@stigmer/server 3.14.0-dev.20260910084630

package/dist/domain/executioncontext/steps.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+/**
+ * ExecutionContext domain steps — port the domain-local steps of
+ * pkg/domain/executioncontext/controller/ (the write-boundary ciphertext
+ * guard, the encrypt-at-rest step, and the execution_id loader).
+ *
+ * The ordering contract these steps embody (oss#535, the EC flavor of the
+ * environment domain's "sentinels → encrypt" doc):
+ *   1. RejectCiphertextShapedValues runs BEFORE EncryptSecretValues.
+ *      ExecutionContext is create-only with NO redaction round-trip
+ *      (unlike Environment, whose PreserveRedactedSecrets restores
+ *      ***REDACTED*** markers on update), so this guard is the WHOLE
+ *      write boundary: every legitimate creator — the agent/workflow
+ *      builders, the MCP connect handler, an SDK caller — supplies
+ *      plaintext, and nothing with an enc:v<N>: prefix reaches the store
+ *      except server-produced ciphertext. That is what keeps the decrypt
+ *      lane safe from forged or replayed blobs.
+ *   2. Redaction (redact.ts) runs AFTER Persist, outside the pipeline.
+ *
+ * Proven by executioncontext.conformance.test.ts
+ * (CONFORMANCE_TARGET=local) and __tests__/executioncontext.test.ts.
+ */
+import { ExecutionContextSchema } from "@stigmer/protos/ai/stigmer/agentic/executioncontext/v1/api_pb";
+import type { ExecutionContextQueryController } from "@stigmer/protos/ai/stigmer/agentic/executioncontext/v1/query_pb";
+import type { Logger } from "../../boot/logger.js";
+import type { SecretService } from "../../encryption/encryption.js";
+import type { Authorizer } from "../../extensions/authorizer.js";
+import type { PipelineStep } from "../../pipeline/pipeline.js";
+import type { Store } from "../../store/interface.js";
+/**
+ * RejectCiphertextShapedValues — Go rejectCiphertextShapedStep: refuses
+ * client-supplied values that look like stored ciphertext (the enc:v<N>:
+ * prefix family, ANY version — an unknown future version fails closed) —
+ * the EC flavor of the oss#395 / cloud#229 write-boundary guard. Without
+ * it, the encrypt step's idempotent pass-through would let a caller
+ * smuggle a forged or replayed ciphertext blob into the store, where the
+ * runner lane would later try to decrypt it.
+ *
+ * Checks ALL of spec.data — secret and non-secret alike, exactly as Go
+ * does: the prefix is server-reserved regardless of the is_secret flag.
+ * Reads the immutable input (Go ctx.Input()), the request as the client
+ * sent it.
+ */
+export declare function newRejectCiphertextShapedStep(): PipelineStep<typeof ExecutionContextSchema>;
+/**
+ * EncryptSecretValues — Go encryptSecretValuesStep: encrypts every
+ * non-empty is_secret value in spec.data before persistence — the EC twin
+ * of the environment domain's step of the same name, closing the at-rest
+ * half of oss#535 (the merged EC — decrypted environment secrets,
+ * runtime_env overrides, injected OAuth tokens — rested plaintext for
+ * each run's duration, the same backup-exposure class oss#405 closed for
+ * environments).
+ *
+ * Runs after RejectCiphertextShapedValues, so every secret value reaching
+ * it is client plaintext; encrypt's idempotent pass-through is therefore
+ * never exercised by design, but keeps a double application harmless.
+ *
+ * Keyless mode: values pass through plaintext with one WARN per request,
+ * emitted only when a non-empty secret would actually rest plaintext (the
+ * oss#394 convention). Non-secret values are never touched: the read
+ * paths gate decryption on is_secret, so encrypting a non-secret value
+ * would strand it as unreadable ciphertext.
+ *
+ * Seals as ONE batch through the v2-capped verb — the Java service's
+ * encryptAllV2 lane (vault project DD-005): EC values are ephemeral, on
+ * the runner's latency-budgeted read path, so a vault-backed write codec
+ * must spend one batched KEK round trip here, never one per value, and a
+ * future v3 write flip must not drag these unlocatable rows with it.
+ * Under the v1-only OSS default the batch is behaviorally identical to
+ * the per-value loop it replaced, except that an encrypt failure (never
+ * observed for local AES-GCM) reports without the failing key name —
+ * disclosed with the codec seam (20260830.04 Stage 1).
+ */
+export declare function newEncryptSecretValuesStep(secretService: SecretService, logger: Logger): PipelineStep<typeof ExecutionContextSchema>;
+type GetByExecutionIdDesc = typeof ExecutionContextQueryController.method.getByExecutionId.input;
+/**
+ * LoadByExecutionId — Go loadByExecutionIdStep: loads an ExecutionContext
+ * by querying the spec.executionId FIELD (protobuf JSON naming), not the
+ * resource id — the runner's lookup key is the parent execution's id.
+ * findByField is a full scan of the kind with first-match semantics, the
+ * Go-parity behavior the store interface documents.
+ *
+ * The empty-input guard is unreachable behind ValidateProto (min_len 1 on
+ * execution_id) but ports Go's in-step defense verbatim so the chains
+ * correspond step-for-step.
+ */
+export declare function newLoadByExecutionIdStep(store: Store): PipelineStep<GetByExecutionIdDesc>;
+/**
+ * AuthorizeCreate — the Java ExecutionContextCreateHandler.AuthorizeCreate
+ * port (stigmer-cloud#297; C2 Stage 3D): the create RPC skips the
+ * declarative position-1 check (in-process creators — the agent/workflow
+ * execution machinery — already authorized the run against its
+ * session-or-org and act as the machine account), so EXTERNAL callers are
+ * gated here instead: they must hold can_create_execution_in on
+ * metadata.org — the same permission that gates creating an execution in
+ * the org, so members and org guests pass and an outsider refuses.
+ * Ordered before the duplicate check so an unauthorized caller learns
+ * nothing about which execution ids exist.
+ *
+ * OSS byte-identity: the permissive authorizer allows every check, so the
+ * single-user posture is unchanged (the rosters prove it).
+ */
+export declare function newAuthorizeExecutionContextCreateStep(authorizer: Authorizer): PipelineStep<typeof ExecutionContextSchema>;
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=steps.d.ts.map

package/dist/domain/executioncontext/steps.d.ts.map

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package/dist/domain/executioncontext/steps.js

@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+/**
+ * ExecutionContext domain steps — port the domain-local steps of
+ * pkg/domain/executioncontext/controller/ (the write-boundary ciphertext
+ * guard, the encrypt-at-rest step, and the execution_id loader).
+ *
+ * The ordering contract these steps embody (oss#535, the EC flavor of the
+ * environment domain's "sentinels → encrypt" doc):
+ *   1. RejectCiphertextShapedValues runs BEFORE EncryptSecretValues.
+ *      ExecutionContext is create-only with NO redaction round-trip
+ *      (unlike Environment, whose PreserveRedactedSecrets restores
+ *      ***REDACTED*** markers on update), so this guard is the WHOLE
+ *      write boundary: every legitimate creator — the agent/workflow
+ *      builders, the MCP connect handler, an SDK caller — supplies
+ *      plaintext, and nothing with an enc:v<N>: prefix reaches the store
+ *      except server-produced ciphertext. That is what keeps the decrypt
+ *      lane safe from forged or replayed blobs.
+ *   2. Redaction (redact.ts) runs AFTER Persist, outside the pipeline.
+ *
+ * Proven by executioncontext.conformance.test.ts
+ * (CONFORMANCE_TARGET=local) and __tests__/executioncontext.test.ts.
+ */
+import { ExecutionContextSchema } from "@stigmer/protos/ai/stigmer/agentic/executioncontext/v1/api_pb";
+import { Code, ConnectError } from "@connectrpc/connect";
+import { ApiResourceKind } from "@stigmer/protos/ai/stigmer/commons/apiresource/apiresourcekind/api_resource_kind_pb";
+import { IamPermission } from "@stigmer/protos/ai/stigmer/iam/v1/enum_pb";
+import { isCiphertextShaped } from "../../encryption/encryption.js";
+import { EncryptionScope } from "../../encryption/encryption.js";
+import { internalError, invalidArgumentError, notFoundError, } from "../../pipeline/errors.js";
+import { TARGET_RESOURCE_KEY } from "../../pipeline/steps/load-target.js";
+import { ResourceNotFoundError } from "../../store/interface.js";
+import { ENCRYPT_BATCH_FAILURE_MESSAGE, ciphertextShapedMessage, } from "./constants.js";
+/**
+ * RejectCiphertextShapedValues — Go rejectCiphertextShapedStep: refuses
+ * client-supplied values that look like stored ciphertext (the enc:v<N>:
+ * prefix family, ANY version — an unknown future version fails closed) —
+ * the EC flavor of the oss#395 / cloud#229 write-boundary guard. Without
+ * it, the encrypt step's idempotent pass-through would let a caller
+ * smuggle a forged or replayed ciphertext blob into the store, where the
+ * runner lane would later try to decrypt it.
+ *
+ * Checks ALL of spec.data — secret and non-secret alike, exactly as Go
+ * does: the prefix is server-reserved regardless of the is_secret flag.
+ * Reads the immutable input (Go ctx.Input()), the request as the client
+ * sent it.
+ */
+export function newRejectCiphertextShapedStep() {
+    return {
+        name: "RejectCiphertextShapedValues",
+        execute(ctx) {
+            const data = ctx.input.spec?.data ?? {};
+            for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(data)) {
+                if (isCiphertextShaped(value.value)) {
+                    throw invalidArgumentError(ciphertextShapedMessage(key));
+                }
+            }
+        },
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * EncryptSecretValues — Go encryptSecretValuesStep: encrypts every
+ * non-empty is_secret value in spec.data before persistence — the EC twin
+ * of the environment domain's step of the same name, closing the at-rest
+ * half of oss#535 (the merged EC — decrypted environment secrets,
+ * runtime_env overrides, injected OAuth tokens — rested plaintext for
+ * each run's duration, the same backup-exposure class oss#405 closed for
+ * environments).
+ *
+ * Runs after RejectCiphertextShapedValues, so every secret value reaching
+ * it is client plaintext; encrypt's idempotent pass-through is therefore
+ * never exercised by design, but keeps a double application harmless.
+ *
+ * Keyless mode: values pass through plaintext with one WARN per request,
+ * emitted only when a non-empty secret would actually rest plaintext (the
+ * oss#394 convention). Non-secret values are never touched: the read
+ * paths gate decryption on is_secret, so encrypting a non-secret value
+ * would strand it as unreadable ciphertext.
+ *
+ * Seals as ONE batch through the v2-capped verb — the Java service's
+ * encryptAllV2 lane (vault project DD-005): EC values are ephemeral, on
+ * the runner's latency-budgeted read path, so a vault-backed write codec
+ * must spend one batched KEK round trip here, never one per value, and a
+ * future v3 write flip must not drag these unlocatable rows with it.
+ * Under the v1-only OSS default the batch is behaviorally identical to
+ * the per-value loop it replaced, except that an encrypt failure (never
+ * observed for local AES-GCM) reports without the failing key name —
+ * disclosed with the codec seam (20260830.04 Stage 1).
+ */
+export function newEncryptSecretValuesStep(secretService, logger) {
+    return {
+        name: "EncryptSecretValues",
+        async execute(ctx) {
+            const ec = ctx.newState;
+            const data = ec.spec?.data;
+            if (data === undefined || Object.keys(data).length === 0) {
+                return;
+            }
+            if (!secretService.isEnabled()) {
+                if (hasNonEmptySecret(data)) {
+                    logger.warn("Encryption disabled: execution context secret values will be stored in plaintext", { executionId: ec.spec?.executionId ?? "" });
+                }
+                return;
+            }
+            const toSeal = new Map();
+            for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(data)) {
+                if (!value.isSecret || value.value === "") {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                toSeal.set(key, value.value);
+            }
+            if (toSeal.size === 0) {
+                return;
+            }
+            let sealed;
+            try {
+                sealed = await secretService.encryptAllAtMostV2(toSeal, EncryptionScope.forOrganization(ec.metadata?.org ?? ""));
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw internalError(error, ENCRYPT_BATCH_FAILURE_MESSAGE);
+            }
+            for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(data)) {
+                const sealedValue = sealed.get(key);
+                if (sealedValue !== undefined) {
+                    value.value = sealedValue;
+                }
+            }
+        },
+    };
+}
+/** Whether any entry would have been encrypted — keeps the WARN honest. */
+function hasNonEmptySecret(data) {
+    return Object.values(data).some((v) => v.isSecret && v.value !== "");
+}
+/**
+ * LoadByExecutionId — Go loadByExecutionIdStep: loads an ExecutionContext
+ * by querying the spec.executionId FIELD (protobuf JSON naming), not the
+ * resource id — the runner's lookup key is the parent execution's id.
+ * findByField is a full scan of the kind with first-match semantics, the
+ * Go-parity behavior the store interface documents.
+ *
+ * The empty-input guard is unreachable behind ValidateProto (min_len 1 on
+ * execution_id) but ports Go's in-step defense verbatim so the chains
+ * correspond step-for-step.
+ */
+export function newLoadByExecutionIdStep(store) {
+    return {
+        name: "LoadByExecutionId",
+        async execute(ctx) {
+            const input = ctx.input;
+            if (input.executionId === "") {
+                throw invalidArgumentError("execution_id is required");
+            }
+            let executionContext;
+            try {
+                executionContext = await store.findByField(ctx.apiResourceKind, "spec.executionId", input.executionId, ExecutionContextSchema);
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                if (error instanceof ResourceNotFoundError) {
+                    throw notFoundError("execution_context", `execution_id=${input.executionId}`);
+                }
+                throw internalError(error, "failed to query execution context");
+            }
+            ctx.set(TARGET_RESOURCE_KEY, executionContext);
+        },
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * AuthorizeCreate — the Java ExecutionContextCreateHandler.AuthorizeCreate
+ * port (stigmer-cloud#297; C2 Stage 3D): the create RPC skips the
+ * declarative position-1 check (in-process creators — the agent/workflow
+ * execution machinery — already authorized the run against its
+ * session-or-org and act as the machine account), so EXTERNAL callers are
+ * gated here instead: they must hold can_create_execution_in on
+ * metadata.org — the same permission that gates creating an execution in
+ * the org, so members and org guests pass and an outsider refuses.
+ * Ordered before the duplicate check so an unauthorized caller learns
+ * nothing about which execution ids exist.
+ *
+ * OSS byte-identity: the permissive authorizer allows every check, so the
+ * single-user posture is unchanged (the rosters prove it).
+ */
+export function newAuthorizeExecutionContextCreateStep(authorizer) {
+    return {
+        name: "AuthorizeCreate",
+        async execute(ctx) {
+            const caller = ctx.callerIdentity;
+            if (caller.callerClass === "internal" || caller.origin === "in-process") {
+                return; // authorized upstream — the Java in-process trust arm
+            }
+            let decision;
+            try {
+                decision = await authorizer.authorize(caller, {
+                    permission: IamPermission.can_create_execution_in,
+                    resourceKind: ApiResourceKind.organization,
+                    resourceId: ctx.newState.metadata?.org ?? "",
+                });
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw internalError(error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error)), "execution-context create authorization could not be completed");
+            }
+            switch (decision.kind) {
+                case "allow":
+                    return;
+                case "deny":
+                case "not-found":
+                    throw new ConnectError("unauthorized to create execution context in this organization", Code.PermissionDenied);
+                case "unavailable":
+                    throw internalError(decision.cause, "execution-context create authorization could not be completed");
+                default: {
+                    const exhaustive = decision;
+                    throw internalError(new Error(`unknown decision ${JSON.stringify(exhaustive)}`), "execution-context create authorization could not be completed");
+                }
+            }
+        },
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=steps.js.map

package/dist/domain/executioncontext/steps.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/domain/executioncontext/temporal/delete-execution-context.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+import type { Logger } from "../../../boot/logger.js";
+import type { Store } from "../../../store/interface.js";
+/** The activity name for worker registration — Go's constant, byte-pinned. */
+export declare const DELETE_EXECUTION_CONTEXT_ACTIVITY_NAME = "DeleteExecutionContext";
+/**
+ * Finds and deletes the ExecutionContext for the given execution ID
+ * (an AgentExecution or WorkflowExecution id — the lookup uses the
+ * spec.executionId field).
+ */
+export declare function deleteExecutionContextForExecution(store: Store, logger: Logger, executionId: string): Promise<void>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=delete-execution-context.d.ts.map

package/dist/domain/executioncontext/temporal/delete-execution-context.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/domain/executioncontext/temporal/delete-execution-context.js

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/**
+ * DeleteExecutionContext activity seam — ports
+ * pkg/domain/executioncontext/temporal/activities/delete_execution_context.go.
+ *
+ * The ExecutionContext is an ephemeral resource containing the
+ * fully-merged environment (environment_refs values overridden by
+ * runtime_env, filtered to the blueprint's declared env keys), including
+ * secrets. It must be cleaned up when the execution finishes so sensitive
+ * data does not persist beyond the execution lifetime.
+ *
+ * A SEAM, deliberately unregistered: this module has no Temporal SDK
+ * dependency — it is the plain store-direct function the agent-execution
+ * and workflow-execution workers (D4 #18/#21) will register as a local
+ * activity under DELETE_EXECUTION_CONTEXT_ACTIVITY_NAME, shared by both
+ * workflows exactly as in Go.
+ *
+ * Behavior (Go parity):
+ *   - Idempotent: no-op if the ExecutionContext does not exist.
+ *   - Best-effort: logs failures but never throws — cleanup failure must
+ *     not affect the workflow outcome. A failed delete leaves the row in
+ *     place with its secret values still encrypted at rest (oss#535);
+ *     nothing retries it later, so the WARN is the operator's signal.
+ *   - Security-aware: logs the variable count, never names or values.
+ */
+import { ExecutionContextSchema } from "@stigmer/protos/ai/stigmer/agentic/executioncontext/v1/api_pb";
+import { ApiResourceKind } from "@stigmer/protos/ai/stigmer/commons/apiresource/apiresourcekind/api_resource_kind_pb";
+import { ResourceNotFoundError } from "../../../store/interface.js";
+/** The activity name for worker registration — Go's constant, byte-pinned. */
+export const DELETE_EXECUTION_CONTEXT_ACTIVITY_NAME = "DeleteExecutionContext";
+/**
+ * Finds and deletes the ExecutionContext for the given execution ID
+ * (an AgentExecution or WorkflowExecution id — the lookup uses the
+ * spec.executionId field).
+ */
+export async function deleteExecutionContextForExecution(store, logger, executionId) {
+    logger.debug("Cleaning up ExecutionContext for execution", { executionId });
+    let ec;
+    try {
+        ec = await store.findByField(ApiResourceKind.execution_context, "spec.executionId", executionId, ExecutionContextSchema);
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        if (error instanceof ResourceNotFoundError) {
+            logger.debug("No ExecutionContext found for execution -- nothing to clean up", { executionId });
+            return;
+        }
+        logger.warn("Failed to query ExecutionContext -- leaving cleanup to the operator", {
+            executionId,
+            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
+        });
+        return;
+    }
+    const contextId = ec.metadata?.id ?? "";
+    const dataCount = Object.keys(ec.spec?.data ?? {}).length;
+    try {
+        await store.deleteResource(ApiResourceKind.execution_context, contextId);
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        logger.warn("Failed to delete ExecutionContext -- leaving cleanup to the operator", {
+            executionId,
+            contextId,
+            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
+        });
+        return;
+    }
+    logger.info("Deleted ExecutionContext for execution", {
+        executionId,
+        contextId,
+        variables: dataCount,
+    });
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=delete-execution-context.js.map

package/dist/domain/executioncontext/temporal/delete-execution-context.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/domain/github/controller.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+import type { ConnectRouter } from "@connectrpc/connect";
+import type { Logger } from "../../boot/logger.js";
+export interface GitHubControllerDeps {
+    readonly clientId: string;
+    readonly clientSecret: string;
+    readonly logger: Logger;
+    /** Test seam for the token exchange; defaults to global fetch. */
+    readonly fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;
+}
+/** Registers the GitHub broker service on the router (routes stage). */
+export declare function registerGitHubServices(router: ConnectRouter, deps: GitHubControllerDeps): void;
+//# sourceMappingURL=controller.d.ts.map

package/dist/domain/github/controller.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/domain/github/controller.js

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/**
+ * GitHub broker controller — ports pkg/domain/github: the stateless OAuth
+ * utility service for workspace repo selection (NOT a resource domain — no
+ * store, no persistence of state or tokens; the frontend never holds the
+ * client credentials).
+ *
+ * Proven by github.conformance.test.ts (the Layer-1 protovalidate arms —
+ * the only hermetic, cross-edition-true surface; see that suite's header
+ * for why the other arms are deliberately absent) and
+ * __tests__/github.test.ts (the broker mechanics against an injected
+ * fetch, mirroring where Go keeps these pins).
+ *
+ * The config-missing FailedPrecondition arms are STRUCTURALLY UNREACHABLE
+ * on OSS — the bundled "Stigmer Local" defaults (boot/config.ts) cannot be
+ * blanked — but they are ported and unit-tested: the guard is live on the
+ * cloud edition, and the error copy is cross-edition contract.
+ */
+import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
+import { create } from "@bufbuild/protobuf";
+import { ExchangeOAuthCodeResponseSchema, GetOAuthAuthorizeUrlResponseSchema, GitHubService, } from "@stigmer/protos/ai/stigmer/platform/github/v1/service_pb";
+import { goUrlValuesEncode } from "../../gocompat/query-escape.js";
+import { failedPreconditionError, internalError, invalidArgumentError, unavailableError, } from "../../pipeline/errors.js";
+/** Go githubAuthorizeURL. */
+const GITHUB_AUTHORIZE_URL = "https://github.com/login/oauth/authorize";
+/** Go githubTokenURL. */
+const GITHUB_TOKEN_URL = "https://github.com/login/oauth/access_token";
+/** Go oauthScopes — repo access + user identity, the workspace needs. */
+const OAUTH_SCOPES = "repo,read:user";
+/**
+ * Go httpTimeout (10s): the exchange is a single interactive round-trip to
+ * github.com; anything slower should fail the RPC rather than hold the
+ * caller's OAuth callback open.
+ */
+const HTTP_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;
+/** Registers the GitHub broker service on the router (routes stage). */
+export function registerGitHubServices(router, deps) {
+    router.service(GitHubService, {
+        getOAuthAuthorizeUrl: (req) => getOAuthAuthorizeUrl(deps, req),
+        exchangeOAuthCode: (req) => exchangeOAuthCode(deps, req),
+    });
+}
+/**
+ * Go GetOAuthAuthorizeUrl: pure URL construction — client_id, the caller's
+ * redirect_uri, the pinned scopes, and a random 16-byte hex state, encoded
+ * with Go url.Values.Encode semantics (sorted keys, QueryEscape) so the
+ * URL is byte-identical across editions.
+ */
+function getOAuthAuthorizeUrl(deps, req) {
+    if (deps.clientId === "") {
+        throw failedPreconditionError("GitHub OAuth is not configured (STIGMER_GITHUB_CLIENT_ID not set)");
+    }
+    let state;
+    try {
+        state = randomBytes(16).toString("hex");
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        deps.logger.error("failed to generate OAuth state", {
+            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
+        });
+        throw internalError(error, "failed to generate OAuth state");
+    }
+    const authorizeUrl = GITHUB_AUTHORIZE_URL +
+        "?" +
+        goUrlValuesEncode({
+            client_id: deps.clientId,
+            redirect_uri: req.redirectUri,
+            scope: OAUTH_SCOPES,
+            state,
+        });
+    return create(GetOAuthAuthorizeUrlResponseSchema, { authorizeUrl, state });
+}
+/**
+ * Go ExchangeOAuthCode: POSTs the code to github.com and relays the token
+ * to the caller — nothing stored. Error mapping is contract: GitHub's own
+ * OAuth error → InvalidArgument (the caller sent a bad/expired code);
+ * network failure → Unavailable; unreadable/unparseable response →
+ * Internal.
+ */
+async function exchangeOAuthCode(deps, req) {
+    if (deps.clientId === "" || deps.clientSecret === "") {
+        throw failedPreconditionError("GitHub OAuth is not configured");
+    }
+    const body = goUrlValuesEncode({
+        client_id: deps.clientId,
+        client_secret: deps.clientSecret,
+        code: req.code,
+        redirect_uri: req.redirectUri,
+    });
+    const fetchImpl = deps.fetchImpl ?? fetch;
+    let response;
+    try {
+        response = await fetchImpl(GITHUB_TOKEN_URL, {
+            method: "POST",
+            headers: {
+                "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+                Accept: "application/json",
+            },
+            body,
+            signal: AbortSignal.timeout(HTTP_TIMEOUT_MS),
+        });
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        deps.logger.error("GitHub token exchange failed", {
+            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
+        });
+        throw unavailableError("failed to reach GitHub for token exchange");
+    }
+    let raw;
+    try {
+        raw = await response.text();
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        deps.logger.error("failed to read GitHub token response", {
+            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
+        });
+        throw internalError(error, "failed to read GitHub response");
+    }
+    let tokenResponse;
+    try {
+        tokenResponse = JSON.parse(raw);
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        deps.logger.error("failed to parse GitHub token response", {
+            error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
+        });
+        throw internalError(error, "failed to parse GitHub response");
+    }
+    if (tokenResponse.error !== undefined && tokenResponse.error !== "") {
+        deps.logger.warn("GitHub OAuth error", {
+            error: tokenResponse.error,
+            description: tokenResponse.error_description ?? "",
+        });
+        throw invalidArgumentError(`GitHub OAuth error: ${tokenResponse.error_description ?? ""}`);
+    }
+    return create(ExchangeOAuthCodeResponseSchema, {
+        accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token ?? "",
+        tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type ?? "",
+        scope: tokenResponse.scope ?? "",
+    });
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=controller.js.map

package/dist/domain/github/controller.js.map

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package/dist/domain/mcpserver/complete-oauth-connect.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+import type { CompleteOAuthConnectInput, CompleteOAuthConnectOutput } from "@stigmer/protos/ai/stigmer/agentic/mcpserver/v1/io_pb";
+import type { SecretService } from "../../encryption/encryption.js";
+import type { CallerIdentity } from "../../extensions/identity.js";
+import type { PendingOAuthState } from "../../store/interface.js";
+import type { McpServerConnectDeps } from "./connect.js";
+export declare function completeOAuthConnect(deps: McpServerConnectDeps, input: CompleteOAuthConnectInput, identity: CallerIdentity): Promise<CompleteOAuthConnectOutput>;
+/**
+ * Decrypts the secrets sealPendingOAuthState encrypted before the row
+ * rested (oss#394) — the read seam paired with the write seam in
+ * initiate-oauth-connect.ts.
+ *
+ * decrypt() dispatches on the value's own enc:v1: prefix and passes
+ * plaintext through unchanged, which quietly covers every legacy shape:
+ * rows written before the sealing release, rows written while encryption
+ * was disabled, and the DCR path's deliberately empty client secret. No
+ * migration — the table turns over in 10 minutes.
+ *
+ * A sealed row on a deployment whose key has since vanished fails here
+ * (loudly, before any token-exchange attempt) rather than sending
+ * ciphertext to the vendor's token endpoint.
+ */
+export declare function unsealPendingOAuthState(secretService: SecretService, state: PendingOAuthState): Promise<PendingOAuthState>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=complete-oauth-connect.d.ts.map

package/dist/domain/mcpserver/complete-oauth-connect.d.ts.map

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