@stonyx/oauth 0.1.1-alpha.16 → 0.1.1-alpha.18

package/dist/state-store.d.ts

@@ -10,6 +10,33 @@ export interface PendingState {
     bindingHash: string;
     createdAt: number;
 }
+/**
+ * The five reasons a callback is rejected, as fixed strings.
+ *
+ * Named rather than inlined so that collapsing two of them into one is a
+ * visible edit: distinguishing them in the server log is the whole point of
+ * logging a reason, and an operator telling an expired state from a
+ * cross-provider replay depends on them staying distinct.
+ */
+export declare const STATE_REJECTION: {
+    readonly unknownState: "Invalid or missing state token";
+    readonly expired: "State token has expired";
+    readonly wrongProvider: "State token was not issued for this provider";
+    readonly missingBinding: "Missing state binding value";
+    readonly unboundClient: "State token is not bound to this client";
+};
+/**
+ * A callback rejected by `StateStore.consume`.
+ *
+ * Carries two things the route layer cannot otherwise recover: that the
+ * rejection came from state validation rather than from anything downstream of
+ * it, and whether a pending record was actually consumed.
+ */
+export declare class StateRejection extends Error {
+    /** True when this attempt recognised a pending record and burned it. */
+    consumed: boolean;
+    constructor(reason: string, consumed: boolean);
+}
 export interface IssuedState {
     /** Sent to the provider as the OAuth2 `state` parameter. */
     stateToken: string;
@@ -39,9 +66,49 @@ export default class StateStore {
     /**
      * Validates and consumes a pending state. Throws on every rejection path.
      *
-     * The record is removed as soon as the state is recognised — before the
-     * binding is checked — so a state cannot survive a failed attempt and be
-     * used as a target for guessing the binding value.
+     * The record is removed as soon as the state is recognised — before the TTL,
+     * provider and binding checks — so every state gets exactly one attempt
+     * whatever the outcome.
+     *
+     * That uniformity is the justification, not brute-force resistance:
+     * guessing `BINDING_VALUE_BYTES` of CSPRNG output is infeasible whether or
+     * not the record survives. What retaining it would buy an attacker is a
+     * repeatable, unauthenticated oracle on this endpoint for the state's full
+     * lifetime — and the safety of that would then rest entirely on an entropy
+     * constant a future change can lower. One attempt per state is a structural
+     * property; entropy arithmetic is not.
+     *
+     * The trade is real: an attacker who already knows a victim's state can burn
+     * it, and the victim must restart at `/auth/login/:provider`. That vector is
+     * accepted deliberately — it requires the victim's `randomUUID` state, and
+     * it is self-healing on retry. `consumed` on the rejection says whether this
+     * call actually burned a record, so a caller can distinguish "nothing of the
+     * victim's was touched" from "one attempt was spent".
+     *
+     * `bindingValues` is every value the client presented under the binding
+     * cookie's name, not just the first — see `anyCandidateMatches`.
+     */
+    consume(stateToken: string | undefined, provider: string, bindingValues: readonly string[]): void;
+    /**
+     * Whether *any* presented value is the binding value for this record.
+     *
+     * Every candidate is tried, and the callback is accepted if one matches.
+     * Returning on the first value carrying the cookie name instead made a
+     * planted cookie a permanent, unauthenticated denial of login: RFC 6265
+     * section 5.4 orders the `Cookie` header by path length then creation time,
+     * so an attacker with content control on a sibling subdomain sets a
+     * same-named cookie once and every subsequent callback for that victim reads
+     * theirs, fails the binding check, and burns the state on the way out. The
+     * victim cannot recover by retrying.
+     *
+     * Accepting any match gives an attacker nothing: they would have to present
+     * the victim's own binding value, which is the property being checked. The
+     * candidate list is bounded by `MAX_BINDING_COOKIE_CANDIDATES` at the point
+     * it is parsed, and the record is consumed on recognition, so a state still
+     * gets exactly one attempt.
+     *
+     * The loop does not short-circuit, so the work is a function of how many
+     * values were presented and not of which one matched.
      */
-    consume(stateToken: string | undefined, provider: string, bindingValue: string | undefined): void;
+    anyCandidateMatches(candidates: readonly string[], record: PendingState): boolean;
 }

package/dist/state-store.js

@@ -1,5 +1,36 @@
 import { createHash, randomBytes, randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
 import { BINDING_VALUE_BYTES, STATE_TTL_MS } from './constants.js';
+/**
+ * The five reasons a callback is rejected, as fixed strings.
+ *
+ * Named rather than inlined so that collapsing two of them into one is a
+ * visible edit: distinguishing them in the server log is the whole point of
+ * logging a reason, and an operator telling an expired state from a
+ * cross-provider replay depends on them staying distinct.
+ */
+export const STATE_REJECTION = {
+    unknownState: 'Invalid or missing state token',
+    expired: 'State token has expired',
+    wrongProvider: 'State token was not issued for this provider',
+    missingBinding: 'Missing state binding value',
+    unboundClient: 'State token is not bound to this client',
+};
+/**
+ * A callback rejected by `StateStore.consume`.
+ *
+ * Carries two things the route layer cannot otherwise recover: that the
+ * rejection came from state validation rather than from anything downstream of
+ * it, and whether a pending record was actually consumed.
+ */
+export class StateRejection extends Error {
+    /** True when this attempt recognised a pending record and burned it. */
+    consumed;
+    constructor(reason, consumed) {
+        super(reason);
+        this.name = 'StateRejection';
+        this.consumed = consumed;
+    }
+}
 /**
  * Issues and validates OAuth2 `state` tokens bound to the client that started
  * the flow (#36).
@@ -44,25 +75,68 @@ export default class StateStore {
     /**
      * Validates and consumes a pending state. Throws on every rejection path.
      *
-     * The record is removed as soon as the state is recognised — before the
-     * binding is checked — so a state cannot survive a failed attempt and be
-     * used as a target for guessing the binding value.
+     * The record is removed as soon as the state is recognised — before the TTL,
+     * provider and binding checks — so every state gets exactly one attempt
+     * whatever the outcome.
+     *
+     * That uniformity is the justification, not brute-force resistance:
+     * guessing `BINDING_VALUE_BYTES` of CSPRNG output is infeasible whether or
+     * not the record survives. What retaining it would buy an attacker is a
+     * repeatable, unauthenticated oracle on this endpoint for the state's full
+     * lifetime — and the safety of that would then rest entirely on an entropy
+     * constant a future change can lower. One attempt per state is a structural
+     * property; entropy arithmetic is not.
+     *
+     * The trade is real: an attacker who already knows a victim's state can burn
+     * it, and the victim must restart at `/auth/login/:provider`. That vector is
+     * accepted deliberately — it requires the victim's `randomUUID` state, and
+     * it is self-healing on retry. `consumed` on the rejection says whether this
+     * call actually burned a record, so a caller can distinguish "nothing of the
+     * victim's was touched" from "one attempt was spent".
+     *
+     * `bindingValues` is every value the client presented under the binding
+     * cookie's name, not just the first — see `anyCandidateMatches`.
      */
-    consume(stateToken, provider, bindingValue) {
+    consume(stateToken, provider, bindingValues) {
         if (!stateToken)
-            throw new Error('Invalid or missing state token');
+            throw new StateRejection(STATE_REJECTION.unknownState, false);
         const record = this.pending.get(stateToken);
         if (!record)
-            throw new Error('Invalid or missing state token');
+            throw new StateRejection(STATE_REJECTION.unknownState, false);
         this.pending.delete(stateToken);
         if (Date.now() - record.createdAt > this.ttl)
-            throw new Error('State token has expired');
+            throw new StateRejection(STATE_REJECTION.expired, true);
         if (record.provider !== provider)
-            throw new Error('State token was not issued for this provider');
-        if (!bindingValue)
-            throw new Error('Missing state binding value');
-        if (!StateStore.digestsMatch(StateStore.hash(bindingValue), record.bindingHash)) {
-            throw new Error('State token is not bound to this client');
+            throw new StateRejection(STATE_REJECTION.wrongProvider, true);
+        const candidates = bindingValues.filter(value => value.length > 0);
+        if (candidates.length === 0)
+            throw new StateRejection(STATE_REJECTION.missingBinding, true);
+        if (!this.anyCandidateMatches(candidates, record)) {
+            throw new StateRejection(STATE_REJECTION.unboundClient, true);
         }
     }
+    /**
+     * Whether *any* presented value is the binding value for this record.
+     *
+     * Every candidate is tried, and the callback is accepted if one matches.
+     * Returning on the first value carrying the cookie name instead made a
+     * planted cookie a permanent, unauthenticated denial of login: RFC 6265
+     * section 5.4 orders the `Cookie` header by path length then creation time,
+     * so an attacker with content control on a sibling subdomain sets a
+     * same-named cookie once and every subsequent callback for that victim reads
+     * theirs, fails the binding check, and burns the state on the way out. The
+     * victim cannot recover by retrying.
+     *
+     * Accepting any match gives an attacker nothing: they would have to present
+     * the victim's own binding value, which is the property being checked. The
+     * candidate list is bounded by `MAX_BINDING_COOKIE_CANDIDATES` at the point
+     * it is parsed, and the record is consumed on recognition, so a state still
+     * gets exactly one attempt.
+     *
+     * The loop does not short-circuit, so the work is a function of how many
+     * values were presented and not of which one matched.
+     */
+    anyCandidateMatches(candidates, record) {
+        return candidates.reduce((matched, candidate) => StateStore.digestsMatch(StateStore.hash(candidate), record.bindingHash) || matched, false);
+    }
 }

package/package.json

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
     "stonyx-async",
     "stonyx-module"
   ],
-  "version": "0.1.1-alpha.16",
+  "version": "0.1.1-alpha.18",
   "description": "OAuth2 authentication module for the Stonyx framework",
   "repository": {
     "type": "git",
@@ -17,10 +17,6 @@
       "types": "./dist/main.d.ts",
       "default": "./dist/main.js"
     },
-    "./constants": {
-      "types": "./dist/constants.d.ts",
-      "default": "./dist/constants.js"
-    },
     "./oauth-flow": {
       "types": "./dist/oauth-flow.d.ts",
       "default": "./dist/oauth-flow.js"
@@ -65,7 +61,7 @@
     "@stonyx/rest-server": ">=0.2.1-beta.11"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
-    "@stonyx/rest-server": "0.2.1-beta.80",
+    "@stonyx/rest-server": "0.2.1-beta.81",
     "@stonyx/utils": "0.2.3-beta.26",
     "@stonyx/logs": "1.0.1-beta.19",
     "@types/qunit": "^2.19.13",

package/src/auth-request.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 import { Request } from '@stonyx/rest-server';
 import log from 'stonyx/log';
+import { StateRejection } from './state-store.js';
 import {
+  MAX_BINDING_COOKIE_CANDIDATES,
   STATE_COOKIE_NAME,
   STATE_COOKIE_PATH,
   STATE_COOKIE_SAME_SITE,
@@ -12,6 +14,55 @@ interface AuthorizationRequest {
   bindingValue: string;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Hosts treated as a development origin by exact match, and — together with
+ * `127.0.0.0/8` and the IPv4-mapped IPv6 spellings of it — the only ones exempt
+ * from `Secure` on the binding cookie. See `AuthRequest.isSecureContext`.
+ *
+ * `0.0.0.0` and `::` are the wildcard bind addresses a developer reaches a
+ * local server on; `127.0.0.1` is covered by the `127.0.0.0/8` test rather than
+ * listed here, so the two are not silently redundant.
+ */
+const LOOPBACK_HOSTS = new Set(['localhost', '::1', '0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1', '0.0.0.0', '::']);
+
+/** `host` values whose port component is anything but a decimal port are rejected. */
+const PORT_PATTERN = /^\d{1,5}$/;
+
+/**
+ * The characters RFC 1123 permits in a registered hostname, plus `.`.
+ *
+ * Anything else — `@`, `,`, whitespace, `/` — means the value is not a bare
+ * hostname, and the caller fails secure rather than guessing. This is what
+ * rejects `localhost:80@evil.com` and a comma-joined multi-value `Host`.
+ */
+const HOSTNAME_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$/;
+
+/** A dotted-quad whose first octet is 127, i.e. real `127.0.0.0/8` membership. */
+function isLoopbackIpv4(hostname: string): boolean {
+  const octets = hostname.split('.');
+  if (octets.length !== 4) return false;
+  if (!octets.every(octet => /^\d{1,3}$/.test(octet) && Number(octet) <= 255)) return false;
+
+  return Number(octets[0]) === 127;
+}
+
+/**
+ * IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback, in both spellings a dual-stack listener produces:
+ * `::ffff:127.0.0.1` and `::ffff:7f00:1`.
+ */
+function isLoopbackIpv6(hostname: string): boolean {
+  const mapped = /^::ffff:(.+)$/.exec(hostname);
+  if (!mapped) return false;
+
+  const rest = mapped[1];
+  if (isLoopbackIpv4(rest)) return true;
+
+  const hextets = /^([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/.exec(rest);
+  if (!hextets) return false;
+
+  return parseInt(hextets[1], 16) >>> 8 === 127;
+}
+
 interface OAuthInstance {
   frontendCallbackUrl?: string;
   getSession(sessionId: string): unknown;
@@ -20,7 +71,7 @@ interface OAuthInstance {
     providerName: string,
     code: string,
     stateToken: string,
-    bindingValue?: string,
+    bindingValues: readonly string[],
   ): Promise<{ sessionId: string; expiresAt: number }>;
   logout(sessionId: string): void;
 }
@@ -49,6 +100,13 @@ interface ResponseLike {
 
 interface RouteRequest {
   headers: Record<string, string | undefined>;
+  /**
+   * Node's flat `[name, value, name, value, ...]` header list, when the runtime
+   * supplies it. Read only to detect a *duplicate* `Host`: Node collapses
+   * repeats into the first value, so `req.headers.host` alone cannot tell an
+   * unambiguous origin from a smuggled one.
+   */
+  rawHeaders?: string[];
   params: Record<string, string>;
   query: Record<string, string>;
   secure?: boolean;
@@ -100,10 +158,7 @@ export default class AuthRequest extends Request {
         const { provider: providerName } = req.params;
         const { code, state: stateToken, error } = req.query;
 
-        // The binding value is single-use: whatever the outcome below, this
-        // callback is the end of that cookie's life.
-        const bindingValue = this.readBindingCookie(req);
-        this.clearBindingCookie(req);
+        const bindingValues = this.readBindingCookies(req);
 
         if (error) {
           if (this.oauth.frontendCallbackUrl) {
@@ -116,7 +171,11 @@ export default class AuthRequest extends Request {
         if (!code) return 400;
 
         try {
-          const session = await this.oauth.handleCallback(providerName, code, stateToken, bindingValue);
+          const session = await this.oauth.handleCallback(providerName, code, stateToken, bindingValues);
+
+          // The binding value is single-use and the state has now been
+          // consumed, so this is the end of that cookie's life.
+          this.clearBindingCookie(req);
 
           if (this.oauth.frontendCallbackUrl) {
             const params = new URLSearchParams({
@@ -128,7 +187,53 @@ export default class AuthRequest extends Request {
           }
 
           return session;
-        } catch {
+        } catch (rejection) {
+          // Clear only when this request actually spent the cookie.
+          //
+          // Moving the clear below the `error` and `!code` returns was not
+          // enough: it still ran unconditionally for any request carrying a
+          // `code`, and `code` is attacker-supplied and unvalidated. So
+          // `?code=1` — one query parameter, no knowledge of the victim's state
+          // — deleted the binding cookie of a client still at the provider's
+          // consent screen, leaving their pending state untouched so nothing
+          // was detectable server-side, and their real callback then failed.
+          //
+          // `StateRejection.consumed` is the only thing that distinguishes
+          // "nothing of this client's was touched" from "one attempt was
+          // spent". Anything that is not a `StateRejection` was thrown below
+          // the state check, which means the record was already burned.
+          if (!(rejection instanceof StateRejection) || rejection.consumed) {
+            this.clearBindingCookie(req);
+          }
+
+          // `StateStore.consume` distinguishes five rejection reasons that
+          // otherwise collapse into one opaque outcome with no server-side
+          // signal at all. The client-facing `auth_failed` stays opaque; the
+          // server has no reason to be.
+          //
+          // Only a `StateRejection`'s message is logged, and those are the
+          // fixed strings in `STATE_REJECTION`. The `try` above spans far more
+          // than `consume` — `getProvider`, `TokenManager.getTokens` ->
+          // `flow.exchangeCode`, `flow.fetchUserInfo`, `flow.normalizeUser`,
+          // `emit('authenticate')`, `sessionManager.create` — and three of
+          // those are consumer-overridable through the documented
+          // `providers.<name>.module` extension point. A provider that puts
+          // request context in its error, which is ordinary practice, would
+          // otherwise land its `clientSecret` and the caller-supplied `code` in
+          // the log verbatim; `@stonyx/logs` appends content raw when
+          // `logToFile` is enabled, so an echoed `code` is also a CRLF
+          // log-forging primitive for an unauthenticated caller. Before this
+          // module logged anything, all of that was swallowed.
+          //
+          // Anything below the state check therefore gets a fixed
+          // discriminator, and the detail is left to whatever the provider
+          // itself logs.
+          if (rejection instanceof StateRejection) {
+            log.error(`OAuth: callback rejected — ${rejection.message}`);
+          } else {
+            log.error('OAuth: callback failed after state validation');
+          }
+
           if (this.oauth.frontendCallbackUrl) {
             state.redirect = `${this.oauth.frontendCallbackUrl}?error=auth_failed`;
             return;
@@ -152,10 +257,119 @@ export default class AuthRequest extends Request {
       // request and breaks login outright.
       sameSite: STATE_COOKIE_SAME_SITE,
       path: STATE_COOKIE_PATH,
-      secure: req.secure === true,
+      secure: this.isSecureContext(req),
     };
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Whether the binding cookie is issued with `Secure`.
+   *
+   * Not `req.secure`. Express derives that from the socket unless `trust proxy`
+   * is enabled, and `@stonyx/rest-server` leaves it off by default
+   * (`trustProxy: REST_TRUST_PROXY === 'true'`). In the standard production
+   * topology — TLS terminated at a proxy, plaintext to the origin — `req.secure`
+   * is therefore `false` on every request to an HTTPS site, and the binding
+   * cookie would ship without `Secure` while the deployment looks correct.
+   *
+   * So `Secure` is set unconditionally except on a loopback host. Guessing
+   * wrong there breaks a non-loopback plaintext development setup, which fails
+   * at the first login and is loud. The alternative fails silently, in
+   * production, on the one attribute protecting the value this whole mechanism
+   * is built around.
+   *
+   * The exemption is decided by *parsing* the `Host` header and testing the
+   * result for membership, never by matching a prefix or a suffix on the raw
+   * value — `Host` is attacker-controllable on any non-browser client, and a
+   * security predicate written as a substring match drifts. Every shape that
+   * cannot be parsed as a bare `host[:port]`, and every request with more than
+   * one `Host`, fails secure.
+   */
+  isSecureContext(req: RouteRequest): boolean {
+    if (req.secure === true) return true;
+    if (AuthRequest.hasAmbiguousHost(req)) return true;
+
+    const host = req.headers.host;
+    if (!host) return true;
+
+    const hostname = AuthRequest.parseHostname(host);
+    if (hostname === undefined) return true;
+
+    return !AuthRequest.isLoopbackHost(hostname);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * True when the request carried more than one `Host` header.
+   *
+   * Node keeps the first and discards the rest, so a component that *prepends*
+   * a `Host:` line — request smuggling, or a proxy that appends rather than
+   * replaces — can make `req.headers.host` read `localhost` on a request whose
+   * real origin is public. RFC 9112 section 3.2 makes such a request invalid;
+   * this treats it as unattributable and fails secure rather than trusting it.
+   */
+  static hasAmbiguousHost(req: RouteRequest): boolean {
+    const raw = req.rawHeaders;
+    if (!Array.isArray(raw)) return false;
+
+    let seen = 0;
+    for (let index = 0; index < raw.length; index += 2) {
+      if (typeof raw[index] === 'string' && raw[index].toLowerCase() === 'host') seen++;
+    }
+
+    return seen > 1;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * The hostname component of a `Host` header, lowercased, or `undefined` when
+   * the value is not a well-formed `host[:port]`.
+   *
+   * `host.split(':')[0]` is not enough: it truncates at the *first* colon, so
+   * `localhost:80@evil.com` reduces to `localhost`. The port is therefore
+   * required to be decimal, and the hostname to contain only characters a
+   * registered name may contain.
+   */
+  static parseHostname(host: string): string | undefined {
+    if (host.startsWith('[')) {
+      const close = host.indexOf(']');
+      if (close === -1) return undefined;
+
+      const port = host.slice(close + 1);
+      if (port !== '' && !(port.startsWith(':') && PORT_PATTERN.test(port.slice(1)))) return undefined;
+
+      const literal = host.slice(1, close);
+      if (!/^[0-9A-Fa-f:.]+$/.test(literal)) return undefined;
+
+      return literal.toLowerCase();
+    }
+
+    const colon = host.indexOf(':');
+    if (colon === -1) return HOSTNAME_PATTERN.test(host) ? host.toLowerCase() : undefined;
+
+    if (!PORT_PATTERN.test(host.slice(colon + 1))) return undefined;
+
+    const name = host.slice(0, colon);
+
+    return HOSTNAME_PATTERN.test(name) ? name.toLowerCase() : undefined;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Whether a parsed hostname is a loopback development origin.
+   *
+   * Membership tests, never prefix or suffix tests. `startsWith('127.')`
+   * matched `127.evil.com`, a perfectly registerable name (RFC 1123 permits a
+   * leading digit in a label), and `endsWith('.localhost')` exempted an entire
+   * suffix — so a `.localhost` split-horizon vhost shipped the binding value in
+   * cleartext. The `.localhost` exemption is withdrawn rather than tightened:
+   * the README documented `127.0.0.0/8`, `localhost`, `::1` and `0.0.0.0` and
+   * never documented it, and a developer on `app.localhost` reaches the same
+   * server on `localhost` or `127.0.0.1`.
+   */
+  static isLoopbackHost(hostname: string): boolean {
+    if (LOOPBACK_HOSTS.has(hostname)) return true;
+    if (isLoopbackIpv4(hostname)) return true;
+
+    return isLoopbackIpv6(hostname);
+  }
+
   setBindingCookie(req: RouteRequest, bindingValue: string): boolean {
     const { res } = req;
 
@@ -172,19 +386,42 @@ export default class AuthRequest extends Request {
     return true;
   }
 
-  readBindingCookie(req: RouteRequest): string | undefined {
+  /**
+   * Every value the client presented under the binding cookie's name.
+   *
+   * Not the first one. A browser sends every applicable cookie in a single
+   * header, and a sibling subdomain can set a same-named cookie on the parent
+   * domain that RFC 6265 section 5.4 orders *ahead* of the real one — so
+   * returning on the first name match handed an attacker a permanent,
+   * unauthenticated denial of login for any victim they could plant a cookie
+   * on. `Secure`, `HttpOnly` and `SameSite` do not constrain that: the attacker
+   * is writing, not reading.
+   *
+   * Bounded at `MAX_BINDING_COOKIE_CANDIDATES`, so the work an unauthenticated
+   * caller can ask for is capped whatever the header contains.
+   */
+  readBindingCookies(req: RouteRequest): string[] {
     const header = req.headers.cookie;
-    if (!header) return undefined;
+    if (!header) return [];
+
+    const values: string[] = [];
 
     for (const part of header.split(';')) {
+      if (values.length >= MAX_BINDING_COOKIE_CANDIDATES) break;
+
       const separator = part.indexOf('=');
       if (separator === -1) continue;
       if (part.slice(0, separator).trim() !== STATE_COOKIE_NAME) continue;
 
-      return decodeURIComponent(part.slice(separator + 1).trim());
+      // Not decoded. The binding value is base64url, whose alphabet
+      // `encodeURIComponent` never escapes, so a decode buys nothing — and
+      // `decodeURIComponent` throws `URIError` on malformed input, which any
+      // unauthenticated caller can supply, turning the first line of the
+      // callback into a 500 with a stack trace.
+      values.push(part.slice(separator + 1).trim());
     }
 
-    return undefined;
+    return values;
   }
 
   clearBindingCookie(req: RouteRequest): void {

package/src/constants.ts

@@ -17,3 +17,16 @@ export const STATE_TTL_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000;
 
 /** Entropy of the client-held binding value, in bytes. */
 export const BINDING_VALUE_BYTES = 32;
+
+/**
+ * Most values carrying `STATE_COOKIE_NAME` that a single callback will try.
+ *
+ * A client can hold more than one cookie of the same name — a sibling
+ * subdomain can set one on the parent domain, and the browser sends every
+ * applicable cookie in one header. All of them are tried, so a planted cookie
+ * cannot deny login by sorting ahead of the real one; the cap bounds the work
+ * an unauthenticated caller can ask for. It is not a brute-force control: the
+ * pending record is consumed on recognition, so a state gets one attempt
+ * whatever the cap.
+ */
+export const MAX_BINDING_COOKIE_CANDIDATES = 8;

package/src/main.ts

@@ -85,8 +85,25 @@ export default class OAuth {
     return { url: flow.buildAuthorizationUrl(stateToken), bindingValue };
   }
 
-  async handleCallback(providerName: string, code: string, stateToken: string, bindingValue?: string) {
-    this.stateStore.consume(stateToken, providerName, bindingValue);
+  /**
+   * `bindingValues` is required, not optional (#36). An optional parameter lets
+   * an existing three-argument call site keep compiling and then fail at
+   * runtime on the first real login; a compile error is the loudest disclosure
+   * channel available for this break.
+   *
+   * It is an array, not a single value, because a client can hold more than one
+   * cookie of the binding cookie's name and every one of them has to be tried —
+   * see `StateStore.anyCandidateMatches`. A caller driving the flow itself
+   * passes `[bindingValue]`; the route handler passes through every value the
+   * client presented, which may be none.
+   */
+  async handleCallback(
+    providerName: string,
+    code: string,
+    stateToken: string,
+    bindingValues: readonly string[],
+  ) {
+    this.stateStore.consume(stateToken, providerName, bindingValues);
 
     const { flow, tokenManager } = this.getProvider(providerName);
     const tokens = await tokenManager.getTokens(code);