@staix/agent-hub 0.13.0 → 0.15.0

package/docs/quickstart.md

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ ahub setup                                # installs the Claude Code channel plu
 Or use the matching GitHub release:
 
 ```bash
-bun add -g github:STAIxBWLB/agent-hub#v0.13.0
+bun add -g github:STAIxBWLB/agent-hub#v0.15.0
 ahub setup
 ```
 
@@ -30,6 +30,14 @@ and upgrade or crash recovery, see the [operations guide](operations.md). To
 move running projects to a newer release later, run `ahub upgrade` in a
 terminal: it reviews the plan with you, applies it and follows it.
 
+## Upgrading to 0.15.0
+
+Publish, external-write, destroy and install calls now ask a person (#636 slice 2): the Claude PreToolUse hook returns `ask` for such a call in every permission mode, `never-ask` included, and a hub-owned ACP peer such as Kimi in native `ask` mode never auto-approves one, not under `--unattended` either; it waits in the console and the dashboard as `Action approval (<classes>): <command>` and is denied when `approvals.timeout_s` passes. When a class budget is above one, the approval of a classed ACP call also offers `Allow <class> xN for this session`. Unattended work that publishes, installs or deletes now stops for you: answer it, or set `ahub settings set action_policy.enabled false` or `action_policy.budgets.<class> <n>` (the policy and its budgets live only in untracked `.agenthub/config.local.json`). `ahub status` names each peer where the hub cannot see the call before it runs: a Kimi in `yolo` or `auto`, a Claude session that has not run the hub's permission hook, an `--unattended` Claude launch, and Codex, Pi and the local worker until #313 (see [always-ask action policy](operations.md#always-ask-action-policy-foundation-636)). A terminal Claude instance declared with `implementer` or `verifier` and its own `worktree` now owns write-class tasks once the daemon verifies its launch record and channel cwd; start it again with `ahub claude --as <id>` after the upgrade, because a launch recorded without its execution root attaches without isolation and gets no write task (#525-5). A headless Claude implementer can be declared in `.agenthub/config.local.json` (`"start_mode": "headless"`, roles `["implementer"]`, its own registered `worktree`, `permission_mode` `ask` or `ask-when-needed`; `never-ask` is refused): create and register the worktree first, then `ahub claude --as <id>` asks the hub to start it and returns. It keeps one session per task, and its writes and shell calls reach you as allow-once or deny requests in the console; no answer is a deny (#525-4; see [additional headless peer instances](operations.md#additional-headless-peer-instances)). `hub_task_done` and `hub_sdlc_record` take `deliverables: [{path, format, version?}]`: the hub hashes the files itself, a reviewer's approval is refused when a file changed since delivery, and `ahub task show` reports each file as `unchanged`, `changed`, `missing` or `unknown` (#509; see [deliverable records](sdlc.md#deliverable-records-509a)). A review request lists the task's recorded acceptance criteria by id, and an unmet item that starts with one (`AC2: what is missing`) is recorded on the verdict (#507). A peer that accepted or finished a task no longer reviews it; when no other reviewer is left, you review it, and `ahub route explain <id>` also prints the planner walk (#525-3). Instances, `review`, `snapshots.keep`, `approvals.timeout_s`, `context.gate` and the `sdlc.toml` `mode` and `required_checks` can be edited with `ahub settings edit`, the console Settings key `c` or the Structure group of an `ahub ui --settings` session: the hub validates, shows a diff and keeps a backup; a changed instance or `sdlc.toml` waits for a hub restart (console `R`), and keys that run code or locate secrets stay console only with their name typed (#689; see [structural configuration](operations.md#structural-configuration-from-the-console-and-the-dashboard-issue-689)). Kimi's token use is now counted from its session wire log, so a `budget.kimi_tokens_5h` you set pauses Kimi when it is reached (#285). `ahub backlog list` prints a table by rank; a script that read its output uses `--json` (#399). A launcher that meets a busy hub retries for up to 15 s and prints `hub busy, retrying` once (#719). Upgrade running hubs with `ahub upgrade` before relying on deliverables: an older daemon drops them from a newer plugin's `hub_task_done` without a word. Restart Claude sessions so they load the 0.15.0 plugin, and if `ahub status` shows a fresh reviewer instance such as `codex-review` stopped after the upgrade, start it again with `ahub codex --as codex-review`. Coming from 0.13.0 or older, the notes below apply too.
+
+## Upgrading to 0.14.0
+
+At a terminal width `ahub board` now prints one line per task: the title is cut with `...`, dependencies move to an AFTER column, STAGE is the meter with a short next-step code (`intent: issue?`, `review: CI?`, `ready`) and a legend line explains them; `ahub board --full`, piped output without `COLUMNS` and `--json` keep the whole title and SDLC advice (#724). The dashboard's Agents view gains a Usage view under Usage budgets: lifetime totals, the last 14 UTC days of tokens per peer, the open pauses and recent limit events, and a task table in which a private task shows only as `#id [pii]` (#683 U4). A task sheet gains a Code group: the changed symbols marked `matching` or `unplanned` against the plan, the plan names nothing changed under as `untouched`, and a symbol opens the Memory tab on its node; a private task has no group (#684). `ahub sdlc metrics [--since <date>]` and the planner tool `hub_sdlc_metrics` (planner or person, read-only) report lead times, first-pass approval, rework rounds, stale-head re-reviews and stalls from board history, with `unknown` where the board cannot tell. An optional `[bands.<metric>]` table in `.agenthub/sdlc.toml` turns a breach into a hub notice, a read-only `triage` backlog task or a `plan` backlog card, once per episode, only while `mode` is `advise` or `enforce`, and never a GitHub issue (#481 S7; see [SDLC metrics and control bands](sdlc.md#sdlc-metrics-and-control-bands-481-s7)). In advise and enforce a task's issue identity is now linked when it is proposed or accepted, with no GitHub read; a title that names another repository (`agent-mem#13`) links only when `refs.repo` names it, and the propose result suggests setting it (#723). A fresh reviewer whose start fails now names a cause class (`version`, `binary`, `mcp_inventory`, `plugins_hooks_apps`, `sandbox_proof`, `credential_root`, `timeout` or `unknown`) on the `reviewer` line of `ahub status` and in `hub.log` (#722). A Claude channel instance in `.agenthub/config.local.json` may declare `implementer` or `verifier` and then needs its own `worktree`, while a planner or reviewer instance refuses one; the hub routes no code tasks to such an instance until #525-5, and a headless Claude instance stays reviewer-only. `planner` is refused on a pi, local or agy instance declaration and dropped, with a notice, from a `roles` entry for those kinds (#525-1; see [Roles per SDLC stage](operations.md#roles-per-sdlc-stage-525)). A planner pull of a reserved backlog task now assigns it to the reserved peer and offers it at once; when that peer is offline, off roster, paused, full or excluded, the pull is refused with the reason and no other peer takes it (#718). `ahub codex --as <id>` for a headless fresh reviewer instance starts it and returns (#720). Restart Claude sessions so they load the 0.14.0 plugin. Coming from 0.12.45 or older, the notes below apply too.
+
 ## Upgrading to 0.13.0
 
 One version policy now gates the Codex and Kimi fresh reviewers, Jcode, agy and Qwen (#691): `ahub agents` lists each installed CLI with its version and verdict, a version outside the verified ones (or, for Jcode and agy, outside their compatible line) is refused with the trust command, and `ahub agents trust <id> <version>` accepts that exact version on this machine; only the person can run it, and the reviewers' isolation proofs still run. See [agent CLI versions](operations.md#agent-cli-versions). If you use Jcode, run `ahub jcode` once per project: the hub-owned `.jcode/mcp.json` entry no longer names a peer, `ahub status` and `ahub doctor` show the old entry as not ready until it is rewritten, and the hub admits Jcode's hub tools only from an owned launch (#368). Extra Jcode instances, each with its own `jcode_home`, can be declared in `.agenthub/config.local.json` and started with `ahub jcode --as <id>` (#685; see [Jcode operations](operations.md#optional-jcode-peer)). Run `ahub init` once per project to refresh the hub block in `AGENTS.md`: it tells pull-only agents never to poll `hub_inbox` or CI on a timer and to run one heavy job per repository at a time (#681). `ahub usage` (with `limits` and `total`) and the console's Usage panel (`7`) show tokens per peer, task, issue, PR, release, day or model and the quota pause and reset history (#683); `ahub report --dogfood` prints a read-only scorecard (#687). In the console, `r` on a task in review now asks `a` (approve) or `c` (request changes, which needs a note) (#711), and a task's detail shows an overlaps block and, when ripwire 0.6.7 is on the daemon's PATH, its changed symbols, which the review brief lists too (#684). A pull-only peer now drains its queue up to 64 KiB per `hub_inbox` read, a queued delivery can be discarded while its peer is busy, and the person clears one peer's queue with `ahub queue discard --peer <id> --reason <text> --yes` (#713). `ahub sdlc authorize-release <version>` records the person's release approval, and `ahub init --release-guard` installs an optional tag pre-push guard (#481 S6; see [release approval](operations.md#release-approval-and-optional-tag-guard)). As announced since 0.12.x, `sdlc.workflow = "gsd-lite"` no longer loads and the `phase` receipt name is refused (#481): remove the setting and record a `criteria` checklist with `hub_sdlc_record`. Restart Claude sessions so they load the 0.13.0 plugin. Coming from 0.12.44 or older, the notes below apply too.
@@ -140,10 +148,11 @@ or set `OMNIROUTE_API_KEY`. The `.agenthub/routing.toml` that `ahub init` writes
 | --- | --- |
 | `ahub say [@peer] <text>` | talk; start with `[STATUS]` to let it batch, `[FYI]` for the record only |
 | `ahub task propose [--class <c>] <title>` | put work on the board; the hub picks an owner and a reviewer, and the class if you name none |
-| `ahub board` | who has what; `ahub task show <id>` for one task |
+| `ahub board` | who has what, one line per task at a terminal width; `--full` for whole titles and SDLC advice, `ahub task show <id>` for one task |
 | `ahub task cancel <id> --reason <text>` | close obsolete work without approving it or stopping a native turn |
 | `ahub settings set planner <peer>` | pin the planner; status reports whether it came from settings, roles or the automatic choice |
 | `ahub settings reload` | apply edited config files without a restart; guarded values wait for your `y` in this terminal, and restart-only keys stay pending |
+| `ahub settings edit <file> set <path> <json>` | change an instance, the review block or the `sdlc.toml` lifecycle with a validated diff and a backup; `ahub settings backups` lists the backups |
 | `ahub status` | peers, queues, pauses; `ahub budget` for quota windows |
 | `ahub usage [--by peer\|task\|issue\|pr\|release\|day\|model]` | tokens per group, each number with its source; `ahub usage limits` for pauses and resets |
 | `ahub agents` | which installed agent CLI versions the hub accepts; `ahub agents trust <id> <version>` accepts an untested one on this machine |
@@ -174,7 +183,8 @@ allow. They can be denied on the page. PII task details remain available only vi
 `ahub task show <id>` in the terminal. The page also starts a peer in its start
 mode (a TUI opens in a terminal when the hub has a terminal provider) and shows
 the settings with a Reload configuration button; raising one needs `ahub ui --settings`
-or `ahub settings` in a terminal, and guarded values from an edited file need
+or `ahub settings` in a terminal (the Structure group edits instances and the
+lifecycle only in such a session), and guarded values from an edited file need
 `ahub settings reload` there. See the operations guide, "Settings from the dashboard and the
 terminal" and "Start modes".
 

package/docs/sdlc.md

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ The built-in lifecycle follows the [AI-Native SDLC Playbook](https://claude.com/
 | review | Deploy | assigned reviewer | current head-bound verdict, no pending change request/open thread; AC checklist under Compliance | approval, when enabled; open Important findings block in enforce |
 | merge | Deploy | person | current-head readiness, ordered touching PRs | shown; no mutation |
 | release | Deploy | person | merged commit, version/tag, docs freshness/live receipt checklist | person authorization and optional tag hook below |
-| maintain | Maintain | person/planner | follow-up intent and operational evidence | shown; metrics/control bands pending S7 |
+| maintain | Maintain | person/planner | follow-up intent and operational evidence | shown; metrics and control bands from S7 (`ahub sdlc metrics`) |
 
 Stored `implement` and `verify` stage ids read as `build` and `test`. A write that names the old id stores the id the configuration lists, so new enabled-lifecycle receipts use the canonical ids. The default remains off, preserving existing off-mode output, receipt and schema shapes. Status, explain, console and dashboard name the playbook stage beside enabled lifecycle ids.
 
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Stored `implement` and `verify` stage ids read as `build` and `test`. A write th
 | S4 | Red-first tests and test integrity | Bug-label metadata, source-labelled red-first proof and changed pre-existing test blockers |
 | S5 | Continuous evals for agent configuration | Pending gate, dependent on #251/#266; no eval pass claimed |
 | S6 | Production approval gate | Person-only commit/version/docs receipt and opt-in Git tag pre-push guard; report stays read-only |
-| S7 | Metrics, deterministic control bands and follow-up intent | Pending; no automated metric triage or security baseline claimed |
+| S7 | Metrics, deterministic control bands and follow-up intent | `ahub sdlc metrics`, optional `[bands]` with log, diagnose and propose tiers, one card per breach episode; no PR readback and no security baseline (design spec amendment) |
 | S8 | Compliance acceptance-criteria checklist | Head-bound checklist retained; legacy workflow and phase compatibility deprecated; task import removed |
 | S9 | Planner grooming and plan review | Read-only digest, current plan-review receipt at build admission, all-mode WIP and accepted-untouched return |
 | S10 | Planner cost governance | Typed review/CI scope, premature-review admission, identical-tree CI reuse and read-only cost report |
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ A person records ids and a claimed local receipt with `ahub sdlc record 12 '{"re
 - A checklist names a bounded slug `id`, a full `head` and 1..32 criterion records. Each criterion has a bounded `id`, boolean `required`, `result` verified|failed|unverified and up to eight hashed refs. Accepted refs are `sha256:<64-hex>`, or `artifact|check|source:<ASCII-reference>@<64-hex>`. Whole receipt JSON is at most 32 KiB. The hub never fetches those refs or treats a model claim as a deterministic check. Verified outcomes are reviewer claims, separately labelled from fresh GitHub checks.
 - Required failed/unverified criteria and missing/stale checklist heads keep readiness false. Advise/off preserve existing transition behavior. Enforce adds criteria blockers only at approval. Entering review remains possible with unverified criteria so the reviewer can inspect and record them. Criteria claims do not replace exact-head local/CI checks.
 - Once recorded, a checklist adds its blockers in any enabled lifecycle; off ignores it, as #257 did. The `criteria` entry/exit gate uses the same checklist without a workflow selector, and a missing checklist is a blocker the reviewer clears by recording one. Task dependencies remain with `Tasks.after`, created through `ahub task propose --after`. Checklist task import is removed.
+- A task's acceptance criteria are this checklist: there is no second criteria model (#507b). The review request lists the recorded criteria (`- <id>: <result>`, `(optional)` for a non-required one) ahead of its checklist, so the reviewer sees the ids the task is judged by; a PII task lists none. A `hub_review` unmet item that starts with a recorded id (`AC2: the overwrite case has no test`, or the bare id) names that criterion: the hub records the ids it matched on the verdict as `unmetCriteria` (history and the public view), read from the board's checklist at the verdict and never from the caller. An id the checklist does not hold, the wrong case, a longer word that merely starts with an id and an id in the middle of a sentence are plain text, and the note text is unchanged. These ids are what later review packing and learning refer to.
 - `ahub sdlc status <id>`, `explain` and console/dashboard projections show the same criteria view. `ahub sdlc export <id>` keeps the #257 schema-1 bytes in plain off (`workflow: "none"`, `phase: null`); an enabled or retired-setting lifecycle emits schema 2, with sanitized state, criteria/hashes and `stateHash`/`sourceHash`: the exact projection hash and normalized effective lifecycle-configuration hash. These are derived hashes, not code/build attestations or import authority. Private exports contain a stub and no checklist refs.
 
 Example reviewer receipt:
@@ -221,6 +222,27 @@ The digest is bounded to 500 task rows (open work plus structured cancelled supe
 
 S9 ceilings: a private build task with an issue reference cannot satisfy enforce admission: privacy forbids the external issue metadata read, and no person override for a metadata-free plan receipt exists. Grooming pointers are coalesced only while queued, per board revision; there is no minimum time interval after delivery, so a busy board may produce one delivered pointer per revision.
 
+# SDLC metrics and control bands (#481 S7)
+
+`ahub sdlc metrics [--since <YYYY-MM-DD|ISO time>]` (the planner tool `hub_sdlc_metrics`; planner or person only, read-only) derives these from board history: time from spec acceptance to plan review, from acceptance to the first verdict and (when a merge time is supplied) to merge; the first-pass approval rate and rework rounds; the first-pass check rate; same-head CI reruns; stale-head re-reviews; and open stalls by kind. Each is a count, mean, median, p90 and max over the tasks that have it. `unknown` is the word and a count (`unknown: N`) for a task that does not have it: a metric the board cannot derive is never zero. A private task is counted as withheld and read for nothing else. The report is a pure function of the board history, so a fixture history gives the same report every time.
+
+What each metric reads, and what it does not:
+
+- `first_pass_check` is the hub's own completion check (`check passed` or `check failed` at `hub_task_done`), not PR CI. It is `unknown` for every task where completion checks are off, which is the default.
+- `stale_head_re_reviews` counts review rounds whose verdict was bound to a different head than the review was requested for (the `done`'s recorded head against the verdict's findings head), so it needs both heads on the round. A task with no such round is `unknown`, not 0. (A `done` after an `approved` is not a signal: the board cannot produce one.)
+- `acceptance_to_merge_ms` and `same_head_ci_reruns` need a PR readback. This report makes none, so they read `unknown` here; `ahub sdlc costs` carries the PR-based review rounds, CI runs and reruns.
+- `stalls` counts open stalls on public tasks by kind and the dones recorded without writes.
+
+`.agenthub/sdlc.toml` may set `[bands.<metric>]` for `acceptance_to_plan_ms`, `acceptance_to_first_review_ms`, `first_pass_approval`, `rework_rounds`, `first_pass_check` or `stale_head_re_reviews`. Every field is optional and bounded: `window` (4 to 200, default 20), `min_samples` (3 to 200, default 8, at most `window`), `log_sigma` 2, `diagnose_sigma` 3, `propose_sigma` 4 (ordered, 0.5 to 20), `drift_run` (3 to 50, default 6) and `min_delta` (the smallest step worth any tier: an hour for the times, one round, half a rate). An unknown metric or field is refused with its path. The newest value is compared with the mean and population standard deviation of the `window` values before it, on the bad side only (a longer time, more rework, a lower rate). The deviation is floored per metric (half an hour, or half a round or a rate) so a flat baseline does not turn one step into thousands of deviations. Fewer than `min_samples` before it fires nothing, and so does a step under `min_delta`, drift included. A run of `drift_run` newest values all more than one deviation on the bad side is at least `diagnose` even when none reaches a sigma tier, provided the newest step clears `min_delta`. Tiers:
+
+- `log`: one hub notice per breach episode, remembered in the board database so a restart does not repeat it.
+- `diagnose`: one read-only `triage` backlog task for the planner to inspect the histories behind the metric. It asks for no edit of files, branches or the board.
+- `propose`: one `plan` backlog card that names the metric and its evidence (the newest value, the task that produced it, where the episode began, the baseline and the deviations).
+
+`rework_rounds` and `stale_head_re_reviews` are final only when a task is approved: a task still in flight is `unknown` for both and the series places them at the approval, so a provisional value cannot move and start a second episode inside one shift. The stale-head count compares the head a `done` requested with the head the verdict is bound to; the verdict head prefers the lifecycle receipt's `head` or `localHead` over the commit, so a task whose receipt head and commit disagree can read one spurious stale round. Release metrics (interval, lead time, hotfix rate), release bands and the per-release gates-run record are not built; they need release history and S6, and are the next slice. A breach is an episode: the run of non-ok values of one metric, keyed `<metric>:#<task that started it>:<tier>` in the card (`Band breach key:`). The key comes from history alone, so a sustained shift keeps one key however many tasks finish inside it, and a restart finds the same one. A metric with an open band card (a backlog or open task, not approved or cancelled) writes nothing more, so a value that grows from `diagnose` to `propose` inside one episode adds no second card. When the planner closes the card and the metric returns to ok, a later breach is a new episode and a new card. The daemon evaluates every five minutes, only when the board or the band configuration changed since the last evaluation that ran, and not while it is stopping or recovering or has a storage error; a held pass, mode off or no bands consumes nothing, so the breach is written when the hold clears. A failed evaluation is one `hub.log` line. Detection never calls a model, the cards hold fixed words, numbers and task ids and no task text, and the hub opens no GitHub issue: external registration stays a person's decision.
+
+Bands act only when the lifecycle `mode` is `advise` or `enforce`: in `off` the writer is idle, though `ahub sdlc metrics` still reports each configured band's tier. A scheduled security scan baseline is not part of this slice.
+
 # Planner review and CI cost governance (#481 S10)
 
 At plan review, batch small related fixes into one area branch and PR; keep release preparation separate from feature work. A plan can name `review: {scope: "none" | "delta" | "full", reviewers: N}` and `ci: "focused" | "full" | "reuse"`. None requires zero reviewers; delta/full require one to eight. These are expected costs, not permission to bypass the task's reviewer, CI or privacy gates. Use one reviewer for a small change; split a large review by area with one receipt owner. After a fix, review the delta against the previous findings. S2 will compare planned scope with completed coverage.
@@ -308,3 +330,19 @@ For every actual pushed `v*` destination, the hook requires an exact semantic ve
 Before other release commands, agents run `ahub sdlc release-guard -- <literal argv...>`. Supported forms are one named-remote tag push, `gh release create v<version>` (an existing GitHub tag is read back; a new one requires `--target <full-sha>`), and `npm publish` from the approved checkout. Ambiguous selectors, alternate repositories, bulk pushes, workspaces and archive publishes refuse. The npm preflight refuses tracked worktree changes before and after rechecking the committed-doc verdict and HEAD, but does not attest the eventual tarball, npm configuration or lifecycle scripts. The command performs no release operation and its answer is not an execution grant. GitHub/npm enforcement remains instruction-based until adapter integration (#312/#313); rerun preflight after changing any target or candidate. Native install, live release and migration evidence remain separate obligations.
 
 Tracked npm cleanliness compares the cached index to HEAD and raw tracked blob bytes without `git status`, clean/process filters or text converters. It refuses unknown evidence, gitlinks, transformed files and inventories above 4,096 entries, 4 MiB per file, 32 MiB total or 250 ms; untracked files remain outside this check and the eventual tarball is not attested.
+
+## Deliverable records (#509a)
+
+A report, translation or slide deck has no commit, so the artifact identity is the file's own content hash, recorded by the hub.
+
+- `hub_task_done` and `hub_sdlc_record` (inside `receipt`) accept `deliverables: [{path, format, version?}]`, one to sixteen entries. `path` is project-relative with forward slashes; `format` is a lowercase label (`md`, `pdf`, `docx`, `csv`); `version` is an optional short label. There is no hash field: **a claimed `sha256`, `hash` or `bytes` is refused**, and so is any field the hub does not own.
+- The hub opens and hashes each file itself. The path is resolved with `realPath` and checked with `guardPath` in read mode: outside the project, on the secrets denylist (`local.deny`), through a dangling link, inside `.git` or `.agenthub` (the hub's own state), not a regular file, missing, over 256 MiB each or 512 MiB together are refused, with the path as given and never a resolved one. The file is opened without following a final link and its device and inode are compared with what was checked, so a path swapped in between is refused; a file that changes while it is read is refused, never recorded half-read. Reading is chunked with an await between chunks, so a large file does not stall the daemon.
+- A bad call is refused whole, before any board write: no partial record, and the task stays where it was. Each record stores `id` (an opaque id from path and format, stable across edits), `path`, `format`, `version`, the real `sha256` and the size.
+- **Where the files are read.** Paths are relative to the owner's execution root: the project checkout for an ordinary owner, the instance's own verified worktree for a declared worktree instance (the place it writes). A root the host cannot prove refuses the call, and a read of such a task reports every file `unknown`, never `unchanged`; an approval is refused for the same reason.
+- It works in a plain folder. Nothing needs git, a PR, a shadow repository, a snapshot, facts or a lifecycle receipt (a task with no `sdlc` receipt records and approves deliverables).
+- **Approval binds the bytes.** When a reviewer approves, the hub reads the files again. Unchanged, the approval records the same hashes. Changed, missing or unreadable, the approval is refused before any write with `deliverable changed since it was delivered: <id> (<state>)`; the owner calls `hub_task_done` again so the current files are reviewed. `changes_requested` needs no binding. The person may approve files that moved: the current bytes are measured and bound, and the verdict note says the files had changed since delivery.
+- **Later edits.** `hub_task_show` and `ahub task show` add `deliverables: { state: "delivered" | "approved", changedSinceReview, files: [{ id, sha256, state: "unchanged" | "changed" | "missing" | "unknown", ... }] }`, read from the files as they are now against what was approved (or, before approval, delivered). `changedSinceReview` is true only for a file measured to differ. A file the hub cannot read or vouch for (denied, outside, replaced by a link out, too large) is `unknown`, never `unchanged`.
+- **Private records.** For a PII task, or a file under `pii.paths`, the record is private: every peer view, review request, status and log shows the id, hash and size only, `(path withheld)` in the request. The board keeps the path so the file can be found again, as it keeps the rest of a PII task's text. A path that matches a PII pattern is withheld the same way.
+- `hub_sdlc_record` with `deliverables` records them on a `lifecycle` entry, through the same hashing and the same owner, reviewer or console authority; a receipt without them is the old call.
+- Limit: a daemon from before this slice ignores `deliverables` on `hub_task_done` (the plugin is installed apart from the daemon), so restart the hub after an upgrade before relying on it; a done that names deliverables and shows no `Deliverables` block in its review request was recorded without them.
+- Not in this slice: `ahub deliverables [--task <id>]` and the dashboard column (#509 AC3, the next slice), and a hash of a file the hub cannot read.

package/docs/security.md

@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ agent-hub connects agents that can each run commands. This page says what the hu
 
 - **Other agents' text is untrusted.** Every message that crosses from one peer to another is framed as untrusted input: a channel tag with `meta.source` for Claude started with `ahub claude`; otherwise a fixed header line (`frame()`, `[agent-hub message from ...]`) with an instruction that says it is untrusted, the plugin's server instructions for a tools-only Claude reading `hub_inbox` and a standing instruction for the others. A message body cannot forge the hub's own headers: such lines are quoted (`sanitize`). Replies inherit a hop count capped at 3, so agents cannot ping-pong forever; neither a digest nor a steer can reset it.
 - **The control link is loopback plus a secret.** The daemon and the Codex proxy bind 127.0.0.1 only. The control WebSocket requires a per-run token (`.agenthub/state/control-token`, mode 600), and both servers refuse any request that carries an `Origin` header: any web page can open a WebSocket to localhost, and browsers always send `Origin`. The bearer header a Codex TUI sends to the proxy carries only the terminal launch id (#586): it binds terminal ownership and is not a credential. External clients cannot claim the console user's id or a hub-managed peer's id.
-- **Permission prompts stay on unless an operator selects a permission mode.** `ask` leaves native decisions unchanged. `ask-when-needed` grants scoped Claude file tools or Pi/local writes and edits; Kimi and Codex use their own native policies. `never-ask` requires explicit runtime confirmation or a person's console `y` for a config default at hub start. Until that config confirmation the peer runs in `ask`. Kimi's and `local`'s permission requests are relayed to the console and cancelled after `approvals.timeout_s` (default 120 s) of silence; the macOS notification for a waiting request carries the peer and the tool name only. The one exception is the hub's own tools (`hub_send` and the task tools, matched by exact name): Kimi's requests for them are approved once without a prompt and logged by name, the same trust Codex gets through `approval_mode` in the hub's config. They invoke hub-owned operations rather than arbitrary file or shell tools, and every call passes the hub's own checks. Identity comes from the exact permission title, or from the earlier tool-call title bound to the same call id and resolved against the configured MCP servers when the permission title contains argument JSON (Qwen). Payload text and unrelated display titles never establish identity. Configured ACP kinds (#451) never get this exception: a request whose title spells a hub tool exactly still goes to the person approval path, and only a mapped native mode changes what the agent itself asks. For ACP agents, a payload longer than the console shows is marked as cut and never offers a session-wide grant. Pi's write, edit, shell and git write requests are relayed the same way and can be answered `Always allow <tool> until Pi restarts`: later calls of that tool by the same Pi start skip the prompt but stay inside the path guard and sandbox. The grant covers every later call of that tool whatever its payload, is kept in memory only, cannot be given from the dashboard, and each call it allows is logged by tool name. A Pi or `local` request whose call was cancelled or whose turn ended is withdrawn at once: a later answer is refused and grants nothing, an `Always allow` included. One shell command runs without a hub approval: the `!command` a person types in the managed Pi TUI. It stays inside the same sandbox and denylist, and the hub takes it only from the verified owner process of a Pi in TUI mode, while Pi is idle, on a reservation that is used once; a model's own bash call never takes that path (issue #253). `--unattended` turns prompts off, says so loudly, and is never the default.
+- **Permission prompts stay on unless an operator selects a permission mode.** `ask` leaves native decisions unchanged. `ask-when-needed` grants scoped Claude file tools or Pi/local writes and edits; Kimi and Codex use their own native policies. `never-ask` requires explicit runtime confirmation or a person's console `y` for a config default at hub start. Until that config confirmation the peer runs in `ask`. Kimi's and `local`'s permission requests are relayed to the console and cancelled after `approvals.timeout_s` (default 120 s) of silence; the macOS notification for a waiting request carries the peer and the tool name only. The one exception is the hub's own tools (`hub_send` and the task tools, matched by exact name): Kimi's requests for them are approved once without a prompt and logged by name, the same trust Codex gets through `approval_mode` in the hub's config. They invoke hub-owned operations rather than arbitrary file or shell tools, and every call passes the hub's own checks. A call the always-ask policy classes (below) is never approved this way, whatever its title. Identity comes from the exact permission title, or from the earlier tool-call title bound to the same call id and resolved against the configured MCP servers when the permission title contains argument JSON (Qwen). Payload text and unrelated display titles never establish identity. Configured ACP kinds (#451) never get this exception: a request whose title spells a hub tool exactly still goes to the person approval path, and only a mapped native mode changes what the agent itself asks. For ACP agents, a payload longer than the console shows is marked as cut and never offers a session-wide grant. Pi's write, edit, shell and git write requests are relayed the same way and can be answered `Always allow <tool> until Pi restarts`: later calls of that tool by the same Pi start skip the prompt but stay inside the path guard and sandbox. The grant covers every later call of that tool whatever its payload, is kept in memory only, cannot be given from the dashboard, and each call it allows is logged by tool name. A Pi or `local` request whose call was cancelled or whose turn ended is withdrawn at once: a later answer is refused and grants nothing, an `Always allow` included. One shell command runs without a hub approval: the `!command` a person types in the managed Pi TUI. It stays inside the same sandbox and denylist, and the hub takes it only from the verified owner process of a Pi in TUI mode, while Pi is idle, on a reservation that is used once; a model's own bash call never takes that path (issue #253). `--unattended` turns prompts off, says so loudly, and is never the default; a classed call from a hub-owned ACP peer still waits for a person under it.
 - **A committed config cannot choose launch commands, credential files, data endpoints, permission modes or a wider sandbox.** The machine-local fields (`kimi_cmd`, `permission_modes`, `codex_bin`, `pi.cmd`, `checks`, `mlx.bin`, `mlx.runtimeDir`, `mlx.modelPath`, `omniroute.urls`, `omniroute.access_hosts`, the `omniroute` key files, `memory.worker_url`, `local.read_allow`, `local.bash_network`, `local.network_allow`, `terminal.open`, `instances`, `action_policy`) apply only from a config file git confirms nobody committed (`instances` and `action_policy` are read only from an untracked `.agenthub/config.local.json`; in `config.json` they are ignored even when untracked): `.agenthub/config.json` or `.agenthub/config.local.json`, matched by file identity so no other spelling the file system accepts slips past, and `.agenthub` itself not a committed symlink or submodule. Without a repository, or when git fails, they keep their defaults; an empty value always means the default. "Untracked" is answered by the repository that contains the project: a checkout copied or extracted into an unrelated repository, or into an ignored directory of one, is trusted like your own files. So a cloned repository cannot choose a launch command, a completion check, a gateway to send a key file to, a memory endpoint, a permission mode, the command that opens a terminal, or a wider sandbox. A command in `checks` runs as you, outside the local worker's sandbox, like a git hook. So do the `setup` and `verify` commands of a benchmark suite (issue #251): `ahub bench run <suite.json>` is a person's command, refused from an agent session, and it resets the work tree for each attempt, so it runs only with `bench.enabled`, at the root of a clean repository that tracks nothing under `.agenthub/`. Nothing in `routing.toml` or in task text is ever run. `routing.toml` and the other shared fields still come from the checkout, and they matter: `routing.toml` picks the models the local worker and the hub's inference use at your gateway and can turn the PII constraint off, and roles and budget shape who does what. Review them in a repository you do not trust. The hub's own git calls outside the sandbox (snapshots, facts, config trust, project discovery, memory recall, the bench runner) all use the single hardened implementation in the exact-pinned first-party `@staix/agent-mem/platform` package, re-exported by `src/hub/git.ts`, which disables the programs a repository's configuration can name — the file-system monitor, hooks, external diff, the pager, and the credential and askpass helpers, with prompts failing closed — so a config that ever does get written cannot run code with the hub's rights. Of those, the monitor, hooks and external diff are reachable by commands the hub issues (the planted-program test exercises all three; a `diff --no-index` reads the repo's config, so that call also passes `--no-ext-diff` and `--no-textconv`); the pager is not (every call pipes stdout). Credential and askpass helpers are disabled for project repositories; memory sync alone may use credentials for its own memory repository, without prompts. The cost: `core.fsmonitor=false` also turns off a person's enabled built-in monitor for the hub's own calls, so the per-turn snapshot's `add -A` scans the whole tree (the snapshot Git calls of one burst share a 250 ms budget, each call at most 10 s; a boundary that runs out is recorded as unknown, never as a stale baseline) (#576). git has no global switch for filter drivers, and of the hub's commands only the snapshot's `add`/`restore` would run one (its driver command lives in the protected `.git/config`).
-- **Telemetry holds no bodies.** `.agenthub/state/events.jsonl` (issue #40) records envelope ids, routing and sizes, task ids and states, overlapping paths and token counts, and the task id (with a PII flag) that each usage and token record is attributed to. It never records a message body, a task title or detail, and marks private (PII) envelopes and tasks as such. Budget pauses, resumes and quota resets carry the peer, window, times and the hub's own reason text, and a person's release authorization its commit, version and docs digest. The usage roll-up (#683) folds the usage, token and limit records into `hub.db` and joins issue, PR and release from the board when read; `ahub usage` and the console's Usage panel answer only the console and a configured planner, and a planner not during a private turn. It stays on the machine; `ahub export` only prints it. Two opt-in stores copy numbers from it into your home directory, shared by every project on the machine (directories mode 700, files 600): research records (issue #247, `research.enabled`) in `~/.agenthub/research/` hold per approved task the ids, states, counts, tokens, times and PII flag the events hold, a person's label from a closed list, and a hash in place of the project id; benchmark runs (issue #251) in `~/.agenthub/bench/` hold suite name and hash, arm label, the attached peers' ids, models and permission modes, task ids, outcomes, exit codes, counts, tokens and times, never suite text or a command's output.
+- **Telemetry holds no bodies.** `.agenthub/state/events.jsonl` (issue #40) records envelope ids, routing and sizes, task ids and states, overlapping paths and token counts, and the task id (with a PII flag) that each usage and token record is attributed to. It never records a message body, a task title or detail, and marks private (PII) envelopes and tasks as such. Budget pauses, resumes and quota resets carry the peer, window, times and the hub's own reason text, and a person's release authorization its commit, version and docs digest. The usage roll-up (#683) folds the usage, token and limit records into `hub.db` and joins issue, PR and release from the board when read; `ahub usage` and the console's Usage panel answer only the console and a configured planner, and a planner not during a private turn. Kimi's token records (#285) are counted from its own session wire log under its home: only the four token integers, the model label and the row time are copied, and the record id is an opaque hash, never a path, session id or text. The log stays on the machine; `ahub export` only prints it. Two opt-in stores copy numbers from it into your home directory, shared by every project on the machine (directories mode 700, files 600): research records (issue #247, `research.enabled`) in `~/.agenthub/research/` hold per approved task the ids, states, counts, tokens, times and PII flag the events hold, a person's label from a closed list, and a hash in place of the project id; benchmark runs (issue #251) in `~/.agenthub/bench/` hold suite name and hash, arm label, the attached peers' ids, models and permission modes, task ids, outcomes, exit codes, counts, tokens and times, never suite text or a command's output.
 - **Snapshots stay in your repository.** Per-turn snapshots (issue #33) are git objects in the project's own object store, written through a temporary index; nothing is referenced, pushed or copied elsewhere, and `git gc` prunes them. They hold what the work tree held, including untracked files that are not ignored, so keep secrets in ignored files. They carry the repository's own permissions, and nothing caps their disk use but `git gc`. A turn of a peer holding an open PII task is not snapshotted; a PII file left in the project is snapshotted by later turns like any other file. `ahub undo` restores only files whose current content is exactly what the turn left.
 - **The edit hook reads, never decides.** `ahub check-path --hook` (issue #32) reads hub.db and returns context for Claude and a line for you; it sets no permission decision, so your permission rules stay in charge. It names other owners' task ids, titles and states, which then reach Claude's model; PII tasks are left out.
 - **The session record holds identities only.** `.agenthub/state/sessions.json` (issue #37, mode 600) keeps each attached peer's recovery metadata: launch options, session and thread ids, Pi's session file path. No message or task text; loss notices name deliveries by id, sender and public task title. The Pi continuity bookmark that recovery keeps across stop and archive (`.agenthub/state/recovery-continuity.json`, mode 600, at most 16 KiB) holds identities only too: operation and project ids, the project root, and Pi's session id, session file, backend and model name; a bookmark that is not a private regular file, is larger than that or names another project or operation reads as invalid, which is kept distinct from no bookmark.
@@ -59,11 +59,31 @@ is refused before write/edit effects.
 Kimi executes its own tools outside that sandbox; Claude and Codex retain their
 vendor boundaries. The never-ask confirmation names this difference. No mode
 turns off the sandbox or grants a session-wide allow-always option.
-The always-ask action policy (#636) is a foundation only: its classifier and
-session budgets exist, `action_policy` is read only from an untracked
-`.agenthub/config.local.json`, and no adapter enforces it yet, so it adds no
-protection; each peer's status says `always-ask not enforceable: adapter
-integration pending`.
+The always-ask action policy (#636) classes a call as publish, external-write,
+destroy or install; `action_policy` is read only from an untracked
+`.agenthub/config.local.json`. Since slice 2 two adapters enforce it. Claude's
+managed PreToolUse hook returns `ask` for a classed call in every permission
+mode, `never-ask` included, and that `ask` replaces any allow the mode would
+add; the hook never denies, and a hub that is down, slow or refusing decides
+nothing, which leaves Claude's own policy. A hub-owned ACP peer's
+`session/request_permission` for a classed call is never auto-approved (a
+hub-tool title, a mode grant and `--unattended` included), offers no
+allow-always, shows `Action approval (<classes>): <command>` built from the
+task's public view and the PII screen (withheld for a private turn or an open PII
+task), and is denied when the approval timeout passes. A class budget above one
+adds one person-only choice that allows at most N calls of those classes in the
+same native session; a new session, a changed policy or a stopped, crashed or
+restarted peer starts from zero, and an ordinary allow never spends it. The
+limits are the point of the visibility rule: the hub enforces only a call it
+sees before it runs. A Claude session without the hub hook or not yet proven to
+have run it, an `--unattended` Claude launch (it skips hooks), an ACP agent in a
+native mode that sends no request for a call it allows (Kimi's `yolo` and
+`auto`), a call whose payload the agent did not report, and Codex, Pi and the
+local worker until slice 3 (#313) are not enforced, and `ahub status` says
+`always-ask not enforceable: <reason>` for each such peer rather than claiming
+it. The classifier reads command text: unknown syntax keeps native handling, and
+an agent with an unrestricted shell can still reach the same effect another way
+(the hostile-agent boundary above).
 
 Config defaults apply automatically only up to ask-when-needed. A never-ask
 request from an applied untracked config is held as ask until the person
@@ -176,19 +196,20 @@ Please report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub's "Report a vulnerability
 - The exchange creates a separate random session, valid for one hour without renewal, in an `HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict; Path=/` cookie named for this listener's port. Sessions and tickets live only in memory and die with the daemon. The page itself keeps one more cookie, `agent-hub-theme` (issue #246): script-set, `SameSite=Strict`, kept for a year for the whole `127.0.0.1` host, and read back only as one of `system`, `light` or `dark`. A second script-set cookie, `agent-hub-office` (issue #264), keeps the Office view choice under the same attributes and is read back only as `off`, `flat` or `isometric`. The #391 view split adds two more script-set cookies under the same attributes: `agent-hub-view`, read back only as one of the seven view names, and `agent-hub-column-focus`, read back only as one of the five board columns or empty. HTTP is loopback-only; the cookie is not a substitute for the origin checks.
 - Every request must have the exact listener Host. Every data or action request, including the ticket exchange and snapshot polling, must be POST with the exact listener Origin and JSON content type. Foreign and missing origins, missing or expired sessions, oversized bodies and unknown actions are rejected. There is no CORS support. The only unauthenticated GET is the fixed, data-free HTML shell. No files or paths are served dynamically.
 - Responses are non-cacheable, cannot be framed, suppress referrers, and use a content security policy restricting scripts/styles to the shipped inline content and connections to this origin. Browser text is rendered with textContent, never interpreted as HTML.
-- The browser receives a bounded redacted event stream, peer states and queue counts, public task views (with a task's screened changed-symbol observation, #684: ids, paths, names and kinds, never source or line spans), budget windows, pending approvals, the settings rows (closed values and ids, the file each comes from) and each startable peer's start plan (issue #269), benchmark run summaries (issue #251): the newest runs in `~/.agenthub/bench/`, whichever project on this machine ran them, by suite name, arm label, state, the task id in progress, counts, tokens and times, never suite text, and the office view's optional fields (issue #264): each peer's open turn (start time, attributed task id, attribution kind), a `checking` flag on tasks whose check is running, and warning `links` of overlapping, conflicting or cohort tasks (task and peer ids only, never paths, symbols or reasons; a PII task never joins a link, and a private or PII-attributed turn exposes no task id). Private envelope bodies and PII task text never cross this endpoint. Local-worker and Pi approval titles can contain PII, so their details remain terminal-only; the dashboard identifies the request and directs the operator to `ahub tail` before allowing it. Budget checkpoint summaries are also omitted.
-- The closed action list includes permission response, peer pause/resume, console message, task proposal/assignment and the settings actions below (set, undo, preview, reload). Project-board actions add revision-fenced planning, Backlog pull/return/split/undo and release planning/state changes through Tasks; they do not tag, publish or write GitHub state. These use the existing daemon/task paths and budget pause rules. `start_peer` (issue #269) starts a peer from a closed list in the mode a person set, with a command the hub assembles: the request carries a peer id and nothing else. There is no generic control proxy, task-detail read, shell, file access, free-form configuration edit, budget override, launch of a caller-chosen command or daemon shutdown API.
+- The browser receives a bounded redacted event stream, peer states and queue counts, public task views (with a task's screened changed-symbol observation, #684: ids, paths, names and kinds, never source or line spans, and its Code group, #684 phase 2c: those symbols marked against the plan's names, each name re-screened by the public metadata screen; a private task has no group and its plan names never enter the snapshot), budget windows, pending approvals, the settings rows (closed values and ids, the file each comes from) and each startable peer's start plan (issue #269), benchmark run summaries (issue #251): the newest runs in `~/.agenthub/bench/`, whichever project on this machine ran them, by suite name, arm label, state, the task id in progress, counts, tokens and times, never suite text, the Usage view (#683 U4), computed only while the Agents view is open: peer ids, UTC days and token counts with their source, budget pause, resume and reset events without their reason text, and per-task rows of the task id, a PII flag and token counts, never a title, and the office view's optional fields (issue #264): each peer's open turn (start time, attributed task id, attribution kind), a `checking` flag on tasks whose check is running, and warning `links` of overlapping, conflicting or cohort tasks (task and peer ids only, never paths, symbols or reasons; a PII task never joins a link, and a private or PII-attributed turn exposes no task id). Private envelope bodies and PII task text never cross this endpoint. Local-worker and Pi approval titles can contain PII, so their details remain terminal-only; the dashboard identifies the request and directs the operator to `ahub tail` before allowing it. Budget checkpoint summaries are also omitted.
+- The closed action list includes permission response, peer pause/resume, console message, task proposal/assignment and the settings actions below (set, undo, preview, reload, and the structural edit preview and apply of a settings session). Project-board actions add revision-fenced planning, Backlog pull/return/split/undo and release planning/state changes through Tasks; they do not tag, publish or write GitHub state. These use the existing daemon/task paths and budget pause rules. `start_peer` (issue #269) starts a peer from a closed list in the mode a person set, with a command the hub assembles: the request carries a peer id and nothing else. There is no generic control proxy, task-detail read, shell, file access, free-form configuration edit, budget override, launch of a caller-chosen command or daemon shutdown API.
 - The listener stops with the daemon. Expired sessions must be reopened with `ahub ui`; the page does not silently obtain new credentials.
 
 ## Dashboard settings and the settings session (issue #269)
 
-- Settings are a closed registry (`src/hub/settings.ts`). The dashboard and `ahub settings` can write only its keys, each checked against its own closed values, and only to `.agenthub/config.local.json` and `.agenthub/routing.local.toml`. A file git tracks is never written, so the shared `config.json` and `routing.toml` stay byte-identical; in a repository where git cannot answer, nothing is written either. Commands and binaries (`kimi_cmd`, `codex_bin`, `pi.cmd`, `checks`, `mlx`), credential files and gateway URLs (`omniroute`, `memory.worker_url`), the local worker's reach (`local.read_allow`, `local.bash_network`, `local.network_allow`), `bench.enabled`, `terminal` and `instances` are refused by name from every surface: they choose what the hub runs or where secrets and task text go.
+- Settings are a closed registry (`src/hub/settings.ts`). The dashboard and `ahub settings` can write only its keys, each checked against its own closed values, and only to `.agenthub/config.local.json` and `.agenthub/routing.local.toml`. A file git tracks is never written, so the shared `config.json` and `routing.toml` stay byte-identical; in a repository where git cannot answer, nothing is written either. Commands and binaries (`kimi_cmd`, `codex_bin`, `pi.cmd`, `checks`, `mlx`), credential files and gateway URLs (`omniroute`, `memory.worker_url`), the local worker's reach (`local.read_allow`, `local.bash_network`, `local.network_allow`), `bench.enabled`, `terminal` and `instances` are refused by name from every registry surface: they choose what the hub runs or where secrets and task text go. The structural editor below (#689) is the only other writer, and it keeps the executable and secret-locating keys console only.
 - `routing.local.toml` holds `stay_switch` and, per class, `peers`, `escalate_to`, `route` (an id `routing.toml` defines) and `pi_backend`, and nothing else: targets, routes, signals and the PII constraint cannot be set through it. A write is read by the hub's own loader before it replaces the file (temp file and rename), and one previous version is kept for undo.
 - An ordinary dashboard session (`ahub ui`) reads settings, lowers a mode to `ask`, turns `pi.auto_start`, `task_sweep.enabled` or `task_sweep.auto_reassign` off, sets a start mode back to `tui` or a WIP limit to 0, and changes the safe switches (`research.enabled`, `approvals.notify`, `snapshots.enabled`, `coordination`). Whatever can widen what agents do without asking needs a settings session: a non-ask mode now or at hub start, routing, starting Pi with the hub, removing a machine-local value, and undo. `ahub ui --settings` opens one: its ticket marks the session for 15 minutes, after which it is an ordinary session. `never-ask` also needs the peer's id typed as the confirmation, and a stored never-ask default still waits for the console's `y` at each hub start. An undo never puts never-ask back, and removing a machine-local value that uncovers a never-ask in the shared file needs the same confirmation. "Lowering to `ask`" means handing the decision back to the agent's own rules: for Codex that is the approval policy the person configured natively, which the hub does not judge.
 - A settings session is as strong as the console for these settings and no stronger elsewhere. A mode change is the console's own request with the same refusals; tool approvals stay deny-only for Pi and local; there is still no shell, file, task-detail or launch-command API. `ahub ui --settings` and `ahub settings` pass the same identity gate as `ahub permission`, which is an operating policy, not authentication. The hostile-agent boundary above applies unchanged: an agent with an unrestricted shell as the same user can impersonate the console, and so can open a settings session.
 - Every change writes a `settings` event (the key, the value before and after, the source `dashboard` or `terminal`) and a line in `hub.log` and open consoles; opening a settings session is logged too. The unified dashboard (`ahub ui --all`) forwards settings actions as an ordinary session and opens no settings session.
 - Configuration reload (issue #439). The daemon watches `config.json`, `config.local.json`, `routing.toml` and `routing.local.toml` and re-reads the complete candidate after a change, as the dashboard's Reload configuration and `ahub settings reload` do; an invalid candidate applies nothing. Each changed key is then authorized on its own against its file's actual git provenance. A privacy tightening (local-only PII, the model screen on, added PII patterns, narrower roles or capability lists, unless it moves the planner or conductor) and a safe registered setting apply from any file. Every other change, machine-local fields included, keeps its running value when its file is tracked or git cannot answer. From an untracked file such a guarded change is adopted only by `ahub settings reload` in an interactive terminal, after it lists each guarded key with its full before and after values and the person types `y` within 30 seconds; the confirmation is bound to the file contents and accepted state it was shown for. File watches and dashboard reloads, a settings session's included, never confirm, and no reload changes the roster: membership moves only through the roster setting. Keys whose consumers are bound at start (memory, the gateway and MLX, checks, the privacy and sandbox policy of existing sessions, the terminal provider and others) stay pending until a restart.
-- Start modes. A start the hub makes itself (the dashboard's Start control, `peer_start` from a console child, the conductor's `hub_peer_start`, `pi.auto_start`) takes the peer's start mode. Through settings only a settings session or the terminal can set it to headless; a config file can also set `peers.<id>.start_mode`, the shared one included (it is not a machine-local field: headless was the only form for Pi, Kimi and the local worker before this change, and for Jcode before 0.12.39, a hub-made headless Codex start is the app-server the hub already ran for it, and a start mode grants nothing a permission mode or a capability controls). A declared extra instance accepts only `headless` from any surface; a Claude channel instance accepts no start mode, and a headless Claude instance must have roles exactly `["reviewer"]` and no worktree. For a TUI the hub opens a terminal running `<runtime> <its own entry point> --project <this project> <peer>` (with `--mode tui` for Pi, Kimi and Jcode): every word is the hub's own, the command line is those words each quoted for a POSIX shell, and no request field, tool argument or agent message is part of it. In a `terminal.open` template `{command}` is that quoted line and `{title}` and `{cwd}` are raw text for argv elements of their own; each placeholder is substituted once, so a project path that itself contains a placeholder, a quote or `$` stays one word. A provider's own error text goes to `hub.log`, not to the caller. The terminal comes from `terminal.open`, a machine-local command template that config trust refuses from a committed file and that no settings surface can write, or from Orca. The opened terminal's environment carries no agent marker, so `ahub` there has the console's identity. Without a provider the start is refused with the command to run by hand; it is never downgraded to headless. After a successful headless start of a watch-capable peer (Kimi, Qwen) the hub also opens `<runtime> <its own entry point> --project <this project> watch <peer>` through the same provider under the same fixed-words rule, at most once per peer per 30 s and never for an already attached peer or a declared instance; the pane has the console's identity, and a missing or failing provider leaves the start standing and reports the command (#286). A conductor can start a peer but cannot choose its mode.
+- Structural configuration (issue #689). A second, wider list than the registry can be edited, in three tiers (`src/hub/config-tier.ts` is the one rule). Tier 2 (instance fields that choose no executable or home, the review, snapshots, approvals and `context.gate` keys, and `sdlc.toml` `mode` and `required_checks`) is editable from the console and from a settings session. Tier 3 is everything that chooses what the hub executes or where secrets go (the rest of `NEVER_EDITABLE`, and an instance's `jcode_home`, `provider`, `model` and `provider_profile`): console only, confirmed by typing the key's name, one key per write, never by `--yes`, and the dashboard shows it as text with the console command. A browser page must never be able to set what the hub runs, so the refusal is in the hub, not in the page: `config_edit_preview` and `config_edit_apply` from a dashboard session refuse a tier 3 path whatever else the request carries, and an ordinary session is refused before anything about the project is read. Reload authority admits a structural key from a settings session only while the daemon's own validated edit holds that key's scope (`structural` in `authorizeConfigLeaf`) and `structuralLeaf` says tier 2; a file edit made by hand still needs the terminal's confirmed reload. The candidate is read by the same loaders the daemon starts with before anything is written, the file revision is checked twice (planning and writing), the previous file is kept as one of the newest five backups, a symlinked, oversized or git-tracked file is never written, and unknown request fields and keys are refused. One write changes exactly one tier 3 key, counting the keys the plan adds from what the file holds (`plan.tier3Keys`), not only the ones the request names, and the audit record carries no hash of a tier 3 value. A whole instance that holds a tier 3 field is tier 3 to remove or replace (decided from what the file holds, not from the request), a preview or write reply masks every tier 3 value as `(set)`, and `.agenthub` itself must be a real directory. The `config_edit` event and the notice carry key paths and hashes, never a value, so a tier 3 key's home or model never reaches the event log, `hub.log` or the dashboard. Agent shells and hub tools cannot reach any of it: the CLI is `console` in `classifyPeerCommand` and the control requests answer the console role only.
+- Start modes. A start the hub makes itself (the dashboard's Start control, `peer_start` from a console child, the conductor's `hub_peer_start`, `pi.auto_start`) takes the peer's start mode. Through settings only a settings session or the terminal can set it to headless; a config file can also set `peers.<id>.start_mode`, the shared one included (it is not a machine-local field: headless was the only form for Pi, Kimi and the local worker before this change, and for Jcode before 0.12.39, a hub-made headless Codex start is the app-server the hub already ran for it, and a start mode grants nothing a permission mode or a capability controls). A declared extra instance accepts only `headless` from any surface; a Claude channel instance accepts no start mode (one that implements or verifies needs its own worktree, and a planner or reviewer one refuses a worktree, #525-1), and a headless Claude instance is either a reviewer (roles exactly `["reviewer"]`, no worktree) or an implementer with its own registered worktree and permission mode `ask` or `ask-when-needed` (#525-4). For a TUI the hub opens a terminal running `<runtime> <its own entry point> --project <this project> <peer>` (with `--mode tui` for Pi, Kimi and Jcode): every word is the hub's own, the command line is those words each quoted for a POSIX shell, and no request field, tool argument or agent message is part of it. In a `terminal.open` template `{command}` is that quoted line and `{title}` and `{cwd}` are raw text for argv elements of their own; each placeholder is substituted once, so a project path that itself contains a placeholder, a quote or `$` stays one word. A provider's own error text goes to `hub.log`, not to the caller. The terminal comes from `terminal.open`, a machine-local command template that config trust refuses from a committed file and that no settings surface can write, or from Orca. The opened terminal's environment carries no agent marker, so `ahub` there has the console's identity. Without a provider the start is refused with the command to run by hand; it is never downgraded to headless. After a successful headless start of a watch-capable peer (Kimi, Qwen) the hub also opens `<runtime> <its own entry point> --project <this project> watch <peer>` through the same provider under the same fixed-words rule, at most once per peer per 30 s and never for an already attached peer or a declared instance; the pane has the console's identity, and a missing or failing provider leaves the start standing and reports the command (#286). A conductor can start a peer but cannot choose its mode.
 
 ## Multi-project manager (protocol 7)
 
@@ -196,7 +217,9 @@ The manager has its own loopback session server and authenticated local control
 endpoint. Browsers provide registered project IDs and expected daemon instance
 IDs; they cannot submit arbitrary paths, ports, PIDs or control tokens. The
 manager forwards the same closed, redacted dashboard operations as a project-local
-page. It cannot expose private task history or allow local-worker tools.
+page. A snapshot request's `view` is forwarded only when it is one of the page's
+seven view names (#683 U4), and the project hub checks it again. It cannot expose
+private task history or allow local-worker tools.
 
 Per-project control handshakes verify project, root and instance against the
 runtime manifest. Shutdown removes only the owning instance's runtime files and
@@ -371,14 +394,22 @@ Stall causes are persisted and deduplicated by cause and replanning revision. Pl
 
 A declared instance whose only role is reviewer gets review requests, task messages addressed to it and the person's messages; agent chat, digests and presence are discarded and journaled, and it gets no memory recall (#223). The headless Claude reviewer runs one new `claude -p` per review with `--setting-sources ""`, `--strict-mcp-config`, `--no-session-persistence`, tools limited to Read, Grep, Glob, `hub_review` and `hub_task_show`, and `dontAsk`. Its prompt holds hub facts and a bounded diff, never the builder's summary, and its `hub_task_show` drops the builder's notes. Changes touching `local.deny` or `pii.paths` are withheld and passed as `Read` deny rules, which Claude enforces, not the hub. Private tasks are never given to it. Its `hub_review` counts only while the child started for that task still runs; a stop or exit revokes it first, and surviving processes hold the delivery as `needs_review` and keep the reviewer busy.
 
-The fresh Codex reviewer (#519) needs `review_mode: "fresh"` and a compat-admitted Codex (receipt-verified 0.146.0 and 0.163.0; `ahub agents` shows the current policy); an unverified/untrusted version is unavailable. Before each review it requires a model-free isolation receipt: binary and config unchanged, only the two hub tools in the configured MCP inventory, plugins, hooks and Apps disabled (Apps by a separate feature readback), and a named filesystem profile whose fixtures prove public reads, private-path denial (exact, glob and symlink), standard host credential denial and write denial. Credential and tool-home roots are denied even with an empty `local.deny`; that list does not cover every personal file. A dangling or unreadable credential root refuses the reviewer, and the reason names only its path class (`~/.docker`, `$DOCKER_CONFIG`), never the path or its contents. Its shell is sandboxed read-only, not Claude's Read/Grep/Glob whitelist. Network and web search are configured disabled but not observed: managed requirements can still select cached web search, and no run has shown the review selecting the profile through `default_permissions`. A failed receipt or start never falls back to a continuing native session, and a child that ends without a saved verdict is never approval. The agy reviewer slot is an unavailable placeholder and never runs.
+A terminal Claude implementer or verifier instance (#525-5) owns write-class tasks only after the daemon proves its execution root: the current launch id, a private single-link launch record naming the root, the cwd the channel's MCP server reports (verified model-free on Claude Code 2.1.309) and the daemon's own validation of the declared non-canonical branch worktree must all agree, and the proof belongs to the attached claim generation and socket. A detach, a replacement claim or a changed launch record revokes it. Missing, legacy or mismatched evidence still attaches the channel, but write-owner routing is refused and facts grants give nothing, never a fall-back to the canonical tree; terminal recovery revalidates the recorded root against the current declaration. This is same-user launch evidence, not filesystem isolation: Claude can still write wherever its own permissions allow.
+
+The headless Claude implementer (#525-4) runs one owned `claude -p` child per turn in its declared worktree, with `--setting-sources ""`, `--strict-mcp-config`, native permission mode `default`, the hub's managed PreToolUse hook and `--permission-prompt-tool mcp__agent-hub__hub_permission_request`; never `--bare`, `acceptEdits`, `dontAsk` or `bypassPermissions`, and `never-ask` is refused. Each task keeps its own persisted session; unscoped chat reuses one only while exactly one task is in progress, and a `hub_inbox` read refuses a batch attributed to another task. The approval path fails closed: `hub_permission_request` is accepted only from the current child's launch and generation, goes to the console's existing approval queue and `approvals.timeout_s`, and offers allow-once and deny only, with no allow-always or session grant. A timeout, a prompt failure, a disconnect, a hub that is down or refusing, or a stale child binding answers deny; a failed hook decides nothing, so the call still waits for a person. The approval title is the tool name and a JSON rendering of the arguments passed through `sanitize()` and the public-text screen (any PII, secret or private-path match withholds the whole value as `[withheld]`, before any cut), never task text, cut at 600 characters with a `[cut, N chars]` marker; the original arguments stay with the child and are not logged. The MCP wire cannot tell a native permission dispatch from a call the model makes itself; either way it needs a fresh allow-once for its own arguments and grants nothing later. A stop holds an uncertain delivery until the owned process group is confirmed gone. The [native permission receipt](verification/2026-10-23-headless-claude-permissions.md) is model-free on Claude Code 2.1.309; it is not sandbox proof, and a real account, model and person interaction remains a live leg.
+
+The fresh Codex reviewer (#519) needs `review_mode: "fresh"` and a compat-admitted Codex (receipt-verified 0.146.0 and 0.163.0; `ahub agents` shows the current policy); an unverified/untrusted version is unavailable. Before each review it requires a model-free isolation receipt: binary and config unchanged, only the two hub tools in the configured MCP inventory, plugins, hooks and Apps disabled (Apps by a separate feature readback), and a named filesystem profile whose fixtures prove public reads, private-path denial (exact, glob and symlink), standard host credential denial and write denial. Credential and tool-home roots are denied even with an empty `local.deny`; that list does not cover every personal file. A dangling or unreadable credential root refuses the reviewer, and the reason names only its path class (`~/.docker`, `$DOCKER_CONFIG`), never the path or its contents. A failed per-review start names one class from a closed list (`version`, `binary`, `mcp_inventory`, `plugins_hooks_apps`, `sandbox_proof`, `credential_root`, `timeout`, `unknown`) with a fixed sentence in the unavailable reason, `hub.log` and the `reviewer` line of `ahub status`; it never carries a path, native CLI text or a token (#722). Its shell is sandboxed read-only, not Claude's Read/Grep/Glob whitelist. Network and web search are configured disabled but not observed: managed requirements can still select cached web search, and no run has shown the review selecting the profile through `default_permissions`. A failed receipt or start never falls back to a continuing native session, and a child that ends without a saved verdict is never approval. The agy reviewer slot is an unavailable placeholder and never runs.
 
 The fresh Kimi reviewer (#533) needs `review_mode: "fresh"` and a compat-admitted Kimi Code (receipt-verified 2.2.0 and 2.3.0; `ahub agents` shows the current policy) with its native OAuth login; an unverified/untrusted version, or a failed preparation, is unavailable. The [2.3.0 receipt](verification/2026-10-22-kimi-qwen-compat.md) is model-free and does not prove real login or a model review. It is a native tool-authority boundary, not a sandbox: no Seatbelt wraps it, and same-user native code is not isolated from the filesystem or network. Each review starts a new child in a private `KIMI_CODE_HOME` with managed-provider-only config, a clean temporary working directory and an empty skills directory. Its agent may use only `hub_review` and `hub_task_show`, served by a loopback MCP session bound to the task, head and review revision that never carries the hub's control token; it has no native read, file or shell tool and sees only the screened review brief and host facts. Its `credentials/` and `oauth/` directories and `device_id` link to the person's native ones, so refresh keeps Kimi's own lock and atomic rename; no token is copied and `KIMI_DISABLE_OAUTH_LOCK` is never set. A stop revokes its verdict authority before termination; killing it mid-refresh may require a native re-login. Private tasks are never given to it, and a child that ends without a saved verdict is never approval.
 
-The review brief (#520) withholds private changes whole (both sides of a move) and counts them; a rule file that fails the private-data screen is named, not shown. Attributes and rules are read at the merge base, so a change cannot loosen its own review. Optional changed symbols (#684) come from ripwire 0.6.7 on the daemon's host PATH, run as an owned process on a disposable snapshot of the task's commit; each path, name and kind passes the hub's public metadata screen before the brief, the console's task detail or the dashboard shows it, a private task stores and shows none, and a failed or missing read is `unknown`, never a gate. Spec acceptance, plan review, plan conformance, premature-review, cost, test-integrity (#481 S4), issue and PR identity linking (#694) and dogfood scorecard (#687) reads fetch GitHub metadata only (edit times, check states, thread authorship and resolution, changed file names, open PR heads, workflow run conclusions), never issue bodies, comments or patches. The CI workflow keeps `contents: read` and `actions: read`.
+The review brief (#520) withholds private changes whole (both sides of a move) and counts them; a rule file that fails the private-data screen is named, not shown. Attributes and rules are read at the merge base, so a change cannot loosen its own review. Optional changed symbols (#684) come from ripwire 0.6.7 on the daemon's host PATH, run as an owned process on a disposable snapshot of the task's commit; each path, name and kind passes the hub's public metadata screen before the brief, the console's task detail or the dashboard shows it, a private task stores and shows none, and a failed or missing read is `unknown`, never a gate. Spec acceptance, plan review, plan conformance, premature-review, cost, test-integrity (#481 S4), issue and PR identity linking (#694) and dogfood scorecard (#687) reads fetch GitHub metadata only (edit times, check states, thread authorship and resolution, changed file names, open PR heads, workflow run conclusions), never issue bodies, comments or patches. Issue identity linking at propose and accept (#723) parses the task's title and refs locally, reads nothing from GitHub and skips PII tasks. The CI workflow keeps `contents: read` and `actions: read`.
+
+Deliverable records (#509a). `hub_task_done` and `hub_sdlc_record` name files as `{path, format, version?}`; the hub hashes them itself and refuses a claimed `sha256`, `hash` or `bytes` and any field it does not own. Paths resolve under the owner's execution root with `realPath` and `guardPath` in read mode: outside the project, the secrets denylist, the hub's own state (`.git`, `.agenthub`), a dangling link, a non-regular file and more than 256 MiB each or 512 MiB together are refused, with the path as given and never a resolved one. The file is opened without following a final link and its device, inode, size and time are compared with what was checked, before and after the read, so a swapped or changing file is refused rather than recorded half-read; a bad call writes nothing. A declared worktree instance whose root is not proven refuses, and a later read of it reports `unknown`. No hash of hub state is ever taken, and a file the hub cannot read or vouch for is `unknown`, never `unchanged`. A reviewer's approval re-hashes the files and is refused when one changed, went missing or is unknown; only the person may approve the current bytes, which are then measured and bound. For a PII task, a file under `pii.paths` or a path matching a PII pattern, `publicDeliverables` is the one projection every peer view, review request, status and log uses: id, hash and size only. The board keeps the path, as it keeps a PII task's text.
 
 Person release authorization (#481 S6). `ahub sdlc authorize-release <version>` is taken from the console role only and refused under `--live-test`. It binds the daemon checkout's commit, package version, push remote identity and a fresh-docs verdict, lives only in daemon memory (a restart revokes it) and is logged with its commit, version and docs digest. `ahub sdlc release-guard -- <argv>` is a read-only preflight that agents may run, except during a private or PII turn; it never executes the command and refuses ambient target selectors (`GIT_DIR`, `GH_REPO`, npm prefix and registry settings and the like). The pre-push hook that `ahub init --release-guard` installs refuses an unauthorized or unknown `v*` tag push, also with the daemon down, and passes other pushes through. It and the release block in `AGENTS.md` are a cooperative guard, not an operating-system boundary: `git push --no-verify`, a custom `core.hooksPath` or another Git invocation bypasses the hook, and `gh release create` and `npm publish` are checked only when the preflight is run (#312, #313).
 
+SDLC metrics and control bands (#481 S7). `ahub sdlc metrics` and `hub_sdlc_metrics` are planner or person only, read-only, and refused during a private or PII turn. A private task is counted as withheld and read for nothing else; the report calls no model and makes no GitHub read. Band breaches are written only by the daemon's evaluator through Tasks, never while it is stopping, recovering or has a storage error. A `diagnose` or `propose` card is a backlog task (`triage` or `plan`) whose text is fixed words, numbers and task ids, never task text; it passes the PII signal check and the candidate-text screen before it is written, and no GitHub issue is created. A `log` breach is one hub notice, remembered in the board's `band_notices` table as a marker (`<metric>:#<task>:log`, checked against a fixed pattern) and a time, nothing else.
+
 ## Bounded task specs and isolated checks (#418)
 
 `hub_task_spec` reads only the GitHub issues named by a current owner's or reviewer's task in this project's origin repository, including the validated canonical GitHub intake source when its title/body has no issue token. Bare `#N` references count only in the title; detail references require `owner/repo#N` or `https://github.com/owner/repo/issues/N`. Bare detail numbers denote hub tasks, and arbitrary file paths are not parsed as issue references. A qualified reference cannot begin after a slash or a name character, so `src/hub/tasks.ts#12` is a file path. Routing uses this same parser. Without a GitHub project identity, bare title numbers do not require spec access, but explicit qualified/URL references, `refs.repo` and imported GitHub identity still fail closed. `refs.repo`, which `hub_task_propose` and `hub_task_accept` take since #476 to scope overlap per repository, is metadata only: it grants no file access or execution root, and a spec read for a task naming another repository refuses. The daemon resolves authenticated and container executables outside the project, pins their absolute paths and uses fixed arguments; repository-writable PATH shims are refused. Runner Git resolves its host executable through a restricted PATH. For specs, the model receives no credential or arbitrary authenticated URL capability. Foreign/transferred issues, more than three references, bodies over 64 KiB and aggregate results over 80 KiB fail explicitly. Spec fetches share a 25-second budget inside the control client's 30-second cap; each gh call remains bounded to 15 seconds. Current PII, secret and private-path policy withholds the complete spec rather than returning a partial contract. PII turns and PII tasks refuse these tools. The independent `spec_read` and `check_run` capabilities apply when a peer has a narrowed capability list. Arguments and results are excluded from capture. Proven deterministic pre-effect guards return PreEffectToolRefusal so Pi settles the exact refusal receipt; generic transport/storage failures and failures after durable receipt/output changes remain uncertain, never reclassified from error text.