@stapel/workspaces-react 0.6.0 → 0.8.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +56 -0
- package/dist/api/generated/schema.d.ts +774 -7
- package/dist/api/generated/schema.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/api/types.d.ts +104 -7
- package/dist/api/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/api/workspacesApi.d.ts +55 -1
- package/dist/api/workspacesApi.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/api/workspacesApi.js +23 -0
- package/dist/api/workspacesApi.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/default/InviteAcceptPage.d.ts +28 -0
- package/dist/default/InviteAcceptPage.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/default/InviteAcceptPage.js +141 -0
- package/dist/default/InviteAcceptPage.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/default/MembersManager.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/default/MembersManager.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/default/MembersManager.js +61 -56
- package/dist/default/MembersManager.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/default/index.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/default/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/default/index.js +1 -0
- package/dist/default/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/flows/inviteAcceptFlow.d.ts +155 -0
- package/dist/flows/inviteAcceptFlow.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/flows/inviteAcceptFlow.js +126 -0
- package/dist/flows/inviteAcceptFlow.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/headless/Can.d.ts +40 -0
- package/dist/headless/Can.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/headless/Can.js +30 -0
- package/dist/headless/Can.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/headless/InviteAcceptFlow.d.ts +44 -0
- package/dist/headless/InviteAcceptFlow.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/headless/InviteAcceptFlow.js +67 -0
- package/dist/headless/InviteAcceptFlow.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/headless/RoleSelect.d.ts +41 -0
- package/dist/headless/RoleSelect.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/headless/RoleSelect.js +34 -0
- package/dist/headless/RoleSelect.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/i18n/generated/errors.gen.d.ts +48 -0
- package/dist/i18n/generated/errors.gen.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/i18n/generated/errors.gen.js +24 -0
- package/dist/i18n/generated/errors.gen.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/i18n/generated/errors.ru.gen.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/i18n/generated/errors.ru.gen.js +8 -0
- package/dist/i18n/generated/errors.ru.gen.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/i18n/keys.d.ts +28 -0
- package/dist/i18n/keys.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/i18n/keys.js +64 -0
- package/dist/i18n/keys.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/i18n/ru.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/i18n/ru.js +30 -0
- package/dist/i18n/ru.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.ts +17 -4
- package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +10 -2
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/model/capabilities.d.ts +21 -0
- package/dist/model/capabilities.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/model/capabilities.js +32 -0
- package/dist/model/capabilities.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/model/emailMask.d.ts +22 -0
- package/dist/model/emailMask.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/model/emailMask.js +36 -0
- package/dist/model/emailMask.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/model/mutations.d.ts +107 -3
- package/dist/model/mutations.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/model/mutations.js +190 -1
- package/dist/model/mutations.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/model/queries.d.ts +108 -2
- package/dist/model/queries.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/model/queries.js +139 -1
- package/dist/model/queries.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/model/queryKeys.d.ts +12 -1
- package/dist/model/queryKeys.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/model/queryKeys.js +25 -0
- package/dist/model/queryKeys.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/model/stepUp.d.ts +25 -0
- package/dist/model/stepUp.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/model/stepUp.js +79 -0
- package/dist/model/stepUp.js.map +1 -0
- package/llms.txt +49 -15
- package/manifest.json +346 -3
- package/package.json +5 -5
- package/src/analytics/generated/events.json +1 -1
- package/src/api/generated/schema.ts +774 -7
- package/src/api/types.ts +113 -7
- package/src/api/workspacesApi.ts +137 -0
- package/src/default/InviteAcceptPage.tsx +373 -0
- package/src/default/MembersManager.tsx +155 -145
- package/src/default/index.ts +2 -0
- package/src/flows/inviteAcceptFlow.ts +289 -0
- package/src/headless/Can.tsx +49 -0
- package/src/headless/InviteAcceptFlow.tsx +105 -0
- package/src/headless/RoleSelect.tsx +58 -0
- package/src/i18n/generated/errors.gen.ts +24 -0
- package/src/i18n/generated/errors.json +62 -0
- package/src/i18n/generated/errors.ru.gen.ts +8 -0
- package/src/i18n/keys.ts +68 -0
- package/src/i18n/ru.ts +34 -0
- package/src/index.ts +54 -1
- package/src/model/capabilities.ts +37 -0
- package/src/model/emailMask.ts +37 -0
- package/src/model/mutations.ts +248 -4
- package/src/model/queries.ts +205 -2
- package/src/model/queryKeys.ts +45 -1
- package/src/model/stepUp.ts +96 -0
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@@ -86,6 +86,113 @@ export interface paths {
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patch: operations["workspaces_api_v1_partial_update"];
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trace?: never;
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};
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"/workspaces/api/v1/{workspace_id}/invitations": {
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parameters: {
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query?: never;
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header?: never;
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path?: never;
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cookie?: never;
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};
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/**
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* @description Who was invited and has not accepted (#109).
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*
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* Before this endpoint an admin could send invitations and never see
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* them again: acceptance produced a member row, and everything else —
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* the unopened mail, the wrong address, the person who declined — was
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* invisible from the product. The roster answered "who is in"; nothing
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* answered "who is still out, and since when".
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*
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* Gated on ``members.invite``: the mandate that creates invitations is
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* the mandate that sees and manages them. Reading the list is strictly
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* less than sending one, so no separate capability is minted — a role
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* that may invite but may not audit its own invitations would be a
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* distinction without a use.
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*
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* The invite token is never in the response. It is a bearer credential;
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* a list endpoint that carried it would hand every admin a working login
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* link for every invited address.
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*
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* **Permissions:** `IsAuthenticated`
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*/
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get: operations["workspaces_api_v1_invitations_list"];
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put?: never;
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post?: never;
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delete?: never;
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options?: never;
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head?: never;
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patch?: never;
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trace?: never;
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};
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"/workspaces/api/v1/{workspace_id}/invitations/{invitation_id}/resend": {
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parameters: {
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query?: never;
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header?: never;
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path?: never;
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cookie?: never;
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};
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get?: never;
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put?: never;
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/**
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* @description Send the invitation email again (#109).
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*
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* Accepts an **expired** invitation on purpose — a dead TTL is the most
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* common reason to resend — and refuses the three stored terminal states,
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* which are decisions rather than delivery failures. The token is
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* rotated and the TTL restarts, so the fresh letter carries a fresh link
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* and any stale copy of the old one stops working.
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*
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* Reviving an expired invitation re-reserves a seat, so the plan ceiling
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* is re-checked here exactly as it is on invite: capability first ("may
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* YOU", 403), then the org's plan ("may the ORG", 402). An invitation
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* that is already pending costs no additional seat and is never blocked
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* by that check.
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*
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* **Permissions:** `IsAuthenticated`
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*/
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post: operations["workspaces_api_v1_invitations_resend_create"];
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delete?: never;
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options?: never;
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head?: never;
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patch?: never;
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trace?: never;
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};
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"/workspaces/api/v1/{workspace_id}/invitations/{invitation_id}/revoke": {
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parameters: {
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query?: never;
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header?: never;
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path?: never;
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cookie?: never;
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};
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get?: never;
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put?: never;
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/**
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* @description Withdraw a live invitation (#109).
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*
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* The workspace's terminal "no", the mirror of the invitee's decline —
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* the two stay distinguishable in ``status`` forever. The seat the
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* invitation reserved is freed on commit.
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*
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* Only a **pending** invitation is revocable: an accepted one produced a
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* membership (remove the member instead), a declined or already-revoked
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* one is terminal, and an expired one is already harmless. Each of those
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* gets its own error key rather than a shrug.
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*
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* The transition is a compare-and-set under a row lock, not a blind
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* write: an accept committing between this view's state check and the
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* lock wins, and the revocation then fails honestly with
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* ``error.400.invitation_already_used``. The reverse — a revocation
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* committing between an accept's check and its lock — is the race fixed
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* in 0.10.0, and it is the same predicate holding both ends.
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*
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* **Permissions:** `IsAuthenticated`
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*/
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post: operations["workspaces_api_v1_invitations_revoke_create"];
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delete?: never;
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options?: never;
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head?: never;
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patch?: never;
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trace?: never;
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};
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"/workspaces/api/v1/{workspace_id}/members": {
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parameters: {
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query?: never;
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patch: operations["workspaces_api_v1_members_partial_update"];
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trace?: never;
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};
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"/workspaces/api/v1/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}/password/reset": {
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parameters: {
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query?: never;
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header?: never;
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path?: never;
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cookie?: never;
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};
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get?: never;
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put?: never;
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/**
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* @description Reset a member's password on the organization's order (#110).
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*
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* Five questions this endpoint has to answer out loud, because a
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* password reset is an account takeover performed on purpose and every
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* one of them is a way to get it wrong.
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*
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* **Who may do it.** A mandate, not a session: capability
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* ``members.password.reset`` (builtin ``admin`` and ``owner``), declared
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* ``high``, so ``@requires_verification(scope="sensitive")`` demands a
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* fresh step-up on top — an ambient cookie is not enough to hand
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* somebody else's account over. Only an owner may reset an OWNER's
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* password, the same hardcoded owner protection role changes and
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* removals carry: otherwise an admin resets the owner and inherits the
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* organization. And auth refuses a staff/superuser target outright
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* (``error.403.privileged_account``) — org admin is a role inside one
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* workspace, deployment staff is a role above every workspace, and the
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* first must never be a route to the second.
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*
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* **Whether the user finds out.** Always. A
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* ``workspace.member_password_reset`` letter names the workspace and the
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* admin who did it — a reset is indistinguishable from a takeover
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* unless the account holder is told which one it was. ``notified`` in
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* the response says honestly whether a channel existed; the letter
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* never carries the new password (see
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* :func:`~stapel_workspaces.services.reset_member_password`).
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*
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* **Whether the new password is temporary.** Yes — auth raises the
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* workspace's ``provisioned_user_policies`` (#90), defaulting to
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* ``password_change``. A password the admin knows must stop working the
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* first time it is used, and since auth 0.15.0 that demand holds on all
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* 19 session-issuance paths rather than only the password form. An org
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* may pass an explicit ``[]`` to suppress it, and that lands in auth's
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* audit row.
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*
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* **Whether it is an existence oracle.** No: a target that is not a
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* resettable member of THIS workspace — an unknown UUID, a real account
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* that is not a member, a member of a different workspace, or the
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* caller's own id — all get one byte-identical 404. And the capability
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* check runs before any target lookup, so a caller without the mandate
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* learns nothing at all about anybody. ``tests/
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* test_api_member_password_reset.py`` compares those responses byte for
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* byte.
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*
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* **Whether it is logged with the actor.** Twice, on purpose:
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* ``workspace.member_password_reset`` through the transactional outbox
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* (the org's activity log) and auth's own ``AuthAuditLog`` row carrying
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* ``actor_id`` and ``via=admin_reset`` (the deployment's security
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* journal). Neither carries credential material.
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*
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* Own password: use auth's ``POST /password/change/``. This endpoint is
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* for acting on somebody else, and answers about yourself with the same
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* 404 as about a stranger.
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*
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* **Permissions:** `IsAuthenticated`
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*/
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post: operations["workspaces_api_v1_members_password_reset_create"];
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delete?: never;
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options?: never;
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head?: never;
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patch?: never;
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trace?: never;
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};
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"/workspaces/api/v1/{workspace_id}/members/invite": {
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parameters: {
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query?: never;
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};
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"/workspaces/api/v1/{workspace_id}/members/provision": {
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parameters: {
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query?: never;
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header?: never;
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path?: never;
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cookie?: never;
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};
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get?: never;
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put?: never;
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/**
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* @description Provision an org-created (synthetic) member (org-program spec §C1).
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*
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* The org mints its own login/password account: full username is
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* ``{workspace_slug}/{username_local}`` (namespaced — the slug is
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* globally unique, so orgs cannot collide), the account is created by
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* ``auth.provision_user`` with the workspace's first-login policy
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* (``settings.security.provisioned_user_policy``: forced password change
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* or mandatory MFA enrollment) and joins immediately
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* (``accepted_at=now``, ``provisioned=True``).
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*
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* Gate stack, in order: HIGH step-up (``@requires_verification``, scope
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* ``sensitive`` — the same store as admin step-up) → capability
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* ``members.provision`` (403) → entitlement ``workspaces.provision_user``
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* (402; degrades to allow without billing) → optional per-user debit
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* (``STAPEL_WORKSPACES["PROVISION_USER_CREDITS"]`` > 0).
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*
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* Credentials: a synthetic account normally has no email — when the
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* request omits ``email``, the server-generated password comes back in
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* the response (``generated_password``) exactly once and no letter is
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* sent. With ``email``, the ``workspace.provisioned_account`` letter
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* carries the credentials as well. Auth's structured failures pass
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* through keyed (``error.409.username_taken`` / auth's 400s); auth not
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|
+
* wired → honest 503, this seam never degrades to allow.
|
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|
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*
|
|
394
|
+
* **Permissions:** `IsAuthenticated`
|
|
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|
+
*/
|
|
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|
+
post: operations["workspaces_api_v1_members_provision_create"];
|
|
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|
+
delete?: never;
|
|
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|
+
options?: never;
|
|
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|
+
head?: never;
|
|
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|
+
patch?: never;
|
|
401
|
+
trace?: never;
|
|
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|
+
};
|
|
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403
|
"/workspaces/api/v1/internal/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}": {
|
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|
parameters: {
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405
|
query?: never;
|
|
@@ -220,6 +442,90 @@ export interface paths {
|
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220
442
|
patch?: never;
|
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443
|
trace?: never;
|
|
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444
|
};
|
|
445
|
+
"/workspaces/api/v1/invitations/{token}": {
|
|
446
|
+
parameters: {
|
|
447
|
+
query?: never;
|
|
448
|
+
header?: never;
|
|
449
|
+
path?: never;
|
|
450
|
+
cookie?: never;
|
|
451
|
+
};
|
|
452
|
+
/**
|
|
453
|
+
* @description Public invitation preview — what the /invite/{token} page renders.
|
|
454
|
+
*
|
|
455
|
+
* AllowAny by design (org-program spec §B2): the invitee has no session
|
|
456
|
+
* yet; the token in the URL is the bearer secret. The response leaks
|
|
457
|
+
* nothing harvestable — the email is masked, and ``status`` /
|
|
458
|
+
* ``email_registered`` are exactly what the frontend flow machine needs
|
|
459
|
+
* to route (login vs claim vs terminal-state screen). Throttled as an
|
|
460
|
+
* enumeration backstop. The token is never logged.
|
|
461
|
+
*
|
|
462
|
+
* **Permissions:** `AllowAny`
|
|
463
|
+
*/
|
|
464
|
+
get: operations["workspaces_api_v1_invitations_retrieve"];
|
|
465
|
+
put?: never;
|
|
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|
+
post?: never;
|
|
467
|
+
delete?: never;
|
|
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|
+
options?: never;
|
|
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|
+
head?: never;
|
|
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|
+
patch?: never;
|
|
471
|
+
trace?: never;
|
|
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|
+
};
|
|
473
|
+
"/workspaces/api/v1/invitations/{token}/claim": {
|
|
474
|
+
parameters: {
|
|
475
|
+
query?: never;
|
|
476
|
+
header?: never;
|
|
477
|
+
path?: never;
|
|
478
|
+
cookie?: never;
|
|
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|
+
};
|
|
480
|
+
get?: never;
|
|
481
|
+
put?: never;
|
|
482
|
+
/**
|
|
483
|
+
* @description Mint a login grant for a not-yet-registered invitee (spec §B2-B3).
|
|
484
|
+
*
|
|
485
|
+
* AllowAny — the whole point is that no account exists yet. Only valid
|
|
486
|
+
* for ``email_registered == false``: an existing account gets 409 and the
|
|
487
|
+
* frontend switches to login. The grant comes from auth's
|
|
488
|
+
* ``auth.issue_login_grant`` comm Function (``create_if_missing`` — the
|
|
489
|
+
* verified account materializes on exchange); if that Function is not
|
|
490
|
+
* wired, the answer is an honest 503 — an invite flow without auth is
|
|
491
|
+
* meaningless, so this seam never degrades to allow. The invitation is
|
|
492
|
+
* NOT consumed here: accept stays a separate, deliberate step after
|
|
493
|
+
* setup. Neither the invite token nor the grant token is ever logged.
|
|
494
|
+
*
|
|
495
|
+
* **Permissions:** `AllowAny`
|
|
496
|
+
*/
|
|
497
|
+
post: operations["workspaces_api_v1_invitations_claim_create"];
|
|
498
|
+
delete?: never;
|
|
499
|
+
options?: never;
|
|
500
|
+
head?: never;
|
|
501
|
+
patch?: never;
|
|
502
|
+
trace?: never;
|
|
503
|
+
};
|
|
504
|
+
"/workspaces/api/v1/invitations/{token}/decline": {
|
|
505
|
+
parameters: {
|
|
506
|
+
query?: never;
|
|
507
|
+
header?: never;
|
|
508
|
+
path?: never;
|
|
509
|
+
cookie?: never;
|
|
510
|
+
};
|
|
511
|
+
get?: never;
|
|
512
|
+
put?: never;
|
|
513
|
+
/**
|
|
514
|
+
* @description Decline an invitation — the invitee's terminal "no" (spec §B2).
|
|
515
|
+
*
|
|
516
|
+
* Authenticated + email-match, exactly like accept: only the invited
|
|
517
|
+
* account may resolve the invitation, in either direction. Decline ≠
|
|
518
|
+
* revoke — both states stay distinguishable in the preview ``status``.
|
|
519
|
+
*
|
|
520
|
+
* **Permissions:** `IsAuthenticated`
|
|
521
|
+
*/
|
|
522
|
+
post: operations["workspaces_api_v1_invitations_decline_create"];
|
|
523
|
+
delete?: never;
|
|
524
|
+
options?: never;
|
|
525
|
+
head?: never;
|
|
526
|
+
patch?: never;
|
|
527
|
+
trace?: never;
|
|
528
|
+
};
|
|
223
529
|
"/workspaces/api/v1/invitations/accept": {
|
|
224
530
|
parameters: {
|
|
225
531
|
query?: never;
|
|
@@ -247,6 +553,31 @@ export interface paths {
|
|
|
247
553
|
patch?: never;
|
|
248
554
|
trace?: never;
|
|
249
555
|
};
|
|
556
|
+
"/workspaces/api/v1/roles": {
|
|
557
|
+
parameters: {
|
|
558
|
+
query?: never;
|
|
559
|
+
header?: never;
|
|
560
|
+
path?: never;
|
|
561
|
+
cookie?: never;
|
|
562
|
+
};
|
|
563
|
+
/**
|
|
564
|
+
* @description The effective role registry — metadata for frontends (spec §A2).
|
|
565
|
+
*
|
|
566
|
+
* Lets a RoleSelect stop hardcoding the builtin four: builtin roles plus
|
|
567
|
+
* the deployment's ``STAPEL_WORKSPACES["ROLES"]`` overlay, capability
|
|
568
|
+
* strings verbatim (wildcards included), ordered by descending rank.
|
|
569
|
+
*
|
|
570
|
+
* **Permissions:** `IsAuthenticated`
|
|
571
|
+
*/
|
|
572
|
+
get: operations["workspaces_api_v1_roles_retrieve"];
|
|
573
|
+
put?: never;
|
|
574
|
+
post?: never;
|
|
575
|
+
delete?: never;
|
|
576
|
+
options?: never;
|
|
577
|
+
head?: never;
|
|
578
|
+
patch?: never;
|
|
579
|
+
trace?: never;
|
|
580
|
+
};
|
|
250
581
|
}
|
|
251
582
|
export type webhooks = Record<string, never>;
|
|
252
583
|
export interface components {
|
|
@@ -264,18 +595,100 @@ export interface components {
|
|
|
264
595
|
/** @description Invite token from the email link */
|
|
265
596
|
token: string;
|
|
266
597
|
};
|
|
267
|
-
/** @description
|
|
598
|
+
/** @description Login-grant mint for an unregistered invitee (claim step). */
|
|
599
|
+
InvitationClaimResponse: {
|
|
600
|
+
/** @description Single-use, short-lived login grant token — exchange it at auth's POST /grant/exchange/ for a session (creates the verified account). A credential: never log it */
|
|
601
|
+
grant_token: string;
|
|
602
|
+
};
|
|
603
|
+
/** @description Public (AllowAny) invitation preview — what the /invite/{token} page renders before any auth decision. */
|
|
604
|
+
InvitationPreviewResponse: {
|
|
605
|
+
/**
|
|
606
|
+
* @description Display name of the inviting workspace
|
|
607
|
+
* @example Acme Engineering
|
|
608
|
+
*/
|
|
609
|
+
workspace_name: string;
|
|
610
|
+
/**
|
|
611
|
+
* @description Role granted on acceptance
|
|
612
|
+
* @example member
|
|
613
|
+
*/
|
|
614
|
+
role: string;
|
|
615
|
+
/**
|
|
616
|
+
* @description Invited email, masked for the public page
|
|
617
|
+
* @example m***@e***.com
|
|
618
|
+
*/
|
|
619
|
+
email_masked: string;
|
|
620
|
+
/**
|
|
621
|
+
* @description Invitation state. One of pending / expired / revoked / accepted / declined
|
|
622
|
+
* @example pending
|
|
623
|
+
*/
|
|
624
|
+
status: string;
|
|
625
|
+
/** @description Whether an account already exists for the invited email — steers the frontend to login vs claim */
|
|
626
|
+
email_registered: boolean;
|
|
627
|
+
/**
|
|
628
|
+
* @description ISO 8601 expiry time
|
|
629
|
+
* @example 2026-07-31T10:00:00Z
|
|
630
|
+
*/
|
|
631
|
+
expires_at: string;
|
|
632
|
+
};
|
|
633
|
+
/**
|
|
634
|
+
* @description One invitation row — the admin's "who has not accepted yet" table (#109).
|
|
635
|
+
*
|
|
636
|
+
* ``status`` is the derived label (``WorkspaceInvitation.status``), not a
|
|
637
|
+
* stored column: it is what the table renders and what the frontend
|
|
638
|
+
* routes the revoke/resend affordances on. The raw timestamps travel
|
|
639
|
+
* alongside it because "expires in 2 days" and "declined last Tuesday"
|
|
640
|
+
* are different rows on the same screen; the label alone cannot say
|
|
641
|
+
* when.
|
|
642
|
+
*
|
|
643
|
+
* The invite token is deliberately absent — it is a bearer secret that
|
|
644
|
+
* only ever leaves this service inside the invitation email.
|
|
645
|
+
*/
|
|
268
646
|
InvitationResponse: {
|
|
269
|
-
/**
|
|
647
|
+
/**
|
|
648
|
+
* Format: uuid
|
|
649
|
+
* @description Invitation UUID
|
|
650
|
+
* @example 0192f...
|
|
651
|
+
*/
|
|
270
652
|
id: string;
|
|
271
|
-
/**
|
|
653
|
+
/**
|
|
654
|
+
* Format: uuid
|
|
655
|
+
* @description Workspace UUID
|
|
656
|
+
*/
|
|
272
657
|
workspace_id: string;
|
|
658
|
+
/**
|
|
659
|
+
* @description Invited email address (normalized lowercase)
|
|
660
|
+
* @example alice@example.com
|
|
661
|
+
*/
|
|
273
662
|
email: string;
|
|
663
|
+
/**
|
|
664
|
+
* @description Role granted on acceptance
|
|
665
|
+
* @example member
|
|
666
|
+
*/
|
|
274
667
|
role: string;
|
|
668
|
+
/**
|
|
669
|
+
* @description Derived state. One of pending / accepted / declined / revoked / expired
|
|
670
|
+
* @example pending
|
|
671
|
+
*/
|
|
672
|
+
status: string;
|
|
673
|
+
/**
|
|
674
|
+
* @description ISO 8601 expiry time
|
|
675
|
+
* @example 2026-07-31T10:00:00Z
|
|
676
|
+
*/
|
|
275
677
|
expires_at: string;
|
|
678
|
+
/** @description ISO 8601 acceptance time; null unless accepted */
|
|
276
679
|
accepted_at: string | null;
|
|
680
|
+
/** @description ISO 8601 decline time (the invitee said no); null unless declined */
|
|
681
|
+
declined_at: string | null;
|
|
682
|
+
/** @description ISO 8601 revocation time (the workspace withdrew it); null unless revoked */
|
|
277
683
|
revoked_at: string | null;
|
|
684
|
+
/** @description ISO 8601 creation time */
|
|
278
685
|
created_at: string;
|
|
686
|
+
/**
|
|
687
|
+
* Format: uuid
|
|
688
|
+
* @description UUID of the admin who sent it; null when that account is gone
|
|
689
|
+
* @example 0192a...
|
|
690
|
+
*/
|
|
691
|
+
invited_by_id?: string | null;
|
|
279
692
|
};
|
|
280
693
|
/** @description Invite payload. */
|
|
281
694
|
MemberInviteRequest: {
|
|
@@ -296,6 +709,50 @@ export interface components {
|
|
|
296
709
|
MemberInviteResponse: {
|
|
297
710
|
invitations?: components["schemas"]["InvitationResponse"][];
|
|
298
711
|
};
|
|
712
|
+
/** @description Reset a member's password on the organization's order (#110). */
|
|
713
|
+
MemberPasswordResetRequest: {
|
|
714
|
+
/** @description New password chosen by the admin. Omitted: the server generates a crypto-strong one, returned once as generated_password */
|
|
715
|
+
password?: string | null;
|
|
716
|
+
/**
|
|
717
|
+
* @description First-login steps to demand of the member afterwards — any subset of password_change / mfa_enroll. Omitted: the workspace's own security policies, falling back to password_change. A password somebody else chose has to stop working at its first use, so an EMPTY list is a deliberate, auditable choice, not a shortcut
|
|
718
|
+
* @example [
|
|
719
|
+
* "password_change"
|
|
720
|
+
* ]
|
|
721
|
+
*/
|
|
722
|
+
first_login_policies?: string[] | null;
|
|
723
|
+
/**
|
|
724
|
+
* @description Free-text note recorded on auth's audit row (e.g. the ticket the request came in on)
|
|
725
|
+
* @example SUP-42
|
|
726
|
+
*/
|
|
727
|
+
reason?: string | null;
|
|
728
|
+
};
|
|
729
|
+
/** @description Result of an administrative password reset (#110). */
|
|
730
|
+
MemberPasswordResetResponse: {
|
|
731
|
+
/**
|
|
732
|
+
* Format: uuid
|
|
733
|
+
* @description UUID of the member whose password was reset
|
|
734
|
+
*/
|
|
735
|
+
user_id: string;
|
|
736
|
+
/**
|
|
737
|
+
* @description How many live sessions the reset ended. A reset that left them standing would not recover the account
|
|
738
|
+
* @example 2
|
|
739
|
+
*/
|
|
740
|
+
sessions_revoked?: number;
|
|
741
|
+
/** @description Server-generated password — returned exactly ONCE, only when the request omitted password. Hand it to the member out of band; it cannot be re-fetched. A credential: never log it */
|
|
742
|
+
generated_password?: string | null;
|
|
743
|
+
/**
|
|
744
|
+
* @description The steps now demanded of the member before their next session
|
|
745
|
+
* @example [
|
|
746
|
+
* "password_change"
|
|
747
|
+
* ]
|
|
748
|
+
*/
|
|
749
|
+
first_login_policies_applied?: string[];
|
|
750
|
+
/**
|
|
751
|
+
* @description Whether the member was told their password was reset. False means the account has no contact channel — the admin is the only one who can tell them
|
|
752
|
+
* @example true
|
|
753
|
+
*/
|
|
754
|
+
notified?: boolean;
|
|
755
|
+
};
|
|
299
756
|
/** @description Workspace member. */
|
|
300
757
|
MemberResponse: {
|
|
301
758
|
/**
|
|
@@ -327,6 +784,25 @@ export interface components {
|
|
|
327
784
|
accepted_at: string | null;
|
|
328
785
|
/** @description ISO 8601 last access; null if never accessed */
|
|
329
786
|
last_accessed_at: string | null;
|
|
787
|
+
/** @description Whether this is an org-created (synthetic) member joined via members/provision */
|
|
788
|
+
provisioned?: boolean;
|
|
789
|
+
/** @description ISO 8601 suspension timestamp; null while active. Suspension is not removal — the role stays but access is closed */
|
|
790
|
+
suspended_at?: string | null;
|
|
791
|
+
/** @description Why the membership is suspended (canonical value no_mfa); null while active */
|
|
792
|
+
suspension_reason?: string | null;
|
|
793
|
+
};
|
|
794
|
+
PaginatedInvitationResponseList: {
|
|
795
|
+
items: components["schemas"]["InvitationResponse"][];
|
|
796
|
+
/** @description Anchor value for next page */
|
|
797
|
+
next_anchor?: string | null;
|
|
798
|
+
/** @description Anchor value for previous page */
|
|
799
|
+
prev_anchor?: string | null;
|
|
800
|
+
/** @description Whether there are more items after this page */
|
|
801
|
+
has_next: boolean;
|
|
802
|
+
/** @description Whether there are items before this page */
|
|
803
|
+
has_prev: boolean;
|
|
804
|
+
/** @description Number of items in current page */
|
|
805
|
+
count: number;
|
|
330
806
|
};
|
|
331
807
|
PaginatedMemberResponseList: {
|
|
332
808
|
items: components["schemas"]["MemberResponse"][];
|
|
@@ -353,6 +829,78 @@ export interface components {
|
|
|
353
829
|
[key: string]: unknown;
|
|
354
830
|
} | null;
|
|
355
831
|
};
|
|
832
|
+
/** @description Provision an org-created (synthetic) member (org-program spec §C1). */
|
|
833
|
+
ProvisionMemberRequest: {
|
|
834
|
+
/**
|
|
835
|
+
* @description Local part of the login; the full username becomes "{workspace_slug}/{username_local}". Stock username alphabet, no slash
|
|
836
|
+
* @example jdoe
|
|
837
|
+
*/
|
|
838
|
+
username_local: string;
|
|
839
|
+
/**
|
|
840
|
+
* @description Role to grant (effective registry; owner is not provisionable)
|
|
841
|
+
* @example member
|
|
842
|
+
*/
|
|
843
|
+
role?: string;
|
|
844
|
+
/** @description Initial password chosen by the admin. Omitted: the server generates a crypto-strong one, returned once as generated_password */
|
|
845
|
+
password?: string | null;
|
|
846
|
+
/**
|
|
847
|
+
* @description Display-name hint forwarded to auth/profiles
|
|
848
|
+
* @example Jane Doe
|
|
849
|
+
*/
|
|
850
|
+
display_name?: string | null;
|
|
851
|
+
/** @description Optional email anchor (stored UNVERIFIED by auth). When present, the provisioned-account email with the credentials is sent there. Normally omitted — synthetic accounts have no email */
|
|
852
|
+
email?: string | null;
|
|
853
|
+
};
|
|
854
|
+
/** @description Result of provisioning an org member. */
|
|
855
|
+
ProvisionMemberResponse: {
|
|
856
|
+
/**
|
|
857
|
+
* Format: uuid
|
|
858
|
+
* @description UUID of the created account
|
|
859
|
+
*/
|
|
860
|
+
user_id: string;
|
|
861
|
+
/**
|
|
862
|
+
* @description Full namespaced login
|
|
863
|
+
* @example acme-eng/jdoe
|
|
864
|
+
*/
|
|
865
|
+
username: string;
|
|
866
|
+
/**
|
|
867
|
+
* @description Granted role
|
|
868
|
+
* @example member
|
|
869
|
+
*/
|
|
870
|
+
role: string;
|
|
871
|
+
/** @description Server-generated initial password — returned exactly ONCE, only when the request omitted password. Store it or hand it to the user now; it cannot be re-fetched. A credential: never log it */
|
|
872
|
+
generated_password?: string | null;
|
|
873
|
+
};
|
|
874
|
+
/** @description RoleListResponse(roles: List[stapel_workspaces.dto.RoleResponse] = <factory>) */
|
|
875
|
+
RoleListResponse: {
|
|
876
|
+
roles?: components["schemas"]["RoleResponse"][];
|
|
877
|
+
};
|
|
878
|
+
/** @description One role of the effective registry (builtin + STAPEL_WORKSPACES overlay). */
|
|
879
|
+
RoleResponse: {
|
|
880
|
+
/**
|
|
881
|
+
* @description Role key
|
|
882
|
+
* @example admin
|
|
883
|
+
*/
|
|
884
|
+
role: string;
|
|
885
|
+
/**
|
|
886
|
+
* @description Ordering weight; higher = more powerful
|
|
887
|
+
* @example 300
|
|
888
|
+
*/
|
|
889
|
+
rank: number;
|
|
890
|
+
/**
|
|
891
|
+
* @description Granted capability strings, verbatim (wildcards like * included)
|
|
892
|
+
* @example [
|
|
893
|
+
* "workspace.view",
|
|
894
|
+
* "members.invite"
|
|
895
|
+
* ]
|
|
896
|
+
*/
|
|
897
|
+
capabilities: string[];
|
|
898
|
+
/**
|
|
899
|
+
* @description Whether the role key is one of the builtin four
|
|
900
|
+
* @example true
|
|
901
|
+
*/
|
|
902
|
+
builtin: boolean;
|
|
903
|
+
};
|
|
356
904
|
/** @description Structured error returned by all Stapel API endpoints. */
|
|
357
905
|
StapelError: {
|
|
358
906
|
/**
|
|
@@ -360,10 +908,7 @@ export interface components {
|
|
|
360
908
|
* @example error.404.not_found
|
|
361
909
|
*/
|
|
362
910
|
localizable_error: string;
|
|
363
|
-
/**
|
|
364
|
-
* @description Human-readable message in English
|
|
365
|
-
* @example Requested resource not found
|
|
366
|
-
*/
|
|
911
|
+
/** @description Human-readable fallback/debug message — not reliably English, */
|
|
367
912
|
error: string;
|
|
368
913
|
/**
|
|
369
914
|
* @description Context values for template placeholders
|
|
@@ -374,6 +919,8 @@ export interface components {
|
|
|
374
919
|
params?: {
|
|
375
920
|
[key: string]: unknown;
|
|
376
921
|
};
|
|
922
|
+
/** @description Active Django locale `error` was rendered in (e.g */
|
|
923
|
+
error_language?: string;
|
|
377
924
|
};
|
|
378
925
|
/** @description Create-workspace payload. */
|
|
379
926
|
WorkspaceCreateRequest: {
|
|
@@ -451,6 +998,14 @@ export interface components {
|
|
|
451
998
|
* @example 2026-05-20T10:00:00Z
|
|
452
999
|
*/
|
|
453
1000
|
updated_at: string;
|
|
1001
|
+
/**
|
|
1002
|
+
* @description Granted capability strings of the requesting user's role, verbatim from the registry (wildcards like * included)
|
|
1003
|
+
* @example [
|
|
1004
|
+
* "workspace.view",
|
|
1005
|
+
* "members.view"
|
|
1006
|
+
* ]
|
|
1007
|
+
*/
|
|
1008
|
+
my_capabilities?: string[];
|
|
454
1009
|
};
|
|
455
1010
|
};
|
|
456
1011
|
responses: never;
|
|
@@ -573,6 +1128,82 @@ export interface operations {
|
|
|
573
1128
|
};
|
|
574
1129
|
};
|
|
575
1130
|
};
|
|
1131
|
+
workspaces_api_v1_invitations_list: {
|
|
1132
|
+
parameters: {
|
|
1133
|
+
query?: {
|
|
1134
|
+
/** @description Anchor value to paginate from (exclusive) */
|
|
1135
|
+
anchor?: string;
|
|
1136
|
+
/** @description Pagination direction */
|
|
1137
|
+
direction?: "next" | "prev" | "center";
|
|
1138
|
+
/** @description Number of items (default 100, max 500) */
|
|
1139
|
+
limit?: number;
|
|
1140
|
+
/** @description Case-insensitive substring filter on the invited email address. */
|
|
1141
|
+
search?: string;
|
|
1142
|
+
/** @description Which invitations to return. `pending` (default) — live, actionable, seat-reserving ones, i.e. who has not accepted yet. `never_accepted` — those plus the declined, revoked and expired ones. `all` — the full history, accepted rows included. */
|
|
1143
|
+
status?: "all" | "never_accepted" | "pending";
|
|
1144
|
+
};
|
|
1145
|
+
header?: never;
|
|
1146
|
+
path: {
|
|
1147
|
+
workspace_id: string;
|
|
1148
|
+
};
|
|
1149
|
+
cookie?: never;
|
|
1150
|
+
};
|
|
1151
|
+
requestBody?: never;
|
|
1152
|
+
responses: {
|
|
1153
|
+
200: {
|
|
1154
|
+
headers: {
|
|
1155
|
+
[name: string]: unknown;
|
|
1156
|
+
};
|
|
1157
|
+
content: {
|
|
1158
|
+
"application/json": components["schemas"]["PaginatedInvitationResponseList"];
|
|
1159
|
+
};
|
|
1160
|
+
};
|
|
1161
|
+
};
|
|
1162
|
+
};
|
|
1163
|
+
workspaces_api_v1_invitations_resend_create: {
|
|
1164
|
+
parameters: {
|
|
1165
|
+
query?: never;
|
|
1166
|
+
header?: never;
|
|
1167
|
+
path: {
|
|
1168
|
+
invitation_id: string;
|
|
1169
|
+
workspace_id: string;
|
|
1170
|
+
};
|
|
1171
|
+
cookie?: never;
|
|
1172
|
+
};
|
|
1173
|
+
requestBody?: never;
|
|
1174
|
+
responses: {
|
|
1175
|
+
200: {
|
|
1176
|
+
headers: {
|
|
1177
|
+
[name: string]: unknown;
|
|
1178
|
+
};
|
|
1179
|
+
content: {
|
|
1180
|
+
"application/json": components["schemas"]["InvitationResponse"];
|
|
1181
|
+
};
|
|
1182
|
+
};
|
|
1183
|
+
};
|
|
1184
|
+
};
|
|
1185
|
+
workspaces_api_v1_invitations_revoke_create: {
|
|
1186
|
+
parameters: {
|
|
1187
|
+
query?: never;
|
|
1188
|
+
header?: never;
|
|
1189
|
+
path: {
|
|
1190
|
+
invitation_id: string;
|
|
1191
|
+
workspace_id: string;
|
|
1192
|
+
};
|
|
1193
|
+
cookie?: never;
|
|
1194
|
+
};
|
|
1195
|
+
requestBody?: never;
|
|
1196
|
+
responses: {
|
|
1197
|
+
200: {
|
|
1198
|
+
headers: {
|
|
1199
|
+
[name: string]: unknown;
|
|
1200
|
+
};
|
|
1201
|
+
content: {
|
|
1202
|
+
"application/json": components["schemas"]["InvitationResponse"];
|
|
1203
|
+
};
|
|
1204
|
+
};
|
|
1205
|
+
};
|
|
1206
|
+
};
|
|
576
1207
|
workspaces_api_v1_members_list: {
|
|
577
1208
|
parameters: {
|
|
578
1209
|
query?: {
|
|
@@ -652,6 +1283,34 @@ export interface operations {
|
|
|
652
1283
|
};
|
|
653
1284
|
};
|
|
654
1285
|
};
|
|
1286
|
+
workspaces_api_v1_members_password_reset_create: {
|
|
1287
|
+
parameters: {
|
|
1288
|
+
query?: never;
|
|
1289
|
+
header?: never;
|
|
1290
|
+
path: {
|
|
1291
|
+
user_id: string;
|
|
1292
|
+
workspace_id: string;
|
|
1293
|
+
};
|
|
1294
|
+
cookie?: never;
|
|
1295
|
+
};
|
|
1296
|
+
requestBody?: {
|
|
1297
|
+
content: {
|
|
1298
|
+
"application/json": components["schemas"]["MemberPasswordResetRequest"];
|
|
1299
|
+
"application/x-www-form-urlencoded": components["schemas"]["MemberPasswordResetRequest"];
|
|
1300
|
+
"multipart/form-data": components["schemas"]["MemberPasswordResetRequest"];
|
|
1301
|
+
};
|
|
1302
|
+
};
|
|
1303
|
+
responses: {
|
|
1304
|
+
200: {
|
|
1305
|
+
headers: {
|
|
1306
|
+
[name: string]: unknown;
|
|
1307
|
+
};
|
|
1308
|
+
content: {
|
|
1309
|
+
"application/json": components["schemas"]["MemberPasswordResetResponse"];
|
|
1310
|
+
};
|
|
1311
|
+
};
|
|
1312
|
+
};
|
|
1313
|
+
};
|
|
655
1314
|
workspaces_api_v1_members_invite_create: {
|
|
656
1315
|
parameters: {
|
|
657
1316
|
query?: never;
|
|
@@ -679,6 +1338,33 @@ export interface operations {
|
|
|
679
1338
|
};
|
|
680
1339
|
};
|
|
681
1340
|
};
|
|
1341
|
+
workspaces_api_v1_members_provision_create: {
|
|
1342
|
+
parameters: {
|
|
1343
|
+
query?: never;
|
|
1344
|
+
header?: never;
|
|
1345
|
+
path: {
|
|
1346
|
+
workspace_id: string;
|
|
1347
|
+
};
|
|
1348
|
+
cookie?: never;
|
|
1349
|
+
};
|
|
1350
|
+
requestBody: {
|
|
1351
|
+
content: {
|
|
1352
|
+
"application/json": components["schemas"]["ProvisionMemberRequest"];
|
|
1353
|
+
"application/x-www-form-urlencoded": components["schemas"]["ProvisionMemberRequest"];
|
|
1354
|
+
"multipart/form-data": components["schemas"]["ProvisionMemberRequest"];
|
|
1355
|
+
};
|
|
1356
|
+
};
|
|
1357
|
+
responses: {
|
|
1358
|
+
201: {
|
|
1359
|
+
headers: {
|
|
1360
|
+
[name: string]: unknown;
|
|
1361
|
+
};
|
|
1362
|
+
content: {
|
|
1363
|
+
"application/json": components["schemas"]["ProvisionMemberResponse"];
|
|
1364
|
+
};
|
|
1365
|
+
};
|
|
1366
|
+
};
|
|
1367
|
+
};
|
|
682
1368
|
workspaces_api_v1_internal_members_retrieve: {
|
|
683
1369
|
parameters: {
|
|
684
1370
|
query?: never;
|
|
@@ -730,6 +1416,68 @@ export interface operations {
|
|
|
730
1416
|
};
|
|
731
1417
|
};
|
|
732
1418
|
};
|
|
1419
|
+
workspaces_api_v1_invitations_retrieve: {
|
|
1420
|
+
parameters: {
|
|
1421
|
+
query?: never;
|
|
1422
|
+
header?: never;
|
|
1423
|
+
path: {
|
|
1424
|
+
token: string;
|
|
1425
|
+
};
|
|
1426
|
+
cookie?: never;
|
|
1427
|
+
};
|
|
1428
|
+
requestBody?: never;
|
|
1429
|
+
responses: {
|
|
1430
|
+
200: {
|
|
1431
|
+
headers: {
|
|
1432
|
+
[name: string]: unknown;
|
|
1433
|
+
};
|
|
1434
|
+
content: {
|
|
1435
|
+
"application/json": components["schemas"]["InvitationPreviewResponse"];
|
|
1436
|
+
};
|
|
1437
|
+
};
|
|
1438
|
+
};
|
|
1439
|
+
};
|
|
1440
|
+
workspaces_api_v1_invitations_claim_create: {
|
|
1441
|
+
parameters: {
|
|
1442
|
+
query?: never;
|
|
1443
|
+
header?: never;
|
|
1444
|
+
path: {
|
|
1445
|
+
token: string;
|
|
1446
|
+
};
|
|
1447
|
+
cookie?: never;
|
|
1448
|
+
};
|
|
1449
|
+
requestBody?: never;
|
|
1450
|
+
responses: {
|
|
1451
|
+
200: {
|
|
1452
|
+
headers: {
|
|
1453
|
+
[name: string]: unknown;
|
|
1454
|
+
};
|
|
1455
|
+
content: {
|
|
1456
|
+
"application/json": components["schemas"]["InvitationClaimResponse"];
|
|
1457
|
+
};
|
|
1458
|
+
};
|
|
1459
|
+
};
|
|
1460
|
+
};
|
|
1461
|
+
workspaces_api_v1_invitations_decline_create: {
|
|
1462
|
+
parameters: {
|
|
1463
|
+
query?: never;
|
|
1464
|
+
header?: never;
|
|
1465
|
+
path: {
|
|
1466
|
+
token: string;
|
|
1467
|
+
};
|
|
1468
|
+
cookie?: never;
|
|
1469
|
+
};
|
|
1470
|
+
requestBody?: never;
|
|
1471
|
+
responses: {
|
|
1472
|
+
/** @description No response body */
|
|
1473
|
+
204: {
|
|
1474
|
+
headers: {
|
|
1475
|
+
[name: string]: unknown;
|
|
1476
|
+
};
|
|
1477
|
+
content?: never;
|
|
1478
|
+
};
|
|
1479
|
+
};
|
|
1480
|
+
};
|
|
733
1481
|
workspaces_api_v1_invitations_accept_create: {
|
|
734
1482
|
parameters: {
|
|
735
1483
|
query?: never;
|
|
@@ -755,5 +1503,24 @@ export interface operations {
|
|
|
755
1503
|
};
|
|
756
1504
|
};
|
|
757
1505
|
};
|
|
1506
|
+
workspaces_api_v1_roles_retrieve: {
|
|
1507
|
+
parameters: {
|
|
1508
|
+
query?: never;
|
|
1509
|
+
header?: never;
|
|
1510
|
+
path?: never;
|
|
1511
|
+
cookie?: never;
|
|
1512
|
+
};
|
|
1513
|
+
requestBody?: never;
|
|
1514
|
+
responses: {
|
|
1515
|
+
200: {
|
|
1516
|
+
headers: {
|
|
1517
|
+
[name: string]: unknown;
|
|
1518
|
+
};
|
|
1519
|
+
content: {
|
|
1520
|
+
"application/json": components["schemas"]["RoleListResponse"];
|
|
1521
|
+
};
|
|
1522
|
+
};
|
|
1523
|
+
};
|
|
1524
|
+
};
|
|
758
1525
|
}
|
|
759
1526
|
//# sourceMappingURL=schema.d.ts.map
|