@su-record/vibe 2.9.32 → 2.9.34

package/hooks/scripts/pre-tool-guard.js

@@ -1,259 +1,259 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env node
-/**
- * Pre-Tool Guard
- * 위험한 도구 사용 전 검증 및 경고
- */
-
-import { VIBE_PATH, PROJECT_DIR } from './utils.js';
-
-// 위험한 명령어 패턴
-//
-// 각 엔트리의 `target`은 매칭 대상 필드:
-//   - 'command'   → tool_input.command (Bash)
-//   - 'file_path' → tool_input.file_path (Write, Edit)
-//   - 'raw'       → 전체 문자열 (스키마 모를 때 폴백)
-//
-// 예전 버전은 항상 stringify된 tool_input 전체에 매칭하여 file content가
-// 패턴(예: /etc/, .env)과 일치하면 false positive로 차단되는 버그가 있었음.
-// 회귀: .claude/vibe/regressions/pre-tool-guard-content-false-positive.md
-const DANGEROUS_PATTERNS = {
-  bash: [
-    // `/` or `~` must be the *entire* argument (optionally followed by `*`, `/`, or `/*`).
-    // Prevents false positives on safe absolute paths like `/tmp/foo` or `/Users/me/proj`.
-    // The lookahead requires an arg boundary (whitespace, shell separator, or end-of-string).
-    { pattern: /rm\s+-rf?\s+(\/|\/\*|~|~\/|~\/\*)(?=\s|[;&|]|$)/, target: 'command', severity: 'critical', message: 'Deleting root or home directory' },
-    { pattern: /rm\s+-rf?\s+\*/, target: 'command', severity: 'high', message: 'Wildcard deletion detected' },
-    { pattern: /git\s+push\s+.*--force/, target: 'command', severity: 'high', message: 'Force push detected' },
-    { pattern: /git\s+reset\s+--hard/, target: 'command', severity: 'medium', message: 'Hard reset will discard changes' },
-    { pattern: /drop\s+(table|database)/i, target: 'command', severity: 'critical', message: 'Database drop detected' },
-    { pattern: /truncate\s+table/i, target: 'command', severity: 'high', message: 'Table truncate detected' },
-    { pattern: /:(){ :|:& };:/, target: 'command', severity: 'critical', message: 'Fork bomb detected' },
-    { pattern: /mkfs|fdisk|dd\s+if=/, target: 'command', severity: 'critical', message: 'Disk operation detected' },
-    { pattern: /chmod\s+-R\s+777/, target: 'command', severity: 'medium', message: 'Insecure permission change' },
-    { pattern: /curl.*\|\s*(ba)?sh/, target: 'command', severity: 'high', message: 'Piping curl to shell' },
-  ],
-  edit: [
-    { pattern: /\.env|credentials|secret|password|api[_-]?key/i, target: 'file_path', severity: 'medium', message: 'Editing sensitive file' },
-    { pattern: /package-lock\.json|yarn\.lock|pnpm-lock/, target: 'file_path', severity: 'low', message: 'Editing lock file directly' },
-  ],
-  write: [
-    { pattern: /\.env|credentials|secret/i, target: 'file_path', severity: 'medium', message: 'Writing to sensitive file' },
-    { pattern: /\/etc\/|\/usr\/|C:\\Windows/i, target: 'file_path', severity: 'critical', message: 'Writing to system directory' },
-  ],
-};
-
-// 도구 입력 스키마 검증 (경량 — 외부 의존성 없음)
-const TOOL_INPUT_SCHEMAS = {
-  Bash: { required: ['command'], types: { command: 'string', timeout: 'number' } },
-  Read: { required: ['file_path'], types: { file_path: 'string', offset: 'number', limit: 'number' } },
-  Edit: { required: ['file_path', 'old_string', 'new_string'], types: { file_path: 'string', old_string: 'string', new_string: 'string' } },
-  Write: { required: ['file_path', 'content'], types: { file_path: 'string', content: 'string' } },
-  Glob: { required: ['pattern'], types: { pattern: 'string', path: 'string' } },
-  Grep: { required: ['pattern'], types: { pattern: 'string', path: 'string' } },
-};
-
-function validateInputSchema(toolName, rawInput) {
-  const schema = TOOL_INPUT_SCHEMAS[toolName];
-  if (!schema) return { valid: true, errors: [] }; // 스키마 없으면 통과
-
-  let input;
-  try {
-    input = typeof rawInput === 'string' ? JSON.parse(rawInput) : rawInput;
-  } catch {
-    return { valid: true, errors: [] }; // JSON 아니면 레거시 모드 — 통과
-  }
-  if (typeof input !== 'object' || !input) return { valid: true, errors: [] };
-
-  const errors = [];
-  // 필수 필드 검증
-  for (const field of schema.required || []) {
-    if (input[field] === undefined || input[field] === null) {
-      errors.push(`Missing required field: ${field}`);
-    }
-  }
-  // 타입 검증
-  for (const [field, expectedType] of Object.entries(schema.types || {})) {
-    if (input[field] !== undefined && typeof input[field] !== expectedType) {
-      errors.push(`Field '${field}' expected ${expectedType}, got ${typeof input[field]}`);
-    }
-  }
-  // 경로 검증 (path traversal 기본 방어)
-  if (input.file_path && typeof input.file_path === 'string') {
-    if (input.file_path.includes('\0')) errors.push('Null byte in file_path');
-  }
-
-  return { valid: errors.length === 0, errors };
-}
-
-// 안전한 대안 제안
-const SAFE_ALTERNATIVES = {
-  'rm -rf': 'Use trash-cli (trash-put) or move to a backup directory first',
-  'git push --force': 'Use git push --force-with-lease instead',
-  'git reset --hard': 'Create a backup branch first: git branch backup-$(date +%s)',
-  'drop table': 'Consider soft delete or backup first',
-  'chmod 777': 'Use specific permissions (e.g., chmod 755 for directories)',
-};
-
-/**
- * 패턴 매칭 대상 추출
- *
- * tool_input이 객체이면 target 필드만 뽑아 반환. 객체가 아니거나(레거시 argv 모드)
- * target='raw'이면 입력 전체를 그대로 반환.
- *
- * 핵심: write/edit 패턴은 file_path만 봐야 한다. content에 우연히 들어간
- * 리터럴(예: 코드 안의 '/etc/machine-id' 문자열)이 차단을 일으키지 않도록.
- */
-function extractTarget(rawInput, target) {
-  if (target === 'raw') return typeof rawInput === 'string' ? rawInput : JSON.stringify(rawInput);
-
-  // 객체로 파싱 시도
-  let obj = rawInput;
-  if (typeof rawInput === 'string') {
-    try {
-      obj = JSON.parse(rawInput);
-    } catch {
-      // JSON 아님 → 레거시 argv 모드. argv[3]은 보통 file_path 또는 command 단일 문자열.
-      // 안전하게 그 문자열을 target 값으로 간주.
-      return rawInput;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (typeof obj !== 'object' || obj === null) return '';
-  const value = obj[target];
-  return typeof value === 'string' ? value : '';
-}
-
-/**
- * 명령어 검증
- */
-function validateCommand(toolName, rawInput) {
-  const results = {
-    allowed: true,
-    severity: 'none',
-    warnings: [],
-    suggestions: [],
-  };
-
-  const patterns = DANGEROUS_PATTERNS[toolName.toLowerCase()] || [];
-
-  for (const { pattern, target, severity, message } of patterns) {
-    const haystack = extractTarget(rawInput, target || 'raw');
-    if (!haystack) continue;
-
-    if (pattern.test(haystack)) {
-      results.warnings.push(`[${severity.toUpperCase()}] ${message}`);
-
-      // 심각도에 따른 처리
-      if (severity === 'critical') {
-        results.allowed = false;
-        results.severity = 'critical';
-      } else if (severity === 'high' && results.severity !== 'critical') {
-        results.severity = 'high';
-      } else if (results.severity === 'none') {
-        results.severity = severity;
-      }
-
-      // 대안 제안 — 매칭된 target 필드에서만 검색
-      for (const [dangerous, safe] of Object.entries(SAFE_ALTERNATIVES)) {
-        if (haystack.includes(dangerous)) {
-          results.suggestions.push(safe);
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  return results;
-}
-
-/**
- * 출력 포맷
- */
-function formatOutput(toolName, validation) {
-  const lines = [];
-
-  if (validation.warnings.length === 0) {
-    return ''; // 경고 없으면 출력 없음
-  }
-
-  lines.push(`⚠️ PRE-TOOL GUARD: ${toolName}`);
-
-  for (const warning of validation.warnings) {
-    lines.push(`  ${warning}`);
-  }
-
-  if (validation.suggestions.length > 0) {
-    lines.push('');
-    lines.push('💡 Suggestions:');
-    for (const suggestion of validation.suggestions) {
-      lines.push(`  - ${suggestion}`);
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!validation.allowed) {
-    lines.push('');
-    lines.push('🚫 BLOCKED: This operation is too dangerous. Please review and modify.');
-  }
-
-  return lines.join('\n');
-}
-
-/**
- * stdin에서 JSON 페이로드 읽기 (Claude Code 하네스 호환)
- * stdin이 없거나 파싱 실패 시 argv/env 폴백
- */
-function readStdinSync() {
-  try {
-    if (process.stdin.isTTY) return null;
-    // fd 0을 직접 사용 (Windows는 '/dev/stdin'이 없음)
-    const buf = Buffer.alloc(65536);
-    const bytesRead = fs.readSync(0, buf, 0, buf.length, null);
-    if (bytesRead > 0) {
-      return JSON.parse(buf.toString('utf-8', 0, bytesRead));
-    }
-  } catch { /* 파싱 실패 시 폴백 */ }
-  return null;
-}
-
-import fs from 'fs';
-
-// 메인 실행: stdin JSON 우선, argv 폴백
-const stdinPayload = readStdinSync();
-const toolName = stdinPayload?.tool_name || process.argv[2] || 'Bash';
-const toolInput = stdinPayload?.tool_input
-  ? (typeof stdinPayload.tool_input === 'string'
-    ? stdinPayload.tool_input
-    : JSON.stringify(stdinPayload.tool_input))
-  : (process.argv[3] || process.env.TOOL_INPUT || '');
-
-import { logHookDecision } from './utils.js';
-
-// 1단계: 입력 스키마 검증 (구조적 오류 탐지)
-const schemaResult = validateInputSchema(toolName, stdinPayload?.tool_input || toolInput);
-if (!schemaResult.valid) {
-  // stderr: Claude Code surfaces stderr in hook-error notifications; stdout is injected
-  // into the assistant's context and never shown to the user. Guard messages target the user.
-  console.error(`⚠️ INPUT VALIDATION: ${toolName}`);
-  for (const err of schemaResult.errors) {
-    console.error(`  [SCHEMA] ${err}`);
-  }
-  logHookDecision('pre-tool-guard', toolName, 'warn', `schema: ${schemaResult.errors.join('; ')}`);
-  // 스키마 오류는 경고만 (차단하지 않음 — 레거시 호환)
-}
-
-// 2단계: 위험 패턴 검증 (보안 탐지)
-const validation = validateCommand(toolName, toolInput);
-const output = formatOutput(toolName, validation);
-
-if (output) {
-  console.error(output);
-}
-
-// Hook trace logging
-if (!validation.allowed) {
-  logHookDecision('pre-tool-guard', toolName, 'block', validation.warnings.join('; '));
-} else if (validation.warnings.length > 0) {
-  logHookDecision('pre-tool-guard', toolName, 'warn', validation.warnings.join('; '));
-}
-
-// Exit code: 0 = allowed, 2 = denied (claw-code 규약), 1 = 레거시 호환
-process.exit(validation.allowed ? 0 : 2);
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+/**
+ * Pre-Tool Guard
+ * 위험한 도구 사용 전 검증 및 경고
+ */
+
+import { VIBE_PATH, PROJECT_DIR } from './utils.js';
+
+// 위험한 명령어 패턴
+//
+// 각 엔트리의 `target`은 매칭 대상 필드:
+//   - 'command'   → tool_input.command (Bash)
+//   - 'file_path' → tool_input.file_path (Write, Edit)
+//   - 'raw'       → 전체 문자열 (스키마 모를 때 폴백)
+//
+// 예전 버전은 항상 stringify된 tool_input 전체에 매칭하여 file content가
+// 패턴(예: /etc/, .env)과 일치하면 false positive로 차단되는 버그가 있었음.
+// 회귀: .claude/vibe/regressions/pre-tool-guard-content-false-positive.md
+const DANGEROUS_PATTERNS = {
+  bash: [
+    // `/` or `~` must be the *entire* argument (optionally followed by `*`, `/`, or `/*`).
+    // Prevents false positives on safe absolute paths like `/tmp/foo` or `/Users/me/proj`.
+    // The lookahead requires an arg boundary (whitespace, shell separator, or end-of-string).
+    { pattern: /rm\s+-rf?\s+(\/|\/\*|~|~\/|~\/\*)(?=\s|[;&|]|$)/, target: 'command', severity: 'critical', message: 'Deleting root or home directory' },
+    { pattern: /rm\s+-rf?\s+\*/, target: 'command', severity: 'high', message: 'Wildcard deletion detected' },
+    { pattern: /git\s+push\s+.*--force/, target: 'command', severity: 'high', message: 'Force push detected' },
+    { pattern: /git\s+reset\s+--hard/, target: 'command', severity: 'medium', message: 'Hard reset will discard changes' },
+    { pattern: /drop\s+(table|database)/i, target: 'command', severity: 'critical', message: 'Database drop detected' },
+    { pattern: /truncate\s+table/i, target: 'command', severity: 'high', message: 'Table truncate detected' },
+    { pattern: /:(){ :|:& };:/, target: 'command', severity: 'critical', message: 'Fork bomb detected' },
+    { pattern: /mkfs|fdisk|dd\s+if=/, target: 'command', severity: 'critical', message: 'Disk operation detected' },
+    { pattern: /chmod\s+-R\s+777/, target: 'command', severity: 'medium', message: 'Insecure permission change' },
+    { pattern: /curl.*\|\s*(ba)?sh/, target: 'command', severity: 'high', message: 'Piping curl to shell' },
+  ],
+  edit: [
+    { pattern: /\.env|credentials|secret|password|api[_-]?key/i, target: 'file_path', severity: 'medium', message: 'Editing sensitive file' },
+    { pattern: /package-lock\.json|yarn\.lock|pnpm-lock/, target: 'file_path', severity: 'low', message: 'Editing lock file directly' },
+  ],
+  write: [
+    { pattern: /\.env|credentials|secret/i, target: 'file_path', severity: 'medium', message: 'Writing to sensitive file' },
+    { pattern: /\/etc\/|\/usr\/|C:\\Windows/i, target: 'file_path', severity: 'critical', message: 'Writing to system directory' },
+  ],
+};
+
+// 도구 입력 스키마 검증 (경량 — 외부 의존성 없음)
+const TOOL_INPUT_SCHEMAS = {
+  Bash: { required: ['command'], types: { command: 'string', timeout: 'number' } },
+  Read: { required: ['file_path'], types: { file_path: 'string', offset: 'number', limit: 'number' } },
+  Edit: { required: ['file_path', 'old_string', 'new_string'], types: { file_path: 'string', old_string: 'string', new_string: 'string' } },
+  Write: { required: ['file_path', 'content'], types: { file_path: 'string', content: 'string' } },
+  Glob: { required: ['pattern'], types: { pattern: 'string', path: 'string' } },
+  Grep: { required: ['pattern'], types: { pattern: 'string', path: 'string' } },
+};
+
+function validateInputSchema(toolName, rawInput) {
+  const schema = TOOL_INPUT_SCHEMAS[toolName];
+  if (!schema) return { valid: true, errors: [] }; // 스키마 없으면 통과
+
+  let input;
+  try {
+    input = typeof rawInput === 'string' ? JSON.parse(rawInput) : rawInput;
+  } catch {
+    return { valid: true, errors: [] }; // JSON 아니면 레거시 모드 — 통과
+  }
+  if (typeof input !== 'object' || !input) return { valid: true, errors: [] };
+
+  const errors = [];
+  // 필수 필드 검증
+  for (const field of schema.required || []) {
+    if (input[field] === undefined || input[field] === null) {
+      errors.push(`Missing required field: ${field}`);
+    }
+  }
+  // 타입 검증
+  for (const [field, expectedType] of Object.entries(schema.types || {})) {
+    if (input[field] !== undefined && typeof input[field] !== expectedType) {
+      errors.push(`Field '${field}' expected ${expectedType}, got ${typeof input[field]}`);
+    }
+  }
+  // 경로 검증 (path traversal 기본 방어)
+  if (input.file_path && typeof input.file_path === 'string') {
+    if (input.file_path.includes('\0')) errors.push('Null byte in file_path');
+  }
+
+  return { valid: errors.length === 0, errors };
+}
+
+// 안전한 대안 제안
+const SAFE_ALTERNATIVES = {
+  'rm -rf': 'Use trash-cli (trash-put) or move to a backup directory first',
+  'git push --force': 'Use git push --force-with-lease instead',
+  'git reset --hard': 'Create a backup branch first: git branch backup-$(date +%s)',
+  'drop table': 'Consider soft delete or backup first',
+  'chmod 777': 'Use specific permissions (e.g., chmod 755 for directories)',
+};
+
+/**
+ * 패턴 매칭 대상 추출
+ *
+ * tool_input이 객체이면 target 필드만 뽑아 반환. 객체가 아니거나(레거시 argv 모드)
+ * target='raw'이면 입력 전체를 그대로 반환.
+ *
+ * 핵심: write/edit 패턴은 file_path만 봐야 한다. content에 우연히 들어간
+ * 리터럴(예: 코드 안의 '/etc/machine-id' 문자열)이 차단을 일으키지 않도록.
+ */
+function extractTarget(rawInput, target) {
+  if (target === 'raw') return typeof rawInput === 'string' ? rawInput : JSON.stringify(rawInput);
+
+  // 객체로 파싱 시도
+  let obj = rawInput;
+  if (typeof rawInput === 'string') {
+    try {
+      obj = JSON.parse(rawInput);
+    } catch {
+      // JSON 아님 → 레거시 argv 모드. argv[3]은 보통 file_path 또는 command 단일 문자열.
+      // 안전하게 그 문자열을 target 값으로 간주.
+      return rawInput;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (typeof obj !== 'object' || obj === null) return '';
+  const value = obj[target];
+  return typeof value === 'string' ? value : '';
+}
+
+/**
+ * 명령어 검증
+ */
+function validateCommand(toolName, rawInput) {
+  const results = {
+    allowed: true,
+    severity: 'none',
+    warnings: [],
+    suggestions: [],
+  };
+
+  const patterns = DANGEROUS_PATTERNS[toolName.toLowerCase()] || [];
+
+  for (const { pattern, target, severity, message } of patterns) {
+    const haystack = extractTarget(rawInput, target || 'raw');
+    if (!haystack) continue;
+
+    if (pattern.test(haystack)) {
+      results.warnings.push(`[${severity.toUpperCase()}] ${message}`);
+
+      // 심각도에 따른 처리
+      if (severity === 'critical') {
+        results.allowed = false;
+        results.severity = 'critical';
+      } else if (severity === 'high' && results.severity !== 'critical') {
+        results.severity = 'high';
+      } else if (results.severity === 'none') {
+        results.severity = severity;
+      }
+
+      // 대안 제안 — 매칭된 target 필드에서만 검색
+      for (const [dangerous, safe] of Object.entries(SAFE_ALTERNATIVES)) {
+        if (haystack.includes(dangerous)) {
+          results.suggestions.push(safe);
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return results;
+}
+
+/**
+ * 출력 포맷
+ */
+function formatOutput(toolName, validation) {
+  const lines = [];
+
+  if (validation.warnings.length === 0) {
+    return ''; // 경고 없으면 출력 없음
+  }
+
+  lines.push(`⚠️ PRE-TOOL GUARD: ${toolName}`);
+
+  for (const warning of validation.warnings) {
+    lines.push(`  ${warning}`);
+  }
+
+  if (validation.suggestions.length > 0) {
+    lines.push('');
+    lines.push('💡 Suggestions:');
+    for (const suggestion of validation.suggestions) {
+      lines.push(`  - ${suggestion}`);
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!validation.allowed) {
+    lines.push('');
+    lines.push('🚫 BLOCKED: This operation is too dangerous. Please review and modify.');
+  }
+
+  return lines.join('\n');
+}
+
+/**
+ * stdin에서 JSON 페이로드 읽기 (Claude Code 하네스 호환)
+ * stdin이 없거나 파싱 실패 시 argv/env 폴백
+ */
+function readStdinSync() {
+  try {
+    if (process.stdin.isTTY) return null;
+    // fd 0을 직접 사용 (Windows는 '/dev/stdin'이 없음)
+    const buf = Buffer.alloc(65536);
+    const bytesRead = fs.readSync(0, buf, 0, buf.length, null);
+    if (bytesRead > 0) {
+      return JSON.parse(buf.toString('utf-8', 0, bytesRead));
+    }
+  } catch { /* 파싱 실패 시 폴백 */ }
+  return null;
+}
+
+import fs from 'fs';
+
+// 메인 실행: stdin JSON 우선, argv 폴백
+const stdinPayload = readStdinSync();
+const toolName = stdinPayload?.tool_name || process.argv[2] || 'Bash';
+const toolInput = stdinPayload?.tool_input
+  ? (typeof stdinPayload.tool_input === 'string'
+    ? stdinPayload.tool_input
+    : JSON.stringify(stdinPayload.tool_input))
+  : (process.argv[3] || process.env.TOOL_INPUT || '');
+
+import { logHookDecision } from './utils.js';
+
+// 1단계: 입력 스키마 검증 (구조적 오류 탐지)
+const schemaResult = validateInputSchema(toolName, stdinPayload?.tool_input || toolInput);
+if (!schemaResult.valid) {
+  // stderr: Claude Code surfaces stderr in hook-error notifications; stdout is injected
+  // into the assistant's context and never shown to the user. Guard messages target the user.
+  console.error(`⚠️ INPUT VALIDATION: ${toolName}`);
+  for (const err of schemaResult.errors) {
+    console.error(`  [SCHEMA] ${err}`);
+  }
+  logHookDecision('pre-tool-guard', toolName, 'warn', `schema: ${schemaResult.errors.join('; ')}`);
+  // 스키마 오류는 경고만 (차단하지 않음 — 레거시 호환)
+}
+
+// 2단계: 위험 패턴 검증 (보안 탐지)
+const validation = validateCommand(toolName, toolInput);
+const output = formatOutput(toolName, validation);
+
+if (output) {
+  console.error(output);
+}
+
+// Hook trace logging
+if (!validation.allowed) {
+  logHookDecision('pre-tool-guard', toolName, 'block', validation.warnings.join('; '));
+} else if (validation.warnings.length > 0) {
+  logHookDecision('pre-tool-guard', toolName, 'warn', validation.warnings.join('; '));
+}
+
+// Exit code: 0 = allowed, 2 = denied (claw-code 규약), 1 = 레거시 호환
+process.exit(validation.allowed ? 0 : 2);