@solongate/proxy 0.83.19 → 0.83.20

package/hooks/guard.bundled.mjs

@@ -6578,7 +6578,7 @@ function sweepLegacyFlagDir() {
   } catch {
   }
 }
-var HOOK_VERSION = 79;
+var HOOK_VERSION = 80;
 function localLogsOnly(security) {
   if (security !== void 0) {
     const l = security && security.localLogs;
@@ -6606,6 +6606,17 @@ function accountMark() {
     return "";
   }
 }
+function postAuditDetached(entry) {
+  try {
+    const payload = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({
+      url: API_URL + "/api/v1/audit-logs",
+      headers: AUTH_HEADERS,
+      body: entry
+    }), "utf-8").toString("base64");
+    spawn(process.execPath, [process.argv[1], "--sg-audit-post", payload], { detached: true, stdio: "ignore" }).unref();
+  } catch {
+  }
+}
 function writeLocalLog(security, entry) {
   try {
     const mark = accountMark();
@@ -6818,6 +6829,28 @@ var AGENT_TYPE = process.argv[2] || "claude-code";
 var POLICY_SELECTOR = process.env.SOLONGATE_AGENT_ID || "";
 var AGENT_ID = POLICY_SELECTOR || AGENT_TYPE;
 var AGENT_NAME = process.env.SOLONGATE_AGENT_NAME || process.argv[3] || AGENT_TYPE;
+{
+  const _ai = process.argv.indexOf("--sg-audit-post");
+  if (_ai !== -1) {
+    try {
+      const _raw = Buffer.from(process.argv[_ai + 1] || "", "base64").toString("utf-8");
+      const _p = JSON.parse(_raw);
+      if (_p && _p.url && _p.body) {
+        fetch(_p.url, {
+          method: "POST",
+          headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", ..._p.headers || {} },
+          body: JSON.stringify(_p.body),
+          signal: AbortSignal.timeout(1e4)
+        }).catch(() => {
+        }).finally(() => process.exit(0));
+        setTimeout(() => process.exit(0), 11e3).unref();
+      } else
+        process.exit(0);
+    } catch {
+      process.exit(0);
+    }
+  }
+}
 {
   const _wi = process.argv.indexOf("--sg-log-write");
   if (_wi !== -1) {
@@ -8511,12 +8544,7 @@ if (!REFRESH_MODE) {
           }
           try {
             if (!localLogsOnly(_sec))
-              await fetch(API_URL + "/api/v1/audit-logs", {
-                method: "POST",
-                headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", ...AUTH_HEADERS },
-                body: JSON.stringify(_logEntry),
-                signal: AbortSignal.timeout(3e3)
-              });
+              postAuditDetached(_logEntry);
           } catch {
           }
           if (AGENT_TYPE !== "codex")
@@ -8629,22 +8657,17 @@ if (!REFRESH_MODE) {
           writeLocalLog(securityCfg, { ts: (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString(), tool: toolName, arguments: args, decision: "DENY", reason: "ghost path (hidden from agent)", permission: guessPermission(toolName), source: `${AGENT_TYPE}-guard`, agent_id: AGENT_TYPE, agent_name: AGENT_NAME, session_id: call.sessionId, evaluation_time_ms: Date.now() - _evalStart });
           try {
             if (!localLogsOnly(securityCfg))
-              await fetch(API_URL + "/api/v1/audit-logs", {
-                method: "POST",
-                headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", ...AUTH_HEADERS },
-                body: JSON.stringify({
-                  tool: toolName,
-                  arguments: args,
-                  decision: "DENY",
-                  reason: "ghost path (hidden from agent)",
-                  permission: guessPermission(toolName),
-                  source: `${AGENT_TYPE}-guard`,
-                  agent_id: AGENT_TYPE,
-                  agent_name: AGENT_NAME,
-                  session_id: call.sessionId,
-                  evaluation_time_ms: Date.now() - _evalStart
-                }),
-                signal: AbortSignal.timeout(3e3)
+              postAuditDetached({
+                tool: toolName,
+                arguments: args,
+                decision: "DENY",
+                reason: "ghost path (hidden from agent)",
+                permission: guessPermission(toolName),
+                source: `${AGENT_TYPE}-guard`,
+                agent_id: AGENT_TYPE,
+                agent_name: AGENT_NAME,
+                session_id: call.sessionId,
+                evaluation_time_ms: Date.now() - _evalStart
               });
           } catch {
           }
@@ -8728,12 +8751,7 @@ if (!REFRESH_MODE) {
             };
             writeLocalLog(securityCfg, { ts: (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString(), ...logEntry });
             if (!localLogsOnly(securityCfg))
-              await fetch(API_URL + "/api/v1/audit-logs", {
-                method: "POST",
-                headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", ...AUTH_HEADERS },
-                body: JSON.stringify(logEntry),
-                signal: AbortSignal.timeout(3e3)
-              });
+              postAuditDetached(logEntry);
           } catch {
           }
         }

package/hooks/guard.mjs

@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
 // the installed hook self-updates when the cloud version is higher (see
 // maybeSelfUpdate). This is what makes guard fixes propagate without a manual
 // reinstall — the same trust model as the OPA WASM this hook already runs.
-const HOOK_VERSION = 79;
+const HOOK_VERSION = 80;
 
 // True when local log storage is ON. In that mode logs are kept LOCAL ONLY and
 // nothing is sent to the cloud audit log — local and cloud are one or the
@@ -170,6 +170,25 @@ function accountMark() {
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Record a denial in the cloud WITHOUT making the agent wait for it.
+ *
+ * The verdict is the product; the audit line is bookkeeping. Awaiting the POST
+ * put a full network round trip between "blocked" and the agent hearing it —
+ * measured at 1643ms per denial, against 78ms with the API unreachable. Handing
+ * it to a detached child keeps the record and gives the time back.
+ */
+function postAuditDetached(entry) {
+  try {
+    const payload = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({
+      url: API_URL + '/api/v1/audit-logs',
+      headers: AUTH_HEADERS,
+      body: entry,
+    }), 'utf-8').toString('base64');
+    spawn(process.execPath, [process.argv[1], '--sg-audit-post', payload], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' }).unref();
+  } catch { /* the denial still stands; only the record is at risk */ }
+}
+
 function writeLocalLog(security, entry) {
   try {
     const mark = accountMark();
@@ -460,6 +479,31 @@ const AGENT_NAME = process.env.SOLONGATE_AGENT_NAME || process.argv[3] || AGENT_
 // lands even if Claude Code kills the parent hook mid-write during a concurrent
 // denial burst. Handled FIRST and exits immediately — the child never loads the
 // heavy guard logic below.
+// Survivable CLOUD writer, same idea. A denial used to `await` its audit POST
+// before telling the agent it was blocked, so the agent sat waiting on a network
+// round trip to be told "no": measured at 1643ms per denial against 78ms with
+// the API unreachable. The record still has to land, so it is handed to a
+// detached child rather than dropped — the verdict goes out at once and the POST
+// finishes on its own.
+{
+  const _ai = process.argv.indexOf('--sg-audit-post');
+  if (_ai !== -1) {
+    try {
+      const _raw = Buffer.from(process.argv[_ai + 1] || '', 'base64').toString('utf-8');
+      const _p = JSON.parse(_raw);
+      if (_p && _p.url && _p.body) {
+        fetch(_p.url, {
+          method: 'POST',
+          headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...(_p.headers || {}) },
+          body: JSON.stringify(_p.body),
+          signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10000),
+        }).catch(() => {}).finally(() => process.exit(0));
+        setTimeout(() => process.exit(0), 11000).unref();
+      } else process.exit(0);
+    } catch { process.exit(0); }
+  }
+}
+
 {
   const _wi = process.argv.indexOf('--sg-log-write');
   if (_wi !== -1) {
@@ -2523,12 +2567,7 @@ if (!REFRESH_MODE) { try { input += readFileSync(0, 'utf-8'); } catch {} }
         };
         try { writeLocalLog(_sec, { ts: new Date().toISOString(), ..._logEntry }); } catch {}
         try {
-          if (!localLogsOnly(_sec)) await fetch(API_URL + '/api/v1/audit-logs', {
-            method: 'POST',
-            headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...AUTH_HEADERS },
-            body: JSON.stringify(_logEntry),
-            signal: AbortSignal.timeout(3000),
-          });
+          if (!localLogsOnly(_sec)) postAuditDetached(_logEntry);
         } catch {}
         // Not on Codex: its block reason IS the hook's stderr (see the ROUTE
         // write at the end of the slow path for the full rationale).
@@ -2676,18 +2715,13 @@ if (!REFRESH_MODE) { try { input += readFileSync(0, 'utf-8'); } catch {} }
         try { writeDenyFlag(toolName); } catch {}
         writeLocalLog(securityCfg, { ts: new Date().toISOString(), tool: toolName, arguments: args, decision: 'DENY', reason: 'ghost path (hidden from agent)', permission: guessPermission(toolName), source: `${AGENT_TYPE}-guard`, agent_id: AGENT_TYPE, agent_name: AGENT_NAME, session_id: call.sessionId, evaluation_time_ms: Date.now() - _evalStart });
         try {
-          if (!localLogsOnly(securityCfg)) await fetch(API_URL + '/api/v1/audit-logs', {
-            method: 'POST',
-            headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...AUTH_HEADERS },
-            body: JSON.stringify({
-              tool: toolName, arguments: args, decision: 'DENY',
-              reason: 'ghost path (hidden from agent)',
-              permission: guessPermission(toolName),
-              source: `${AGENT_TYPE}-guard`, agent_id: AGENT_TYPE, agent_name: AGENT_NAME,
-              session_id: call.sessionId,
-              evaluation_time_ms: Date.now() - _evalStart,
-            }),
-            signal: AbortSignal.timeout(3000),
+          if (!localLogsOnly(securityCfg)) postAuditDetached({
+            tool: toolName, arguments: args, decision: 'DENY',
+            reason: 'ghost path (hidden from agent)',
+            permission: guessPermission(toolName),
+            source: `${AGENT_TYPE}-guard`, agent_id: AGENT_TYPE, agent_name: AGENT_NAME,
+            session_id: call.sessionId,
+            evaluation_time_ms: Date.now() - _evalStart,
           });
         } catch {}
         // NOT maybeSelfUpdate() first: see the deny at the end of this flow.
@@ -2819,12 +2853,7 @@ if (!REFRESH_MODE) { try { input += readFileSync(0, 'utf-8'); } catch {} }
           writeLocalLog(securityCfg, { ts: new Date().toISOString(), ...logEntry });
           // PI hook layer removed — piResult fields no longer attached.
           // Local-only mode: keep the log on the user's machine, skip the cloud.
-          if (!localLogsOnly(securityCfg)) await fetch(API_URL + '/api/v1/audit-logs', {
-            method: 'POST',
-            headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...AUTH_HEADERS },
-            body: JSON.stringify(logEntry),
-            signal: AbortSignal.timeout(3000),
-          });
+          if (!localLogsOnly(securityCfg)) postAuditDetached(logEntry);
         } catch {}
       }
       writeDenyFlag(toolName);

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@solongate/proxy",
-  "version": "0.83.19",
+  "version": "0.83.20",
   "description": "AI tool security proxy: protect any AI tool server with customizable policies, path/command constraints, rate limiting, and audit logging. No code changes required.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {