@spinabot/brigade 0.1.2 → 1.0.1

package/dist/core/system-prompt.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/core/version.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+import { VERSION } from "../version.js";
+export { VERSION };
+export declare const BRIGADE_CLI_VERSION = "0.1.0";
+//# sourceMappingURL=version.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/version.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"version.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/core/version.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAIA,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AAExC,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;AAEnB,eAAO,MAAM,mBAAmB,UAAU,CAAC"}

package/dist/core/version.js

@@ -1,14 +1,9 @@
-/**
- * Single source of truth for the Brigade CLI version.
- *
- * Lives in core/ (rather than being re-imported from cli.ts) so subsystems
- * that don't pull cli.ts (brigade-config.ts's meta.lastTouchedVersion stamp,
- * future telemetry/diagnostics, the gateway protocol handshake) can read the
- * version without dragging the entire CLI dispatcher into their import graph.
- *
- * Keep in lockstep with package.json::version. There's no automated check —
- * a missed bump just means meta.lastTouchedVersion lies, which is annoying
- * but not corrupting.
- */
-export const BRIGADE_CLI_VERSION = "0.1.0";
+// Tiny shim — re-exports F:\Brigade's existing version constant under the
+// names the lifted code expects (`./version.js` from `core/`). Avoids
+// duplicating the version literal; single source of truth stays at
+// `src/version.ts`.
+import { VERSION } from "../version.js";
+export { VERSION };
+// Alias the lifted callers use (Downloads/Brigade calls it BRIGADE_CLI_VERSION).
+export const BRIGADE_CLI_VERSION = VERSION;
 //# sourceMappingURL=version.js.map

package/dist/core/version.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/core/webhook-guards.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+/**
+ * Webhook + RPC guards — body-size cap, timeout, HMAC helpers.
+ *
+ * Used by the gateway's HTTP route dispatcher to enforce per-route guarantees
+ * BEFORE a plugin's handler ever sees the request, and exposed to plugin
+ * authors so a webhook handler can verify provider-signed payloads (Stripe,
+ * GitHub, LINE, Slack, etc.) without re-implementing the careful crypto bits.
+ *
+ * Three primitives:
+ *   - `readBodyWithLimit(req, res, opts)` — pre-buffer the body up to a byte
+ *     cap. Sends `413 Payload Too Large` (or `408 Request Timeout`) directly
+ *     and returns `null` so the handler can early-out. The cap defaults to
+ *     1 MiB, mirroring the reference upstream's post-auth limit; the timeout
+ *     defaults to 30s.
+ *   - `computeHmacSha256(body, secret)` — canonical hex HMAC-SHA256 for the
+ *     provider signature schemes that use hex (Stripe v1, GitHub `sha256=…`,
+ *     etc). Returns the bare hex string so callers can prefix `sha256=` etc.
+ *     to match the provider's wire format.
+ *   - `safeEqualHmac(expected, actual)` — timing-safe string compare via
+ *     `crypto.timingSafeEqual` on equal-length padded buffers. Avoids the
+ *     early-exit length-leak that the naive `===` path has, and never
+ *     throws on length mismatch (the LINE adapter taught us that one).
+ *
+ * Plugin-author contract: a webhook handler that opts into `auth: "none"`
+ * MUST verify the signature itself — these helpers are the supported way.
+ * Routes that opt into `auth: "operator"` are gated by the gateway before
+ * the handler runs and can skip the HMAC step entirely.
+ *
+ * Replay defense (also author-facing): a valid signature does NOT prove a
+ * payload is FRESH — a captured signed request replays forever. Pair
+ * `verifyWebhookSignature` (multi-provider, computed over the RAW body,
+ * fail-closed) with `verifyTimestampFresh` + a per-account `WebhookReplayGuard`
+ * (delivery-id/nonce dedup) for at-most-once inbound processing.
+ */
+import type { IncomingMessage, ServerResponse } from "node:http";
+/** Default cap when a route doesn't declare `maxBodyBytes`. Matches the reference upstream's post-auth limit. */
+export declare const DEFAULT_MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1048576;
+/** Default timeout when a route doesn't declare `timeoutMs`. */
+export declare const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 30000;
+/**
+ * Read a request body up to `maxBytes`. Streams the request, accumulating
+ * chunks until either the body ends (returns the `Buffer`) or the running
+ * total exceeds the cap (responds `413` + returns `null`). A per-call
+ * timeout aborts the read and responds `408` if the client takes too long.
+ *
+ * Why pre-buffer at all? Plugin handlers want a `Buffer` they can HMAC-verify
+ * against the provider's signature header. Letting the handler consume the
+ * stream itself loses the size guard — and the typical "re-emit the chunks"
+ * shim is a foot-gun (every author gets it slightly wrong). Buffering once,
+ * up front, lands the body where it's wanted with the safety baked in.
+ *
+ * Always writes a JSON body on rejection so the caller (or curl) sees what
+ * happened, never just a bare status line.
+ */
+export declare function readBodyWithLimit(req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse, opts?: {
+    maxBytes?: number;
+    timeoutMs?: number;
+}): Promise<Buffer | null>;
+/**
+ * Compute HMAC-SHA256 of `body` with `secret` and return the hex digest.
+ * The hex shape is what GitHub (`sha256=…`), Stripe (`v1=…`), and most other
+ * providers send on the wire; callers can prefix as needed.
+ */
+export declare function computeHmacSha256(body: Buffer | string, secret: string): string;
+/**
+ * Timing-safe HMAC compare. Always reads the same number of bytes regardless
+ * of where the strings differ, and tolerates length mismatch by padding both
+ * sides to the longest length before the constant-time compare (then returns
+ * `false` if the original lengths differed). Never throws — a length mismatch
+ * passed to `crypto.timingSafeEqual` directly would.
+ *
+ * Use for any string-vs-string secret comparison: HMAC hex digests, base64
+ * signatures, shared-secret tokens. NOT for password hashes — use a slow KDF
+ * for those (bcrypt/argon2).
+ */
+export declare function safeEqualHmac(expected: string, actual: string): boolean;
+/**
+ * Reject STALE or REPLAYED webhook deliveries. A provider signature proves a
+ * payload was signed with the shared secret — it does NOT prove the payload is
+ * fresh: a captured signed request is otherwise replayable forever. Pair
+ * `verifyTimestampFresh` (reject deliveries outside a clock-skew window) with
+ * `WebhookReplayGuard` (reject a delivery-id/nonce seen before) for at-most-once
+ * inbound processing. Both are author-facing, same as the HMAC helpers above.
+ */
+/** True if `tsMs` is within `windowMs` of now (default ±5 min). Reject otherwise. */
+export declare function verifyTimestampFresh(tsMs: number, opts?: {
+    windowMs?: number;
+    nowMs?: number;
+}): boolean;
+/**
+ * Bounded, TTL'd dedup of webhook delivery ids / nonces. `check(id)` returns
+ * `true` if `id` was already seen within the TTL (a REPLAY — reject it) and
+ * `false` otherwise (first sight — recorded, accept). Size-capped with oldest-
+ * first eviction so a flood can't grow it unbounded; entries also expire by TTL.
+ * One instance per webhook account/channel (held in the adapter's runtime).
+ */
+export declare class WebhookReplayGuard {
+    private readonly seen;
+    private readonly ttlMs;
+    private readonly maxEntries;
+    constructor(opts?: {
+        ttlMs?: number;
+        maxEntries?: number;
+    });
+    /** Record `id` and report whether it was a replay. Empty id → not a replay
+     *  (the caller should fall back to timestamp-only freshness in that case). */
+    check(id: string, nowMs?: number): boolean;
+    /** Tracked-id count (diagnostics/tests). */
+    get size(): number;
+}
+export type WebhookSignatureProvider = "github" | "slack" | "gitlab" | "hmac-sha256";
+/**
+ * Verify a provider-signed webhook over the RAW body bytes. The HMAC MUST be
+ * computed BEFORE any JSON parse — re-serializing a parsed body changes the
+ * bytes and breaks the signature, the single most common webhook-auth bug. Fails
+ * CLOSED: a missing/blank secret or a missing expected header returns
+ * `{ok:false}` rather than silently skipping the check. For Slack it also
+ * enforces the signed timestamp's freshness (the v0 signature covers the ts, so
+ * a replay outside the window fails here without a separate guard).
+ */
+export declare function verifyWebhookSignature(provider: WebhookSignatureProvider, args: {
+    headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;
+    rawBody: Buffer | string;
+    secret: string;
+    nowMs?: number;
+    timestampWindowMs?: number;
+}): {
+    ok: boolean;
+    reason?: string;
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=webhook-guards.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/webhook-guards.d.ts.map

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package/dist/core/webhook-guards.js

@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+/**
+ * Webhook + RPC guards — body-size cap, timeout, HMAC helpers.
+ *
+ * Used by the gateway's HTTP route dispatcher to enforce per-route guarantees
+ * BEFORE a plugin's handler ever sees the request, and exposed to plugin
+ * authors so a webhook handler can verify provider-signed payloads (Stripe,
+ * GitHub, LINE, Slack, etc.) without re-implementing the careful crypto bits.
+ *
+ * Three primitives:
+ *   - `readBodyWithLimit(req, res, opts)` — pre-buffer the body up to a byte
+ *     cap. Sends `413 Payload Too Large` (or `408 Request Timeout`) directly
+ *     and returns `null` so the handler can early-out. The cap defaults to
+ *     1 MiB, mirroring the reference upstream's post-auth limit; the timeout
+ *     defaults to 30s.
+ *   - `computeHmacSha256(body, secret)` — canonical hex HMAC-SHA256 for the
+ *     provider signature schemes that use hex (Stripe v1, GitHub `sha256=…`,
+ *     etc). Returns the bare hex string so callers can prefix `sha256=` etc.
+ *     to match the provider's wire format.
+ *   - `safeEqualHmac(expected, actual)` — timing-safe string compare via
+ *     `crypto.timingSafeEqual` on equal-length padded buffers. Avoids the
+ *     early-exit length-leak that the naive `===` path has, and never
+ *     throws on length mismatch (the LINE adapter taught us that one).
+ *
+ * Plugin-author contract: a webhook handler that opts into `auth: "none"`
+ * MUST verify the signature itself — these helpers are the supported way.
+ * Routes that opt into `auth: "operator"` are gated by the gateway before
+ * the handler runs and can skip the HMAC step entirely.
+ *
+ * Replay defense (also author-facing): a valid signature does NOT prove a
+ * payload is FRESH — a captured signed request replays forever. Pair
+ * `verifyWebhookSignature` (multi-provider, computed over the RAW body,
+ * fail-closed) with `verifyTimestampFresh` + a per-account `WebhookReplayGuard`
+ * (delivery-id/nonce dedup) for at-most-once inbound processing.
+ */
+import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
+/** Default cap when a route doesn't declare `maxBodyBytes`. Matches the reference upstream's post-auth limit. */
+export const DEFAULT_MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1_048_576; // 1 MiB
+/** Default timeout when a route doesn't declare `timeoutMs`. */
+export const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000; // 30s
+/**
+ * Read a request body up to `maxBytes`. Streams the request, accumulating
+ * chunks until either the body ends (returns the `Buffer`) or the running
+ * total exceeds the cap (responds `413` + returns `null`). A per-call
+ * timeout aborts the read and responds `408` if the client takes too long.
+ *
+ * Why pre-buffer at all? Plugin handlers want a `Buffer` they can HMAC-verify
+ * against the provider's signature header. Letting the handler consume the
+ * stream itself loses the size guard — and the typical "re-emit the chunks"
+ * shim is a foot-gun (every author gets it slightly wrong). Buffering once,
+ * up front, lands the body where it's wanted with the safety baked in.
+ *
+ * Always writes a JSON body on rejection so the caller (or curl) sees what
+ * happened, never just a bare status line.
+ */
+export async function readBodyWithLimit(req, res, opts) {
+    const maxBytes = opts?.maxBytes ?? DEFAULT_MAX_BODY_BYTES;
+    const timeoutMs = opts?.timeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS;
+    return new Promise((resolve) => {
+        const chunks = [];
+        let received = 0;
+        let settled = false;
+        const finish = (value) => {
+            if (settled)
+                return;
+            settled = true;
+            clearTimeout(timer);
+            req.removeListener("data", onData);
+            req.removeListener("end", onEnd);
+            req.removeListener("error", onError);
+            req.removeListener("aborted", onAborted);
+            resolve(value);
+        };
+        const writeStatus = (status, message) => {
+            if (!res.headersSent) {
+                res.statusCode = status;
+                res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8");
+                res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: message }));
+            }
+            else if (!res.writableEnded) {
+                try {
+                    res.end();
+                }
+                catch {
+                    /* socket already torn down */
+                }
+            }
+        };
+        const onData = (chunk) => {
+            const buf = typeof chunk === "string" ? Buffer.from(chunk) : chunk;
+            received += buf.length;
+            if (received > maxBytes) {
+                writeStatus(413, `Payload too large (max ${maxBytes} bytes)`);
+                // Drain the rest of the stream so the client doesn't hang on
+                // a half-closed socket. Node ignores additional data after
+                // res.end() but the request side still wants its end event.
+                try {
+                    req.pause();
+                }
+                catch {
+                    /* ignore */
+                }
+                finish(null);
+                return;
+            }
+            chunks.push(buf);
+        };
+        const onEnd = () => {
+            finish(Buffer.concat(chunks, received));
+        };
+        const onError = () => {
+            writeStatus(400, "Bad request body");
+            finish(null);
+        };
+        const onAborted = () => {
+            // Client hung up mid-body; nothing to respond with, just clean up.
+            finish(null);
+        };
+        const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+            writeStatus(408, `Request timeout (${timeoutMs}ms)`);
+            finish(null);
+        }, timeoutMs);
+        // Don't keep the event loop alive on this timer alone.
+        if (typeof timer.unref === "function") {
+            timer.unref();
+        }
+        req.on("data", onData);
+        req.on("end", onEnd);
+        req.on("error", onError);
+        req.on("aborted", onAborted);
+    });
+}
+/**
+ * Compute HMAC-SHA256 of `body` with `secret` and return the hex digest.
+ * The hex shape is what GitHub (`sha256=…`), Stripe (`v1=…`), and most other
+ * providers send on the wire; callers can prefix as needed.
+ */
+export function computeHmacSha256(body, secret) {
+    const data = typeof body === "string" ? Buffer.from(body) : body;
+    return createHmac("sha256", secret).update(data).digest("hex");
+}
+/**
+ * Timing-safe HMAC compare. Always reads the same number of bytes regardless
+ * of where the strings differ, and tolerates length mismatch by padding both
+ * sides to the longest length before the constant-time compare (then returns
+ * `false` if the original lengths differed). Never throws — a length mismatch
+ * passed to `crypto.timingSafeEqual` directly would.
+ *
+ * Use for any string-vs-string secret comparison: HMAC hex digests, base64
+ * signatures, shared-secret tokens. NOT for password hashes — use a slow KDF
+ * for those (bcrypt/argon2).
+ */
+export function safeEqualHmac(expected, actual) {
+    const a = Buffer.from(expected);
+    const b = Buffer.from(actual);
+    const maxLen = Math.max(a.length, b.length);
+    // Allocate fixed-length buffers so timingSafeEqual never throws on
+    // mismatched lengths. We still return false below when the original
+    // lengths differ — the constant-time compare is just for the bytes.
+    const padA = Buffer.alloc(maxLen);
+    const padB = Buffer.alloc(maxLen);
+    a.copy(padA);
+    b.copy(padB);
+    // Call timingSafeEqual unconditionally so the && short-circuit can't
+    // leak length information through wall-clock timing.
+    const bytesEqual = timingSafeEqual(padA, padB);
+    return a.length === b.length && bytesEqual;
+}
+/**
+ * Reject STALE or REPLAYED webhook deliveries. A provider signature proves a
+ * payload was signed with the shared secret — it does NOT prove the payload is
+ * fresh: a captured signed request is otherwise replayable forever. Pair
+ * `verifyTimestampFresh` (reject deliveries outside a clock-skew window) with
+ * `WebhookReplayGuard` (reject a delivery-id/nonce seen before) for at-most-once
+ * inbound processing. Both are author-facing, same as the HMAC helpers above.
+ */
+/** True if `tsMs` is within `windowMs` of now (default ±5 min). Reject otherwise. */
+export function verifyTimestampFresh(tsMs, opts = {}) {
+    if (!Number.isFinite(tsMs))
+        return false;
+    const windowMs = opts.windowMs && opts.windowMs > 0 ? opts.windowMs : 300_000;
+    const nowMs = opts.nowMs ?? Date.now();
+    return Math.abs(nowMs - tsMs) <= windowMs;
+}
+/**
+ * Bounded, TTL'd dedup of webhook delivery ids / nonces. `check(id)` returns
+ * `true` if `id` was already seen within the TTL (a REPLAY — reject it) and
+ * `false` otherwise (first sight — recorded, accept). Size-capped with oldest-
+ * first eviction so a flood can't grow it unbounded; entries also expire by TTL.
+ * One instance per webhook account/channel (held in the adapter's runtime).
+ */
+export class WebhookReplayGuard {
+    seen = new Map();
+    ttlMs;
+    maxEntries;
+    constructor(opts = {}) {
+        this.ttlMs = opts.ttlMs && opts.ttlMs > 0 ? opts.ttlMs : 300_000;
+        this.maxEntries = opts.maxEntries && opts.maxEntries > 0 ? opts.maxEntries : 5000;
+    }
+    /** Record `id` and report whether it was a replay. Empty id → not a replay
+     *  (the caller should fall back to timestamp-only freshness in that case). */
+    check(id, nowMs = Date.now()) {
+        if (!id)
+            return false;
+        const exp = this.seen.get(id);
+        if (exp !== undefined && exp > nowMs)
+            return true; // within TTL → replay
+        // (Re)insert at the tail; Map preserves insertion order for oldest-first eviction.
+        this.seen.delete(id);
+        this.seen.set(id, nowMs + this.ttlMs);
+        while (this.seen.size > this.maxEntries) {
+            const oldest = this.seen.keys().next().value;
+            if (oldest === undefined)
+                break;
+            this.seen.delete(oldest);
+        }
+        return false;
+    }
+    /** Tracked-id count (diagnostics/tests). */
+    get size() {
+        return this.seen.size;
+    }
+}
+/** Case-insensitive header lookup (Node lowercases inbound headers, but be defensive). */
+function headerValue(headers, name) {
+    const lower = name.toLowerCase();
+    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(headers)) {
+        if (k.toLowerCase() === lower)
+            return Array.isArray(v) ? v[0] : v;
+    }
+    return undefined;
+}
+/**
+ * Verify a provider-signed webhook over the RAW body bytes. The HMAC MUST be
+ * computed BEFORE any JSON parse — re-serializing a parsed body changes the
+ * bytes and breaks the signature, the single most common webhook-auth bug. Fails
+ * CLOSED: a missing/blank secret or a missing expected header returns
+ * `{ok:false}` rather than silently skipping the check. For Slack it also
+ * enforces the signed timestamp's freshness (the v0 signature covers the ts, so
+ * a replay outside the window fails here without a separate guard).
+ */
+export function verifyWebhookSignature(provider, args) {
+    const { headers, rawBody, secret } = args;
+    if (!secret)
+        return { ok: false, reason: "no signing secret configured" };
+    switch (provider) {
+        case "github": {
+            const sig = headerValue(headers, "x-hub-signature-256");
+            if (!sig)
+                return { ok: false, reason: "missing x-hub-signature-256 header" };
+            return { ok: safeEqualHmac(`sha256=${computeHmacSha256(rawBody, secret)}`, sig) };
+        }
+        case "gitlab": {
+            const token = headerValue(headers, "x-gitlab-token");
+            if (!token)
+                return { ok: false, reason: "missing x-gitlab-token header" };
+            return { ok: safeEqualHmac(secret, token) };
+        }
+        case "slack": {
+            const sig = headerValue(headers, "x-slack-signature");
+            const ts = headerValue(headers, "x-slack-request-timestamp");
+            if (!sig || !ts)
+                return { ok: false, reason: "missing slack signature/timestamp headers" };
+            const fresh = verifyTimestampFresh(Number(ts) * 1000, {
+                ...(args.timestampWindowMs !== undefined ? { windowMs: args.timestampWindowMs } : {}),
+                ...(args.nowMs !== undefined ? { nowMs: args.nowMs } : {}),
+            });
+            if (!fresh)
+                return { ok: false, reason: "stale or invalid slack timestamp" };
+            const body = typeof rawBody === "string" ? rawBody : rawBody.toString("utf8");
+            return { ok: safeEqualHmac(`v0=${computeHmacSha256(`v0:${ts}:${body}`, secret)}`, sig) };
+        }
+        case "hmac-sha256": {
+            const sig = headerValue(headers, "x-webhook-signature");
+            if (!sig)
+                return { ok: false, reason: "missing x-webhook-signature header" };
+            const normalized = sig.startsWith("sha256=") ? sig.slice(7) : sig;
+            return { ok: safeEqualHmac(computeHmacSha256(rawBody, secret), normalized) };
+        }
+        default:
+            return { ok: false, reason: "unknown signature provider" };
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=webhook-guards.js.map

package/dist/core/webhook-guards.js.map

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package/dist/core/ws-subscription-filter.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+export interface FrameTags {
+    agentId?: string | undefined;
+    sessionId?: string | undefined;
+}
+/** Pure predicate: does a client with these subs want this frame? */
+export declare function shouldDeliverFrame(agentSubs: ReadonlySet<string> | undefined, sessionSubs: ReadonlySet<string> | undefined, tags: FrameTags): boolean;
+/** Cheap discriminator: pulls optional agentId/sessionId off a payload. */
+export declare function extractFrameTags(payload: unknown): FrameTags;
+//# sourceMappingURL=ws-subscription-filter.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/ws-subscription-filter.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"ws-subscription-filter.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/core/ws-subscription-filter.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAcA,MAAM,WAAW,SAAS;IACzB,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;IAC7B,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;CAC/B;AAED,qEAAqE;AACrE,wBAAgB,kBAAkB,CACjC,SAAS,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,SAAS,EAC1C,WAAW,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,SAAS,EAC5C,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,GACb,OAAO,CAOT;AAED,2EAA2E;AAC3E,wBAAgB,gBAAgB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,SAAS,CAO5D"}

package/dist/core/ws-subscription-filter.js

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+// Pure per-client subscription filter for the gateway WS broadcaster.
+//
+// Wave I closure: `connWantsFrame` inside `startServer` decides whether a
+// connected client should receive a broadcast frame. It was inlined when
+// Wave H landed but is now extracted so both the gateway and a focused
+// unit test exercise the same predicate. The behaviour is unchanged:
+//
+//   - Untagged frames (no agentId, no sessionId) broadcast to everyone —
+//     state snapshots / generic errors keep working without a subscribe.
+//   - Clients with no subscriptions get every frame — legacy single-agent
+//     TUI clients are not penalised for omitting the subscribe handshake.
+//   - Otherwise the client must be subscribed to either the agentId or
+//     sessionId on the frame; an explicit subscribe narrows the view.
+/** Pure predicate: does a client with these subs want this frame? */
+export function shouldDeliverFrame(agentSubs, sessionSubs, tags) {
+    const { agentId, sessionId } = tags;
+    if (!agentId && !sessionId)
+        return true;
+    if (!agentSubs && !sessionSubs)
+        return true;
+    if (agentId && agentSubs?.has(agentId))
+        return true;
+    if (sessionId && sessionSubs?.has(sessionId))
+        return true;
+    return false;
+}
+/** Cheap discriminator: pulls optional agentId/sessionId off a payload. */
+export function extractFrameTags(payload) {
+    const obj = payload;
+    if (!obj || typeof obj !== "object")
+        return {};
+    const tags = {};
+    if (typeof obj.agentId === "string")
+        tags.agentId = obj.agentId;
+    if (typeof obj.sessionId === "string")
+        tags.sessionId = obj.sessionId;
+    return tags;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=ws-subscription-filter.js.map

package/dist/core/ws-subscription-filter.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/cron/active-service.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/**
+ * Process-wide active cron service singleton.
+ *
+ * The cron service is a singleton in Brigade's process model — the gateway
+ * daemon owns ONE `CronServiceState` instance, constructed at boot and
+ * wired with the real deps (`runIsolatedAgentJob`, `enqueueSystemEvent`,
+ * etc.). Surfaces that need to reach the service — the agent-callable
+ * `cron` tool, the gateway RPC handlers, the CLI commands — all look it
+ * up here rather than threading the state through every callsite.
+ *
+ * Pattern mirrors `approval-bridge.ts`'s active-bridge singleton. Tests
+ * set this to a fake state in `beforeEach` + null it in `afterEach` so a
+ * stray test instance can't leak across suites.
+ *
+ * P1#9 (Wave H) — pinned via `resolveGlobalSingleton` so dual-loaded
+ * Brigade modules (test harness + runtime in one process; hot-reload in
+ * dev) share ONE slot. Without the pin, every module copy would carry its
+ * own `activeState` and the agent tool / gateway handler that imported a
+ * different copy than the boot path would silently see `null`.
+ */
+import type { CronServiceState } from "./service/state.js";
+/** Set the process-wide active cron service. Gateway boot calls this once. */
+export declare function setActiveCronService(state: CronServiceState | null): void;
+/** Read the active service. Returns `null` when no daemon has booted yet. */
+export declare function getActiveCronService(): CronServiceState | null;
+/** Resolve or throw — caller wants the service and wants a clear error otherwise. */
+export declare function requireActiveCronService(): CronServiceState;
+/** Test-only — clear between cases. */
+export declare function clearActiveCronServiceForTests(): void;
+//# sourceMappingURL=active-service.d.ts.map

package/dist/cron/active-service.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/cron/active-service.js

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/**
+ * Process-wide active cron service singleton.
+ *
+ * The cron service is a singleton in Brigade's process model — the gateway
+ * daemon owns ONE `CronServiceState` instance, constructed at boot and
+ * wired with the real deps (`runIsolatedAgentJob`, `enqueueSystemEvent`,
+ * etc.). Surfaces that need to reach the service — the agent-callable
+ * `cron` tool, the gateway RPC handlers, the CLI commands — all look it
+ * up here rather than threading the state through every callsite.
+ *
+ * Pattern mirrors `approval-bridge.ts`'s active-bridge singleton. Tests
+ * set this to a fake state in `beforeEach` + null it in `afterEach` so a
+ * stray test instance can't leak across suites.
+ *
+ * P1#9 (Wave H) — pinned via `resolveGlobalSingleton` so dual-loaded
+ * Brigade modules (test harness + runtime in one process; hot-reload in
+ * dev) share ONE slot. Without the pin, every module copy would carry its
+ * own `activeState` and the agent tool / gateway handler that imported a
+ * different copy than the boot path would silently see `null`.
+ */
+import { resolveGlobalSingleton } from "../shared/global-singleton.js";
+const ACTIVE_CRON_SERVICE_KEY = Symbol.for("brigade.cron.activeService");
+function getState() {
+    return resolveGlobalSingleton(ACTIVE_CRON_SERVICE_KEY, () => ({
+        activeState: null,
+    }));
+}
+/** Set the process-wide active cron service. Gateway boot calls this once. */
+export function setActiveCronService(state) {
+    getState().activeState = state;
+}
+/** Read the active service. Returns `null` when no daemon has booted yet. */
+export function getActiveCronService() {
+    return getState().activeState;
+}
+/** Resolve or throw — caller wants the service and wants a clear error otherwise. */
+export function requireActiveCronService() {
+    const state = getState().activeState;
+    if (!state) {
+        throw new Error("cron service not initialized — boot the gateway (or set a test fake) before calling this surface");
+    }
+    return state;
+}
+/** Test-only — clear between cases. */
+export function clearActiveCronServiceForTests() {
+    getState().activeState = null;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=active-service.js.map

package/dist/cron/active-service.js.map

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