@stigmer/runner 3.12.8 → 3.13.0

package/dist/encryption/config.js

@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Payload-encryption configuration (stigmer-cloud#227, stigmer#398).
- *
- * Two key sources, strict precedence:
- *
- *   1. Environment (STIGMER_PAYLOAD_ENCRYPTION_KEY(_ID)) — the operator's
- *      explicit choice: self-hosted deployments sharing one key with their
- *      server, and cloud sandboxes injected with the platform key. When the
- *      env key is set, bootstrap-delivered material is ignored entirely.
- *   2. Bootstrap-delivered — server-managed per-identity keys handed to
- *      desktop-class runners by getRunnerBootstrapConfig. Held in memory
- *      only; persistence lives server-side, which is what makes Temporal
- *      replay work across runner restarts (every boot re-fetches the SAME
- *      key).
- *
- * Encryption is enabled iff a key is present from either source — the same
- * enabled-iff-configured pattern as the claim-check codec. A malformed key
- * fails the boot rather than silently running plaintext: an operator who set
- * the key (or a server that minted one) intended history to be encrypted.
- *
- * Key rotation: payloads carry the id of the key that encrypted them.
- * During a rotation window the previous key stays readable via the
- * secondary pair while new payloads are written under the primary key.
- * Workers capture keys at construction, so a rotated bootstrap key lands
- * on the next runner boot — there is no live re-key.
- */
-import { getRunnerSecret } from "../shared/runner-credential-store.js";
-const KEY_ENV = "STIGMER_PAYLOAD_ENCRYPTION_KEY";
-const KEY_ID_ENV = "STIGMER_PAYLOAD_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ID";
-const SECONDARY_KEY_ENV = "STIGMER_PAYLOAD_ENCRYPTION_SECONDARY_KEY";
-const SECONDARY_KEY_ID_ENV = "STIGMER_PAYLOAD_ENCRYPTION_SECONDARY_KEY_ID";
-const AES_256_KEY_BYTES = 32;
-/**
- * Returns the encryption config, or undefined when encryption is not
- * configured (the codec is then simply not installed).
- *
- * Source precedence: the env key wins outright; bootstrap-delivered
- * material applies only when no env key is set (see the module doc).
- *
- * @throws when a key is present but malformed, or a key id is missing —
- *   key misconfiguration must stop the boot, not degrade to plaintext.
- *   This applies equally to bootstrap material: a server that hands out
- *   a bad key or omits its id has broken the protocol contract, and
- *   running plaintext against a server that manages keys would silently
- *   defeat the feature.
- */
-export function loadPayloadEncryptionConfig(bootstrap) {
-    // Key VALUES resolve through the credential store (the #508 boot capture
-    // moves them out of process.env — agent shells must not read them); the
-    // *_KEY_ID companions are rotation bookkeeping, not secrets, and stay
-    // plain env reads.
-    const rawKey = getRunnerSecret(KEY_ENV);
-    if (rawKey) {
-        const primary = {
-            keyId: requireKeyId(KEY_ID_ENV),
-            key: parseKey(rawKey, KEY_ENV),
-        };
-        const rawSecondary = getRunnerSecret(SECONDARY_KEY_ENV);
-        const secondary = rawSecondary
-            ? {
-                keyId: requireKeyId(SECONDARY_KEY_ID_ENV),
-                key: parseKey(rawSecondary, SECONDARY_KEY_ENV),
-            }
-            : undefined;
-        return { primary, secondary };
-    }
-    if (bootstrap?.key) {
-        const primary = {
-            keyId: requireBootstrapKeyId(bootstrap.keyId, "payload_encryption_key_id"),
-            key: parseKey(bootstrap.key, "bootstrap payload_encryption_key"),
-        };
-        const secondary = bootstrap.secondaryKey
-            ? {
-                keyId: requireBootstrapKeyId(bootstrap.secondaryKeyId, "payload_encryption_secondary_key_id"),
-                key: parseKey(bootstrap.secondaryKey, "bootstrap payload_encryption_secondary_key"),
-            }
-            : undefined;
-        return { primary, secondary };
-    }
-    return undefined;
-}
-function requireKeyId(envName) {
-    const keyId = process.env[envName];
-    // An explicit id is required (no default): during rotation two keys
-    // coexist, and payloads must name which one encrypted them.
-    if (!keyId) {
-        throw new Error(`Payload encryption misconfigured: ${envName} is required when the ` +
-            `corresponding key is set`);
-    }
-    return keyId;
-}
-function requireBootstrapKeyId(keyId, fieldName) {
-    if (!keyId) {
-        throw new Error(`Runner bootstrap returned a payload encryption key without its ${fieldName} — ` +
-            `refusing to encrypt under an unidentified key (server contract violation)`);
-    }
-    return keyId;
-}
-function parseKey(rawBase64, envName) {
-    let key;
-    try {
-        key = Buffer.from(rawBase64, "base64");
-    }
-    catch {
-        throw new Error(`Payload encryption misconfigured: ${envName} is not valid base64`);
-    }
-    if (key.length !== AES_256_KEY_BYTES) {
-        throw new Error(`Payload encryption misconfigured: ${envName} must decode to ` +
-            `${AES_256_KEY_BYTES} bytes (AES-256), got ${key.length}`);
-    }
-    return key;
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=config.js.map

package/dist/encryption/config.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"config.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/encryption/config.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAyBG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,sCAAsC,CAAC;AA4BvE,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,gCAAgC,CAAC;AACjD,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,mCAAmC,CAAC;AACvD,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,0CAA0C,CAAC;AACrE,MAAM,oBAAoB,GAAG,6CAA6C,CAAC;AAE3E,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;AAE7B;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAaG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,2BAA2B,CACzC,SAAgC;IAEhC,yEAAyE;IACzE,wEAAwE;IACxE,sEAAsE;IACtE,mBAAmB;IACnB,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,eAAe,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IACxC,IAAI,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QACX,MAAM,OAAO,GAAkB;YAC7B,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC;YAC/B,GAAG,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;SAC/B,CAAC;QAEF,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG,eAAe,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAC;QACxD,MAAM,SAAS,GAA8B,YAAY;YACvD,CAAC,CAAC;gBACE,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC;gBACzC,GAAG,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,iBAAiB,CAAC;aAC/C;YACH,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;QAEd,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;IAChC,CAAC;IAED,IAAI,SAAS,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;QACnB,MAAM,OAAO,GAAkB;YAC7B,KAAK,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC;YAC1E,GAAG,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,kCAAkC,CAAC;SACjE,CAAC;QAEF,MAAM,SAAS,GAA8B,SAAS,CAAC,YAAY;YACjE,CAAC,CAAC;gBACE,KAAK,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAC1B,SAAS,CAAC,cAAc,EACxB,qCAAqC,CACtC;gBACD,GAAG,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,4CAA4C,CAAC;aACpF;YACH,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;QAEd,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;IAChC,CAAC;IAED,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AACnB,CAAC;AAED,SAAS,YAAY,CAAC,OAAe;IACnC,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IACnC,oEAAoE;IACpE,4DAA4D;IAC5D,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QACX,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CACb,qCAAqC,OAAO,wBAAwB;YAClE,0BAA0B,CAC7B,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;IACD,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;AACf,CAAC;AAED,SAAS,qBAAqB,CAAC,KAAyB,EAAE,SAAiB;IACzE,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QACX,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CACb,kEAAkE,SAAS,KAAK;YAC9E,2EAA2E,CAC9E,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;IACD,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;AACf,CAAC;AAED,SAAS,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAiB,EAAE,OAAe;IAClD,IAAI,GAAW,CAAC;IAChB,IAAI,CAAC;QACH,GAAG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;IACzC,CAAC;IAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACP,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,qCAAqC,OAAO,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAAC;IACtF,CAAC;IACD,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC;QACrC,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CACb,qCAAqC,OAAO,kBAAkB;YAC5D,GAAG,iBAAiB,yBAAyB,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAC5D,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;IACD,OAAO,GAAG,CAAC;AACb,CAAC"}

package/dist/encryption/index.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-export { EncryptionPayloadCodec } from "./payload-codec.js";
-export { loadPayloadEncryptionConfig } from "./config.js";
-export type { PayloadEncryptionConfig, EncryptionKey } from "./config.js";

package/dist/encryption/index.js

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-export { EncryptionPayloadCodec } from "./payload-codec.js";
-export { loadPayloadEncryptionConfig } from "./config.js";
-//# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/encryption/index.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/encryption/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAC5D,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC"}

package/dist/encryption/payload-codec.d.ts

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Temporal PayloadCodec that encrypts payloads at rest in workflow
- * history (stigmer-cloud#227).
- *
- * Why: the workflow engine runs inside the Temporal deterministic
- * sandbox, so decrypted execution-context values cross the history
- * boundary in many places — the hydrate activity result, the runtime
- * env passed as an input to every per-task activity, and expression
- * results recorded as local-activity markers. Encrypting at the payload
- * codec layer closes the entire class with one mechanism instead of
- * chasing each crossing.
- *
- * Envelope (cross-SDK contract — the Java decode-only codec in
- * stigmer-cloud's temporal-starter must match it byte-for-byte, pinned
- * by the conformance fixture in __tests__/fixtures/):
- *
- *   metadata: encoding            = "binary/encrypted"
- *             encryption-key-id   = <key id that encrypted this payload>
- *   data:     iv (12 bytes) ‖ AES-256-GCM(ciphertext ‖ tag (16 bytes))
- *
- * The plaintext is the serialized ORIGINAL Payload proto (metadata AND
- * data), so decode restores the payload exactly — including its
- * original encoding — with no side channel.
- *
- * Decode passes through payloads it did not encode. This is what keeps
- * plaintext signals from the Java/Go orchestrators and pre-rollout
- * in-flight histories working with zero migration. Everything else
- * fails closed: unknown key id, missing key id, and ciphertext tampering
- * all throw rather than surfacing bogus payloads.
- */
-import type { Payload, PayloadCodec } from "@temporalio/common";
-import type { PayloadEncryptionConfig } from "./config.js";
-export declare class EncryptionPayloadCodec implements PayloadCodec {
-    private readonly config;
-    private readonly decryptKeysById;
-    constructor(config: PayloadEncryptionConfig);
-    encode(payloads: Payload[]): Promise<Payload[]>;
-    decode(payloads: Payload[]): Promise<Payload[]>;
-    private encodePayload;
-    private decodePayload;
-}

package/dist/encryption/payload-codec.js

@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Temporal PayloadCodec that encrypts payloads at rest in workflow
- * history (stigmer-cloud#227).
- *
- * Why: the workflow engine runs inside the Temporal deterministic
- * sandbox, so decrypted execution-context values cross the history
- * boundary in many places — the hydrate activity result, the runtime
- * env passed as an input to every per-task activity, and expression
- * results recorded as local-activity markers. Encrypting at the payload
- * codec layer closes the entire class with one mechanism instead of
- * chasing each crossing.
- *
- * Envelope (cross-SDK contract — the Java decode-only codec in
- * stigmer-cloud's temporal-starter must match it byte-for-byte, pinned
- * by the conformance fixture in __tests__/fixtures/):
- *
- *   metadata: encoding            = "binary/encrypted"
- *             encryption-key-id   = <key id that encrypted this payload>
- *   data:     iv (12 bytes) ‖ AES-256-GCM(ciphertext ‖ tag (16 bytes))
- *
- * The plaintext is the serialized ORIGINAL Payload proto (metadata AND
- * data), so decode restores the payload exactly — including its
- * original encoding — with no side channel.
- *
- * Decode passes through payloads it did not encode. This is what keeps
- * plaintext signals from the Java/Go orchestrators and pre-rollout
- * in-flight histories working with zero migration. Everything else
- * fails closed: unknown key id, missing key id, and ciphertext tampering
- * all throw rather than surfacing bogus payloads.
- */
-import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
-// Default-import + destructure, NOT `import { temporal } from …`:
-// @temporalio/proto is CommonJS and its `temporal` export defeats Node's
-// cjs-module-lexer named-export detection, so the named form loads under
-// tsx/vitest (their interop is looser) but crashes plain `node dist/main.js`
-// at startup with "Named export 'temporal' not found" (stigmer/stigmer#399
-// boot regression). Pinned by scripts/verify-dist-boot.mjs in CI.
-import proto from "@temporalio/proto";
-const { temporal } = proto;
-const ENCODING_METADATA_KEY = "encoding";
-const ENCRYPTED_ENCODING_VALUE = "binary/encrypted";
-const KEY_ID_METADATA_KEY = "encryption-key-id";
-/** AES-GCM parameters shared with the Java implementation. */
-const IV_BYTES = 12;
-const AUTH_TAG_BYTES = 16;
-export class EncryptionPayloadCodec {
-    config;
-    decryptKeysById;
-    constructor(config) {
-        this.config = config;
-        this.decryptKeysById = new Map([[config.primary.keyId, config.primary.key]]);
-        if (config.secondary) {
-            this.decryptKeysById.set(config.secondary.keyId, config.secondary.key);
-        }
-    }
-    async encode(payloads) {
-        return payloads.map((p) => this.encodePayload(p));
-    }
-    async decode(payloads) {
-        return payloads.map((p) => this.decodePayload(p));
-    }
-    encodePayload(payload) {
-        // Data-less payloads (binary/null from void results) stay as-is:
-        // there is nothing to protect, and the cross-language parents that
-        // await our workflows as void must be able to read them without a key.
-        if (!payload.data || payload.data.length === 0) {
-            return payload;
-        }
-        const plaintext = temporal.api.common.v1.Payload.encode(payload).finish();
-        return {
-            metadata: {
-                [ENCODING_METADATA_KEY]: Buffer.from(ENCRYPTED_ENCODING_VALUE),
-                [KEY_ID_METADATA_KEY]: Buffer.from(this.config.primary.keyId),
-            },
-            data: encrypt(plaintext, this.config.primary),
-        };
-    }
-    decodePayload(payload) {
-        if (!isEncryptedPayload(payload)) {
-            return payload;
-        }
-        const keyIdBytes = payload.metadata?.[KEY_ID_METADATA_KEY];
-        if (!keyIdBytes) {
-            throw new Error("Encrypted payload is missing its encryption-key-id metadata — refusing to decode");
-        }
-        const keyId = Buffer.from(keyIdBytes).toString("utf-8");
-        const key = this.decryptKeysById.get(keyId);
-        if (!key) {
-            throw new Error(`Encrypted payload uses unknown key id '${keyId}' — configure it as the ` +
-                `primary or secondary payload encryption key (rotation window?)`);
-        }
-        const plaintext = decrypt(payload.data, key, keyId);
-        return temporal.api.common.v1.Payload.decode(plaintext);
-    }
-}
-function isEncryptedPayload(payload) {
-    const encoding = payload.metadata?.[ENCODING_METADATA_KEY];
-    if (!encoding)
-        return false;
-    return Buffer.from(encoding).toString("utf-8") === ENCRYPTED_ENCODING_VALUE;
-}
-function encrypt(plaintext, key) {
-    const iv = randomBytes(IV_BYTES);
-    const cipher = createCipheriv("aes-256-gcm", key.key, iv);
-    const ciphertext = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext), cipher.final()]);
-    // Layout iv ‖ ciphertext ‖ tag matches Java's AES/GCM/NoPadding, whose
-    // doFinal() output is ciphertext ‖ tag.
-    return Buffer.concat([iv, ciphertext, cipher.getAuthTag()]);
-}
-function decrypt(data, key, keyId) {
-    if (data.length < IV_BYTES + AUTH_TAG_BYTES) {
-        throw new Error(`Encrypted payload under key id '${keyId}' is truncated (${data.length} bytes)`);
-    }
-    const buf = Buffer.from(data);
-    const iv = buf.subarray(0, IV_BYTES);
-    const ciphertext = buf.subarray(IV_BYTES, buf.length - AUTH_TAG_BYTES);
-    const tag = buf.subarray(buf.length - AUTH_TAG_BYTES);
-    const decipher = createDecipheriv("aes-256-gcm", key, iv);
-    decipher.setAuthTag(tag);
-    try {
-        return Buffer.concat([decipher.update(ciphertext), decipher.final()]);
-    }
-    catch {
-        // GCM auth failure: tampered ciphertext or a key that does not match
-        // its advertised id. Never surface partially decrypted bytes.
-        throw new Error(`Failed to decrypt payload under key id '${keyId}' — ciphertext is ` +
-            `corrupt or the configured key does not match`);
-    }
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=payload-codec.js.map

package/dist/encryption/payload-codec.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"payload-codec.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/encryption/payload-codec.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA6BG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAE5E,kEAAkE;AAClE,yEAAyE;AACzE,yEAAyE;AACzE,6EAA6E;AAC7E,2EAA2E;AAC3E,kEAAkE;AAClE,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAGtC,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC;AAE3B,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAAG,UAAU,CAAC;AACzC,MAAM,wBAAwB,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC;AACpD,MAAM,mBAAmB,GAAG,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAEhD,8DAA8D;AAC9D,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;AACpB,MAAM,cAAc,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;AAE1B,MAAM,OAAO,sBAAsB;IAGJ;IAFZ,eAAe,CAAsB;IAEtD,YAA6B,MAA+B;QAA/B,WAAM,GAAN,MAAM,CAAyB;QAC1D,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAC7E,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YACrB,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;QACzE,CAAC;IACH,CAAC;IAED,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,QAAmB;QAC9B,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IACpD,CAAC;IAED,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,QAAmB;QAC9B,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IACpD,CAAC;IAEO,aAAa,CAAC,OAAgB;QACpC,iEAAiE;QACjE,mEAAmE;QACnE,uEAAuE;QACvE,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YAC/C,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC;QACjB,CAAC;QAED,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QAC1E,OAAO;YACL,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC;gBAC9D,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC;aAC9D;YACD,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC;SAC9C,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;IAEO,aAAa,CAAC,OAAgB;QACpC,IAAI,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YACjC,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC;QACjB,CAAC;QAED,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC;QAC3D,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;YAChB,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CACb,kFAAkF,CACnF,CAAC;QACJ,CAAC;QACD,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;QACxD,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;QAC5C,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;YACT,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CACb,0CAA0C,KAAK,0BAA0B;gBACvE,gEAAgE,CACnE,CAAC;QACJ,CAAC;QAED,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAK,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;QACrD,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;IAC1D,CAAC;CACF;AAED,SAAS,kBAAkB,CAAC,OAAgB;IAC1C,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC;IAC3D,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ;QAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IAC5B,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAC9E,CAAC;AAED,SAAS,OAAO,CAAC,SAAqB,EAAE,GAAkB;IACxD,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,WAAW,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;IACjC,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,cAAc,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IAC1D,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IAC7E,uEAAuE;IACvE,wCAAwC;IACxC,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAC9D,CAAC;AAED,SAAS,OAAO,CAAC,IAAgB,EAAE,GAAW,EAAE,KAAa;IAC3D,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,QAAQ,GAAG,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC;QAC5C,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CACb,mCAAmC,KAAK,mBAAmB,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,SAAS,CAChF,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;IACD,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAC9B,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;IACrC,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC;IACvE,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC;IAEtD,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,gBAAgB,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IAC1D,QAAQ,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;IACzB,IAAI,CAAC;QACH,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IACxE,CAAC;IAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACP,qEAAqE;QACrE,8DAA8D;QAC9D,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CACb,2CAA2C,KAAK,oBAAoB;YAClE,8CAA8C,CACjD,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;AACH,CAAC"}

package/dist/shared/zip-structure.d.ts

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Policy-free structural ZIP parsing: end-of-central-directory (EOCD)
- * location plus central-directory walk, producing one record per entry.
- *
- * Parsing is *central-directory-based* — never a front-to-back walk of
- * local file headers. This is a correctness decision, not a style choice
- * (issues #450 and #567): local headers of streaming entries
- * (general-purpose flag bit 3) carry zeroed sizes, and the only
- * local-only way to recover them is scanning the payload for the
- * data-descriptor signature — which silently truncates any stored entry
- * whose *content* happens to contain those four bytes, and
- * desynchronizes every entry after it. The central directory always
- * carries the real sizes, and every consumer here holds the complete
- * archive bytes, so nothing a local-header walk could offer is needed.
- *
- * This layer maps bytes to entry records and nothing else. Policy — what
- * a structural failure means, which entries are acceptable, how payloads
- * are decoded — belongs to the consumers, and they differ on purpose:
- *
- *   - shared/zip-extract.ts (skill artifacts): structural failure is
- *     NON-FATAL — both editions' push gates validated every artifact
- *     with a central-directory-based reader before storage, so a defect
- *     here can only be a truncated or corrupted download.
- *   - execute-deep-agent/attachment-injector.ts (user attachments):
- *     structural failure is FAIL-HARD — the input is an untrusted
- *     upload and nothing upstream vouched for it.
- *
- * ZIP64 is deliberately unsupported: both consumers cap input far below
- * every ZIP64 threshold (skill push gates: 100MB / 10,000 files;
- * attachment uploads: 10MB).
- *
- * Throws plain `Error`s on structural defects (no valid EOCD, a central
- * directory or local header record that does not parse, a payload slice
- * that runs past the end of the buffer); consumers translate those into
- * their own error models.
- */
-export interface ZipStructuralEntry {
-    /** Entry path exactly as recorded in the central directory. */
-    readonly name: string;
-    readonly isDirectory: boolean;
-    readonly compressionMethod: number;
-    /**
-     * The central directory's declared uncompressed size — authoritative for
-     * pre-extraction accounting (e.g. ZIP-bomb budgeting), but still a
-     * *declaration*: a consumer that distrusts its input must enforce it
-     * against the actual decompressed output.
-     */
-    readonly uncompressedSize: number;
-    /** The entry's raw payload slice (a view, not a copy) of the archive buffer. */
-    readonly compressedData: Uint8Array;
-}
-/** Fixed size of the EOCD record, excluding the variable-length comment. */
-export declare const EOCD_MIN_SIZE = 22;
-/**
- * Enumerate the archive's entries from its central directory.
- *
- * Throws on any structural defect: no valid EOCD, a central directory or
- * local header record that doesn't parse, or a payload slice that runs
- * past the end of the buffer.
- */
-export declare function parseZipStructure(data: Uint8Array): ZipStructuralEntry[];

package/dist/shared/zip-structure.js

@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Policy-free structural ZIP parsing: end-of-central-directory (EOCD)
- * location plus central-directory walk, producing one record per entry.
- *
- * Parsing is *central-directory-based* — never a front-to-back walk of
- * local file headers. This is a correctness decision, not a style choice
- * (issues #450 and #567): local headers of streaming entries
- * (general-purpose flag bit 3) carry zeroed sizes, and the only
- * local-only way to recover them is scanning the payload for the
- * data-descriptor signature — which silently truncates any stored entry
- * whose *content* happens to contain those four bytes, and
- * desynchronizes every entry after it. The central directory always
- * carries the real sizes, and every consumer here holds the complete
- * archive bytes, so nothing a local-header walk could offer is needed.
- *
- * This layer maps bytes to entry records and nothing else. Policy — what
- * a structural failure means, which entries are acceptable, how payloads
- * are decoded — belongs to the consumers, and they differ on purpose:
- *
- *   - shared/zip-extract.ts (skill artifacts): structural failure is
- *     NON-FATAL — both editions' push gates validated every artifact
- *     with a central-directory-based reader before storage, so a defect
- *     here can only be a truncated or corrupted download.
- *   - execute-deep-agent/attachment-injector.ts (user attachments):
- *     structural failure is FAIL-HARD — the input is an untrusted
- *     upload and nothing upstream vouched for it.
- *
- * ZIP64 is deliberately unsupported: both consumers cap input far below
- * every ZIP64 threshold (skill push gates: 100MB / 10,000 files;
- * attachment uploads: 10MB).
- *
- * Throws plain `Error`s on structural defects (no valid EOCD, a central
- * directory or local header record that does not parse, a payload slice
- * that runs past the end of the buffer); consumers translate those into
- * their own error models.
- */
-// ─── Format constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-const LOCAL_FILE_HEADER_SIG = 0x04034b50;
-const CENTRAL_DIRECTORY_SIG = 0x02014b50;
-const EOCD_SIG = 0x06054b50;
-/** Fixed size of the EOCD record, excluding the variable-length comment. */
-export const EOCD_MIN_SIZE = 22;
-/** The archive comment length is a u16, so the EOCD sits within the last 64KB + 22 bytes. */
-const EOCD_MAX_COMMENT = 0xffff;
-const LOCAL_HEADER_SIZE = 30;
-const CD_RECORD_SIZE = 46;
-// ─── Parsing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-/**
- * Enumerate the archive's entries from its central directory.
- *
- * Throws on any structural defect: no valid EOCD, a central directory or
- * local header record that doesn't parse, or a payload slice that runs
- * past the end of the buffer.
- */
-export function parseZipStructure(data) {
-    const view = new DataView(data.buffer, data.byteOffset, data.byteLength);
-    const eocd = findEndOfCentralDirectory(data, view);
-    const entries = [];
-    let offset = eocd.centralDirectoryOffset;
-    for (let i = 0; i < eocd.entryCount; i++) {
-        if (offset + CD_RECORD_SIZE > data.length || view.getUint32(offset, true) !== CENTRAL_DIRECTORY_SIG) {
-            throw new Error(`invalid central directory record at offset ${offset}`);
-        }
-        const compressionMethod = view.getUint16(offset + 10, true);
-        const compressedSize = view.getUint32(offset + 20, true);
-        const uncompressedSize = view.getUint32(offset + 24, true);
-        const fileNameLength = view.getUint16(offset + 28, true);
-        const extraFieldLength = view.getUint16(offset + 30, true);
-        const commentLength = view.getUint16(offset + 32, true);
-        const localHeaderOffset = view.getUint32(offset + 42, true);
-        const fileName = new TextDecoder().decode(data.subarray(offset + CD_RECORD_SIZE, offset + CD_RECORD_SIZE + fileNameLength));
-        // The local header is consulted for one thing only: the payload start.
-        // Its name/extra field lengths can legitimately differ from the central
-        // directory's (streaming writers pad the extra field), so the offset
-        // cannot be derived from CD fields alone.
-        const dataStart = payloadStart(data, view, localHeaderOffset, fileName);
-        if (dataStart + compressedSize > data.length) {
-            throw new Error(`entry "${fileName}" payload runs past end of archive`);
-        }
-        entries.push({
-            name: fileName,
-            isDirectory: fileName.endsWith("/"),
-            compressionMethod,
-            uncompressedSize,
-            compressedData: data.subarray(dataStart, dataStart + compressedSize),
-        });
-        offset += CD_RECORD_SIZE + fileNameLength + extraFieldLength + commentLength;
-    }
-    return entries;
-}
-/**
- * Locate and validate the end-of-central-directory record.
- *
- * Scans backward from the end of the archive across the maximum comment
- * span. A signature match alone is not trusted (the four bytes can occur
- * inside a trailing comment): the record must also point at an offset
- * that actually holds a central directory record, or be a genuinely
- * empty archive.
- */
-function findEndOfCentralDirectory(data, view) {
-    const scanFloor = Math.max(0, data.length - EOCD_MIN_SIZE - EOCD_MAX_COMMENT);
-    for (let pos = data.length - EOCD_MIN_SIZE; pos >= scanFloor; pos--) {
-        if (view.getUint32(pos, true) !== EOCD_SIG)
-            continue;
-        const entryCount = view.getUint16(pos + 10, true);
-        const centralDirectorySize = view.getUint32(pos + 12, true);
-        const centralDirectoryOffset = view.getUint32(pos + 16, true);
-        const directoryEndsAtRecord = centralDirectoryOffset + centralDirectorySize <= pos;
-        const directoryLooksReal = entryCount === 0 ||
-            (centralDirectoryOffset + 4 <= data.length &&
-                view.getUint32(centralDirectoryOffset, true) === CENTRAL_DIRECTORY_SIG);
-        if (directoryEndsAtRecord && directoryLooksReal) {
-            return { centralDirectoryOffset, entryCount };
-        }
-    }
-    throw new Error("no end-of-central-directory record found");
-}
-/** Resolve where an entry's payload begins, from its local file header. */
-function payloadStart(data, view, localHeaderOffset, fileName) {
-    if (localHeaderOffset + LOCAL_HEADER_SIZE > data.length ||
-        view.getUint32(localHeaderOffset, true) !== LOCAL_FILE_HEADER_SIG) {
-        throw new Error(`entry "${fileName}" has no local file header at offset ${localHeaderOffset}`);
-    }
-    const localNameLength = view.getUint16(localHeaderOffset + 26, true);
-    const localExtraLength = view.getUint16(localHeaderOffset + 28, true);
-    return localHeaderOffset + LOCAL_HEADER_SIZE + localNameLength + localExtraLength;
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=zip-structure.js.map

package/dist/shared/zip-structure.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"zip-structure.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/shared/zip-structure.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAmCG;AAoBH,4EAA4E;AAE5E,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAAG,UAAU,CAAC;AACzC,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAAG,UAAU,CAAC;AACzC,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,UAAU,CAAC;AAE5B,4EAA4E;AAC5E,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,aAAa,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;AAChC,6FAA6F;AAC7F,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;AAEhC,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;AAC7B,MAAM,cAAc,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;AAE1B,4EAA4E;AAE5E;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,iBAAiB,CAAC,IAAgB;IAChD,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;IACzE,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,yBAAyB,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAEnD,MAAM,OAAO,GAAyB,EAAE,CAAC;IACzC,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC;IAEzC,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;QACzC,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG,cAAc,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,qBAAqB,EAAE,CAAC;YACpG,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,8CAA8C,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QAC1E,CAAC;QAED,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;QAC5D,MAAM,cAAc,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;QACzD,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;QAC3D,MAAM,cAAc,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;QACzD,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;QAC3D,MAAM,aAAa,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;QACxD,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;QAE5D,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,CACvC,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,cAAc,GAAG,cAAc,CAAC,CACjF,CAAC;QAEF,uEAAuE;QACvE,wEAAwE;QACxE,qEAAqE;QACrE,0CAA0C;QAC1C,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,YAAY,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;QACxE,IAAI,SAAS,GAAG,cAAc,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YAC7C,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,UAAU,QAAQ,oCAAoC,CAAC,CAAC;QAC1E,CAAC;QAED,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;YACX,IAAI,EAAE,QAAQ;YACd,WAAW,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC;YACnC,iBAAiB;YACjB,gBAAgB;YAChB,cAAc,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,GAAG,cAAc,CAAC;SACrE,CAAC,CAAC;QAEH,MAAM,IAAI,cAAc,GAAG,cAAc,GAAG,gBAAgB,GAAG,aAAa,CAAC;IAC/E,CAAC;IAED,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC;AACjB,CAAC;AAOD;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,SAAS,yBAAyB,CAAC,IAAgB,EAAE,IAAc;IACjE,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,aAAa,GAAG,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAAC;IAE9E,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,aAAa,EAAE,GAAG,IAAI,SAAS,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;QACpE,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,QAAQ;YAAE,SAAS;QAErD,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;QAClD,MAAM,oBAAoB,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;QAC5D,MAAM,sBAAsB,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;QAE9D,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAAG,sBAAsB,GAAG,oBAAoB,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC;QACnF,MAAM,kBAAkB,GACtB,UAAU,KAAK,CAAC;YAChB,CAAC,sBAAsB,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM;gBACxC,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,sBAAsB,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC;QAE5E,IAAI,qBAAqB,IAAI,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YAChD,OAAO,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;QAChD,CAAC;IACH,CAAC;IAED,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,0CAA0C,CAAC,CAAC;AAC9D,CAAC;AAED,2EAA2E;AAC3E,SAAS,YAAY,CACnB,IAAgB,EAChB,IAAc,EACd,iBAAyB,EACzB,QAAgB;IAEhB,IACE,iBAAiB,GAAG,iBAAiB,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM;QACnD,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,iBAAiB,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,qBAAqB,EACjE,CAAC;QACD,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,UAAU,QAAQ,wCAAwC,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IACjG,CAAC;IAED,MAAM,eAAe,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,iBAAiB,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IACrE,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,iBAAiB,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IACtE,OAAO,iBAAiB,GAAG,iBAAiB,GAAG,eAAe,GAAG,gBAAgB,CAAC;AACpF,CAAC"}