@spaciv/sdk 0.1.13 → 0.1.15

package/.openapi-generator/FILES

@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ src/models/CalcTreeValue.ts
 src/models/CalcTypeSingleValue.ts
 src/models/ChangelogOption.ts
 src/models/ChangelogValueOption.ts
+src/models/ClientMessage.ts
 src/models/ConfidentialityData.ts
 src/models/Contribution.ts
 src/models/ContributionChangelogBody.ts
@@ -202,6 +203,8 @@ src/models/DatasetDataOneOf2.ts
 src/models/DatasetModify.ts
 src/models/DatasetRes.ts
 src/models/DaysOffData.ts
+src/models/EntityChangeActor.ts
+src/models/EntityChangedEvent.ts
 src/models/EntryPatch.ts
 src/models/EntryPatchPropertiesValue.ts
 src/models/ErrorDetail.ts
@@ -355,6 +358,7 @@ src/models/ScriptUsageResBody.ts
 src/models/ScriptWebhookResBody.ts
 src/models/SendPasswordPutReqBody.ts
 src/models/SerializedEvent.ts
+src/models/ServerMessage.ts
 src/models/SingleSelectChangelogData.ts
 src/models/SingleSelectContributionData.ts
 src/models/SingleSelectData.ts

package/README.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-## @spaciv/sdk@0.1.13
+## @spaciv/sdk@0.1.15
 
 This generator creates TypeScript/JavaScript client that utilizes [Fetch API](https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/). The generated Node module can be used in the following environments:
 
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ navigate to the folder of your consuming project and run one of the following co
 _published:_
 
 ```
-npm install @spaciv/sdk@0.1.13 --save
+npm install @spaciv/sdk@0.1.15 --save
 ```
 
 _unPublished (not recommended):_

package/dist/apis/AuthenticationApi.d.ts

@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ export interface AuthenticationApiInterface {
      */
     createAuthLogout(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthLogoutRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<void>;
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * @summary Refresh an access token
      * @param {AuthRefreshTokenReqBody} authRefreshTokenReqBody
      * @param {Cookie} [hostToken]
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ export interface AuthenticationApiInterface {
      */
     createAuthRefreshTokenRaw(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthRefreshTokenRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<runtime.ApiResponse<AuthRefreshTokenResBody>>;
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * Refresh an access token
      */
     createAuthRefreshToken(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthRefreshTokenRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<AuthRefreshTokenResBody>;
@@ -309,12 +309,12 @@ export declare class AuthenticationApi extends runtime.BaseAPI implements Authen
      */
     createAuthLogout(requestParameters?: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthLogoutRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<void>;
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * Refresh an access token
      */
     createAuthRefreshTokenRaw(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthRefreshTokenRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<runtime.ApiResponse<AuthRefreshTokenResBody>>;
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * Refresh an access token
      */
     createAuthRefreshToken(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthRefreshTokenRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<AuthRefreshTokenResBody>;

package/dist/apis/AuthenticationApi.js

@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ class AuthenticationApi extends runtime.BaseAPI {
         });
     }
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * Refresh an access token
      */
     createAuthRefreshTokenRaw(requestParameters, initOverrides) {
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ class AuthenticationApi extends runtime.BaseAPI {
         });
     }
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * Refresh an access token
      */
     createAuthRefreshToken(requestParameters, initOverrides) {

package/dist/esm/apis/AuthenticationApi.d.ts

@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ export interface AuthenticationApiInterface {
      */
     createAuthLogout(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthLogoutRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<void>;
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * @summary Refresh an access token
      * @param {AuthRefreshTokenReqBody} authRefreshTokenReqBody
      * @param {Cookie} [hostToken]
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ export interface AuthenticationApiInterface {
      */
     createAuthRefreshTokenRaw(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthRefreshTokenRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<runtime.ApiResponse<AuthRefreshTokenResBody>>;
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * Refresh an access token
      */
     createAuthRefreshToken(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthRefreshTokenRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<AuthRefreshTokenResBody>;
@@ -309,12 +309,12 @@ export declare class AuthenticationApi extends runtime.BaseAPI implements Authen
      */
     createAuthLogout(requestParameters?: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthLogoutRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<void>;
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * Refresh an access token
      */
     createAuthRefreshTokenRaw(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthRefreshTokenRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<runtime.ApiResponse<AuthRefreshTokenResBody>>;
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * Refresh an access token
      */
     createAuthRefreshToken(requestParameters: AuthenticationApiCreateAuthRefreshTokenRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | runtime.InitOverrideFunction): Promise<AuthRefreshTokenResBody>;

package/dist/esm/apis/AuthenticationApi.js

@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ export class AuthenticationApi extends runtime.BaseAPI {
         });
     }
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * Refresh an access token
      */
     createAuthRefreshTokenRaw(requestParameters, initOverrides) {
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ export class AuthenticationApi extends runtime.BaseAPI {
         });
     }
     /**
-     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use. The session stays usable for other accounts, so keep it and cancel only the account-scoped action.
+     * Exchanges the refresh token cookie (`__Host-token`, or `token` when `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` is false) for a fresh short-lived access token. Optionally scope the token to a specific account or project by providing `account` and/or `project` in the request body. For OIDC accounts, the provider\'s token is silently re-validated on each refresh.  A successful refresh rotates the cookie, keeping the session\'s original expiry. The session\'s refresh token advances at most once a minute: within that minute, presenting the current token sets no cookie, and presenting the token it just replaced sets a cookie for the current one. A superseded refresh token is still accepted for a short grace period, so parallel refreshes and retries succeed; presenting it after that revokes the whole session.  Returns `401` when no access token could be minted: an invalid refresh token, a missing or signed-out session, a reused refresh token, a deleted user, or, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, unusable session data or an OIDC provider that rejects the session\'s token. Returning the user to sign-in is the usual response.  Returns `503` when, for a refresh scoped to an `account`, the OIDC provider could not be reached or reported a transient failure. The session is still valid, so retry the refresh later rather than signing the user out.  Returns `403` when the session is valid but is not authorised for the requested `account`, which typically means the account mandates a sign-in method the session did not use, or when a refresh without an `account` comes from a session that signed in through an account\'s own OIDC provider: such a session only gets tokens for an account. The session stays usable for the accounts it is authorised for, so keep it and cancel only the action that needed the token.
      * Refresh an access token
      */
     createAuthRefreshToken(requestParameters, initOverrides) {

package/dist/esm/models/ClientMessage.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/**
+ * spaciv API
+ * The spaciv API powers workplace planning: modelling how many people an organisation has, how they work, and how much space that requires.  ## Getting started  1. Exchange credentials for an access token using one of the operations under    **Authentication**. 2. Send that token on every subsequent request as `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. 3. Access tokens are short lived. Call `POST /v1/auth/refresh-token` to obtain a new one    before the old one expires.  ## Conventions  Every operation is versioned under `/v1`. Collections are plural (`GET /v1/dashboards` lists, `POST /v1/dashboards` creates) and individual records live beneath them (`/v1/dashboards/{id}`). Singular paths such as `/v1/account`, `/v1/project` and `/v1/user` refer to the record the access token was issued for.  Request and response bodies are JSON. Timestamps are RFC 3339. Identifiers are opaque strings unless documented otherwise, and collection operations return the records visible to the account the token was issued for.  Failures return an [RFC 9457](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9457) problem document with a `detail` field describing what went wrong.
+ *
+ * The version of the OpenAPI document: 1.0.0
+ * Contact: support@spaciv.com
+ *
+ * NOTE: This class is auto generated by OpenAPI Generator (https://openapi-generator.tech).
+ * https://openapi-generator.tech
+ * Do not edit the class manually.
+ */
+/**
+ *
+ * @export
+ * @interface ClientMessage
+ */
+export interface ClientMessage {
+    [key: string]: any | any;
+    /**
+     *
+     * @type {string}
+     * @memberof ClientMessage
+     */
+    token?: string;
+    /**
+     * Between 1 and 100 topics for subscribe and unsubscribe. A message must fit within 128 KiB as sent, so topics whose JSON encoding is long go in several messages.
+     * @type {Array<string>}
+     * @memberof ClientMessage
+     */
+    topics?: Array<string>;
+    /**
+     *
+     * @type {string}
+     * @memberof ClientMessage
+     */
+    type: ClientMessageTypeEnum;
+    /**
+     *
+     * @type {number}
+     * @memberof ClientMessage
+     */
+    v: ClientMessageVEnum;
+}
+/**
+ * @export
+ */
+export declare const ClientMessageTypeEnum: {
+    readonly Auth: "auth";
+    readonly Subscribe: "subscribe";
+    readonly Unsubscribe: "unsubscribe";
+};
+export type ClientMessageTypeEnum = typeof ClientMessageTypeEnum[keyof typeof ClientMessageTypeEnum];
+/**
+ * @export
+ */
+export declare const ClientMessageVEnum: {
+    readonly NUMBER_1: 1;
+};
+export type ClientMessageVEnum = typeof ClientMessageVEnum[keyof typeof ClientMessageVEnum];
+/**
+ * Check if a given object implements the ClientMessage interface.
+ */
+export declare function instanceOfClientMessage(value: object): value is ClientMessage;
+export declare function ClientMessageFromJSON(json: any): ClientMessage;
+export declare function ClientMessageFromJSONTyped(json: any, ignoreDiscriminator: boolean): ClientMessage;
+export declare function ClientMessageToJSON(json: any): ClientMessage;
+export declare function ClientMessageToJSONTyped(value?: ClientMessage | null, ignoreDiscriminator?: boolean): any;

package/dist/esm/models/ClientMessage.js

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/* tslint:disable */
+/* eslint-disable */
+/**
+ * spaciv API
+ * The spaciv API powers workplace planning: modelling how many people an organisation has, how they work, and how much space that requires.  ## Getting started  1. Exchange credentials for an access token using one of the operations under    **Authentication**. 2. Send that token on every subsequent request as `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. 3. Access tokens are short lived. Call `POST /v1/auth/refresh-token` to obtain a new one    before the old one expires.  ## Conventions  Every operation is versioned under `/v1`. Collections are plural (`GET /v1/dashboards` lists, `POST /v1/dashboards` creates) and individual records live beneath them (`/v1/dashboards/{id}`). Singular paths such as `/v1/account`, `/v1/project` and `/v1/user` refer to the record the access token was issued for.  Request and response bodies are JSON. Timestamps are RFC 3339. Identifiers are opaque strings unless documented otherwise, and collection operations return the records visible to the account the token was issued for.  Failures return an [RFC 9457](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9457) problem document with a `detail` field describing what went wrong.
+ *
+ * The version of the OpenAPI document: 1.0.0
+ * Contact: support@spaciv.com
+ *
+ * NOTE: This class is auto generated by OpenAPI Generator (https://openapi-generator.tech).
+ * https://openapi-generator.tech
+ * Do not edit the class manually.
+ */
+/**
+ * @export
+ */
+export const ClientMessageTypeEnum = {
+    Auth: 'auth',
+    Subscribe: 'subscribe',
+    Unsubscribe: 'unsubscribe'
+};
+/**
+ * @export
+ */
+export const ClientMessageVEnum = {
+    NUMBER_1: 1
+};
+/**
+ * Check if a given object implements the ClientMessage interface.
+ */
+export function instanceOfClientMessage(value) {
+    if (!('type' in value) || value['type'] === undefined)
+        return false;
+    if (!('v' in value) || value['v'] === undefined)
+        return false;
+    return true;
+}
+export function ClientMessageFromJSON(json) {
+    return ClientMessageFromJSONTyped(json, false);
+}
+export function ClientMessageFromJSONTyped(json, ignoreDiscriminator) {
+    if (json == null) {
+        return json;
+    }
+    return Object.assign(Object.assign({}, json), { 'token': json['token'] == null ? undefined : json['token'], 'topics': json['topics'] == null ? undefined : json['topics'], 'type': json['type'], 'v': json['v'] });
+}
+export function ClientMessageToJSON(json) {
+    return ClientMessageToJSONTyped(json, false);
+}
+export function ClientMessageToJSONTyped(value, ignoreDiscriminator = false) {
+    if (value == null) {
+        return value;
+    }
+    return Object.assign(Object.assign({}, value), { 'token': value['token'], 'topics': value['topics'], 'type': value['type'], 'v': value['v'] });
+}

package/dist/esm/models/EntityChangeActor.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/**
+ * spaciv API
+ * The spaciv API powers workplace planning: modelling how many people an organisation has, how they work, and how much space that requires.  ## Getting started  1. Exchange credentials for an access token using one of the operations under    **Authentication**. 2. Send that token on every subsequent request as `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. 3. Access tokens are short lived. Call `POST /v1/auth/refresh-token` to obtain a new one    before the old one expires.  ## Conventions  Every operation is versioned under `/v1`. Collections are plural (`GET /v1/dashboards` lists, `POST /v1/dashboards` creates) and individual records live beneath them (`/v1/dashboards/{id}`). Singular paths such as `/v1/account`, `/v1/project` and `/v1/user` refer to the record the access token was issued for.  Request and response bodies are JSON. Timestamps are RFC 3339. Identifiers are opaque strings unless documented otherwise, and collection operations return the records visible to the account the token was issued for.  Failures return an [RFC 9457](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9457) problem document with a `detail` field describing what went wrong.
+ *
+ * The version of the OpenAPI document: 1.0.0
+ * Contact: support@spaciv.com
+ *
+ * NOTE: This class is auto generated by OpenAPI Generator (https://openapi-generator.tech).
+ * https://openapi-generator.tech
+ * Do not edit the class manually.
+ */
+/**
+ *
+ * @export
+ * @interface EntityChangeActor
+ */
+export interface EntityChangeActor {
+    [key: string]: any | any;
+    /**
+     *
+     * @type {string}
+     * @memberof EntityChangeActor
+     */
+    clientId?: string;
+    /**
+     *
+     * @type {string}
+     * @memberof EntityChangeActor
+     */
+    session: string;
+    /**
+     *
+     * @type {string}
+     * @memberof EntityChangeActor
+     */
+    type: EntityChangeActorTypeEnum;
+    /**
+     *
+     * @type {number}
+     * @memberof EntityChangeActor
+     */
+    user: number;
+}
+/**
+ * @export
+ */
+export declare const EntityChangeActorTypeEnum: {
+    readonly User: "user";
+    readonly System: "system";
+    readonly Anonymous: "anonymous";
+    readonly Unknown: "unknown";
+};
+export type EntityChangeActorTypeEnum = typeof EntityChangeActorTypeEnum[keyof typeof EntityChangeActorTypeEnum];
+/**
+ * Check if a given object implements the EntityChangeActor interface.
+ */
+export declare function instanceOfEntityChangeActor(value: object): value is EntityChangeActor;
+export declare function EntityChangeActorFromJSON(json: any): EntityChangeActor;
+export declare function EntityChangeActorFromJSONTyped(json: any, ignoreDiscriminator: boolean): EntityChangeActor;
+export declare function EntityChangeActorToJSON(json: any): EntityChangeActor;
+export declare function EntityChangeActorToJSONTyped(value?: EntityChangeActor | null, ignoreDiscriminator?: boolean): any;

package/dist/esm/models/EntityChangeActor.js

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/* tslint:disable */
+/* eslint-disable */
+/**
+ * spaciv API
+ * The spaciv API powers workplace planning: modelling how many people an organisation has, how they work, and how much space that requires.  ## Getting started  1. Exchange credentials for an access token using one of the operations under    **Authentication**. 2. Send that token on every subsequent request as `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. 3. Access tokens are short lived. Call `POST /v1/auth/refresh-token` to obtain a new one    before the old one expires.  ## Conventions  Every operation is versioned under `/v1`. Collections are plural (`GET /v1/dashboards` lists, `POST /v1/dashboards` creates) and individual records live beneath them (`/v1/dashboards/{id}`). Singular paths such as `/v1/account`, `/v1/project` and `/v1/user` refer to the record the access token was issued for.  Request and response bodies are JSON. Timestamps are RFC 3339. Identifiers are opaque strings unless documented otherwise, and collection operations return the records visible to the account the token was issued for.  Failures return an [RFC 9457](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9457) problem document with a `detail` field describing what went wrong.
+ *
+ * The version of the OpenAPI document: 1.0.0
+ * Contact: support@spaciv.com
+ *
+ * NOTE: This class is auto generated by OpenAPI Generator (https://openapi-generator.tech).
+ * https://openapi-generator.tech
+ * Do not edit the class manually.
+ */
+/**
+ * @export
+ */
+export const EntityChangeActorTypeEnum = {
+    User: 'user',
+    System: 'system',
+    Anonymous: 'anonymous',
+    Unknown: 'unknown'
+};
+/**
+ * Check if a given object implements the EntityChangeActor interface.
+ */
+export function instanceOfEntityChangeActor(value) {
+    if (!('session' in value) || value['session'] === undefined)
+        return false;
+    if (!('type' in value) || value['type'] === undefined)
+        return false;
+    if (!('user' in value) || value['user'] === undefined)
+        return false;
+    return true;
+}
+export function EntityChangeActorFromJSON(json) {
+    return EntityChangeActorFromJSONTyped(json, false);
+}
+export function EntityChangeActorFromJSONTyped(json, ignoreDiscriminator) {
+    if (json == null) {
+        return json;
+    }
+    return Object.assign(Object.assign({}, json), { 'clientId': json['clientId'] == null ? undefined : json['clientId'], 'session': json['session'], 'type': json['type'], 'user': json['user'] });
+}
+export function EntityChangeActorToJSON(json) {
+    return EntityChangeActorToJSONTyped(json, false);
+}
+export function EntityChangeActorToJSONTyped(value, ignoreDiscriminator = false) {
+    if (value == null) {
+        return value;
+    }
+    return Object.assign(Object.assign({}, value), { 'clientId': value['clientId'], 'session': value['session'], 'type': value['type'], 'user': value['user'] });
+}

package/dist/esm/models/EntityChangedEvent.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/**
+ * spaciv API
+ * The spaciv API powers workplace planning: modelling how many people an organisation has, how they work, and how much space that requires.  ## Getting started  1. Exchange credentials for an access token using one of the operations under    **Authentication**. 2. Send that token on every subsequent request as `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. 3. Access tokens are short lived. Call `POST /v1/auth/refresh-token` to obtain a new one    before the old one expires.  ## Conventions  Every operation is versioned under `/v1`. Collections are plural (`GET /v1/dashboards` lists, `POST /v1/dashboards` creates) and individual records live beneath them (`/v1/dashboards/{id}`). Singular paths such as `/v1/account`, `/v1/project` and `/v1/user` refer to the record the access token was issued for.  Request and response bodies are JSON. Timestamps are RFC 3339. Identifiers are opaque strings unless documented otherwise, and collection operations return the records visible to the account the token was issued for.  Failures return an [RFC 9457](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9457) problem document with a `detail` field describing what went wrong.
+ *
+ * The version of the OpenAPI document: 1.0.0
+ * Contact: support@spaciv.com
+ *
+ * NOTE: This class is auto generated by OpenAPI Generator (https://openapi-generator.tech).
+ * https://openapi-generator.tech
+ * Do not edit the class manually.
+ */
+import type { EntityChangeActor } from './EntityChangeActor';
+/**
+ *
+ * @export
+ * @interface EntityChangedEvent
+ */
+export interface EntityChangedEvent {
+    [key: string]: any | any;
+    /**
+     *
+     * @type {number}
+     * @memberof EntityChangedEvent
+     */
+    account: number;
+    /**
+     *
+     * @type {EntityChangeActor}
+     * @memberof EntityChangedEvent
+     */
+    actor: EntityChangeActor;
+    /**
+     *
+     * @type {string}
+     * @memberof EntityChangedEvent
+     */
+    at: string;
+    /**
+     *
+     * @type {string}
+     * @memberof EntityChangedEvent
+     */
+    id: string;
+    /**
+     *
+     * @type {string}
+     * @memberof EntityChangedEvent
+     */
+    op: EntityChangedEventOpEnum;
+    /**
+     *
+     * @type {number}
+     * @memberof EntityChangedEvent
+     */
+    project?: number;
+    /**
+     *
+     * @type {string}
+     * @memberof EntityChangedEvent
+     */
+    type: string;
+    /**
+     *
+     * @type {string}
+     * @memberof EntityChangedEvent
+     */
+    version?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * @export
+ */
+export declare const EntityChangedEventOpEnum: {
+    readonly Upsert: "upsert";
+    readonly Delete: "delete";
+};
+export type EntityChangedEventOpEnum = typeof EntityChangedEventOpEnum[keyof typeof EntityChangedEventOpEnum];
+/**
+ * Check if a given object implements the EntityChangedEvent interface.
+ */
+export declare function instanceOfEntityChangedEvent(value: object): value is EntityChangedEvent;
+export declare function EntityChangedEventFromJSON(json: any): EntityChangedEvent;
+export declare function EntityChangedEventFromJSONTyped(json: any, ignoreDiscriminator: boolean): EntityChangedEvent;
+export declare function EntityChangedEventToJSON(json: any): EntityChangedEvent;
+export declare function EntityChangedEventToJSONTyped(value?: EntityChangedEvent | null, ignoreDiscriminator?: boolean): any;

package/dist/esm/models/EntityChangedEvent.js

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/* tslint:disable */
+/* eslint-disable */
+/**
+ * spaciv API
+ * The spaciv API powers workplace planning: modelling how many people an organisation has, how they work, and how much space that requires.  ## Getting started  1. Exchange credentials for an access token using one of the operations under    **Authentication**. 2. Send that token on every subsequent request as `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. 3. Access tokens are short lived. Call `POST /v1/auth/refresh-token` to obtain a new one    before the old one expires.  ## Conventions  Every operation is versioned under `/v1`. Collections are plural (`GET /v1/dashboards` lists, `POST /v1/dashboards` creates) and individual records live beneath them (`/v1/dashboards/{id}`). Singular paths such as `/v1/account`, `/v1/project` and `/v1/user` refer to the record the access token was issued for.  Request and response bodies are JSON. Timestamps are RFC 3339. Identifiers are opaque strings unless documented otherwise, and collection operations return the records visible to the account the token was issued for.  Failures return an [RFC 9457](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9457) problem document with a `detail` field describing what went wrong.
+ *
+ * The version of the OpenAPI document: 1.0.0
+ * Contact: support@spaciv.com
+ *
+ * NOTE: This class is auto generated by OpenAPI Generator (https://openapi-generator.tech).
+ * https://openapi-generator.tech
+ * Do not edit the class manually.
+ */
+import { EntityChangeActorFromJSON, EntityChangeActorToJSON, } from './EntityChangeActor';
+/**
+ * @export
+ */
+export const EntityChangedEventOpEnum = {
+    Upsert: 'upsert',
+    Delete: 'delete'
+};
+/**
+ * Check if a given object implements the EntityChangedEvent interface.
+ */
+export function instanceOfEntityChangedEvent(value) {
+    if (!('account' in value) || value['account'] === undefined)
+        return false;
+    if (!('actor' in value) || value['actor'] === undefined)
+        return false;
+    if (!('at' in value) || value['at'] === undefined)
+        return false;
+    if (!('id' in value) || value['id'] === undefined)
+        return false;
+    if (!('op' in value) || value['op'] === undefined)
+        return false;
+    if (!('type' in value) || value['type'] === undefined)
+        return false;
+    return true;
+}
+export function EntityChangedEventFromJSON(json) {
+    return EntityChangedEventFromJSONTyped(json, false);
+}
+export function EntityChangedEventFromJSONTyped(json, ignoreDiscriminator) {
+    if (json == null) {
+        return json;
+    }
+    return Object.assign(Object.assign({}, json), { 'account': json['account'], 'actor': EntityChangeActorFromJSON(json['actor']), 'at': json['at'], 'id': json['id'], 'op': json['op'], 'project': json['project'] == null ? undefined : json['project'], 'type': json['type'], 'version': json['version'] == null ? undefined : json['version'] });
+}
+export function EntityChangedEventToJSON(json) {
+    return EntityChangedEventToJSONTyped(json, false);
+}
+export function EntityChangedEventToJSONTyped(value, ignoreDiscriminator = false) {
+    if (value == null) {
+        return value;
+    }
+    return Object.assign(Object.assign({}, value), { 'account': value['account'], 'actor': EntityChangeActorToJSON(value['actor']), 'at': value['at'], 'id': value['id'], 'op': value['op'], 'project': value['project'], 'type': value['type'], 'version': value['version'] });
+}