@stigmer/server 3.15.3-dev.20260914100347 → 3.15.3-dev.20260916211208

package/src/authorization/__tests__/fixtures/fga/org-shared-environment.fga.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+# Pinned copy of stigmer-cloud backend/services/stigmer-server/fga/tests/org-shared-environment.fga.yaml
+# at commit b87dd1170 (the OpenFGA store test the cloud runs against its live model).
+# The body below is byte-identical to the source; the cloud re-runs the LIVE
+# file against this evaluator at the re-pin, so a stale copy is caught there.
+# Store tests for org-shared environments (T06).
+#
+# Environments are personal resources with opt-in org sharing. Setting
+# visibility_org writes one tuple (viewer@organization:<org>#viewer — the
+# org's full read audience, cloud#257) that grants everyone in the org
+# REDACTED view only. The creator-only secret-reveal
+# invariant holds at every level: can_read_secrets never widens with
+# sharing. Runtime resolution for executions is app-level (server-side
+# policy on metadata.visibility), deliberately NOT modeled here — no FGA
+# relation could allow a member's execution to use a secret while denying
+# the same member's reveal.
+#
+# Run with:
+#   fga model test --tests org-shared-environment.fga.yaml
+#
+# Scenario: org "acme" has creator carol, plain member dave, read-only
+# viewer vera, and an explicit viewer grant for frank on the private
+# environment; mallory belongs to an unrelated org. Carol owns a PRIVATE environment and an
+# ORG-shared environment.
+name: org-shared-environment
+model_file: ../model/fga.mod
+
+tuples:
+  # --- Org memberships ---
+  - user: identity_account:carol
+    relation: member
+    object: organization:acme
+  - user: identity_account:dave
+    relation: member
+    object: organization:acme
+  - user: identity_account:frank
+    relation: member
+    object: organization:acme
+  - user: identity_account:vera
+    relation: viewer
+    object: organization:acme
+  - user: identity_account:mallory
+    relation: member
+    object: organization:outsider
+
+  # --- PRIVATE environment (creation tuples only) ---
+  - user: organization:acme
+    relation: organization
+    object: environment:private-creds
+  - user: identity_account:carol
+    relation: owner
+    object: environment:private-creds
+  - user: identity_account:carol
+    relation: creator
+    object: environment:private-creds
+  # Explicit viewer grant to frank (redacted view, no secret reveal).
+  - user: identity_account:frank
+    relation: viewer
+    object: environment:private-creds
+
+  # --- ORG-shared environment (creation tuples + the org viewer tuple) ---
+  - user: organization:acme
+    relation: organization
+    object: environment:team-creds
+  - user: identity_account:carol
+    relation: owner
+    object: environment:team-creds
+  - user: identity_account:carol
+    relation: creator
+    object: environment:team-creds
+  - user: organization:acme#viewer
+    relation: viewer
+    object: environment:team-creds
+
+tests:
+  - name: private-environment-invisible-to-org-members
+    check:
+      - user: identity_account:dave
+        object: environment:private-creds
+        assertions:
+          can_view: false
+          can_edit: false
+          can_read_secrets: false
+
+  - name: explicit-viewer-grant-is-redacted-view-only
+    check:
+      - user: identity_account:frank
+        object: environment:private-creds
+        assertions:
+          can_view: true
+          can_edit: false
+          can_read_secrets: false
+
+  - name: org-sharing-grants-members-redacted-view-only
+    check:
+      - user: identity_account:dave
+        object: environment:team-creds
+        assertions:
+          can_view: true
+          can_edit: false
+          can_delete: false
+          can_grant_access: false
+          # THE invariant: org sharing never widens secret reveal.
+          can_read_secrets: false
+
+  - name: org-sharing-reaches-read-only-viewers-redacted-too
+    check:
+      # cloud#257: the org viewer role is read-only by definition — an
+      # org-shared environment is readable (REDACTED) to vera, secrets never.
+      - user: identity_account:vera
+        object: environment:team-creds
+        assertions:
+          can_view: true
+          can_edit: false
+          can_read_secrets: false
+      - user: identity_account:vera
+        object: environment:private-creds
+        assertions:
+          can_view: false
+
+  - name: creator-keeps-full-access-on-shared-environment
+    check:
+      - user: identity_account:carol
+        object: environment:team-creds
+        assertions:
+          can_view: true
+          can_edit: true
+          can_delete: true
+          can_read_secrets: true
+
+  - name: org-sharing-does-not-leak-across-orgs
+    check:
+      - user: identity_account:mallory
+        object: environment:team-creds
+        assertions:
+          can_view: false
+          can_read_secrets: false
+
+  - name: org-members-can-list-shared-environments-only
+    list_objects:
+      - user: identity_account:dave
+        type: environment
+        assertions:
+          can_view:
+            - environment:team-creds

package/src/authorization/__tests__/fixtures/fga/platform-visibility.fga.yaml

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+# Pinned copy of stigmer-cloud backend/services/stigmer-server/fga/tests/platform-visibility.fga.yaml
+# at commit b87dd1170 (the OpenFGA store test the cloud runs against its live model).
+# The body below is byte-identical to the source; the cloud re-runs the LIVE
+# file against this evaluator at the re-pin, so a stale copy is caught there.
+# Store tests for platform visibility (visibility_platform).
+#
+# Verifies the userset chain end-to-end against the authorization model:
+#
+#   blueprint#platform_viewer -> identity_provider#platform_user
+#     -> member from managed_org -> organization#member
+#
+# Run with:
+#   fga model test --tests platform-visibility.fga.yaml
+#
+# Scenario: "planton" is a platform org owning identity_provider:idp1, which
+# manages two customer orgs (acme, beta). Blueprints owned by planton and
+# shared with visibility_platform must be viewable/executable by acme and
+# beta members, invisible to members of an unrelated org, and never editable
+# by managed-org members.
+name: platform-visibility
+model_file: ../model/fga.mod
+
+tuples:
+  # --- Platform tenancy: idp1 is owned by planton and manages acme + beta ---
+  - user: organization:planton
+    relation: organization
+    object: identity_provider:idp1
+  - user: organization:acme
+    relation: managed_org
+    object: identity_provider:idp1
+  - user: organization:beta
+    relation: managed_org
+    object: identity_provider:idp1
+
+  # --- Org memberships ---
+  - user: identity_account:swarup
+    relation: owner
+    object: organization:planton
+  - user: identity_account:priya
+    relation: member
+    object: organization:planton
+  - user: identity_account:veda
+    relation: viewer
+    object: organization:planton
+  - user: identity_account:alice
+    relation: member
+    object: organization:acme
+  - user: identity_account:bob
+    relation: member
+    object: organization:beta
+  - user: identity_account:mallory
+    relation: member
+    object: organization:outsider
+
+  # --- Platform-shared agent (visibility_platform) owned by planton ---
+  # PLATFORM carries the org floor tuple too (viewer@org#viewer — the org's
+  # full read audience, cloud#257), exactly as VisibilityTupleReconciler
+  # writes it, so everyone in the platform org keeps access.
+  - user: organization:planton
+    relation: organization
+    object: agent:sara
+  - user: identity_account:swarup
+    relation: owner
+    object: agent:sara
+  - user: identity_provider:idp1#platform_user
+    relation: platform_viewer
+    object: agent:sara
+  - user: organization:planton#viewer
+    relation: viewer
+    object: agent:sara
+
+  # --- Private agent owned by planton (no platform_viewer tuple) ---
+  - user: organization:planton
+    relation: organization
+    object: agent:internal-bot
+  - user: identity_account:swarup
+    relation: owner
+    object: agent:internal-bot
+
+  # --- Platform-shared blueprints of the other three kinds ---
+  - user: organization:planton
+    relation: organization
+    object: skill:research
+  - user: identity_provider:idp1#platform_user
+    relation: platform_viewer
+    object: skill:research
+  - user: organization:planton
+    relation: organization
+    object: workflow:onboarding
+  - user: identity_provider:idp1#platform_user
+    relation: platform_viewer
+    object: workflow:onboarding
+  - user: organization:planton
+    relation: organization
+    object: mcp_server:github
+  - user: identity_provider:idp1#platform_user
+    relation: platform_viewer
+    object: mcp_server:github
+
+tests:
+  - name: managed-org members can view and execute a platform-shared agent
+    check:
+      - user: identity_account:alice
+        object: agent:sara
+        context:
+          allow: false
+        assertions:
+          can_view: true
+          can_execute: true
+          can_create_instance: true
+          can_edit: false
+          can_delete: false
+      - user: identity_account:bob
+        object: agent:sara
+        context:
+          allow: false
+        assertions:
+          can_view: true
+          can_execute: true
+
+  - name: outsiders and unrelated orgs get nothing from platform visibility
+    check:
+      - user: identity_account:mallory
+        object: agent:sara
+        context:
+          allow: false
+        assertions:
+          can_view: false
+          can_execute: false
+          can_create_instance: false
+
+  - name: platform org's own members keep access via the org floor tuple
+    check:
+      - user: identity_account:priya
+        object: agent:sara
+        context:
+          allow: false
+        assertions:
+          can_view: true
+          can_execute: true
+          can_edit: false
+      # cloud#257: the viewer-shaped org floor reaches the platform org's own
+      # read-only viewers too. (Managed-org audiences are deliberately
+      # narrower: platform_user resolves member-from-managed_org.)
+      - user: identity_account:veda
+        object: agent:sara
+        context:
+          allow: false
+        assertions:
+          can_view: true
+          can_edit: false
+
+  - name: platform visibility does not leak the platform org's private agents
+    check:
+      - user: identity_account:alice
+        object: agent:internal-bot
+        context:
+          allow: false
+        assertions:
+          can_view: false
+          can_execute: false
+      # Private is real: even the platform org's own members see nothing
+      # without an explicit visibility tuple.
+      - user: identity_account:priya
+        object: agent:internal-bot
+        context:
+          allow: false
+        assertions:
+          can_view: false
+          can_execute: false
+
+  - name: platform-shared skill is usable by managed-org members
+    check:
+      - user: identity_account:alice
+        object: skill:research
+        context:
+          allow: false
+        assertions:
+          can_view: true
+          can_use: true
+          can_edit: false
+
+  - name: platform-shared workflow is viewable and executable by managed-org members
+    check:
+      - user: identity_account:alice
+        object: workflow:onboarding
+        context:
+          allow: false
+        assertions:
+          can_view: true
+          can_execute: true
+
+  - name: platform-shared mcp_server is usable by managed-org members
+    check:
+      - user: identity_account:alice
+        object: mcp_server:github
+        context:
+          allow: false
+        assertions:
+          can_view: true
+          can_use: true
+          can_connect: true
+
+  - name: platform owner retains full control of shared blueprints
+    check:
+      - user: identity_account:swarup
+        object: agent:sara
+        context:
+          allow: false
+        assertions:
+          can_view: true
+          can_edit: true
+          can_delete: true
+
+  - name: list managed-org member's viewable agents includes only the shared one
+    list_objects:
+      - user: identity_account:alice
+        type: agent
+        context:
+          allow: false
+        assertions:
+          can_view:
+            - agent:sara

package/src/authorization/__tests__/fixtures/fga/provider-standing-viewer.fga.yaml

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+# Pinned copy of stigmer-cloud backend/services/stigmer-server/fga/tests/provider-standing-viewer.fga.yaml
+# at commit b87dd1170 (the OpenFGA store test the cloud runs against its live model).
+# The body below is byte-identical to the source; the cloud re-runs the LIVE
+# file against this evaluator at the re-pin, so a stale copy is caught there.
+# Store tests for the provider-standing view permission (cloud#447).
+#
+# can_view_provider_standing gates the read-only operator console view of
+# platform provider standing (the canary-probe verdicts the cloud#370
+# probe records). It derives from the platform operator role — provider
+# account health is platform-internal, so ordinary tenants (even org
+# owners) never see it, regardless of what they own.
+#
+# Run with:
+#   fga model test --tests provider-standing-viewer.fga.yaml
+name: provider-standing-viewer
+model_file: ../model/fga.mod
+
+tuples:
+  # A platform operator.
+  - user: identity_account:opal
+    relation: operator
+    object: platform:stigmer
+
+  # A tenant org owner — owns everything in their org, nothing on the
+  # platform.
+  - user: identity_account:mallory
+    relation: owner
+    object: organization:acme
+
+tests:
+  - name: operator may view provider standing, tenants may not
+    check:
+      - user: identity_account:opal
+        object: platform:stigmer
+        assertions:
+          can_view_provider_standing: true
+      - user: identity_account:mallory
+        object: platform:stigmer
+        assertions:
+          can_view_provider_standing: false

package/src/authorization/__tests__/fixtures/fga/public-visibility-setter.fga.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+# Pinned copy of stigmer-cloud backend/services/stigmer-server/fga/tests/public-visibility-setter.fga.yaml
+# at commit b87dd1170 (the OpenFGA store test the cloud runs against its live model).
+# The body below is byte-identical to the source; the cloud re-runs the LIVE
+# file against this evaluator at the re-pin, so a stale copy is caught there.
+# Store tests for the public-visibility permission (marketplace curation).
+#
+# can_set_public_visibility gates who may set a resource's visibility to
+# PUBLIC — the only level that crosses every org boundary. It derives
+# from the platform operator role: operators (human curators and the
+# seeding machine account) hold it; ordinary tenants — even org owners,
+# who can otherwise fully manage their resources — never do. Enforced by
+# PublicVisibilityEscalationPolicy at both write doors (updateVisibility
+# escalation and create-with-public).
+#
+# Run with:
+#   fga model test --tests public-visibility-setter.fga.yaml
+name: public-visibility-setter
+model_file: ../model/fga.mod
+
+tuples:
+  # The bootstrap machine account is the platform operator
+  # (BootstrapIdentitySeeder re-asserts this tuple on every boot).
+  - user: identity_account:machine
+    relation: operator
+    object: platform:stigmer
+
+  # A human operator granted the same platform role.
+  - user: identity_account:opal
+    relation: operator
+    object: platform:stigmer
+
+  # A tenant org owner — owns everything in their org, nothing on the
+  # platform.
+  - user: identity_account:mallory
+    relation: owner
+    object: organization:acme
+
+tests:
+  - name: operators may set public visibility, tenants may not
+    check:
+      - user: identity_account:machine
+        object: platform:stigmer
+        assertions:
+          can_set_public_visibility: true
+      - user: identity_account:opal
+        object: platform:stigmer
+        assertions:
+          can_set_public_visibility: true
+      - user: identity_account:mallory
+        object: platform:stigmer
+        assertions:
+          can_set_public_visibility: false

package/src/authorization/__tests__/fixtures/fga/reserved-label-writer.fga.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+# Pinned copy of stigmer-cloud backend/services/stigmer-server/fga/tests/reserved-label-writer.fga.yaml
+# at commit b87dd1170 (the OpenFGA store test the cloud runs against its live model).
+# The body below is byte-identical to the source; the cloud re-runs the LIVE
+# file against this evaluator at the re-pin, so a stale copy is caught there.
+# Store tests for the reserved-label write permission (cloud#320).
+#
+# can_write_reserved_labels gates who may introduce or change labels in
+# the reserved stigmer.ai/* namespace at client-facing write boundaries
+# (GuardReservedLabelsStep). It derives from the platform operator role
+# — the seeding machine account holds it, ordinary tenants (even org
+# owners) never do, regardless of what they own.
+#
+# Run with:
+#   fga model test --tests reserved-label-writer.fga.yaml
+name: reserved-label-writer
+model_file: ../model/fga.mod
+
+tuples:
+  # The bootstrap machine account is the platform operator
+  # (BootstrapIdentitySeeder re-asserts this tuple on every boot).
+  - user: identity_account:machine
+    relation: operator
+    object: platform:stigmer
+
+  # A tenant org owner — owns everything in their org, nothing on the
+  # platform.
+  - user: identity_account:mallory
+    relation: owner
+    object: organization:acme
+
+tests:
+  - name: operator may write reserved labels, tenants may not
+    check:
+      - user: identity_account:machine
+        object: platform:stigmer
+        assertions:
+          can_write_reserved_labels: true
+      - user: identity_account:mallory
+        object: platform:stigmer
+        assertions:
+          can_write_reserved_labels: false

package/src/authorization/__tests__/fixtures/fga/schedule-owner.fga.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+# Pinned copy of stigmer-cloud backend/services/stigmer-server/fga/tests/schedule-owner.fga.yaml
+# at commit b87dd1170 (the OpenFGA store test the cloud runs against its live model).
+# The body below is byte-identical to the source; the cloud re-runs the LIVE
+# file against this evaluator at the re-pin, so a stale copy is caught there.
+# Schedules are owner-scoped operational config (whatsapp-proactive-
+# messaging DD-008/DD-009, cloned from the agent_channel model): the
+# creator owns the schedule; view/edit/delete require ownership or an
+# explicit grant. Plain org members get NO implicit access — a schedule's
+# levers are billing-affecting (every fire spends the owning org's
+# credits, unattended). Creation is target-gated (can_edit on the
+# referenced agent, checked in-handler), so no organization-level
+# can_create_schedule relation exists to test.
+#
+# Org ADMINS inherit owner (T08, consistent with agents and channels — an
+# admin who can edit the agent can manage its schedules). The narrowness
+# these tests pin: owner + admins have control, granted viewers read,
+# plain members have nothing.
+#
+# Run: fga model test --tests schedule-owner.fga.yaml
+
+name: schedule-owner
+model_file: ../model/fga.mod
+
+tuples:
+  # Org membership for both accounts — proving membership grants nothing.
+  - user: identity_account:alice
+    relation: member
+    object: organization:acme
+  - user: identity_account:mallory
+    relation: member
+    object: organization:acme
+
+  # Org admin — proving T08 inheritance reaches schedules.
+  - user: identity_account:ana
+    relation: admin
+    object: organization:acme
+
+  # The schedule, created by alice (the config-driven create tuples).
+  - user: organization:acme
+    relation: organization
+    object: schedule:daily-fee-reminders
+  - user: identity_account:alice
+    relation: owner
+    object: schedule:daily-fee-reminders
+
+  # An explicit viewer grant to carol (not even an org member).
+  - user: identity_account:carol
+    relation: viewer
+    object: schedule:daily-fee-reminders
+
+tests:
+  - name: owner has full control including grant management
+    check:
+      - user: identity_account:alice
+        object: schedule:daily-fee-reminders
+        assertions:
+          can_view: true
+          can_edit: true
+          can_delete: true
+          can_grant_access: true
+          can_view_access: true
+
+  - name: explicitly granted viewer can read but not mutate
+    check:
+      - user: identity_account:carol
+        object: schedule:daily-fee-reminders
+        assertions:
+          can_view: true
+          can_edit: false
+          can_delete: false
+          can_grant_access: false
+          can_view_access: true
+
+  - name: fellow org member has no implicit access
+    check:
+      - user: identity_account:mallory
+        object: schedule:daily-fee-reminders
+        assertions:
+          can_view: false
+          can_edit: false
+          can_delete: false
+          can_grant_access: false
+          can_view_access: false
+
+  - name: org admin inherits schedule management (T08)
+    check:
+      - user: identity_account:ana
+        object: schedule:daily-fee-reminders
+        assertions:
+          can_view: true
+          can_edit: true
+          can_delete: true
+          can_grant_access: true
+
+  - name: listing schedules reflects ownership and grants, not membership
+    list_objects:
+      - user: identity_account:alice
+        type: schedule
+        assertions:
+          can_view:
+            - schedule:daily-fee-reminders
+          can_edit:
+            - schedule:daily-fee-reminders
+      - user: identity_account:carol
+        type: schedule
+        assertions:
+          can_view:
+            - schedule:daily-fee-reminders
+          can_edit: []
+      - user: identity_account:mallory
+        type: schedule
+        assertions:
+          can_view: []