@stream-io/node-sdk 0.7.55 → 0.7.57
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/index.cjs.js +245 -4
- package/dist/index.cjs.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/index.es.mjs +244 -5
- package/dist/index.es.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/src/StreamClient.d.ts +32 -0
- package/dist/src/gen/feeds/FeedApi.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/src/gen/feeds/FeedsApi.d.ts +3 -1
- package/dist/src/gen/models/index.d.ts +46 -6
- package/dist/src/utils/webhook.d.ts +98 -0
- package/index.ts +4 -0
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/src/StreamClient.ts +48 -0
- package/src/gen/feeds/FeedApi.ts +1 -0
- package/src/gen/feeds/FeedsApi.ts +32 -3
- package/src/gen/model-decoders/decoders.ts +14 -0
- package/src/gen/models/index.ts +66 -10
- package/src/utils/webhook.ts +206 -0
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@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
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import crypto from 'crypto';
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import zlib from 'zlib';
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import type { WHEvent } from '../gen/models';
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/**
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* Canonical failure-mode messages for {@link InvalidWebhookError}.
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*
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* Callers that prefer exact-match filtering (security logging, retry
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* policy) over substring matches can compare `err.message` to these
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* constants instead of pattern-matching free-form text.
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*/
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export const InvalidWebhookErrorMessages = {
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signatureMismatch: 'signature mismatch',
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invalidBase64: 'invalid base64 encoding',
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gzipFailed: 'gzip decompression failed',
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invalidJson: 'invalid JSON payload',
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} as const;
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/**
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* Thrown by {@link verifyAndParseWebhook} when the supplied `x-signature`
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* does not match the HMAC of the uncompressed payload, and by all webhook
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* helpers (including {@link parseSqs} / {@link parseSns}) when a
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* gzip / base64 / JSON envelope is malformed.
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*
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* The message identifies which failure mode fired. See
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* {@link InvalidWebhookErrorMessages} for the canonical strings.
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*/
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export class InvalidWebhookError extends Error {
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public name = 'InvalidWebhookError';
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constructor(message: string = InvalidWebhookErrorMessages.signatureMismatch) {
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super(message);
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}
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}
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const GZIP_MAGIC = Buffer.from([0x1f, 0x8b]);
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/**
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* Returns `body` as a `Buffer`, gzip-decompressed when its first two
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* bytes match the gzip magic (`1f 8b`, per RFC 1952). When the body is
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* plain JSON (no compression, or middleware already decompressed), the
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* bytes are returned unchanged.
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*
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* Magic-byte detection (rather than relying on a header) keeps the same
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* handler correct when middleware - Express, Next.js, AWS Lambda -
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* auto-decompresses the request before your code sees it.
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*/
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export function gunzipPayload(rawBody: string | Buffer): Buffer {
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const body = Buffer.isBuffer(rawBody) ? rawBody : Buffer.from(rawBody);
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if (body.length >= 2 && body.subarray(0, 2).equals(GZIP_MAGIC)) {
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try {
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return zlib.gunzipSync(body);
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} catch {
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throw new InvalidWebhookError(InvalidWebhookErrorMessages.gzipFailed);
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}
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}
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return body;
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}
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/**
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* Reverses the SQS firehose envelope: the message `Body` is
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* base64-decoded, then the result is gzip-decompressed when it begins
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* with the gzip magic. Returns the raw JSON `Buffer` Stream signed.
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*
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* SQS bodies are always base64-encoded so they remain valid UTF-8 over
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* the queue. The same call works whether or not Stream is currently
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* compressing payloads for this app.
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*/
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export function decodeSqsPayload(body: string): Buffer {
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// Reject anything that isn't canonical base64 up front. Node's base64
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// decoder is permissive (silently strips characters outside the
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// alphabet, accepts both standard and URL-safe variants), so we have
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// to be strict here to avoid silently corrupting the body before the
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// signature check runs.
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if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9+/]*={0,2}$/.test(body) || body.length % 4 !== 0) {
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throw new InvalidWebhookError(InvalidWebhookErrorMessages.invalidBase64);
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}
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const decoded = Buffer.from(body, 'base64');
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if (decoded.toString('base64').length !== body.length) {
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throw new InvalidWebhookError(InvalidWebhookErrorMessages.invalidBase64);
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}
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return gunzipPayload(decoded);
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}
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/**
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* Reverses an SNS HTTP notification envelope. When `notificationBody`
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* is a JSON envelope (`{"Type":"Notification","Message":"..."}`), the
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* inner `Message` field is extracted and run through the SQS pipeline
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* (base64-decode, then gzip-if-magic). When the input is not a JSON
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* envelope it is treated as the already-extracted `Message` string,
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* so call sites that pre-unwrap continue to work.
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*/
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export function decodeSnsPayload(notificationBody: string): Buffer {
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const inner = extractSnsMessage(notificationBody);
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return decodeSqsPayload(inner ?? notificationBody);
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}
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function extractSnsMessage(notificationBody: string): string | null {
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const trimmed = notificationBody.replace(/^[\s\uFEFF]+/, '');
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if (!trimmed.startsWith('{')) {
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return null;
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}
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let parsed: unknown;
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try {
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parsed = JSON.parse(trimmed);
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} catch {
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return null;
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}
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if (
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parsed === null ||
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typeof parsed !== 'object' ||
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Array.isArray(parsed) ||
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typeof (parsed as { Message?: unknown }).Message !== 'string'
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) {
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return null;
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}
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return (parsed as { Message: string }).Message;
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}
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/**
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* Constant-time HMAC-SHA256 verification of `signature` against the
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* digest of `body` using `secret` as the key. The signature is always
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* computed over the **uncompressed** JSON bytes, so callers that
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* decoded a gzipped or base64-wrapped payload must pass the inflated
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* bytes here.
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*
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* The legacy `client.verifyWebhook` helper wraps this function, so
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* callers that have already migrated to `verifyAndParseWebhook`,
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* `parseSqs`, or `parseSns` rarely need to invoke this directly.
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*/
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export function verifySignature(
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body: string | Buffer,
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signature: string,
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secret: string,
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): boolean {
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const key = Buffer.from(secret, 'utf8');
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const hash = crypto.createHmac('sha256', key).update(body).digest('hex');
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try {
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return crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(hash), Buffer.from(signature));
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} catch {
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return false;
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}
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}
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/**
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* Parse a JSON-encoded webhook event into a typed {@link WHEvent}. New
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* event types Stream introduces still parse successfully — the runtime
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* shape is the JSON Stream sent and the `type` field stays preserved.
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*/
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export function parseEvent(payload: Buffer | string): WHEvent {
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const text = Buffer.isBuffer(payload) ? payload.toString('utf8') : payload;
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try {
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return JSON.parse(text) as WHEvent;
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} catch {
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throw new InvalidWebhookError(InvalidWebhookErrorMessages.invalidJson);
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}
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}
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function verifyAndParse(
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payload: Buffer,
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signature: string,
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secret: string,
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): WHEvent {
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if (!verifySignature(payload, signature, secret)) {
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throw new InvalidWebhookError(
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InvalidWebhookErrorMessages.signatureMismatch,
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);
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}
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return parseEvent(payload);
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}
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/**
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* Decompress (when gzipped), verify the HMAC `signature`, and return
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* the parsed {@link WHEvent}.
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*
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* @param rawBody Raw HTTP request body bytes Stream signed
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* @param signature Value of the `X-Signature` header
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* @param secret Your app's API secret
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* @throws {InvalidWebhookError} When the signature does not match or
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* the gzip / base64 / JSON envelope is malformed.
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*/
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export function verifyAndParseWebhook(
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rawBody: string | Buffer,
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signature: string,
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secret: string,
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): WHEvent {
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return verifyAndParse(gunzipPayload(rawBody), signature, secret);
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}
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/**
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* Decode the SQS message `Body` (base64, then gzip-if-magic) and return
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* the parsed {@link WHEvent}. Stream does not attach an application-level
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* HMAC to SQS deliveries — use {@link verifyAndParseWebhook} for HTTP
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* webhooks.
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*/
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export function parseSqs(messageBody: string): WHEvent {
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return parseEvent(decodeSqsPayload(messageBody));
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}
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/**
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* Decode an SNS notification (unwrap the JSON envelope when needed; same
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* inner format as SQS). No application-level HMAC verification.
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*/
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export function parseSns(notificationBody: string): WHEvent {
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return parseEvent(decodeSnsPayload(notificationBody));
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}
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