@solongate/proxy 0.81.65 → 0.81.67

package/dist/index.js

@@ -10233,7 +10233,7 @@ function SettingsPanel({
     const id = editor.id;
     setEditor(null);
     if (id) run12("alert updated", () => api.settings.updateAlert(id, body), alertQ.reload);
-    else run12(`${editor.channel} alert added`, () => api.settings.createAlert({ name: "dataroom alert", ...body }), alertQ.reload);
+    else run12(`${editor.channel} alert added`, () => api.settings.createAlert({ name: "SolonGate alert", ...body }), alertQ.reload);
   };
   const activate = (r) => {
     if (r.kind === "acct") {

package/dist/tui/index.js

@@ -3360,7 +3360,7 @@ function SettingsPanel({
     const id = editor.id;
     setEditor(null);
     if (id) run("alert updated", () => api.settings.updateAlert(id, body), alertQ.reload);
-    else run(`${editor.channel} alert added`, () => api.settings.createAlert({ name: "dataroom alert", ...body }), alertQ.reload);
+    else run(`${editor.channel} alert added`, () => api.settings.createAlert({ name: "SolonGate alert", ...body }), alertQ.reload);
   };
   const activate = (r) => {
     if (r.kind === "acct") {

package/hooks/.solongate/.eval-ring.jsonl

@@ -60,3 +60,12 @@
 {"ms":3,"ts":1784374848281,"tool":"Bash","session":"f5933c65-c315-4440-9afb-7136fce6b695"}
 {"ms":4,"ts":1784375224287,"tool":"Bash","session":"f5933c65-c315-4440-9afb-7136fce6b695"}
 {"ms":5,"ts":1784375813890,"tool":"Bash","session":"f5933c65-c315-4440-9afb-7136fce6b695"}
+{"ms":3,"ts":1784376258704,"tool":"Bash","session":"f5933c65-c315-4440-9afb-7136fce6b695"}
+{"ms":6,"ts":1784376281596,"tool":"Bash","session":"f5933c65-c315-4440-9afb-7136fce6b695"}
+{"ms":6,"ts":1784376313566,"tool":"Bash","session":"f5933c65-c315-4440-9afb-7136fce6b695"}
+{"ms":6,"ts":1784376391108,"tool":"Bash","session":"f5933c65-c315-4440-9afb-7136fce6b695"}
+{"ms":5,"ts":1784376414971,"tool":"Write","session":"f5933c65-c315-4440-9afb-7136fce6b695"}
+{"ms":3,"ts":1784376423302,"tool":"Bash","session":"f5933c65-c315-4440-9afb-7136fce6b695"}
+{"ms":2,"ts":1784376491365,"tool":"Bash","session":"t2"}
+{"ms":3,"ts":1784376536945,"tool":"Bash","session":"t2"}
+{"ms":6,"ts":1784376555716,"tool":"Bash","session":"f5933c65-c315-4440-9afb-7136fce6b695"}

package/hooks/.solongate/.last-deny

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"tool":"Bash","ts":1784365527031}
+{"tool":"Bash","ts":1784376536900}

package/hooks/.solongate/.last-eval

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"ms":5,"ts":1784375813890,"tool":"Bash","session":"f5933c65-c315-4440-9afb-7136fce6b695"}
+{"ms":6,"ts":1784376555716,"tool":"Bash","session":"f5933c65-c315-4440-9afb-7136fce6b695"}

package/hooks/.solongate/.last-tool-call

@@ -1 +1 @@
-1784375802574
+1784376536991

package/hooks/guard.bundled.mjs

@@ -6536,7 +6536,7 @@ import { resolve, join, dirname, isAbsolute } from "node:path";
 import { homedir } from "node:os";
 import { gunzipSync } from "node:zlib";
 import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
-var HOOK_VERSION = 39;
+var HOOK_VERSION = 40;
 function localLogsOnly(security) {
   if (security && typeof security === "object") {
     const l = security.localLogs;
@@ -7746,6 +7746,56 @@ if (!REFRESH_MODE) {
       };
       const args = data.tool_input;
       const toolName = data.tool_name || "";
+      try {
+        const _ak = (AGENT_ID || "default").replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]/g, "_");
+        const _cf = join(resolve(homedir(), ".solongate"), ".policy-cache-" + _ak + ".json");
+        let _selfProt = true, _sec = null, _cacheOk = false;
+        try {
+          const _c = JSON.parse(readFileSync(_cf, "utf-8"));
+          _cacheOk = true;
+          if (_c && typeof _c.selfProtect === "boolean")
+            _selfProt = _c.selfProtect;
+          if (_c && _c.security !== void 0)
+            _sec = _c.security;
+        } catch {
+        }
+        const _tr = _cacheOk && _selfProt ? tamperCheck(toolName, args) : null;
+        if (_tr) {
+          const _logEntry = {
+            tool: toolName,
+            arguments: args,
+            decision: "DENY",
+            reason: _tr,
+            permission: guessPermission(toolName),
+            source: `${AGENT_TYPE}-guard`,
+            agent_id: AGENT_TYPE,
+            agent_name: AGENT_NAME,
+            session_id: data.session_id || "",
+            evaluation_time_ms: Date.now() - _evalStart
+          };
+          try {
+            writeLocalLog(_sec, { ts: (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString(), ..._logEntry });
+          } catch {
+          }
+          try {
+            if (!localLogsOnly(_sec))
+              await fetch(API_URL + "/api/v1/audit-logs", {
+                method: "POST",
+                headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", ...AUTH_HEADERS },
+                body: JSON.stringify(_logEntry),
+                signal: AbortSignal.timeout(3e3)
+              });
+          } catch {
+          }
+          process.stderr.write(`[SolonGate ROUTE] BLACK (block)
+`);
+          writeDenyFlag(toolName);
+          blockTool(_tr);
+        }
+      } catch (_e) {
+        if (_e === SG_DONE)
+          throw _e;
+      }
       const hookCwd = data.cwd || process.cwd();
       let policy;
       let selfProtectEnabled = true;

package/hooks/guard.mjs

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
 // the installed hook self-updates when the cloud version is higher (see
 // maybeSelfUpdate). This is what makes guard fixes propagate without a manual
 // reinstall — the same trust model as the OPA WASM this hook already runs.
-const HOOK_VERSION = 39;
+const HOOK_VERSION = 40;
 
 // True when local log storage is ON. In that mode logs are kept LOCAL ONLY and
 // nothing is sent to the cloud audit log.
@@ -1562,6 +1562,54 @@ if (!REFRESH_MODE) { try { input += readFileSync(0, 'utf-8'); } catch {} }
     const args = data.tool_input;
     const toolName = data.tool_name || '';
 
+    // ── FAST tamper path (hook v40) ───────────────────────────────────────
+    // Tamper protection is independent of the cloud policy, so decide it BEFORE
+    // the slow policy resolution (cache read + WASM + background refresh). That
+    // slow work made the earliest guard processes in a concurrent denial burst
+    // exceed Claude Code's PreToolUse hook timeout and get SIGKILLed mid-write,
+    // dropping the local log. Here we cheap-read the cache for selfProtect +
+    // localLogs config and, on a tamper hit, log + block IMMEDIATELY — no WASM,
+    // no refresh — so the process is fast and never killed. Falls through
+    // untouched when there is no tamper hit.
+    try {
+      const _ak = (AGENT_ID || 'default').replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]/g, '_');
+      const _cf = join(resolve(homedir(), '.solongate'), '.policy-cache-' + _ak + '.json');
+      let _selfProt = true, _sec = null, _cacheOk = false;
+      try {
+        const _c = JSON.parse(readFileSync(_cf, 'utf-8'));
+        _cacheOk = true;
+        if (_c && typeof _c.selfProtect === 'boolean') _selfProt = _c.selfProtect;
+        if (_c && _c.security !== undefined) _sec = _c.security;
+      } catch {}
+      // Only fast-path when we actually read the cache (so _sec is the real
+      // localLogs config). On a cache miss, fall through to the full flow, which
+      // resolves the policy properly and still blocks tamper.
+      const _tr = (_cacheOk && _selfProt) ? tamperCheck(toolName, args) : null;
+      if (_tr) {
+        const _logEntry = {
+          tool: toolName, arguments: args,
+          decision: 'DENY', reason: _tr,
+          permission: guessPermission(toolName),
+          source: `${AGENT_TYPE}-guard`,
+          agent_id: AGENT_TYPE, agent_name: AGENT_NAME,
+          session_id: data.session_id || '',
+          evaluation_time_ms: Date.now() - _evalStart,
+        };
+        try { writeLocalLog(_sec, { ts: new Date().toISOString(), ..._logEntry }); } catch {}
+        try {
+          if (!localLogsOnly(_sec)) await fetch(API_URL + '/api/v1/audit-logs', {
+            method: 'POST',
+            headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...AUTH_HEADERS },
+            body: JSON.stringify(_logEntry),
+            signal: AbortSignal.timeout(3000),
+          });
+        } catch {}
+        process.stderr.write(`[SolonGate ROUTE] BLACK (block)\n`);
+        writeDenyFlag(toolName);
+        blockTool(_tr); // throws SG_DONE — skips the slow policy path entirely
+      }
+    } catch (_e) { if (_e === SG_DONE) throw _e; /* else: fall through to full flow */ }
+
     // (self-protection + PI hook layers removed per project decision)
 
     // Load policy. Priority:

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@solongate/proxy",
-  "version": "0.81.65",
+  "version": "0.81.67",
   "description": "AI tool security proxy: protect any AI tool server with customizable policies, path/command constraints, rate limiting, and audit logging. No code changes required.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {