@substrat-run/adapter-cloudflare 0.133.0 → 0.135.0

package/dist/scope-do.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/scope-do.js

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 import { REWIND_REFUSED } from './rewind-refusal.js';
 import { DurableObject } from 'cloudflare:workers';
 import { ATTACHMENT_ADDED, ATTACHMENT_REMOVED, attachmentRecord, domainEvent, domainEventInput, eventId, instant, objectRef, entityObjectRef, assertModuleEmittableType, assertKernelAuthoredType, toWireFailure, grantRefFromProof, principalId, scopeId as scopeIdOf, tenantId as tenantIdOf, platformRequestInput, platformRequestId, MAX_PENDING_PLATFORM_REQUESTS, MAX_PENDING_SWEEP_RUNS, SWEEP_RUNS_KIND, SCOPE_TABLE_PAGE_MAX, SCOPE_QUERY_ROW_MAX, listLimitOf, requestFingerprint, substratError, assertReplayableDump, REDRAIN_BATCH, } from '@substrat-run/contracts';
-import { ulid, DO_SQL_LIMITS, unknownRoleError, createUlid, assertAllowed, ConnectionSealingKeyUnavailableError, noSealingKeyMessage, sealTo, assertReadOnlyQuery, entitlementDenial, platformRequestHistoryQuery, platformRequestOf, PLATFORM_REQUEST_COLUMNS, PLATFORM_REQUEST_REDACTION_SQL, platformRequestRedactionParams, platformRequestRedactionQuery, intentPayloadCarriesSubject, redactSubjectJobRuns, JOB_RUN_PATCH_SQL, JOB_STEP_RECORD_SQL, DELIVERY_ERROR_REDACTION_SQL, REDACTED_DELIVERY_NOTE, seatScopeTuple, effectiveRoleGrantQuery, switchRecordedOff, switchSystemSchedules, peerGrantsStatus, systemGrantsStatus, systemScheduleState, systemSwitchedOff, denialListQuery, denialSummaryQuery, denialTotalsQuery, DENIAL_WINDOW_QUERY, mapDenialRow, mapDenialSummaryBuckets, PermissionDenied, assertImpersonationWrites, assertModuleEnqueueableKind, impersonationStampOf, createAtomic, NotSearchable, isSearchIndexTable, searchIndexDdl, searchIndexPlans, NotListable, listIndexPlans, moduleMigrations, listQuery, cursorOf, searchLimit, searchMatchExpression, searchQuery, IDEMPOTENCY_DDL, REFUSALS_DDL, refusalInsert, refusedTransitionOf, assertIdempotencyKey, assertPermissionKey, idempotencyLookupQuery, idempotencyPruneStatement, idempotencyRecordStatement, idempotencyOptedOutMessage, replayFor, entityVersionQuery, entityVersionOf, assertIfMatch, OUTBOX_ENTITY_INDEX, SCHEDULE_STATE_DDL, SCHEDULE_STATE_REBUILD, scheduleStateHasKind, VERTICAL_EVENTS_DDL, EXPORT_HOPS_SQL, IMPORT_CURSORS_SQL, IMPORT_CURSOR_OF_SQL, OUTBOX_MARK_SQL, exportedSinceQuery, emittedSinceQuery, emittedReportOf, EMITTED_REPORT_CAP, IMPORT_CURSOR_ADVANCE_SQL, IMPORT_RECORD_SQL, moveImportCursor, CrossVerticalRegistry, exportReadPlan, exportReadQuery, planExportBatch, withheldNote, JOB_RUN_DDL, jobRunListLimit, } from '@substrat-run/kernel';
+import { ulid, DO_SQL_LIMITS, unknownRoleError, createUlid, assertAllowed, ConnectionSealingKeyUnavailableError, noSealingKeyMessage, sealTo, assertReadOnlyQuery, entitlementDenial, platformRequestHistoryQuery, platformRequestOf, PLATFORM_REQUEST_COLUMNS, PLATFORM_REQUEST_REDACTION_SQL, platformRequestRedactionParams, platformRequestRedactionQuery, intentPayloadCarriesSubject, redactSubjectJobRuns, redactSubjectScopeText, assertRowLimit, assertRowOffset, JOB_RUN_PATCH_SQL, JOB_STEP_RECORD_SQL, DELIVERY_ERROR_REDACTION_SQL, REDACTED_DELIVERY_NOTE, seatScopeTuple, effectiveRoleGrantQuery, switchRecordedOff, switchSystemSchedules, peerGrantsStatus, systemGrantsStatus, systemScheduleState, systemSwitchedOff, denialListQuery, refusalListQuery, mapRefusalRow, denialSummaryQuery, denialTotalsQuery, DENIAL_WINDOW_QUERY, mapDenialRow, mapDenialSummaryBuckets, PermissionDenied, assertImpersonationWrites, assertModuleEnqueueableKind, impersonationStampOf, createAtomic, NotSearchable, isSearchIndexTable, searchIndexDdl, searchIndexPlans, NotListable, listIndexPlans, moduleMigrations, listQuery, cursorOf, searchLimit, searchMatchExpression, searchQuery, ATTACHMENT_TEXT_DDL, attachmentRecordOfRow, enqueueAttachmentText, reconcileAttachmentText, recordAttachmentText, searchAttachments, IDEMPOTENCY_DDL, REFUSALS_DDL, refusalInsert, refusedTransitionOf, assertIdempotencyKey, assertPermissionKey, idempotencyLookupQuery, idempotencyPruneStatement, idempotencyRecordStatement, idempotencyOptedOutMessage, replayFor, entityVersionQuery, entityVersionOf, assertIfMatch, OUTBOX_ENTITY_INDEX, SCHEDULE_STATE_DDL, SCHEDULE_STATE_REBUILD, scheduleStateHasKind, VERTICAL_EVENTS_DDL, EXPORT_HOPS_SQL, IMPORT_CURSORS_SQL, IMPORT_CURSOR_OF_SQL, OUTBOX_MARK_SQL, exportedSinceQuery, emittedSinceQuery, emittedReportOf, EMITTED_REPORT_CAP, IMPORT_CURSOR_ADVANCE_SQL, IMPORT_RECORD_SQL, moveImportCursor, CrossVerticalRegistry, exportReadPlan, exportReadQuery, planExportBatch, withheldNote, JOB_RUN_DDL, jobRunListLimit, } from '@substrat-run/kernel';
 import { isUpgradeRequest, readSubscription, LIVE_FANOUT_LIMIT, LIVE_MODE_HEADER, LIVE_PRINCIPAL_HEADER, LIVE_SCOPE_HEADER, LIVE_SUBSCRIBE_PATH, LIVE_TENANT_HEADER, } from './live-reads.js';
 import { OperationQueue } from './serialization.js';
-import { doScopedSql, doBuiltColumnsOf, doSpineSql } from './sql.js';
-import { actorOf, admitPeer, collectPeers, switchPeer, assertNoSecret, CAPABILITY_DDL, CAPABILITY_EXCHANGE_OPERATION, capabilityAttachmentWriteRefused, createCapabilityVerbs, createEntityEdgeVerbs, exchangeCapability, guardSecrets, mintBecomeCapability, redactSecrets, redactSecretText, moduleLog, resolveCapabilitySession, revokeCapabilityAsPlatform, domainEventOf, facetEvents, readDeadLetters, readLifecycleFlow, readHistory, readInvocation, readUndrainedOutbox, walkEventCause, walkEventEffects, } from '@substrat-run/kernel';
+import { doScopedSql, doBuiltColumnsOf, doRedactionSql, doSpineSql } from './sql.js';
+import { actorOf, admitPeer, collectPeers, switchPeer, assertNoSecret, CAPABILITY_DDL, CAPABILITY_EXCHANGE_OPERATION, capabilityAttachmentWriteRefused, createCapabilityVerbs, createEntityEdgeVerbs, exchangeCapability, guardSecrets, mintBecomeCapability, redactSecrets, redactSecretText, moduleLog, resolveCapabilitySession, revokeCapabilityAsPlatform, readCapabilityPage, domainEventOf, facetEvents, readDeadLetters, readLifecycleFlow, readHistory, readInvocation, readUndrainedOutbox, walkEventCause, walkEventEffects, } from '@substrat-run/kernel';
 import { createDoTupleChecker, createLocalControlPlaneReader } from './checker.js';
 import { assertNoSpineReference, assertSpineTablesBuilt, dumpRowsInsert, isSpineTable, repointScopeGrants, spineColumnAdditions } from '@substrat-run/kernel';
 /**
@@ -312,6 +312,9 @@ const KERNEL_DDL = `
   );
   CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS _substrat_attachments_entity
     ON _substrat_attachments (entity_type, entity_id);
+  -- #1575: attachment text and its FTS5 index, shared from @substrat-run/kernel. After
+  -- _substrat_attachments, whose delete trigger it adds.
+  ${ATTACHMENT_TEXT_DDL}
   -- #901: an entity's version is the ULID of the last event about it, so
   -- MAX(id) per (entity_type, entity_id) is the read. The id column sits last so
   -- SQLite walks to the end of the matched range instead of aggregating over it.
@@ -1383,6 +1386,9 @@ export function defineScopeDO(modules, bareOps) {
          * where the control plane is unreachable by the sandbox contract and the projected
          * entitlements are the source of truth. A console-managed scope is gated on the
          * coordinator against the shared CP, so this is left undefined / a no-op there.
+         * Also undefined for a module's own declared schedule through the system door
+         * (#1654): the coordinator resolves the key with the kernel's `requiredEntitlementFor`,
+         * which exempts exactly that invoke, so the DO enforces whatever it is handed.
          */
         requiredEntitlement, 
         /**
@@ -2089,19 +2095,7 @@ export function defineScopeDO(modules, bareOps) {
             const row = this.sql
                 .exec('SELECT * FROM _substrat_attachments WHERE id = ?', attachmentId)
                 .toArray()[0];
-            if (!row)
-                return null;
-            return attachmentRecord.parse({
-                id: row.id,
-                entity: { entityType: row.entity_type, entityId: row.entity_id },
-                filename: row.filename,
-                contentType: row.content_type,
-                size: Number(row.size),
-                sha256: row.sha256,
-                visibility: row.visibility,
-                createdBy: row.created_by,
-                createdAt: row.created_at,
-            });
+            return row ? attachmentRecordOfRow(row) : null;
         }
         /** Record an uploaded attachment: write gate + row + `attachment.added`, one txn. */
         async attachmentAdd(record, principal, tenantId, scopeId, 
@@ -2131,6 +2125,9 @@ export function defineScopeDO(modules, bareOps) {
                             piiClass: 'none',
                             payload: { attachment: parsed },
                         });
+                        // #1575: queue its text extraction in the same transaction — a `pending` row
+                        // and a job run. Nothing is extracted here, so nothing here can fail the upload.
+                        enqueueAttachmentText(doSpineSql(this.sql), parsed.id, ulid(), new Date().toISOString());
                     });
                 }
                 catch (err) {
@@ -2263,6 +2260,49 @@ export function defineScopeDO(modules, bareOps) {
                 return record;
             });
         }
+        // -- attachment text (#1575) ---------------------------------------------------
+        /**
+         * Extracted-text search as `ctx`'s subject: authorized first — the check `open` makes,
+         * the target's read key on the owning entity — then matched over readable owners only
+         * (`searchAttachments`). The term and the limit are judged here again, never trusted
+         * from the coordinator.
+         */
+        searchAttachmentsAs(ctx, term, limit) {
+            return searchAttachments(doSpineSql(this.sql), { targets: this.attachmentTargets, check: (permission, entity) => ctx.check(permission, entity) }, term, limit);
+        }
+        /**
+         * #1575: `ScopeAttachments.search` for a principal or a connection. Its failure travels as
+         * DATA, the capability verbs' envelope, because a throw across this RPC keeps only its
+         * message — and the too-many-owners refusal's `reason` is what a UI explains it by.
+         */
+        async attachmentSearch(term, limit, principal, tenantId, scopeId, connectionId) {
+            await this.ensureMigrations();
+            try {
+                const ctx = this.operationContext(principal, tenantId, scopeId, undefined, connectionId, undefined, undefined, undefined, 'attachments.search');
+                return { value: await this.searchAttachmentsAs(ctx, term, limit) };
+            }
+            catch (err) {
+                return { failure: toWireFailure(err) };
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * #1575: the extraction job's read of one record. No gate, deliberately — extraction
+         * is the kernel's own derivation and the coordinator is its only caller; what a person
+         * learns is gated at search.
+         */
+        async attachmentTextSource(attachmentId) {
+            await this.ensureMigrations();
+            return this.attachmentRow(attachmentId);
+        }
+        /**
+         * #1575: write one extraction outcome, guarded on the attachment still existing.
+         * Through the queue, so it can never land inside an invoke's or an upload's open
+         * transaction and roll back with it.
+         */
+        async attachmentTextRecord(attachmentId, outcome) {
+            await this.ensureMigrations();
+            return this.queue.enqueue(async () => this.ctx.storage.transactionSync(() => recordAttachmentText(doSpineSql(this.sql), attachmentId, outcome, new Date().toISOString())));
+        }
         // -- attachments through a capability (#1686) -------------------------------
         // The coordinator hashed the session token; only the hash arrives. Each verb resolves it
         // INSIDE the queue, as `invoke` does, so nothing can revoke between the resolution and
@@ -2332,6 +2372,11 @@ export function defineScopeDO(modules, bareOps) {
                 return record;
             });
         }
+        /** #1575: extracted-text search as the capability — its keys, its subtree, its minter now. */
+        async capabilityAttachmentSearch(term, limit, sessionHash, tenantId, scopeId) {
+            await this.ensureMigrations();
+            return this.asCapability(sessionHash, tenantId, scopeId, 'attachments.search', (ctx) => this.searchAttachmentsAs(ctx, term, limit));
+        }
         /**
          * Refuse an upload or a remove through a capability, and record it. Throws for an
          * unknown attachment id too — the same answer either way — but only a known target has
@@ -2708,6 +2753,15 @@ export function defineScopeDO(modules, bareOps) {
             await this.ensureMigrations();
             return await this.queue.enqueue(() => this.ctx.storage.transactionSync(() => revokeCapabilityAsPlatform(doSpineSql(this.sql), id, actor, instant.parse(new Date().toISOString()))) ?? null);
         }
+        /**
+         * The operator's read of this scope's capabilities (#1686). The kernel's one read
+         * (`readCapabilityPage`): no `token_hash` selected, decoded to a record with no field to hold one.
+         * Authorization and the K-3 cross-check happen on the coordinator first.
+         */
+        async listCapabilities(filter) {
+            await this.ensureMigrations();
+            return readCapabilityPage(doSpineSql(this.sql), filter);
+        }
         /**
          * The last time a schedule's operation ran on this scope (#383), or null.
          *
@@ -3284,8 +3338,10 @@ export function defineScopeDO(modules, bareOps) {
                 .toArray().map((r) => r.name));
             if (!known.has(table))
                 throw new Error(`unknown table '${table}'`);
-            const l = Math.min(Math.max(1, limit), SCOPE_TABLE_PAGE_MAX);
-            const o = Math.max(0, offset);
+            // The ceiling clamps; a bound SQLite would misread (NaN, non-finite, fractional,
+            // negative) is refused instead of reaching LIMIT / OFFSET (#1632).
+            const l = Math.min(assertRowLimit('limit', limit), SCOPE_TABLE_PAGE_MAX);
+            const o = assertRowOffset('offset', offset);
             const cursor = this.sql.exec(`SELECT * FROM "${table}" LIMIT ? OFFSET ?`, l, o);
             const columns = cursor.columnNames;
             const rows = Array.from(cursor.raw(), (row) => row.map(cellToJson));
@@ -3338,6 +3394,14 @@ export function defineScopeDO(modules, bareOps) {
             const q = denialListQuery(filter);
             return this.sql.exec(q.sql, ...q.params).toArray().map(mapDenialRow);
         }
+        /**
+         * #1745: the refusal log — every lifecycle move refused and failed with, recorded after
+         * the rollback. Authorization and the K-3 cross-check happen on the coordinator first.
+         */
+        listRefusals(filter) {
+            const q = refusalListQuery(filter);
+            return this.sql.exec(q.sql, ...q.params).toArray().map(mapRefusalRow);
+        }
         /**
          * The same log bucketed per (actor, permission) — or per operation when the filter
          * says `groupBy: 'operation'` (#1456) — with the window's own facts.
@@ -3601,6 +3665,10 @@ export function defineScopeDO(modules, bareOps) {
                 // not this one. Dropped, so a restore never carries a receipt over; the repair
                 // projection that follows writes this scope's own.
                 this.sql.exec(`DELETE FROM _substrat_meta WHERE key = 'provisioned_for'`);
+                // #1575: attachment text is not in a dump, so the load left it as it was. Drop the
+                // text of attachments the dump did not bring back, and queue extraction for those
+                // it brought back without text — the bytes decide what that run finds.
+                reconcileAttachmentText(doSpineSql(this.sql), ulid, new Date().toISOString());
                 // Re-point the restored grants at THIS scope (after the spine exists, so a dump
                 // that carried no tuples table still finds one here).
                 if (destScopeId) {
@@ -3747,12 +3815,16 @@ export function defineScopeDO(modules, bareOps) {
             // A failed delivery's error text about one of those events (#1632) — keyed by event
             // id, so the outbox predicate names it. Not a copy of the event; not counted.
             this.sql.exec(DELIVERY_ERROR_REDACTION_SQL, REDACTED_DELIVERY_NOTE, REDACTED_DELIVERY_NOTE, subjectId);
+            const sql = doRedactionSql(this.sql);
             return {
                 events: doomed.length,
                 intents: this.redactSubjectIntents(subjectId, at),
                 // The job-run tables (#1632) — the kernel's walk, so the pure host runs the
                 // identical SQL.
-                jobRuns: redactSubjectJobRuns((sql, params) => this.sql.exec(sql, ...params).toArray(), subjectId, at),
+                jobRuns: redactSubjectJobRuns(sql, subjectId, at),
+                // The free-text copies (#1632), and the tombstoned intents the coordinator hands to
+                // the directory half. Last, so those ids include every intent tombstoned above.
+                ...redactSubjectScopeText(sql, subjectId, at),
             };
         }
         /**