@sponsio/sdk 0.2.0-alpha.4 → 0.2.0-alpha.9

package/contracts/core/llm_safety.yaml

@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
-# =============================================================================
-# sponsio/contracts/core/llm_safety.yaml
-#
-# !! Not supported in this build !! , this pack is composed entirely of
-# LLM-judged stochastic atoms (`injection_free`, `jailbreak_free`,
-# `harmful`, `toxic_free`, `semantic_pii_free`). The deterministic
-# engine ships no evaluator for them and will refuse to load this pack.
-#
-# It still ships on disk so external builds with a real StoEvaluator
-# (auto-discovered via the `sponsio.evaluators` entry-point group)
-# see the same on-disk layout and can evaluate these contracts.
-#
-# Once an evaluator is available, opt in from your config:
-#
-#     include:
-#       - sponsio:core/llm_safety
-#
-# Why opt-in: every contract here triggers a judge LLM call on each
-# evaluation. That's the right default for response-quality work but
-# the wrong default for tool-call-only agents (no LLM responses to
-# score, judge calls add latency without value). Splitting out of
-# `core/universal` was the user-driven fix for "why is the SRE tool-call
-# demo running prompt-injection scoring".
-#
-# Source tag convention for this file:
-#   library:tier0.<category>  where category ∈
-#     adversarial | harm | privacy | scope
-# =============================================================================
-
-version: "1"
-
-# NOTE: no `tools:` section here because these contracts are response-scoped.
-# They evaluate against llm_response events, not tool calls.  Agents that
-# include this file will add their own `tools:` inventory separately.
-
-agents:
-  # Template agent id — replaced at include time by the including config.
-  # The include mechanism substitutes this section under the real agent id.
-  "*":
-    contracts:
-
-      # -- Adversarial resistance ----------------------------------------
-      #
-      # `beta` weights the cost of a *missed* violation in the contract
-      # score.  Higher beta = a missed violation hurts the score more,
-      # so the judge has to be near-certain the response is *clean*
-      # before allowing it.  We ship the values below as defaults
-      # calibrated for the threat profile (slip-through cost) of each
-      # category.  Override per-agent in your config if your workload
-      # has different stakes.
-
-      # 0.95 — prompt-injection slip-throughs cause downstream tool
-      # misuse with full agent privileges.  High slip-through cost.
-      - desc: "Every LLM response must be free of prompt-injection compliance"
-        G:
-          pattern: injection_free
-          context_scope: full_trace
-          source: "library:tier0.adversarial"
-        beta: 0.95
-
-      # 0.90 — jailbreak compliance is bad but mostly self-contained
-      # (response-level harm, not tool-level harm).
-      - desc: "LLM must not comply with jailbreak attempts (DAN, roleplay, hypothetical bypass)"
-        G:
-          pattern: jailbreak_free
-          source: "library:tier0.adversarial"
-        beta: 0.9
-
-      # -- Harm avoidance -----------------------------------------------
-
-      # 0.95 — real-world-harm enablement (CSAM, weapons, self-harm
-      # methods) carries the same high slip-through cost as injection.
-      - desc: "Response must not encourage or enable real-world harm"
-        G:
-          pattern: harmful
-          source: "library:tier0.harm"
-        beta: 0.95
-
-      # 0.90 — toxic language is corrosive but not safety-critical;
-      # match the jailbreak weight rather than the harm weight.
-      - desc: "Response free of toxic / harassing language"
-        G:
-          pattern: toxic_free
-          source: "library:tier0.harm"
-        beta: 0.9
-
-      # -- Privacy ------------------------------------------------------
-
-      # 0.95 — PII slip-throughs are regulatory issues (GDPR / CCPA)
-      # not just trust issues.  High slip-through cost.
-      - desc: "Response free of contextual PII (names tied to conditions, inferable identity)"
-        G:
-          pattern: semantic_pii_free
-          source: "library:tier0.privacy"
-        beta: 0.95
-
-      # -- Scope --------------------------------------------------------
-      #
-      # `scope_respect` is deliberately NOT shipped on by default.  It
-      # needs a concrete, agent-specific scope string to be useful —
-      # something like "respond only to loan-origination questions for
-      # the approved product catalogue".  A generic default like "do
-      # not act beyond the task" is irredeemably abstract: the judge
-      # has nothing to anchor on and will either flag everything or
-      # pass everything, depending on model temperament.  Shipping
-      # such a rule as default-on produces noise, not signal.
-      #
-      # Add it to your own agent config once you have a concrete scope
-      # statement, e.g.::
-      #
-      #     agents:
-      #       support_bot:
-      #         contracts:
-      #           - desc: "Stays within customer-support remit"
-      #             E:
-      #               pattern: scope_respect
-      #               args: ["answer questions about order status,
-      #                       refunds, and shipping — no legal advice,
-      #                       no medical advice, no code execution"]
-      #             beta: 0.85
-      #
-      # The β=0.85 default acknowledges that "out of scope" is fuzzier
-      # than "contains PII"; a higher beta flags too aggressively on
-      # responses that drift only slightly.
-
-# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# What this file deliberately does NOT include
-# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-#
-# - Token / loop budgets — those live in core/budget.yaml and core/runaway.yaml
-#   respectively, so an agent with a custom budget can include only that.
-#
-# - Tool-specific protections — any constraint that mentions a specific tool
-#   name (exec, web_fetch, ...) belongs in capability/*.yaml.
-#
-# - Hallucination / faithfulness atoms — those require a retrieval source
-#   argument and are not universally applicable.  See docs/sto-atoms.md §1
-#   for when to add them per-agent.