@stigmer/protos 3.12.3 → 3.12.5

package/ai/stigmer/agentic/executioncontext/v1/query_connect.d.ts

@@ -1,17 +1,6 @@
 /**
  * ExecutionContextQueryController handles read operations for ExecutionContext resources.
  *
- * @internal
- * Authorization: All RPCs use is_skip_authorization with handler-level auth.
- * In cloud, the handler performs a direct FGA check: can_view on
- * execution_context:<metadata.id>, against the owner tuple written at creation
- * time by the create pipeline. OSS enforces no authorization.
- *
- * Secret handling: values with is_secret=true are returned in plaintext on OSS
- * (single-user local, no encryption). On cloud they are redacted for user-class
- * callers on every read RPC; only getByExecutionId can return decrypted values,
- * and only to runner-class credentials (see that RPC's comment).
- *
  * @generated from service ai.stigmer.agentic.executioncontext.v1.ExecutionContextQueryController
  */
 export declare const ExecutionContextQueryController: {
@@ -20,10 +9,6 @@ export declare const ExecutionContextQueryController: {
         /**
          * Get an ExecutionContext by ID.
          *
-         * @internal
-         * Handler-level auth (cloud): direct FGA can_view on the execution_context resource.
-         * Secret values are redacted on cloud.
-         *
          * @generated from rpc ai.stigmer.agentic.executioncontext.v1.ExecutionContextQueryController.get
          */
         readonly get: {
@@ -35,10 +20,6 @@ export declare const ExecutionContextQueryController: {
         /**
          * Get an ExecutionContext by reference (slug-based lookup).
          *
-         * @internal
-         * Handler-level auth (cloud): direct FGA can_view on the execution_context resource.
-         * Secret values are redacted on cloud.
-         *
          * @generated from rpc ai.stigmer.agentic.executioncontext.v1.ExecutionContextQueryController.getByReference
          */
         readonly getByReference: {
@@ -50,21 +31,6 @@ export declare const ExecutionContextQueryController: {
         /**
          * Get the ExecutionContext for a given execution ID.
          *
-         * @internal
-         * Primary lookup method used by runners to retrieve the merged environment
-         * variables during workflow/agent execution and MCP discovery.
-         * Handler-level auth (cloud): direct FGA can_view on the execution_context resource.
-         *
-         * Secret handling (cloud): the decrypt path is gated by caller credential
-         * class AND scope, not by FGA — runners authenticate as the user who owns
-         * the execution, so permissions cannot tell them apart. Callers presenting
-         * a platform-minted runner token (token_type of sandbox, workflow_sandbox,
-         * or connect_sandbox) whose scope claim binds it to this very execution
-         * receive decrypted secret values. The unscoped embedded_runner bootstrap
-         * credential is refused; desktop runners exchange it for a scoped token
-         * via getRunnerScopedToken before reading. Every other caller (user JWT,
-         * SDK, console) receives the same redaction as get/getByReference.
-         *
          * @generated from rpc ai.stigmer.agentic.executioncontext.v1.ExecutionContextQueryController.getByExecutionId
          */
         readonly getByExecutionId: {

package/ai/stigmer/agentic/executioncontext/v1/query_connect.js

@@ -9,17 +9,6 @@ import { ApiResourceReference } from "../../../commons/apiresource/io_pbjs";
 /**
  * ExecutionContextQueryController handles read operations for ExecutionContext resources.
  *
- * @internal
- * Authorization: All RPCs use is_skip_authorization with handler-level auth.
- * In cloud, the handler performs a direct FGA check: can_view on
- * execution_context:<metadata.id>, against the owner tuple written at creation
- * time by the create pipeline. OSS enforces no authorization.
- *
- * Secret handling: values with is_secret=true are returned in plaintext on OSS
- * (single-user local, no encryption). On cloud they are redacted for user-class
- * callers on every read RPC; only getByExecutionId can return decrypted values,
- * and only to runner-class credentials (see that RPC's comment).
- *
  * @generated from service ai.stigmer.agentic.executioncontext.v1.ExecutionContextQueryController
  */
 export const ExecutionContextQueryController = {
@@ -28,10 +17,6 @@ export const ExecutionContextQueryController = {
         /**
          * Get an ExecutionContext by ID.
          *
-         * @internal
-         * Handler-level auth (cloud): direct FGA can_view on the execution_context resource.
-         * Secret values are redacted on cloud.
-         *
          * @generated from rpc ai.stigmer.agentic.executioncontext.v1.ExecutionContextQueryController.get
          */
         get: {
@@ -43,10 +28,6 @@ export const ExecutionContextQueryController = {
         /**
          * Get an ExecutionContext by reference (slug-based lookup).
          *
-         * @internal
-         * Handler-level auth (cloud): direct FGA can_view on the execution_context resource.
-         * Secret values are redacted on cloud.
-         *
          * @generated from rpc ai.stigmer.agentic.executioncontext.v1.ExecutionContextQueryController.getByReference
          */
         getByReference: {
@@ -58,21 +39,6 @@ export const ExecutionContextQueryController = {
         /**
          * Get the ExecutionContext for a given execution ID.
          *
-         * @internal
-         * Primary lookup method used by runners to retrieve the merged environment
-         * variables during workflow/agent execution and MCP discovery.
-         * Handler-level auth (cloud): direct FGA can_view on the execution_context resource.
-         *
-         * Secret handling (cloud): the decrypt path is gated by caller credential
-         * class AND scope, not by FGA — runners authenticate as the user who owns
-         * the execution, so permissions cannot tell them apart. Callers presenting
-         * a platform-minted runner token (token_type of sandbox, workflow_sandbox,
-         * or connect_sandbox) whose scope claim binds it to this very execution
-         * receive decrypted secret values. The unscoped embedded_runner bootstrap
-         * credential is refused; desktop runners exchange it for a scoped token
-         * via getRunnerScopedToken before reading. Every other caller (user JWT,
-         * SDK, console) receives the same redaction as get/getByReference.
-         *
          * @generated from rpc ai.stigmer.agentic.executioncontext.v1.ExecutionContextQueryController.getByExecutionId
          */
         getByExecutionId: {

package/ai/stigmer/agentic/executioncontext/v1/query_connect.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"query_connect.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../../ai/stigmer/agentic/executioncontext/v1/query_connect.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,4FAA4F;AAC5F,0IAA0I;AAC1I,oBAAoB;AACpB,cAAc;AAEd,OAAO,EAAE,gCAAgC,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AACjF,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;AAC9C,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAChD,OAAO,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,sCAAsC,CAAC;AAE5E;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,+BAA+B,GAAG;IAC7C,QAAQ,EAAE,wEAAwE;IAClF,OAAO,EAAE;QACP;;;;WAIG;QACH,GAAG,EAAE;YACH,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK;YACX,CAAC,EAAE,kBAAkB;YACrB,CAAC,EAAE,gBAAgB;YACnB,IAAI,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;SACvB;QACD;;;;WAIG;QACH,cAAc,EAAE;YACd,IAAI,EAAE,gBAAgB;YACtB,CAAC,EAAE,oBAAoB;YACvB,CAAC,EAAE,gBAAgB;YACnB,IAAI,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;SACvB;QACD;;;;WAIG;QACH,gBAAgB,EAAE;YAChB,IAAI,EAAE,kBAAkB;YACxB,CAAC,EAAE,gCAAgC;YACnC,CAAC,EAAE,gBAAgB;YACnB,IAAI,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;SACvB;KACF;CACO,CAAC"}

package/ai/stigmer/agentic/executioncontext/v1/query_pb.d.ts

@@ -9,27 +9,12 @@ export declare const file_ai_stigmer_agentic_executioncontext_v1_query: GenFile;
 /**
  * ExecutionContextQueryController handles read operations for ExecutionContext resources.
  *
- * @internal
- * Authorization: All RPCs use is_skip_authorization with handler-level auth.
- * In cloud, the handler performs a direct FGA check: can_view on
- * execution_context:<metadata.id>, against the owner tuple written at creation
- * time by the create pipeline. OSS enforces no authorization.
- *
- * Secret handling: values with is_secret=true are returned in plaintext on OSS
- * (single-user local, no encryption). On cloud they are redacted for user-class
- * callers on every read RPC; only getByExecutionId can return decrypted values,
- * and only to runner-class credentials (see that RPC's comment).
- *
  * @generated from service ai.stigmer.agentic.executioncontext.v1.ExecutionContextQueryController
  */
 export declare const ExecutionContextQueryController: GenService<{
     /**
      * Get an ExecutionContext by ID.
      *
-     * @internal
-     * Handler-level auth (cloud): direct FGA can_view on the execution_context resource.
-     * Secret values are redacted on cloud.
-     *
      * @generated from rpc ai.stigmer.agentic.executioncontext.v1.ExecutionContextQueryController.get
      */
     get: {
@@ -40,10 +25,6 @@ export declare const ExecutionContextQueryController: GenService<{
     /**
      * Get an ExecutionContext by reference (slug-based lookup).
      *
-     * @internal
-     * Handler-level auth (cloud): direct FGA can_view on the execution_context resource.
-     * Secret values are redacted on cloud.
-     *
      * @generated from rpc ai.stigmer.agentic.executioncontext.v1.ExecutionContextQueryController.getByReference
      */
     getByReference: {
@@ -54,21 +35,6 @@ export declare const ExecutionContextQueryController: GenService<{
     /**
      * Get the ExecutionContext for a given execution ID.
      *
-     * @internal
-     * Primary lookup method used by runners to retrieve the merged environment
-     * variables during workflow/agent execution and MCP discovery.
-     * Handler-level auth (cloud): direct FGA can_view on the execution_context resource.
-     *
-     * Secret handling (cloud): the decrypt path is gated by caller credential
-     * class AND scope, not by FGA — runners authenticate as the user who owns
-     * the execution, so permissions cannot tell them apart. Callers presenting
-     * a platform-minted runner token (token_type of sandbox, workflow_sandbox,
-     * or connect_sandbox) whose scope claim binds it to this very execution
-     * receive decrypted secret values. The unscoped embedded_runner bootstrap
-     * credential is refused; desktop runners exchange it for a scoped token
-     * via getRunnerScopedToken before reading. Every other caller (user JWT,
-     * SDK, console) receives the same redaction as get/getByReference.
-     *
      * @generated from rpc ai.stigmer.agentic.executioncontext.v1.ExecutionContextQueryController.getByExecutionId
      */
     getByExecutionId: {

package/ai/stigmer/agentic/executioncontext/v1/query_pb.js

@@ -14,17 +14,6 @@ export const file_ai_stigmer_agentic_executioncontext_v1_query = /*@__PURE__*/ f
 /**
  * ExecutionContextQueryController handles read operations for ExecutionContext resources.
  *
- * @internal
- * Authorization: All RPCs use is_skip_authorization with handler-level auth.
- * In cloud, the handler performs a direct FGA check: can_view on
- * execution_context:<metadata.id>, against the owner tuple written at creation
- * time by the create pipeline. OSS enforces no authorization.
- *
- * Secret handling: values with is_secret=true are returned in plaintext on OSS
- * (single-user local, no encryption). On cloud they are redacted for user-class
- * callers on every read RPC; only getByExecutionId can return decrypted values,
- * and only to runner-class credentials (see that RPC's comment).
- *
  * @generated from service ai.stigmer.agentic.executioncontext.v1.ExecutionContextQueryController
  */
 export const ExecutionContextQueryController = /*@__PURE__*/ serviceDesc(file_ai_stigmer_agentic_executioncontext_v1_query, 0);

package/ai/stigmer/agentic/executioncontext/v1/query_pb.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"query_pb.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../../ai/stigmer/agentic/executioncontext/v1/query_pb.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,oFAAoF;AACpF,0IAA0I;AAC1I,oBAAoB;AAGpB,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,8BAA8B,CAAC;AAErE,OAAO,EAAE,+CAA+C,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAE9E,OAAO,EAAE,8CAA8C,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;AAE5E,OAAO,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,MAAM,uCAAuC,CAAC;AAC/F,OAAO,EAAE,uDAAuD,EAAE,MAAM,wDAAwD,CAAC;AACjI,OAAO,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,MAAM,2CAA2C,CAAC;AAEvG;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,iDAAiD,GAAY,aAAa,CACrF,QAAQ,CAAC,0vBAA0vB,EAAE,CAAC,+CAA+C,EAAE,8CAA8C,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,uDAAuD,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAEv/B;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAeG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,+BAA+B,GAsDvC,aAAa,CAChB,WAAW,CAAC,iDAAiD,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"query_pb.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../../ai/stigmer/agentic/executioncontext/v1/query_pb.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,oFAAoF;AACpF,0IAA0I;AAC1I,oBAAoB;AAGpB,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,8BAA8B,CAAC;AAErE,OAAO,EAAE,+CAA+C,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAE9E,OAAO,EAAE,8CAA8C,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;AAE5E,OAAO,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,MAAM,uCAAuC,CAAC;AAC/F,OAAO,EAAE,uDAAuD,EAAE,MAAM,wDAAwD,CAAC;AACjI,OAAO,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,MAAM,2CAA2C,CAAC;AAEvG;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,iDAAiD,GAAY,aAAa,CACrF,QAAQ,CAAC,0vBAA0vB,EAAE,CAAC,+CAA+C,EAAE,8CAA8C,EAAE,sCAAsC,EAAE,uDAAuD,EAAE,0CAA0C,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAEv/B;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,+BAA+B,GA+BvC,aAAa,CAChB,WAAW,CAAC,iDAAiD,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC"}

package/ai/stigmer/agentic/executioncontext/v1/spec_pb.d.ts

@@ -7,9 +7,6 @@ export declare const file_ai_stigmer_agentic_executioncontext_v1_spec: GenFile;
 /**
  * Runtime configuration and secrets for a single execution.
  *
- * @internal
- * Created by the execution engine, deleted when execution completes.
- *
  * @generated from message ai.stigmer.agentic.executioncontext.v1.ExecutionContextSpec
  */
 export type ExecutionContextSpec = Message<"ai.stigmer.agentic.executioncontext.v1.ExecutionContextSpec"> & {
@@ -22,10 +19,6 @@ export type ExecutionContextSpec = Message<"ai.stigmer.agentic.executioncontext.
     /**
      * Runtime key-value pairs, each marked as secret or plaintext.
      *
-     * @internal
-     * Provided at runtime and only exist for the duration of the execution.
-     * Example: {"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID": {value: "AKIA...", is_secret: true}}
-     *
      * @generated from field: map<string, ai.stigmer.agentic.executioncontext.v1.ExecutionValue> data = 2;
      */
     data: {
@@ -48,21 +41,12 @@ export type ExecutionValue = Message<"ai.stigmer.agentic.executioncontext.v1.Exe
      * workflow env vars may be provided with no value, and the workflow
      * engine resolves them to "" in expression interpolation.
      *
-     * @internal
-     * If is_secret=true: encrypted at rest and redacted in logs.
-     * If is_secret=false: stored as plaintext.
-     *
      * @generated from field: string value = 1;
      */
     value: string;
     /**
      * Whether this value should be treated as a secret.
      *
-     * @internal
-     * When true: value is encrypted at rest, redacted in logs, and deleted
-     * when execution completes.
-     * When false: value is stored as plaintext and visible in audit logs.
-     *
      * @generated from field: bool is_secret = 2;
      */
     isSecret: boolean;

package/ai/stigmer/agentic/executioncontext/v1/spec_pb.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"spec_pb.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../../ai/stigmer/agentic/executioncontext/v1/spec_pb.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,oFAAoF;AACpF,yIAAyI;AACzI,oBAAoB;AAGpB,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,8BAA8B,CAAC;AACrE,OAAO,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,MAAM,4CAA4C,CAAC;AAGxF;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,gDAAgD,GAAY,aAAa,CACpF,QAAQ,CAAC,ghBAAghB,EAAE,CAAC,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AA8B3jB;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,0BAA0B,GAAqC,aAAa,CACvF,WAAW,CAAC,gDAAgD,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAkCnE;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,oBAAoB,GAA+B,aAAa,CAC3E,WAAW,CAAC,gDAAgD,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"spec_pb.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../../ai/stigmer/agentic/executioncontext/v1/spec_pb.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,oFAAoF;AACpF,yIAAyI;AACzI,oBAAoB;AAGpB,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,8BAA8B,CAAC;AACrE,OAAO,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,MAAM,4CAA4C,CAAC;AAGxF;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,gDAAgD,GAAY,aAAa,CACpF,QAAQ,CAAC,ghBAAghB,EAAE,CAAC,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAuB3jB;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,0BAA0B,GAAqC,aAAa,CACvF,WAAW,CAAC,gDAAgD,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAyBnE;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,oBAAoB,GAA+B,aAAa,CAC3E,WAAW,CAAC,gDAAgD,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC"}

package/ai/stigmer/agentic/mcpserver/v1/api_pb.d.ts

@@ -10,19 +10,6 @@ export declare const file_ai_stigmer_agentic_mcpserver_v1_api: GenFile;
 /**
  * McpServer represents a reusable MCP (Model Context Protocol) server configuration.
  *
- * @internal
- * Unlike inline McpServerDefinition in AgentSpec, McpServer is a first-class resource that:
- * - Can be referenced by multiple agents (reusability)
- * - Has proper access control via FGA (authorization)
- * - Can be discovered in the marketplace (discoverability)
- * - Belongs to an organization with PUBLIC/PRIVATE visibility
- *
- * Lifecycle:
- * 1. Create McpServer definition (this resource) with server type and env requirements
- * 2. Reference in Agent via mcp_server_usages
- * 3. Create AgentInstance with environment_ref providing actual secrets
- * 4. Agent runner resolves McpServer, gets secrets from Environment, starts server
- *
  * @generated from message ai.stigmer.agentic.mcpserver.v1.McpServer
  */
 export type McpServer = Message<"ai.stigmer.agentic.mcpserver.v1.McpServer"> & {
@@ -43,19 +30,6 @@ export type McpServer = Message<"ai.stigmer.agentic.mcpserver.v1.McpServer"> & {
     /**
      * Resource metadata including name, organization, visibility, and labels.
      *
-     * @internal
-     * Key fields:
-     * - name: Human-readable name (e.g., "GitHub MCP Server")
-     * - slug: URL-friendly identifier (e.g., "github")
-     * - org: Organization that owns this MCP server (required)
-     * - visibility: Access control (PUBLIC or PRIVATE)
-     *
-     * Visibility semantics:
-     * - PUBLIC: Marketplace server, discoverable by all users
-     * - PRIVATE: Only accessible to organization members
-     *
-     * Reference format: "org/slug" (e.g., "stigmer/github", "acme/internal-tools")
-     *
      * @generated from field: ai.stigmer.commons.apiresource.ApiResourceMetadata metadata = 3;
      */
     metadata?: ApiResourceMetadata;

package/ai/stigmer/agentic/mcpserver/v1/api_pb.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"api_pb.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../../ai/stigmer/agentic/mcpserver/v1/api_pb.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,oFAAoF;AACpF,0HAA0H;AAC1H,oBAAoB;AAGpB,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,8BAA8B,CAAC;AAErE,OAAO,EAAE,yCAAyC,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AAEzE,OAAO,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAE7E,OAAO,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,MAAM,6CAA6C,CAAC;AAC3G,OAAO,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,MAAM,4CAA4C,CAAC;AAGxF;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,wCAAwC,GAAY,aAAa,CAC5E,QAAQ,CAAC,4pBAA4pB,EAAE,CAAC,yCAAyC,EAAE,2CAA2C,EAAE,4CAA4C,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAiD70B;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,eAAe,GAA0B,aAAa,CACjE,WAAW,CAAC,wCAAwC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AA+B3D;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,mBAAmB,GAA8B,aAAa,CACzE,WAAW,CAAC,wCAAwC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC"}

package/ai/stigmer/agentic/mcpserver/v1/command_connect.d.ts

@@ -1,15 +1,6 @@
 /**
  * McpServerCommandController provides write operations for MCP server resources.
  *
- * @internal
- * Authorization model for writes:
- * - Platform-scoped: Only platform operators can create/modify
- * - Organization-scoped: Org admins can create/modify
- * - Identity-account-scoped: Only the owner can create/modify
- *
- * Primary interface: The `apply` method provides Kubernetes-style idempotent
- * create-or-update semantics, which is the recommended approach for CLI usage.
- *
  * @generated from service ai.stigmer.agentic.mcpserver.v1.McpServerCommandController
  */
 export declare const McpServerCommandController: {
@@ -21,12 +12,6 @@ export declare const McpServerCommandController: {
          * If the resource doesn't exist, creates it. If it exists, updates it.
          * The resource is identified by its (scope, org, slug) combination.
          *
-         * @internal
-         * The handler determines whether this is a create or update operation
-         * and performs appropriate scope-aware authorization:
-         * - Create: Requires permission to create in the target scope
-         * - Update: Requires can_edit on the existing resource
-         *
          * @generated from rpc ai.stigmer.agentic.mcpserver.v1.McpServerCommandController.apply
          */
         readonly apply: {
@@ -41,13 +26,6 @@ export declare const McpServerCommandController: {
          * Returns an error if a resource with the same (scope, org, slug) already exists.
          * Use `apply` for idempotent create-or-update semantics.
          *
-         * @internal
-         * Authorization: Custom authorization in handler.
-         * Requires permission to create MCP servers in the specified scope:
-         * - Platform: Requires platform operator role
-         * - Organization: Requires org admin role or can_create_mcp_server permission
-         * - Identity Account: Automatically allowed for the authenticated user
-         *
          * @generated from rpc ai.stigmer.agentic.mcpserver.v1.McpServerCommandController.create
          */
         readonly create: {
@@ -59,13 +37,6 @@ export declare const McpServerCommandController: {
         /**
          * Update an existing MCP server resource.
          *
-         * @internal
-         * Authorization: Requires can_edit permission on the mcp_server resource.
-         * Only the owner (based on scope) can update:
-         * - Platform: Platform operators
-         * - Organization: Org admins or resource owner
-         * - Identity Account: The owner
-         *
          * @generated from rpc ai.stigmer.agentic.mcpserver.v1.McpServerCommandController.update
          */
         readonly update: {
@@ -80,13 +51,6 @@ export declare const McpServerCommandController: {
          * Permanently removes the MCP server definition.
          * Agents referencing this server will need to be updated.
          *
-         * @internal
-         * Authorization: Requires can_delete permission on the mcp_server resource.
-         * Only the owner can delete:
-         * - Platform: Platform operators
-         * - Organization: Org admins or resource owner
-         * - Identity Account: The owner
-         *
          * @generated from rpc ai.stigmer.agentic.mcpserver.v1.McpServerCommandController.delete
          */
         readonly delete: {
@@ -101,8 +65,9 @@ export declare const McpServerCommandController: {
          * Only modifies metadata.visibility, leaving spec, status, and other
          * metadata fields untouched.
          *
-         * @internal
-         * Authorization: Requires can_edit permission on the mcp_server resource.
+         * In the cloud edition, PUBLIC is operator-gated: public listing crosses
+         * every org boundary, so it is granted by the platform team on request.
+         * Un-publishing and all other levels stay self-service.
          *
          * @generated from rpc ai.stigmer.agentic.mcpserver.v1.McpServerCommandController.updateVisibility
          */
@@ -118,25 +83,15 @@ export declare const McpServerCommandController: {
          * Connects to the MCP server, enumerates tools and resource templates,
          * classifies tool approval policies via a lightweight LLM, and stores the
          * results in status.discovered_capabilities and status.tool_approvals.
-         * Blocks until completion (up to ~30 seconds) and returns the updated McpServer.
-         *
-         * @internal
-         * Typical flows:
-         * - Web console: user clicks Connect, backend resolves env vars from the
-         *   user's personal environment, starts a Temporal workflow on the runner
-         *   (stigmer-runner).
-         * - CLI: `stigmer discover mcp-server <name>` calls connect with runtime_env
-         *   populated from local env vars, delegating discovery to the backend.
-         * - Runner backfill: the runner calls connect on first use when
-         *   status.discovered_capabilities is empty, passing runtime_env from the
-         *   execution context (shared/connect-backfill.ts).
-         *
-         * Errors:
-         * - FAILED_PRECONDITION: Required credentials missing from personal environment
-         * - DEADLINE_EXCEEDED: Discovery did not complete within the timeout
-         * - NOT_FOUND: MCP server does not exist
-         *
-         * Authorization: Requires can_connect permission on the mcp_server resource.
+         * Blocks until the operation settles — legitimately minutes for heavy
+         * stdio servers (the server-side workflow ceiling is the bound) — and
+         * returns the updated McpServer.
+         *
+         * Prefer startConnect for interactive clients: browsers can drop a
+         * no-bytes-yet unary response around ~300s, below the workflow ceiling,
+         * so a blocking connect can appear to fail while succeeding server-side.
+         * This RPC remains for callers that want synchronous semantics (and for
+         * backends that do not yet serve startConnect).
          *
          * @generated from rpc ai.stigmer.agentic.mcpserver.v1.McpServerCommandController.connect
          */
@@ -146,6 +101,32 @@ export declare const McpServerCommandController: {
             readonly O: any;
             readonly kind: any;
         };
+        /**
+         * Start a connect operation without waiting for it: discovery and
+         * classification run server-side, and the caller observes progress by
+         * polling the resource.
+         *
+         * Returns the McpServer immediately with status.connect_status describing
+         * the accepted operation (phase CONNECTING, plus a warning when no runner
+         * appears to be polling the task queue). Poll get/getByReference until
+         * status.connect_status reaches a terminal phase; results land in
+         * status.discovered_capabilities and status.tool_approvals exactly as with
+         * the blocking connect.
+         *
+         * Idempotent while an operation is in flight: a startConnect that finds a
+         * live CONNECTING operation attaches to it (the in-flight operation's
+         * runtime_env wins) instead of starting a second workflow. A CONNECTING
+         * entry orphaned by a backend restart is reconciled against Temporal
+         * before a new operation starts.
+         *
+         * @generated from rpc ai.stigmer.agentic.mcpserver.v1.McpServerCommandController.startConnect
+         */
+        readonly startConnect: {
+            readonly name: "startConnect";
+            readonly I: any;
+            readonly O: any;
+            readonly kind: any;
+        };
         /**
          * Start the OAuth authorization flow for an MCP server.
          *
@@ -154,21 +135,6 @@ export declare const McpServerCommandController: {
          * redirect the user to. The frontend calls completeOAuthConnect after
          * the user authorizes.
          *
-         * @internal
-         * Two auth modes determined by the MCP server's spec.auth block:
-         * - No oauth_app_ref: MCP Authorization spec (DCR + PKCE). Backend
-         *   discovers the authorization server, registers a client via DCR,
-         *   and builds the auth URL automatically.
-         * - oauth_app_ref set: Vendor OAuth. Backend loads the referenced
-         *   OAuthApp for client credentials and endpoint URLs.
-         *
-         * Errors:
-         * - FAILED_PRECONDITION: MCP server has no auth block, or is stdio
-         *   without oauth_app_ref (DCR requires HTTP transport)
-         * - NOT_FOUND: MCP server or referenced OAuthApp does not exist
-         *
-         * Authorization: Requires can_connect permission on the mcp_server resource.
-         *
          * @generated from rpc ai.stigmer.agentic.mcpserver.v1.McpServerCommandController.initiateOAuthConnect
          */
         readonly initiateOAuthConnect: {
@@ -189,15 +155,6 @@ export declare const McpServerCommandController: {
          * After success, the frontend should call connect() to trigger tool
          * discovery using the freshly acquired token.
          *
-         * @internal
-         * Errors:
-         * - FAILED_PRECONDITION: State parameter is invalid, expired, or does
-         *   not match the mcp_server_id
-         * - UNAVAILABLE: Token exchange with the authorization server failed
-         * - NOT_FOUND: No pending OAuth state found for the given state param
-         *
-         * Authorization: Requires can_connect permission on the mcp_server resource.
-         *
          * @generated from rpc ai.stigmer.agentic.mcpserver.v1.McpServerCommandController.completeOAuthConnect
          */
         readonly completeOAuthConnect: {
@@ -220,11 +177,6 @@ export declare const McpServerCommandController: {
          * disconnected=false when no grant existed. Never returns an error
          * for a missing grant.
          *
-         * @internal
-         * Authorization: Requires can_connect permission on the mcp_server resource.
-         * Uses the same permission as connect/initiateOAuthConnect — if you can
-         * establish a connection, you can tear it down.
-         *
          * @generated from rpc ai.stigmer.agentic.mcpserver.v1.McpServerCommandController.disconnectOAuth
          */
         readonly disconnectOAuth: {
@@ -248,16 +200,6 @@ export declare const McpServerCommandController: {
          * see the full scoping note on McpServerQueryController.getOrgOAuthApp,
          * the RPC clients probe.
          *
-         * @internal
-         * Authorization: Requires can_create_oauth_app permission on the organization.
-         * This is an org-admin operation — setting credentials that affect all users
-         * in the org who connect to this resource.
-         *
-         * Errors:
-         * - FAILED_PRECONDITION: Resource has no auth block or no oauth_app_ref
-         *   (BYOA requires a platform template to clone from)
-         * - NOT_FOUND: Resource does not exist
-         *
          * @generated from rpc ai.stigmer.agentic.mcpserver.v1.McpServerCommandController.setOrgOAuthApp
          */
         readonly setOrgOAuthApp: {
@@ -282,13 +224,6 @@ export declare const McpServerCommandController: {
          * will fail on next token refresh — those users will need to
          * re-authenticate using the platform default or a new org override.
          *
-         * @internal
-         * Authorization: Requires can_create_oauth_app permission on the organization.
-         * Same gate as setOrgOAuthApp — org-admin authority for credential management.
-         *
-         * Errors:
-         * - NOT_FOUND: No override exists for this resource + org
-         *
          * @generated from rpc ai.stigmer.agentic.mcpserver.v1.McpServerCommandController.deleteOrgOAuthApp
          */
         readonly deleteOrgOAuthApp: {