@solongate/proxy 0.82.17 → 0.82.18

package/hooks/guard.bundled.mjs

@@ -6536,7 +6536,7 @@ import { resolve, join, dirname, isAbsolute } from "node:path";
 import { homedir } from "node:os";
 import { gunzipSync } from "node:zlib";
 import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
-var HOOK_VERSION = 45;
+var HOOK_VERSION = 46;
 function localLogsOnly(security) {
   if (security && typeof security === "object") {
     const l = security.localLogs;
@@ -6789,6 +6789,7 @@ if (REFRESH_MODE) {
 }
 var SG_DONE = Symbol("sg-done");
 var _sgDone = false;
+var _decisionEmitted = false;
 function sgFinish(code) {
   if (!_sgDone) {
     _sgDone = true;
@@ -6798,34 +6799,46 @@ function sgFinish(code) {
 }
 function blockTool(reason) {
   if (AGENT_TYPE === "antigravity") {
-    process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({
-      allow_tool: false,
-      deny_reason: `[SolonGate] ${reason}`
-    }));
+    if (!_decisionEmitted) {
+      _decisionEmitted = true;
+      process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({
+        allow_tool: false,
+        deny_reason: `[SolonGate] ${reason}`
+      }));
+    }
     sgFinish(0);
   } else {
     const msg = reason || "[SolonGate] Blocked by policy";
-    process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({
-      hookSpecificOutput: {
-        hookEventName: "PreToolUse",
-        permissionDecision: "deny",
-        permissionDecisionReason: msg
-      }
-    }));
-    process.stderr.write(msg + "\n");
+    if (!_decisionEmitted) {
+      _decisionEmitted = true;
+      process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({
+        hookSpecificOutput: {
+          hookEventName: "PreToolUse",
+          permissionDecision: "deny",
+          permissionDecisionReason: msg
+        }
+      }));
+      process.stderr.write(msg + "\n");
+    }
     sgFinish(2);
   }
 }
 function allowTool() {
   if (AGENT_TYPE === "antigravity") {
-    process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ allow_tool: true }));
+    if (!_decisionEmitted) {
+      _decisionEmitted = true;
+      process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ allow_tool: true }));
+    }
   }
   sgFinish(0);
 }
 function rewriteTool(updatedInput) {
-  process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({
-    hookSpecificOutput: { hookEventName: "PreToolUse", permissionDecision: "allow", updatedInput }
-  }));
+  if (!_decisionEmitted) {
+    _decisionEmitted = true;
+    process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({
+      hookSpecificOutput: { hookEventName: "PreToolUse", permissionDecision: "allow", updatedInput }
+    }));
+  }
   sgFinish(0);
 }
 function writeDenyFlag(toolName) {
@@ -7966,11 +7979,17 @@ if (!REFRESH_MODE) {
           }
           await maybeSelfUpdate();
           if (AGENT_TYPE === "antigravity") {
-            process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ allow_tool: false, deny_reason: ghostHit }));
+            if (!_decisionEmitted) {
+              _decisionEmitted = true;
+              process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ allow_tool: false, deny_reason: ghostHit }));
+            }
             sgFinish(0);
           }
-          process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ hookSpecificOutput: { hookEventName: "PreToolUse", permissionDecision: "deny", permissionDecisionReason: ghostHit } }));
-          process.stderr.write(ghostHit + "\n");
+          if (!_decisionEmitted) {
+            _decisionEmitted = true;
+            process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ hookSpecificOutput: { hookEventName: "PreToolUse", permissionDecision: "deny", permissionDecisionReason: ghostHit } }));
+            process.stderr.write(ghostHit + "\n");
+          }
           sgFinish(2);
         }
         if (AGENT_TYPE !== "antigravity" && toolName === "Bash") {

package/hooks/guard.mjs

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
 // the installed hook self-updates when the cloud version is higher (see
 // maybeSelfUpdate). This is what makes guard fixes propagate without a manual
 // reinstall — the same trust model as the OPA WASM this hook already runs.
-const HOOK_VERSION = 45;
+const HOOK_VERSION = 46;
 
 // True when local log storage is ON. In that mode logs are kept LOCAL ONLY and
 // nothing is sent to the cloud audit log.
@@ -365,6 +365,14 @@ if (REFRESH_MODE) { try { setTimeout(() => { try { process.exit(process.exitCode
 // the threadpool has drained, so exit() is safe.
 const SG_DONE = Symbol('sg-done');
 let _sgDone = false;
+// The decision JSON must be written to stdout AT MOST ONCE. The handler can reach
+// a terminal allowTool() even after a block already emitted its deny (the SG_DONE
+// unwind is swallowed on some paths), which for Claude Code was harmless
+// (allowTool writes nothing there) but for Antigravity appended a second
+// {"allow_tool":true} right after {"allow_tool":false} — agy then parsed the
+// trailing allow (or failed on the double object) and ran the blocked tool. This
+// latch guarantees the FIRST decision is the only one on stdout.
+let _decisionEmitted = false;
 // Terminate WITHOUT ever calling process.exit() on the hot path. On Windows + Node
 // 24, process.exit() called in (or right after) the same tick a cloud fetch()
 // settled aborts with `Assertion failed: !(handle->flags & UV_HANDLE_CLOSING),
@@ -384,10 +392,13 @@ function sgFinish(code) {
 
 function blockTool(reason) {
   if (AGENT_TYPE === 'antigravity') {
-    process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({
-      allow_tool: false,
-      deny_reason: `[SolonGate] ${reason}`,
-    }));
+    if (!_decisionEmitted) {
+      _decisionEmitted = true;
+      process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({
+        allow_tool: false,
+        deny_reason: `[SolonGate] ${reason}`,
+      }));
+    }
     sgFinish(0);
   } else {
     // Claude Code — emit the JSON PreToolUse deny on stdout AND exit 2 (reason on
@@ -400,21 +411,27 @@ function blockTool(reason) {
     // propagate reliably; Claude Code parses the JSON instead). Reason is never
     // empty — an empty deny becomes an is_error tool_result the API rejects.
     const msg = reason || '[SolonGate] Blocked by policy';
-    process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({
-      hookSpecificOutput: {
-        hookEventName: 'PreToolUse',
-        permissionDecision: 'deny',
-        permissionDecisionReason: msg,
-      },
-    }));
-    process.stderr.write(msg + '\n');
+    if (!_decisionEmitted) {
+      _decisionEmitted = true;
+      process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({
+        hookSpecificOutput: {
+          hookEventName: 'PreToolUse',
+          permissionDecision: 'deny',
+          permissionDecisionReason: msg,
+        },
+      }));
+      process.stderr.write(msg + '\n');
+    }
     sgFinish(2);
   }
 }
 
 function allowTool() {
   if (AGENT_TYPE === 'antigravity') {
-    process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ allow_tool: true }));
+    if (!_decisionEmitted) {
+      _decisionEmitted = true;
+      process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ allow_tool: true }));
+    }
   }
   sgFinish(0);
 }
@@ -423,9 +440,12 @@ function allowTool() {
 // ghost layer to rewrite a listing command so hidden entries are filtered out of
 // its output — the agent never sees them. Claude Code only.
 function rewriteTool(updatedInput) {
-  process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({
-    hookSpecificOutput: { hookEventName: 'PreToolUse', permissionDecision: 'allow', updatedInput },
-  }));
+  if (!_decisionEmitted) {
+    _decisionEmitted = true;
+    process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({
+      hookSpecificOutput: { hookEventName: 'PreToolUse', permissionDecision: 'allow', updatedInput },
+    }));
+  }
   sgFinish(0);
 }
 
@@ -1821,13 +1841,16 @@ if (!REFRESH_MODE) { try { input += readFileSync(0, 'utf-8'); } catch {} }
           });
         } catch {}
         await maybeSelfUpdate();
-        if (AGENT_TYPE === 'antigravity') { process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ allow_tool: false, deny_reason: ghostHit })); sgFinish(0); }
+        if (AGENT_TYPE === 'antigravity') { if (!_decisionEmitted) { _decisionEmitted = true; process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ allow_tool: false, deny_reason: ghostHit })); } sgFinish(0); }
         // Claude Code: JSON deny on stdout + exit 2 (reason on stderr). Exit 2 is
         // the only block enforced in auto-accept mode (see blockTool); the JSON is
         // the Windows fallback. ghostHit is a bare "No such file or directory", so
         // the stderr text keeps the stealth (looks like the path simply isn't there).
-        process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ hookSpecificOutput: { hookEventName: 'PreToolUse', permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: ghostHit } }));
-        process.stderr.write(ghostHit + '\n');
+        if (!_decisionEmitted) {
+          _decisionEmitted = true;
+          process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ hookSpecificOutput: { hookEventName: 'PreToolUse', permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: ghostHit } }));
+          process.stderr.write(ghostHit + '\n');
+        }
         sgFinish(2);
       }
       // No direct hit: if this is a listing command, rewrite it so hidden

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@solongate/proxy",
-  "version": "0.82.17",
+  "version": "0.82.18",
   "description": "AI tool security proxy: protect any AI tool server with customizable policies, path/command constraints, rate limiting, and audit logging. No code changes required.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {