@steerable/runtime-win32-x64 0.9.2 → 0.10.0

package/python-runtime/python/Lib/site-packages/steerable_agent_runtime/engines.py

@@ -0,0 +1,499 @@
+"""Sub-agents that are not our own CoreLoop: an external agent over ACP.
+
+A child pool so far has meant "a second CoreLoop on the same provider". This
+module is the other kind: the parent hands a task to a separate agent process
+— Codex, Claude Code, another Steerable — and gets back only its final answer.
+The protocol is the Agent Client Protocol (ACP), which the sidecar already
+speaks as a server, so the same adapter can be spawned as the peer.
+
+Three decisions shape this module:
+
+- **The parent waits for one answer.** Streamed agent text and tool calls are
+  mapped onto the pool's child events so a host can render progress, but the
+  child's outcome is the answer text plus the prompt's stop reason.
+- **Permissions are a fixed, engine-level policy.** The tool titles and option
+  labels a foreign agent sends are its own prose, not our tool names, so
+  routing them to the user's approval UI would ask the user to authorize text
+  nobody validated. The policy reads only the ACP tool *kind* (`read`,
+  `execute`, …) and answers allow or reject.
+- **No token bill.** The engine does not report tokens, so the child's usage
+  is unknown, never zero — the turn's total is then honestly partial instead
+  of quietly smaller.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import contextlib
+import logging
+from collections.abc import Callable, Mapping
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from typing import Any, Literal
+
+__all__ = [
+    "AcpEngineSpec",
+    "AcpOutcome",
+    "AcpPermissionPolicy",
+    "AcpToolBridge",
+    "AcpUnavailable",
+    "PermissionDiagnostic",
+    "run_acp_child",
+]
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+#: How long the handshake (spawn → initialize → new session) may take before
+#: the spawn is treated as failed. A command that does not answer is a broken
+#: configuration, and the user needs that error now, not after a task timeout.
+HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_S = 60.0
+
+#: Grace between `cancel` and killing the process. The protocol says a cancel
+#: is cooperative; a peer that ignores it must not hold the turn open.
+CANCEL_GRACE_S = 5.0
+
+#: Stop reasons that mean "the peer finished its answer". Anything else
+#: (a refusal, a token limit, a cancel) is reported as an error so the parent
+#: does not treat a truncated answer as a conclusion.
+_COMPLETED_STOP_REASONS = frozenset({"", "end_turn", "max_turn_requests"})
+
+
+class AcpUnavailable(Exception):
+    """The external engine could not be started or failed its handshake.
+
+    Raised at spawn time so the caller fails the spawn (no empty child is
+    created) and reports the command.
+    """
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class AcpEngineSpec:
+    """How to launch and drive one external agent process.
+
+    ``timeout_s`` bounds a whole prompt: an external agent that never answers
+    would otherwise hold the parent's turn open until the host gives up, and
+    the parent has no way to tell "still working" from "wedged".
+    """
+
+    command: str
+    args: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    env: Mapping[str, str] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    cwd: str | None = None
+    timeout_s: float = 1800.0
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class AcpOutcome:
+    """One external run's terminal result.
+
+    ``status`` uses the pool's vocabulary so an ACP child and a CoreLoop child
+    arrive at the same call sites: ``completed`` / ``error`` / ``interrupted``.
+    """
+
+    status: str
+    answer: str
+    error: str | None = None
+    stop_reason: str | None = None
+
+
+#: What the policy decides for one permission request.
+PermissionDecision = Literal["allow", "reject"]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class AcpPermissionPolicy:
+    """The engine-level answer to a foreign agent's permission request.
+
+    Deliberately not the parent's ``ApprovalExecutor``: an ACP request carries
+    the *peer's* tool title and option text, which are prose we did not write
+    and cannot validate. Judging permission from untrusted text is worse than
+    a fixed policy, so the only input is the ACP tool kind — a closed enum of
+    ten values the protocol defines.
+
+    ``default`` applies to kinds not listed in ``by_kind``; ``reject`` is the
+    default because a foreign engine running with our user's privileges must
+    opt in, not out.
+    """
+
+    default: PermissionDecision = "reject"
+    by_kind: Mapping[str, PermissionDecision] = field(default_factory=dict)
+
+    def decide(self, kind: str | None) -> PermissionDecision:
+        """The decision for one tool kind (``None`` when the peer omitted it)."""
+        if kind is None:
+            return self.default
+        return self.by_kind.get(kind, self.default)
+
+    def matched_by(self, kind: str | None) -> Literal["kind", "default"]:
+        """Whether ``decide`` used a kind-specific rule or the default."""
+        if kind is None or kind not in self.by_kind:
+            return "default"
+        return "kind"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class PermissionDiagnostic:
+    """One permission decision, in fixed vocabulary only.
+
+    Deliberately excludes the peer's title and option labels: they are the
+    foreign engine's prose and must not enter the parent's record or events.
+    What is recorded is what we decided and why.
+    """
+
+    kind: str | None
+    decision: PermissionDecision
+    matched_by: Literal["kind", "default"]
+
+
+class AcpToolBridge:
+    """Forwards the peer's file and terminal requests into our tool domain.
+
+    A foreign agent that asks to read a file or run a command is asking *us*
+    to do it — the protocol routes those through the client. Passing them to
+    the parent's tool executor keeps one confinement story: the project fence
+    and the egress allow-list apply to an ACP child exactly as they do to a
+    local one. Permission and confinement stay separate questions: the policy
+    says whether the call may happen at all, the fence says how far it may
+    reach.
+
+    A bridge with no executor refuses every request: an external agent is not
+    granted filesystem access by being spawned.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        read_text_file: Callable[[str, int | None, int | None], Any] | None = None,
+        write_text_file: Callable[[str, str], Any] | None = None,
+        create_terminal: Callable[
+            [str, list[str], Mapping[str, str] | None], Any
+        ]
+        | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self._read = read_text_file
+        self._write = write_text_file
+        self._terminal = create_terminal
+
+    async def read_text_file(
+        self, path: str, line: int | None = None, limit: int | None = None
+    ) -> str:
+        """Read through the parent's tool domain, or refuse.
+
+        Raises:
+            AcpUnavailable: when no read capability was wired.
+        """
+        if self._read is None:
+            raise AcpUnavailable(
+                f"fs/read_text_file refused: this host grants no file access "
+                f"to external agents (requested {path!r})"
+            )
+        return str(await self._read(path, line, limit))
+
+    async def write_text_file(self, path: str, content: str) -> None:
+        """Write through the parent's tool domain, or refuse.
+
+        Raises:
+            AcpUnavailable: when no write capability was wired.
+        """
+        if self._write is None:
+            raise AcpUnavailable(
+                f"fs/write_text_file refused: this host grants no file access "
+                f"to external agents (requested {path!r})"
+            )
+        await self._write(path, content)
+
+    async def create_terminal(
+        self, command: str, args: list[str], env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None
+    ) -> Any:
+        """Run a command through the parent's tool domain, or refuse.
+
+        Raises:
+            AcpUnavailable: when no terminal capability was wired.
+        """
+        if self._terminal is None:
+            raise AcpUnavailable(
+                f"terminal/create refused: this host grants no command "
+                f"execution to external agents (requested {command!r})"
+            )
+        return await self._terminal(command, args, env)
+
+
+def _text_of(update: Any) -> str:
+    """The text of one streamed content chunk, or empty.
+
+    ACP content is a union of text, image and embedded-resource blocks; only
+    text contributes to the answer, and a block whose shape we do not know is
+    dropped rather than stringified into the transcript.
+    """
+    content = getattr(update, "content", None)
+    if content is None:
+        return ""
+    if isinstance(content, str):
+        return content
+    if isinstance(content, list):
+        return "".join(_text_of(part) for part in content)
+    text = getattr(content, "text", None)
+    return str(text) if isinstance(text, str) else ""
+
+
+def _answer_from_events(events: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> str:
+    """The child's final answer: the last contiguous block of agent text.
+
+    Working rounds narrate progress; the last run of agent text is what the
+    parent should read as the conclusion — the same rule the local pool applies
+    to a child's final request.
+    """
+    blocks: list[str] = []
+    current: list[str] = []
+    for event in events:
+        if event.get("kind") == "child_message":
+            current.append(str(event.get("text") or ""))
+        elif current:
+            blocks.append("".join(current))
+            current = []
+    if current:
+        blocks.append("".join(current))
+    return (blocks[-1].strip() if blocks else "")
+
+
+async def run_acp_child(
+    spec: AcpEngineSpec,
+    task: str,
+    *,
+    tool_bridge: AcpToolBridge,
+    permission: AcpPermissionPolicy,
+    on_event: Callable[[dict[str, Any]], None] | None = None,
+) -> AcpOutcome:
+    """Spawn an external ACP agent, run one prompt, return its final answer.
+
+    The peer's streamed updates are mapped onto the pool's child event names
+    (``child_message`` / ``child_reasoning`` / ``child_tool``), so a host that
+    already renders a sub-agent's progress needs no second vocabulary.
+    Permission requests are answered by ``permission`` — a fixed policy over
+    the tool kind, never the parent's approval UI.
+
+    Args:
+        spec: How to launch and bound the peer.
+        task: The self-contained instructions for it.
+        tool_bridge: Where its file and terminal requests land.
+        permission: The engine-level permission policy.
+        on_event: Optional synchronous sink for progress events.
+
+    Returns:
+        The run's terminal outcome. A peer that stops without finishing is an
+        ``error`` with the stop reason named, never a truncated answer passed
+        off as a conclusion.
+
+    Raises:
+        AcpUnavailable: when the peer cannot be launched or fails its
+            handshake — the caller must fail the spawn rather than create an
+            empty child.
+    """
+    import acp
+
+    events: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+
+    def emit(event: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        events.append(event)
+        if on_event is not None:
+            with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
+                on_event(event)
+
+    class _Client(acp.Client):
+        async def request_permission(
+            self, session_id: str, tool_call: Any, options: list[Any], **kwargs: Any
+        ) -> Any:
+            raw_kind = getattr(tool_call, "kind", None)
+            kind = str(raw_kind) if raw_kind is not None else None
+            decision = permission.decide(kind)
+            # Fixed vocabulary only: the peer's title and option labels never
+            # leave this method (they are its prose, not our tool names).
+            diagnostic = PermissionDiagnostic(
+                kind=kind,
+                decision=decision,
+                matched_by=permission.matched_by(kind),
+            )
+            emit(
+                {
+                    "kind": "child_permission",
+                    "toolKind": diagnostic.kind,
+                    "decision": diagnostic.decision,
+                    "matchedBy": diagnostic.matched_by,
+                }
+            )
+            if decision == "allow":
+                for option in options:
+                    if getattr(option, "kind", None) in ("allow_once", "allow_always"):
+                        return acp.RequestPermissionResponse(
+                            outcome=acp.schema.AllowedOutcome(
+                                outcome="selected", option_id=option.option_id
+                            )
+                        )
+            # No allow option, or the policy rejects: the peer must not
+            # continue this call.
+            return acp.RequestPermissionResponse(
+                outcome=acp.schema.DeniedOutcome(outcome="cancelled")
+            )
+
+        async def session_update(
+            self, session_id: str, update: Any, **kwargs: Any
+        ) -> None:
+            kind = getattr(update, "session_update", "")
+            if kind == "agent_message_chunk":
+                emit({"kind": "child_message", "text": _text_of(update)})
+            elif kind == "agent_thought_chunk":
+                emit({"kind": "child_reasoning", "text": _text_of(update)})
+            elif kind == "tool_call":
+                emit(
+                    {
+                        "kind": "child_tool",
+                        "toolCallId": str(getattr(update, "tool_call_id", "")),
+                        # The peer's title is its own prose; the kind is the
+                        # protocol's closed vocabulary, which is what a host
+                        # may render as a category.
+                        "toolKind": getattr(update, "kind", None),
+                    }
+                )
+            elif kind == "tool_call_update":
+                emit(
+                    {
+                        "kind": "child_tool_done",
+                        "toolCallId": str(getattr(update, "tool_call_id", "")),
+                        "status": getattr(update, "status", None),
+                    }
+                )
+
+        async def read_text_file(
+            self,
+            path: str,
+            session_id: str,
+            line: int | None = None,
+            limit: int | None = None,
+            **kwargs: Any,
+        ) -> Any:
+            text = await tool_bridge.read_text_file(path, line, limit)
+            return acp.ReadTextFileResponse(content=text)
+
+        async def write_text_file(
+            self, path: str, content: str, session_id: str, **kwargs: Any
+        ) -> Any:
+            await tool_bridge.write_text_file(path, content)
+            return None
+
+        async def create_terminal(
+            self,
+            command: str,
+            session_id: str,
+            args: list[str] | None = None,
+            env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
+            **kwargs: Any,
+        ) -> Any:
+            return await tool_bridge.create_terminal(command, list(args or []), env)
+
+    context = acp.spawn_agent_process(
+        lambda _agent: _Client(),
+        spec.command,
+        *spec.args,
+        env=dict(spec.env) if spec.env else None,
+        cwd=spec.cwd or None,
+    )
+    try:
+        connection, process = await asyncio.wait_for(
+            context.__aenter__(), timeout=HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_S
+        )
+    except FileNotFoundError as exc:
+        raise AcpUnavailable(
+            f"cannot launch ACP engine {spec.command!r}: no such command"
+        ) from exc
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise AcpUnavailable(
+            f"cannot launch ACP engine {spec.command!r}: {exc}"
+        ) from exc
+    except asyncio.TimeoutError as exc:
+        raise AcpUnavailable(
+            f"ACP engine {spec.command!r} did not start within "
+            f"{HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_S:.0f}s"
+        ) from exc
+
+    session_id: str | None = None
+    try:
+        try:
+            await asyncio.wait_for(
+                connection.initialize(protocol_version=acp.PROTOCOL_VERSION),
+                timeout=HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_S,
+            )
+            session = await asyncio.wait_for(
+                connection.new_session(cwd=spec.cwd or "", mcp_servers=[]),
+                timeout=HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_S,
+            )
+            session_id = session.session_id
+        except asyncio.TimeoutError as exc:
+            raise AcpUnavailable(
+                f"ACP engine {spec.command!r} did not complete its handshake "
+                f"within {HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_S:.0f}s"
+            ) from exc
+        except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — any handshake failure
+            raise AcpUnavailable(
+                f"ACP engine {spec.command!r} refused the handshake: {exc}"
+            ) from exc
+
+        try:
+            response = await asyncio.wait_for(
+                connection.prompt(
+                    session_id=session_id,
+                    prompt=[acp.schema.TextContentBlock(type="text", text=task)],
+                ),
+                timeout=spec.timeout_s,
+            )
+        except asyncio.TimeoutError:
+            return AcpOutcome(
+                status="error",
+                answer=_answer_from_events(events),
+                error=(
+                    f"ACP engine {spec.command!r} did not finish within "
+                    f"{spec.timeout_s:.0f}s"
+                ),
+            )
+        except asyncio.CancelledError:
+            # The parent cancelled the turn (or the pool is winding down).
+            await _cancel(connection, session_id)
+            raise
+        except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — a peer failure is data
+            return AcpOutcome(
+                status="error",
+                answer=_answer_from_events(events),
+                error=f"ACP engine {spec.command!r} failed: {exc}",
+            )
+
+        stop_reason = str(getattr(response, "stop_reason", "") or "")
+        answer = _answer_from_events(events)
+        if stop_reason in _COMPLETED_STOP_REASONS:
+            return AcpOutcome(
+                status="completed",
+                answer=answer,
+                stop_reason=stop_reason or None,
+            )
+        # A truncated answer is not a conclusion: report why it stopped so the
+        # parent can decide to resume or take the task elsewhere.
+        return AcpOutcome(
+            status="error",
+            answer=answer,
+            stop_reason=stop_reason,
+            error=f"ACP engine stopped with {stop_reason!r}",
+        )
+    finally:
+        with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
+            await context.__aexit__(None, None, None)
+        with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
+            if process.returncode is None:
+                process.kill()
+
+
+async def _cancel(connection: Any, session_id: str) -> None:
+    """Ask the peer to stop, then leave the caller to kill it.
+
+    The protocol's cancel is cooperative. A peer that keeps generating after
+    the parent gave up would burn its own budget for an answer nobody reads.
+    """
+    with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
+        await connection.cancel(session_id=session_id)
+    await asyncio.sleep(CANCEL_GRACE_S)

package/python-runtime/python/Lib/site-packages/steerable_agent_runtime/history.py

@@ -188,6 +188,11 @@ class HistorySeed:
     turn_id: str | None = None
     kind: str = KIND_HISTORY_SEED
     message_kinds: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    #: Which model produced the seeded history. Recorded so a reader can tell
+    #: "this transcript came from another model" — a cross-model fork re-reads
+    #: the whole prefix on a new route, and that cost has to be explainable
+    #: afterwards. Audit metadata only: never read at projection time.
+    source_model: str | None = None
 
 
 #: The record is a linear log of items, declared-rewrite markers, region
@@ -558,6 +563,7 @@ class ContextManager:
         source_record_id: str | None = None,
         source_until_seq: int | None = None,
         turn_id: str | None = None,
+        source_model: str | None = None,
     ) -> HistorySeed:
         """Inline-seed a projected prefix as ONE entry (fork/regenerate).
 
@@ -573,6 +579,7 @@ class ContextManager:
             source_record_id=source_record_id,
             source_until_seq=source_until_seq,
             turn_id=turn_id or self.turn_id,
+            source_model=source_model,
         )
         self._record.append(entry)
         self._pending.append(entry)
@@ -627,7 +634,6 @@ class ContextManager:
             for entry in self._record[self._boundary_index + 1 :]
             if isinstance(entry, HistoryItem)
         ]
-
     @property
     def latest_boundary(self) -> CompactionBoundary | None:
         if self._boundary_index < 0:
@@ -726,6 +732,108 @@ def message_from_dict(data: dict[str, Any]) -> LLMMessage:
     )
 
 
+def completed_turn_prefix(
+    messages: Sequence["LLMMessage"],
+    *,
+    max_turns: int | None = None,
+) -> list["LLMMessage"]:
+    """The balanced prefix of a transcript — the fork seed primitive.
+
+    A fork seed must be a transcript a provider accepts and a loop can
+    replay. Two rules, both load-bearing:
+
+    - it ends at an **assistant** message whose tool calls are all answered
+      (a dangling call cannot be replayed, and a trailing user message is a
+      question the parent never got to answer);
+    - everything before that point is kept.
+
+    This is deliberately *not* "drop the last turn". A Steerable turn is one
+    user request that may contain dozens of tool rounds — dropping it would
+    throw away the very investigation a child is asked to continue ("verify
+    these findings"), which is the main reason to fork at all. The in-flight
+    round is dropped; the work before it is kept.
+
+    Args:
+        messages: a projection, oldest first.
+        max_turns: keep only the last N *user* messages and everything after
+            the first of them. ``None`` keeps the whole prefix; this is the
+            escape hatch for an over-long parent conversation.
+
+    Returns:
+        A transcript ending at a completed assistant turn, or an empty list
+        when the transcript contains no such point (a fork then behaves like
+        a fresh child).
+    """
+    if not messages:
+        return []
+    cut = _balanced_prefix_length(messages)
+    if cut <= 0:
+        return []
+    prefix = list(messages[:cut])
+    if max_turns is not None:
+        prefix = _last_turns(prefix, max_turns)
+    return prefix
+
+
+def _balanced_prefix_length(messages: Sequence["LLMMessage"]) -> int:
+    """Index one past the last assistant message that closes a balanced run.
+
+    Walks forward pairing ``tool_calls`` with the ``tool`` results that
+    answer them, so a partly-answered assistant message is excluded whole
+    rather than truncated mid-call. Only an assistant message advances the
+    kept boundary: a trailing user message or a stray tool result is waiting
+    on something, which is exactly what a seed cannot contain.
+    """
+    last_balanced_end = 0
+    index = 0
+    total = len(messages)
+    while index < total:
+        message = messages[index]
+        index += 1
+        if message.role != "assistant":
+            continue
+        pending = {call.id for call in (message.tool_calls or [])}
+        if pending:
+            # Consume the results that belong to this assistant message. A
+            # result for anything else ends the pairing: the transcript did
+            # not come back in the order a replay needs.
+            while index < total and messages[index].role == "tool":
+                call_id = messages[index].tool_call_id
+                if call_id is not None:
+                    pending.discard(call_id)
+                index += 1
+            if pending:
+                return last_balanced_end
+            last_balanced_end = index
+            continue
+        # Text-only assistant message: balanced by construction, unless a
+        # result follows it, which would mean the log is out of order.
+        while index < total and messages[index].role == "tool":
+            index += 1
+        last_balanced_end = index
+    return last_balanced_end
+
+
+def _last_turns(
+    messages: Sequence["LLMMessage"], max_turns: int
+) -> list["LLMMessage"]:
+    """Keep the trailing ``max_turns`` user messages and what follows.
+
+    Counting user messages rather than assistant turns keeps the cut at a
+    request boundary, so the kept span still starts where a user spoke.
+    """
+    if max_turns <= 0:
+        return []
+    seen = 0
+    for index in range(len(messages) - 1, -1, -1):
+        if messages[index].role != "user":
+            continue
+        seen += 1
+        if seen >= max_turns:
+            return list(messages[index:])
+    return list(messages)
+
+
 def entry_to_dict(entry: RecordEntry) -> dict[str, Any]:
     """Serialize one record entry for ``StorageAdapter.append_history``."""
     if isinstance(entry, HistoryItem):
@@ -797,6 +905,10 @@ def entry_to_dict(entry: RecordEntry) -> dict[str, Any]:
             "token_estimate": entry.token_estimate,
             "source_record_id": entry.source_record_id,
             "source_until_seq": entry.source_until_seq,
+            # Additive + optional: a seed written before this field existed
+            # has no `source_model`, and a reader that does not know it
+            # ignores the key.
+            **({"source_model": entry.source_model} if entry.source_model else {}),
             "messages": [message_to_dict(m) for m in entry.messages],
             "message_kinds": list(entry.message_kinds),
         }
@@ -934,6 +1046,7 @@ def entry_from_dict(data: dict[str, Any]) -> RecordEntry:
             source_until_seq=data.get("source_until_seq"),
             turn_id=data.get("turn_id"),
             message_kinds=tuple(str(k) for k in data.get("message_kinds") or ()),
+            source_model=data.get("source_model"),
         )
     raise RecordFormatError(f"unknown record entry envelope: {envelope!r}")