@stream-io/video-client 1.57.0 → 1.59.0

package/src/rtc/e2ee/__tests__/transform-pipeline.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,839 @@
+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
+import {
+  COUNTER_HARD_LIMIT,
+  E2EE_VERSION,
+  FAILURE_TOLERANCE,
+  MAGIC,
+  MAX_CLEAR_BYTES,
+  RBSP_FLAG,
+  TRAILER_LEN,
+} from '../e2ee-worker/constants';
+
+type Posted = {
+  type?: string;
+  userId?: string;
+  keyIndex?: number;
+  trackType?: string;
+};
+const posted: Posted[] = [];
+
+// The worker registers its 'message' / 'rtctransform' listeners at import time
+// and uses self.postMessage. Capture the listeners and the posted messages so
+// the tests can drive the worker through its real message interface.
+const handlers: Record<string, (e: { data: unknown }) => void> = {};
+vi.stubGlobal(
+  'addEventListener',
+  (type: string, h: (e: { data: unknown }) => void) => {
+    handlers[type] = h;
+  },
+);
+vi.stubGlobal('self', { postMessage: (m: Posted) => void posted.push(m) });
+
+// Import AFTER stubbing so the top-level addEventListener calls are captured.
+await import('../e2ee-worker/e2ee-worker-impl');
+// `enqueue` is the worker's own serial message queue; awaiting a no-op task
+// flushes everything queued before it (e.g. an async setKey).
+const { enqueue } = await import('../e2ee-worker/queue');
+// Test seams: position the per-user frame counter so we can hit the low
+// values whose big-endian encoding forms Annex-B start codes, and reset the
+// worker's module-level key state between tests (production teardown is
+// Worker.terminate(), which tests cannot use).
+const { __resetFrameCounterForTest, __setFrameCounterForTest } =
+  await import('../e2ee-worker/frameCounter');
+const { keyStore } = await import('../e2ee-worker/keyStore');
+
+type Frame = {
+  data: ArrayBuffer;
+  type?: 'key' | 'delta' | 'empty';
+  timestamp: number;
+};
+
+const KEY = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15];
+
+const message = (data: unknown) => handlers.message({ data });
+const flush = () => enqueue(async () => undefined);
+
+const setKey = async (userId: string, keyIndex = 0) => {
+  message({
+    type: 'cmd.set_key',
+    userId,
+    keyIndex,
+    rawKey: new Uint8Array(KEY).buffer,
+  });
+  await flush();
+};
+const setSharedKey = async (keyIndex: number, rawKey = KEY) => {
+  message({
+    type: 'cmd.set_shared_key',
+    keyIndex,
+    rawKey: new Uint8Array(rawKey).buffer,
+  });
+  await flush();
+};
+const removeSharedKey = async (keyIndex: number) => {
+  message({ type: 'cmd.remove_shared_key', keyIndex });
+  await flush();
+};
+const removeAllKeys = async (userId: string) => {
+  message({ type: 'cmd.remove_all_keys', userId });
+  await flush();
+};
+
+// `type` is required, and `undefined` is meaningful: the absence of a key/delta
+// type is exactly how the worker recognizes an audio frame, so a default here
+// would silently turn audio cases into delta video ones.
+const frame = (bytes: number[], type: Frame['type']): Frame => ({
+  data: new Uint8Array(bytes).buffer,
+  type,
+  timestamp: 1,
+});
+
+const cloneFrame = (source: Frame): Frame => ({
+  ...source,
+  data: source.data.slice(0),
+});
+
+// Attach a transform via the real worker message path (Insertable Streams
+// setup branch) and run frames through it, returning what it emits.
+const drive = async (
+  operation: 'encode' | 'decode',
+  userId: string,
+  codec: string | undefined,
+  frames: Frame[],
+  trackType?: string,
+): Promise<Frame[]> => {
+  const out: Frame[] = [];
+  const readable = new ReadableStream<Frame>({
+    start(c) {
+      for (const f of frames) c.enqueue(f);
+      c.close();
+    },
+  });
+  let resolveDone!: () => void;
+  const done = new Promise<void>((r) => (resolveDone = r));
+  const writable = new WritableStream<Frame>({
+    write(f) {
+      out.push(f);
+    },
+    close: () => resolveDone(),
+    abort: () => resolveDone(),
+  });
+  message({
+    type: 'cmd.setup_transform',
+    readable,
+    writable,
+    operation,
+    userId,
+    codec,
+    trackType,
+  });
+  await done;
+  return out;
+};
+
+let nextUser = 0;
+const freshUser = () => `user-${nextUser++}`;
+
+const roundTrip = async (
+  codec: string,
+  plaintext: number[],
+  type: Frame['type'],
+): Promise<number[]> => {
+  const user = freshUser();
+  await setKey(user);
+  const [encrypted] = await drive('encode', user, codec, [
+    frame(plaintext, type),
+  ]);
+  expect(encrypted).toBeDefined();
+  expect(Array.from(new Uint8Array(encrypted.data))).not.toEqual(plaintext);
+  // The decode side is codec-blind: it detects the format from the bytes.
+  const [decrypted] = await drive('decode', user, undefined, [encrypted]);
+  expect(decrypted).toBeDefined();
+  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(decrypted.data));
+};
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  posted.length = 0;
+});
+afterEach(async () => {
+  await flush();
+  keyStore.clear();
+  __resetFrameCounterForTest();
+});
+
+// The worker's message interface is its whole public surface, so the commands
+// that carry no frames still need a wire test. What each command *does* is
+// covered by the module that owns it (perf.test.ts, crypto.test.ts); these
+// cover the dispatch reaching it.
+describe('worker command interface', () => {
+  it('answers cmd.request_key_state with fingerprints, never key material', async () => {
+    const user = freshUser();
+    await setKey(user, 4);
+    posted.length = 0;
+    message({ type: 'cmd.request_key_state' });
+    await flush();
+    const dump = posted.find((m) => m.type === 'e2ee.key_state') as
+      { perUserKeys: Array<{ userId: string; keyIndex: number }> } | undefined;
+    expect(dump).toBeDefined();
+    expect(dump!.perUserKeys).toContainEqual(
+      expect.objectContaining({ userId: user, keyIndex: 4 }),
+    );
+    // The raw bytes must never leave the worker.
+    expect(JSON.stringify(dump)).not.toContain(KEY.join(','));
+  });
+
+  it('starts and stops performance reporting', async () => {
+    const user = freshUser();
+    await setKey(user);
+    // Streams settle on microtasks, so faking timers here only controls the
+    // reporter's own interval.
+    vi.useFakeTimers();
+    try {
+      message({ type: 'cmd.enable_performance_reporting', enabled: true });
+      await flush();
+      await drive('encode', user, 'vp8', [frame([1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6], 'delta')]);
+
+      posted.length = 0;
+      vi.advanceTimersByTime(1000);
+      expect(posted.some((m) => m.type === 'e2ee.perf_report')).toBe(true);
+
+      message({ type: 'cmd.enable_performance_reporting', enabled: false });
+      await flush();
+      posted.length = 0;
+      vi.advanceTimersByTime(3000);
+      expect(posted.some((m) => m.type === 'e2ee.perf_report')).toBe(false);
+    } finally {
+      vi.useRealTimers();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('reports an unknown command instead of failing silently', async () => {
+    message({ type: 'cmd.not_a_real_command' });
+    await flush();
+    expect(posted).toEqual([
+      {
+        type: 'e2ee.error',
+        message: expect.stringContaining('cmd.not_a_real_command'),
+      },
+    ]);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('encode -> decode pipeline round-trips', () => {
+  it.each([
+    [
+      'vp8 (clear-prefix + trailer path)',
+      'vp8',
+      'delta' as const,
+      [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12],
+    ],
+    [
+      'h264 with a slice NALU (RBSP-escape path)',
+      'h264',
+      'key' as const,
+      [
+        ...[0, 0, 0, 1, 0x67, 0x42, 0x00, 0x0a], // SPS
+        ...[0, 0, 0, 1, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x40], // slice start code + type 5 + 2 bytes
+        ...[0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xee], // body (encrypted)
+      ],
+    ],
+    [
+      'h264 with no slice NALU (clearBytes 0 path)',
+      'h264',
+      'key' as const,
+      [0, 0, 0, 1, 0x67, 0x42, 0x00, 0x0a],
+    ],
+  ])('%s', async (_label, codec, type, plaintext) => {
+    expect(await roundTrip(codec, plaintext, type)).toEqual(plaintext);
+  });
+
+  it('opus (audio, 1 clear byte)', async () => {
+    const pt = [0x78, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd];
+    // An audio frame is recognized by the ABSENCE of a key/delta type, and that
+    // is what selects the 1-byte Opus TOC clear header.
+    const user = freshUser();
+    await setKey(user);
+    const [encrypted] = await drive('encode', user, 'opus', [
+      frame(pt, undefined),
+    ]);
+    const bytes = Array.from(new Uint8Array(encrypted.data));
+    // TOC byte in the clear (the SFU reads it), everything after it encrypted.
+    expect(bytes[0]).toBe(0x78);
+    expect(bytes.slice(1, pt.length)).not.toEqual(pt.slice(1));
+    const [decrypted] = await drive('decode', user, undefined, [encrypted]);
+    expect(Array.from(new Uint8Array(decrypted.data))).toEqual(pt);
+  });
+
+  it('keeps old shared epochs decryptable until explicitly removed', async () => {
+    const user = freshUser();
+    const oldPlaintext = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8];
+    const newPlaintext = [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16];
+    const nextKey = KEY.map((byte) => byte + 16);
+
+    await setSharedKey(1);
+    const [oldEncrypted] = await drive('encode', user, 'vp8', [
+      frame(oldPlaintext, 'delta'),
+    ]);
+
+    await setSharedKey(2, nextKey);
+    const [newEncrypted] = await drive('encode', user, 'vp8', [
+      frame(newPlaintext, 'delta'),
+    ]);
+
+    const duringRotation = await drive('decode', user, undefined, [
+      cloneFrame(oldEncrypted),
+      cloneFrame(newEncrypted),
+    ]);
+    expect(
+      duringRotation.map((decoded) => Array.from(new Uint8Array(decoded.data))),
+    ).toEqual([oldPlaintext, newPlaintext]);
+
+    await removeSharedKey(1);
+    posted.length = 0;
+    expect(
+      await drive('decode', user, undefined, [cloneFrame(oldEncrypted)]),
+    ).toHaveLength(0);
+    expect(posted).toContainEqual(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        type: 'e2ee.missing_key',
+        userId: user,
+        keyIndex: 1,
+      }),
+    );
+
+    const [stillDecryptable] = await drive('decode', user, undefined, [
+      cloneFrame(newEncrypted),
+    ]);
+    expect(Array.from(new Uint8Array(stillDecryptable.data))).toEqual(
+      newPlaintext,
+    );
+  });
+});
+
+describe('decode pipeline edge behaviors', () => {
+  it('passes an unencrypted frame through, but signals it', async () => {
+    const user = freshUser();
+    const bytes = [9, 9, 9, 9, 9];
+    const [out] = await drive(
+      'decode',
+      user,
+      undefined,
+      [frame(bytes, 'delta')],
+      'SCREEN_SHARE',
+    );
+    expect(Array.from(new Uint8Array(out.data))).toEqual(bytes);
+    // Forwarded as-is (a peer may publish plain), but never silently: the host
+    // needs a signal to notice a downgrade on a call where everyone should encrypt.
+    expect(posted).toEqual([
+      {
+        type: 'e2ee.unencrypted_frame',
+        userId: user,
+        trackType: 'SCREEN_SHARE',
+      },
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it('drops a frame from a newer framing version instead of forwarding it', async () => {
+    const user = freshUser();
+    await setKey(user);
+    const [encrypted] = await drive('encode', user, 'vp8', [
+      frame([1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8], 'delta'),
+    ]);
+    const future = new Uint8Array(encrypted.data.slice(0));
+    future[future.length - 5] = E2EE_VERSION + 1;
+    posted.length = 0;
+
+    const out = await drive('decode', user, undefined, [
+      { ...encrypted, data: future.buffer },
+    ]);
+
+    // Forwarding would hand ciphertext to the decoder: corrupt media, reported
+    // as a downgrade. The peer is simply newer, so drop and say which version.
+    expect(out).toEqual([]);
+    expect(posted).toEqual([
+      {
+        type: 'e2ee.unsupported_version',
+        userId: user,
+        version: E2EE_VERSION + 1,
+        trackType: undefined,
+      },
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it('drops and signals missing_key when the key is gone', async () => {
+    const user = freshUser();
+    await setKey(user);
+    const [encrypted] = await drive('encode', user, 'vp8', [
+      frame([1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8], 'delta'),
+    ]);
+    await removeAllKeys(user);
+    posted.length = 0;
+    const out = await drive('decode', user, undefined, [encrypted], 'AUDIO');
+    expect(out).toHaveLength(0);
+    // Not holding the key is reported apart from a failed decrypt, so a host can
+    // tell key distribution lag from a mismatched or tampered frame.
+    expect(posted).toEqual([
+      {
+        type: 'e2ee.missing_key',
+        userId: user,
+        keyIndex: 0,
+        trackType: 'AUDIO',
+      },
+    ]);
+    expect(posted.some((m) => m.type === 'e2ee.decryption_failed')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('drops a replayed frame silently (no failure event)', async () => {
+    const user = freshUser();
+    await setKey(user);
+    const [encrypted] = await drive('encode', user, 'vp8', [
+      frame([1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8], 'delta'),
+    ]);
+    const clone: Frame = { ...encrypted, data: encrypted.data.slice(0) };
+    posted.length = 0;
+    // Both frames go through ONE decode transform (shared replay window).
+    const out = await drive('decode', user, undefined, [encrypted, clone]);
+    expect(out).toHaveLength(1); // first decrypts, second is a replay
+    expect(posted.some((m) => m.type === 'e2ee.decryption_failed')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('signals decryption_failed on a tampered frame', async () => {
+    const user = freshUser();
+    await setKey(user);
+    const [encrypted] = await drive('encode', user, 'vp8', [
+      frame([1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10], 'delta'),
+    ]);
+    const tampered = new Uint8Array(encrypted.data);
+    tampered[5] ^= 0xff; // flip a ciphertext byte
+    posted.length = 0;
+    const out = await drive('decode', user, undefined, [
+      { ...encrypted, data: tampered.buffer },
+    ]);
+    expect(out).toHaveLength(0);
+    expect(posted.some((m) => m.type === 'e2ee.decryption_failed')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('pairs every delivered decryption_failed with a decryption_resumed', async () => {
+    const user = freshUser();
+    await setKey(user);
+    const pt = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10];
+    const [encrypted] = await drive('encode', user, 'vp8', [
+      frame(pt, 'delta'),
+    ]);
+    const corrupt = (): Frame => {
+      const b = new Uint8Array(encrypted.data.slice(0));
+      b[5] ^= 0xff;
+      return { ...encrypted, data: b.buffer };
+    };
+    const valid = (): Frame => ({
+      ...encrypted,
+      data: encrypted.data.slice(0),
+    });
+    posted.length = 0;
+    // Two full fail -> recover cycles inside one throttle window. `resumed` is
+    // an edge, so throttling it would drop a transition permanently and leave
+    // the host latched on `failed` for a track that is fine.
+    await drive(
+      'decode',
+      user,
+      undefined,
+      [corrupt(), valid(), corrupt(), valid()],
+      'VIDEO',
+    );
+    const signals = posted
+      .map((m) => m.type)
+      .filter(
+        (t) =>
+          t === 'e2ee.decryption_failed' || t === 'e2ee.decryption_resumed',
+      );
+    // Never more recoveries than failures, never fewer, and the run ends on the
+    // recovery - so the host's last signal matches the track's real state.
+    const failed = signals.filter((t) => t === 'e2ee.decryption_failed').length;
+    const resumed = signals.filter(
+      (t) => t === 'e2ee.decryption_resumed',
+    ).length;
+    expect(resumed).toBe(failed);
+    expect(signals.at(-1)).toBe('e2ee.decryption_resumed');
+  });
+
+  it('clears a reported failure when the track recovers on a NEW keyIndex', async () => {
+    const user = freshUser();
+    await setKey(user, 0);
+    const pt = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10];
+    const [atKey0] = await drive('encode', user, 'vp8', [frame(pt, 'delta')]);
+    await setKey(user, 1);
+    const [atKey1] = await drive('encode', user, 'vp8', [frame(pt, 'delta')]);
+    const tampered = new Uint8Array(atKey0.data.slice(0));
+    tampered[5] ^= 0xff;
+
+    posted.length = 0;
+    // The failure count is per keyIndex, but the host was told "this TRACK is
+    // failing" with no index, so a rotation that fixes the track has to clear
+    // it. Gating recovery on the failing key's own count would latch forever.
+    await drive(
+      'decode',
+      user,
+      undefined,
+      [{ ...atKey0, data: tampered.buffer }, atKey1],
+      'VIDEO',
+    );
+    expect(posted.filter((m) => m.type === 'e2ee.decryption_failed')).toEqual([
+      { type: 'e2ee.decryption_failed', userId: user, trackType: 'VIDEO' },
+    ]);
+    expect(posted.filter((m) => m.type === 'e2ee.decryption_resumed')).toEqual([
+      { type: 'e2ee.decryption_resumed', userId: user, trackType: 'VIDEO' },
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it('survives an RBSP frame that unescapes shorter than the trailer', async () => {
+    const user = freshUser();
+    await setKey(user);
+    const [genuine] = await drive('encode', user, 'h264', [
+      frame([0, 0, 0, 1, 0x65, 0x88, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44], 'key'),
+    ]);
+    // Forge a frame that readTrailer accepts as RBSP - valid magic, version and
+    // clearBytes in the start-code-safe tail - whose escaped region unescapes to
+    // fewer than TRAILER_LEN bytes. Reading the trailer at a negative offset
+    // throws, and an unguarded throw out of transform() errors the stream and
+    // kills this track's pipeline for good.
+    const forged = new Uint8Array(40);
+    const view = new DataView(forged.buffer);
+    const clearBytes = 20;
+    for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+      forged.set([0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00], clearBytes + i * 4);
+    }
+    view.setUint16(forged.length - 7, RBSP_FLAG | clearBytes);
+    forged[forged.length - 5] = E2EE_VERSION;
+    view.setUint32(forged.length - 4, MAGIC);
+    posted.length = 0;
+    // The forged frame arrives first; the genuine frame must still decrypt.
+    const out = await drive('decode', user, undefined, [
+      { ...genuine, data: forged.buffer },
+      genuine,
+    ]);
+    expect(out).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(posted.some((m) => m.type === 'e2ee.error')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  // --- authenticate-before-mutate ------------------------------------------
+
+  it('a forged max-counter frame does not freeze the track', async () => {
+    const user = freshUser();
+    await setKey(user);
+    // Two genuine frames (counters 1 and 2 for this user).
+    const [g1, g2] = await drive('encode', user, 'vp8', [
+      frame([1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8], 'delta'),
+      frame([9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16], 'delta'),
+    ]);
+    // Forge a frame: copy g1 (real ivPrefix + keyIndex), rewrite the trailer
+    // counter to the 32-bit max, and corrupt the body so GCM rejects it.
+    const forged = new Uint8Array(g1.data.slice(0));
+    new DataView(forged.buffer).setUint32(
+      forged.length - TRAILER_LEN,
+      COUNTER_HARD_LIMIT,
+    );
+    forged[5] ^= 0xff;
+    posted.length = 0;
+    // The forged frame arrives first, then the genuine frames. With the old
+    // mutate-before-auth window the forged max counter advanced `highest` to
+    // 2^32-1, dropping every later genuine frame as "older than the window".
+    const out = await drive('decode', user, undefined, [
+      { ...g1, data: forged.buffer },
+      g1,
+      g2,
+    ]);
+    expect(out).toHaveLength(2);
+    expect(Array.from(new Uint8Array(out[0].data))).toEqual([
+      1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
+    ]);
+    expect(Array.from(new Uint8Array(out[1].data))).toEqual([
+      9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it('keeps attempting decryption after the failure tolerance is exceeded', async () => {
+    const user = freshUser();
+    await setKey(user);
+    // Encode FAILURE_TOLERANCE + 2 genuine frames with distinct rising
+    // counters, then tamper all but the last.
+    const n = FAILURE_TOLERANCE + 2;
+    const plaintexts = Array.from({ length: n }, (_, i) => [
+      1,
+      2,
+      3,
+      4,
+      5,
+      6,
+      7,
+      8,
+      i & 0xff,
+    ]);
+    const encrypted = await drive(
+      'encode',
+      user,
+      'vp8',
+      plaintexts.map((p) => frame(p, 'delta')),
+    );
+    expect(encrypted).toHaveLength(n);
+    const garbage = encrypted.slice(0, n - 1).map((f) => {
+      const bytes = new Uint8Array(f.data.slice(0));
+      bytes[5] ^= 0xff; // flip a ciphertext byte; trailer/counter stay intact
+      return { ...f, data: bytes.buffer };
+    });
+    const genuine = encrypted[n - 1];
+    posted.length = 0;
+    const out = await drive(
+      'decode',
+      user,
+      undefined,
+      [...garbage, genuine],
+      'VIDEO',
+    );
+    // The genuine final frame still decrypts — the key was NOT latched invalid
+    // by the preceding failure burst.
+    expect(out).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(Array.from(new Uint8Array(out[0].data))).toEqual(plaintexts[n - 1]);
+    // The break is surfaced once (on the tolerance crossing) and recovery once.
+    // Both name the track: a peer's audio and video are separate transforms
+    // reported under one userId, so a host cannot pair them up without this.
+    expect(posted.filter((m) => m.type === 'e2ee.decryption_stalled')).toEqual([
+      {
+        type: 'e2ee.decryption_stalled',
+        userId: user,
+        keyIndex: 0,
+        trackType: 'VIDEO',
+      },
+    ]);
+    expect(posted.filter((m) => m.type === 'e2ee.decryption_resumed')).toEqual([
+      { type: 'e2ee.decryption_resumed', userId: user, trackType: 'VIDEO' },
+    ]);
+    expect(posted.filter((m) => m.type === 'e2ee.decryption_failed')).toEqual([
+      { type: 'e2ee.decryption_failed', userId: user, trackType: 'VIDEO' },
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it('scopes failure accounting per track so a healthy track cannot mask a broken one', async () => {
+    const user = freshUser();
+    await setKey(user);
+    // A video track and an audio track for the SAME user + keyIndex. Encode
+    // FAILURE_TOLERANCE + 1 video frames (then tamper them so each fails GCM)
+    // and one genuine audio frame on the same shared key.
+    const n = FAILURE_TOLERANCE + 1;
+    const videoPts = Array.from({ length: n }, (_, i) => [
+      1,
+      2,
+      3,
+      4,
+      5,
+      6,
+      7,
+      8,
+      i & 0xff,
+    ]);
+    const videoEnc = await drive(
+      'encode',
+      user,
+      'vp8',
+      videoPts.map((p) => frame(p, 'delta')),
+    );
+    const [audioEnc] = await drive('encode', user, 'opus', [
+      frame([0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04], undefined),
+    ]);
+    const tamperedVideo = videoEnc.map((f) => {
+      const bytes = new Uint8Array(f.data.slice(0));
+      bytes[5] ^= 0xff;
+      return { ...f, data: bytes.buffer };
+    });
+
+    // Video decode transform: every frame fails, so the break surfaces once.
+    posted.length = 0;
+    const vOut = await drive('decode', user, undefined, tamperedVideo);
+    expect(vOut).toHaveLength(0);
+    expect(
+      posted.filter((m) => m.type === 'e2ee.decryption_stalled'),
+    ).toHaveLength(1);
+
+    // Audio decode transform (a SEPARATE track): the genuine frame decrypts and
+    // must NOT emit decryption_resumed - this track never failed. With the old
+    // per-(user, keyIndex) counter shared across tracks, the audio success reset
+    // the video failures and spuriously "resumed" (and kept e2ee.decryption_stalled from
+    // ever firing).
+    posted.length = 0;
+    const aOut = await drive('decode', user, undefined, [audioEnc]);
+    expect(aOut).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(posted.some((m) => m.type === 'e2ee.decryption_resumed')).toBe(
+      false,
+    );
+  });
+});
+
+describe('encode pipeline edge behaviors', () => {
+  it('drops and signals missing_key when no key is set', async () => {
+    const user = freshUser();
+    const out = await drive('encode', user, 'vp8', [
+      frame([1, 2, 3, 4, 5], 'delta'),
+    ]);
+    expect(out).toHaveLength(0);
+    expect(posted.some((m) => m.type === 'e2ee.missing_key')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed and signals encryption_failed on an unsupported codec', async () => {
+    const user = freshUser();
+    await setKey(user);
+    // A codec the worker can't split must not be published in the clear and
+    // must not stall the encoder (the old behavior left frames buffering with
+    // no signal). The pipeline drains - nothing is emitted - and the failure is
+    // observable via e2ee.encryption_failed.
+    const out = await drive('encode', user, 'theora', [
+      frame([1, 2, 3, 4, 5], 'delta'),
+    ]);
+    expect(out).toHaveLength(0);
+    expect(posted.some((m) => m.type === 'e2ee.encryption_failed')).toBe(true);
+  }, 3000);
+
+  it('fails closed on a video frame whose codec was not supplied', async () => {
+    const user = freshUser();
+    await setKey(user);
+    // Without a codec there is no clear-byte rule and no escaping decision for
+    // video. Encrypting it whole would blind the SFU to the frame headers, and
+    // an unescaped H264 payload would be split by the packetizer on a random
+    // start code in the ciphertext - silently, since nothing would signal it.
+    const out = await drive('encode', user, undefined, [
+      frame([1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8], 'key'),
+    ]);
+    expect(out).toHaveLength(0);
+    expect(posted.some((m) => m.type === 'e2ee.encryption_failed')).toBe(true);
+  }, 3000);
+
+  it('still encrypts an audio frame whose codec was not supplied', async () => {
+    const user = freshUser();
+    await setKey(user);
+    // The counterpart to the case above: an audio frame carries no key/delta
+    // type, and the 1-byte TOC rule holds for any audio codec, so an unlabeled
+    // audio track must keep working.
+    const pt = [0x78, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd];
+    const [encrypted] = await drive('encode', user, undefined, [
+      frame(pt, undefined),
+    ]);
+    expect(encrypted).toBeDefined();
+    expect(new Uint8Array(encrypted.data)[0]).toBe(0x78);
+    expect(posted.some((m) => m.type === 'e2ee.encryption_failed')).toBe(false);
+    const [decrypted] = await drive('decode', user, undefined, [encrypted]);
+    expect(Array.from(new Uint8Array(decrypted.data))).toEqual(pt);
+  });
+
+  it('re-signals encryption_failed after recovery instead of latching for the worker lifetime', async () => {
+    const user = freshUser();
+    await setKey(user);
+    // One h264 encode transform: a frame whose clear header exceeds the
+    // trailer's 15-bit clearBytes field fails to encrypt, a normal keyframe then
+    // encrypts (recovering the track), and a second bad frame must signal AGAIN.
+    // The old worker-lifetime latch emitted only the first signal and then went
+    // silent forever - so a later permanent fail-closed dropped every frame with
+    // no event.
+    const bad = () => {
+      // Zero padding, then an IDR slice start code far enough in that
+      // h264ClearBytes reports a clear header past MAX_CLEAR_BYTES.
+      const bytes = new Array(MAX_CLEAR_BYTES + 8).fill(0);
+      bytes.splice(MAX_CLEAR_BYTES, 6, 0, 0, 1, 0x65, 0xaa, 0xbb);
+      return frame(bytes, 'key');
+    };
+    const good = () =>
+      frame([0, 0, 0, 1, 0x65, 0x88, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44], 'key');
+    posted.length = 0;
+    const out = await drive('encode', user, 'h264', [bad(), good(), bad()]);
+    // Only the valid frame is emitted; both bad frames are dropped (fail closed).
+    expect(out).toHaveLength(1);
+    // Signaled on the first bad frame, re-armed by the good frame, signaled
+    // again on the second bad frame.
+    expect(
+      posted.filter((m) => m.type === 'e2ee.encryption_failed'),
+    ).toHaveLength(2);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('h264 trailer start-code safety', () => {
+  // SPS NALU, then an IDR slice NALU. h264ClearBytes leaves the start code +
+  // NALU header + 2 slice-header bytes in the clear (14 bytes here) and
+  // encrypts the rest.
+  const H264_KEYFRAME = [
+    0,
+    0,
+    0,
+    1,
+    0x67,
+    0x42,
+    0x00,
+    0x0a, // SPS
+    0,
+    0,
+    0,
+    1,
+    0x65,
+    0xb8,
+    0x40, // IDR slice: start code + NALU header + 1 byte
+    0xaa,
+    0xbb,
+    0xcc,
+    0xdd,
+    0xee, // encrypted body
+  ];
+  const H264_CLEAR_BYTES = 14;
+
+  const hasAnnexBStartCode = (b: Uint8Array): boolean => {
+    for (let i = 0; i + 2 < b.length; i++) {
+      if (b[i] === 0 && b[i + 1] === 0 && b[i + 2] === 1) return true;
+    }
+    return false;
+  };
+
+  it.each([
+    ['counter 1 -> 00 00 00 01', 0],
+    ['counter 256 -> 00 00 01 00', 255],
+  ])(
+    'leaves no fake Annex-B start code in the encrypted region (%s)',
+    async (_label, seed) => {
+      const user = freshUser();
+      await setKey(user);
+      __setFrameCounterForTest(seed);
+      const [encrypted] = await drive('encode', user, 'h264', [
+        frame(H264_KEYFRAME, 'key'),
+      ]);
+      expect(encrypted).toBeDefined();
+      const bytes = new Uint8Array(encrypted.data);
+      // The clear NALU header legitimately carries start codes; only the
+      // encrypted region after it must be start-code free, or libwebrtc's H264
+      // packetizer would split a spurious NALU and corrupt the frame.
+      expect(hasAnnexBStartCode(bytes.subarray(H264_CLEAR_BYTES))).toBe(false);
+    },
+  );
+
+  it('leaves no start code across the clear/encrypted boundary when the clear header ends in 0x00', async () => {
+    // The last clear byte is the first slice-header byte, which multi-slice
+    // encoders can emit as 0x00 (large first_mb_in_slice). If the ciphertext
+    // then starts 00 01, an unseeded escaper would ship a fake start code
+    // spanning the boundary. Ciphertext is not controllable here, so assert
+    // the invariant over the boundary region on many frames instead.
+    const h264ZeroTail = [
+      ...[0, 0, 0, 1, 0x65, 0x00], // slice: start code + NALU header + 0x00
+      ...[0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xee], // encrypted body
+    ];
+    const clearBytes = 6;
+    const user = freshUser();
+    await setKey(user);
+    const frames = Array.from({ length: 32 }, () =>
+      frame(h264ZeroTail, 'key' as const),
+    );
+    const encrypted = await drive('encode', user, 'h264', frames);
+    expect(encrypted.length).toBe(frames.length);
+    for (const f of encrypted) {
+      const bytes = new Uint8Array(f.data);
+      // Scan from 2 bytes before the boundary so a code spanning it is seen.
+      expect(hasAnnexBStartCode(bytes.subarray(clearBytes - 2))).toBe(false);
+    }
+    const decrypted = await drive('decode', user, undefined, encrypted);
+    for (const f of decrypted) {
+      expect(Array.from(new Uint8Array(f.data))).toEqual(h264ZeroTail);
+    }
+  });
+});