export const PLANIMA_DEFAULT_CURRENCY = 'SEK';
+/**
+ * How many years past the current one a sweep reads when a binding names no window.
+ *
+ * A Swedish maintenance plan is conventionally drawn 30 years out, and almost nothing
+ * consumes all of it: the far years are placeholders that move every time a surveyor
+ * revisits. Ten years is the horizon a budget actually uses, and — because the window
+ * is part of the sync's identity — a shorter one also means the far-future churn does
+ * not make every sweep look like a change.
+ */
+export const PLANIMA_DEFAULT_HORIZON_YEARS = 10;
+/** How many action rows ride one `invoke`. */
+const PAGE_SIZE = 500;
+/**
+ * One page of a maintenance plan, as it crosses into a scope.
+ *
+ * Parsed with this schema on the way OUT, before every `invoke`. The engine-seam rule
+ * (`returns()`) exists because a value crossing a version boundary must be pinned to a
+ * published shape rather than to whatever the code currently produces, and a connector
+ * seam is the same boundary with a network in the middle: a vertical compiled against
+ * one version of this package and running against another must get a throw, never a
+ * silently-reshaped plan on a screen.
+ *
+ * ## The paging shape, and how a consumer reads it
+ *
+ * Pages are global across one sync and each page names exactly one facility. A
+ * facility's buildings and components ride its **first** page only (`facilityHead`) —
+ * they are the same on every page of that facility, and repeating a component list
+ * across ten pages of actions is bytes through a clone pipe for nothing. So a consumer
+ * upserts on `facilityHead`, appends actions on every page, and commits or swaps when
+ * `final` arrives.
+ */
+export const planimaPlanPage = z.object({
+    /**
+     * Identifies this sync RUN, and it is the content hash rather than a ULID on purpose:
+     * two syncs of an unchanged plan produce the same `syncId`, so a consumer's upsert is
+     * naturally idempotent and a redelivered page cannot double a cost.
+     */
+    syncId: z.string().min(1),
+    connectionId: z.string().min(1),
+    /** The organization the facility belongs to, when Planima nested one on it. */
+    organization: z.object({ id: z.number().int(), name: z.string() }).nullable(),
+    /**
+     * The facility this page carries — or `null` on a CLEAR page.
+     *
+     * A sync that finds no facilities at all still has something to say, and saying
+     * nothing is the one answer that corrupts a consumer: it commits or swaps on `final`,
+     * so a pass that lands zero pages leaves last month's facilities and actions in place
+     * for ever, while the cursor records the empty plan as synced and no later sweep
+     * repairs it. So an empty plan lands exactly one page — `facility: null`,
+     * `actions: []`, `final: true` — which reads as "this plan is now empty" rather than
+     * as silence.
+     */
+    facility: planimaFacilityFact.nullable(),
+    /** The year range the actions on this page were read through — inclusive both ends. */
+    window: z.object({ fromYear: z.number().int(), toYear: z.number().int() }),
+    /** The currency every `Money` on this page is denominated in; declared, not read — see the binding. */
+    currency: z.string(),
+    page: z.number().int().nonnegative(),
+    pageCount: z.number().int().positive(),
+    /** True on the last page of the whole sync — the signal a consumer commits or swaps on. */
+    final: z.boolean(),
+    /** True on this facility's FIRST page, where its buildings and components ride. */
+    facilityHead: z.boolean(),
+    buildings: z.array(planimaBuildingFact).default([]),
+    components: z.array(planimaComponentFact).default([]),
+    actions: z.array(planimaActionFact),
+});
+/**
+ * Declare that a connection should sync one scope — the one-time setup a poll-only
+ * connector needs in place of a dispatch.
+ *
+ * **Refuses a binding whose grant is missing**, which is the whole reason this is a
+ * function rather than a config object. The alternative — write the binding, discover
+ * at sweep time that the connection cannot invoke the operation — fails in the worst
+ * possible place: after a whole maintenance plan has been fetched against a
+ * 10-request-per-10-seconds budget, in a background timer nobody is watching. Here it
+ * fails in the operator's hands, naming the permission to grant.
+ */
+export async function bindPlanimaScope(host, input) {
+    const tenant = tenantIdSchema.parse(input.tenantId);
+    const scope = scopeIdSchema.parse(input.scopeId);
+    if (input.window && input.window.toYear < input.window.fromYear) {
+        throw new Error(`window ${input.window.fromYear}..${input.window.toYear} ends before it starts — ` +
+            `Planima would return nothing and the sync would look like an empty plan`);
+    }
+    const horizonYears = input.horizonYears ?? PLANIMA_DEFAULT_HORIZON_YEARS;
+    if (!Number.isInteger(horizonYears) || horizonYears < 0) {
+        throw new Error(`horizonYears must be a non-negative integer, got ${String(input.horizonYears)}`);
+    }
+    // On the host, not `admin`: this is the same projection the permission checker reads,
+    // so a binding is verified against the tuples that will actually gate the invoke —
+    // not against a directory row that may not have reached the scope yet.
+    const granted = await host.connectionGrantsInScope(tenant, scope);
+    const held = granted.some((g) => g.connectionId === input.connectionId && g.permission === input.permission);
+    if (!held) {
+        throw new Error(`connection ${input.connectionId} does not hold '${input.permission}' on scope ${input.scopeId} — ` +
+            `a sweep would fetch the maintenance plan and then fail to land it. Grant it first ` +
+            `(grantToConnection), then bind.`);
+    }
+    const binding = {
+        scopeId: input.scopeId,
+        tenantId: input.tenantId,
+        vertical: input.vertical,
+        operation: input.operation,
+        permission: input.permission,
+        organizationId: input.organizationId ?? null,
+        currency: input.currency ?? PLANIMA_DEFAULT_CURRENCY,
+        window: input.window ?? null,
+        horizonYears,
+        boundAt: new Date(input.now?.() ?? Date.now()).toISOString(),
+    };
+    await host.admin.putConnectorState(input.connectionId, bindingKey(input.scopeId), binding);
+    return binding;
+}
+/** Every scope this connection syncs into. */
+export async function listPlanimaBindings(host, connectionId) {
+    const rows = await host.admin.listConnectorState(connectionId, BINDING_PREFIX);
+    // Tombstones filtered, exactly as the sweep and the activity projection do.
+    // `unbindPlanimaScope` writes `null` under the same key, and casting that to
+    // `PlanimaBinding` hands a caller a typed value that throws on the first property
+    // read — a lie the type system cannot catch.
+    return rows
+        .filter((r) => r.value !== null && typeof r.value === 'object')
+        .map((r) => r.value);
+}
+/**
+ * Stop syncing one scope. The binding row is replaced with a tombstone rather than
+ * removed, because `putConnectorState` is the only verb this surface has — and an
+ * unbound scope that a later sweep silently re-adopts would be worse than a visible
+ * dead row.
+ */
+export async function unbindPlanimaScope(host, connectionId, scopeId) {
+    await host.admin.putConnectorState(connectionId, bindingKey(scopeId), null);
+}
+const sha256Hex = async (text) => {
+    const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', new TextEncoder().encode(text));
+    return [...new Uint8Array(digest)].map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
+};
+/** The window a binding reads through, resolved against the clock for a rolling one. */
+export function windowFor(binding, nowMs) {
+    if (binding.window)
+        return binding.window;
+    const fromYear = new Date(nowMs).getUTCFullYear();
+    return { fromYear, toYear: fromYear + binding.horizonYears };
+}
+/**
+ * Sync ONE bound scope: read the plan, hash it, and land it through the binding's
+ * operation as the connection itself (#97).
+ *
+ * Idempotent and cheap to re-land on a no-op. The assembled plan is hashed before
+ * anything is landed, and an unchanged hash returns `changed: false` without a single
+ * `invoke` — which matters because a sweep runs on a timer and most passes find a plan
+ * nobody has touched.
+ *
+ * Note what that does NOT save: the provider reads still happen, because Planima offers
+ * no collection-level `updated_at` or ETag to ask "has anything changed" cheaply. The
+ * skip saves the writes and the events, not the round trips. Being straight about that
+ * is what makes the sweep interval a real decision — every pass costs
+ * `1 + 3 × facilities` requests against a 10-per-10-second budget.
+ */
+export async function syncPlanimaScope(host, connectionId, binding, options) {
+    const admin = host.admin;
+    const conn = await openPlanimaConnection(admin, options.fetch, binding.tenantId, binding.vertical, options.timeoutMs ?? 30_000, 
+    // The binding's own connection, or nothing. See `openPlanimaConnection`.
+    connectionId);
+    const api = new PlanimaApi(conn, {
+        apiBase: options.apiBase,
+        now: options.now,
+        sleep: options.sleep,
+        rateWindow: options.rateWindow,
+    });
+    const nowMs = options.now?.() ?? Date.now();
+    const window = options.window ?? windowFor(binding, nowMs);
+    const currency = binding.currency || PLANIMA_DEFAULT_CURRENCY;
+    const facilities = await api.facilities(binding.organizationId ?? undefined);
+    // Sorted by id before anything else touches them. Planima documents no ordering, so
+    // two sweeps could legitimately return the same facilities in a different order — and
+    // an unsorted hash would then read as a changed plan and re-land the whole thing.
+    // The same reasoning applies to every list below.
+    facilities.sort((a, b) => a.id - b.id);
+    const plans = [];
+    for (const facility of facilities) {
+        // Sequential, not `Promise.all`: the client's rate-limit window is a per-instance
+        // list, so three concurrent requests would each see an empty window and fire at
+        // once. Against a 10-per-10-second budget that is how a sweep of a handful of
+        // facilities starts eating 429s.
+        const buildings = await api.buildings(facility.id);
+        const components = await api.components(facility.id);
+        const actions = await api.actions(facility.id, window);
+        buildings.sort((a, b) => a.id - b.id);
+        components.sort((a, b) => a.id - b.id);
+        actions.sort((a, b) => a.id - b.id);
+        plans.push({
+            facility: facilityFact(facility),
+            organization: facility.organization
+                ? { id: facility.organization.id, name: facility.organization.name }
+                : null,
+            buildings: buildings.map(buildingFact),
+            components: components.map(componentFact),
+            actions: actions.map((a) => actionFactIn(a, facility.id, currency)),
+        });
+    }
+    // The WINDOW and the CURRENCY are part of the sync's identity, not just the rows.
+    //
+    // The window because what lands is the plan filtered to it (Fortnox's lesson, and
+    // sharper here because a rolling window moves by itself every January). The currency
+    // because it is a declared value rather than a read one: re-binding a scope from SEK
+    // to EUR changes every `Money` that lands while leaving every provider row identical,
+    // and a hash over the rows alone would call that no change at all.
+    const contentHash = await sha256Hex(JSON.stringify({ window, currency, organizationId: binding.organizationId, plans }));
+    const actionCount = plans.reduce((n, p) => n + p.actions.length, 0);
+    if (binding.lastSync?.contentHash === contentHash) {
+        return {
+            scopeId: binding.scopeId,
+            changed: false,
+            syncId: contentHash,
+            window,
+            facilities: plans.length,
+            actions: actionCount,
+            pages: 0,
+        };
+    }
+    // Every page of every facility, counted BEFORE the first invoke, because `pageCount`
+    // and `final` are on page 0 and a consumer swapping a plan atomically needs to know
+    // from the first page how many are coming.
+    //
+    // Floored at one: a plan with no facilities still lands a single CLEAR page. Landing
+    // nothing would leave a consumer holding the previous sync's rows for ever, because
+    // it swaps on `final` and no `final` would ever arrive — while the cursor below
+    // recorded the empty plan as synced, so no later sweep would repair it either.
+    const pageCount = Math.max(1, plans.reduce((n, p) => n + Math.max(1, Math.ceil(p.actions.length / PAGE_SIZE)), 0));
+    // The connection acting as itself (#97). Refuses a scope in another tenant or running
+    // another vertical by construction, and the invoke below is gated on the connection's
+    // own grant — the one `bindPlanimaScope` verified.
+    const scope = await host.getConnectorScope(connectionId, scopeIdSchema.parse(binding.scopeId));
+    if (plans.length === 0) {
+        // "This plan is now empty", said explicitly. Every facility deleted, an
+        // organization filter that matches nothing, a token whose access was narrowed —
+        // all of them arrive here, and all of them are a fact the consumer needs.
+        await scope.invoke(binding.operation, planimaPlanPage.parse({
+            syncId: contentHash,
+            connectionId,
+            organization: null,
+            facility: null,
+            window,
+            currency,
+            page: 0,
+            pageCount: 1,
+            final: true,
+            facilityHead: false,
+            buildings: [],
+            components: [],
+            actions: [],
+        }));
+    }
+    let page = 0;
+    for (const plan of plans) {
+        const facilityPages = Math.max(1, Math.ceil(plan.actions.length / PAGE_SIZE));
+        for (let i = 0; i < facilityPages; i += 1) {
+            const payload = planimaPlanPage.parse({
+                syncId: contentHash,
+                connectionId,
+                organization: plan.organization,
+                facility: plan.facility,
+                window,
+                currency,
+                page,
+                pageCount,
+                final: page === pageCount - 1,
+                facilityHead: i === 0,
+                buildings: i === 0 ? plan.buildings : [],
+                components: i === 0 ? plan.components : [],
+                actions: plan.actions.slice(i * PAGE_SIZE, (i + 1) * PAGE_SIZE),
+            });
+            await scope.invoke(binding.operation, payload);
+            page += 1;
+        }
+    }
+    const synced = {
+        ...binding,
+        lastSync: {
+            syncedAt: new Date(nowMs).toISOString(),
+            contentHash,
+            facilities: plans.length,
+            actions: actionCount,
+        },
+    };
+    // Written only AFTER every page landed, so a failure mid-way leaves the cursor at the
+    // previous hash and the next sweep retries the whole plan rather than resuming into a
+    // half-written one.
+    await admin.putConnectorState(connectionId, bindingKey(binding.scopeId), synced);
+    return {
+        scopeId: binding.scopeId,
+        changed: true,
+        syncId: contentHash,
+        window,
+        facilities: plans.length,
+        actions: actionCount,
+        pages: pageCount,
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Poll Planima for every scope this connection is bound to — the sweeper a deployment
+ * schedules.
+ *
+ * A timer calls this; it holds no timer itself. That keeps the trigger a deployment
+ * concern (`startPlatformSweeper` on node, `definePlatformSweeperDO`'s alarm on
+ * Cloudflare) and this a plain, testable function.
+ *
+ * Robust the way a poller must be: an unchanged plan is skipped without landing
+ * anything, and a failure on one scope is recorded and stepped over rather than sinking
+ * the pass — one vertical's missing grant must not stop another tenant's plan syncing.
+ */
+export async function sweepPlanimaPlan(host, connectionId, options) {
+    const rows = await host.admin.listConnectorState(connectionId, BINDING_PREFIX);
+    const result = { found: 0, synced: [], unchanged: 0, failed: [] };
+    // ONE rate-limit window for the whole pass. Every binding under this connection
+    // shares its token, and Planima meters per token — so a per-scope window would let
+    // the second scope's first ten requests land on top of the first scope's ten.
+    const rateWindow = options.rateWindow ?? [];
+    for (const { value } of rows) {
+        // A tombstoned binding (`unbindPlanimaScope`) — present as a row, not a target.
+        if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object')
+            continue;
+        const binding = value;
+        result.found += 1;
+        try {
+            const r = await syncPlanimaScope(host, connectionId, binding, { ...options, rateWindow });
+            if (r.changed)
+                result.synced.push(r);
+            else
+                result.unchanged += 1;
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            result.failed.push({
+                scopeId: binding.scopeId,
+                error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
+            });
+        }
+    }
+    return result;
+}
+/**
+ * Probe a credential that is not stored yet — the connect-time check (#605).
+ *
+ * Takes the candidate secret directly, touches no connection and no store, and records
+ * no health: there may be no connection to record against, and a candidate's failure is
+ * not a fact about a live one.
+ *
+ * The probe reads `/organizations`, which is both the cheapest authenticated read
+ * Planima offers and the one that answers the question an operator actually has: not
+ * "is this token valid" but "does this token see the customer account I meant". A token
+ * from the wrong Planima login is perfectly valid and syncs somebody else's buildings.
+ */
+export async function probePlanimaSecret(secret, options) {
+    const parsed = planimaSecret.safeParse(secret);
+    if (!parsed.success) {
+        // A malformed credential IS a refusal — Planima would reject it, and there is no
+        // point spending a round trip to hear so.
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            refused: true,
+            accountRef: null,
+            accountLabel: null,
+            facts: [],
+            error: `incomplete Planima credential: ${parsed.error.issues
+                .map((i) => i.path.join('.'))
+                .join(', ')}`,
+        };
+    }
+    const timeoutMs = options.timeoutMs ?? 15_000;
+    const conn = {
+        id: connectionIdSchema.parse('00000000000000000000000000'), // no row yet; never read
+        tenantId: '',
+        vertical: '',
+        provider: 'planima',
+        secret: parsed.data,
+        expiresAt: null,
+        fetch: (input, init) => options.fetch(input, { ...init, signal: AbortSignal.timeout(timeoutMs) }),
+    };
+    return probeWith(conn, options);
+}
+/** Probe the credential a live connection already holds. Verifying is itself a use. */
+export async function probePlanimaConnection(host, connection, options) {
+    const conn = await openPlanimaConnection(host.admin, options.fetch, connection.tenantId, connection.vertical, options.timeoutMs ?? 15_000);
+    return probeWith(conn, options);
+}
+async function probeWith(conn, options) {
+    const api = new PlanimaApi(conn, {
+        apiBase: options.apiBase,
+        now: options.now,
+        sleep: options.sleep,
+        // A probe answers a person waiting on a form. Sitting out a rate limit for tens of
+        // seconds to answer them is worse than saying "busy, try again" — and a 429 is not
+        // a fact about the credential, which is what a probe is for.
+        maxRateLimitRetries: 0,
+    });
+    try {
+        const organizations = await api.organizations();
+        return {
+            ok: true,
+            refused: false,
+            // Left null on purpose: a Planima token is one customer ACCOUNT's, and an account
+            // may hold several organizations, so no single id names what this credential
+            // reads. The dashboard catalog therefore declares no `accountRefField` and a
+            // re-paste rotates the one connection in place, which is the right behaviour when
+            // there is only ever one.
+            accountRef: null,
+            accountLabel: organizations.length === 1
+                ? (organizations[0]?.name ?? null)
+                : organizations.length === 0
+                    ? null
+                    : `${organizations.length} organizations`,
+            facts: [
+                { label: 'Organizations', value: String(organizations.length) },
+                {
+                    label: 'Names',
+                    value: organizations.length === 0
+                        ? '— (the token is valid but sees nothing)'
+                        : organizations
+                            .slice(0, 5)
+                            .map((o) => o.name)
+                            .join(', ') + (organizations.length > 5 ? `, +${organizations.length - 5} more` : ''),
+                },
+            ],
+            error: null,
+        };
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            // Only "not with this token" counts. A timeout, a 429 or a 5xx says nothing about
+            // the credential, and treating it as a refusal would make a Planima outage look
+            // like every tenant's token going bad at once.
+            refused: err instanceof PlanimaApiError && err.refused,
+            accountRef: null,
+            accountLabel: null,
+            facts: [],
+            error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
+        };
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * What this connection has been doing, for a console — one entry per bound scope.
+ *
+ * Reads the binding ledger rather than the provider: this answers "what has the platform
+ * synced", which is the question an operator asks when a plan looks stale, and it
+ * answers it without spending a provider round trip against a 10-per-10-second budget.
+ */
+export async function planimaConnectionActivity(host, connectionId) {
+    const rows = await host.admin.listConnectorState(connectionId, BINDING_PREFIX);
+    const entries = rows
+        .filter(({ value }) => value !== null && typeof value === 'object')
+        .map(({ key, value }) => {
+        const b = value;
+        return {
+            key,
+            title: `${b.vertical} — ${b.scopeId}`,
+            reference: b.organizationId === null ? null : String(b.organizationId),
+            status: b.lastSync ? 'synced' : 'bound — not yet synced',
+            at: instant.parse(b.lastSync?.syncedAt ?? b.boundAt),
+            facts: [
+                { label: 'Lands through', value: b.operation },
+                { label: 'Permission', value: b.permission },
+                {
+                    label: 'Organization',
+                    value: b.organizationId === null ? 'all the token can see' : String(b.organizationId),
+                },
+                {
+                    label: 'Window',
+                    value: b.window
+                        ? `${b.window.fromYear}–${b.window.toYear} (fixed)`
+                        : `rolling, +${b.horizonYears} years`,
+                },
+                ...(b.lastSync
+                    ? [
+                        { label: 'Facilities', value: String(b.lastSync.facilities) },
+                        { label: 'Actions', value: String(b.lastSync.actions) },
+                        // The content hash IS the sync identity, so an operator comparing two
+                        // scopes can tell "same plan" from "same moment" at a glance.
+                        { label: 'Content hash', value: b.lastSync.contentHash.slice(0, 12) },
+                    ]
+                    : []),
+            ],
+        };
+    });
+    return connectionActivity.parse({
+        source: 'ledger',
+        entries,
+        // Never live: this reads the binding ledger, never the provider. The ledger knows
+        // what the platform synced, not what Planima has since changed, and a console that
+        // blurs the two invents facts.
+        live: false,
+    });
+}
+/**
+ * The stored credential, REDUCED (#605) — and for this provider that is one masked
+ * field and nothing else.
+ *
+ * There is no identifier half to show. Fortnox can display its client id and
+ * DatabaseNumber unmasked because they name the integration and the company; a Planima
+ * credential is a single opaque token and every character of it is secret. So this
+ * surface is honest rather than useful, and the useful answer — *which* Planima account
+ * this is — comes from {@link probePlanimaConnection}, which reads the organization
+ * names back from the provider.
+ */
+export async function planimaCredentialSummary(host, connection) {
+    const open = await host.admin.openConnection(tenantIdSchema.parse(connection.tenantId), connection.vertical, 'planima');
+    if (!open) {
+        throw new Error(`no live 'planima' connection for tenant ${connection.tenantId} / vertical '${connection.vertical}'`);
+    }
+    const secret = planimaSecret.parse(open.secret);
+    return {
+        fields: [{ key: 'token', label: 'API token', value: maskSecret(secret.token), masked: true }],
+    };
+}
+/** A bullet run plus the last four — or nothing at all when there is too little to hide behind. */
+const maskSecret = (value) => value.length < 8 ? '••••••••' : `••••••••${value.slice(-4)}`;
+/** Open the live Planima connection for a (tenant, vertical), with health recorded. */
+async function openPlanimaConnection(admin, fetchImpl, tenant, vertical, timeoutMs, expected) {
+    const parsedTenant = tenantIdSchema.parse(tenant);
+    const open = await admin.openConnection(parsedTenant, vertical, 'planima');
+    if (!open) {
+        throw new Error(`no live 'planima' connection for tenant ${tenant} / vertical '${vertical}'`);
+    }
+    // The credential that READS and the identity that WRITES must be the same connection.
+    //
+    // A binding names a `connectionId`, and that id is what opens the scope, stamps the
+    // spine and is checked for the grant. The token, though, comes from
+    // `openConnection(tenant, vertical, provider)` — whichever live row exists. Nothing in
+    // THIS file makes those the same row; two layers below it do, and both were checked
+    // rather than assumed: the directory holds a UNIQUE constraint that refuses a second
+    // live connection for one (tenant, vertical, provider, account), and revoking one
+    // takes its bindings with it. So a mismatch is currently unreachable.
+    //
+    // This is a backstop for the day that stops being true, not a fix for a live bug. It
+    // is here because the invariant is load-bearing and invisible: if Planima ever gains
+    // an `accountRefField` — one token per client company, the shape Fortnox already has —
+    // a (tenant, vertical) grows several live connections, `openConnection` starts
+    // choosing between them, and the sweep would silently read one company's plan with
+    // another's credential while the audit trail named a connection that fetched nothing.
+    // One comparison buys a loud refusal instead of that.
+    if (expected !== undefined && open.id !== expected) {
+        throw new Error(`binding names connection ${expected}, but the live 'planima' connection for tenant ` +
+            `${tenant} / vertical '${vertical}' is ${open.id} — the credential that reads and the ` +
+            `identity that writes must be the same connection. Re-bind the scope against ${open.id}.`);
+    }
+    return {
+        ...open,
+        fetch: async (input, init) => {
+            try {
+                const res = await fetchImpl(input, { ...init, signal: AbortSignal.timeout(timeoutMs) });
+                await admin.recordConnectionUse(open.id, res.ok ? { ok: true } : { ok: false, error: `HTTP ${res.status} from planima` });
+                return res;
+            }
+            catch (err) {
+                await admin.recordConnectionUse(open.id, {
+                    ok: false,
+                    error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
+                });
+                throw err;
+            }
+        },
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map