@sparkdreamnft/sparkdreamjs 0.0.35 → 0.0.37

package/sparkdream/rep/v1/params.d.ts

@@ -376,23 +376,310 @@ export interface Params {
      */
     proposedProjectExpiryBlocks: bigint;
     /**
-     * Fraction of the initiative budget locked as a DREAM bond when the project
-     * creator self-assigns on a budget-backed project (permissionless projects
-     * are exempt — no treasury exposure). Bond is returned on completion or
-     * abandonment and burned when a challenge is upheld. Range [0, 1]; 0 disables.
+     * Fraction of the initiative budget locked as a DREAM bond when an
+     * initiative is self-assigned on a budget-backed project. Bond is returned
+     * on completion or abandonment and burned when a challenge is upheld.
+     * Range [0, 1]; 0 disables.
      */
     selfAssignedBondRate: string;
     /**
      * External-conviction ratio applied instead of external_conviction_ratio when
-     * the assignee is the project creator. Must be >= external_conviction_ratio
-     * and <= 1. Default 1.0: the community alone vouches for self-assigned work.
+     * the initiative is self-assigned. Must be >= external_conviction_ratio and
+     * <= 1. Default 1.0: the community alone vouches for self-assigned work.
      */
     selfAssignedExternalConvictionRatio: string;
     /**
-     * Multiplier applied to the challenge window for creator-assigned
-     * initiatives. Must be >= 1. Default 2.
+     * Multiplier applied to the challenge window for self-assigned initiatives.
+     * Must be >= 1. Default 2.
      */
     selfAssignedChallengeMultiplier: bigint;
+    /**
+     * Bond rate applied instead of self_assigned_bond_rate when the initiative
+     * is self-assigned under a permissionless project. Higher because the two
+     * cases expose the commons differently: a budget-backed initiative MOVES
+     * DREAM that governance already approved, while a permissionless one MINTS
+     * DREAM nobody approved and dilutes every holder. Permissionless
+     * self-assignment used to be exempt from the bond entirely, which disabled
+     * the main economic deterrent exactly where no counterparty exists.
+     * Range [0, 1]; 0 disables. Default 0.25.
+     */
+    permissionlessSelfAssignedBondRate: string;
+    /**
+     * Reputation deducted, per tag of the disputed initiative, from a juror who
+     * accepted a summons and then let it lapse. Accepting is voluntary and
+     * declining is free and immediate, so an abandoned seat is a broken
+     * commitment rather than an accident of the draw.
+     *
+     * Charged in reputation because that is what qualifies a juror: enough
+     * abandoned seats and they fall below min_juror_reputation and stop being
+     * drawn for that tag at all. Must be non-negative; 0 disables. Default 10.
+     */
+    abandonedJurySeatPenalty: string;
+    /**
+     * Fraction of the disputed initiative's budget paid out to its jury, split
+     * evenly across the seats. Juror pay was a flat StandardComplexityBudget
+     * regardless of what was in dispute, so a challenge over a 100 DREAM
+     * APPRENTICE initiative minted 750 DREAM in juror fees to settle it — more
+     * than the work was worth. Range [0, 1]. Default 0.25.
+     */
+    jurorRewardRate: string;
+    /**
+     * Fraction of an initiative's review period a juror has to answer a summons
+     * before the seat is swept and redrawn.
+     *
+     * A ratio rather than a block count because the review period varies by two
+     * orders of magnitude across networks: the previous fixed 1200-block (~2h)
+     * window was 1.2% of mainnet's ~7-day review but 133% of devnet's, putting
+     * the acceptance deadline *after* the vote deadline there and making the
+     * sweep unreachable. It also contradicted the reason no-shows go unpunished
+     * — that a member cannot be expected to watch the chain for an event that
+     * reaches them about once a year — by then withdrawing the seat if they did
+     * not answer within two hours.
+     *
+     * Sized for how long it takes someone to read a notification, not to react
+     * to a block. Range (0, 1). Default 0.25 — about 42 hours on mainnet.
+     *
+     * Operational alongside the other juror knobs: leaving juror *pay* committee
+     * tunable while juror *timing* needed a governance vote was an artifact of
+     * build order, not a decision.
+     */
+    juryAcceptanceWindowRatio: string;
+    /**
+     * Floor on a single juror's pay, in micro-DREAM.
+     *
+     * juror_reward_rate scales pay against the disputed initiative's budget, but
+     * content challenges and moderation appeals have no initiative budget to
+     * scale against — for those this floor *is* the whole rate, which is why it
+     * cannot stay a compile-time constant. Default 5 DREAM.
+     */
+    minJurorReward: string;
+    /**
+     * Floor on the responsiveness multiplier applied to a juror's selection
+     * weight. A juror who never answers is drawn less often, never not at all —
+     * a zero-weight address could never earn its way back, since it would stop
+     * being drawn and so could never demonstrate otherwise.
+     *
+     * Chosen for shape rather than fitted to anything, and meant to be revisited
+     * against observed response rates. Range (0,1]. Default 0.1.
+     */
+    minJurorSelectionWeight: string;
+    /**
+     * Seatings a juror must have before the responsiveness weight applies at all.
+     * Below this there is no meaningful record and they are drawn at full weight.
+     * Like the floor above, a guess awaiting real data. Default 3.
+     */
+    minJurySeatingsForWeighting: bigint;
+    /**
+     * Conviction-weighted completion bonus, as a fraction of the initiative
+     * budget, paid to external stakers on completion.
+     *
+     * Was a hardcoded 1/10 divisor while the project-side equivalent
+     * (project_completion_bonus_rate) was already a param — the same economic
+     * knob, tunable on one side and fixed on the other. Range [0,1].
+     * Default 0.1.
+     */
+    initiativeCompletionBonusRate: string;
+    /**
+     * Replacement rounds the acceptance sweep may run per jury review.
+     *
+     * Coupled to jury_acceptance_window_ratio and validated against it: each round
+     * costs one acceptance window out of the review period, so widening the window
+     * without lowering this leaves replacement jurors no time to read the work.
+     * Both live in the same scope so the pair always moves under one authority.
+     * Default 1.
+     */
+    maxJuryRedraws: number;
+    /**
+     * Fraction of an initiative's budget a reviewer commits as bond when filing a
+     * verdict on it, and the amount slashed if a jury overturns that verdict.
+     *
+     * Scaled rather than flat so liability tracks what the review could mint — a
+     * wrong approval on an EPIC initiative releases up to 10,000 DREAM, and the
+     * same risk should not attach to a 100 DREAM one. It is also self-limiting:
+     * a reviewer can only hold as many open verdicts as their free bond covers.
+     * Range (0,1]. Default 0.1.
+     */
+    reviewerBondReserveRate: string;
+    /**
+     * Fraction of an initiative's budget paid to the reviewers who filed a
+     * verdict on the round that resolved it, scaled by the tier's
+     * reward_multiplier and split evenly across those reviewers.
+     *
+     * Paid per verdict filed, never per approval — if approving paid and
+     * rejecting did not, the role would rebuild "paid to say yes" one layer down.
+     * Paid when the initiative resolves, so an unacted-on review costs nothing and
+     * filing verdicts earns nothing until something turns on them. Range [0,1].
+     * Default 0.05.
+     */
+    reviewFeeRate: string;
+    /**
+     * Review rounds an initiative may go through before a rejection becomes
+     * terminal. A rejection returns the work to ASSIGNED so the assignee can fix
+     * and resubmit, which is the right remedy for "not done" — but unbounded it
+     * lets a bad-faith assignee burn reviewer effort indefinitely. Default 3.
+     */
+    maxReviewRounds: number;
+    /**
+     * SPARK reward pool for initiative reviewers, mirroring the sentinel pool but
+     * held and tuned separately.
+     *
+     * The DREAM review fee pays for the act of reviewing; this pays for reviewing
+     * *well*, gated on windowed accuracy the same way sentinel pay is. Separate
+     * knobs because the liability differs by orders of magnitude: a wrong
+     * approval mints DREAM that cannot be clawed back, where a wrong hide costs a
+     * post some visibility.
+     *
+     * The pool is an ordinary bank sub-address, so a council policy funds it with
+     * a plain send.
+     */
+    maxReviewerRewardPool: string;
+    /**
+     * Fraction of overflow burned per epoch. Default 0.5.
+     */
+    reviewerRewardPoolOverflowBurnRatio: string;
+    /**
+     * Distribution cadence. Default 14400 (~1 day).
+     */
+    reviewerRewardEpochBlocks: bigint;
+    /**
+     * Minimum windowed accuracy to earn a share. Default 0.70.
+     */
+    minReviewerAccuracy: string;
+    /**
+     * Epochs of history the accuracy ring scores. Default 6.
+     */
+    reviewerAccuracyWindowEpochs: bigint;
+    /**
+     * Ceiling on the uspark x/rep may draw from the community pool per UTC day to
+     * fund its bonded-role reward pools.
+     *
+     * One capped claim on the community pool for the whole module, divided
+     * internally by headroom — adding a fourth bonded role must not mean adding a
+     * fourth funding line. The skim tops pools up toward their own caps and stops
+     * there, so an idle role costs the community pool nothing.
+     *
+     * Funding is automatic rather than by council transfer because pay that
+     * depends on somebody remembering to send it arrives unpredictably, and
+     * unpredictable pay does not hold a roster.
+     *
+     * Expressed as a SHARE OF INFLATION rather than an absolute daily amount:
+     *
+     *   daily_allowance = annual_provisions * community_tax * share / 365
+     *
+     * A fixed nominal draw takes its largest share of the community pool exactly
+     * when the pool is poorest — inflation floats 2–5%, so a constant amount is
+     * half the pool's income at the top of that range and more than all of it at
+     * the bottom, and x/rep skims before x/split. A share is counter-cyclical:
+     * it takes less when there is less, so the councils' remainder is structural
+     * rather than whatever happens to be left over. It also tracks supply growth
+     * without periodic retuning.
+     *
+     * The base is inflation, NOT the community pool balance. A share of the
+     * balance would let x/rep raid the 95M SPARK genesis allocation that x/split
+     * exists to hand to the councils, and would take a cut of every direct
+     * fund-community-pool deposit. annual_provisions is also set by x/mint, whose
+     * authority is the burn address — so this rate is anchored to a number no
+     * committee or proposal can move.
+     *
+     * Default 0.5 (half the community pool's inflation income); zero disables the
+     * skim, leaving the pools to forfeited bonds and direct sends.
+     */
+    roleRewardInflationShare: string;
+    /**
+     * Curator SPARK pool. Same shape and cadence as the sentinel pool above and
+     * sized to match it: curating a collection rating and hiding a post are
+     * comparable judgment calls with comparable liability. Kept as separate
+     * params (and a separate pool) anyway, so neither role can draw on the
+     * other's funds or be retuned by the other's bar.
+     */
+    maxCuratorRewardPool: string;
+    curatorRewardPoolOverflowBurnRatio: string;
+    curatorRewardEpochBlocks: bigint;
+    minCuratorAccuracy: string;
+    curatorAccuracyWindowEpochs: bigint;
+    /**
+     * Budget above which an initiative cannot complete without at least one
+     * reviewer verdict, regardless of the parent project's verification policy.
+     *
+     * The gate keys on how much DREAM the completion CREATES, not on whether the
+     * project is budget-backed. Permissionless initiatives mint against a
+     * self-declared budget with no treasury behind it, capped only by tier — so
+     * the funded/unfunded axis gets the risk ordering backwards. Mint size is the
+     * number that actually matters and it exists on both paths.
+     *
+     * Default 100 DREAM, the APPRENTICE ceiling: apprentice work stays exempt
+     * because it is small and it is the on-ramp where reviewer scarcity would
+     * hurt newcomers most, while every permissionless STANDARD initiative — the
+     * whole farming vector — is gated.
+     *
+     * Composes with the per-project policy as a MAXIMUM, never a replacement: a
+     * project may demand more verifiers than this, never fewer. Zero disables the
+     * chain-wide gate and leaves review entirely to project policy.
+     */
+    reviewRequiredAboveBudget: string;
+    /**
+     * Blocks a review bounty must sit before its funder may reclaim it. Stops a
+     * funder advertising a bounty and withdrawing it in the same breath, which
+     * would let anyone grief the reviewer roster at zero cost. Reclaim is barred
+     * outright once any verdict is filed, regardless of this delay.
+     */
+    reviewBountyReclaimDelay: bigint;
+    /**
+     * Minimum review bounty a PERMISSIONLESS initiative must escrow at creation,
+     * as a fraction of its budget, paid in existing DREAM.
+     *
+     * Permissionless initiatives mint against a self-declared budget with no
+     * treasury behind them, and their review fee is minted too — so reviewers of
+     * permissionless work are currently paid purely by dilution, the very thing
+     * the funded path's budget-netting exists to avoid. A creator-funded bounty
+     * prices that reviewer attention onto whoever consumes it, is non-inflationary
+     * because it moves existing DREAM, and scales the spam brake with the amount
+     * being minted instead of a flat creation fee.
+     *
+     * Charged ONLY when the budget exceeds review_required_above_budget: the
+     * bounty funds mandatory review, so below the gate it would take DREAM for a
+     * service that is never delivered. That keeps apprentice work — the on-ramp,
+     * where members arrive holding zero DREAM — free of it. Zero disables the
+     * requirement entirely.
+     */
+    permissionlessMinReviewBountyRate: string;
+    /**
+     * --- Federation verifier pay (SPARK pool + DREAM stipend) ---
+     *
+     * The verifier's whole reward distribution lives here rather than in
+     * x/federation, for the same reason the curator's lives here rather than in
+     * x/collect: the accuracy it scores comes from the shared RoleActivity
+     * record x/rep owns, and the epoch it resets is the epoch the accuracy ring
+     * is stamped in. Two modules distributing on two independently-editable
+     * cadences would both reset those per-epoch counters and neither would read
+     * a coherent window. x/federation keeps the verification mechanics -- bond,
+     * slash, challenge windows, cooldown base -- and reports actions here.
+     *
+     * The verifier is the one bonded role whose work has an OFF-chain cost:
+     * fetching the peer's content and hashing it, then paying SPARK gas to
+     * submit. Paying only in DREAM made it the single role where doing the job
+     * drains the holder's SPARK and returns a token they cannot spend on gas.
+     */
+    maxVerifierRewardPool: string;
+    verifierRewardPoolOverflowBurnRatio: string;
+    verifierRewardEpochBlocks: bigint;
+    minVerifierAccuracy: string;
+    verifierAccuracyWindowEpochs: bigint;
+    /**
+     * Verified items required in an epoch to earn anything that epoch. This is
+     * the ONLY place volume enters verifier pay -- as a floor, never as a
+     * weight. See the score formula in x/rep/keeper/verifier_reward_distribution.go
+     * for why weighting by verified_count is the wrong curve for this role.
+     */
+    minEpochVerifications: number;
+    /**
+     * Flat DREAM minted per eligible verifier per epoch, scaled down pro-rata
+     * when the roster would push the epoch's total past the mint cap. Auto-bonds
+     * while the verifier is in RECOVERY so a slashed verifier can rebuild their
+     * bond by working rather than by fronting DREAM.
+     */
+    verifierDreamReward: string;
+    maxVerifierDreamMintPerEpoch: string;
 }
 export interface ParamsProtoMsg {
     typeUrl: "/sparkdream.rep.v1.Params";
@@ -684,23 +971,310 @@ export interface ParamsAmino {
      */
     proposed_project_expiry_blocks?: string;
     /**
-     * Fraction of the initiative budget locked as a DREAM bond when the project
-     * creator self-assigns on a budget-backed project (permissionless projects
-     * are exempt — no treasury exposure). Bond is returned on completion or
-     * abandonment and burned when a challenge is upheld. Range [0, 1]; 0 disables.
+     * Fraction of the initiative budget locked as a DREAM bond when an
+     * initiative is self-assigned on a budget-backed project. Bond is returned
+     * on completion or abandonment and burned when a challenge is upheld.
+     * Range [0, 1]; 0 disables.
      */
     self_assigned_bond_rate?: string;
     /**
      * External-conviction ratio applied instead of external_conviction_ratio when
-     * the assignee is the project creator. Must be >= external_conviction_ratio
-     * and <= 1. Default 1.0: the community alone vouches for self-assigned work.
+     * the initiative is self-assigned. Must be >= external_conviction_ratio and
+     * <= 1. Default 1.0: the community alone vouches for self-assigned work.
      */
     self_assigned_external_conviction_ratio?: string;
     /**
-     * Multiplier applied to the challenge window for creator-assigned
-     * initiatives. Must be >= 1. Default 2.
+     * Multiplier applied to the challenge window for self-assigned initiatives.
+     * Must be >= 1. Default 2.
      */
     self_assigned_challenge_multiplier?: string;
+    /**
+     * Bond rate applied instead of self_assigned_bond_rate when the initiative
+     * is self-assigned under a permissionless project. Higher because the two
+     * cases expose the commons differently: a budget-backed initiative MOVES
+     * DREAM that governance already approved, while a permissionless one MINTS
+     * DREAM nobody approved and dilutes every holder. Permissionless
+     * self-assignment used to be exempt from the bond entirely, which disabled
+     * the main economic deterrent exactly where no counterparty exists.
+     * Range [0, 1]; 0 disables. Default 0.25.
+     */
+    permissionless_self_assigned_bond_rate?: string;
+    /**
+     * Reputation deducted, per tag of the disputed initiative, from a juror who
+     * accepted a summons and then let it lapse. Accepting is voluntary and
+     * declining is free and immediate, so an abandoned seat is a broken
+     * commitment rather than an accident of the draw.
+     *
+     * Charged in reputation because that is what qualifies a juror: enough
+     * abandoned seats and they fall below min_juror_reputation and stop being
+     * drawn for that tag at all. Must be non-negative; 0 disables. Default 10.
+     */
+    abandoned_jury_seat_penalty?: string;
+    /**
+     * Fraction of the disputed initiative's budget paid out to its jury, split
+     * evenly across the seats. Juror pay was a flat StandardComplexityBudget
+     * regardless of what was in dispute, so a challenge over a 100 DREAM
+     * APPRENTICE initiative minted 750 DREAM in juror fees to settle it — more
+     * than the work was worth. Range [0, 1]. Default 0.25.
+     */
+    juror_reward_rate?: string;
+    /**
+     * Fraction of an initiative's review period a juror has to answer a summons
+     * before the seat is swept and redrawn.
+     *
+     * A ratio rather than a block count because the review period varies by two
+     * orders of magnitude across networks: the previous fixed 1200-block (~2h)
+     * window was 1.2% of mainnet's ~7-day review but 133% of devnet's, putting
+     * the acceptance deadline *after* the vote deadline there and making the
+     * sweep unreachable. It also contradicted the reason no-shows go unpunished
+     * — that a member cannot be expected to watch the chain for an event that
+     * reaches them about once a year — by then withdrawing the seat if they did
+     * not answer within two hours.
+     *
+     * Sized for how long it takes someone to read a notification, not to react
+     * to a block. Range (0, 1). Default 0.25 — about 42 hours on mainnet.
+     *
+     * Operational alongside the other juror knobs: leaving juror *pay* committee
+     * tunable while juror *timing* needed a governance vote was an artifact of
+     * build order, not a decision.
+     */
+    jury_acceptance_window_ratio?: string;
+    /**
+     * Floor on a single juror's pay, in micro-DREAM.
+     *
+     * juror_reward_rate scales pay against the disputed initiative's budget, but
+     * content challenges and moderation appeals have no initiative budget to
+     * scale against — for those this floor *is* the whole rate, which is why it
+     * cannot stay a compile-time constant. Default 5 DREAM.
+     */
+    min_juror_reward?: string;
+    /**
+     * Floor on the responsiveness multiplier applied to a juror's selection
+     * weight. A juror who never answers is drawn less often, never not at all —
+     * a zero-weight address could never earn its way back, since it would stop
+     * being drawn and so could never demonstrate otherwise.
+     *
+     * Chosen for shape rather than fitted to anything, and meant to be revisited
+     * against observed response rates. Range (0,1]. Default 0.1.
+     */
+    min_juror_selection_weight?: string;
+    /**
+     * Seatings a juror must have before the responsiveness weight applies at all.
+     * Below this there is no meaningful record and they are drawn at full weight.
+     * Like the floor above, a guess awaiting real data. Default 3.
+     */
+    min_jury_seatings_for_weighting?: string;
+    /**
+     * Conviction-weighted completion bonus, as a fraction of the initiative
+     * budget, paid to external stakers on completion.
+     *
+     * Was a hardcoded 1/10 divisor while the project-side equivalent
+     * (project_completion_bonus_rate) was already a param — the same economic
+     * knob, tunable on one side and fixed on the other. Range [0,1].
+     * Default 0.1.
+     */
+    initiative_completion_bonus_rate?: string;
+    /**
+     * Replacement rounds the acceptance sweep may run per jury review.
+     *
+     * Coupled to jury_acceptance_window_ratio and validated against it: each round
+     * costs one acceptance window out of the review period, so widening the window
+     * without lowering this leaves replacement jurors no time to read the work.
+     * Both live in the same scope so the pair always moves under one authority.
+     * Default 1.
+     */
+    max_jury_redraws?: number;
+    /**
+     * Fraction of an initiative's budget a reviewer commits as bond when filing a
+     * verdict on it, and the amount slashed if a jury overturns that verdict.
+     *
+     * Scaled rather than flat so liability tracks what the review could mint — a
+     * wrong approval on an EPIC initiative releases up to 10,000 DREAM, and the
+     * same risk should not attach to a 100 DREAM one. It is also self-limiting:
+     * a reviewer can only hold as many open verdicts as their free bond covers.
+     * Range (0,1]. Default 0.1.
+     */
+    reviewer_bond_reserve_rate?: string;
+    /**
+     * Fraction of an initiative's budget paid to the reviewers who filed a
+     * verdict on the round that resolved it, scaled by the tier's
+     * reward_multiplier and split evenly across those reviewers.
+     *
+     * Paid per verdict filed, never per approval — if approving paid and
+     * rejecting did not, the role would rebuild "paid to say yes" one layer down.
+     * Paid when the initiative resolves, so an unacted-on review costs nothing and
+     * filing verdicts earns nothing until something turns on them. Range [0,1].
+     * Default 0.05.
+     */
+    review_fee_rate?: string;
+    /**
+     * Review rounds an initiative may go through before a rejection becomes
+     * terminal. A rejection returns the work to ASSIGNED so the assignee can fix
+     * and resubmit, which is the right remedy for "not done" — but unbounded it
+     * lets a bad-faith assignee burn reviewer effort indefinitely. Default 3.
+     */
+    max_review_rounds?: number;
+    /**
+     * SPARK reward pool for initiative reviewers, mirroring the sentinel pool but
+     * held and tuned separately.
+     *
+     * The DREAM review fee pays for the act of reviewing; this pays for reviewing
+     * *well*, gated on windowed accuracy the same way sentinel pay is. Separate
+     * knobs because the liability differs by orders of magnitude: a wrong
+     * approval mints DREAM that cannot be clawed back, where a wrong hide costs a
+     * post some visibility.
+     *
+     * The pool is an ordinary bank sub-address, so a council policy funds it with
+     * a plain send.
+     */
+    max_reviewer_reward_pool?: string;
+    /**
+     * Fraction of overflow burned per epoch. Default 0.5.
+     */
+    reviewer_reward_pool_overflow_burn_ratio?: string;
+    /**
+     * Distribution cadence. Default 14400 (~1 day).
+     */
+    reviewer_reward_epoch_blocks?: string;
+    /**
+     * Minimum windowed accuracy to earn a share. Default 0.70.
+     */
+    min_reviewer_accuracy?: string;
+    /**
+     * Epochs of history the accuracy ring scores. Default 6.
+     */
+    reviewer_accuracy_window_epochs?: string;
+    /**
+     * Ceiling on the uspark x/rep may draw from the community pool per UTC day to
+     * fund its bonded-role reward pools.
+     *
+     * One capped claim on the community pool for the whole module, divided
+     * internally by headroom — adding a fourth bonded role must not mean adding a
+     * fourth funding line. The skim tops pools up toward their own caps and stops
+     * there, so an idle role costs the community pool nothing.
+     *
+     * Funding is automatic rather than by council transfer because pay that
+     * depends on somebody remembering to send it arrives unpredictably, and
+     * unpredictable pay does not hold a roster.
+     *
+     * Expressed as a SHARE OF INFLATION rather than an absolute daily amount:
+     *
+     *   daily_allowance = annual_provisions * community_tax * share / 365
+     *
+     * A fixed nominal draw takes its largest share of the community pool exactly
+     * when the pool is poorest — inflation floats 2–5%, so a constant amount is
+     * half the pool's income at the top of that range and more than all of it at
+     * the bottom, and x/rep skims before x/split. A share is counter-cyclical:
+     * it takes less when there is less, so the councils' remainder is structural
+     * rather than whatever happens to be left over. It also tracks supply growth
+     * without periodic retuning.
+     *
+     * The base is inflation, NOT the community pool balance. A share of the
+     * balance would let x/rep raid the 95M SPARK genesis allocation that x/split
+     * exists to hand to the councils, and would take a cut of every direct
+     * fund-community-pool deposit. annual_provisions is also set by x/mint, whose
+     * authority is the burn address — so this rate is anchored to a number no
+     * committee or proposal can move.
+     *
+     * Default 0.5 (half the community pool's inflation income); zero disables the
+     * skim, leaving the pools to forfeited bonds and direct sends.
+     */
+    role_reward_inflation_share?: string;
+    /**
+     * Curator SPARK pool. Same shape and cadence as the sentinel pool above and
+     * sized to match it: curating a collection rating and hiding a post are
+     * comparable judgment calls with comparable liability. Kept as separate
+     * params (and a separate pool) anyway, so neither role can draw on the
+     * other's funds or be retuned by the other's bar.
+     */
+    max_curator_reward_pool?: string;
+    curator_reward_pool_overflow_burn_ratio?: string;
+    curator_reward_epoch_blocks?: string;
+    min_curator_accuracy?: string;
+    curator_accuracy_window_epochs?: string;
+    /**
+     * Budget above which an initiative cannot complete without at least one
+     * reviewer verdict, regardless of the parent project's verification policy.
+     *
+     * The gate keys on how much DREAM the completion CREATES, not on whether the
+     * project is budget-backed. Permissionless initiatives mint against a
+     * self-declared budget with no treasury behind it, capped only by tier — so
+     * the funded/unfunded axis gets the risk ordering backwards. Mint size is the
+     * number that actually matters and it exists on both paths.
+     *
+     * Default 100 DREAM, the APPRENTICE ceiling: apprentice work stays exempt
+     * because it is small and it is the on-ramp where reviewer scarcity would
+     * hurt newcomers most, while every permissionless STANDARD initiative — the
+     * whole farming vector — is gated.
+     *
+     * Composes with the per-project policy as a MAXIMUM, never a replacement: a
+     * project may demand more verifiers than this, never fewer. Zero disables the
+     * chain-wide gate and leaves review entirely to project policy.
+     */
+    review_required_above_budget?: string;
+    /**
+     * Blocks a review bounty must sit before its funder may reclaim it. Stops a
+     * funder advertising a bounty and withdrawing it in the same breath, which
+     * would let anyone grief the reviewer roster at zero cost. Reclaim is barred
+     * outright once any verdict is filed, regardless of this delay.
+     */
+    review_bounty_reclaim_delay?: string;
+    /**
+     * Minimum review bounty a PERMISSIONLESS initiative must escrow at creation,
+     * as a fraction of its budget, paid in existing DREAM.
+     *
+     * Permissionless initiatives mint against a self-declared budget with no
+     * treasury behind them, and their review fee is minted too — so reviewers of
+     * permissionless work are currently paid purely by dilution, the very thing
+     * the funded path's budget-netting exists to avoid. A creator-funded bounty
+     * prices that reviewer attention onto whoever consumes it, is non-inflationary
+     * because it moves existing DREAM, and scales the spam brake with the amount
+     * being minted instead of a flat creation fee.
+     *
+     * Charged ONLY when the budget exceeds review_required_above_budget: the
+     * bounty funds mandatory review, so below the gate it would take DREAM for a
+     * service that is never delivered. That keeps apprentice work — the on-ramp,
+     * where members arrive holding zero DREAM — free of it. Zero disables the
+     * requirement entirely.
+     */
+    permissionless_min_review_bounty_rate?: string;
+    /**
+     * --- Federation verifier pay (SPARK pool + DREAM stipend) ---
+     *
+     * The verifier's whole reward distribution lives here rather than in
+     * x/federation, for the same reason the curator's lives here rather than in
+     * x/collect: the accuracy it scores comes from the shared RoleActivity
+     * record x/rep owns, and the epoch it resets is the epoch the accuracy ring
+     * is stamped in. Two modules distributing on two independently-editable
+     * cadences would both reset those per-epoch counters and neither would read
+     * a coherent window. x/federation keeps the verification mechanics -- bond,
+     * slash, challenge windows, cooldown base -- and reports actions here.
+     *
+     * The verifier is the one bonded role whose work has an OFF-chain cost:
+     * fetching the peer's content and hashing it, then paying SPARK gas to
+     * submit. Paying only in DREAM made it the single role where doing the job
+     * drains the holder's SPARK and returns a token they cannot spend on gas.
+     */
+    max_verifier_reward_pool?: string;
+    verifier_reward_pool_overflow_burn_ratio?: string;
+    verifier_reward_epoch_blocks?: string;
+    min_verifier_accuracy?: string;
+    verifier_accuracy_window_epochs?: string;
+    /**
+     * Verified items required in an epoch to earn anything that epoch. This is
+     * the ONLY place volume enters verifier pay -- as a floor, never as a
+     * weight. See the score formula in x/rep/keeper/verifier_reward_distribution.go
+     * for why weighting by verified_count is the wrong curve for this role.
+     */
+    min_epoch_verifications?: number;
+    /**
+     * Flat DREAM minted per eligible verifier per epoch, scaled down pro-rata
+     * when the roster would push the epoch's total past the mint cap. Auto-bonds
+     * while the verifier is in RECOVERY so a slashed verifier can rebuild their
+     * bond by working rather than by fronting DREAM.
+     */
+    verifier_dream_reward?: string;
+    max_verifier_dream_mint_per_epoch?: string;
 }
 export interface ParamsAminoMsg {
     type: "sparkdream/x/rep/Params";
@@ -901,6 +1475,93 @@ export interface RepOperationalParams {
     maxProjectRequestedBudget: string;
     maxProjectRequestedSpark: string;
     proposedProjectExpiryBlocks: bigint;
+    /**
+     * Reputation deducted from a juror who accepted a summons and abandoned it.
+     * Mirrors abandoned_jury_seat_penalty in Params.
+     */
+    abandonedJurySeatPenalty: string;
+    /**
+     * Fraction of the disputed initiative's budget paid out to its jury, split
+     * evenly across the seats. Juror pay was a flat StandardComplexityBudget
+     * regardless of what was in dispute, so a challenge over a 100 DREAM
+     * APPRENTICE initiative minted 750 DREAM in juror fees to settle it — more
+     * than the work was worth. Range [0, 1]. Default 0.25.
+     */
+    jurorRewardRate: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors min_juror_reward in Params.
+     */
+    minJurorReward: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors min_juror_selection_weight in Params.
+     */
+    minJurorSelectionWeight: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors min_jury_seatings_for_weighting in Params.
+     */
+    minJurySeatingsForWeighting: bigint;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors initiative_completion_bonus_rate in Params.
+     */
+    initiativeCompletionBonusRate: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors jury_acceptance_window_ratio in Params. Validated against
+     * max_jury_redraws below — the pair must fit inside the review period.
+     */
+    juryAcceptanceWindowRatio: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors max_jury_redraws in Params.
+     */
+    maxJuryRedraws: number;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors reviewer_bond_reserve_rate in Params.
+     */
+    reviewerBondReserveRate: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors review_fee_rate in Params.
+     */
+    reviewFeeRate: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors max_review_rounds in Params.
+     */
+    maxReviewRounds: number;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors the reviewer reward pool knobs in Params.
+     */
+    maxReviewerRewardPool: string;
+    reviewerRewardPoolOverflowBurnRatio: string;
+    reviewerRewardEpochBlocks: bigint;
+    minReviewerAccuracy: string;
+    reviewerAccuracyWindowEpochs: bigint;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors role_reward_inflation_share in Params.
+     */
+    roleRewardInflationShare: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors the curator SPARK pool params in Params.
+     */
+    maxCuratorRewardPool: string;
+    curatorRewardPoolOverflowBurnRatio: string;
+    curatorRewardEpochBlocks: bigint;
+    minCuratorAccuracy: string;
+    curatorAccuracyWindowEpochs: bigint;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors review_required_above_budget in Params.
+     */
+    reviewRequiredAboveBudget: string;
+    reviewBountyReclaimDelay: bigint;
+    permissionlessMinReviewBountyRate: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors the federation-verifier pay params in Params.
+     */
+    maxVerifierRewardPool: string;
+    verifierRewardPoolOverflowBurnRatio: string;
+    verifierRewardEpochBlocks: bigint;
+    minVerifierAccuracy: string;
+    verifierAccuracyWindowEpochs: bigint;
+    minEpochVerifications: number;
+    verifierDreamReward: string;
+    maxVerifierDreamMintPerEpoch: string;
 }
 export interface RepOperationalParamsProtoMsg {
     typeUrl: "/sparkdream.rep.v1.RepOperationalParams";
@@ -1101,6 +1762,93 @@ export interface RepOperationalParamsAmino {
     max_project_requested_budget?: string;
     max_project_requested_spark?: string;
     proposed_project_expiry_blocks?: string;
+    /**
+     * Reputation deducted from a juror who accepted a summons and abandoned it.
+     * Mirrors abandoned_jury_seat_penalty in Params.
+     */
+    abandoned_jury_seat_penalty?: string;
+    /**
+     * Fraction of the disputed initiative's budget paid out to its jury, split
+     * evenly across the seats. Juror pay was a flat StandardComplexityBudget
+     * regardless of what was in dispute, so a challenge over a 100 DREAM
+     * APPRENTICE initiative minted 750 DREAM in juror fees to settle it — more
+     * than the work was worth. Range [0, 1]. Default 0.25.
+     */
+    juror_reward_rate?: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors min_juror_reward in Params.
+     */
+    min_juror_reward?: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors min_juror_selection_weight in Params.
+     */
+    min_juror_selection_weight?: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors min_jury_seatings_for_weighting in Params.
+     */
+    min_jury_seatings_for_weighting?: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors initiative_completion_bonus_rate in Params.
+     */
+    initiative_completion_bonus_rate?: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors jury_acceptance_window_ratio in Params. Validated against
+     * max_jury_redraws below — the pair must fit inside the review period.
+     */
+    jury_acceptance_window_ratio?: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors max_jury_redraws in Params.
+     */
+    max_jury_redraws?: number;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors reviewer_bond_reserve_rate in Params.
+     */
+    reviewer_bond_reserve_rate?: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors review_fee_rate in Params.
+     */
+    review_fee_rate?: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors max_review_rounds in Params.
+     */
+    max_review_rounds?: number;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors the reviewer reward pool knobs in Params.
+     */
+    max_reviewer_reward_pool?: string;
+    reviewer_reward_pool_overflow_burn_ratio?: string;
+    reviewer_reward_epoch_blocks?: string;
+    min_reviewer_accuracy?: string;
+    reviewer_accuracy_window_epochs?: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors role_reward_inflation_share in Params.
+     */
+    role_reward_inflation_share?: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors the curator SPARK pool params in Params.
+     */
+    max_curator_reward_pool?: string;
+    curator_reward_pool_overflow_burn_ratio?: string;
+    curator_reward_epoch_blocks?: string;
+    min_curator_accuracy?: string;
+    curator_accuracy_window_epochs?: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors review_required_above_budget in Params.
+     */
+    review_required_above_budget?: string;
+    review_bounty_reclaim_delay?: string;
+    permissionless_min_review_bounty_rate?: string;
+    /**
+     * Mirrors the federation-verifier pay params in Params.
+     */
+    max_verifier_reward_pool?: string;
+    verifier_reward_pool_overflow_burn_ratio?: string;
+    verifier_reward_epoch_blocks?: string;
+    min_verifier_accuracy?: string;
+    verifier_accuracy_window_epochs?: string;
+    min_epoch_verifications?: number;
+    verifier_dream_reward?: string;
+    max_verifier_dream_mint_per_epoch?: string;
 }
 export interface RepOperationalParamsAminoMsg {
     type: "sparkdream/x/rep/RepOperationalParams";