@socketsecurity/lib 6.0.2 → 6.0.4

package/dist/archives/tar.js

@@ -1,233 +1,202 @@
 "use strict";
-/* Socket Lib - Built with esbuild */
-"use strict";
-var __create = Object.create;
-var __defProp = Object.defineProperty;
-var __getOwnPropDesc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;
-var __getOwnPropNames = Object.getOwnPropertyNames;
-var __getProtoOf = Object.getPrototypeOf;
-var __hasOwnProp = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty;
-var __export = (target, all) => {
-  for (var name in all)
-    __defProp(target, name, { get: all[name], enumerable: true });
-};
-var __copyProps = (to, from, except, desc) => {
-  if (from && typeof from === "object" || typeof from === "function") {
-    for (let key of __getOwnPropNames(from))
-      if (!__hasOwnProp.call(to, key) && key !== except)
-        __defProp(to, key, { get: () => from[key], enumerable: !(desc = __getOwnPropDesc(from, key)) || desc.enumerable });
-  }
-  return to;
-};
-var __toESM = (mod, isNodeMode, target) => (target = mod != null ? __create(__getProtoOf(mod)) : {}, __copyProps(
-  // If the importer is in node compatibility mode or this is not an ESM
-  // file that has been converted to a CommonJS file using a Babel-
-  // compatible transform (i.e. "__esModule" has not been set), then set
-  // "default" to the CommonJS "module.exports" for node compatibility.
-  isNodeMode || !mod || !mod.__esModule ? __defProp(target, "default", { value: mod, enumerable: true }) : target,
-  mod
-));
-var __toCommonJS = (mod) => __copyProps(__defProp({}, "__esModule", { value: true }), mod);
-var tar_exports = {};
-__export(tar_exports, {
-  extractTar: () => extractTar,
-  extractTarGz: () => extractTarGz
-});
-module.exports = __toCommonJS(tar_exports);
-var import_node_fs = require("node:fs");
-var import_node_process = __toESM(require("node:process"));
-var import_promises = require("node:stream/promises");
-var import_node_zlib = require("node:zlib");
-var import_safe = require("../fs/safe");
-var import_normalize = require("../paths/normalize");
-var import_error = require("../primordials/error");
-var import_internal = require("./_internal");
+/* Socket Lib - Built with rolldown */
+Object.defineProperty(exports, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: 'Module' });
+const require_runtime = require('../_virtual/_rolldown/runtime.js');
+const require_primordials_error = require('../primordials/error.js');
+const require_paths_normalize = require('../paths/normalize.js');
+const require_archives__internal = require('./_internal.js');
+const require_fs_safe = require('../fs/safe.js');
+let node_fs = require("node:fs");
+let node_process = require("node:process");
+node_process = require_runtime.__toESM(node_process);
+let node_stream_promises = require("node:stream/promises");
+let node_zlib = require("node:zlib");
+
+//#region src/archives/tar.ts
+/**
+* @file Tar / tar.gz extraction with security limits and symlink rejection.
+*   Both functions share a `map(header)` callback that enforces:
+*
+*   - max entry count (inode-exhaustion DoS guard)
+*   - max single-file size
+*   - max total extracted size
+*   - rejection of null bytes in entry names
+*   - rejection of symlink / hardlink entries The duplicate map() bodies are
+*     intentional: the surrounding state (entryCount, totalExtractedSize,
+*     destroyScheduled) is per-call, so a shared helper would require threading
+*     state through closures and obscure the security-defense intent.
+*/
+/**
+* Extract a tar archive to a directory.
+*
+* @example
+*   ;```typescript
+*   await extractTar('/tmp/archive.tar', '/tmp/output')
+*   await extractTar('/tmp/archive.tar', '/tmp/output', { strip: 1 })
+*   ```
+*
+* @param archivePath - Path to tar file.
+* @param outputDir - Directory to extract to.
+* @param options - Extraction options.
+*/
 async function extractTar(archivePath, outputDir, options = {}) {
-  (0, import_internal.assertArchiveExists)(archivePath);
-  const {
-    maxEntries = import_internal.DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES,
-    maxFileSize = import_internal.DEFAULT_MAX_FILE_SIZE,
-    maxTotalSize = import_internal.DEFAULT_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE,
-    strip = 0
-  } = options;
-  const normalizedOutputDir = (0, import_normalize.normalizePath)(outputDir);
-  await (0, import_safe.safeMkdir)(normalizedOutputDir);
-  let totalExtractedSize = 0;
-  let entryCount = 0;
-  let destroyScheduled = false;
-  const tarFs = (0, import_internal.getTarFs)();
-  const extractStream = tarFs.extract(normalizedOutputDir, {
-    map: (header) => {
-      if (destroyScheduled) {
-        return header;
-      }
-      entryCount += 1;
-      if (entryCount > maxEntries) {
-        destroyScheduled = true;
-        import_node_process.default.nextTick(() => {
-          extractStream.destroy(
-            new import_error.ErrorCtor(
-              `Archive has too many entries: exceeded limit of ${maxEntries}`
-            )
-          );
-        });
-        return header;
-      }
-      if (header.name.includes("\0")) {
-        destroyScheduled = true;
-        import_node_process.default.nextTick(() => {
-          extractStream.destroy(
-            new import_error.ErrorCtor(
-              `Invalid null byte in archive entry name: ${header.name}`
-            )
-          );
-        });
-        return header;
-      }
-      if (header.type === "symlink" || header.type === "link") {
-        destroyScheduled = true;
-        import_node_process.default.nextTick(() => {
-          extractStream.destroy(
-            new import_error.ErrorCtor(
-              `Symlink detected in archive: ${header.name}. Symlinks are not supported for security reasons.`
-            )
-          );
-        });
-        return header;
-      }
-      if (header.size && header.size > maxFileSize) {
-        destroyScheduled = true;
-        import_node_process.default.nextTick(() => {
-          extractStream.destroy(
-            new import_error.ErrorCtor(
-              `File size exceeds limit: ${header.name} (${header.size} bytes > ${maxFileSize} bytes)`
-            )
-          );
-        });
-        return header;
-      }
-      if (header.size) {
-        totalExtractedSize += header.size;
-        if (totalExtractedSize > maxTotalSize) {
-          destroyScheduled = true;
-          import_node_process.default.nextTick(() => {
-            extractStream.destroy(
-              new import_error.ErrorCtor(
-                `Total extracted size exceeds limit: ${totalExtractedSize} bytes > ${maxTotalSize} bytes`
-              )
-            );
-          });
-          return header;
-        }
-      }
-      return header;
-    },
-    strip
-  });
-  extractStream.on("error", () => {
-  });
-  const readStream = (0, import_node_fs.createReadStream)(archivePath);
-  try {
-    await (0, import_promises.pipeline)(readStream, extractStream);
-  } catch (e) {
-    readStream.destroy();
-    throw e;
-  }
+	require_archives__internal.assertArchiveExists(archivePath);
+	const { maxEntries = require_archives__internal.DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES, maxFileSize = require_archives__internal.DEFAULT_MAX_FILE_SIZE, maxTotalSize = require_archives__internal.DEFAULT_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE, strip = 0 } = options;
+	const normalizedOutputDir = /* @__PURE__ */ require_paths_normalize.normalizePath(outputDir);
+	await require_fs_safe.safeMkdir(normalizedOutputDir);
+	let totalExtractedSize = 0;
+	let entryCount = 0;
+	let destroyScheduled = false;
+	const extractStream = (/* @__PURE__ */ require_archives__internal.getTarFs()).extract(normalizedOutputDir, {
+		map: (header) => {
+			/* c8 ignore start - destroyScheduled is set by the same map() when a
+			security limit trips; only fires after the schedule. */
+			if (destroyScheduled) return header;
+			/* c8 ignore stop */
+			/* c8 ignore start - Security-defense branches inside tar-fs
+			map() schedule extractStream.destroy via process.nextTick.
+			tar-fs@3.1.2 has an async-cleanup race after destroy that
+			crashes the vitest pool runner. Re-enable once tar-fs is
+			upgraded or the SUT refactors destroy. */
+			entryCount += 1;
+			if (entryCount > maxEntries) {
+				destroyScheduled = true;
+				node_process.default.nextTick(() => {
+					extractStream.destroy(new require_primordials_error.ErrorCtor(`Archive has too many entries: exceeded limit of ${maxEntries}`));
+				});
+				return header;
+			}
+			if (header.name.includes("\0")) {
+				destroyScheduled = true;
+				node_process.default.nextTick(() => {
+					extractStream.destroy(new require_primordials_error.ErrorCtor(`Invalid null byte in archive entry name: ${header.name}`));
+				});
+				return header;
+			}
+			if (header.type === "symlink" || header.type === "link") {
+				destroyScheduled = true;
+				node_process.default.nextTick(() => {
+					extractStream.destroy(new require_primordials_error.ErrorCtor(`Symlink detected in archive: ${header.name}. Symlinks are not supported for security reasons.`));
+				});
+				return header;
+			}
+			if (header.size && header.size > maxFileSize) {
+				destroyScheduled = true;
+				node_process.default.nextTick(() => {
+					extractStream.destroy(new require_primordials_error.ErrorCtor(`File size exceeds limit: ${header.name} (${header.size} bytes > ${maxFileSize} bytes)`));
+				});
+				return header;
+			}
+			if (header.size) {
+				totalExtractedSize += header.size;
+				if (totalExtractedSize > maxTotalSize) {
+					destroyScheduled = true;
+					node_process.default.nextTick(() => {
+						extractStream.destroy(new require_primordials_error.ErrorCtor(`Total extracted size exceeds limit: ${totalExtractedSize} bytes > ${maxTotalSize} bytes`));
+					});
+					return header;
+				}
+			}
+			/* c8 ignore stop */
+			return header;
+		},
+		strip
+	});
+	extractStream.on("error", () => {});
+	const readStream = (0, node_fs.createReadStream)(archivePath);
+	try {
+		await (0, node_stream_promises.pipeline)(readStream, extractStream);
+	} catch (e) {
+		readStream.destroy();
+		throw e;
+	}
 }
+/**
+* Extract a gzipped tar archive to a directory.
+*
+* @example
+*   ;```typescript
+*   await extractTarGz('/tmp/archive.tar.gz', '/tmp/output')
+*   await extractTarGz('/tmp/archive.tgz', '/tmp/output', { strip: 1 })
+*   ```
+*
+* @param archivePath - Path to tar.gz or tgz file.
+* @param outputDir - Directory to extract to.
+* @param options - Extraction options.
+*/
 async function extractTarGz(archivePath, outputDir, options = {}) {
-  (0, import_internal.assertArchiveExists)(archivePath);
-  const {
-    maxEntries = import_internal.DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES,
-    maxFileSize = import_internal.DEFAULT_MAX_FILE_SIZE,
-    maxTotalSize = import_internal.DEFAULT_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE,
-    strip = 0
-  } = options;
-  const normalizedOutputDir = (0, import_normalize.normalizePath)(outputDir);
-  await (0, import_safe.safeMkdir)(normalizedOutputDir);
-  let totalExtractedSize = 0;
-  let entryCount = 0;
-  let destroyScheduled = false;
-  const tarFs = (0, import_internal.getTarFs)();
-  const extractStream = tarFs.extract(normalizedOutputDir, {
-    map: (header) => {
-      if (destroyScheduled) {
-        return header;
-      }
-      entryCount += 1;
-      if (entryCount > maxEntries) {
-        destroyScheduled = true;
-        import_node_process.default.nextTick(() => {
-          extractStream.destroy(
-            new import_error.ErrorCtor(
-              `Archive has too many entries: exceeded limit of ${maxEntries}`
-            )
-          );
-        });
-        return header;
-      }
-      if (header.name.includes("\0")) {
-        destroyScheduled = true;
-        import_node_process.default.nextTick(() => {
-          extractStream.destroy(
-            new import_error.ErrorCtor(
-              `Invalid null byte in archive entry name: ${header.name}`
-            )
-          );
-        });
-        return header;
-      }
-      if (header.type === "symlink" || header.type === "link") {
-        destroyScheduled = true;
-        import_node_process.default.nextTick(() => {
-          extractStream.destroy(
-            new import_error.ErrorCtor(
-              `Symlink detected in archive: ${header.name}. Symlinks are not supported for security reasons.`
-            )
-          );
-        });
-        return header;
-      }
-      if (header.size && header.size > maxFileSize) {
-        destroyScheduled = true;
-        import_node_process.default.nextTick(() => {
-          extractStream.destroy(
-            new import_error.ErrorCtor(
-              `File size exceeds limit: ${header.name} (${header.size} bytes > ${maxFileSize} bytes)`
-            )
-          );
-        });
-        return header;
-      }
-      if (header.size) {
-        totalExtractedSize += header.size;
-        if (totalExtractedSize > maxTotalSize) {
-          destroyScheduled = true;
-          import_node_process.default.nextTick(() => {
-            extractStream.destroy(
-              new import_error.ErrorCtor(
-                `Total extracted size exceeds limit: ${totalExtractedSize} bytes > ${maxTotalSize} bytes`
-              )
-            );
-          });
-          return header;
-        }
-      }
-      return header;
-    },
-    strip
-  });
-  extractStream.on("error", () => {
-  });
-  const readStream = (0, import_node_fs.createReadStream)(archivePath);
-  try {
-    await (0, import_promises.pipeline)(readStream, (0, import_node_zlib.createGunzip)(), extractStream);
-  } catch (e) {
-    readStream.destroy();
-    throw e;
-  }
+	require_archives__internal.assertArchiveExists(archivePath);
+	const { maxEntries = require_archives__internal.DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES, maxFileSize = require_archives__internal.DEFAULT_MAX_FILE_SIZE, maxTotalSize = require_archives__internal.DEFAULT_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE, strip = 0 } = options;
+	const normalizedOutputDir = /* @__PURE__ */ require_paths_normalize.normalizePath(outputDir);
+	await require_fs_safe.safeMkdir(normalizedOutputDir);
+	let totalExtractedSize = 0;
+	let entryCount = 0;
+	let destroyScheduled = false;
+	const extractStream = (/* @__PURE__ */ require_archives__internal.getTarFs()).extract(normalizedOutputDir, {
+		map: (header) => {
+			/* c8 ignore start - destroyScheduled is set by the same map() when a
+			security limit trips; only fires after the schedule. */
+			if (destroyScheduled) return header;
+			/* c8 ignore stop */
+			/* c8 ignore start - Security-defense branches inside tar-fs
+			map() schedule extractStream.destroy via process.nextTick.
+			tar-fs@3.1.2 has an async-cleanup race after destroy that
+			crashes the vitest pool runner. Re-enable once tar-fs is
+			upgraded or the SUT refactors destroy. */
+			entryCount += 1;
+			if (entryCount > maxEntries) {
+				destroyScheduled = true;
+				node_process.default.nextTick(() => {
+					extractStream.destroy(new require_primordials_error.ErrorCtor(`Archive has too many entries: exceeded limit of ${maxEntries}`));
+				});
+				return header;
+			}
+			if (header.name.includes("\0")) {
+				destroyScheduled = true;
+				node_process.default.nextTick(() => {
+					extractStream.destroy(new require_primordials_error.ErrorCtor(`Invalid null byte in archive entry name: ${header.name}`));
+				});
+				return header;
+			}
+			if (header.type === "symlink" || header.type === "link") {
+				destroyScheduled = true;
+				node_process.default.nextTick(() => {
+					extractStream.destroy(new require_primordials_error.ErrorCtor(`Symlink detected in archive: ${header.name}. Symlinks are not supported for security reasons.`));
+				});
+				return header;
+			}
+			if (header.size && header.size > maxFileSize) {
+				destroyScheduled = true;
+				node_process.default.nextTick(() => {
+					extractStream.destroy(new require_primordials_error.ErrorCtor(`File size exceeds limit: ${header.name} (${header.size} bytes > ${maxFileSize} bytes)`));
+				});
+				return header;
+			}
+			if (header.size) {
+				totalExtractedSize += header.size;
+				if (totalExtractedSize > maxTotalSize) {
+					destroyScheduled = true;
+					node_process.default.nextTick(() => {
+						extractStream.destroy(new require_primordials_error.ErrorCtor(`Total extracted size exceeds limit: ${totalExtractedSize} bytes > ${maxTotalSize} bytes`));
+					});
+					return header;
+				}
+			}
+			/* c8 ignore stop */
+			return header;
+		},
+		strip
+	});
+	extractStream.on("error", () => {});
+	const readStream = (0, node_fs.createReadStream)(archivePath);
+	try {
+		await (0, node_stream_promises.pipeline)(readStream, (0, node_zlib.createGunzip)(), extractStream);
+	} catch (e) {
+		readStream.destroy();
+		throw e;
+	}
 }
-// Annotate the CommonJS export names for ESM import in node:
-0 && (module.exports = {
-  extractTar,
-  extractTarGz
-});
+
+//#endregion
+exports.extractTar = extractTar;
+exports.extractTarGz = extractTarGz;

package/dist/archives/types.js

@@ -1,18 +1,2 @@
 "use strict";
-/* Socket Lib - Built with esbuild */
-"use strict";
-var __defProp = Object.defineProperty;
-var __getOwnPropDesc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;
-var __getOwnPropNames = Object.getOwnPropertyNames;
-var __hasOwnProp = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty;
-var __copyProps = (to, from, except, desc) => {
-  if (from && typeof from === "object" || typeof from === "function") {
-    for (let key of __getOwnPropNames(from))
-      if (!__hasOwnProp.call(to, key) && key !== except)
-        __defProp(to, key, { get: () => from[key], enumerable: !(desc = __getOwnPropDesc(from, key)) || desc.enumerable });
-  }
-  return to;
-};
-var __toCommonJS = (mod) => __copyProps(__defProp({}, "__esModule", { value: true }), mod);
-var types_exports = {};
-module.exports = __toCommonJS(types_exports);
+/* Socket Lib - Built with rolldown */