@staix/agent-hub 0.15.0 → 0.17.0

package/docs/sdlc.md

@@ -10,17 +10,17 @@ A reviewed head is a full lowercase 40-character SHA observed through a successf
 
 The built-in lifecycle follows the [AI-Native SDLC Playbook](https://claude.com/resources/articles/the-ai-native-sdlc-playbook). Stage ids describe the hub's artifacts and handoffs; the playbook labels group them into Plan, Design, Build, Test, Deploy and Maintain.
 
-| Stage id | Playbook stage | Acting role | Artifact or exit gate | Current enforcement |
-| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
-| intent | Plan | person/planner | intent or backlog identity | person spec acceptance required at build entry in enforce |
-| spec | Design | person/planner | issue identity and scope | spec acceptance/body drift checked at build entry |
-| plan | Build | planner/owner | plan, branch, existing predecessor gates | current planner review required at build admission; literal-path conformance gates approval in enforce |
-| build | Build | owner | PR identity/current head and local check on that head | entering review, when enabled |
-| test | Test | verifier/reviewer | required checks and local gate on the reviewed head | approval, when enabled; bug test integrity below, evals pending S5 |
-| review | Deploy | assigned reviewer | current head-bound verdict, no pending change request/open thread; AC checklist under Compliance | approval, when enabled; open Important findings block in enforce |
-| merge | Deploy | person | current-head readiness, ordered touching PRs | shown; no mutation |
-| release | Deploy | person | merged commit, version/tag, docs freshness/live receipt checklist | person authorization and optional tag hook below |
-| maintain | Maintain | person/planner | follow-up intent and operational evidence | shown; metrics and control bands from S7 (`ahub sdlc metrics`) |
+| Stage id | Playbook stage | Acting role | Artifact or exit gate | Current enforcement | Class (#784) |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| intent | Plan | person/planner | intent or backlog identity | person spec acceptance required at build entry in enforce | person-only (acceptance) |
+| spec | Design | person/planner | issue identity and scope | spec acceptance/body drift checked at build entry | person-only (acceptance) |
+| plan | Build | planner/owner | plan, branch, existing predecessor gates | current planner review required at build admission; literal-path conformance gates approval in enforce | agent-executable |
+| build | Build | owner | PR identity/current head and local check on that head | entering review, when enabled | agent-executable |
+| test | Test | verifier/reviewer | required checks and local gate on the reviewed head | approval, when enabled; bug test integrity below, evals pending S5 | agent-executable |
+| review | Deploy | assigned reviewer | current head-bound verdict, no pending change request/open thread; AC checklist under Compliance | approval, when enabled; open Important findings block in enforce | agent-executable |
+| merge | Deploy | person | current-head readiness, ordered touching PRs | shown; no mutation | agent-executable where the project's AGENTS.md delegates it to the approving reviewer (this repository does, #784); the hub still shows the person as actor |
+| release | Deploy | person | merged commit, version/tag, docs freshness/live receipt checklist | person authorization and optional tag hook below | agent-evidence / person-verdict (consent) |
+| maintain | Maintain | person/planner | follow-up intent and operational evidence | shown; metrics and control bands from S7 (`ahub sdlc metrics`) | agent-executable |
 
 Stored `implement` and `verify` stage ids read as `build` and `test`. A write that names the old id stores the id the configuration lists, so new enabled-lifecycle receipts use the canonical ids. The default remains off, preserving existing off-mode output, receipt and schema shapes. Status, explain, console and dashboard name the playbook stage beside enabled lifecycle ids.
 

package/docs/security.md

@@ -6,28 +6,30 @@ agent-hub connects agents that can each run commands. This page says what the hu
 
 - **Other agents' text is untrusted.** Every message that crosses from one peer to another is framed as untrusted input: a channel tag with `meta.source` for Claude started with `ahub claude`; otherwise a fixed header line (`frame()`, `[agent-hub message from ...]`) with an instruction that says it is untrusted, the plugin's server instructions for a tools-only Claude reading `hub_inbox` and a standing instruction for the others. A message body cannot forge the hub's own headers: such lines are quoted (`sanitize`). Replies inherit a hop count capped at 3, so agents cannot ping-pong forever; neither a digest nor a steer can reset it.
 - **The control link is loopback plus a secret.** The daemon and the Codex proxy bind 127.0.0.1 only. The control WebSocket requires a per-run token (`.agenthub/state/control-token`, mode 600), and both servers refuse any request that carries an `Origin` header: any web page can open a WebSocket to localhost, and browsers always send `Origin`. The bearer header a Codex TUI sends to the proxy carries only the terminal launch id (#586): it binds terminal ownership and is not a credential. External clients cannot claim the console user's id or a hub-managed peer's id.
-- **Permission prompts stay on unless an operator selects a permission mode.** `ask` leaves native decisions unchanged. `ask-when-needed` grants scoped Claude file tools or Pi/local writes and edits; Kimi and Codex use their own native policies. `never-ask` requires explicit runtime confirmation or a person's console `y` for a config default at hub start. Until that config confirmation the peer runs in `ask`. Kimi's and `local`'s permission requests are relayed to the console and cancelled after `approvals.timeout_s` (default 120 s) of silence; the macOS notification for a waiting request carries the peer and the tool name only. The one exception is the hub's own tools (`hub_send` and the task tools, matched by exact name): Kimi's requests for them are approved once without a prompt and logged by name, the same trust Codex gets through `approval_mode` in the hub's config. They invoke hub-owned operations rather than arbitrary file or shell tools, and every call passes the hub's own checks. A call the always-ask policy classes (below) is never approved this way, whatever its title. Identity comes from the exact permission title, or from the earlier tool-call title bound to the same call id and resolved against the configured MCP servers when the permission title contains argument JSON (Qwen). Payload text and unrelated display titles never establish identity. Configured ACP kinds (#451) never get this exception: a request whose title spells a hub tool exactly still goes to the person approval path, and only a mapped native mode changes what the agent itself asks. For ACP agents, a payload longer than the console shows is marked as cut and never offers a session-wide grant. Pi's write, edit, shell and git write requests are relayed the same way and can be answered `Always allow <tool> until Pi restarts`: later calls of that tool by the same Pi start skip the prompt but stay inside the path guard and sandbox. The grant covers every later call of that tool whatever its payload, is kept in memory only, cannot be given from the dashboard, and each call it allows is logged by tool name. A Pi or `local` request whose call was cancelled or whose turn ended is withdrawn at once: a later answer is refused and grants nothing, an `Always allow` included. One shell command runs without a hub approval: the `!command` a person types in the managed Pi TUI. It stays inside the same sandbox and denylist, and the hub takes it only from the verified owner process of a Pi in TUI mode, while Pi is idle, on a reservation that is used once; a model's own bash call never takes that path (issue #253). `--unattended` turns prompts off, says so loudly, and is never the default; a classed call from a hub-owned ACP peer still waits for a person under it.
-- **A committed config cannot choose launch commands, credential files, data endpoints, permission modes or a wider sandbox.** The machine-local fields (`kimi_cmd`, `permission_modes`, `codex_bin`, `pi.cmd`, `checks`, `mlx.bin`, `mlx.runtimeDir`, `mlx.modelPath`, `omniroute.urls`, `omniroute.access_hosts`, the `omniroute` key files, `memory.worker_url`, `local.read_allow`, `local.bash_network`, `local.network_allow`, `terminal.open`, `instances`, `action_policy`) apply only from a config file git confirms nobody committed (`instances` and `action_policy` are read only from an untracked `.agenthub/config.local.json`; in `config.json` they are ignored even when untracked): `.agenthub/config.json` or `.agenthub/config.local.json`, matched by file identity so no other spelling the file system accepts slips past, and `.agenthub` itself not a committed symlink or submodule. Without a repository, or when git fails, they keep their defaults; an empty value always means the default. "Untracked" is answered by the repository that contains the project: a checkout copied or extracted into an unrelated repository, or into an ignored directory of one, is trusted like your own files. So a cloned repository cannot choose a launch command, a completion check, a gateway to send a key file to, a memory endpoint, a permission mode, the command that opens a terminal, or a wider sandbox. A command in `checks` runs as you, outside the local worker's sandbox, like a git hook. So do the `setup` and `verify` commands of a benchmark suite (issue #251): `ahub bench run <suite.json>` is a person's command, refused from an agent session, and it resets the work tree for each attempt, so it runs only with `bench.enabled`, at the root of a clean repository that tracks nothing under `.agenthub/`. Nothing in `routing.toml` or in task text is ever run. `routing.toml` and the other shared fields still come from the checkout, and they matter: `routing.toml` picks the models the local worker and the hub's inference use at your gateway and can turn the PII constraint off, and roles and budget shape who does what. Review them in a repository you do not trust. The hub's own git calls outside the sandbox (snapshots, facts, config trust, project discovery, memory recall, the bench runner) all use the single hardened implementation in the exact-pinned first-party `@staix/agent-mem/platform` package, re-exported by `src/hub/git.ts`, which disables the programs a repository's configuration can name — the file-system monitor, hooks, external diff, the pager, and the credential and askpass helpers, with prompts failing closed — so a config that ever does get written cannot run code with the hub's rights. Of those, the monitor, hooks and external diff are reachable by commands the hub issues (the planted-program test exercises all three; a `diff --no-index` reads the repo's config, so that call also passes `--no-ext-diff` and `--no-textconv`); the pager is not (every call pipes stdout). Credential and askpass helpers are disabled for project repositories; memory sync alone may use credentials for its own memory repository, without prompts. The cost: `core.fsmonitor=false` also turns off a person's enabled built-in monitor for the hub's own calls, so the per-turn snapshot's `add -A` scans the whole tree (the snapshot Git calls of one burst share a 250 ms budget, each call at most 10 s; a boundary that runs out is recorded as unknown, never as a stale baseline) (#576). git has no global switch for filter drivers, and of the hub's commands only the snapshot's `add`/`restore` would run one (its driver command lives in the protected `.git/config`).
+- **Permission prompts stay on unless an operator selects a permission mode.** `ask` leaves native decisions unchanged. `ask-when-needed` grants scoped Claude file tools or Pi/local writes and edits; Kimi and Codex use their own native policies. `never-ask` requires explicit runtime confirmation or a person's console `y` for a config default at hub start. Until that config confirmation the peer runs in `ask`. Kimi's and `local`'s permission requests are relayed to the console and cancelled after `approvals.timeout_s` (default 120 s) of silence; the macOS notification for a waiting request carries the peer and the tool name only. The one exception is the hub's own tools (`hub_send` and the task tools, matched by exact name): Kimi's requests for them are approved once without a prompt and logged by name, the same trust Codex gets through `approval_mode` in the hub's config. They invoke hub-owned operations rather than arbitrary file or shell tools, and every call passes the hub's own checks. A call the always-ask policy classes (below) is never approved this way, whatever its title. Identity comes from the exact permission title, or from the earlier tool-call title bound to the same call id and resolved against the configured MCP servers when the permission title contains argument JSON (Qwen). Payload text and unrelated display titles never establish identity. Configured ACP kinds (#451) never get this exception: a request whose title spells a hub tool exactly still goes to the person approval path, and only a mapped native mode changes what the agent itself asks. For ACP agents, a payload longer than the console shows is marked as cut and never offers a session-wide grant. Pi's write, edit, shell and git write requests are relayed the same way and can be answered `Always allow <tool> until Pi restarts`: later calls of that tool by the same Pi start skip the prompt but stay inside the path guard and sandbox. The grant covers every later call of that tool whatever its payload, is kept in memory only, cannot be given from the dashboard, and each call it allows is logged by tool name. A Pi or `local` request whose call was cancelled or whose turn ended is withdrawn at once: a later answer is refused and grants nothing, an `Always allow` included. One shell command runs without a hub approval: the `!command` a person types in the managed Pi TUI. It stays inside the same sandbox and denylist, and the hub takes it only from the verified owner process of a Pi in TUI mode, while Pi is idle, on a reservation that is used once; a model's own bash call never takes that path (issue #253). `--unattended` turns prompts off, says so loudly, and is never the default; a classed call from a hub-owned ACP peer, the local worker or Pi still waits for a person under it.
+- **A committed config cannot choose launch commands, credential files, data endpoints, permission modes or a wider sandbox.** The machine-local fields (`kimi_cmd`, `permission_modes`, `codex_bin`, `pi.cmd`, `checks`, `mlx.bin`, `mlx.runtimeDir`, `mlx.modelPath`, `omniroute.urls`, `omniroute.access_hosts`, the `omniroute` key files, `memory.worker_url` (still accepted, ignored since 0.16.0), `local.read_allow`, `local.bash_network`, `local.network_allow`, `terminal.open`, `instances`, `action_policy`) apply only from a config file git confirms nobody committed (`instances` and `action_policy` are read only from an untracked `.agenthub/config.local.json`; in `config.json` they are ignored even when untracked): `.agenthub/config.json` or `.agenthub/config.local.json`, matched by file identity so no other spelling the file system accepts slips past, and `.agenthub` itself not a committed symlink or submodule. Without a repository, or when git fails, they keep their defaults; an empty value always means the default. "Untracked" is answered by the repository that contains the project: a checkout copied or extracted into an unrelated repository, or into an ignored directory of one, is trusted like your own files. So a cloned repository cannot choose a launch command, a completion check, a gateway to send a key file to, a memory endpoint, a permission mode, the command that opens a terminal, or a wider sandbox. A command in `checks` runs as you, outside the local worker's sandbox, like a git hook. So do the `setup` and `verify` commands of a benchmark suite (issue #251): `ahub bench run <suite.json>` is a person's command, refused from an agent session, and it resets the work tree for each attempt, so it runs only with `bench.enabled`, at the root of a clean repository that tracks nothing under `.agenthub/`. Nothing in `routing.toml` or in task text is ever run. `routing.toml` and the other shared fields still come from the checkout, and they matter: `routing.toml` picks the models the local worker and the hub's inference use at your gateway and can turn the PII constraint off, and roles and budget shape who does what. Review them in a repository you do not trust. The hub's own git calls outside the sandbox (snapshots, facts, config trust, project discovery, memory recall, the bench runner) all use the single hardened implementation in the exact-pinned first-party `@staix/agent-mem/platform` package, re-exported by `src/hub/git.ts`, which disables the programs a repository's configuration can name — the file-system monitor, hooks, external diff, the pager, and the credential and askpass helpers, with prompts failing closed — so a config that ever does get written cannot run code with the hub's rights. Of those, the monitor, hooks and external diff are reachable by commands the hub issues (the planted-program test exercises all three; a `diff --no-index` reads the repo's config, so that call also passes `--no-ext-diff` and `--no-textconv`); the pager is not (every call pipes stdout). Credential and askpass helpers are disabled for project repositories; memory sync alone may use credentials for its own memory repository, without prompts. The cost: `core.fsmonitor=false` also turns off a person's enabled built-in monitor for the hub's own calls, so the per-turn snapshot's `add -A` scans the whole tree (the snapshot Git calls of one burst share a 250 ms budget, each call at most 10 s; a boundary that runs out is recorded as unknown, never as a stale baseline) (#576). git has no global switch for filter drivers, and of the hub's commands only the snapshot's `add`/`restore` would run one (its driver command lives in the protected `.git/config`).
 - **Telemetry holds no bodies.** `.agenthub/state/events.jsonl` (issue #40) records envelope ids, routing and sizes, task ids and states, overlapping paths and token counts, and the task id (with a PII flag) that each usage and token record is attributed to. It never records a message body, a task title or detail, and marks private (PII) envelopes and tasks as such. Budget pauses, resumes and quota resets carry the peer, window, times and the hub's own reason text, and a person's release authorization its commit, version and docs digest. The usage roll-up (#683) folds the usage, token and limit records into `hub.db` and joins issue, PR and release from the board when read; `ahub usage` and the console's Usage panel answer only the console and a configured planner, and a planner not during a private turn. Kimi's token records (#285) are counted from its own session wire log under its home: only the four token integers, the model label and the row time are copied, and the record id is an opaque hash, never a path, session id or text. The log stays on the machine; `ahub export` only prints it. Two opt-in stores copy numbers from it into your home directory, shared by every project on the machine (directories mode 700, files 600): research records (issue #247, `research.enabled`) in `~/.agenthub/research/` hold per approved task the ids, states, counts, tokens, times and PII flag the events hold, a person's label from a closed list, and a hash in place of the project id; benchmark runs (issue #251) in `~/.agenthub/bench/` hold suite name and hash, arm label, the attached peers' ids, models and permission modes, task ids, outcomes, exit codes, counts, tokens and times, never suite text or a command's output.
 - **Snapshots stay in your repository.** Per-turn snapshots (issue #33) are git objects in the project's own object store, written through a temporary index; nothing is referenced, pushed or copied elsewhere, and `git gc` prunes them. They hold what the work tree held, including untracked files that are not ignored, so keep secrets in ignored files. They carry the repository's own permissions, and nothing caps their disk use but `git gc`. A turn of a peer holding an open PII task is not snapshotted; a PII file left in the project is snapshotted by later turns like any other file. `ahub undo` restores only files whose current content is exactly what the turn left.
 - **The edit hook reads, never decides.** `ahub check-path --hook` (issue #32) reads hub.db and returns context for Claude and a line for you; it sets no permission decision, so your permission rules stay in charge. It names other owners' task ids, titles and states, which then reach Claude's model; PII tasks are left out.
 - **The session record holds identities only.** `.agenthub/state/sessions.json` (issue #37, mode 600) keeps each attached peer's recovery metadata: launch options, session and thread ids, Pi's session file path. No message or task text; loss notices name deliveries by id, sender and public task title. The Pi continuity bookmark that recovery keeps across stop and archive (`.agenthub/state/recovery-continuity.json`, mode 600, at most 16 KiB) holds identities only too: operation and project ids, the project root, and Pi's session id, session file, backend and model name; a bookmark that is not a private regular file, is larger than that or names another project or operation reads as invalid, which is kept distinct from no bookmark.
-- **Context checkpoints have a separate text record.** Native occupancy readings carry numeric metadata only. An optional context checkpoint persists its summary in `.agenthub/state/context-checkpoint-<peer>.json` with mode 0600 and attempts shared-memory storage when enabled. Completion requires the outstanding request id, current peer/native session and transport generation; new connection claims invalidate old requests. Private turns, every open PII task associated with the peer as owner or reviewer (including pending review), and PII-pattern summaries are refused before persistence or cloud memory. Its text is never broadcast, and context pressure does not pause, reassign or replace the session.
+- **Context checkpoints have a separate text record.** Native occupancy readings carry numeric metadata only. An optional context checkpoint persists its summary in `.agenthub/state/context-checkpoint-<peer>.json` with mode 0600 and, when memory is enabled, proposes it as a machine-local memory candidate that only a person can accept. Completion requires the outstanding request id, current peer/native session and transport generation; new connection claims invalidate old requests. Private turns, every open PII task associated with the peer as owner or reviewer (including pending review), and PII-pattern summaries are refused before persistence or memory. Its text is never broadcast, and context pressure does not pause, reassign or replace the session.
 - **The local worker is boxed in.** Paths are resolved through symlinks and must stay inside the project; a secrets denylist (`.env*`, keys, credential files, the hub's own state and the state archives `ahub reset --all` leaves) applies to its file tools, its git arguments and its memory capture alike; `.git` and `.agenthub` are not writable. Writes, edits, shell commands and mutating git wait for approval unless the operator's permission mode grants them (writes and edits inside the grant filter in `ask-when-needed`, all four in `never-ask`; see below), and the approver sees what will be written or run, with control characters escaped. Everything it executes runs under the macOS sandbox, attended or not. Since 0.10 the profile starts from deny default (issue #39): commands run and read only the system, toolchain and project directories (and the project's git dir and the selected developer dir; with network on, the public CA bundles); no writes outside the project, its git dir and a temp dir of its own (`TMPDIR`, made for each command and removed when it ends; issue #63); no `.git` name at any depth, closing the creation, rename, symlink and gitfile routes to a planted repository, no `config` or `hooks` directly under one nor below the discovered modules root of the project's own `.git` (a submodule's git directory, nested submodules included; every term is anchored below that root, so a directory named `refs`, `config` or `hooks` above the project neither disables the rule nor trips it; a `/refs/` or `/logs/` segment below it keeps refs named `config` or `hooks` writable, and leaves a submodule whose own path contains such a segment uncovered; a submodule whose path has `hooks` as a whole component (`tools/hooks` included) fares worse: the rule matches its whole git directory, so every write there is refused; the discovered git directories, the modules root and every component in between are also refused as targets, closing the rename, replace and symlink routes to the same files), no `commondir` at any depth below one, with every such name matched folded against the code points HFS+ ignores (the fold covers the security-relevant names; on a volume that folds names, folded spellings of the components between `.git` and a submodule's git directory are not matched — the 1024-byte SBPL literal cannot hold a folded path — the same residual the external git dir rules carry since #270), and no `.agenthub` anywhere in the project (in an external git dir the `config`/`hooks` rules cover only its own children and the hooks directory's contents, so refs named `config` or `hooks` still work); a nested repository in bare layout stays open — the directory is the git dir, with no `.git` name to anchor a rule on, and the hub never runs git there, whatever the project root is: its calls are all `-C <project root>` or `--no-index` on temp files, and none descends into a nested directory's git layout, so a planted hook fires only if a person or another tool runs git in that directory themselves; the rules are probed on HFS+, which folds the 16 code points the patterns tolerate, and on a case-sensitive APFS image, which folds nothing (a folded spelling is an inert new file there and the real names stay refused); the cost is that `git init`, `git clone` and `git worktree add` do not run inside the sandbox (add, commit, stash, checkout and gc still do), `git submodule update --init` does not either (its git directory's `config` write is refused), and neither do `git worktree remove`, `git worktree prune` of a stale record, `git clean -ffd` in a project with a nested repository, or `rm -rf` of a directory that holds a `.git` (refusing the unlink is what stops the rename-out route); no network, loopback included, unless `local.bash_network`; with it, only through the hub's egress proxy to the hosts in `local.network_allow` (issue #65), which refuses names that resolve to internal addresses (behind NAT64 with the well-known prefix, by the IPv4 address the answer carries; a network-specific prefix is not recognised), so claude-mem and the Codex app-server stay out of reach (`"direct"` opens everything, until 0.13.0). One channel stays open: `trustd`, which TLS clients need, can fetch a certificate's AIA or OCSP URL on a command's behalf, outside the proxy. The allow-default profile of 0.9 and earlier was removed in 0.12.0 (issue #83); a `local.sandbox` setting is ignored with a note. The shared temp dirs (the user's and `/private/tmp`) are closed. Without the sandbox there is no `bash` tool.
 - **Capabilities are enforced, not suggested.** `capabilities` (issue #39) is checked by the daemon where task operations and messages arrive, so a peer cannot get round it by phrasing. A peer can never answer a permission request: the control link takes `permit` from the console role only, and a message that quotes a permit command is just text. Both bind the hub's own tool paths: a vendor agent with its own shell in the project (Codex, Claude, Kimi) can read `.agenthub/state/control-token` and connect as the console, which only the local worker's and Pi's sandbox prevents.
-- **PII has an enforced path.** A task matching `signals.pii_patterns` goes to `local` or to nobody; its text is absent from other peers' envelopes, the console stream, the log and the board listing; the console user reviews it; `local` answers such a turn to the console only, keeps it out of its history, refuses it when the only gateway is off campus, and may not save notes or spin off tasks during it. Nothing about it is sent to claude-mem, whose observer is a cloud model.
-- **A model screen can add to the patterns (issue #198).** With `signals.pii_screen = "local"` in `routing.toml` (default `off`; it applies while `constraints.pii = "local_only"`), a newly proposed task is read by a model before the hub does anything else with it: until the verdict it is on no board, in no envelope, before no triage model, and the hub makes no brief or note call for it. The local worker's claude-mem capture leaves its hub tool calls out (issue #230), so a proposal it makes in an ordinary turn cannot reach claude-mem ahead of the verdict that way. The screen runs on the model on this machine (MLX or Ollama, loopback only) or, without one, on the gateway only while `onCampus()` holds, and the gateway call is refused once more right before transport if the gateway is behind Access; task text never goes off campus to be screened. When the on-device generation slot is taken (Pi generating, another screen), the screen goes to the campus gateway instead of waiting, and on campus a device that fails or is still loading after 60% of the deadline hands over to the gateway too; off campus it waits for the slot and the device within the deadline. With the legacy MLX provider the screen may start an `mlx_lm.server`, as Pi's relay does, and it stays running until `ahub models stop`. Its answer is `pii` or `clear` plus a category from a closed list (name, student id, phone, address, grade, health, other). Anything else, a timeout (8 s, one call and one generation slot per item), a missing or off-campus model, or text longer than 6000 UTF-8 bytes (about 2000 Hangul syllables) is `unknown`, and an unknown task is a PII task: this is the hub's one model call that fails closed, so with the screener down every new task waits for `local`. An unknown verdict has the costs of any PII task, even when a second look clears it later: opening it lifts every silent turn-free cohort for good and turns facts off while it is open, and off campus a proposal without a class is refused (triage is not asked for a PII task there), with an error that says so. Off campus with the on-device slot taken, a task stays `unknown` until it is screened again: while it is still proposed and no peer ever owned it, the hub's release timer (every 60 s, one task at a time, the least tried first, at most 10 times per task in a hub run; never text too long to read) asks again, and `clear` lifts its `pii` signal and routes it through the class peers (a named owner is not remembered; a reserved one is offered first, as always). A task `local` took keeps its PII path, also once it is declined back to nobody. A pattern match is PII without a call. The task's history records the source of its `pii` signal (`regex`, `screen` with the category, or `unknown` with the reason), an unknown verdict is a console line naming the task id only, and `events.jsonl` gets a `pii_screen` record with the item kind, label, source, category, reason and latency, never the text. A routing explanation of a draft does not call the screen and says so.
-- **Free text is screened too.** On an ordinary task, a done summary (with its check output: a match withholds the whole note), a review note, an unmet item or a budget handoff that matches a PII pattern (issue #69) is not saved to claude-mem, and every peer, `local` included, gets a stub naming `ahub task show <id>`; the board keeps the text, `hub.log` notes the withholding by task id only, and `ahub ask` shows such a note only when its model is reached on campus. `hub_remember` refuses a match; what a vendor agent writes to its own memory is not screened. With the model screen on, the same items (and `hub_remember` notes) go through it as well, one call each and only after the call's own checks (owner, state, verdict, a running check, memory enabled) pass: a `pii` or `unknown` verdict withholds the item exactly like a pattern match, and the board marks the history entry (`withheld`) so later views (task lists, completed-change notices, `ahub ask`, a reviewer replaced after a restart) keep withholding it. A budget hand-off is screened once per hand-off, whatever the number of tasks it moves; an escalation's reason is the hub's own text and is not screened. Pattern-only, without the model: the check output tail in a done note (only the summary is screened), a plan given with `hub_task_accept`, a decline reason, a task's refs (paths, branch), and context checkpoint summaries. Not screened at all (an existing gap, not new with the screen): the local worker's claude-mem capture records its file, shell and git tool calls in ordinary turns with their raw arguments and output, and the closing answer of a turn that used tools, without a pattern or model check. Its hub tool calls (`hub_send`, the task tools, the conductor tools) are not captured (issue #230), so a title, detail, done summary, review note or `hub_remember` text it writes reaches claude-mem only through the screened paths above.
+- **PII has an enforced path.** A task matching `signals.pii_patterns` goes to `local` or to nobody; its text is absent from other peers' envelopes, the console stream, the log and the board listing; the console user reviews it; `local` answers such a turn to the console only, keeps it out of its history, refuses it when the only gateway is off campus, and may not save notes or spin off tasks during it. Nothing about it enters hub-managed memory; local storage does not relax this privacy fence.
+- **A model screen can add to the patterns (issue #198).** With `signals.pii_screen = "local"` in `routing.toml` (default `off`; it applies while `constraints.pii = "local_only"`), a newly proposed task is read by a model before the hub does anything else with it: until the verdict it is on no board, in no envelope, before no triage model, and the hub makes no brief or note call for it. The local worker's amem capture leaves its hub tool calls out (issue #230), so a proposal it makes in an ordinary turn cannot reach shared memory ahead of the verdict that way. The screen runs on the model on this machine (MLX or Ollama, loopback only) or, without one, on the gateway only while `onCampus()` holds, and the gateway call is refused once more right before transport if the gateway is behind Access; task text never goes off campus to be screened. When the on-device generation slot is taken (Pi generating, another screen), the screen goes to the campus gateway instead of waiting, and on campus a device that fails or is still loading after 60% of the deadline hands over to the gateway too; off campus it waits for the slot and the device within the deadline. With the legacy MLX provider the screen may start an `mlx_lm.server`, as Pi's relay does, and it stays running until `ahub models stop`. Its answer is `pii` or `clear` plus a category from a closed list (name, student id, phone, address, grade, health, other). Anything else, a timeout (8 s, one call and one generation slot per item), a missing or off-campus model, or text longer than 6000 UTF-8 bytes (about 2000 Hangul syllables) is `unknown`, and an unknown task is a PII task: this is the hub's one model call that fails closed, so with the screener down every new task waits for `local`. An unknown verdict has the costs of any PII task, even when a second look clears it later: opening it lifts every silent turn-free cohort for good and turns facts off while it is open, and off campus a proposal without a class is refused (triage is not asked for a PII task there), with an error that says so. Off campus with the on-device slot taken, a task stays `unknown` until it is screened again: while it is still proposed and no peer ever owned it, the hub's release timer (every 60 s, one task at a time, the least tried first, at most 10 times per task in a hub run; never text too long to read) asks again, and `clear` lifts its `pii` signal and routes it through the class peers (a named owner is not remembered; a reserved one is offered first, as always). A task `local` took keeps its PII path, also once it is declined back to nobody. A pattern match is PII without a call. The task's history records the source of its `pii` signal (`regex`, `screen` with the category, or `unknown` with the reason), an unknown verdict is a console line naming the task id only, and `events.jsonl` gets a `pii_screen` record with the item kind, label, source, category, reason and latency, never the text. A routing explanation of a draft does not call the screen and says so.
+- **Free text is screened too.** On an ordinary task, a done summary (with its check output: a match withholds the whole note), a review note, an unmet item or a budget handoff that matches a PII pattern (issue #69) is not saved to hub-managed memory, and every peer, `local` included, gets a stub naming `ahub task show <id>`; the board keeps the text, `hub.log` notes the withholding by task id only, and `ahub ask` shows such a note only when its model is reached on campus. `hub_remember` refuses a match; what a vendor agent writes to its own memory is not screened. With the model screen on, the same items (and `hub_remember` notes) go through it as well, one call each and only after the call's own checks (owner, state, verdict, a running check, memory enabled) pass: a `pii` or `unknown` verdict withholds the item exactly like a pattern match, and the board marks the history entry (`withheld`) so later views (task lists, completed-change notices, `ahub ask`, a reviewer replaced after a restart) keep withholding it. A budget hand-off is screened once per hand-off, whatever the number of tasks it moves; an escalation's reason is the hub's own text and is not screened. Pattern-only, without the model: the check output tail in a done note (only the summary is screened), a plan given with `hub_task_accept`, a decline reason, a task's refs (paths, branch), and context checkpoint summaries. Ordinary-turn amem capture uses deterministic secret, routing-pattern and private-path screening of complete input/output before bounding; it makes no model classification or network call. Private turns remain excluded before capture. Raw capture is machine-local and never curated evidence. Tools are identified by host session/turn/step/invocation rather than trusting provider ids to be unique. Its hub tool calls (`hub_send`, the task tools, the conductor tools) are not captured (issue #230), so a title, detail, done summary, review note or `hub_remember` text it writes reaches shared memory only through the screened paths above.
 - **Secrets stay where they are read.** The gateway key and Cloudflare Access values are read inside the gateway client and go only into request headers: never into logs, errors, envelopes, tool output, memory. Subscription logins of Claude, Codex and Kimi are never proxied or pooled.
 - **The hub's own model calls are fenced.** Digest condensation, task triage and the PII screen read agent-written text as data; their output is capped text framed as untrusted, or a value checked against a closed list. It is never used as a route, a peer id, a tool call or an instruction.
 
 ## Native memory authority and profile selection
 
-The portable core is the exact-pinned first-party `@staix/agent-mem` 0.4.0 package; it does not replace the hub's caller identity, PII policy or task-write authority. Deny, hardened git, real paths and process identity are single-sourced in its Node-safe platform entry. Current project privacy is applied by the hub before promotion and again before model-facing reads. Standalone person reads are unscreened, and the standalone `--policy-free` acknowledgement grants no hub or peer authority.
+The portable core is the exact-pinned first-party `@staix/agent-mem` 0.7.0 package; it does not replace the hub's caller identity, PII policy or task-write authority. Deny, hardened git, real paths and process identity are single-sourced in its Node-safe platform entry. Current project privacy is applied by the hub before promotion and again before model-facing reads. Standalone person reads are unscreened, and the standalone `--policy-free` acknowledgement grants no hub or peer authority.
 
 `hub_memory_search`, `hub_memory_show` and `hub_memory_graph` take the project from the daemon, require `memory_read`, refuse private turns and validate UTF-8 input before logs or storage work. Complete records and graph metadata are screened before counts and truncation. Search is at most 20 lines/4 KiB (default 8); show accepts at most 8 ids and returns at most 8 KiB; graph is at most 120 nodes/240 edges/6 KiB (default 60 nodes), with no edge lacking an endpoint. Unknown, ambiguous and withheld ids share one neutral refusal. Arguments and results are excluded from hub-managed capture; this does not govern a vendor's independent transcript or memory hooks.
 
-`hub_memory_correct` requires `memory_correct` and proposes a machine-local candidate after the same project/privacy checks, including revalidation after asynchronous screening. It cannot accept or alter a note. Public review failures with unmet items may also propose candidates through Tasks. Candidates and usage counters stay at `M/candidates.db`, are not synced/imported, and never enter recall, briefs, ask or graph evidence. A person accepts shared-v1 candidates through the package CLI's TTY/policy checks; the accepted result is an ordinary v1 note, while the sidecar remains local. Generation `amem review` remains unsupported and refuses. Citation counters are observation proxies, not evidence that an agent understood or used a note.
+Code neighbours (#684 phase 4). For a symbol start, `hub_memory_graph` and the dashboard Memory view's Code neighbours toggle add one hop of callers and callees, read at the current commit through the optional code-facts boundary and shown with that commit; these edges are never stored. They share the graph limits above, an ambiguous or name-only seed is withheld, attached notes are screened again when published, current HEAD, profile, policy and caller privacy are rechecked across awaits, and a PII task or private turn starts no code query. `ahub doctor --stale-anchors` (#684 phase 3) only reads: it never edits, deletes or repairs a note, and an anchor whose task record is now private, foreign or missing stays unknown.
+
+`hub_memory_correct` requires `memory_correct` and proposes a machine-local candidate after the same project/privacy checks, including revalidation after asynchronous screening. It cannot accept or alter a note. Public review failures with unmet items may also propose candidates through Tasks, and `ahub ask --remember` answers and context checkpoints are saved only as candidates, never as curated notes (agent-mem#13 P4). Candidates and usage counters stay at `M/candidates.db`, are not synced/imported, and never enter recall, briefs, ask or graph evidence. A person accepts shared-v1 candidates through the package CLI's TTY/policy checks; the accepted result is an ordinary v1 note, while the sidecar remains local. Generation `amem review` remains unsupported and refuses. Citation counters are observation proxies, not evidence that an agent understood or used a note.
 
 The hub binds the selected root/profile at open. Invalid/missing generation metadata refuses native memory without a shared-v1 fallback; the bus and board continue. Explicit checks at hub operation entry and before sidecar writes stop later stale calls, but are not atomic against a selector change during an in-flight core operation. Migration therefore requires quiescing consumers and closing handles before changing selection, then reopening through the supported lifecycle. A public core pre-write hook is the upgrade path for atomic in-flight cutover.
 
@@ -61,8 +63,10 @@ vendor boundaries. The never-ask confirmation names this difference. No mode
 turns off the sandbox or grants a session-wide allow-always option.
 The always-ask action policy (#636) classes a call as publish, external-write,
 destroy or install; `action_policy` is read only from an untracked
-`.agenthub/config.local.json`. Since slice 2 two adapters enforce it. Claude's
-managed PreToolUse hook returns `ask` for a classed call in every permission
+`.agenthub/config.local.json`. A local policy that disables enforcement, omits a
+class or raises a budget above its default is flagged on every status policy row;
+startup still adopts it without a person's confirmation. Claude's
+managed PreToolUse hook (the headless Claude implementer's included) returns `ask` for a classed call in every permission
 mode, `never-ask` included, and that `ask` replaces any allow the mode would
 add; the hook never denies, and a hub that is down, slow or refusing decides
 nothing, which leaves Claude's own policy. A hub-owned ACP peer's
@@ -70,7 +74,17 @@ nothing, which leaves Claude's own policy. A hub-owned ACP peer's
 hub-tool title, a mode grant and `--unattended` included), offers no
 allow-always, shows `Action approval (<classes>): <command>` built from the
 task's public view and the PII screen (withheld for a private turn or an open PII
-task), and is denied when the approval timeout passes. A class budget above one
+task), and is denied when the approval timeout passes. Since slice 3 (#636) a
+command approval request Codex sends (v2 command execution or legacy exec) is
+classed before it reaches the TUI and answered once, bound to its link, thread
+and live turn; a cancelled, disconnected or stale one is denied. The local
+worker's and Pi's model tool calls are classed at the hub's permit boundary
+before `never-ask`, `ask-when-needed`, Pi's tool-wide grant and `--unattended`,
+and a replayed Pi call spends no allowance twice. Their approval shows the
+complete tool command with its class line on the person's console, private
+turns included; logs, public status, other peers and the dashboard keep the
+screened view. Any view that is cut (`[cut, N chars]`) or withheld offers deny
+only, with no allow-once or class budget. A class budget above one
 adds one person-only choice that allows at most N calls of those classes in the
 same native session; a new session, a changed policy or a stopped, crashed or
 restarted peer starts from zero, and an ordinary allow never spends it. The
@@ -78,13 +92,56 @@ limits are the point of the visibility rule: the hub enforces only a call it
 sees before it runs. A Claude session without the hub hook or not yet proven to
 have run it, an `--unattended` Claude launch (it skips hooks), an ACP agent in a
 native mode that sends no request for a call it allows (Kimi's `yolo` and
-`auto`), a call whose payload the agent did not report, and Codex, Pi and the
-local worker until slice 3 (#313) are not enforced, and `ahub status` says
+`auto`), a call whose payload the agent did not report, a Codex command its
+native policy runs without sending a request (so status lists Codex as not
+enforceable even though the requests it sends are gated), Jcode, an offline
+local worker, a Pi without a verified live tool bridge and a headless Claude
+implementer with no current child are not enforced, and `ahub status` says
 `always-ask not enforceable: <reason>` for each such peer rather than claiming
 it. The classifier reads command text: unknown syntax keeps native handling, and
 an agent with an unrestricted shell can still reach the same effect another way
 (the hostile-agent boundary above).
 
+Expansions (#762). A shell expansion (`$VAR`, `${...}`, `$(...)`, a backtick,
+`$'...'`) is an opaque word, and the literal words around it are still read, so
+`git push origin $B`, `npm publish $D`, `gh issue create --title "$T"` and
+`rm -rf "$DIR"` are classed like their literal forms. The command an expansion
+runs (`echo $(git push)`) is classed too. Where the opaque part can change the
+class the strictest class the command can reach is used, never none: `git $CMD`
+is publish and destroy, `npm $CMD` is publish and install, `gh $GROUP ...` is
+publish and external-write, `gh <group> $ACTION` is external-write (publish for
+`release`), `gh api` with a dynamic method (`-X $M`), a dynamic option word, or a
+trailing operand that is an expansion, is external-write, a GraphQL query with an
+expansion in it is never a read, and `rm`, `cp -f` and `mv -f` with an opaque
+target are destroy (an expansion may hold `..` or an absolute path). A word that
+starts with an expansion may be a flag (`$OPTS` as `-rf`), so where a class
+depends on a flag it counts as that flag: `rm $OPTS "$DIR"`, `git reset $MODE`,
+`git clean $F`, `git branch $F topic`, `cp $F a /etc/x` and `npm install $G pkg`
+are classed (a literal `-n`, or a word after `--`, still decides). The cost of
+failing closed is a prompt for a call that may be harmless: `git branch "$NAME"`
+and `npm install "$PKG"` ask, while `rm "$F"` (one operand), `git log $RANGE` and
+`cp "$A" b` do not. A command
+with no classed literal prefix (`echo $X`, `cat "$F"`, `sudo $CMD`,
+`bash -c "$CMD"`) stays unclassed, and so does an opaque value in a position that
+is data (the endpoint of `gh api`, a header, a `--jq` filter, a read-only
+subcommand's argument). What the policy still cannot see is the content of a
+variable used as the whole command, an alias or function, a script the command
+runs, and text read from a file or stdin.
+
+The `gh` classes (#636, #756, #762). `publish`: `gh release create|upload|edit|delete`.
+`external-write`: `gh issue|pr|gist create|comment|edit|close|reopen|merge|review|delete`,
+`gh run rerun|cancel|delete`, `gh workflow run|enable|disable`, and `gh api` with a
+non-GET method or any field or `--input`. `gh api graphql` is the one exception,
+classed by its operation: a call with exactly one literal `query` field whose
+every operation is a `query` (shorthand `{...}` included; fragments allowed) is a
+read and is not asked about, so a reviewer's unresolved-thread check does not
+prompt. A `mutation`, a `subscription`, a second `query` field, a document from a
+file or stdin (`-F query=@file`, `--input`), an unknown option, a non-POST method
+and any document the hub cannot parse stay `external-write`: unknown is never a
+read. Read-only `gh` commands (`view`, `list`, `status`, `watch`, REST GET) are
+unclassed. `gh repo delete|archive|edit`, `gh secret` and `gh variable`
+`set|delete`, and `gh label create|edit|delete` are `external-write` as well.
+
 Config defaults apply automatically only up to ask-when-needed. A never-ask
 request from an applied untracked config is held as ask until the person
 confirms its source file in the console at hub start. Git-tracked mode defaults
@@ -289,13 +346,23 @@ Antigravity (`agy`, #485) is optional, cloud and off roster by default. The laun
 
 Configured ACP adapters (#451 A3) are declared only by the person, in a Git-confirmed untracked `.agenthub/config.local.json`. The whole declaration (command, argv, identity, roles and mode maps) is machine-local authority: a shared or tracked declaration is ignored with a notice, settings never edit it, and changes need a hub restart. The hub runs only the declared argv, never a module or callback. Argv that selects a leader, attach, connect or remote mode is refused, and a Grok declaration needs `--no-leader`. Each start requires the pinned native identity, an exact `session/load` echo on resume, and positive ownership of the spawned process and its original process group; unknown ownership refuses, and stop signals only that verified group. An agent that hands its work to a process outside that group is outside this boundary. Without a mode map native policy is unmanaged, and there is no hub sandbox either way. Configured kinds are cloud peers (never PII), headless only and off roster by default, and the hub makes no quota, context or controlled-recovery claims for them. A read-only instance needs the native read-only mode acknowledged before a prompt and is limited to read and review hub tools, both in the published MCP list and at the host; its native non-read tool requests are rejected, and no setting or runtime change can raise it. These agents' stderr and error text are withheld from logs, and previews redact the executable, argv and session id.
 
-External adapter modules (#451 A4) are the one way to run adapter code that ships outside the hub, and the pin is code authorization, not a sandbox. `adapter_modules` is read only from a Git-confirmed untracked `.agenthub/config.local.json` (never from a shared, tracked or cloned config, and never written by settings or a hub tool). Only daemon startup imports a module, from the captured bytes that matched the `sha256` pin, not by reopening the path; the file must sit inside the project with no symlinked component and not be world-writable. Its imports are bound to the running hub's own `@staix/agent-hub/adapter` and builtins (`bun:ffi` and `bun:test` excluded), and dynamic imports, `require`, `eval` and `Function` are refused by a conservative scan. Once imported, the module runs with the daemon's privileges: the 2 s import deadline stops waiting but does not cancel its code or undo side effects, and the host's default against hub-tool title auto-approval holds only while the module keeps the factory options it is given. Inspect the whole bundle before recording its hash. Refusal reasons withhold source and module error text. A loaded kind keeps its own family, cloud trust (never PII), headless start and off-roster default, and fixed-builtin capabilities are refused.
+External adapter modules (#451 A4) are the one way to run adapter code that ships outside the hub, and the pin is code authorization, not a sandbox. `adapter_modules` is read only from a Git-confirmed untracked `.agenthub/config.local.json` (never from a shared, tracked or cloned config, and never written by settings or a hub tool). Only daemon startup imports a module, from the captured bytes that matched the `sha256` pin, not by reopening the path; the file must sit inside the project with no symlinked component and not be world-writable. Its imports are bound to the running hub's own `@staix/agent-hub/adapter` and builtins (`bun:ffi` and `bun:test` excluded), and dynamic imports, `require`, `eval` and `Function` are refused by a conservative scan. Once imported, the module runs with the daemon's privileges: the 2 s import deadline stops waiting but does not cancel its code or undo side effects, and the host's default against hub-tool title auto-approval holds only while the module keeps the factory options it is given. Inspect the whole bundle before recording its hash. Refusal reasons withhold source and module error text. A loaded kind keeps its own family, cloud trust (never PII), headless start and off-roster default, and fixed-builtin capabilities are refused. The daemon reads a native proof port (a status notice, the Codex frontend proxy, a native turn revert, a Claude launch proof) only from a fixed builtin definition, so a module product that carries one gains nothing (#790).
 
 # Transient ACP activity (#286)
 
 - Watch activity can contain file contents, thoughts and command output. It is console-role only, kept in a bounded in-memory ring and exposed only through the `watch` control request. Agent shells, conductor tools, dashboard snapshots, hub tools and memory observers cannot read it. Terminal bodies pass through the console's sanitization and wrapping helpers. Slow sockets close instead of accumulating unbounded output.
 - Private/PII turns show a single stub; the adapter latches privacy for that turn. The existing final-answer bus and native approval paths (console and dashboard) remain independent, with their existing privacy rules. Watch never adds activity to either path or any disk log.
-- There is no Qwen dual-output input file or TUI transport in this slice; Q2-Q6 are unverified and TUI mode stays refused.
+- Qwen's dual-output TUI (#286 Part 3, [receipt](verification/2026-10-25-qwen-dual-output-t0.md)) is a separate transport, covered next.
+
+# Qwen dual-output input file (#286 Part 3)
+
+- **The input file is a prompt channel.** Whatever is appended to `<state dir>/qwen/qwen-dual/input.jsonl` is read by Qwen as typed input: a `submit` line is a prompt, a `confirmation_response` line answers a tool approval. The files are created 0600 in a 0700 directory owned by the person running the hub, opened without following links, refused if they are not regular files owned by that person with no group or other access, and written only by the daemon's adapter. No other peer can write them through a hub tool.
+- Qwen's own write and shell tools can reach the file, but only through approval. The hub's approval path therefore refuses, without asking anyone, any Qwen tool request other than the hub's own tools whose input names the hub state directory, its real path, `.agenthub/state`, the `qwen-dual` directory or `input.jsonl`. That check is a lexical one on the request, as the managed local and Pi tools' state-dir guards are: it is not a sandbox, and a Qwen started with `--approval-mode yolo` by a person in their own terminal is outside it.
+- Text another agent wrote reaches Qwen only inside a hub-framed digest. A digest that would begin with `/`, `!`, `@` or `?` (a slash command, a shell line, a file include or a help key in Qwen's prompt) is prefixed with a hub line first.
+- Hub tools are auto-approved by the exact `mcp__agent-hub__<tool>` name Qwen reports for the call and never by prefix, title or argument text. Everything else asks the console, and an always-ask class call (#636) is never auto-approved. A prompt answered in the Qwen terminal withdraws the hub's pending approval: a late answer finds nothing to grant.
+- Identity: the adapter attaches only a Qwen whose `session_start` states a verified version, protocol 2 and the events the hub reads, and it binds the running owner from the host's process table (the root of the process tree whose argv names this adapter's input file: Qwen 0.26.1 runs as a wrapper, a node launcher and a `cli.js` child that all name it; two separate roots is no owner), never from a message the launcher sends. The hub never signals that process and never types into its terminal; the person's terminal owns it.
+- Environment: `ahub qwen --mode tui` execs Qwen in the person's own environment (Qwen needs their PATH, HOME and provider key, which the daemon never copies) with the hub's peer marker over it. Every other `AGENTHUB_*` variable but `AGENTHUB_HOME`, the other agents' vendor markers, and recovery and unattended authority are dropped, so a Qwen started from another agent's shell never carries that agent's identity, launch id or mode.
+- Not defended: a person who gives Qwen yolo mode, an agent that Qwen runs and that writes the file through a path this lexical check does not recognise, and another process of the same user (the usual same-user boundary of the state directory).
 
 ## Global attention metadata (#280, phase 3)
 
@@ -347,7 +414,7 @@ explicitly chmodded 0700 parent directory.
 PII-task notes, PII-pattern notes and secret-looking text are refused before
 persistence; promotions are
 screened again. The index can be rebuilt from segments and does not replace the
-separate claude-mem worker database.
+historical claude-mem database used only by the explicit read-only import.
 
 Sync starts only after a person configures a remote. Public GitHub remotes are
 refused; unknown visibility proceeds with a warning for the configured remote.
@@ -382,11 +449,11 @@ fence instance ownership and close; unknown owners are never signalled.
 
 ## Planner, cancellation and delivery authority
 
-The `planner` setting is person-controlled. A valid pin determines the planner without adding it to the roster; otherwise configured rostered planner roles apply, then the first rostered peer in the closed planner catalog. The automatic choice is not written to disk. Planner guidance does not grant conductor authority or bypass roster, PII, WIP or owner capability checks.
+The `planner` setting is person-controlled: one peer id or a list of up to eight (#525-2). A valid pin determines the planner holders without adding them to the roster; otherwise configured rostered planner roles apply, then the first rostered peer in the closed planner catalog. The automatic choice is not written to disk. Each new non-PII task and each planner-created release records one effective planner from the same pure walk `ahub route explain` shows; only that planner or the person changes its planning. A bound planner keeps that authority while busy, paused or offline; one removed from the holders or the roster falls back to the current holders, and older rows with no binding, PII tasks included, keep holder-wide authority. Only the person moves a task's planner (`ahub task assign <id> <peer> --role planner`). Another holder may record a plan review without gaining the task's other planning powers; an agent cannot review its own plan while another rostered holder is not offline, and otherwise the receipt records `selfReview: true` with `planAuthor`. Planner guidance does not grant conductor authority or bypass roster, PII, WIP or owner capability checks.
 
-`cancelled` is closed, never approval. The person can cancel non-approved work with a reason and optional supersession reference; the configured planner can cancel only its own proposed/backlog work with no historical acceptance. Current task revision, privacy and recovery/shutdown holds are checked before writing and again after awaited screening. Cancellation preserves history, releases reservations and overlap membership, writes no outcome memory, and does not stop native turns or delete branches/worktrees. Owner/reviewer stop notices remain relevant; earlier task requests become moot. Dependents remain blocked and receive ids-only advice, including backlog dependents.
+`cancelled` is closed, never approval. The person can cancel non-approved work with a reason and optional supersession reference; a planner can cancel only its own proposed/backlog work with no historical acceptance, and only as that task's effective planner. Current task revision, privacy and recovery/shutdown holds are checked before writing and again after awaited screening. Cancellation preserves history, releases reservations and overlap membership, writes no outcome memory, and does not stop native turns or delete branches/worktrees. Owner/reviewer stop notices remain relevant; earlier task requests become moot. Dependents remain blocked and receive ids-only advice, including backlog dependents.
 
-Current daemons advertise `task_cancel` in hello and status metadata. A current CLI refuses cancellation against a daemon without that feature. Controlled upgrade/restart refuses an unsupported target while cancelled task ids exist; source prepare and commit recheck compatibility, and the rows are never rewritten as approved. A manually started older binary is outside this compatibility guarantee: it can display cancelled rows as open or fail to move them.
+Current daemons advertise `task_cancel` in hello and status metadata. A current CLI refuses cancellation against a daemon without that feature. Controlled upgrade/restart refuses an unsupported target while cancelled task ids exist; source prepare and commit recheck compatibility, and the rows are never rewritten as approved. In the same way it refuses a target without `task_planners` once a planner list or an instance planner is configured or any task or release planner binding or plan-review authorship is stored, even after that configuration is removed. A manually started older binary is outside this compatibility guarantee: it can display cancelled rows as open or fail to move them.
 
 Stall causes are persisted and deduplicated by cause and replanning revision. Planner advice joins its next delivery as bounded ids-only context; it does not manufacture an ordinary task turn. Pull-only offer attention clears only after acceptance, decline, supersession or durable positive evidence for that exact offer and recipient. Operator/hub completion of an uncertain delivery is not evidence that the offer was read.
 
@@ -398,13 +465,13 @@ A terminal Claude implementer or verifier instance (#525-5) owns write-class tas
 
 The headless Claude implementer (#525-4) runs one owned `claude -p` child per turn in its declared worktree, with `--setting-sources ""`, `--strict-mcp-config`, native permission mode `default`, the hub's managed PreToolUse hook and `--permission-prompt-tool mcp__agent-hub__hub_permission_request`; never `--bare`, `acceptEdits`, `dontAsk` or `bypassPermissions`, and `never-ask` is refused. Each task keeps its own persisted session; unscoped chat reuses one only while exactly one task is in progress, and a `hub_inbox` read refuses a batch attributed to another task. The approval path fails closed: `hub_permission_request` is accepted only from the current child's launch and generation, goes to the console's existing approval queue and `approvals.timeout_s`, and offers allow-once and deny only, with no allow-always or session grant. A timeout, a prompt failure, a disconnect, a hub that is down or refusing, or a stale child binding answers deny; a failed hook decides nothing, so the call still waits for a person. The approval title is the tool name and a JSON rendering of the arguments passed through `sanitize()` and the public-text screen (any PII, secret or private-path match withholds the whole value as `[withheld]`, before any cut), never task text, cut at 600 characters with a `[cut, N chars]` marker; the original arguments stay with the child and are not logged. The MCP wire cannot tell a native permission dispatch from a call the model makes itself; either way it needs a fresh allow-once for its own arguments and grants nothing later. A stop holds an uncertain delivery until the owned process group is confirmed gone. The [native permission receipt](verification/2026-10-23-headless-claude-permissions.md) is model-free on Claude Code 2.1.309; it is not sandbox proof, and a real account, model and person interaction remains a live leg.
 
-The fresh Codex reviewer (#519) needs `review_mode: "fresh"` and a compat-admitted Codex (receipt-verified 0.146.0 and 0.163.0; `ahub agents` shows the current policy); an unverified/untrusted version is unavailable. Before each review it requires a model-free isolation receipt: binary and config unchanged, only the two hub tools in the configured MCP inventory, plugins, hooks and Apps disabled (Apps by a separate feature readback), and a named filesystem profile whose fixtures prove public reads, private-path denial (exact, glob and symlink), standard host credential denial and write denial. Credential and tool-home roots are denied even with an empty `local.deny`; that list does not cover every personal file. A dangling or unreadable credential root refuses the reviewer, and the reason names only its path class (`~/.docker`, `$DOCKER_CONFIG`), never the path or its contents. A failed per-review start names one class from a closed list (`version`, `binary`, `mcp_inventory`, `plugins_hooks_apps`, `sandbox_proof`, `credential_root`, `timeout`, `unknown`) with a fixed sentence in the unavailable reason, `hub.log` and the `reviewer` line of `ahub status`; it never carries a path, native CLI text or a token (#722). Its shell is sandboxed read-only, not Claude's Read/Grep/Glob whitelist. Network and web search are configured disabled but not observed: managed requirements can still select cached web search, and no run has shown the review selecting the profile through `default_permissions`. A failed receipt or start never falls back to a continuing native session, and a child that ends without a saved verdict is never approval. The agy reviewer slot is an unavailable placeholder and never runs.
+The fresh Codex reviewer (#519) needs `review_mode: "fresh"` and a compat-admitted Codex (receipt-verified 0.146.0, 0.163.0 and 0.164.0; `ahub agents` shows the current policy); an unverified/untrusted version is unavailable. Before each review it requires a model-free isolation receipt: binary and config unchanged, only the two hub tools in the configured MCP inventory (each approved by its own name, never by a server-wide default, #783), plugins, hooks and Apps disabled (Apps by a separate feature readback), and a named filesystem profile whose fixtures prove public reads, private-path denial (exact, glob and symlink), standard host credential denial and write denial. Credential and tool-home roots are denied even with an empty `local.deny`; that list does not cover every personal file. A dangling or unreadable credential root refuses the reviewer, and the reason names only its path class (`~/.docker`, `$DOCKER_CONFIG`), never the path or its contents. A failed per-review start names one class from a closed list (`version`, `binary`, `mcp_inventory`, `plugins_hooks_apps`, `sandbox_proof`, `credential_root`, `timeout`, `unknown`) with a fixed sentence in the unavailable reason, `hub.log` and the `reviewer` line of `ahub status`; it never carries a path, native CLI text or a token (#722). Its shell is sandboxed read-only, not Claude's Read/Grep/Glob whitelist. Network and web search are configured disabled but not observed: managed requirements can still select cached web search, and no run has shown the review selecting the profile through `default_permissions`. A failed receipt or start never falls back to a continuing native session, and a child that ends without a saved verdict is never approval. The agy reviewer slot is an unavailable placeholder and never runs; it binds nothing, so agy's own `hub_task_show` reads are not fenced as a review (#792).
 
-The fresh Kimi reviewer (#533) needs `review_mode: "fresh"` and a compat-admitted Kimi Code (receipt-verified 2.2.0 and 2.3.0; `ahub agents` shows the current policy) with its native OAuth login; an unverified/untrusted version, or a failed preparation, is unavailable. The [2.3.0 receipt](verification/2026-10-22-kimi-qwen-compat.md) is model-free and does not prove real login or a model review. It is a native tool-authority boundary, not a sandbox: no Seatbelt wraps it, and same-user native code is not isolated from the filesystem or network. Each review starts a new child in a private `KIMI_CODE_HOME` with managed-provider-only config, a clean temporary working directory and an empty skills directory. Its agent may use only `hub_review` and `hub_task_show`, served by a loopback MCP session bound to the task, head and review revision that never carries the hub's control token; it has no native read, file or shell tool and sees only the screened review brief and host facts. Its `credentials/` and `oauth/` directories and `device_id` link to the person's native ones, so refresh keeps Kimi's own lock and atomic rename; no token is copied and `KIMI_DISABLE_OAUTH_LOCK` is never set. A stop revokes its verdict authority before termination; killing it mid-refresh may require a native re-login. Private tasks are never given to it, and a child that ends without a saved verdict is never approval.
+The fresh Kimi reviewer (#533) needs `review_mode: "fresh"` and a compat-admitted Kimi Code (receipt-verified 2.2.0, 2.3.0 and 2.3.1; `ahub agents` shows the current policy) with its native OAuth login; an unverified/untrusted version, or a failed preparation, is unavailable. The [2.3.0](verification/2026-10-22-kimi-qwen-compat.md) and [2.3.1](verification/2026-10-25-kimi-231-reviewer-compat.md) receipts are model-free and do not prove real login or a model review. It is a native tool-authority boundary, not a sandbox: no Seatbelt wraps it, and same-user native code is not isolated from the filesystem or network. Each review starts a new child in a private `KIMI_CODE_HOME` with managed-provider-only config, a clean temporary working directory and an empty skills directory. Its agent may use only `hub_review` and `hub_task_show`, served by a loopback MCP session bound to the task, head and review revision that never carries the hub's control token; it has no native read, file or shell tool and sees only the screened review brief and host facts. Its `credentials/` and `oauth/` directories and `device_id` link to the person's native ones, so refresh keeps Kimi's own lock and atomic rename; no token is copied and `KIMI_DISABLE_OAUTH_LOCK` is never set. A stop revokes its verdict authority before termination; killing it mid-refresh may require a native re-login. Private tasks are never given to it, and a child that ends without a saved verdict is never approval.
 
 The review brief (#520) withholds private changes whole (both sides of a move) and counts them; a rule file that fails the private-data screen is named, not shown. Attributes and rules are read at the merge base, so a change cannot loosen its own review. Optional changed symbols (#684) come from ripwire 0.6.7 on the daemon's host PATH, run as an owned process on a disposable snapshot of the task's commit; each path, name and kind passes the hub's public metadata screen before the brief, the console's task detail or the dashboard shows it, a private task stores and shows none, and a failed or missing read is `unknown`, never a gate. Spec acceptance, plan review, plan conformance, premature-review, cost, test-integrity (#481 S4), issue and PR identity linking (#694) and dogfood scorecard (#687) reads fetch GitHub metadata only (edit times, check states, thread authorship and resolution, changed file names, open PR heads, workflow run conclusions), never issue bodies, comments or patches. Issue identity linking at propose and accept (#723) parses the task's title and refs locally, reads nothing from GitHub and skips PII tasks. The CI workflow keeps `contents: read` and `actions: read`.
 
-Deliverable records (#509a). `hub_task_done` and `hub_sdlc_record` name files as `{path, format, version?}`; the hub hashes them itself and refuses a claimed `sha256`, `hash` or `bytes` and any field it does not own. Paths resolve under the owner's execution root with `realPath` and `guardPath` in read mode: outside the project, the secrets denylist, the hub's own state (`.git`, `.agenthub`), a dangling link, a non-regular file and more than 256 MiB each or 512 MiB together are refused, with the path as given and never a resolved one. The file is opened without following a final link and its device, inode, size and time are compared with what was checked, before and after the read, so a swapped or changing file is refused rather than recorded half-read; a bad call writes nothing. A declared worktree instance whose root is not proven refuses, and a later read of it reports `unknown`. No hash of hub state is ever taken, and a file the hub cannot read or vouch for is `unknown`, never `unchanged`. A reviewer's approval re-hashes the files and is refused when one changed, went missing or is unknown; only the person may approve the current bytes, which are then measured and bound. For a PII task, a file under `pii.paths` or a path matching a PII pattern, `publicDeliverables` is the one projection every peer view, review request, status and log uses: id, hash and size only. The board keeps the path, as it keeps a PII task's text.
+Deliverable records (#509a). `hub_task_done` and `hub_sdlc_record` name files as `{path, format, version?}`; the hub hashes them itself and refuses a claimed `sha256`, `hash` or `bytes` and any field it does not own. Paths resolve under the owner's execution root with `realPath` and `guardPath` in read mode: outside the project, the secrets denylist, the hub's own state (`.git`, `.agenthub`), a dangling link, a non-regular file and more than 256 MiB each or 512 MiB together are refused, with the path as given and never a resolved one. The file is opened without following a final link and its device, inode, size and time are compared with what was checked, before and after the read, so a swapped or changing file is refused rather than recorded half-read; a bad call writes nothing. A declared worktree instance whose root is not proven refuses, and a later read of it reports `unknown`. No hash of hub state is ever taken, and a file the hub cannot read or vouch for is `unknown`, never `unchanged`. A reviewer's approval re-hashes the files and is refused when one changed, went missing or is unknown; only the person may approve the current bytes, which are then measured and bound. For a PII task, a file under `pii.paths` or a path matching a PII pattern, `publicDeliverables` is the one projection every peer view, review request, status and log uses: id, hash and size only. The board keeps the path, as it keeps a PII task's text. `ahub deliverables` (#509b) is the person's: an agent shell is refused and `--live-test` cannot delegate it. It lists the board's records through `publicDeliverables` and opens a file only with `--check`, through the same reader and limits. The dashboard's Deliverables chip and task group use the same projection of the same records and never read a file on the poll; a `changed` mark there is only as fresh as the last live read in this daemon.
 
 Person release authorization (#481 S6). `ahub sdlc authorize-release <version>` is taken from the console role only and refused under `--live-test`. It binds the daemon checkout's commit, package version, push remote identity and a fresh-docs verdict, lives only in daemon memory (a restart revokes it) and is logged with its commit, version and docs digest. `ahub sdlc release-guard -- <argv>` is a read-only preflight that agents may run, except during a private or PII turn; it never executes the command and refuses ambient target selectors (`GIT_DIR`, `GH_REPO`, npm prefix and registry settings and the like). The pre-push hook that `ahub init --release-guard` installs refuses an unauthorized or unknown `v*` tag push, also with the daemon down, and passes other pushes through. It and the release block in `AGENTS.md` are a cooperative guard, not an operating-system boundary: `git push --no-verify`, a custom `core.hooksPath` or another Git invocation bypasses the hook, and `gh release create` and `npm publish` are checked only when the preflight is run (#312, #313).
 
@@ -425,3 +492,8 @@ Checks serialize through the repository's existing `ahub-heavy.lock`, with one a
 Only an unchanged task/owner/native-generation binding receives an agent result. Stale receipts are person-only. Public receipts include the exact source/tree/lockfile, runner/platform, command, exit and bounded output; they omit internal host paths, owner process identity and generation binding. The output tail is screened again before any tool response or hub envelope. For inactive valid receipts, local full output is bounded to 1 MiB and removed when the owner reads its result (person inspection does not consume it), after 24 hours or beyond the newest 20 outputs; at most 200 inactive valid receipts remain, with active runs excluded from retention. Unknown receipts are an explicit retention exception: malformed/unreadable receipt bytes, full output and source staging remain until ownership/inactivity can be established or the receipt is removed. Their ID-only warnings remain visible. Unknown payload maintenance performs no path-based deletion: a same-user process can swap a parent directory after an entry check, and no atomic descriptor-relative cleanup is available at this boundary. Maintenance never removes an unknown container. Removing the whole receipt directory counts as an empty record set, clears its ID warnings and allows ordinary expired unindexed-staging cleanup. Linux VM evidence is separate from macOS Seatbelt and managed-native acceptance.
 
 Routing receives capability availability and its reason as pure inputs. Capability admission applies to task owners only: non-PII implement/test/bulk-edit owners require tests, and non-PII issue-backed owners in every class (including review-class owners) require spec access. Designated reviewers are not gated by these owner-only capabilities; roster, privacy, role and other eligibility rules still apply. PII tasks are exempt from these two capability requirements and retain the existing local-only owner and person reviewer rules; spec/check tools still refuse them. Explicit nominations and reservations cannot bypass these checks. Inactive sandboxed peers establish their GitHub probe at first spec use, and every explicit local/Pi start path refreshes it (including a prior authentication failure) with concurrent probes shared; host-provided embeddings can inject bounded probe implementations without implicitly contacting real accounts in fixtures. Neither path grants a model control over the probes.
+
+
+## Structured capture write screening
+
+The amem host screens the actual data that may persist, including literal keys/values and its JSON form. It decodes authoritative tool argument/result JSON once before any excerpt cap, so escaping cannot hide whitespace-matching PII, a private data path or a structured secret key/value. It does not recursively interpret arbitrary embedded encodings. Non-persisted host locators (cwd and transport/session identifiers) are kept outside text-policy content; current project/profile authority is checked separately. Ordinary events with a valid private-path policy still capture public data. Private turns remain excluded before this code runs.

package/docs/smoke.md

@@ -1,6 +1,44 @@
 # Live smoke checklist
 
-`scripts/check.sh` covers everything against fakes. The legs below need real accounts and an interactive terminal, so they are run by hand and recorded here.
+`scripts/check.sh` covers everything against fakes. The legs below need real accounts, a real terminal or a person's judgement, and their results are recorded here. An explicitly authorized agent runs most of them itself with `ahub --live-test` in a disposable project (see [Agent-operated verification](#agent-operated-verification-408)); each open leg carries one class (#784):
+
+- `agent-executable`: an authorized agent runs it and records the result.
+- `agent-evidence / person-verdict`: an agent runs it and collects the evidence; the person gives the verdict named in the row.
+- `person-only`: only the person can do it (a login, a native choice, a consent).
+- `external-blocked`: waiting on something outside the hub; the row names it.
+
+## Open live legs by class
+
+| Leg | Section | Class | Person verdict or blocker |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| Off-campus Cloudflare Access headers (#1) | Issue #7 verification ledger | external-blocked | Access credential files; then agent-executable |
+| Natural Codex budget pause with a TUI attached (#1) | Issue #7 verification ledger | external-blocked | a natural weekly reading above the gate |
+| Native Pi restoration and the operator plan (#273) | Issue #273 operator execution plan | agent-executable | |
+| Hub memory live run (#258) | Hub memory | agent-executable | |
+| Office view look (#264) | Office view | agent-evidence / person-verdict | the look in a browser, light and dark |
+| Add-on arms and fingerprints (#248) | Add-on arms and fingerprints | agent-executable | |
+| Settings from the dashboard and the terminal (#269) | Settings from the dashboard and the terminal | agent-evidence / person-verdict | the dashboard controls as a person sees them |
+| Codex resumed approval policy stickiness (#270) | Codex resumed approval policy | person-only | the explicit native choice in the person's TUI |
+| Interactive upgrade screens (#272) | Interactive upgrade | agent-executable | |
+| `ahub reset` on a scratch project (#214) | ahub reset on a scratch project | agent-executable | |
+| Claude without channel evidence (#205) | Claude without channel evidence | agent-executable | |
+| Console layout and readability (#213, #201) | Console layout and readability | agent-evidence / person-verdict | readability at 80 and 120 columns |
+| `ahub bench` live run (#251) | `ahub bench` live run | agent-executable | |
+| Codex and Pi permission-mode legs (#240, #242) | Permission modes | agent-executable | |
+| Dashboard themes (#246) | Whole-board task progress and dashboard themes | agent-evidence / person-verdict | light and dark legibility |
+| Command output (#284) | One-shot command output; Remaining command output | agent-evidence / person-verdict | terminal rendering at 80 and 120 columns |
+| Qwen and Kimi cancellation timing (#304) | ACP cancellation settlement | agent-executable | |
+| Kimi TUI pull mode (#316) | Kimi TUI pull mode | agent-executable | |
+| One issue through merge and release in advise mode (#257) | SDLC gates | agent-evidence / person-verdict | release consent |
+| Qwen native turn and recovery (#256) | Qwen Code production peer | agent-executable | |
+| Jcode instance sign-in per `jcode_home` (#332, #529) | Jcode peer | person-only | signing in to each instance's account |
+| Planner grooms a backlog into two releases (#263) | Project board; Planning and release controls | agent-executable | |
+| Character glyphs in real terminals and tmux (#280) | Console attention; Dashboard character | agent-evidence / person-verdict | glyph rendering in physical terminals |
+| Console Settings panel in a native terminal (#439) | Settings reload and console fixture | agent-evidence / person-verdict | the panel as a person sees it |
+| Reviewer pool native legs (#519) | Reviewer pool native legs | agent-executable | after #783 ships |
+| Antigravity TUI close (#485) | Antigravity P1 | agent-executable | |
+| Managed Pi live receipts (#418 AC8) | none yet (issue #418) | person-only, then agent-executable | the person opts in to a check runner and answers the approvals |
+| Kimi credential probe (#285 AC9) | Kimi usage counting | person-only | the owner's approval of the probe |
 
 ## Issue #273 operator execution plan (2026-10-16)
 
@@ -56,6 +94,16 @@ operationId, console hello and initiating-peer audit (225 related tests passed).
 This is fixture/CLI proof, not an actual native Pi restoration; that live leg
 remains owed in #273.
 
+## Kimi usage counting (#285 AC11)
+
+The [2026-10-25 Kimi 2.3.1 receipt](verification/2026-10-25-kimi-usage-ac11.md)
+records an isolated-HOME ACP session. Native `/usage` exactly matched the
+main-agent four-counter wire total but excluded subagent usage; neither
+`/usage` call added a `usage.record`. The ordinary main row appeared after the
+prompt-result read and within 1,000 ms, while the subagent turn's main and
+subagent rows were present at its result. See the receipt for the counts,
+occupancy timing and isolation boundary.
+
 ## Console task and queue operations (#424)
 
 2026-10-16, macOS, source `691f00ac`: a disposable Git project and fake ACP
@@ -76,7 +124,7 @@ Not run yet (2026-10-12). Source and fakes cover tiers, the graph, retrieval, sy
 - [ ] `ahub memory import claude-mem` against the live claude-mem store of this machine: counts and skipped classes, claude-mem unchanged.
 - [ ] `memory.suggest_edges: true` with the hub's model reachable: suggestions appear, are drawn dashed, and stay out of briefs until confirmed.
 - [ ] Dashboard Memory section and Long-term tasks tab in a browser, light and dark, at phone width.
-- [ ] AC11 arms on a bench project (`--memory off`, `claude-mem`, `native`), 5 repeats each, and two weeks of research records with `briefs`.
+- [ ] AC11 collection after P4: declare a new amem-aware condition before runs and collect repeated arms plus research records with `briefs`. The historical `--memory claude-mem` label is not evidence of a worker on the new runtime; do not compare it silently with old worker runs.
 
 ## Office view (#264, phases 1-4)
 
@@ -629,14 +677,14 @@ Needs a model gateway in `omniroute.urls` (for the owner: the campus gateway ove
 1. `ahub doctor`: `omniroute` healthy, `omniroute key` present, every routing model alias served; no Switchyard row.
 2. In a scratch git repo: `ahub up`, `ahub local`, `ahub tail`, then `ahub say @local "fix the typos in <file>, run git diff --stat and report"`. `ahub tail` shows a permission request for the edit; `ahub permit <id> allow`. The file changes, the answer is a short conclusion, `ahub status` shows the served model in the local row's `MODEL` column and `vllm` in the backend table's `PROVIDER` column.
 3. In an isolated scratch project, use `[local] route = "hub/stage"` with served `fast` and `coding` aliases. Confirm the in-process route event and gateway provider. Try a legacy `sy/` selection: it uses `fixed_model` with one warning, starts no sidecar, and leaves the routing file unchanged. The older Switchyard receipts below describe the retired integration.
-4. claude-mem: `sqlite3 -readonly ~/.claude-mem/claude-mem.db "select agent_id, agent_type, project, title from observations order by id desc limit 3"` shows `local | local-worker` rows a minute or two later (claude-mem's observer runs asynchronously).
+4. amem: after a public tool turn with a unique marker, `amem search "<marker>" --limit 10` in that project shows machine-local capture without a worker or model summarizer. Confirm ordinary curated rows remain separate from raw capture and `ahub ask` never cites a raw capture row.
 
 ## M4: task board
 
 1. `ahub up`, `ahub kimi`, `ahub local`, `ahub tail`. `ahub route explain --class bulk_edit "fix typos"` prints candidates, owner and reviewer.
 2. `ahub task propose bulk_edit "Fix the spelling mistakes in words.ts" --path words.ts`: `local` accepts, edits, calls `hub_task_done`; `ahub board` shows it `approved` (no reviewer attached) or `in_review`.
 3. `ahub task propose test "Check that words.ts contains ..."`: Kimi takes it and reports through the hub's MCP tools (`ahub task show <id>` history: `kimi accepted`, `kimi done`).
-4. PII: propose a task whose title matches `signals.pii_patterns`. Owner `local`, reviewer `user`; `grep <value> .agenthub/state/hub.log` and the `ahub tail` output find nothing; `ahub board` shows `[pii]`; `ahub task show <id>` shows the text; `ahub review <id> approved` closes it; claude-mem has no row with the value.
+4. PII: propose a task whose title matches `signals.pii_patterns`. Owner `local`, reviewer `user`; `grep <value> .agenthub/state/hub.log` and the `ahub tail` output find nothing; `ahub board` shows `[pii]`; `ahub task show <id>` shows the text; `ahub review <id> approved` closes it; amem has no capture, candidate or curated row with the value.
 5. With Claude and Codex attached: a task proposed by Claude, done by Codex, reaches Claude as a review; `tasks.escalate_after` consecutive `changes_requested` (default 3) move it to the next peer in `escalate_to`.
 
 ## M5: budget relay
@@ -1953,13 +2001,13 @@ Complete these legs in a disposable project with authorized accounts after sourc
 - Request a delta review and confirm the same eligible independent reviewing family receives a new session with prior findings. After an earlier same-family fallback, a newly available independent family still takes precedence. Exercise configured re-rotation separately. Stop or exhaust one reviewer and confirm the pure routing walk chooses the next eligible candidate; no failed start or child ending without a saved verdict becomes approval. Check the next candidate even when the missing verdict followed a vendor quota error; no text-based quota classifier is assumed.
 - Make all pool candidates unavailable and confirm a blocked review awaiting planner/person action. Then test a different fresh session in same-family fallback only when no other family can run. Verify stale-child, changed-head and private-review verdict refusals.
 - Verify compatibility separately: a Codex/Kimi headless reviewer-role declaration without `review_mode` keeps its native app-server/ACP behavior and existing worktree/permission options, and stays outside the fresh pool. An explicit fresh declaration must refuse an unsupported backend without downgrading.
-- The default logical pool is Claude, Codex, Kimi. Kimi is runnable for a compat-admitted version when runtime preparation passes (receipt-verified 2.2.0 and 2.3.0; inspect `ahub agents`); an unverified/untrusted version or failed preparation is unavailable with its reason. Seed modulo includes only kinds with a declared candidate, even when blocked; undeclared kinds remain trailing trace entries. Verify seeds 0..5 with only Claude/Codex declared alternate 3/3, and an offline declared kind still retains its slot. Agy stays unavailable as a reviewer with exact reason `agy is an implementer peer (#485)`, including explicit pool requests. #234 adds no agy reviewer launch or live leg.
+- The default logical pool is Claude, Codex, Kimi. Kimi is runnable for a compat-admitted version when runtime preparation passes (receipt-verified 2.2.0, 2.3.0 and 2.3.1; inspect `ahub agents`); an unverified/untrusted version or failed preparation is unavailable with its reason. Seed modulo includes only kinds with a declared candidate, even when blocked; undeclared kinds remain trailing trace entries. Verify seeds 0..5 with only Claude/Codex declared alternate 3/3, and an offline declared kind still retains its slot. Agy stays unavailable as a reviewer with exact reason `agy is an implementer peer (#485)`, including explicit pool requests. #234 adds no agy reviewer launch or live leg.
 
 Record source head, exact executable version/hash, isolation receipt, task/head identities, route walk, distinct native session evidence and persisted verdict separately. Do not record credentials or raw transport environments. Codex sandboxed shell must not be described as Claude's Read/Grep/Glob-only whitelist. Network policy is configured disabled; no network-denial probe or native LLM isolation result has been recorded by this investigation.
 
 ## Kimi reviewer and task-bound MCP (#533)
 
-Kimi receipt-verified 2.2.0 and 2.3.0 are available when runtime preparation passes; a failed or unsupported preparation remains unavailable. The [2.3.0 receipt](verification/2026-10-22-kimi-qwen-compat.md) is model-free; the following authenticated evidence belongs to 2.2.0. Completed evidence includes account-free two-tool/native OAuth race checks, host/fake lifecycle refusals and authenticated fresh `changes_requested` verdicts. The complete-collector live run observed project parity/canary absence, authenticated exact-two hub inventory/calls, zero decoy requests, cleanup and unchanged real config hashes. Its original aggregate receipt remains failed because of an unattributed extra observer error; the later account-free GET reproduction/correction is not a new live pass. These separate outcomes are preserved in the R0/live report. The remaining actual interactive-TUI/coexistence and usage-observation checks are **UNVERIFIED**; they do not turn completed live/fake evidence into an unrun test. Person ruling 2026-10-19 (8281ec35) limits #234 to Kimi and task-bound MCP and supersedes all earlier agy reviewer implementation/admission/live-leg rulings. Agy is an implementer under #485; its retained reviewer slot remains unavailable with exact reason `agy is an implementer peer (#485)`. Earlier agy probes and unresolved meta-tool/resource findings remain historical in the [R0 report](verification/2026-10-19-kimi-agy-reviewer-isolation.md), not active smoke requirements here. Kimi's native-permission/shared-account ruling supersedes its earlier R0-only hold and Seatbelt requirement. The [spec amendment](specs/2026-09-19-agent-hub-design.md#kimi-reviewer-and-task-bound-mcp-amendment-533-hub-task-234) defines the active contract and residuals.
+Kimi receipt-verified 2.2.0, 2.3.0 and 2.3.1 are available when runtime preparation passes; a failed or unsupported preparation remains unavailable. The [2.3.0](verification/2026-10-22-kimi-qwen-compat.md) and [2.3.1](verification/2026-10-25-kimi-231-reviewer-compat.md) receipts are model-free; the following authenticated evidence belongs to 2.2.0. Completed evidence includes account-free two-tool/native OAuth race checks, host/fake lifecycle refusals and authenticated fresh `changes_requested` verdicts. The complete-collector live run observed project parity/canary absence, authenticated exact-two hub inventory/calls, zero decoy requests, cleanup and unchanged real config hashes. Its original aggregate receipt remains failed because of an unattributed extra observer error; the later account-free GET reproduction/correction is not a new live pass. These separate outcomes are preserved in the R0/live report. The remaining actual interactive-TUI/coexistence and usage-observation checks are **UNVERIFIED**; they do not turn completed live/fake evidence into an unrun test. Person ruling 2026-10-19 (8281ec35) limits #234 to Kimi and task-bound MCP and supersedes all earlier agy reviewer implementation/admission/live-leg rulings. Agy is an implementer under #485; its retained reviewer slot remains unavailable with exact reason `agy is an implementer peer (#485)`. Earlier agy probes and unresolved meta-tool/resource findings remain historical in the [R0 report](verification/2026-10-19-kimi-agy-reviewer-isolation.md), not active smoke requirements here. Kimi's native-permission/shared-account ruling supersedes its earlier R0-only hold and Seatbelt requirement. The [spec amendment](specs/2026-09-19-agent-hub-design.md#kimi-reviewer-and-task-bound-mcp-amendment-533-hub-task-234) defines the active contract and residuals.
 
 - For Kimi regression smoke, confirm a fresh child per review, no resume, source evidence supplied only by screened `hub_task_show`/review brief and host facts, and no native Read/file/shell tool. Confirm the in-process host MCP exposes only the task-bound `hub_review` and `hub_task_show` capability, without the full hub control token. Exercise wrong task/head/review revision, stale/replaced child, private review, malformed arguments, unknown tool and stopped-child refusals; verify no saved approval on any failure.
 - For each compat-admitted Kimi version, confirm no Seatbelt wrapper, a private `KIMI_CODE_HOME` with managed-provider-only config, clean temporary cwd and explicit empty skills directory. Verify exactly the two `mcp__agent-hub__...` tools in model disclosure and invocation; reject native read/write/command and extra MCP calls. Confirm `credentials/` and `oauth/` are directory symlinks to the native locations, `device_id` links the native identity, no token copy/extraction/static provider is used, and `KIMI_DISABLE_OAUTH_LOCK` is absent. The concurrent account-free OAuth print stand-in proved two expired generations serialize refresh through shared directory links, but it was not an attached interactive TUI. Actual TUI refresh/atomic rename/lock coordination and shared-account quota/pause fanout remain separate live legs. Existing project MCP/config byte-parity observations remain recorded in the R0/live report. Record identities/metadata without token values.
@@ -1976,3 +2024,7 @@ Kimi usage ceiling: 2.2.0 print stream-json exposes no token counts. Keep unobse
 - In the native TUI call `hub_inbox`, `hub_send`, and a permitted board read/proposal within a non-PII task. Confirm the tool audience and actor remain `agy`, the native model consumes the tool results, and no unsolicited push or PII task text reaches it.
 - End the TUI normally. Confirm its group/socket detaches and only its matching managed three-file plugin is cleaned up; unrelated project/global settings remain unchanged.
 - This live project/account leg is pending until actually run. An older daemon's missing `native_hook_launch` refusal is not a successful TUI launch or grounds for an automatic restart of other active peers.
+
+## Held deliveries and peer retries (#434 AC8, 2026-10-24)
+
+See [delivery holds and peer retry verification](verification/2026-10-24-delivery-holds-ac8.md) for live evidence of hub-settled held deliveries (39 superseded notices in `resolution_history`) and peer retries (2 peer retry rows in `resolution_history`, 27 rows across Claude, Jcode, and Kimi in `delivery_retry_evidence`), alongside daemon status and queue readbacks.