@softspark/ai-toolkit 2.4.1 → 2.6.1

package/app/skills/hipaa-validate/SKILL.md

@@ -100,7 +100,11 @@ Scan the full project for log/print statements that reference PHI keywords.
 | `console\.\w+\(.*req\.body` | WARN | JS/TS | Raw request body may contain PHI |
 | `JSON\.stringify\(.*patient` | WARN | JS/TS | Full patient object serialization |
 | `print\(.*\b(patient\|ssn\|social.security)` | HIGH | Python | PHI in print statements |
-| `logging\.\w+\(.*\b(patient\|ssn\|mrn\|dob)` | HIGH | Python | PHI fields in logger calls |
+| `(logging\|logger\|pprint)\.\w+\(.*\b(patient\|ssn\|mrn\|dob)` | HIGH | Python | PHI in logger/named logger/pprint output |
+| `print\(.*request\.(data\|json\|form\|POST\|body)` | WARN | Python | Raw request body may contain PHI (Django/Flask/FastAPI) |
+| `(logging\|logger)\.\w+\(.*request\.(data\|json\|form\|POST\|body)` | WARN | Python | Raw request body in logger |
+| `\brepr\(.*\b(patient\|ssn\|mrn)` | WARN | Python | repr() may expose PHI fields |
+| `\bvars\(.*\b(patient\|ssn\|mrn)` | WARN | Python | vars() dumps all PHI fields |
 | `fmt\.Print.*\b(patient\|ssn\|mrn)` | HIGH | Go | PHI in fmt output |
 | `log\.\w+\(.*\b(patient\|ssn\|mrn)` | HIGH | Go/Any | PHI in log calls |
 | `System\.out\.print.*\b(patient\|ssn\|mrn)` | HIGH | Java | PHI in stdout |
@@ -110,7 +114,7 @@ Scan the full project for log/print statements that reference PHI keywords.
 | `Console\.Write.*\b(patient\|ssn\|mrn)` | HIGH | C# | PHI in Console output |
 | `_logger\.\w+\(.*\b(patient\|ssn\|mrn\|dob)` | HIGH | C# | PHI in ILogger calls |
 
-> **Language coverage note**: JS/TS patterns are the most comprehensive. Go, Ruby, and Java have baseline coverage for common log patterns. Contributions for additional language-specific patterns are welcome.
+> **Language coverage note**: JS/TS and Python patterns are the most comprehensive. Go, Ruby, and Java have baseline coverage for common log patterns. Contributions for additional language-specific patterns are welcome.
 
 **Minimum Necessary violations** (§164.502(b)):
 
@@ -135,7 +139,7 @@ Scan the full project for files that handle PHI data operations but lack audit-r
 
 **PHI route file definition**: A file qualifies if it contains BOTH:
 1. A healthcare keyword from Step 0 (`patient`, `diagnosis`, `medication`, etc.)
-2. A data operation pattern: `router`, `app.get`, `app.post`, `app.put`, `app.delete`, `@RequestMapping`, `@GetMapping`, `@PostMapping`, `@PutMapping`, `@DeleteMapping`, `Model.find`, `Model.save`, `Model.update`, `db.query`, `db.execute`, `cursor.execute`, `repository.`, `findBy`, `save(`, `delete(`
+2. A data operation pattern: `router`, `app.get`, `app.post`, `app.put`, `app.delete`, `@RequestMapping`, `@GetMapping`, `@PostMapping`, `@PutMapping`, `@DeleteMapping`, `Model.find`, `Model.save`, `Model.update`, `db.query`, `db.execute`, `cursor.execute`, `repository.`, `findBy`, `save(`, `delete(`, `@app.route`, `@blueprint.route`, `@api_view`, `ViewSet`, `APIView`, `\bsession.(query|add|execute|delete|merge)\b` (word-anchored — SQLAlchemy only, avoids matching Express `req.session.save`)
 
 Files with a healthcare keyword but no data operation pattern are excluded.
 
@@ -158,13 +162,20 @@ See: [reference/hipaa-rules.md](reference/hipaa-rules.md) §164.312(b) for audit
 
 *Context-gated: scans PHI-adjacent files only.*
 
-| Pattern | Severity | Description |
-|---------|----------|-------------|
-| `http://` in API calls (not `localhost`/`127.0.0.1`) | HIGH | §164.312(e)(1) requires encryption in transit |
-| Missing TLS/SSL config in database connections | HIGH | Database connections must be encrypted |
-| `rejectUnauthorized:\s*false` | HIGH | TLS verification disabled |
-| `ws://` (WebSocket without TLS) | WARN | Unencrypted WebSocket may carry PHI |
-| Email sending without TLS config | WARN | PHI in email must use TLS |
+| Pattern | Severity | Language | Description |
+|---------|----------|----------|-------------|
+| `http://` in API calls (not `localhost`/`127.0.0.1`) | HIGH | Any | §164.312(e)(1) requires encryption in transit |
+| Missing TLS/SSL config in database connections | HIGH | Any | Database connections must be encrypted |
+| `rejectUnauthorized:\s*false` | HIGH | Any | TLS verification disabled |
+| `ws://` (WebSocket without TLS) | WARN | Any | Unencrypted WebSocket may carry PHI |
+| `verify\s*=\s*False` | HIGH | Python | TLS verification disabled (requests/httpx) |
+| `InsecureRequestWarning` | WARN | Python | TLS warning suppressed |
+| `[,(]\s*ssl\s*=\s*False\b` | HIGH | Python | SSL disabled in connector call (anchored to arg position to avoid matching `is_ssl_enabled = False`) |
+| `ssl\.CERT_NONE` | HIGH | Python | TLS certificate verification disabled (anchored to `ssl.` module) |
+| `check_hostname\s*=\s*False` | HIGH | Python | TLS hostname verification disabled |
+| `urllib3\.disable_warnings` | WARN | Python | TLS warnings suppressed (urllib3) |
+| `SECURE_SSL_REDIRECT\s*=\s*False` | WARN | Python | Django HTTPS redirect disabled (commonly False in dev settings — verify production config) |
+| `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED.*0` | HIGH | JS/TS | TLS rejection disabled globally |
 
 See: [reference/hipaa-rules.md](reference/hipaa-rules.md) §164.312(e)(1) for transmission security requirements.
 
@@ -194,13 +205,16 @@ See: [reference/phi-identifiers.md](reference/phi-identifiers.md) for the full l
 
 *Context-gated: scans PHI-adjacent files only. Heuristic — flags potential gaps.*
 
-**Auth keywords** (co-occurrence check): `auth`, `authenticate`, `requireAuth`, `isAuthenticated`, `protect`, `guard`, `Authorize`, `login_required`, `Permission`
+**Auth keywords** (co-occurrence check): `auth`, `authenticate`, `requireAuth`, `isAuthenticated`, `protect`, `guard`, `Authorize`, `login_required`, `Permission`, `permission_required`, `LoginRequiredMixin`, `PermissionRequiredMixin`, `IsAuthenticated`, `Depends`, `Security`
 
-| Pattern | Severity | Description |
-|---------|----------|-------------|
-| PHI route file without any auth keywords in same file | WARN | POTENTIAL access control gap — verify auth middleware covers these routes (§164.312(d)) |
-| `Access-Control-Allow-Origin:\s*\*` or `origin:\s*(true\|\*)` in PHI-adjacent files | HIGH | Unrestricted cross-origin access to PHI endpoints |
-| Routes marked `public`, `noAuth`, `anonymous` exposing PHI keywords | HIGH | PHI must require authentication |
+**Data operation patterns** (Python frameworks): `@app.route`, `@blueprint.route`, `@api_view`, `ViewSet`, `APIView`, `cursor.execute`, `\bsession.(query|execute)\b` (word-anchored — SQLAlchemy only)
+
+| Pattern | Severity | Language | Description |
+|---------|----------|----------|-------------|
+| PHI route file without any auth keywords in same file | WARN | Any | POTENTIAL access control gap — verify auth middleware covers these routes (§164.312(d)) |
+| `Access-Control-Allow-Origin:\s*\*` or `origin:\s*(true\|\*)` in PHI-adjacent files | HIGH | Any | Unrestricted cross-origin access to PHI endpoints |
+| Routes marked `public`, `noAuth`, `anonymous` exposing PHI keywords | HIGH | Any | PHI must require authentication |
+| `permission_classes\s*=.*AllowAny` | WARN | Python | DRF AllowAny — verify no PHI exposed |
 
 > **Note**: Auth middleware is commonly applied at router-level or app-level. The co-occurrence heuristic checks the same file only. False positives expected when auth is configured globally. Use `.hipaaignore` to suppress.
 
@@ -253,13 +267,15 @@ Instead of per-finding rows, emit a single **BAA Verification Checklist** in the
 
 Detects PHI storage patterns without encryption references. Per §164.312(a)(2)(iv), ePHI must be encrypted when stored.
 
-| Pattern | Severity | Description |
-|---------|----------|-------------|
-| `encrypt\s*[:=]\s*false` in database config files | HIGH | §164.312(a)(2)(iv) — Encryption explicitly disabled |
-| File write operations (`writeFile`, `fs.write`, `open(.*w`, `File.Create`) in PHI-adjacent code without encryption references | WARN | PHI written to disk may lack encryption at rest |
-| Database connection without `ssl`, `encrypt`, or `tls` keywords in PHI-adjacent config | WARN | Database storing PHI should enforce encrypted connections |
-| `localStorage.setItem` or `sessionStorage.setItem` with PHI keywords | HIGH | Browser storage is unencrypted — PHI must not be stored client-side without encryption |
-| `SharedPreferences` or `UserDefaults` with PHI keywords | HIGH | Mobile local storage is unencrypted by default |
+| Pattern | Severity | Language | Description |
+|---------|----------|----------|-------------|
+| `encrypt\s*[:=]\s*false` in database config files | HIGH | Any | §164.312(a)(2)(iv) — Encryption explicitly disabled |
+| File write operations (`writeFile`, `fs.write`, `open(.*w`, `File.Create`) in PHI-adjacent code without encryption references | WARN | Any | PHI written to disk may lack encryption at rest |
+| Database connection without `ssl`, `encrypt`, or `tls` keywords in PHI-adjacent config | WARN | Any | Database storing PHI should enforce encrypted connections |
+| `localStorage.setItem` or `sessionStorage.setItem` with PHI keywords | HIGH | JS/TS | Browser storage is unencrypted — PHI must not be stored client-side without encryption |
+| `SharedPreferences` or `UserDefaults` with PHI keywords | HIGH | Java/Any | Mobile local storage is unencrypted by default |
+| `pickle\.(dump\|dumps)\(` with PHI keywords | HIGH | Python | pickle serialization is unencrypted — PHI must be encrypted at rest |
+| `shelve\.open\(` with PHI keywords | HIGH | Python | shelve storage is unencrypted — PHI must be encrypted at rest |
 
 See: [reference/hipaa-rules.md](reference/hipaa-rules.md) §164.312(a)(2)(iv) for encryption requirements.
 

package/app/skills/hipaa-validate/scripts/hipaa_scan.py

@@ -62,6 +62,19 @@ LANGUAGE_INDICATORS = {
     "*.csproj": "csharp",
 }
 
+# Map language tag to file extensions. Used by scan_patterns to avoid
+# cross-language double-flagging when the same regex is valid for more
+# than one language (e.g. `logger.info(...)` in Python vs Java).
+LANG_EXTENSIONS = {
+    "js": {".js", ".jsx", ".mjs", ".cjs", ".ts", ".tsx"},
+    "ts": {".ts", ".tsx"},
+    "python": {".py", ".pyi"},
+    "java": {".java", ".kt", ".scala"},
+    "go": {".go"},
+    "ruby": {".rb", ".erb"},
+    "csharp": {".cs"},
+}
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Pattern definitions per category
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -72,9 +85,15 @@ CAT1_PATTERNS = [
     (r"console\.log\(.*patient", "HIGH", "js", "Patient data in console.log", "1"),
     (r"console\.\w+\(.*req\.body", "WARN", "js", "Raw request body may contain PHI", "1"),
     (r"JSON\.stringify\(.*patient", "WARN", "js", "Full patient object serialization", "1"),
-    # Python
+    # Python (logger pattern covers logging.*, logger.*, and pprint.* in one regex
+    # to avoid overlapping findings and double-flag with the Java `logger.` pattern.
+    # Language is enforced by file extension via LANG_EXTENSIONS.)
     (r"print\(.*\b(patient|ssn|social.security)", "HIGH", "python", "PHI in print statement", "1"),
-    (r"logging\.\w+\(.*\b(patient|ssn|mrn|dob)", "HIGH", "python", "PHI fields in logger", "1"),
+    (r"(logging|logger|pprint)\.\w+\(.*\b(patient|ssn|mrn|dob)", "HIGH", "python", "PHI in Python logger/pprint", "1"),
+    (r"print\(.*request\.(data|json|form|POST|body)", "WARN", "python", "Raw request body may contain PHI", "1"),
+    (r"(logging|logger)\.\w+\(.*request\.(data|json|form|POST|body)", "WARN", "python", "Raw request body in logger", "1"),
+    (r"\brepr\(.*\b(patient|ssn|mrn)", "WARN", "python", "repr() may expose PHI fields", "1"),
+    (r"\bvars\(.*\b(patient|ssn|mrn)", "WARN", "python", "vars() dumps all PHI fields", "1"),
     # Go
     (r"fmt\.Print.*\b(patient|ssn|mrn)", "HIGH", "go", "PHI in fmt output", "1"),
     (r"log\.\w+\(.*\b(patient|ssn|mrn)", "HIGH", "go", "PHI in log call", "1"),
@@ -101,6 +120,14 @@ CAT3_PATTERNS = [
     (r"NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED.*0", "HIGH", "js", "TLS rejection disabled globally", "3"),
     (r"verify\s*=\s*False", "HIGH", "python", "TLS verification disabled (requests)", "3"),
     (r"InsecureRequestWarning", "WARN", "python", "TLS warning suppressed", "3"),
+    # Anchored to argument position ([, or () to avoid matching `is_ssl_enabled = False`
+    (r"[,(]\s*ssl\s*=\s*False\b", "HIGH", "python", "SSL disabled in connector call", "3"),
+    (r"ssl\.CERT_NONE", "HIGH", "python", "TLS certificate verification disabled (ssl.CERT_NONE)", "3"),
+    (r"check_hostname\s*=\s*False", "HIGH", "python", "TLS hostname verification disabled", "3"),
+    (r"urllib3\.disable_warnings", "WARN", "python", "TLS warnings suppressed (urllib3)", "3"),
+    # WARN (not HIGH): commonly False in DEBUG/dev settings — compliance reviewer
+    # must confirm production config. Avoids flooding every Django project.
+    (r"SECURE_SSL_REDIRECT\s*=\s*False", "WARN", "python", "Django HTTPS redirect disabled (verify prod config)", "3"),
 ]
 
 # Category 4: Hardcoded PHI/Test Data
@@ -119,6 +146,9 @@ CAT7_PATTERNS = [
     (r"sessionStorage\.setItem\(.*\b(patient|ssn|mrn|phi|health)", "HIGH", "js", "PHI in session storage", "7"),
     (r"SharedPreferences.*\b(patient|ssn|mrn|phi|health)", "HIGH", "java", "PHI in unencrypted mobile storage", "7"),
     (r"UserDefaults.*\b(patient|ssn|mrn|phi|health)", "HIGH", "any", "PHI in unencrypted UserDefaults", "7"),
+    # Python
+    (r"pickle\.(dump|dumps)\(.*\b(patient|phi|health|ssn|mrn)", "HIGH", "python", "PHI in unencrypted pickle", "7"),
+    (r"shelve\.open\(.*\b(patient|phi|health|ssn|mrn)", "HIGH", "python", "PHI in unencrypted shelve storage", "7"),
 ]
 
 # Category 8: PHI Temp File Exposure
@@ -132,12 +162,17 @@ CAT8_PATTERNS = [
 CAT5_AUTH_KEYWORDS = [
     "auth", "authenticate", "requireAuth", "isAuthenticated",
     "protect", "guard", "Authorize", "login_required", "Permission",
+    # Python frameworks
+    "permission_required", "LoginRequiredMixin", "PermissionRequiredMixin",
+    "IsAuthenticated", "Depends", "Security",
 ]
 
 CAT5_PATTERNS = [
     (r"Access-Control-Allow-Origin:\s*\*", "HIGH", "any", "Unrestricted CORS on PHI endpoint", "5"),
     (r"origin:\s*(true|\*)", "HIGH", "any", "Unrestricted CORS origin", "5"),
     (r"\b(public|noAuth|anonymous)\b.*\b(patient|phi|health|medical)", "HIGH", "any", "Public route exposing PHI", "5"),
+    # Python
+    (r"permission_classes\s*=.*AllowAny", "WARN", "python", "DRF AllowAny — verify no PHI exposed", "5"),
 ]
 
 # HIPAA rule citations per category
@@ -284,7 +319,15 @@ def detect_languages(root: Path) -> set[str]:
 
 def scan_patterns(files: list[Path], patterns: list[tuple],
                   languages: set[str], root: Path) -> list[dict]:
-    """Run regex patterns against files, return findings."""
+    """Run regex patterns against files, return findings.
+
+    Language-tagged patterns fire only when:
+      1. The project's detected languages include the tag, AND
+      2. The file's extension matches that language (per LANG_EXTENSIONS).
+
+    This prevents cross-language double-flagging when two languages share
+    a regex (e.g. `logger.info(patient)` valid in both Python and Java).
+    """
     findings = []
     for fpath in files:
         try:
@@ -292,11 +335,16 @@ def scan_patterns(files: list[Path], patterns: list[tuple],
         except (OSError, PermissionError):
             continue
         rel = str(fpath.relative_to(root))
+        ext = fpath.suffix.lower()
 
         for line_num, line in enumerate(lines, 1):
             for pat, severity, lang, desc, cat in patterns:
-                if lang != "any" and lang not in languages:
-                    continue
+                if lang != "any":
+                    if lang not in languages:
+                        continue
+                    exts = LANG_EXTENSIONS.get(lang)
+                    if exts and ext not in exts:
+                        continue
                 if re.search(pat, line, re.IGNORECASE):
                     findings.append({
                         "file": rel,
@@ -333,7 +381,12 @@ def scan_cat2_audit_gaps(phi_files: list[Path], root: Path) -> list[dict]:
         r"@(Request|Get|Post|Put|Delete)Mapping|"
         r"Model\.(find|save|update|delete)|"
         r"db\.(query|execute)|cursor\.execute|"
-        r"repository\.|findBy|\.save\(|\.delete\()",
+        r"repository\.|findBy|\.save\(|\.delete\(|"
+        # Python frameworks (SQLAlchemy session methods only — avoids matching
+        # Express req.session.save/destroy which use different method names)
+        r"@app\.route|@blueprint\.route|"
+        r"@api_view|ViewSet|APIView|"
+        r"\bsession\.(query|add|execute|delete|merge)\b)",
         re.IGNORECASE,
     )
     audit_kw = re.compile(
@@ -382,7 +435,11 @@ def scan_cat5_access_gaps(phi_files: list[Path], languages: set[str],
     )
     data_ops = re.compile(
         r"(router|app\.(get|post|put|delete)|"
-        r"@(Request|Get|Post|Put|Delete)Mapping)",
+        r"@(Request|Get|Post|Put|Delete)Mapping|"
+        # Python frameworks (session methods anchored to SQLAlchemy)
+        r"@app\.route|@blueprint\.route|"
+        r"@api_view|ViewSet|APIView|"
+        r"cursor\.execute|\bsession\.(query|execute)\b)",
         re.IGNORECASE,
     )
 

package/app/skills/review/SKILL.md

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Reviews code changes for quality and issues.
 Before starting manual review, run the diff analyzer script to get a structured risk assessment:
 
 ```bash
-python3 "$(dirname "$0")/scripts/diff-analyzer.py" [base_branch]
+python3 ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/diff-analyzer.py [base_branch]
 # Default base branch: main
 # Example: python3 scripts/diff-analyzer.py develop
 ```
@@ -90,11 +90,35 @@ After all reviewers complete:
 - [ ] No code duplication
 - [ ] Appropriate abstractions
 
-### Security
-- [ ] No hardcoded secrets
-- [ ] Input validation
-- [ ] Proper auth checks
-- [ ] SQL injection prevention
+### Security (OWASP Top 10)
+- [ ] A01: Proper auth/authorization on all endpoints
+- [ ] A02: No weak crypto, HTTPS for external comms
+- [ ] A03: Input validation, parameterized queries, output encoding (XSS)
+- [ ] A04: Threat model assumptions documented for new features
+- [ ] A05: No debug mode, default credentials, or verbose errors in prod config
+- [ ] A06: Dependencies checked for known CVEs
+- [ ] A07: No hardcoded secrets, session management correct
+- [ ] A08: Integrity checks on deserialized data, CI/CD pipeline safety
+- [ ] A09: Security-relevant events logged (without PII)
+- [ ] A10: External URL handling validates scheme/host (SSRF prevention)
+
+### API / Contract Changes
+- [ ] Backward compatibility preserved (no silent breaking changes)
+- [ ] API versioning updated if contract changed
+- [ ] Schema validation on request/response
+- [ ] Error responses follow project convention
+
+### Concurrency / Async
+- [ ] Shared mutable state protected (locks, atomics, channels)
+- [ ] No fire-and-forget promises without error handling
+- [ ] Database transactions scoped correctly (no long-held locks)
+- [ ] Race condition risk assessed for concurrent access paths
+
+### Migrations / Schema Changes
+- [ ] Migration is reversible (has rollback path)
+- [ ] No table locks on large tables during peak hours
+- [ ] Data backfill handles NULL/missing values
+- [ ] Indexes added for new query patterns
 
 ### Performance
 - [ ] No N+1 queries