@stigmer/runner 3.12.0 → 3.12.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/.build-fingerprint +1 -1
- package/dist/activities/execute-deep-agent/attachment-injector.d.ts +23 -8
- package/dist/activities/execute-deep-agent/attachment-injector.js +104 -105
- package/dist/activities/execute-deep-agent/attachment-injector.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/activities/execute-deep-agent/prompt-builder.js +11 -1
- package/dist/activities/execute-deep-agent/prompt-builder.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/activities/execute-deep-agent/setup.js +7 -3
- package/dist/activities/execute-deep-agent/setup.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/middleware/path-normalization.d.ts +15 -2
- package/dist/middleware/path-normalization.js +39 -5
- package/dist/middleware/path-normalization.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/shared/mcp-enabled-tools.d.ts +6 -2
- package/dist/shared/mcp-enabled-tools.js +6 -2
- package/dist/shared/mcp-enabled-tools.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/shared/plan-mode-permissions.d.ts +46 -10
- package/dist/shared/plan-mode-permissions.js +56 -12
- package/dist/shared/plan-mode-permissions.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/shared/zip-extract.d.ts +24 -6
- package/dist/shared/zip-extract.js +31 -90
- package/dist/shared/zip-extract.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/shared/zip-structure.d.ts +61 -0
- package/dist/shared/zip-structure.js +128 -0
- package/dist/shared/zip-structure.js.map +1 -0
- package/package.json +2 -2
- package/src/__test-utils__/zip-fixtures.ts +206 -0
- package/src/activities/execute-cursor/__tests__/skill-resolver.test.ts +3 -42
- package/src/activities/execute-deep-agent/__tests__/attachment-injector.test.ts +165 -126
- package/src/activities/execute-deep-agent/__tests__/plan-mode-path-normalization.test.ts +246 -37
- package/src/activities/execute-deep-agent/__tests__/prompt-builder.test.ts +7 -2
- package/src/activities/execute-deep-agent/__tests__/subagent-plan-mode-permissions.test.ts +35 -4
- package/src/activities/execute-deep-agent/attachment-injector.ts +146 -142
- package/src/activities/execute-deep-agent/prompt-builder.ts +11 -1
- package/src/activities/execute-deep-agent/setup.ts +7 -3
- package/src/middleware/__tests__/path-normalization.test.ts +29 -3
- package/src/middleware/path-normalization.ts +42 -5
- package/src/shared/__tests__/plan-mode-permissions.test.ts +58 -0
- package/src/shared/__tests__/zip-extract.test.ts +106 -89
- package/src/shared/mcp-enabled-tools.ts +6 -2
- package/src/shared/plan-mode-permissions.ts +59 -12
- package/src/shared/zip-extract.ts +35 -117
- package/src/shared/zip-structure.ts +181 -0
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/**
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* Workspace-relative path normalization for permission-rule-bearing graphs
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* (
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* (issues #429, #528).
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*
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* deepagents' permission enforcement canonicalizes tool-call paths BEFORE any
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* rule or backend runs, and its validation refuses non-absolute paths — on
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* resolves relative paths under the workspace root, so act mode keeps a
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* byte-zero delta.
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*
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* It also supplies the workspace root when `ls`/`glob`/`grep` are called
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* with NO path argument (issue #528). Those tools' schema default is "/" —
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* the OS ROOT under the legacy backend — and the default is applied inside
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* the tool, after this seam, so under the workspace read boundary a bare
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* first `ls` would otherwise die with `permission denied for read on /`
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* (the same first-turn degradation class #429 fixed). An EXPLICIT "/" is
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* deliberately NOT rewritten: the model asked for the OS root, and the
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* honest answer under plan mode's read boundary is the rules' denial —
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* silently substituting workspace contents would be an answer to a
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* different question.
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*
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* Invariant — nothing becomes newly reachable: only paths whose resolution
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* stays INSIDE the workspace root are rewritten. Escaping relatives (`../x`)
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* and `~`-carrying paths are left raw so today's validation refusal keeps
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* speaking (a naive join would resolve `..` away and smuggle an out-of-root
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* read past validation), and absolute paths pass through byte-untouched.
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* The middleware converts false errors into correct behavior — never a
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* refusal into an allowance the rules didn't decide.
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* refusal into an allowance the rules didn't decide. (The absent-path
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* injection honors the same line: it narrows the tool's own OS-root default
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* to the workspace, granting nothing the rules would refuse.)
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*
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* Tool matching is by bare built-in name, the house doctrine (an MCP server
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* is not expected to shadow a built-in name — see shared/tool-kind.ts); the
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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/**
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* Workspace-relative path normalization for permission-rule-bearing graphs
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* (
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* (issues #429, #528).
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*
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* deepagents' permission enforcement canonicalizes tool-call paths BEFORE any
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* rule or backend runs, and its validation refuses non-absolute paths — on
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@@ -20,13 +20,26 @@
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* resolves relative paths under the workspace root, so act mode keeps a
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* byte-zero delta.
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*
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* It also supplies the workspace root when `ls`/`glob`/`grep` are called
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* with NO path argument (issue #528). Those tools' schema default is "/" —
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* the OS ROOT under the legacy backend — and the default is applied inside
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* the tool, after this seam, so under the workspace read boundary a bare
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* first `ls` would otherwise die with `permission denied for read on /`
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* (the same first-turn degradation class #429 fixed). An EXPLICIT "/" is
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* deliberately NOT rewritten: the model asked for the OS root, and the
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* honest answer under plan mode's read boundary is the rules' denial —
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* silently substituting workspace contents would be an answer to a
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* different question.
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*
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* Invariant — nothing becomes newly reachable: only paths whose resolution
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* stays INSIDE the workspace root are rewritten. Escaping relatives (`../x`)
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* and `~`-carrying paths are left raw so today's validation refusal keeps
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* speaking (a naive join would resolve `..` away and smuggle an out-of-root
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* read past validation), and absolute paths pass through byte-untouched.
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* The middleware converts false errors into correct behavior — never a
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* refusal into an allowance the rules didn't decide.
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* refusal into an allowance the rules didn't decide. (The absent-path
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* injection honors the same line: it narrows the tool's own OS-root default
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* to the workspace, granting nothing the rules would refuse.)
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*
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* Tool matching is by bare built-in name, the house doctrine (an MCP server
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* is not expected to shadow a built-in name — see shared/tool-kind.ts); the
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@@ -38,9 +51,8 @@ import { isAbsolute, relative } from "node:path";
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import { resolveWorkspacePath } from "../shared/file-change.js";
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/**
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* The path-bearing argument of each deepagents built-in filesystem tool.
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* `ls`/`glob`/`grep` take a base directory `path
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*
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* Confirmed against the installed deepagents' tool definitions.
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* `ls`/`glob`/`grep` take a base directory `path`; the file tools take
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* `file_path`. Confirmed against the installed deepagents' tool definitions.
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*/
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const PATH_ARG_BY_TOOL = new Map([
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["ls", "path"],
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["write_file", "file_path"],
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["edit_file", "file_path"],
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]);
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/**
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* The tools whose path argument is optional with an OS-root ("/") schema
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* default. When the model omits it, this middleware supplies the workspace
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* root instead (issue #528). The file tools are deliberately excluded: an
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* absent `file_path` is a genuine model error, and the tool's own input
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* validation gives the better message.
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*/
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const DIR_DEFAULTING_TOOLS = new Set(["ls", "glob", "grep"]);
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/**
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* Rewrite `raw` to its workspace-absolute form, or return undefined when the
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* value must be left untouched (absolute already, `~`-carrying, or escaping
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@@ -91,6 +111,20 @@ export function createPathNormalizationMiddleware(config) {
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if (!argKey)
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return handler(request);
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const raw = request.toolCall.args[argKey];
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// Absent base directory on ls/glob/grep: the middleware sees the
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// model's raw args, BEFORE the tool's zod parse applies the "/"
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// (OS root) schema default — so the omission must be filled here,
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// where the workspace root is known. An explicit "/" is not this
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// case and flows through to an honest rule denial (header doctrine).
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if (raw == null && DIR_DEFAULTING_TOOLS.has(request.toolCall.name)) {
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return handler({
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...request,
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toolCall: {
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...request.toolCall,
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args: { ...request.toolCall.args, [argKey]: rootDir },
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},
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});
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}
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if (typeof raw !== "string")
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return handler(request);
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const normalized = normalizeWorkspacePathArg(raw, rootDir);
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{"version":3,"file":"path-normalization.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/middleware/path-normalization.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA
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{"version":3,"file":"path-normalization.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/middleware/path-normalization.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgDG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AACjD,OAAO,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAGhE;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAgC,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC;IAC5D,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACd,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;IAC1B,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;IAC3B,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;CAC3B,CAAC,CAAC;AAEH;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,oBAAoB,GAAwB,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAOlF;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,yBAAyB,CACvC,GAAW,EACX,OAAe;IAEf,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC;QAAE,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;IAC1D,wEAAwE;IACxE,wEAAwE;IACxE,wCAAwC;IACxC,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC;QAAE,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;IAEnD,MAAM,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,GAAG,oBAAoB,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;IAEnE,wEAAwE;IACxE,uEAAuE;IACvE,uEAAuE;IACvE,6BAA6B;IAC7B,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5C,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC;QAAE,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;IAE9D,OAAO,YAAY,CAAC;AACtB,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,iCAAiC,CAC/C,MAA+B;IAE/B,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;IAE3B,OAAO;QACL,IAAI,EAAE,6BAA6B;QAEnC,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO;YAC3B,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,gBAAgB,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;YAC3D,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM;gBAAE,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;YAErC,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;YAE1C,iEAAiE;YACjE,gEAAgE;YAChE,kEAAkE;YAClE,iEAAiE;YACjE,qEAAqE;YACrE,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,oBAAoB,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;gBACnE,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC;oBACb,GAAG,OAAO;oBACV,QAAQ,EAAE;wBACR,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ;wBACnB,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE;qBACtD;iBACF,CAAC,CAAC;YACL,CAAC;YAED,IAAI,OAAO,GAAG,KAAK,QAAQ;gBAAE,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;YAErD,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,yBAAyB,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;YAC3D,IAAI,UAAU,KAAK,SAAS;gBAAE,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;YAEtD,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC;gBACb,GAAG,OAAO;gBACV,QAAQ,EAAE;oBACR,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ;oBACnB,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE;iBACzD;aACF,CAAC,CAAC;QACL,CAAC;KACF,CAAC;AACJ,CAAC"}
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* capabilities (stigmer-server validateEnabledToolsStep /
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{"version":3,"file":"mcp-enabled-tools.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/shared/mcp-enabled-tools.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA
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{"version":3,"file":"mcp-enabled-tools.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/shared/mcp-enabled-tools.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA6BG;AAEH;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,qBAAqB,CACnC,iBAAgD,EAChD,mBAAkD;IAElD,IAAI,iBAAiB,IAAI,iBAAiB,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACtD,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAC;IAChC,CAAC;IACD,IAAI,mBAAmB,IAAI,mBAAmB,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAC1D,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC;IAClC,CAAC;IACD,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AACnB,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,yBAAyB,CACvC,IAAY,EACZ,KAAmB,EACnB,YAA2C;IAE3C,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC;QAClB,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;IACpB,CAAC;IAED,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC;IACtC,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IAEhE,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IACrD,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,YAAY,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IACrE,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACvB,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CACV,iBAAiB,IAAI,2BAA2B,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI;YACtE,qEAAqE;YACrE,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,sCAAsC;YAC5D,uDAAuD,CACxD,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;IAED,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CACT,iBAAiB,IAAI,8BAA8B,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG;QAClE,yBAAyB,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAC3C,CAAC;IAEF,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC;AAClB,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,kBAAkB,CAChC,OAA6D;IAE7D,MAAM,MAAM,GAA6B,EAAE,CAAC;IAC5C,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;QAC7B,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC;YACxB,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC;QACjD,CAAC;IACH,CAAC;IACD,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC;AAChB,CAAC"}
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* The Plan-mode filesystem permission rules — the enforcement twin of
|
|
3
3
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* `plan-mode-prompt.ts` (which carries the instruction half of the contract).
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4
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*
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* Plan mode is
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* deny every filesystem write
|
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*
|
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-
*
|
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9
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*
|
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-
*
|
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5
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+
* Plan mode is contained BY CONSTRUCTION on the native harness: these rules
|
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6
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+
* deny every filesystem write everywhere AND scope reads to the session
|
|
7
|
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* workspace (issue #528 — owner ruling: the workspace is plan mode's read
|
|
8
|
+
* boundary on cloud and desktop runners alike). Without the read boundary,
|
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9
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+
* model-provided absolute paths reached anywhere the process account could
|
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10
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+
* read — the pod filesystem (including /proc/self/environ) on cloud runners,
|
|
11
|
+
* the user's whole home directory on desktop — while plan mode still carries
|
|
12
|
+
* exfiltration-capable tools (web_fetch, MCP). Rules are first-match-wins
|
|
13
|
+
* with a permissive default (deepagents' decidePathAccess), so order is
|
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14
|
+
* load-bearing: the workspace read-allow must precede the read-deny.
|
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15
|
+
*
|
|
16
|
+
* The workspace-root pattern is matched as a STRING against the raw tool-call
|
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|
+
* path (micromatch, dot:true), before the backend touches disk. That is
|
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18
|
+
* exactly why the legitimate out-of-workspace reads keep working: skills,
|
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19
|
+
* attachments, and the approved plan live in the platform dir but are
|
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|
+
* addressed through the `{workspace}/.stigmer` symlink (see
|
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21
|
+
* shared/workspace/stigmer-link.ts), so their path strings are in-root even
|
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22
|
+
* though the bytes are not. The same holds for multi-workspace local entries
|
|
23
|
+
* (`{workspace}/{name}` symlinks). A realpath-based boundary would break
|
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24
|
+
* both; do not "harden" this into one.
|
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11
25
|
*
|
|
12
26
|
* Applied in execute-deep-agent/setup.ts to the parent graph AND threaded
|
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* into every compiled sub-agent graph: deepagents' parent-permission
|
|
@@ -18,9 +32,9 @@
|
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*
|
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19
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* Rules travel with a companion: every graph that carries them also installs
|
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|
* the path-normalization middleware (middleware/path-normalization.ts,
|
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|
-
*
|
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-
* paths outright
|
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|
-
*
|
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+
* issues #429/#528), because deepagents' rule validation refuses
|
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36
|
+
* workspace-relative paths outright and its `ls`/`glob`/`grep` schema default
|
|
37
|
+
* of "/" would deny the bare first listing. Both are derived from the same
|
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38
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* expression at each composition site so they cannot drift apart.
|
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25
39
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*
|
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26
40
|
* Invariant: never combine these rules with a shell-capable (sandbox)
|
|
@@ -30,4 +44,26 @@
|
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* for shell capability on both the parent and sub-agent backends.
|
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|
*/
|
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import type { FilesystemPermission } from "deepagents";
|
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|
-
|
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|
+
/**
|
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|
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* Backslash-escape every character micromatch/picomatch treats as glob
|
|
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|
+
* syntax, so the result matches the input literally. micromatch exports no
|
|
50
|
+
* escape API of its own, and this is correctness, not caution: an unescaped
|
|
51
|
+
* `(` in a desktop project path would make the workspace read-allow rule
|
|
52
|
+
* silently never match — bricking every plan-mode read for that workspace.
|
|
53
|
+
* Semantics are pinned end-to-end through deepagents' own matcher by the
|
|
54
|
+
* special-character workspace suite in plan-mode-path-normalization.test.ts.
|
|
55
|
+
*/
|
|
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|
+
export declare function escapeGlobLiteral(literal: string): string;
|
|
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|
+
/**
|
|
58
|
+
* Build the plan-mode rule set for a graph whose filesystem backend is
|
|
59
|
+
* rooted at `workspaceRootDir`. The three rules read as the policy:
|
|
60
|
+
* reads allowed in the workspace, reads denied everywhere else, writes
|
|
61
|
+
* denied everywhere.
|
|
62
|
+
*
|
|
63
|
+
* `{root}/**` matches the root itself as well as its subtree (verified
|
|
64
|
+
* against the installed micromatch), so one allow pattern suffices. The
|
|
65
|
+
* root is `path.resolve`d first because enforcement canonicalizes incoming
|
|
66
|
+
* paths (collapsed slashes, no trailing separator) before matching — a
|
|
67
|
+
* trailing slash in the pattern would silently match nothing.
|
|
68
|
+
*/
|
|
69
|
+
export declare function buildPlanModePermissions(workspaceRootDir: string): FilesystemPermission[];
|
|
@@ -2,12 +2,26 @@
|
|
|
2
2
|
* The Plan-mode filesystem permission rules — the enforcement twin of
|
|
3
3
|
* `plan-mode-prompt.ts` (which carries the instruction half of the contract).
|
|
4
4
|
*
|
|
5
|
-
* Plan mode is
|
|
6
|
-
* deny every filesystem write
|
|
7
|
-
*
|
|
8
|
-
*
|
|
9
|
-
*
|
|
10
|
-
*
|
|
5
|
+
* Plan mode is contained BY CONSTRUCTION on the native harness: these rules
|
|
6
|
+
* deny every filesystem write everywhere AND scope reads to the session
|
|
7
|
+
* workspace (issue #528 — owner ruling: the workspace is plan mode's read
|
|
8
|
+
* boundary on cloud and desktop runners alike). Without the read boundary,
|
|
9
|
+
* model-provided absolute paths reached anywhere the process account could
|
|
10
|
+
* read — the pod filesystem (including /proc/self/environ) on cloud runners,
|
|
11
|
+
* the user's whole home directory on desktop — while plan mode still carries
|
|
12
|
+
* exfiltration-capable tools (web_fetch, MCP). Rules are first-match-wins
|
|
13
|
+
* with a permissive default (deepagents' decidePathAccess), so order is
|
|
14
|
+
* load-bearing: the workspace read-allow must precede the read-deny.
|
|
15
|
+
*
|
|
16
|
+
* The workspace-root pattern is matched as a STRING against the raw tool-call
|
|
17
|
+
* path (micromatch, dot:true), before the backend touches disk. That is
|
|
18
|
+
* exactly why the legitimate out-of-workspace reads keep working: skills,
|
|
19
|
+
* attachments, and the approved plan live in the platform dir but are
|
|
20
|
+
* addressed through the `{workspace}/.stigmer` symlink (see
|
|
21
|
+
* shared/workspace/stigmer-link.ts), so their path strings are in-root even
|
|
22
|
+
* though the bytes are not. The same holds for multi-workspace local entries
|
|
23
|
+
* (`{workspace}/{name}` symlinks). A realpath-based boundary would break
|
|
24
|
+
* both; do not "harden" this into one.
|
|
11
25
|
*
|
|
12
26
|
* Applied in execute-deep-agent/setup.ts to the parent graph AND threaded
|
|
13
27
|
* into every compiled sub-agent graph: deepagents' parent-permission
|
|
@@ -18,9 +32,9 @@
|
|
|
18
32
|
*
|
|
19
33
|
* Rules travel with a companion: every graph that carries them also installs
|
|
20
34
|
* the path-normalization middleware (middleware/path-normalization.ts,
|
|
21
|
-
*
|
|
22
|
-
* paths outright
|
|
23
|
-
*
|
|
35
|
+
* issues #429/#528), because deepagents' rule validation refuses
|
|
36
|
+
* workspace-relative paths outright and its `ls`/`glob`/`grep` schema default
|
|
37
|
+
* of "/" would deny the bare first listing. Both are derived from the same
|
|
24
38
|
* expression at each composition site so they cannot drift apart.
|
|
25
39
|
*
|
|
26
40
|
* Invariant: never combine these rules with a shell-capable (sandbox)
|
|
@@ -29,7 +43,37 @@
|
|
|
29
43
|
* it is the mode that clears `shellEnv`, and `shellEnv` is the single switch
|
|
30
44
|
* for shell capability on both the parent and sub-agent backends.
|
|
31
45
|
*/
|
|
32
|
-
|
|
33
|
-
|
|
34
|
-
|
|
46
|
+
import { resolve } from "node:path";
|
|
47
|
+
/**
|
|
48
|
+
* Backslash-escape every character micromatch/picomatch treats as glob
|
|
49
|
+
* syntax, so the result matches the input literally. micromatch exports no
|
|
50
|
+
* escape API of its own, and this is correctness, not caution: an unescaped
|
|
51
|
+
* `(` in a desktop project path would make the workspace read-allow rule
|
|
52
|
+
* silently never match — bricking every plan-mode read for that workspace.
|
|
53
|
+
* Semantics are pinned end-to-end through deepagents' own matcher by the
|
|
54
|
+
* special-character workspace suite in plan-mode-path-normalization.test.ts.
|
|
55
|
+
*/
|
|
56
|
+
export function escapeGlobLiteral(literal) {
|
|
57
|
+
return literal.replace(/[\\*?()[\]{}!+@]/g, "\\$&");
|
|
58
|
+
}
|
|
59
|
+
/**
|
|
60
|
+
* Build the plan-mode rule set for a graph whose filesystem backend is
|
|
61
|
+
* rooted at `workspaceRootDir`. The three rules read as the policy:
|
|
62
|
+
* reads allowed in the workspace, reads denied everywhere else, writes
|
|
63
|
+
* denied everywhere.
|
|
64
|
+
*
|
|
65
|
+
* `{root}/**` matches the root itself as well as its subtree (verified
|
|
66
|
+
* against the installed micromatch), so one allow pattern suffices. The
|
|
67
|
+
* root is `path.resolve`d first because enforcement canonicalizes incoming
|
|
68
|
+
* paths (collapsed slashes, no trailing separator) before matching — a
|
|
69
|
+
* trailing slash in the pattern would silently match nothing.
|
|
70
|
+
*/
|
|
71
|
+
export function buildPlanModePermissions(workspaceRootDir) {
|
|
72
|
+
const canonicalRoot = resolve(workspaceRootDir);
|
|
73
|
+
return [
|
|
74
|
+
{ operations: ["read"], paths: [`${escapeGlobLiteral(canonicalRoot)}/**`] },
|
|
75
|
+
{ operations: ["read"], paths: ["/**"], mode: "deny" },
|
|
76
|
+
{ operations: ["write"], paths: ["/**"], mode: "deny" },
|
|
77
|
+
];
|
|
78
|
+
}
|
|
35
79
|
//# sourceMappingURL=plan-mode-permissions.js.map
|
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"plan-mode-permissions.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/shared/plan-mode-permissions.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"plan-mode-permissions.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/shared/plan-mode-permissions.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA4CG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AAGpC;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,iBAAiB,CAAC,OAAe;IAC/C,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;AACtD,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,wBAAwB,CACtC,gBAAwB;IAExB,MAAM,aAAa,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAAC;IAChD,OAAO;QACL,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,iBAAiB,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE;QAC3E,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE;QACtD,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE;KACxD,CAAC;AACJ,CAAC"}
|
|
@@ -1,10 +1,24 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
/**
|
|
2
|
-
*
|
|
2
|
+
* Skill-artifact ZIP extraction: text-decoded entries with non-fatal
|
|
3
|
+
* structural failure.
|
|
3
4
|
*
|
|
4
|
-
*
|
|
5
|
-
*
|
|
6
|
-
*
|
|
7
|
-
*
|
|
5
|
+
* Structural parsing lives in zip-structure.ts (central-directory-based —
|
|
6
|
+
* see that module's doc for why local-header walks are never acceptable,
|
|
7
|
+
* issue #450). This module owns the skill-artifact *policy* on top of it:
|
|
8
|
+
*
|
|
9
|
+
* Input without a readable central directory is not given a second
|
|
10
|
+
* chance on purpose: every artifact reaching the runner was validated at
|
|
11
|
+
* push by a central-directory-based reader on both editions (OSS:
|
|
12
|
+
* `safearchive/zip` in stigmer-server's skill storage; cloud:
|
|
13
|
+
* commons-compress `ZipFile` in SkillArtifactExtractor), so a missing
|
|
14
|
+
* EOCD here can only mean a truncated or corrupted download — and the
|
|
15
|
+
* honest result for that is the documented empty return, not a guess.
|
|
16
|
+
* (The attachment injector consumes the same structural layer under the
|
|
17
|
+
* opposite policy — fail-hard — because its input is untrusted.)
|
|
18
|
+
*
|
|
19
|
+
* Handles stored (method 0) and deflated (method 8) entries. Returns
|
|
20
|
+
* parsed entries as path + content pairs — consumers bring their own
|
|
21
|
+
* write mechanism (WorkspaceBackend, node:fs, etc.).
|
|
8
22
|
*
|
|
9
23
|
* Extracted from skill-writer.ts so both the deep-agent and Cursor
|
|
10
24
|
* harnesses can share the same ZIP parsing logic without coupling to
|
|
@@ -23,7 +37,11 @@ export interface ZipFileEntry {
|
|
|
23
37
|
* entries whose filename (basename or full path) matches any excluded name.
|
|
24
38
|
*
|
|
25
39
|
* Returns an empty array for empty, truncated, or non-ZIP input rather
|
|
26
|
-
* than throwing — callers treat missing artifacts as non-fatal.
|
|
40
|
+
* than throwing — callers treat missing artifacts as non-fatal. Errors
|
|
41
|
+
* while *decompressing* a structurally valid entry (corrupt deflate
|
|
42
|
+
* stream, unsupported compression method) do propagate: at that point
|
|
43
|
+
* the archive's structure vouched for the entry, and silently dropping
|
|
44
|
+
* it would be the exact corruption this module exists to prevent.
|
|
27
45
|
*/
|
|
28
46
|
export declare function extractZipFileEntries(zipBytes: Uint8Array, options?: {
|
|
29
47
|
exclude?: readonly string[];
|
|
@@ -1,16 +1,31 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
/**
|
|
2
|
-
*
|
|
2
|
+
* Skill-artifact ZIP extraction: text-decoded entries with non-fatal
|
|
3
|
+
* structural failure.
|
|
3
4
|
*
|
|
4
|
-
*
|
|
5
|
-
*
|
|
6
|
-
*
|
|
7
|
-
*
|
|
5
|
+
* Structural parsing lives in zip-structure.ts (central-directory-based —
|
|
6
|
+
* see that module's doc for why local-header walks are never acceptable,
|
|
7
|
+
* issue #450). This module owns the skill-artifact *policy* on top of it:
|
|
8
|
+
*
|
|
9
|
+
* Input without a readable central directory is not given a second
|
|
10
|
+
* chance on purpose: every artifact reaching the runner was validated at
|
|
11
|
+
* push by a central-directory-based reader on both editions (OSS:
|
|
12
|
+
* `safearchive/zip` in stigmer-server's skill storage; cloud:
|
|
13
|
+
* commons-compress `ZipFile` in SkillArtifactExtractor), so a missing
|
|
14
|
+
* EOCD here can only mean a truncated or corrupted download — and the
|
|
15
|
+
* honest result for that is the documented empty return, not a guess.
|
|
16
|
+
* (The attachment injector consumes the same structural layer under the
|
|
17
|
+
* opposite policy — fail-hard — because its input is untrusted.)
|
|
18
|
+
*
|
|
19
|
+
* Handles stored (method 0) and deflated (method 8) entries. Returns
|
|
20
|
+
* parsed entries as path + content pairs — consumers bring their own
|
|
21
|
+
* write mechanism (WorkspaceBackend, node:fs, etc.).
|
|
8
22
|
*
|
|
9
23
|
* Extracted from skill-writer.ts so both the deep-agent and Cursor
|
|
10
24
|
* harnesses can share the same ZIP parsing logic without coupling to
|
|
11
25
|
* a specific workspace abstraction.
|
|
12
26
|
*/
|
|
13
27
|
import { createInflateRaw } from "node:zlib";
|
|
28
|
+
import { EOCD_MIN_SIZE, parseZipStructure } from "./zip-structure.js";
|
|
14
29
|
/**
|
|
15
30
|
* Parse and decompress all file entries from a ZIP archive.
|
|
16
31
|
*
|
|
@@ -18,16 +33,22 @@ import { createInflateRaw } from "node:zlib";
|
|
|
18
33
|
* entries whose filename (basename or full path) matches any excluded name.
|
|
19
34
|
*
|
|
20
35
|
* Returns an empty array for empty, truncated, or non-ZIP input rather
|
|
21
|
-
* than throwing — callers treat missing artifacts as non-fatal.
|
|
36
|
+
* than throwing — callers treat missing artifacts as non-fatal. Errors
|
|
37
|
+
* while *decompressing* a structurally valid entry (corrupt deflate
|
|
38
|
+
* stream, unsupported compression method) do propagate: at that point
|
|
39
|
+
* the archive's structure vouched for the entry, and silently dropping
|
|
40
|
+
* it would be the exact corruption this module exists to prevent.
|
|
22
41
|
*/
|
|
23
42
|
export async function extractZipFileEntries(zipBytes, options) {
|
|
24
|
-
if (zipBytes.length <
|
|
43
|
+
if (zipBytes.length < EOCD_MIN_SIZE)
|
|
25
44
|
return [];
|
|
26
45
|
let entries;
|
|
27
46
|
try {
|
|
28
|
-
entries =
|
|
47
|
+
entries = parseZipStructure(zipBytes);
|
|
29
48
|
}
|
|
30
|
-
catch {
|
|
49
|
+
catch (err) {
|
|
50
|
+
console.warn("[zip-extract] archive has no readable central directory " +
|
|
51
|
+
`(truncated or corrupt download?): ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`);
|
|
31
52
|
return [];
|
|
32
53
|
}
|
|
33
54
|
const excludeSet = new Set(options?.exclude ?? []);
|
|
@@ -50,87 +71,7 @@ function isExcluded(name, excludeSet) {
|
|
|
50
71
|
const basename = name.includes("/") ? name.slice(name.lastIndexOf("/") + 1) : name;
|
|
51
72
|
return excludeSet.has(basename);
|
|
52
73
|
}
|
|
53
|
-
|
|
54
|
-
const entries = [];
|
|
55
|
-
const view = new DataView(data.buffer, data.byteOffset, data.byteLength);
|
|
56
|
-
let offset = 0;
|
|
57
|
-
while (offset < data.length - 4) {
|
|
58
|
-
const signature = view.getUint32(offset, true);
|
|
59
|
-
if (signature !== 0x04034b50)
|
|
60
|
-
break; // Local file header signature
|
|
61
|
-
const generalFlags = view.getUint16(offset + 6, true);
|
|
62
|
-
const hasDataDescriptor = (generalFlags & 0x08) !== 0;
|
|
63
|
-
const compressionMethod = view.getUint16(offset + 8, true);
|
|
64
|
-
let compressedSize = view.getUint32(offset + 18, true);
|
|
65
|
-
let uncompressedSize = view.getUint32(offset + 22, true);
|
|
66
|
-
const fileNameLength = view.getUint16(offset + 26, true);
|
|
67
|
-
const extraFieldLength = view.getUint16(offset + 28, true);
|
|
68
|
-
const fileNameStart = offset + 30;
|
|
69
|
-
const fileName = new TextDecoder().decode(data.subarray(fileNameStart, fileNameStart + fileNameLength));
|
|
70
|
-
const dataStart = fileNameStart + fileNameLength + extraFieldLength;
|
|
71
|
-
if (hasDataDescriptor && compressedSize === 0) {
|
|
72
|
-
const sizes = findDataDescriptor(data, view, dataStart, compressionMethod);
|
|
73
|
-
compressedSize = sizes.compressedSize;
|
|
74
|
-
uncompressedSize = sizes.uncompressedSize;
|
|
75
|
-
}
|
|
76
|
-
const compressedData = data.subarray(dataStart, dataStart + compressedSize);
|
|
77
|
-
entries.push({
|
|
78
|
-
name: fileName,
|
|
79
|
-
isDirectory: fileName.endsWith("/"),
|
|
80
|
-
compressedData,
|
|
81
|
-
compressionMethod,
|
|
82
|
-
uncompressedSize,
|
|
83
|
-
});
|
|
84
|
-
let nextOffset = dataStart + compressedSize;
|
|
85
|
-
if (hasDataDescriptor) {
|
|
86
|
-
if (nextOffset + 4 <= data.length && view.getUint32(nextOffset, true) === 0x08074b50) {
|
|
87
|
-
nextOffset += 16; // signature(4) + crc(4) + compressedSize(4) + uncompressedSize(4)
|
|
88
|
-
}
|
|
89
|
-
else {
|
|
90
|
-
nextOffset += 12; // crc(4) + compressedSize(4) + uncompressedSize(4)
|
|
91
|
-
}
|
|
92
|
-
}
|
|
93
|
-
offset = nextOffset;
|
|
94
|
-
}
|
|
95
|
-
return entries;
|
|
96
|
-
}
|
|
97
|
-
/**
|
|
98
|
-
* Scan forward from dataStart to find the data descriptor that contains
|
|
99
|
-
* the actual compressed and uncompressed sizes. Looks for either the
|
|
100
|
-
* optional signature 0x08074b50 or falls back to scanning the central
|
|
101
|
-
* directory for the matching entry.
|
|
102
|
-
*/
|
|
103
|
-
function findDataDescriptor(data, view, dataStart, _compressionMethod) {
|
|
104
|
-
for (let pos = dataStart; pos < data.length - 16; pos++) {
|
|
105
|
-
const sig = view.getUint32(pos, true);
|
|
106
|
-
if (sig === 0x08074b50) {
|
|
107
|
-
return {
|
|
108
|
-
compressedSize: view.getUint32(pos + 8, true),
|
|
109
|
-
uncompressedSize: view.getUint32(pos + 12, true),
|
|
110
|
-
};
|
|
111
|
-
}
|
|
112
|
-
if (sig === 0x04034b50 || sig === 0x02014b50) {
|
|
113
|
-
const descStart = pos - 12;
|
|
114
|
-
if (descStart >= dataStart) {
|
|
115
|
-
return {
|
|
116
|
-
compressedSize: view.getUint32(descStart + 4, true),
|
|
117
|
-
uncompressedSize: view.getUint32(descStart + 8, true),
|
|
118
|
-
};
|
|
119
|
-
}
|
|
120
|
-
break;
|
|
121
|
-
}
|
|
122
|
-
}
|
|
123
|
-
for (let pos = dataStart; pos < data.length - 4; pos++) {
|
|
124
|
-
const sig = view.getUint32(pos, true);
|
|
125
|
-
if (sig === 0x04034b50 || sig === 0x02014b50 || sig === 0x08074b50) {
|
|
126
|
-
const compressedSize = sig === 0x08074b50
|
|
127
|
-
? view.getUint32(pos + 8, true)
|
|
128
|
-
: pos - dataStart;
|
|
129
|
-
return { compressedSize, uncompressedSize: 0 };
|
|
130
|
-
}
|
|
131
|
-
}
|
|
132
|
-
return { compressedSize: data.length - dataStart, uncompressedSize: 0 };
|
|
133
|
-
}
|
|
74
|
+
// ─── Decompression ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
134
75
|
async function decompressEntry(entry) {
|
|
135
76
|
if (entry.compressionMethod === 0) {
|
|
136
77
|
return new TextDecoder().decode(entry.compressedData);
|
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"zip-extract.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/shared/zip-extract.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"zip-extract.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/shared/zip-extract.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAyBG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AAC7C,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAA2B,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAW/F;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,UAAU,qBAAqB,CACzC,QAAoB,EACpB,OAAyC;IAEzC,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,aAAa;QAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;IAE/C,IAAI,OAA6B,CAAC;IAClC,IAAI,CAAC;QACH,OAAO,GAAG,iBAAiB,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;IACxC,CAAC;IAAC,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;QACb,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CACV,0DAA0D;YAC1D,qCAAqC,GAAG,YAAY,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CACxF,CAAC;QACF,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;IACZ,CAAC;IAED,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IACnD,MAAM,OAAO,GAAmB,EAAE,CAAC;IAEnC,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;QAC5B,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,WAAW;YAAE,SAAS;QAChC,IAAI,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;YAAE,SAAS;QAEjD,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;QAC7C,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IAC9C,CAAC;IAED,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC;AACjB,CAAC;AAED,SAAS,UAAU,CAAC,IAAY,EAAE,UAA+B;IAC/D,IAAI,UAAU,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC;QAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IACxC,IAAI,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;QAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;IAEtC,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;IACnF,OAAO,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;AAClC,CAAC;AAED,4EAA4E;AAE5E,KAAK,UAAU,eAAe,CAAC,KAAyB;IACtD,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,iBAAiB,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAClC,OAAO,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC;IACxD,CAAC;IAED,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,iBAAiB,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAClC,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,CAAS,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE;YAC7C,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC;YACnC,MAAM,MAAM,GAAa,EAAE,CAAC;YAC5B,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,KAAa,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;YAC1D,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;YAC1E,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;YAC5B,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QACjD,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IACL,CAAC;IAED,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,uCAAuC,KAAK,CAAC,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;AACpF,CAAC"}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
/**
|
|
2
|
+
* Policy-free structural ZIP parsing: end-of-central-directory (EOCD)
|
|
3
|
+
* location plus central-directory walk, producing one record per entry.
|
|
4
|
+
*
|
|
5
|
+
* Parsing is *central-directory-based* — never a front-to-back walk of
|
|
6
|
+
* local file headers. This is a correctness decision, not a style choice
|
|
7
|
+
* (issues #450 and #567): local headers of streaming entries
|
|
8
|
+
* (general-purpose flag bit 3) carry zeroed sizes, and the only
|
|
9
|
+
* local-only way to recover them is scanning the payload for the
|
|
10
|
+
* data-descriptor signature — which silently truncates any stored entry
|
|
11
|
+
* whose *content* happens to contain those four bytes, and
|
|
12
|
+
* desynchronizes every entry after it. The central directory always
|
|
13
|
+
* carries the real sizes, and every consumer here holds the complete
|
|
14
|
+
* archive bytes, so nothing a local-header walk could offer is needed.
|
|
15
|
+
*
|
|
16
|
+
* This layer maps bytes to entry records and nothing else. Policy — what
|
|
17
|
+
* a structural failure means, which entries are acceptable, how payloads
|
|
18
|
+
* are decoded — belongs to the consumers, and they differ on purpose:
|
|
19
|
+
*
|
|
20
|
+
* - shared/zip-extract.ts (skill artifacts): structural failure is
|
|
21
|
+
* NON-FATAL — both editions' push gates validated every artifact
|
|
22
|
+
* with a central-directory-based reader before storage, so a defect
|
|
23
|
+
* here can only be a truncated or corrupted download.
|
|
24
|
+
* - execute-deep-agent/attachment-injector.ts (user attachments):
|
|
25
|
+
* structural failure is FAIL-HARD — the input is an untrusted
|
|
26
|
+
* upload and nothing upstream vouched for it.
|
|
27
|
+
*
|
|
28
|
+
* ZIP64 is deliberately unsupported: both consumers cap input far below
|
|
29
|
+
* every ZIP64 threshold (skill push gates: 100MB / 10,000 files;
|
|
30
|
+
* attachment uploads: 10MB).
|
|
31
|
+
*
|
|
32
|
+
* Throws plain `Error`s on structural defects (no valid EOCD, a central
|
|
33
|
+
* directory or local header record that does not parse, a payload slice
|
|
34
|
+
* that runs past the end of the buffer); consumers translate those into
|
|
35
|
+
* their own error models.
|
|
36
|
+
*/
|
|
37
|
+
export interface ZipStructuralEntry {
|
|
38
|
+
/** Entry path exactly as recorded in the central directory. */
|
|
39
|
+
readonly name: string;
|
|
40
|
+
readonly isDirectory: boolean;
|
|
41
|
+
readonly compressionMethod: number;
|
|
42
|
+
/**
|
|
43
|
+
* The central directory's declared uncompressed size — authoritative for
|
|
44
|
+
* pre-extraction accounting (e.g. ZIP-bomb budgeting), but still a
|
|
45
|
+
* *declaration*: a consumer that distrusts its input must enforce it
|
|
46
|
+
* against the actual decompressed output.
|
|
47
|
+
*/
|
|
48
|
+
readonly uncompressedSize: number;
|
|
49
|
+
/** The entry's raw payload slice (a view, not a copy) of the archive buffer. */
|
|
50
|
+
readonly compressedData: Uint8Array;
|
|
51
|
+
}
|
|
52
|
+
/** Fixed size of the EOCD record, excluding the variable-length comment. */
|
|
53
|
+
export declare const EOCD_MIN_SIZE = 22;
|
|
54
|
+
/**
|
|
55
|
+
* Enumerate the archive's entries from its central directory.
|
|
56
|
+
*
|
|
57
|
+
* Throws on any structural defect: no valid EOCD, a central directory or
|
|
58
|
+
* local header record that doesn't parse, or a payload slice that runs
|
|
59
|
+
* past the end of the buffer.
|
|
60
|
+
*/
|
|
61
|
+
export declare function parseZipStructure(data: Uint8Array): ZipStructuralEntry[];
|