@sparkdreamnft/sparkdreamjs 0.0.37 → 0.0.39

package/sparkdream/rep/v1/params.d.ts

@@ -246,6 +246,41 @@ export interface Params {
      * Seasonal staking reward pool
      */
     maxStakingRewardsPerSeason: string;
+    /**
+     * Ceiling on each epoch's reward slice, as a yield on the DREAM actually
+     * staked (default 0.0005 = 0.05% per epoch, 7.5% over a 150-epoch season
+     * gross, ~3.75% net of staked_decay_rate).
+     *
+     * The slice is otherwise remaining/remaining_epochs no matter how little is
+     * staked, so yield per staked DREAM diverges as the staked base shrinks and
+     * acc_per_share grows without bound: a chain with 1.47 DREAM staked hands the
+     * entire season budget to three dust stakes. Whatever this cap withholds
+     * stays in the pool rather than being distributed or dropped.
+     */
+    stakingRewardYieldPerEpoch: string;
+    /**
+     * Share of the previous season's non-staking DREAM mints that funds this
+     * season's staking reward pool (default 0.05 = 5%), so emission tracks what
+     * the chain actually produced rather than the calendar.
+     *
+     * Staking rewards are excluded from the base. Counting them would let each
+     * season's pool inflate the next one's, compounding with nothing but the
+     * schedule cap below to stop it.
+     */
+    stakingPoolMintShare: string;
+    /**
+     * Schedule ceiling on the seasonal pool:
+     *
+     *   cap = staking_pool_cap_base * (season + 1) * staking_pool_cap_rate
+     *
+     * The base is the chain's initial DREAM supply (25,000 DREAM at genesis) and
+     * the rate defaults to 0.05, so the ceiling opens at 1,250 DREAM in season 0
+     * and widens by that much each season. It backstops the mint-share term above
+     * on a chain whose mint volume spikes; max_staking_rewards_per_season remains
+     * the absolute ceiling over both.
+     */
+    stakingPoolCapBase: string;
+    stakingPoolCapRate: string;
     /**
      * Per-epoch decay on staked DREAM (default 0.05% = 0.0005)
      */
@@ -272,6 +307,31 @@ export interface Params {
      * but without this cap, a whale can stake disproportionately and extract most seasonal staking rewards.
      */
     maxInitiativeStakePerMember: string;
+    /**
+     * Anti-dust floor on the DREAM one MsgStake may lock (default 0.002 DREAM =
+     * 2,000 micro-DREAM). There was no floor at all, so a member could open the
+     * ten tranches max_stake_tranches_per_target allows at one micro-DREAM each
+     * and be counted as a participant in every conviction and payout weighting
+     * the initiative runs.
+     *
+     * The default is pinned to 1/staking_reward_yield_per_epoch: the smallest
+     * stake whose own per-epoch accrual (amount * yield, truncated to an integer)
+     * reaches one micro-DREAM. Below that a record can never earn anything, and
+     * should not occupy a state slot. Move it with the yield. What bounds the
+     * return on a small position is max_completion_bonus_stake_multiple, not
+     * this.
+     */
+    minStakeAmount: string;
+    /**
+     * Per-season cap on total DREAM minted to pay interim work (default 50,000
+     * DREAM). The initiative cap below has always existed; the interim path had
+     * no season bound at all, which left it as the one DREAM-creating flow whose
+     * total was limited only by max_dream_mint_per_epoch — 250,000 DREAM/day
+     * against a 25,000 DREAM genesis supply. Interims are self-assigned and
+     * self-completed by design, so the per-member active cap alone does not
+     * bound the total: a member can complete and re-create indefinitely.
+     */
+    maxInterimRewardsPerSeason: string;
     /**
      * Per-season cap on total DREAM minted via initiative completion rewards (default 100,000 DREAM).
      * Bounds total extraction even if colluding members rubber-stamp initiatives.
@@ -385,7 +445,10 @@ export interface Params {
     /**
      * External-conviction ratio applied instead of external_conviction_ratio when
      * the initiative is self-assigned. Must be >= external_conviction_ratio and
-     * <= 1. Default 1.0: the community alone vouches for self-assigned work.
+     * <= 1. Default 0.75 — a distinct-staker floor as much as a magnitude one,
+     * since max_conviction_share_per_member caps any one member's contribution:
+     * ceil(0.75 / 0.33) = 3 independent stakers, against 2 for externally
+     * assigned work.
      */
     selfAssignedExternalConvictionRatio: string;
     /**
@@ -479,6 +542,43 @@ export interface Params {
      * Default 0.1.
      */
     initiativeCompletionBonusRate: string;
+    /**
+     * Ceiling on the initiative completion bonus, as a multiple of the external
+     * DREAM actually staked behind the initiative (default 3.0):
+     *
+     *   bonus_pool = min(initiative_completion_bonus_rate * budget,
+     *                    max_completion_bonus_stake_multiple * external_stake)
+     *
+     * Default 3.0. Without it the bonus is a fixed share of the budget while the
+     * capital needed to unlock that budget falls as 1/N in the number of stakers —
+     * required_conviction is conviction_per_dream * sqrt(budget), each of N
+     * stakers supplies sqrt(stake), so the total stake that clears the gate is
+     * conviction_per_dream^2 * budget / N. The bonus per staker is then
+     * 2.5 * N times their own stake: 7.5x at three stakers, 25x at ten, 62.5x at
+     * twenty-five, risk-free on any initiative that completes.
+     *
+     * Pricing the bonus off capital at risk instead of participant count
+     * restores the stake-to-budget ratio the conviction formula was designed
+     * around (~4%) without touching the sqrt weighting that deliberately rewards
+     * breadth. Range: 0 disables the bonus entirely.
+     */
+    maxCompletionBonusStakeMultiple: string;
+    /**
+     * Ceiling on the TOTAL DREAM one member may hold across all content
+     * conviction stakes (blog, forum, collection — every item combined), on top
+     * of the per-item max_content_stake_per_member.
+     *
+     * Content stakes neither decay (decayStakes skips them) nor earn, so without
+     * an aggregate bound they are an unbounded decay-free store of value: DREAM
+     * parked there escapes the unstaked decay nudge entirely while a reward-
+     * bearing stake pays for itself in yield only when the seasonal pool is not
+     * calendar-bound. The per-item cap alone does not bound the park — one
+     * member can hold max_content_stake_per_member on every item ever created.
+     * Must be >= max_content_stake_per_member. Default 20,000 DREAM (2x the
+     * per-item cap). Author bonds are not counted; they are slashable escrow
+     * with their own per-item cap.
+     */
+    maxTotalContentStakePerMember: string;
     /**
      * Replacement rounds the acceptance sweep may run per jury review.
      *
@@ -549,6 +649,63 @@ export interface Params {
      * Epochs of history the accuracy ring scores. Default 6.
      */
     reviewerAccuracyWindowEpochs: bigint;
+    /**
+     * Reviewer bonded-role policy: the eligibility and exit terms for
+     * ROLE_TYPE_INITIATIVE_REVIEWER.
+     *
+     * These live here rather than only in the BondedRoleConfig store so the
+     * reviewer role has the same shape as every other bonded role: params are the
+     * source of truth and are written through to rep's enforcement state on
+     * InitGenesis and on every operational param update (x/forum does this for
+     * the sentinel, x/collect for the curator). Before that, the reviewer was the
+     * one role no module owned, so its config was reachable only by editing
+     * genesis or shipping an upgrade.
+     *
+     * Field numbers jump past the reviewer pay knobs above because these were
+     * added later; they belong to this block by topic, not by number.
+     *
+     * min_reviewer_bond is deliberately a LOW barrier to entry (500 DREAM), not a
+     * measure of what a bad verdict costs. Per-verdict exposure is the reserve --
+     * SlashReviewersOnOverturn charges BondReserved, which is
+     * reviewer_bond_reserve_rate x the initiative's budget -- so liability already
+     * scales with what the review could mint, whatever the floor is.
+     *
+     * Reviewers scale up by bonding more when they want bigger work. Free bond
+     * above a reviewer's open reserves is what decides which initiatives they can
+     * pick up and how many at once: at the default 10% rate the floor alone covers
+     * work up to ~5,000 DREAM of budget, while an EPIC initiative (10,000 cap)
+     * reserves 1,000. Raising the ceiling is just another MsgBondRole against the
+     * same record -- it adds to current_bond and is reservable on the next verdict,
+     * with no waiting period and no need to unbond first. Keeping the entry price
+     * low is the point: reviewing should be something an ordinary member can start
+     * doing and then grow into, rather than something gated on holding a large
+     * balance up front.
+     */
+    minReviewerBond: string;
+    /**
+     * Free bond below which a reviewer is demoted out of the role. Conventionally
+     * half of min_reviewer_bond.
+     */
+    reviewerDemotionThreshold: string;
+    /**
+     * Trust level a member must hold to bond as a reviewer. The trust ladder
+     * already encodes reputation, so this is the whole eligibility gate and
+     * min_reviewer_rep_tier stays 0 (see BondedRoleConfig seeding notes).
+     *
+     * Required, unlike the sentinel's and curator's: BondRole skips the trust
+     * check entirely on an empty string, so an omitted level would silently open
+     * the one role whose approvals mint DREAM. An ungated roster is still
+     * expressible as TRUST_LEVEL_NEW.
+     */
+    minReviewerTrustLevel: string;
+    minReviewerRepTier: bigint;
+    minReviewerAgeBlocks: bigint;
+    reviewerDemotionCooldown: bigint;
+    /**
+     * Bond stays slashable through this window after an unbond request, so open
+     * verdicts can age out and still be charged if a jury overturns them.
+     */
+    reviewerUnbondCooldown: bigint;
     /**
      * Ceiling on the uspark x/rep may draw from the community pool per UTC day to
      * fund its bonded-role reward pools.
@@ -841,6 +998,41 @@ export interface ParamsAmino {
      * Seasonal staking reward pool
      */
     max_staking_rewards_per_season?: string;
+    /**
+     * Ceiling on each epoch's reward slice, as a yield on the DREAM actually
+     * staked (default 0.0005 = 0.05% per epoch, 7.5% over a 150-epoch season
+     * gross, ~3.75% net of staked_decay_rate).
+     *
+     * The slice is otherwise remaining/remaining_epochs no matter how little is
+     * staked, so yield per staked DREAM diverges as the staked base shrinks and
+     * acc_per_share grows without bound: a chain with 1.47 DREAM staked hands the
+     * entire season budget to three dust stakes. Whatever this cap withholds
+     * stays in the pool rather than being distributed or dropped.
+     */
+    staking_reward_yield_per_epoch?: string;
+    /**
+     * Share of the previous season's non-staking DREAM mints that funds this
+     * season's staking reward pool (default 0.05 = 5%), so emission tracks what
+     * the chain actually produced rather than the calendar.
+     *
+     * Staking rewards are excluded from the base. Counting them would let each
+     * season's pool inflate the next one's, compounding with nothing but the
+     * schedule cap below to stop it.
+     */
+    staking_pool_mint_share?: string;
+    /**
+     * Schedule ceiling on the seasonal pool:
+     *
+     *   cap = staking_pool_cap_base * (season + 1) * staking_pool_cap_rate
+     *
+     * The base is the chain's initial DREAM supply (25,000 DREAM at genesis) and
+     * the rate defaults to 0.05, so the ceiling opens at 1,250 DREAM in season 0
+     * and widens by that much each season. It backstops the mint-share term above
+     * on a chain whose mint volume spikes; max_staking_rewards_per_season remains
+     * the absolute ceiling over both.
+     */
+    staking_pool_cap_base?: string;
+    staking_pool_cap_rate?: string;
     /**
      * Per-epoch decay on staked DREAM (default 0.05% = 0.0005)
      */
@@ -867,6 +1059,31 @@ export interface ParamsAmino {
      * but without this cap, a whale can stake disproportionately and extract most seasonal staking rewards.
      */
     max_initiative_stake_per_member?: string;
+    /**
+     * Anti-dust floor on the DREAM one MsgStake may lock (default 0.002 DREAM =
+     * 2,000 micro-DREAM). There was no floor at all, so a member could open the
+     * ten tranches max_stake_tranches_per_target allows at one micro-DREAM each
+     * and be counted as a participant in every conviction and payout weighting
+     * the initiative runs.
+     *
+     * The default is pinned to 1/staking_reward_yield_per_epoch: the smallest
+     * stake whose own per-epoch accrual (amount * yield, truncated to an integer)
+     * reaches one micro-DREAM. Below that a record can never earn anything, and
+     * should not occupy a state slot. Move it with the yield. What bounds the
+     * return on a small position is max_completion_bonus_stake_multiple, not
+     * this.
+     */
+    min_stake_amount?: string;
+    /**
+     * Per-season cap on total DREAM minted to pay interim work (default 50,000
+     * DREAM). The initiative cap below has always existed; the interim path had
+     * no season bound at all, which left it as the one DREAM-creating flow whose
+     * total was limited only by max_dream_mint_per_epoch — 250,000 DREAM/day
+     * against a 25,000 DREAM genesis supply. Interims are self-assigned and
+     * self-completed by design, so the per-member active cap alone does not
+     * bound the total: a member can complete and re-create indefinitely.
+     */
+    max_interim_rewards_per_season?: string;
     /**
      * Per-season cap on total DREAM minted via initiative completion rewards (default 100,000 DREAM).
      * Bounds total extraction even if colluding members rubber-stamp initiatives.
@@ -980,7 +1197,10 @@ export interface ParamsAmino {
     /**
      * External-conviction ratio applied instead of external_conviction_ratio when
      * the initiative is self-assigned. Must be >= external_conviction_ratio and
-     * <= 1. Default 1.0: the community alone vouches for self-assigned work.
+     * <= 1. Default 0.75 — a distinct-staker floor as much as a magnitude one,
+     * since max_conviction_share_per_member caps any one member's contribution:
+     * ceil(0.75 / 0.33) = 3 independent stakers, against 2 for externally
+     * assigned work.
      */
     self_assigned_external_conviction_ratio?: string;
     /**
@@ -1074,6 +1294,43 @@ export interface ParamsAmino {
      * Default 0.1.
      */
     initiative_completion_bonus_rate?: string;
+    /**
+     * Ceiling on the initiative completion bonus, as a multiple of the external
+     * DREAM actually staked behind the initiative (default 3.0):
+     *
+     *   bonus_pool = min(initiative_completion_bonus_rate * budget,
+     *                    max_completion_bonus_stake_multiple * external_stake)
+     *
+     * Default 3.0. Without it the bonus is a fixed share of the budget while the
+     * capital needed to unlock that budget falls as 1/N in the number of stakers —
+     * required_conviction is conviction_per_dream * sqrt(budget), each of N
+     * stakers supplies sqrt(stake), so the total stake that clears the gate is
+     * conviction_per_dream^2 * budget / N. The bonus per staker is then
+     * 2.5 * N times their own stake: 7.5x at three stakers, 25x at ten, 62.5x at
+     * twenty-five, risk-free on any initiative that completes.
+     *
+     * Pricing the bonus off capital at risk instead of participant count
+     * restores the stake-to-budget ratio the conviction formula was designed
+     * around (~4%) without touching the sqrt weighting that deliberately rewards
+     * breadth. Range: 0 disables the bonus entirely.
+     */
+    max_completion_bonus_stake_multiple?: string;
+    /**
+     * Ceiling on the TOTAL DREAM one member may hold across all content
+     * conviction stakes (blog, forum, collection — every item combined), on top
+     * of the per-item max_content_stake_per_member.
+     *
+     * Content stakes neither decay (decayStakes skips them) nor earn, so without
+     * an aggregate bound they are an unbounded decay-free store of value: DREAM
+     * parked there escapes the unstaked decay nudge entirely while a reward-
+     * bearing stake pays for itself in yield only when the seasonal pool is not
+     * calendar-bound. The per-item cap alone does not bound the park — one
+     * member can hold max_content_stake_per_member on every item ever created.
+     * Must be >= max_content_stake_per_member. Default 20,000 DREAM (2x the
+     * per-item cap). Author bonds are not counted; they are slashable escrow
+     * with their own per-item cap.
+     */
+    max_total_content_stake_per_member?: string;
     /**
      * Replacement rounds the acceptance sweep may run per jury review.
      *
@@ -1144,6 +1401,63 @@ export interface ParamsAmino {
      * Epochs of history the accuracy ring scores. Default 6.
      */
     reviewer_accuracy_window_epochs?: string;
+    /**
+     * Reviewer bonded-role policy: the eligibility and exit terms for
+     * ROLE_TYPE_INITIATIVE_REVIEWER.
+     *
+     * These live here rather than only in the BondedRoleConfig store so the
+     * reviewer role has the same shape as every other bonded role: params are the
+     * source of truth and are written through to rep's enforcement state on
+     * InitGenesis and on every operational param update (x/forum does this for
+     * the sentinel, x/collect for the curator). Before that, the reviewer was the
+     * one role no module owned, so its config was reachable only by editing
+     * genesis or shipping an upgrade.
+     *
+     * Field numbers jump past the reviewer pay knobs above because these were
+     * added later; they belong to this block by topic, not by number.
+     *
+     * min_reviewer_bond is deliberately a LOW barrier to entry (500 DREAM), not a
+     * measure of what a bad verdict costs. Per-verdict exposure is the reserve --
+     * SlashReviewersOnOverturn charges BondReserved, which is
+     * reviewer_bond_reserve_rate x the initiative's budget -- so liability already
+     * scales with what the review could mint, whatever the floor is.
+     *
+     * Reviewers scale up by bonding more when they want bigger work. Free bond
+     * above a reviewer's open reserves is what decides which initiatives they can
+     * pick up and how many at once: at the default 10% rate the floor alone covers
+     * work up to ~5,000 DREAM of budget, while an EPIC initiative (10,000 cap)
+     * reserves 1,000. Raising the ceiling is just another MsgBondRole against the
+     * same record -- it adds to current_bond and is reservable on the next verdict,
+     * with no waiting period and no need to unbond first. Keeping the entry price
+     * low is the point: reviewing should be something an ordinary member can start
+     * doing and then grow into, rather than something gated on holding a large
+     * balance up front.
+     */
+    min_reviewer_bond?: string;
+    /**
+     * Free bond below which a reviewer is demoted out of the role. Conventionally
+     * half of min_reviewer_bond.
+     */
+    reviewer_demotion_threshold?: string;
+    /**
+     * Trust level a member must hold to bond as a reviewer. The trust ladder
+     * already encodes reputation, so this is the whole eligibility gate and
+     * min_reviewer_rep_tier stays 0 (see BondedRoleConfig seeding notes).
+     *
+     * Required, unlike the sentinel's and curator's: BondRole skips the trust
+     * check entirely on an empty string, so an omitted level would silently open
+     * the one role whose approvals mint DREAM. An ungated roster is still
+     * expressible as TRUST_LEVEL_NEW.
+     */
+    min_reviewer_trust_level?: string;
+    min_reviewer_rep_tier?: string;
+    min_reviewer_age_blocks?: string;
+    reviewer_demotion_cooldown?: string;
+    /**
+     * Bond stays slashable through this window after an unbond request, so open
+     * verdicts can age out and still be charged if a jury overturns them.
+     */
+    reviewer_unbond_cooldown?: string;
     /**
      * Ceiling on the uspark x/rep may draw from the community pool per UTC day to
      * fund its bonded-role reward pools.
@@ -1410,6 +1724,14 @@ export interface RepOperationalParams {
      * Anti-whale staking cap (mirrors Params.max_initiative_stake_per_member)
      */
     maxInitiativeStakePerMember: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors min_stake_amount in Params.
+     */
+    minStakeAmount: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors max_interim_rewards_per_season in Params.
+     */
+    maxInterimRewardsPerSeason: string;
     /**
      * Per-season initiative reward minting cap (mirrors Params.max_initiative_rewards_per_season)
      */
@@ -1504,6 +1826,15 @@ export interface RepOperationalParams {
      * Mirrors initiative_completion_bonus_rate in Params.
      */
     initiativeCompletionBonusRate: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors max_completion_bonus_stake_multiple in Params.
+     */
+    maxCompletionBonusStakeMultiple: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors max_total_content_stake_per_member in Params: the aggregate
+     * per-member ceiling across all content conviction stakes.
+     */
+    maxTotalContentStakePerMember: string;
     /**
      * Mirrors jury_acceptance_window_ratio in Params. Validated against
      * max_jury_redraws below — the pair must fit inside the review period.
@@ -1562,6 +1893,25 @@ export interface RepOperationalParams {
     minEpochVerifications: number;
     verifierDreamReward: string;
     maxVerifierDreamMintPerEpoch: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors the reviewer bonded-role policy in Params. Updating these writes
+     * through to the BondedRoleConfig for ROLE_TYPE_INITIATIVE_REVIEWER, so the
+     * reviewer bond floor is tunable by council vote like every other role's.
+     */
+    minReviewerBond: string;
+    reviewerDemotionThreshold: string;
+    minReviewerTrustLevel: string;
+    minReviewerRepTier: bigint;
+    minReviewerAgeBlocks: bigint;
+    reviewerDemotionCooldown: bigint;
+    reviewerUnbondCooldown: bigint;
+    /**
+     * Seasonal staking pool shape; see the same fields on Params.
+     */
+    stakingRewardYieldPerEpoch: string;
+    stakingPoolMintShare: string;
+    stakingPoolCapBase: string;
+    stakingPoolCapRate: string;
 }
 export interface RepOperationalParamsProtoMsg {
     typeUrl: "/sparkdream.rep.v1.RepOperationalParams";
@@ -1697,6 +2047,14 @@ export interface RepOperationalParamsAmino {
      * Anti-whale staking cap (mirrors Params.max_initiative_stake_per_member)
      */
     max_initiative_stake_per_member?: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors min_stake_amount in Params.
+     */
+    min_stake_amount?: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors max_interim_rewards_per_season in Params.
+     */
+    max_interim_rewards_per_season?: string;
     /**
      * Per-season initiative reward minting cap (mirrors Params.max_initiative_rewards_per_season)
      */
@@ -1791,6 +2149,15 @@ export interface RepOperationalParamsAmino {
      * Mirrors initiative_completion_bonus_rate in Params.
      */
     initiative_completion_bonus_rate?: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors max_completion_bonus_stake_multiple in Params.
+     */
+    max_completion_bonus_stake_multiple?: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors max_total_content_stake_per_member in Params: the aggregate
+     * per-member ceiling across all content conviction stakes.
+     */
+    max_total_content_stake_per_member?: string;
     /**
      * Mirrors jury_acceptance_window_ratio in Params. Validated against
      * max_jury_redraws below — the pair must fit inside the review period.
@@ -1849,6 +2216,25 @@ export interface RepOperationalParamsAmino {
     min_epoch_verifications?: number;
     verifier_dream_reward?: string;
     max_verifier_dream_mint_per_epoch?: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors the reviewer bonded-role policy in Params. Updating these writes
+     * through to the BondedRoleConfig for ROLE_TYPE_INITIATIVE_REVIEWER, so the
+     * reviewer bond floor is tunable by council vote like every other role's.
+     */
+    min_reviewer_bond?: string;
+    reviewer_demotion_threshold?: string;
+    min_reviewer_trust_level?: string;
+    min_reviewer_rep_tier?: string;
+    min_reviewer_age_blocks?: string;
+    reviewer_demotion_cooldown?: string;
+    reviewer_unbond_cooldown?: string;
+    /**
+     * Seasonal staking pool shape; see the same fields on Params.
+     */
+    staking_reward_yield_per_epoch?: string;
+    staking_pool_mint_share?: string;
+    staking_pool_cap_base?: string;
+    staking_pool_cap_rate?: string;
 }
 export interface RepOperationalParamsAminoMsg {
     type: "sparkdream/x/rep/RepOperationalParams";