@stalfh233/omc-cli 0.5.0 → 0.5.2

package/dist/approval-token.js

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+import { createHash, createHmac, randomUUID, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
+export class ApprovalTokenRejectedError extends Error {
+    reason;
+    constructor(reason) {
+        super(`approval token rejected: ${reason}`);
+        this.reason = reason;
+    }
+}
+function canonical(value) {
+    return JSON.stringify(sort(value));
+}
+function sort(value) {
+    if (Array.isArray(value))
+        return value.map(sort);
+    if (value && typeof value === "object")
+        return Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(value)
+            .sort(([a], [b]) => a.localeCompare(b))
+            .map(([k, v]) => [k, sort(v)]));
+    return value;
+}
+export function packageFingerprint(plan) {
+    return createHash("sha256")
+        .update(canonical({
+        environment: plan.environment,
+        environmentFingerprint: plan.environmentFingerprint,
+        actions: plan.actions.map((a) => ({ tool: a.tool, args: sort(a.args) })),
+    }))
+        .digest("hex");
+}
+export class ApprovalTokenService {
+    key;
+    ttlMs;
+    now;
+    used = new Set();
+    constructor(options) {
+        const key = Buffer.from(options.key, "base64");
+        if (key.length !== 32)
+            throw new Error("approval token key must be exactly 32 bytes (base64).");
+        this.key = key;
+        this.ttlMs = options.ttlMs ?? 10 * 60 * 1000;
+        this.now = options.now ?? Date.now;
+    }
+    requestApproval(plan) {
+        const approvalId = randomUUID();
+        const fingerprint = packageFingerprint(plan);
+        const issuedAt = this.now();
+        const expiresAt = issuedAt + this.ttlMs;
+        const payload = canonical({
+            v: 1,
+            approvalId,
+            packageFingerprint: fingerprint,
+            issuedAt,
+            expiresAt,
+        });
+        const sig = createHmac("sha256", this.key).update(payload).digest("base64url");
+        const token = Buffer.from(payload, "utf8").toString("base64url") + "." + sig;
+        return {
+            token,
+            approvalId,
+            packageFingerprint: fingerprint,
+            expiresAt: new Date(expiresAt).toISOString(),
+            ttlSeconds: Math.round(this.ttlMs / 1000),
+            singleUse: true,
+        };
+    }
+    verify(plan, token) {
+        const parts = token.split(".");
+        if (parts.length !== 2 || !parts[0] || !parts[1])
+            throw new ApprovalTokenRejectedError("token-malformed");
+        let payload;
+        try {
+            payload = Buffer.from(parts[0], "base64url").toString("utf8");
+        }
+        catch {
+            throw new ApprovalTokenRejectedError("token-malformed");
+        }
+        let decoded;
+        try {
+            decoded = JSON.parse(payload);
+        }
+        catch {
+            throw new ApprovalTokenRejectedError("token-malformed");
+        }
+        const expectedSig = createHmac("sha256", this.key).update(payload).digest("base64url");
+        if (!timingSafeEqualB64(parts[1], expectedSig))
+            throw new ApprovalTokenRejectedError("token-signature-invalid");
+        if (this.used.has(String(decoded.approvalId)))
+            throw new ApprovalTokenRejectedError("token-already-used");
+        if (Number(decoded.expiresAt) <= this.now())
+            throw new ApprovalTokenRejectedError("token-expired");
+        if (decoded.packageFingerprint !== packageFingerprint(plan))
+            throw new ApprovalTokenRejectedError("package-fingerprint-mismatch");
+        this.used.add(String(decoded.approvalId));
+        return { approvalId: String(decoded.approvalId) };
+    }
+}
+function timingSafeEqualB64(a, b) {
+    const ba = Buffer.from(a);
+    const bb = Buffer.from(b);
+    return ba.length === bb.length && timingSafeEqual(ba, bb);
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=approval-token.js.map

package/dist/bench/fake-http-server.js

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+import { createServer } from "node:http";
+import { FakeCloudPivot } from "../fake/index.js";
+export async function startFakeHttpServer() {
+    const server = createServer();
+    await new Promise((resolve) => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve));
+    const address = server.address();
+    if (address === null || typeof address === "string") {
+        server.closeAllConnections?.();
+        await new Promise((resolve) => server.close(() => resolve()));
+        throw new Error("fake http server has no listen address");
+    }
+    const url = `http://127.0.0.1:${address.port}`;
+    const fake = new FakeCloudPivot({ version: "8.6.26", baseUrl: url });
+    server.on("request", (request, response) => {
+        const chunks = [];
+        request.on("data", (chunk) => chunks.push(chunk));
+        request.on("end", () => {
+            const target = new URL(request.url ?? "/", url);
+            const query = {};
+            for (const [key, value] of target.searchParams)
+                query[key] = value;
+            const raw = Buffer.concat(chunks);
+            const contentType = request.headers["content-type"] ?? "";
+            const body = raw.length === 0 ? undefined : contentType.includes("json") ? JSON.parse(raw.toString("utf8")) : raw.toString("utf8");
+            const headers = {};
+            for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(request.headers)) {
+                if (typeof value === "string") {
+                    const capitalized = key.replace(/\b\w/g, (c) => c.toUpperCase()).replace(/-(\w)/g, (_m, c) => `-${c.toUpperCase()}`);
+                    headers[capitalized] = value;
+                }
+            }
+            fake
+                .request({
+                path: target.pathname,
+                method: request.method === "POST" ? "POST" : "GET",
+                ...(Object.keys(query).length > 0 ? { query } : {}),
+                ...(body === undefined ? {} : { body }),
+                headers,
+            })
+                .then((result) => {
+                const payload = Buffer.isBuffer(result.body) ? result.body : JSON.stringify(result.body);
+                response.writeHead(result.status, Buffer.isBuffer(result.body) ? undefined : { "Content-Type": "application/json" });
+                response.end(payload);
+            })
+                .catch(() => {
+                response.writeHead(500, { "Content-Type": "application/json" });
+                response.end(JSON.stringify({ errcode: 500, errmsg: "fake transport failure", data: null }));
+            });
+        });
+    });
+    return {
+        fake,
+        url,
+        close: () => new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+            server.closeAllConnections?.();
+            server.close((error) => (error ? reject(error) : resolve()));
+        }),
+    };
+}
+export function canonicalBusinessCalls(fake) {
+    return JSON.stringify(fake.state.callLog
+        .filter((entry) => !entry.path.startsWith("/user/") && !entry.path.startsWith("/api/public/") && !entry.path.startsWith("/api/api/organization/"))
+        .map((entry) => ({ path: entry.path, method: entry.method, body: entry.body ?? null, query: entry.query && Object.keys(entry.query).length > 0 ? entry.query : null })));
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=fake-http-server.js.map

package/dist/bench/intent-face-eval.js

@@ -122,24 +122,24 @@ function freshHome(url) {
     writeFileSync(join(home, "credentials"), JSON.stringify({ eval: { username: "tester", password: "eval-face-password" } }));
     return home;
 }
-const LADDER_INTENT = `intentVersion: 1
-models:
-  - code: eval_m1
-    name: 评测建模
-    fields:
-      - code: f_title
-        name: 标题
-        type: SHORT_TEXT
-      - code: f_amount
-        name: 金额
-        type: NUMERICAL
-        options:
-          scale: 3
-      - code: f_when
-        name: 日期
-        type: DATE
-    form:
-      publish: true
+const LADDER_INTENT = `intentVersion: 1
+models:
+  - code: eval_m1
+    name: 评测建模
+    fields:
+      - code: f_title
+        name: 标题
+        type: SHORT_TEXT
+      - code: f_amount
+        name: 金额
+        type: NUMERICAL
+        options:
+          scale: 3
+      - code: f_when
+        name: 日期
+        type: DATE
+    form:
+      publish: true
 `;
 export const INTENT_FACE_TASKS = [
     {
@@ -163,12 +163,12 @@ export const INTENT_FACE_TASKS = [
         id: "rule-backfill-ladder",
         description: "two models via intent + DYNAMIC backfill rule + enable + trigger row + verified target readback (mixed face: intent + escape hatch)",
         async run(agent, server) {
-            const modelsIntent = agent.writeIntent("models.yaml", `intentVersion: 1
-models:
-  - code: eval_rs
-    name: 回填源
-  - code: eval_rt
-    name: 回填目标
+            const modelsIntent = agent.writeIntent("models.yaml", `intentVersion: 1
+models:
+  - code: eval_rs
+    name: 回填源
+  - code: eval_rt
+    name: 回填目标
 `);
             await agent.intentValidate(modelsIntent);
             const { plan, planFile } = await agent.intentPlan(modelsIntent);
@@ -209,27 +209,27 @@ models:
         id: "input-error-recovery",
         description: "bad intent -> validate exit 10 with source location -> fix -> plan/apply -> idempotent re-plan/re-apply with zero duplicate wires",
         async run(agent, server) {
-            const bad = agent.writeIntent("intent.yaml", `intentVersion: 1
-models:
-  - code: eval_idem
-    name: 幂等模型
-    fields:
-      - code: f_bad
-        name: 坏类型
-        type: HOLOGRAM
+            const bad = agent.writeIntent("intent.yaml", `intentVersion: 1
+models:
+  - code: eval_idem
+    name: 幂等模型
+    fields:
+      - code: f_bad
+        name: 坏类型
+        type: HOLOGRAM
 `);
             const rejected = await agent.run(["intent", "validate", bad]);
             ok(rejected.code === 10 && rejected.envelope.error?.code === "invalid-input", `expected invalid-input exit 10, got ${String(rejected.code)}`);
             const first = rejected.envelope.result.errors[0];
             ok(first.code === "intent-field-type-unknown" && typeof first.line === "number", `located error: ${JSON.stringify(first).slice(0, 200)}`);
-            const fixed = agent.writeIntent("intent.yaml", `intentVersion: 1
-models:
-  - code: eval_idem
-    name: 幂等模型
-    fields:
-      - code: f_bad
-        name: 改正的字段
-        type: SHORT_TEXT
+            const fixed = agent.writeIntent("intent.yaml", `intentVersion: 1
+models:
+  - code: eval_idem
+    name: 幂等模型
+    fields:
+      - code: f_bad
+        name: 改正的字段
+        type: SHORT_TEXT
 `);
             const validated = await agent.intentValidate(fixed);
             ok(validated.valid === true, `fixed validate: ${JSON.stringify(validated).slice(0, 200)}`);

package/dist/cli-contract.js

@@ -39,15 +39,52 @@ export function asciiStdout() {
         return true;
     if (override === "0")
         return false;
+    // Do not spawn chcp on POSIX: it costs a process per invocation and can only
+    // ever answer "not a Windows code page here".
+    if (process.platform !== "win32")
+        return false;
     return asciiStdoutFor(process.platform, process.stdout.isTTY === true, activeCodePage());
 }
+/** Escape every non-ASCII code unit to `\uXXXX` (idempotent, JSON-safe). */
+export function escapeNonAscii(text) {
+    return text.replace(/[\u007f-\uffff]/g, (character) => `\\u${character.charCodeAt(0).toString(16).padStart(4, "0")}`);
+}
+/**
+ * Apply the SAME code-page policy to stderr diagnostics.
+ *
+ * stdout was made ASCII-safe years ago, but every human/diagnostic line goes
+ * through `console.error`/`process.stderr.write` as raw UTF-8. Under a legacy
+ * Windows pipe (`omc … 2>&1 | tee log`, `npm test`, an agent capturing output)
+ * that is cp936 vs UTF-8 — the user sees `����` instead of the message. Escaping
+ * the same way as the envelope keeps diagnostics decodable, and a real console
+ * (TTY) is untouched because Node writes UTF-16 through WriteConsoleW there.
+ *
+ * Gated on `asciiStdout()` so `OMC_ASCII_STDOUT=0` (what the test suite sets)
+ * still yields raw UTF-8 for assertions that match Chinese text.
+ */
+let stderrHardened = false;
+export function installCodePageSafeStderr() {
+    if (stderrHardened)
+        return;
+    stderrHardened = true;
+    if (!asciiStdout())
+        return;
+    const original = process.stderr.write.bind(process.stderr);
+    process.stderr.write = ((chunk, encodingOrCb, maybeCb) => {
+        if (typeof chunk !== "string")
+            return original(chunk, encodingOrCb, maybeCb);
+        return original(escapeNonAscii(chunk), encodingOrCb, maybeCb);
+    });
+}
 let cachedCodePage;
 function activeCodePage() {
     if (cachedCodePage !== undefined)
         return cachedCodePage;
     cachedCodePage = null;
     try {
-        const chcp = spawnSync("chcp.com", [], { encoding: "utf8" });
+        // windowsHide: a GUI host (editor task, shortcut) must not flash a console
+        // window for a probe; timeout: never hang a one-shot CLI on chcp.
+        const chcp = spawnSync("chcp.com", [], { encoding: "utf8", windowsHide: true, timeout: 2000 });
         cachedCodePage = /([0-9]{3,5})\s*$/.exec((chcp.stdout || "").trim().split("\n").pop() ?? "")?.[1] ?? null;
     }
     catch {

package/dist/cli-output.js

@@ -82,8 +82,14 @@ function emitAsciiBannerOnce() {
         return;
     asciiBannerEmitted = true;
     // r73 win32 实测：管道 + 非 UTF-8 代码页时输出被 ASCII 转义（\uXXXX），用户视为乱码。
-    // 横幅走 stderr（不进管道、不破坏单信封契约），在痛点时刻给出两个解法。
-    process.stderr.write("[omc] 当前控制台代码页非 UTF-8，中文已 ASCII 转义防乱码。要原样中文：本次调用加 --utf8，或 chcp 65001 后重跑，或设 OMC_ASCII_STDOUT=0。\n");
+    // 横幅走 stderr（不进管道、不破坏单信封契约），在痛点时刻给出解法。
+    // 只有「自动判定」成 ascii 时才提示：调用方显式设了 OMC_ASCII_STDOUT/--utf8
+    // 说明已知情，再提示就是每次调用多两行噪音。
+    // 注意：ascii 模式下 stderr 本身也会被转义，所以横幅必须是纯 ASCII。
+    if (process.env.OMC_ASCII_STDOUT !== undefined)
+        return;
+    process.stderr.write("[omc] non-UTF-8 console code page: non-ASCII is \\u-escaped to survive the pipe. "
+        + "Raw text: add --utf8, or `chcp 65001`, or set OMC_ASCII_STDOUT=0.\n");
 }
 /**
  * Attach a repeat warning to a refusal that repeats the previous one. Refusal

package/dist/cli.js

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ import { BATCH_MAX_ENTRIES, runBatchCall } from "./batch-call.js";
 import { cmdModelScaffold } from "./model-scaffold.js";
 import { cmdModelPurge } from "./model-purge.js";
 import { environmentWritable, requiresProductionConfirmation } from "./environment-policy.js";
-import { CLI_EXIT_CODES, classifyResult, envelope, errorEnvelope, refusalText, requestId } from "./cli-contract.js";
+import { CLI_EXIT_CODES, classifyResult, envelope, errorEnvelope, installCodePageSafeStderr, refusalText, requestId } from "./cli-contract.js";
 import { configureOutput, humanSummary, stripOutputFlags, writeEnvelope } from "./cli-output.js";
 import { beginUsage, completeUsage, currentUsageArgsDigest, ensureProjectIgnore, priorIdenticalSuccess, recordUsageOutput, usageReport } from "./usage-log.js";
 import { artifactFetchHint, artifactRoot, boundResult, emitInvalid, emitResult, emitThrown, emitTransportResult, outputBudget, readArtifact, withTransport, } from "./command-transport.js";
@@ -174,6 +174,11 @@ async function cmdDoctor(store, environment, serviceCode) {
         const session = new CloudPivotSession(resolved.name, resolved.profile, credential);
         await session.login();
         steps.push(`登录      ok  企业=${session.enterpriseId()} 管理员=${session.administrator()}`);
+        // A deployment whose system/config `client` blob is absent/unreadable still
+        // logs in (client_secret is optional on 8.x). Say so as a WARN: it used to
+        // abort the login and report env-unreachable on a perfectly usable box.
+        for (const note of session.loginNotes())
+            steps.push(`OAuth 配置  WARN ${note}`);
         const version = session.detectedVersion();
         if (!version) {
             steps.push(`版本      WARN 无版本证据；写入将保守拒绝（fail closed）`);
@@ -1456,6 +1461,9 @@ function joinSplitFlagValues(raw, flags) {
 }
 async function main() {
     let commandExitCode = 0;
+    // stderr is the diagnostics stream: apply the same Windows code-page policy
+    // as stdout before ANY message is written (banner, doctor, refusals).
+    installCodePageSafeStderr();
     beginUsage(argv);
     const command = new Command();
     const ownPackageVersion = () => {

package/dist/fake/app.js

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+import { NOT_HANDLED } from "./state.js";
+/** app-management lane: application package CRUD. Twin of src/lanes/app.ts. */
+export const appRoute = (ctx, input) => {
+    const q = input.query ?? {};
+    const body = (input.body ?? {});
+    switch (input.path) {
+        case "/api/api/app/apppackage/list":
+            return ctx.options.applicationList ?? [...ctx.state.apps.values()].map((app) => ({ appCode: app.code, appName: app.name, id: app.id, groupId: app.groupId, published: app.published !== false }));
+        case "/api/api/app/apppackage/list_all_group":
+            return [...ctx.state.appGroups.values()].map((group) => ({
+                id: group.id,
+                code: group.code,
+                name: group.name,
+                children: [...ctx.state.apps.values()].filter((app) => app.groupId === group.id).map((app) => ({ id: app.id, code: app.code, name: app.name, groupId: app.groupId })),
+            }));
+        case "/api/api/app/apppackage/create": {
+            const code = String(body.code);
+            ctx.state.apps.set(code, { id: `app-${ctx.state.apps.size + 1}`, code, name: String(body.name ?? code), groupId: String(body.groupId ?? [...ctx.state.appGroups.keys()][0] ?? "group-1") });
+            return null;
+        }
+        case "/api/api/app/apppackage/get": {
+            const app = [...ctx.state.apps.values()].find((row) => row.code === q.appCode);
+            return app ? { id: app.id, code: app.code, name: app.name, name_i18n: JSON.stringify({ "zh-CN": app.name }), groupId: app.groupId, enabled: true } : null;
+        }
+        case "/api/api/app/apppackage/update": {
+            // AppIntegrationFacadeImpl.updateAppPackage: id-required whole-record
+            // update; explicit groupId honored; blank groupId would be forced to
+            // the "default" group; enabled !== true wipes workflow favorites.
+            const target = [...ctx.state.apps.values()].find((row) => row.id === body.id);
+            if (target) {
+                if (typeof body.groupId === "string" && body.groupId)
+                    target.groupId = body.groupId;
+                if (typeof body.name === "string" && body.name)
+                    target.name = body.name;
+            }
+            return null;
+        }
+        case "/api/api/app/apppackage/delete":
+            ctx.state.apps.delete(String(q.appCode));
+            return null;
+        default:
+            return NOT_HANDLED;
+    }
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=app.js.map