@spaciv/sdk 0.1.14 → 0.1.15

package/README.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-## @spaciv/sdk@0.1.14
+## @spaciv/sdk@0.1.15
 
 This generator creates TypeScript/JavaScript client that utilizes [Fetch API](https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/). The generated Node module can be used in the following environments:
 
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ navigate to the folder of your consuming project and run one of the following co
 _published:_
 
 ```
-npm install @spaciv/sdk@0.1.14 --save
+npm install @spaciv/sdk@0.1.15 --save
 ```
 
 _unPublished (not recommended):_

package/dist/apis/AuthenticationApi.d.ts

@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ export interface AuthenticationApiInterface {
      */
     createAuthLogout(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthLogoutRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<void>;
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * @summary Refresh an access token
      * @param {AuthRefreshTokenReqBody} authRefreshTokenReqBody
      * @param {Cookie} [hostToken]
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ export interface AuthenticationApiInterface {
      */
     createAuthRefreshTokenRaw(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthRefreshTokenRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<runtime.ApiResponse<AuthRefreshTokenResBody>>;
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * Refresh an access token
      */
     createAuthRefreshToken(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthRefreshTokenRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<AuthRefreshTokenResBody>;
@@ -309,12 +309,12 @@ export declare class AuthenticationApi extends runtime.BaseAPI implements Authen
      */
     createAuthLogout(requestParameters?: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthLogoutRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<void>;
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * Refresh an access token
      */
     createAuthRefreshTokenRaw(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthRefreshTokenRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<runtime.ApiResponse<AuthRefreshTokenResBody>>;
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * Refresh an access token
      */
     createAuthRefreshToken(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthRefreshTokenRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<AuthRefreshTokenResBody>;

package/dist/apis/AuthenticationApi.js

@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ class AuthenticationApi extends runtime.BaseAPI {
         });
     }
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * Refresh an access token
      */
     createAuthRefreshTokenRaw(requestParameters, initOverrides) {
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ class AuthenticationApi extends runtime.BaseAPI {
         });
     }
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * Refresh an access token
      */
     createAuthRefreshToken(requestParameters, initOverrides) {

package/dist/esm/apis/AuthenticationApi.d.ts

@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ export interface AuthenticationApiInterface {
      */
     createAuthLogout(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthLogoutRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<void>;
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * @summary Refresh an access token
      * @param {AuthRefreshTokenReqBody} authRefreshTokenReqBody
      * @param {Cookie} [hostToken]
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ export interface AuthenticationApiInterface {
      */
     createAuthRefreshTokenRaw(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthRefreshTokenRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<runtime.ApiResponse<AuthRefreshTokenResBody>>;
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * Refresh an access token
      */
     createAuthRefreshToken(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthRefreshTokenRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<AuthRefreshTokenResBody>;
@@ -309,12 +309,12 @@ export declare class AuthenticationApi extends runtime.BaseAPI implements Authen
      */
     createAuthLogout(requestParameters?: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthLogoutRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<void>;
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * Refresh an access token
      */
     createAuthRefreshTokenRaw(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthRefreshTokenRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<runtime.ApiResponse<AuthRefreshTokenResBody>>;
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * Refresh an access token
      */
     createAuthRefreshToken(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthRefreshTokenRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<AuthRefreshTokenResBody>;

package/dist/esm/apis/AuthenticationApi.js

@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ export class AuthenticationApi extends runtime.BaseAPI {
         });
     }
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * Refresh an access token
      */
     createAuthRefreshTokenRaw(requestParameters, initOverrides) {
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ export class AuthenticationApi extends runtime.BaseAPI {
         });
     }
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * Refresh an access token
      */
     createAuthRefreshToken(requestParameters, initOverrides) {

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@spaciv/sdk",
-  "version": "0.1.14",
+  "version": "0.1.15",
   "description": "OpenAPI client for @spaciv/sdk",
   "author": "OpenAPI-Generator",
   "repository": {

package/src/apis/AuthenticationApi.ts

@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ export interface AuthenticationApiInterface {
     createAuthLogout(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthLogoutRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<void>;
 
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * @summary Refresh an access token
      * @param {AuthRefreshTokenReqBody} authRefreshTokenReqBody 
      * @param {Cookie} [hostToken] 
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ export interface AuthenticationApiInterface {
     createAuthRefreshTokenRaw(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthRefreshTokenRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<runtime.ApiResponse<AuthRefreshTokenResBody>>;
 
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * Refresh an access token
      */
     createAuthRefreshToken(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthRefreshTokenRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<AuthRefreshTokenResBody>;
@@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ export class AuthenticationApi extends runtime.BaseAPI implements Authentication
     }
 
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * Refresh an access token
      */
     async createAuthRefreshTokenRaw(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthRefreshTokenRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<runtime.ApiResponse<AuthRefreshTokenResBody>> {
@@ -620,7 +620,7 @@ export class AuthenticationApi extends runtime.BaseAPI implements Authentication
     }
 
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * Refresh an access token
      */
     async createAuthRefreshToken(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthRefreshTokenRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<AuthRefreshTokenResBody> {