@stigmer/server 3.27.2 → 3.28.0

package/src/authorization/__tests__/fixtures/fga/agent-share-owner.fga.yaml

@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
-# Pinned copy of stigmer-cloud backend/services/stigmer-server/fga/tests/agent-share-owner.fga.yaml
-# at commit b87dd1170 (the OpenFGA store test the cloud runs against its live model).
-# The body below is byte-identical to the source; the cloud re-runs the LIVE
-# file against this evaluator at the re-pin, so a stale copy is caught there.
-# Agent shares are owner-scoped channel config (decision 011, D1):
-# the creator owns the share; view/edit/delete/rotate require ownership or
-# an explicit grant. Plain org members get NO implicit access, and —
-# critically — no visitor-facing tuples exist at all: guest/member
-# admission to the hosted chat is app-level (shared-profile, mint, and
-# create-time gates), never FGA.
-#
-# T08: org ADMINS inherit owner (consistent with agents — an admin who can
-# edit the agent can manage its channels). The narrowness these tests pin
-# is now: owner + admins have control, granted viewers read, plain members
-# have nothing.
-
-name: agent-share-owner
-model_file: ../model/fga.mod
-
-tuples:
-  # Org membership for both accounts — proving membership grants nothing.
-  - user: identity_account:alice
-    relation: member
-    object: organization:acme
-  - user: identity_account:mallory
-    relation: member
-    object: organization:acme
-
-  # Org admin — proving T08 inheritance reaches shares.
-  - user: identity_account:ana
-    relation: admin
-    object: organization:acme
-
-  # The share, created by alice (the config-driven create tuples).
-  - user: organization:acme
-    relation: organization
-    object: agent_share:support-bot-share
-  - user: identity_account:alice
-    relation: owner
-    object: agent_share:support-bot-share
-
-  # An explicit viewer grant to carol (not even an org member).
-  - user: identity_account:carol
-    relation: viewer
-    object: agent_share:support-bot-share
-
-tests:
-  - name: owner has full control including grant management
-    check:
-      - user: identity_account:alice
-        object: agent_share:support-bot-share
-        assertions:
-          can_view: true
-          can_edit: true
-          can_delete: true
-          can_grant_access: true
-          can_view_access: true
-
-  - name: explicitly granted viewer can read but not mutate
-    check:
-      - user: identity_account:carol
-        object: agent_share:support-bot-share
-        assertions:
-          can_view: true
-          can_edit: false
-          can_delete: false
-          can_grant_access: false
-          can_view_access: true
-
-  - name: fellow org member has no implicit access
-    check:
-      - user: identity_account:mallory
-        object: agent_share:support-bot-share
-        assertions:
-          can_view: false
-          can_edit: false
-          can_delete: false
-          can_grant_access: false
-          can_view_access: false
-
-  - name: org admin inherits share management (T08)
-    check:
-      - user: identity_account:ana
-        object: agent_share:support-bot-share
-        assertions:
-          can_view: true
-          can_edit: true
-          can_delete: true
-          can_grant_access: true
-
-  - name: listing shares reflects ownership and grants, not membership
-    list_objects:
-      - user: identity_account:alice
-        type: agent_share
-        assertions:
-          can_view:
-            - agent_share:support-bot-share
-          can_edit:
-            - agent_share:support-bot-share
-      - user: identity_account:carol
-        type: agent_share
-        assertions:
-          can_view:
-            - agent_share:support-bot-share
-          can_edit: []
-      - user: identity_account:mallory
-        type: agent_share
-        assertions:
-          can_view: []

package/src/authorization/__tests__/fixtures/fga/artifact-org-and-owner.fga.yaml

@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
-# Pinned copy of stigmer-cloud backend/services/stigmer-server/fga/tests/artifact-org-and-owner.fga.yaml
-# at commit b87dd1170 (the OpenFGA store test the cloud runs against its live model).
-# The body below is byte-identical to the source; the cloud re-runs the LIVE
-# file against this evaluator at the re-pin, so a stale copy is caught there.
-# Artifacts are org-scoped execution outputs with creator ownership on
-# top (cloud#216). The two access arms these tests pin:
-#
-# 1. Org inheritance — anyone who is at least a viewer of the owning org
-#    can view its artifacts ("if you can view resources in the org, you
-#    can view its artifacts"). Editing stays org-admin-only.
-# 2. Creator ownership — the identity whose execution produced the
-#    artifact can view it WITHOUT any org role. This is the guest-share /
-#    embedded-user case: org guests are not org viewers, but their
-#    sessions render artifact-backed review payloads and artifact tabs.
-#
-# The narrowness pinned: creator-owners read but never edit (all guests
-# of an org share one guest identity account — owner-edit would let one
-# guest soft-delete another's artifacts), and no arm crosses org
-# boundaries.
-#
-# Run: fga model test --tests artifact-org-and-owner.fga.yaml
-
-name: artifact-org-and-owner
-model_file: ../model/fga.mod
-
-tuples:
-  # Org roles: victor views, ana administers acme. Rival org for the
-  # cross-org boundary.
-  - user: identity_account:victor
-    relation: viewer
-    object: organization:acme
-  - user: identity_account:ana
-    relation: admin
-    object: organization:acme
-  - user: identity_account:eve
-    relation: member
-    object: organization:rival
-
-  # Guest identity: an org GUEST, deliberately not an org viewer.
-  - user: identity_account:acme-guest
-    relation: guest
-    object: organization:acme
-
-  # Artifact produced by a signed-in member's execution.
-  - user: organization:acme
-    relation: organization
-    object: artifact:art_report
-  - user: identity_account:victor
-    relation: owner
-    object: artifact:art_report
-
-  # Artifact produced by a guest-share execution: creator is the guest
-  # identity account (runner tokens carry the acting identity as sub).
-  - user: organization:acme
-    relation: organization
-    object: artifact:art_guest_plan
-  - user: identity_account:acme-guest
-    relation: owner
-    object: artifact:art_guest_plan
-
-tests:
-  - name: org viewer reads any org artifact but cannot edit
-    check:
-      - user: identity_account:victor
-        object: artifact:art_report
-        assertions:
-          can_view: true
-          can_edit: false
-      - user: identity_account:victor
-        object: artifact:art_guest_plan
-        assertions:
-          can_view: true
-          can_edit: false
-
-  - name: org admin views and edits org artifacts
-    check:
-      - user: identity_account:ana
-        object: artifact:art_report
-        assertions:
-          can_view: true
-          can_edit: true
-
-  - name: guest creator reads own execution's artifact via ownership, never edits
-    check:
-      - user: identity_account:acme-guest
-        object: artifact:art_guest_plan
-        assertions:
-          can_view: true
-          can_edit: false
-
-  - name: guest role alone grants nothing on other artifacts in the org
-    check:
-      - user: identity_account:acme-guest
-        object: artifact:art_report
-        assertions:
-          can_view: false
-          can_edit: false
-
-  - name: cross-org caller is denied everything
-    check:
-      - user: identity_account:eve
-        object: artifact:art_report
-        assertions:
-          can_view: false
-          can_edit: false
-      - user: identity_account:eve
-        object: artifact:art_guest_plan
-        assertions:
-          can_view: false
-          can_edit: false
-
-  - name: listing reflects org inheritance plus creator ownership
-    list_objects:
-      - user: identity_account:victor
-        type: artifact
-        assertions:
-          can_view:
-            - artifact:art_report
-            - artifact:art_guest_plan
-      - user: identity_account:acme-guest
-        type: artifact
-        assertions:
-          can_view:
-            - artifact:art_guest_plan
-      - user: identity_account:eve
-        type: artifact
-        assertions:
-          can_view: []

package/src/authorization/__tests__/fixtures/fga/blueprint-private-visibility.fga.yaml

@@ -1,318 +0,0 @@
-# Pinned copy of stigmer-cloud backend/services/stigmer-server/fga/tests/blueprint-private-visibility.fga.yaml
-# as changed by stigmer-cloud#765 (the OpenFGA store test the cloud runs against its live model).
-# The body below is byte-identical to the source; the cloud re-runs the LIVE
-# file against this evaluator at the re-pin, so a stale copy is caught there.
-# Store tests for real blueprint privacy (Phase 3 of the visibility model).
-#
-# Blueprint viewer relations no longer include the unconditional
-# `viewer from organization` grant: a PRIVATE blueprint is invisible to the
-# rest of its own org. Every broader level is an explicit tuple written by
-# VisibilityTupleReconciler:
-#
-#   ORG       viewer@organization:<org>#viewer   (the org's FULL read audience —
-#             every role satisfies organization#viewer, including read-only
-#             viewers; pre-cloud#257 tuples carried #member, which excluded
-#             viewer-role users — still honored until backfilled, see the
-#             legacy-bot fixture)
-#   PLATFORM  platform_viewer@identity_provider:<idp>#platform_user  +  the ORG tuple
-#
-# Read vs spend: an org viewer-role user READS org-visible blueprints (and, at
-# the model level, satisfies can_execute — run-what-you-can-read), but every
-# spend path is gated in Java on the org-level can_create_session /
-# can_create_execution_in permissions, which require member-or-guest. The
-# vera assertions pin both halves of that contract.
-#
-# The ORG tuple rides along on PLATFORM (the "org floor") so a shared
-# blueprint stays listable in its own org.
-#
-# T08 exception: org ADMINS (and org owners, via the role hierarchy) are
-# composed into blueprint `owner` and therefore see, list, and manage
-# PRIVATE blueprints — the GitHub-org-admin model. "Private is real" now
-# means: invisible to plain members, never to org admins. Pinned by the
-# oscar (org admin) assertions below.
-#
-# Run with:
-#   fga model test --tests blueprint-private-visibility.fga.yaml
-#
-# Scenario: org "acme" has owner-creator carol, org admin oscar, plain
-# member dave, and read-only viewer vera (the role SSO auto-provisioning
-# grants by default); mallory belongs to an unrelated org. Carol authors one
-# blueprint of each kind at PRIVATE, plus an ORG agent and a legacy ORG
-# agent whose tuple still carries the pre-cloud#257 shape.
-name: blueprint-private-visibility
-model_file: ../model/fga.mod
-
-tuples:
-  # --- Org memberships ---
-  - user: identity_account:carol
-    relation: owner
-    object: organization:acme
-  - user: identity_account:oscar
-    relation: admin
-    object: organization:acme
-  - user: identity_account:dave
-    relation: member
-    object: organization:acme
-  - user: identity_account:vera
-    relation: viewer
-    object: organization:acme
-  - user: identity_account:mallory
-    relation: member
-    object: organization:outsider
-
-  # --- PRIVATE blueprints (no visibility tuples at all) ---
-  - user: organization:acme
-    relation: organization
-    object: agent:secret-bot
-  - user: identity_account:carol
-    relation: owner
-    object: agent:secret-bot
-  - user: organization:acme
-    relation: organization
-    object: skill:secret-notes
-  - user: identity_account:carol
-    relation: owner
-    object: skill:secret-notes
-  - user: organization:acme
-    relation: organization
-    object: workflow:secret-flow
-  - user: identity_account:carol
-    relation: owner
-    object: workflow:secret-flow
-  - user: organization:acme
-    relation: organization
-    object: mcp_server:secret-tools
-  - user: identity_account:carol
-    relation: owner
-    object: mcp_server:secret-tools
-
-  # --- ORG-visible agent (explicit org viewer tuple, cloud#257 shape) ---
-  - user: organization:acme
-    relation: organization
-    object: agent:team-bot
-  - user: identity_account:carol
-    relation: owner
-    object: agent:team-bot
-  - user: organization:acme#viewer
-    relation: viewer
-    object: agent:team-bot
-
-  # --- ORG-visible agent with the LEGACY pre-cloud#257 tuple shape ---
-  # Pins two transition facts until the boot backfill converges prod tuples:
-  # members must keep their access through the old shape, and viewer-role
-  # users are still refused by it (the cloud#257 defect, alive on legacy
-  # tuples only).
-  - user: organization:acme
-    relation: organization
-    object: agent:legacy-bot
-  - user: identity_account:carol
-    relation: owner
-    object: agent:legacy-bot
-  - user: organization:acme#member
-    relation: viewer
-    object: agent:legacy-bot
-
-  # --- PRIVATE agent with an explicit individual viewer grant ---
-  - user: organization:acme
-    relation: organization
-    object: agent:shared-secret
-  - user: identity_account:carol
-    relation: owner
-    object: agent:shared-secret
-  - user: identity_account:dave
-    relation: viewer
-    object: agent:shared-secret
-
-tests:
-  - name: private blueprints are invisible to fellow org members (all four kinds)
-    check:
-      - user: identity_account:dave
-        object: agent:secret-bot
-        assertions:
-          can_view: false
-          can_execute: false
-          can_create_instance: false
-          can_clone: false
-      - user: identity_account:dave
-        object: skill:secret-notes
-        assertions:
-          can_view: false
-          can_use: false
-      - user: identity_account:dave
-        object: workflow:secret-flow
-        assertions:
-          can_view: false
-          can_execute: false
-      - user: identity_account:dave
-        object: mcp_server:secret-tools
-        assertions:
-          can_view: false
-          can_use: false
-          can_connect: false
-
-  - name: org admin sees and manages private blueprints of every kind (T08)
-    check:
-      - user: identity_account:oscar
-        object: agent:secret-bot
-        assertions:
-          can_view: true
-          can_edit: true
-          can_delete: true
-          can_execute: true
-      - user: identity_account:oscar
-        object: skill:secret-notes
-        assertions:
-          can_view: true
-          can_edit: true
-      - user: identity_account:oscar
-        object: workflow:secret-flow
-        assertions:
-          can_view: true
-          can_edit: true
-      # mcp_server had admin inheritance before T08 — asserted here so all
-      # four private-blueprint kinds are pinned to the same rule.
-      - user: identity_account:oscar
-        object: mcp_server:secret-tools
-        assertions:
-          can_view: true
-          can_edit: true
-
-  - name: org admin's listable agents include private ones (T08)
-    list_objects:
-      - user: identity_account:oscar
-        type: agent
-        assertions:
-          can_view:
-            - agent:secret-bot
-            - agent:team-bot
-            - agent:legacy-bot
-            - agent:shared-secret
-
-  - name: owner retains full access to private blueprints
-    check:
-      - user: identity_account:carol
-        object: agent:secret-bot
-        assertions:
-          can_view: true
-          can_execute: true
-          can_create_instance: true
-          can_edit: true
-          can_delete: true
-      - user: identity_account:carol
-        object: workflow:secret-flow
-        assertions:
-          can_view: true
-          can_execute: true
-          can_edit: true
-
-  - name: org-visible agent is viewable and runnable by org members, not outsiders
-    check:
-      - user: identity_account:dave
-        object: agent:team-bot
-        assertions:
-          can_view: true
-          can_execute: true
-          can_create_instance: true
-          can_edit: false
-          can_delete: false
-      - user: identity_account:mallory
-        object: agent:team-bot
-        assertions:
-          can_view: false
-          can_execute: false
-
-  - name: explicit individual viewer grant on a private agent conveys view and run
-    check:
-      # Run-what-you-can-read: can_execute derives from viewer, so an
-      # explicit viewer grant is enough to run (matches the execution gate,
-      # which checks can_view).
-      - user: identity_account:dave
-        object: agent:shared-secret
-        assertions:
-          can_view: true
-          can_execute: true
-          can_edit: false
-
-  - name: org member's listable agents exclude private ones
-    list_objects:
-      - user: identity_account:dave
-        type: agent
-        assertions:
-          can_view:
-            - agent:team-bot
-            - agent:legacy-bot
-            - agent:shared-secret
-
-  - name: owner's listable agents include everything they authored
-    list_objects:
-      - user: identity_account:carol
-        type: agent
-        assertions:
-          can_view:
-            - agent:secret-bot
-            - agent:team-bot
-            - agent:legacy-bot
-            - agent:shared-secret
-
-  # ── cloud#257: the viewer-role cell (previously untested) ──────────────
-
-  - name: org viewer reads org-visible blueprints — the cloud#257 contract
-    check:
-      # View, clone and (model-level) execute all derive from viewer; the
-      # spend refusal is pinned separately on the org permissions below.
-      - user: identity_account:vera
-        object: agent:team-bot
-        assertions:
-          can_view: true
-          can_clone: true
-          can_execute: true
-          can_edit: false
-          can_delete: false
-      # Private stays private — the viewer role grants nothing beyond the
-      # explicit visibility tuples.
-      - user: identity_account:vera
-        object: agent:secret-bot
-        assertions:
-          can_view: false
-          can_execute: false
-
-  - name: org viewer holds no spend authority on the org (the cost gate)
-    check:
-      # Java execution lanes (session create, agent-execution create,
-      # workflow-execution create, EC create) all check these org-level
-      # permissions — this is why widening read to viewers exposes no cost.
-      - user: identity_account:vera
-        object: organization:acme
-        assertions:
-          can_view: true
-          can_create_session: false
-          can_create_execution_in: false
-      - user: identity_account:dave
-        object: organization:acme
-        assertions:
-          can_create_session: true
-          can_create_execution_in: true
-
-  - name: legacy member-shaped tuple keeps members but still excludes viewers (until backfilled)
-    check:
-      - user: identity_account:dave
-        object: agent:legacy-bot
-        assertions:
-          can_view: true
-          can_execute: true
-      # The original cloud#257 defect, pinned on the legacy shape: the org
-      # role hierarchy flows downward, so a viewer-role user never satisfies
-      # organization#member. The boot backfill converges these tuples.
-      - user: identity_account:vera
-        object: agent:legacy-bot
-        assertions:
-          can_view: false
-          can_execute: false
-
-  - name: org viewer's listable agents are exactly the viewer-shaped org-visible ones
-    list_objects:
-      - user: identity_account:vera
-        type: agent
-        assertions:
-          can_view:
-            - agent:team-bot

package/src/authorization/__tests__/fixtures/fga/channel-app-owner.fga.yaml

@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
-# Pinned copy of stigmer-cloud backend/services/stigmer-server/fga/tests/channel-app-owner.fga.yaml
-# at commit b87dd1170 (the OpenFGA store test the cloud runs against its live model).
-# The body below is byte-identical to the source; the cloud re-runs the LIVE
-# file against this evaluator at the re-pin, so a stale copy is caught there.
-# Channel apps are owner-scoped provider credentials (T04 item 2, the
-# oauth_app RESTRICTED posture with T08 admin inheritance): the creator
-# owns the app; view/edit/delete require ownership or an explicit grant.
-# Plain org members get NO implicit access — the resource carries the
-# org's webhook signing secret and OAuth client secret.
-#
-# Org ADMINS inherit owner (T08): a credential holder needs an operator
-# of last resort more than any blueprint does — an ex-employee owner must
-# never strand secret rotation. The narrowness these tests pin: owner +
-# admins have control, granted viewers read, plain members have nothing,
-# and only admins can create.
-#
-# Run: fga model test --tests channel-app-owner.fga.yaml
-
-name: channel-app-owner
-model_file: ../model/fga.mod
-
-tuples:
-  # Org membership for both accounts — proving membership grants nothing.
-  # alice created the app while she was an admin and was later demoted to
-  # member (creation is admin-gated; the owner tuple survives demotion) —
-  # this keeps the direct-owner path distinct from admin inheritance.
-  - user: identity_account:alice
-    relation: member
-    object: organization:acme
-  - user: identity_account:mallory
-    relation: member
-    object: organization:acme
-
-  # Org admin — proving T08 inheritance reaches channel apps.
-  - user: identity_account:ana
-    relation: admin
-    object: organization:acme
-
-  # The channel app, created by alice (the config-driven create tuples).
-  - user: organization:acme
-    relation: organization
-    object: channel_app:acme-support-bot
-  - user: identity_account:alice
-    relation: owner
-    object: channel_app:acme-support-bot
-
-  # An explicit viewer grant to carol (not even an org member).
-  - user: identity_account:carol
-    relation: viewer
-    object: channel_app:acme-support-bot
-
-tests:
-  - name: owner has full control including grant management
-    check:
-      - user: identity_account:alice
-        object: channel_app:acme-support-bot
-        assertions:
-          can_view: true
-          can_edit: true
-          can_delete: true
-          can_grant_access: true
-          can_view_access: true
-
-  - name: explicitly granted viewer can read but not mutate
-    check:
-      - user: identity_account:carol
-        object: channel_app:acme-support-bot
-        assertions:
-          can_view: true
-          can_edit: false
-          can_delete: false
-          can_grant_access: false
-          can_view_access: true
-
-  - name: fellow org member has no implicit access
-    check:
-      - user: identity_account:mallory
-        object: channel_app:acme-support-bot
-        assertions:
-          can_view: false
-          can_edit: false
-          can_delete: false
-          can_grant_access: false
-          can_view_access: false
-
-  - name: org admin inherits channel app management (T08)
-    check:
-      - user: identity_account:ana
-        object: channel_app:acme-support-bot
-        assertions:
-          can_view: true
-          can_edit: true
-          can_delete: true
-          can_grant_access: true
-
-  - name: creation is admin-gated on the organization
-    check:
-      - user: identity_account:ana
-        object: organization:acme
-        assertions:
-          can_create_channel_app: true
-      - user: identity_account:mallory
-        object: organization:acme
-        assertions:
-          can_create_channel_app: false
-
-  - name: listing channel apps reflects ownership and grants, not membership
-    list_objects:
-      - user: identity_account:alice
-        type: channel_app
-        assertions:
-          can_view:
-            - channel_app:acme-support-bot
-          can_edit:
-            - channel_app:acme-support-bot
-      - user: identity_account:carol
-        type: channel_app
-        assertions:
-          can_view:
-            - channel_app:acme-support-bot
-          can_edit: []
-      - user: identity_account:mallory
-        type: channel_app
-        assertions:
-          can_view: []