@stream-io/node-sdk 0.7.56 → 0.7.57

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
@@ -103,4 +103,36 @@ export declare class StreamClient extends CommonApi {
103
103
  role?: string;
104
104
  }, call_cids: string[], exp?: number, iat?: number) => string;
105
105
  verifyWebhook: (requestBody: string | Buffer, xSignature: string) => boolean;
106
+ /**
107
+ * Verify and parse an HTTP webhook event.
108
+ *
109
+ * Decompresses `rawBody` when gzipped (detected from the body bytes),
110
+ * verifies the `X-Signature` header against the app's API secret, and
111
+ * returns the parsed typed event. Works whether or not Stream is
112
+ * currently compressing payloads for this app, and stays correct behind
113
+ * middleware that auto-decompresses the request.
114
+ *
115
+ * @param rawBody Raw HTTP request body bytes Stream signed
116
+ * @param signature Value of the `X-Signature` header
117
+ * @throws {InvalidWebhookError} When the signature does not match or
118
+ * the gzip / JSON envelope is malformed.
119
+ */
120
+ verifyAndParseWebhook: (rawBody: string | Buffer, signature: string) => import("./gen/models").WHEvent;
121
+ /**
122
+ * Parse an SQS firehose event: decodes the message `Body` (base64 +
123
+ * optional gzip) and returns the parsed typed event. No HMAC
124
+ * verification (Stream does not sign SQS bodies).
125
+ *
126
+ * @param messageBody SQS message `Body` string
127
+ * @throws {InvalidWebhookError} When the base64 / gzip envelope is malformed.
128
+ */
129
+ parseSqs: (messageBody: string) => import("./gen/models").WHEvent;
130
+ /**
131
+ * Parse an SNS-delivered event (unwraps envelope JSON when needed, then
132
+ * same decode path as SQS). No HMAC verification.
133
+ *
134
+ * @param notificationBody Raw SNS POST body or pre-extracted `Message` string
135
+ * @throws {InvalidWebhookError} When the envelope cannot be decoded.
136
+ */
137
+ parseSns: (notificationBody: string) => import("./gen/models").WHEvent;
106
138
  }
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ export declare class FeedApi {
7
7
  constructor(feedsApi: FeedsApi, group: string, id: string);
8
8
  delete(request?: {
9
9
  hard_delete?: boolean;
10
+ purge_user_activities?: boolean;
10
11
  }): Promise<StreamResponse<DeleteFeedResponse>>;
11
12
  getOrCreate(request?: GetOrCreateFeedRequest): Promise<StreamResponse<GetOrCreateFeedResponse>>;
12
13
  update(request?: UpdateFeedRequest): Promise<StreamResponse<UpdateFeedResponse>>;
@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ export declare class FeedsApi {
160
160
  feed_group_id: string;
161
161
  feed_id: string;
162
162
  hard_delete?: boolean;
163
+ purge_user_activities?: boolean;
163
164
  }): Promise<StreamResponse<DeleteFeedResponse>>;
164
165
  getOrCreateFeed(request: GetOrCreateFeedRequest & {
165
166
  feed_group_id: string;
@@ -734,7 +734,7 @@ export interface ActivitySelectorConfig {
734
734
  */
735
735
  cutoff_window?: string;
736
736
  /**
737
- * Minimum popularity threshold
737
+ * Minimum popularity threshold. For the 'popular' selector, omit to use the default (5); values below 1 are rejected
738
738
  */
739
739
  min_popularity?: number;
740
740
  /**
@@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ export interface ActivitySelectorConfigResponse {
761
761
  */
762
762
  cutoff_window?: string;
763
763
  /**
764
- * Minimum popularity threshold
764
+ * Minimum popularity threshold. For the 'popular' selector, values below 1 are normalized to the default (5) at read time.
765
765
  */
766
766
  min_popularity?: number;
767
767
  /**
@@ -1192,6 +1192,7 @@ export interface AppResponseFields {
1192
1192
  disable_auth_checks: boolean;
1193
1193
  disable_permissions_checks: boolean;
1194
1194
  enforce_unique_usernames: string;
1195
+ feed_audit_logs_enabled: boolean;
1195
1196
  guest_user_creation_disabled: boolean;
1196
1197
  id: number;
1197
1198
  image_moderation_enabled: boolean;
@@ -5492,6 +5493,10 @@ export interface DeleteFeedsBatchRequest {
5492
5493
  * Whether to permanently delete the feeds instead of soft delete
5493
5494
  */
5494
5495
  hard_delete?: boolean;
5496
+ /**
5497
+ * When hard-deleting, also fully delete activities authored by each feed's owner from every other feed those activities were fanned out to. Default false preserves existing fan-out. Requires 'hard_delete' to be true; the request is rejected otherwise. Feeds with no recorded owner (created_by_id is empty) are silently skipped for the purge step — owner-matching against an empty string is a safety guard, not a wildcard.
5498
+ */
5499
+ purge_user_activities?: boolean;
5495
5500
  }
5496
5501
  export interface DeleteFeedsBatchResponse {
5497
5502
  duration: string;
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
1
+ import type { WHEvent } from '../gen/models';
2
+ /**
3
+ * Canonical failure-mode messages for {@link InvalidWebhookError}.
4
+ *
5
+ * Callers that prefer exact-match filtering (security logging, retry
6
+ * policy) over substring matches can compare `err.message` to these
7
+ * constants instead of pattern-matching free-form text.
8
+ */
9
+ export declare const InvalidWebhookErrorMessages: {
10
+ readonly signatureMismatch: "signature mismatch";
11
+ readonly invalidBase64: "invalid base64 encoding";
12
+ readonly gzipFailed: "gzip decompression failed";
13
+ readonly invalidJson: "invalid JSON payload";
14
+ };
15
+ /**
16
+ * Thrown by {@link verifyAndParseWebhook} when the supplied `x-signature`
17
+ * does not match the HMAC of the uncompressed payload, and by all webhook
18
+ * helpers (including {@link parseSqs} / {@link parseSns}) when a
19
+ * gzip / base64 / JSON envelope is malformed.
20
+ *
21
+ * The message identifies which failure mode fired. See
22
+ * {@link InvalidWebhookErrorMessages} for the canonical strings.
23
+ */
24
+ export declare class InvalidWebhookError extends Error {
25
+ name: string;
26
+ constructor(message?: string);
27
+ }
28
+ /**
29
+ * Returns `body` as a `Buffer`, gzip-decompressed when its first two
30
+ * bytes match the gzip magic (`1f 8b`, per RFC 1952). When the body is
31
+ * plain JSON (no compression, or middleware already decompressed), the
32
+ * bytes are returned unchanged.
33
+ *
34
+ * Magic-byte detection (rather than relying on a header) keeps the same
35
+ * handler correct when middleware - Express, Next.js, AWS Lambda -
36
+ * auto-decompresses the request before your code sees it.
37
+ */
38
+ export declare function gunzipPayload(rawBody: string | Buffer): Buffer;
39
+ /**
40
+ * Reverses the SQS firehose envelope: the message `Body` is
41
+ * base64-decoded, then the result is gzip-decompressed when it begins
42
+ * with the gzip magic. Returns the raw JSON `Buffer` Stream signed.
43
+ *
44
+ * SQS bodies are always base64-encoded so they remain valid UTF-8 over
45
+ * the queue. The same call works whether or not Stream is currently
46
+ * compressing payloads for this app.
47
+ */
48
+ export declare function decodeSqsPayload(body: string): Buffer;
49
+ /**
50
+ * Reverses an SNS HTTP notification envelope. When `notificationBody`
51
+ * is a JSON envelope (`{"Type":"Notification","Message":"..."}`), the
52
+ * inner `Message` field is extracted and run through the SQS pipeline
53
+ * (base64-decode, then gzip-if-magic). When the input is not a JSON
54
+ * envelope it is treated as the already-extracted `Message` string,
55
+ * so call sites that pre-unwrap continue to work.
56
+ */
57
+ export declare function decodeSnsPayload(notificationBody: string): Buffer;
58
+ /**
59
+ * Constant-time HMAC-SHA256 verification of `signature` against the
60
+ * digest of `body` using `secret` as the key. The signature is always
61
+ * computed over the **uncompressed** JSON bytes, so callers that
62
+ * decoded a gzipped or base64-wrapped payload must pass the inflated
63
+ * bytes here.
64
+ *
65
+ * The legacy `client.verifyWebhook` helper wraps this function, so
66
+ * callers that have already migrated to `verifyAndParseWebhook`,
67
+ * `parseSqs`, or `parseSns` rarely need to invoke this directly.
68
+ */
69
+ export declare function verifySignature(body: string | Buffer, signature: string, secret: string): boolean;
70
+ /**
71
+ * Parse a JSON-encoded webhook event into a typed {@link WHEvent}. New
72
+ * event types Stream introduces still parse successfully — the runtime
73
+ * shape is the JSON Stream sent and the `type` field stays preserved.
74
+ */
75
+ export declare function parseEvent(payload: Buffer | string): WHEvent;
76
+ /**
77
+ * Decompress (when gzipped), verify the HMAC `signature`, and return
78
+ * the parsed {@link WHEvent}.
79
+ *
80
+ * @param rawBody Raw HTTP request body bytes Stream signed
81
+ * @param signature Value of the `X-Signature` header
82
+ * @param secret Your app's API secret
83
+ * @throws {InvalidWebhookError} When the signature does not match or
84
+ * the gzip / base64 / JSON envelope is malformed.
85
+ */
86
+ export declare function verifyAndParseWebhook(rawBody: string | Buffer, signature: string, secret: string): WHEvent;
87
+ /**
88
+ * Decode the SQS message `Body` (base64, then gzip-if-magic) and return
89
+ * the parsed {@link WHEvent}. Stream does not attach an application-level
90
+ * HMAC to SQS deliveries — use {@link verifyAndParseWebhook} for HTTP
91
+ * webhooks.
92
+ */
93
+ export declare function parseSqs(messageBody: string): WHEvent;
94
+ /**
95
+ * Decode an SNS notification (unwrap the JSON envelope when needed; same
96
+ * inner format as SQS). No application-level HMAC verification.
97
+ */
98
+ export declare function parseSns(notificationBody: string): WHEvent;
package/index.ts CHANGED
@@ -6,3 +6,7 @@ export * from './src/StreamVideoClient';
6
6
  export * from './src/gen/models';
7
7
  export * from './src/StreamFeedsClient';
8
8
  export * from './src/StreamFeed';
9
+ export {
10
+ InvalidWebhookError,
11
+ InvalidWebhookErrorMessages,
12
+ } from './src/utils/webhook';
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@stream-io/node-sdk",
3
- "version": "0.7.56",
3
+ "version": "0.7.57",
4
4
  "description": "",
5
5
  "exports": {
6
6
  ".": {
@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
1
1
  import { JWTServerToken, JWTUserToken } from './utils/create-token';
2
+ import {
3
+ InvalidWebhookError,
4
+ parseSns as parseSnsHelper,
5
+ parseSqs as parseSqsHelper,
6
+ verifyAndParseWebhook as verifyAndParseWebhookHelper,
7
+ } from './utils/webhook';
2
8
  import { CommonApi } from './gen/common/CommonApi';
3
9
  import { StreamVideoClient } from './StreamVideoClient';
4
10
  import crypto from 'crypto';
@@ -253,4 +259,46 @@ export class StreamClient extends CommonApi {
253
259
  return false;
254
260
  }
255
261
  };
262
+
263
+ /**
264
+ * Verify and parse an HTTP webhook event.
265
+ *
266
+ * Decompresses `rawBody` when gzipped (detected from the body bytes),
267
+ * verifies the `X-Signature` header against the app's API secret, and
268
+ * returns the parsed typed event. Works whether or not Stream is
269
+ * currently compressing payloads for this app, and stays correct behind
270
+ * middleware that auto-decompresses the request.
271
+ *
272
+ * @param rawBody Raw HTTP request body bytes Stream signed
273
+ * @param signature Value of the `X-Signature` header
274
+ * @throws {InvalidWebhookError} When the signature does not match or
275
+ * the gzip / JSON envelope is malformed.
276
+ */
277
+ verifyAndParseWebhook = (rawBody: string | Buffer, signature: string) => {
278
+ if (!this.secret) {
279
+ throw new InvalidWebhookError(
280
+ 'cannot verify webhook signature without an API secret on the client',
281
+ );
282
+ }
283
+ return verifyAndParseWebhookHelper(rawBody, signature, this.secret);
284
+ };
285
+
286
+ /**
287
+ * Parse an SQS firehose event: decodes the message `Body` (base64 +
288
+ * optional gzip) and returns the parsed typed event. No HMAC
289
+ * verification (Stream does not sign SQS bodies).
290
+ *
291
+ * @param messageBody SQS message `Body` string
292
+ * @throws {InvalidWebhookError} When the base64 / gzip envelope is malformed.
293
+ */
294
+ parseSqs = (messageBody: string) => parseSqsHelper(messageBody);
295
+
296
+ /**
297
+ * Parse an SNS-delivered event (unwraps envelope JSON when needed, then
298
+ * same decode path as SQS). No HMAC verification.
299
+ *
300
+ * @param notificationBody Raw SNS POST body or pre-extracted `Message` string
301
+ * @throws {InvalidWebhookError} When the envelope cannot be decoded.
302
+ */
303
+ parseSns = (notificationBody: string) => parseSnsHelper(notificationBody);
256
304
  }
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ export class FeedApi {
31
31
 
32
32
  delete(request?: {
33
33
  hard_delete?: boolean;
34
+ purge_user_activities?: boolean;
34
35
  }): Promise<StreamResponse<DeleteFeedResponse>> {
35
36
  return this.feedsApi.deleteFeed({
36
37
  feed_id: this.id,
@@ -1545,9 +1545,11 @@ export class FeedsApi {
1545
1545
  feed_group_id: string;
1546
1546
  feed_id: string;
1547
1547
  hard_delete?: boolean;
1548
+ purge_user_activities?: boolean;
1548
1549
  }): Promise<StreamResponse<DeleteFeedResponse>> {
1549
1550
  const queryParams = {
1550
1551
  hard_delete: request?.hard_delete,
1552
+ purge_user_activities: request?.purge_user_activities,
1551
1553
  };
1552
1554
  const pathParams = {
1553
1555
  feed_group_id: request?.feed_group_id,
@@ -2275,6 +2277,7 @@ export class FeedsApi {
2275
2277
  const body = {
2276
2278
  feeds: request?.feeds,
2277
2279
  hard_delete: request?.hard_delete,
2280
+ purge_user_activities: request?.purge_user_activities,
2278
2281
  };
2279
2282
 
2280
2283
  const response = await this.apiClient.sendRequest<
@@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@ export interface ActivitySelectorConfig {
1041
1041
  cutoff_window?: string;
1042
1042
 
1043
1043
  /**
1044
- * Minimum popularity threshold
1044
+ * Minimum popularity threshold. For the 'popular' selector, omit to use the default (5); values below 1 are rejected
1045
1045
  */
1046
1046
  min_popularity?: number;
1047
1047
 
@@ -1083,7 +1083,7 @@ export interface ActivitySelectorConfigResponse {
1083
1083
  cutoff_window?: string;
1084
1084
 
1085
1085
  /**
1086
- * Minimum popularity threshold
1086
+ * Minimum popularity threshold. For the 'popular' selector, values below 1 are normalized to the default (5) at read time.
1087
1087
  */
1088
1088
  min_popularity?: number;
1089
1089
 
@@ -1656,6 +1656,8 @@ export interface AppResponseFields {
1656
1656
 
1657
1657
  enforce_unique_usernames: string;
1658
1658
 
1659
+ feed_audit_logs_enabled: boolean;
1660
+
1659
1661
  guest_user_creation_disabled: boolean;
1660
1662
 
1661
1663
  id: number;
@@ -7896,6 +7898,11 @@ export interface DeleteFeedsBatchRequest {
7896
7898
  * Whether to permanently delete the feeds instead of soft delete
7897
7899
  */
7898
7900
  hard_delete?: boolean;
7901
+
7902
+ /**
7903
+ * When hard-deleting, also fully delete activities authored by each feed's owner from every other feed those activities were fanned out to. Default false preserves existing fan-out. Requires 'hard_delete' to be true; the request is rejected otherwise. Feeds with no recorded owner (created_by_id is empty) are silently skipped for the purge step — owner-matching against an empty string is a safety guard, not a wildcard.
7904
+ */
7905
+ purge_user_activities?: boolean;
7899
7906
  }
7900
7907
 
7901
7908
  export interface DeleteFeedsBatchResponse {
@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
1
+ import crypto from 'crypto';
2
+ import zlib from 'zlib';
3
+ import type { WHEvent } from '../gen/models';
4
+
5
+ /**
6
+ * Canonical failure-mode messages for {@link InvalidWebhookError}.
7
+ *
8
+ * Callers that prefer exact-match filtering (security logging, retry
9
+ * policy) over substring matches can compare `err.message` to these
10
+ * constants instead of pattern-matching free-form text.
11
+ */
12
+ export const InvalidWebhookErrorMessages = {
13
+ signatureMismatch: 'signature mismatch',
14
+ invalidBase64: 'invalid base64 encoding',
15
+ gzipFailed: 'gzip decompression failed',
16
+ invalidJson: 'invalid JSON payload',
17
+ } as const;
18
+
19
+ /**
20
+ * Thrown by {@link verifyAndParseWebhook} when the supplied `x-signature`
21
+ * does not match the HMAC of the uncompressed payload, and by all webhook
22
+ * helpers (including {@link parseSqs} / {@link parseSns}) when a
23
+ * gzip / base64 / JSON envelope is malformed.
24
+ *
25
+ * The message identifies which failure mode fired. See
26
+ * {@link InvalidWebhookErrorMessages} for the canonical strings.
27
+ */
28
+ export class InvalidWebhookError extends Error {
29
+ public name = 'InvalidWebhookError';
30
+
31
+ constructor(message: string = InvalidWebhookErrorMessages.signatureMismatch) {
32
+ super(message);
33
+ }
34
+ }
35
+
36
+ const GZIP_MAGIC = Buffer.from([0x1f, 0x8b]);
37
+
38
+ /**
39
+ * Returns `body` as a `Buffer`, gzip-decompressed when its first two
40
+ * bytes match the gzip magic (`1f 8b`, per RFC 1952). When the body is
41
+ * plain JSON (no compression, or middleware already decompressed), the
42
+ * bytes are returned unchanged.
43
+ *
44
+ * Magic-byte detection (rather than relying on a header) keeps the same
45
+ * handler correct when middleware - Express, Next.js, AWS Lambda -
46
+ * auto-decompresses the request before your code sees it.
47
+ */
48
+ export function gunzipPayload(rawBody: string | Buffer): Buffer {
49
+ const body = Buffer.isBuffer(rawBody) ? rawBody : Buffer.from(rawBody);
50
+ if (body.length >= 2 && body.subarray(0, 2).equals(GZIP_MAGIC)) {
51
+ try {
52
+ return zlib.gunzipSync(body);
53
+ } catch {
54
+ throw new InvalidWebhookError(InvalidWebhookErrorMessages.gzipFailed);
55
+ }
56
+ }
57
+ return body;
58
+ }
59
+
60
+ /**
61
+ * Reverses the SQS firehose envelope: the message `Body` is
62
+ * base64-decoded, then the result is gzip-decompressed when it begins
63
+ * with the gzip magic. Returns the raw JSON `Buffer` Stream signed.
64
+ *
65
+ * SQS bodies are always base64-encoded so they remain valid UTF-8 over
66
+ * the queue. The same call works whether or not Stream is currently
67
+ * compressing payloads for this app.
68
+ */
69
+ export function decodeSqsPayload(body: string): Buffer {
70
+ // Reject anything that isn't canonical base64 up front. Node's base64
71
+ // decoder is permissive (silently strips characters outside the
72
+ // alphabet, accepts both standard and URL-safe variants), so we have
73
+ // to be strict here to avoid silently corrupting the body before the
74
+ // signature check runs.
75
+ if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9+/]*={0,2}$/.test(body) || body.length % 4 !== 0) {
76
+ throw new InvalidWebhookError(InvalidWebhookErrorMessages.invalidBase64);
77
+ }
78
+ const decoded = Buffer.from(body, 'base64');
79
+ if (decoded.toString('base64').length !== body.length) {
80
+ throw new InvalidWebhookError(InvalidWebhookErrorMessages.invalidBase64);
81
+ }
82
+ return gunzipPayload(decoded);
83
+ }
84
+
85
+ /**
86
+ * Reverses an SNS HTTP notification envelope. When `notificationBody`
87
+ * is a JSON envelope (`{"Type":"Notification","Message":"..."}`), the
88
+ * inner `Message` field is extracted and run through the SQS pipeline
89
+ * (base64-decode, then gzip-if-magic). When the input is not a JSON
90
+ * envelope it is treated as the already-extracted `Message` string,
91
+ * so call sites that pre-unwrap continue to work.
92
+ */
93
+ export function decodeSnsPayload(notificationBody: string): Buffer {
94
+ const inner = extractSnsMessage(notificationBody);
95
+ return decodeSqsPayload(inner ?? notificationBody);
96
+ }
97
+
98
+ function extractSnsMessage(notificationBody: string): string | null {
99
+ const trimmed = notificationBody.replace(/^[\s\uFEFF]+/, '');
100
+ if (!trimmed.startsWith('{')) {
101
+ return null;
102
+ }
103
+ let parsed: unknown;
104
+ try {
105
+ parsed = JSON.parse(trimmed);
106
+ } catch {
107
+ return null;
108
+ }
109
+ if (
110
+ parsed === null ||
111
+ typeof parsed !== 'object' ||
112
+ Array.isArray(parsed) ||
113
+ typeof (parsed as { Message?: unknown }).Message !== 'string'
114
+ ) {
115
+ return null;
116
+ }
117
+ return (parsed as { Message: string }).Message;
118
+ }
119
+
120
+ /**
121
+ * Constant-time HMAC-SHA256 verification of `signature` against the
122
+ * digest of `body` using `secret` as the key. The signature is always
123
+ * computed over the **uncompressed** JSON bytes, so callers that
124
+ * decoded a gzipped or base64-wrapped payload must pass the inflated
125
+ * bytes here.
126
+ *
127
+ * The legacy `client.verifyWebhook` helper wraps this function, so
128
+ * callers that have already migrated to `verifyAndParseWebhook`,
129
+ * `parseSqs`, or `parseSns` rarely need to invoke this directly.
130
+ */
131
+ export function verifySignature(
132
+ body: string | Buffer,
133
+ signature: string,
134
+ secret: string,
135
+ ): boolean {
136
+ const key = Buffer.from(secret, 'utf8');
137
+ const hash = crypto.createHmac('sha256', key).update(body).digest('hex');
138
+ try {
139
+ return crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(hash), Buffer.from(signature));
140
+ } catch {
141
+ return false;
142
+ }
143
+ }
144
+
145
+ /**
146
+ * Parse a JSON-encoded webhook event into a typed {@link WHEvent}. New
147
+ * event types Stream introduces still parse successfully — the runtime
148
+ * shape is the JSON Stream sent and the `type` field stays preserved.
149
+ */
150
+ export function parseEvent(payload: Buffer | string): WHEvent {
151
+ const text = Buffer.isBuffer(payload) ? payload.toString('utf8') : payload;
152
+ try {
153
+ return JSON.parse(text) as WHEvent;
154
+ } catch {
155
+ throw new InvalidWebhookError(InvalidWebhookErrorMessages.invalidJson);
156
+ }
157
+ }
158
+
159
+ function verifyAndParse(
160
+ payload: Buffer,
161
+ signature: string,
162
+ secret: string,
163
+ ): WHEvent {
164
+ if (!verifySignature(payload, signature, secret)) {
165
+ throw new InvalidWebhookError(
166
+ InvalidWebhookErrorMessages.signatureMismatch,
167
+ );
168
+ }
169
+ return parseEvent(payload);
170
+ }
171
+
172
+ /**
173
+ * Decompress (when gzipped), verify the HMAC `signature`, and return
174
+ * the parsed {@link WHEvent}.
175
+ *
176
+ * @param rawBody Raw HTTP request body bytes Stream signed
177
+ * @param signature Value of the `X-Signature` header
178
+ * @param secret Your app's API secret
179
+ * @throws {InvalidWebhookError} When the signature does not match or
180
+ * the gzip / base64 / JSON envelope is malformed.
181
+ */
182
+ export function verifyAndParseWebhook(
183
+ rawBody: string | Buffer,
184
+ signature: string,
185
+ secret: string,
186
+ ): WHEvent {
187
+ return verifyAndParse(gunzipPayload(rawBody), signature, secret);
188
+ }
189
+
190
+ /**
191
+ * Decode the SQS message `Body` (base64, then gzip-if-magic) and return
192
+ * the parsed {@link WHEvent}. Stream does not attach an application-level
193
+ * HMAC to SQS deliveries — use {@link verifyAndParseWebhook} for HTTP
194
+ * webhooks.
195
+ */
196
+ export function parseSqs(messageBody: string): WHEvent {
197
+ return parseEvent(decodeSqsPayload(messageBody));
198
+ }
199
+
200
+ /**
201
+ * Decode an SNS notification (unwrap the JSON envelope when needed; same
202
+ * inner format as SQS). No application-level HMAC verification.
203
+ */
204
+ export function parseSns(notificationBody: string): WHEvent {
205
+ return parseEvent(decodeSnsPayload(notificationBody));
206
+ }