@smplcty/auth 7.0.1 → 8.1.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +2 -2
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/schema/functions/auth_all_tenants.yaml +28 -0
- package/schema/functions/auth_create_user.yaml +37 -6
- package/schema/functions/auth_tenant_ids.yaml +37 -0
- package/schema/tables/tenants.yaml +15 -1
- package/schema/tables/user_communication_methods.yaml +7 -0
package/README.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -482,11 +482,11 @@ The library ships its schema as schema-flow YAML inside the package at `@smplcty
|
|
|
482
482
|
@smplcty/auth/schema/
|
|
483
483
|
├── tables/
|
|
484
484
|
│ ├── users.yaml # + audit; seeds the app-init service user (matched by name)
|
|
485
|
-
│ ├── tenants.yaml # + audit; slug (sub-domain), allow_otp (SSO-only switch)
|
|
485
|
+
│ ├── tenants.yaml # + audit; slug (sub-domain, DNS-label CHECK), allow_otp (SSO-only switch)
|
|
486
486
|
│ ├── roles.yaml # + audit; seeds 'user' (default), 'settings', 'security'
|
|
487
487
|
│ ├── user_roles.yaml # + audit; tenant_id NULL = wildcard / all tenants
|
|
488
488
|
│ ├── communication_channels.yaml # + audit
|
|
489
|
-
│ ├── user_communication_methods.yaml # + audit
|
|
489
|
+
│ ├── user_communication_methods.yaml # + audit; qualifier (optional consumer-defined label)
|
|
490
490
|
│ ├── auth_domains.yaml # + audit; tenant's IdP(s), 1:N, resolved by id (display_name = button)
|
|
491
491
|
│ ├── sessions.yaml # PK = token hash; last_seen_at; geo
|
|
492
492
|
│ └── dev_otp_enrollments.yaml
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
name: auth_all_tenants
|
|
2
|
+
language: plpgsql
|
|
3
|
+
volatility: stable
|
|
4
|
+
security: definer
|
|
5
|
+
# True when the current actor holds any live wildcard role — a user_roles row
|
|
6
|
+
# with tenant_id IS NULL, which reaches every tenant (surfaced elsewhere as the
|
|
7
|
+
# app.all_tenants GUC). The all-access companion to auth_tenant_ids: a wildcard
|
|
8
|
+
# grant can't be enumerated into a finite id set, so scope tests OR this against
|
|
9
|
+
# `tenant_id IN (SELECT auth_tenant_ids())`. False when there is no actor.
|
|
10
|
+
#
|
|
11
|
+
# Wrap the call in a subquery — `(SELECT auth_all_tenants())` — in a policy so
|
|
12
|
+
# the planner evaluates it as an InitPlan ONCE per query instead of per row.
|
|
13
|
+
returns: boolean
|
|
14
|
+
args: []
|
|
15
|
+
body: |
|
|
16
|
+
BEGIN
|
|
17
|
+
RETURN EXISTS (
|
|
18
|
+
SELECT 1
|
|
19
|
+
FROM user_roles ur
|
|
20
|
+
WHERE ur.user_id = current_user_id()
|
|
21
|
+
AND ur.deleted_at IS NULL
|
|
22
|
+
AND ur.tenant_id IS NULL
|
|
23
|
+
);
|
|
24
|
+
END;
|
|
25
|
+
comment: >
|
|
26
|
+
True if the current actor holds any live wildcard (all-tenants) role. The
|
|
27
|
+
all-access companion to auth_tenant_ids. SECURITY DEFINER so RLS policies can
|
|
28
|
+
use it without recursing on user_roles.
|
|
@@ -9,27 +9,37 @@ security: definer
|
|
|
9
9
|
# `user_data` shape:
|
|
10
10
|
# {
|
|
11
11
|
# "name": "Ada Lovelace",
|
|
12
|
-
# "communication_methods": [ { "channel": "email", "code": "ada@acme.com" } ],
|
|
12
|
+
# "communication_methods": [ { "channel": "email", "code": "ada@acme.com", "qualifier": "work" } ],
|
|
13
13
|
# "accesses": [ { "tenant_id": 5, "role_id": 2 } ]
|
|
14
14
|
# }
|
|
15
15
|
# At least one communication method and one access are required. `channel` is
|
|
16
16
|
# resolved by name; `tenant_id`/`role_id` are ids the caller already resolved
|
|
17
17
|
# (the library pins none). A NULL/absent tenant_id is an all-tenants grant.
|
|
18
|
+
# `qualifier` is an optional, consumer-defined free-text label on a method
|
|
19
|
+
# (absent → NULL); the library stores it verbatim and never interprets it.
|
|
18
20
|
#
|
|
19
21
|
# Authority: the caller must hold `security` over every tenant in `accesses`;
|
|
20
22
|
# an all-tenants grant requires holding `security` globally. Any failure aborts
|
|
21
23
|
# the whole call — no partially-provisioned user is left behind. SECURITY
|
|
22
24
|
# DEFINER does the writes RLS would otherwise block, but current_user_id() still
|
|
23
25
|
# resolves to the caller, so the checks run against the calling admin.
|
|
26
|
+
#
|
|
27
|
+
# Duplicate-contact contract: if any requested (channel, code) already belongs
|
|
28
|
+
# to a live communication method, this raises SQLSTATE 23505 (unique_violation)
|
|
29
|
+
# with a message naming the channel — a stable, catchable signal a consumer can
|
|
30
|
+
# map to a 4xx ("that email/phone is already in use") without parsing constraint
|
|
31
|
+
# names. 23505 is raised ONLY for this case; every other failure carries the
|
|
32
|
+
# default raise_exception code (P0001).
|
|
24
33
|
returns: bigint
|
|
25
34
|
args:
|
|
26
35
|
- name: user_data
|
|
27
36
|
type: jsonb
|
|
28
37
|
body: |
|
|
29
38
|
DECLARE
|
|
30
|
-
v_user_id
|
|
31
|
-
v_access
|
|
32
|
-
v_methods
|
|
39
|
+
v_user_id bigint;
|
|
40
|
+
v_access jsonb;
|
|
41
|
+
v_methods int;
|
|
42
|
+
v_dup_channel text;
|
|
33
43
|
BEGIN
|
|
34
44
|
IF current_user_id() IS NULL THEN
|
|
35
45
|
RAISE EXCEPTION 'auth_create_user: no authenticated actor (app.actor_id is unset)';
|
|
@@ -55,12 +65,33 @@ body: |
|
|
|
55
65
|
END IF;
|
|
56
66
|
END LOOP;
|
|
57
67
|
|
|
68
|
+
-- Friendly duplicate-contact check. A live ucm row already holding one of
|
|
69
|
+
-- the requested (channel, code) pairs would hit the partial-unique index and
|
|
70
|
+
-- surface as a raw 23505 the consumer can't tell from any other constraint.
|
|
71
|
+
-- Detect it up front and re-raise as unique_violation with a message naming
|
|
72
|
+
-- the channel, so a consumer maps it to a 4xx without parsing constraint
|
|
73
|
+
-- names. Done before the users INSERT so a doomed call burns no sequence
|
|
74
|
+
-- value. (The unique index remains the backstop for a concurrent race.)
|
|
75
|
+
SELECT cc.name INTO v_dup_channel
|
|
76
|
+
FROM jsonb_array_elements(user_data -> 'communication_methods') AS m
|
|
77
|
+
JOIN communication_channels cc
|
|
78
|
+
ON cc.name = m ->> 'channel' AND cc.deleted_at IS NULL
|
|
79
|
+
JOIN user_communication_methods ucm
|
|
80
|
+
ON ucm.communication_channel_id = cc.communication_channel_id
|
|
81
|
+
AND ucm.code = m ->> 'code'
|
|
82
|
+
AND ucm.deleted_at IS NULL
|
|
83
|
+
LIMIT 1;
|
|
84
|
+
IF v_dup_channel IS NOT NULL THEN
|
|
85
|
+
RAISE EXCEPTION 'auth_create_user: a user with this % already exists', v_dup_channel
|
|
86
|
+
USING ERRCODE = 'unique_violation';
|
|
87
|
+
END IF;
|
|
88
|
+
|
|
58
89
|
INSERT INTO users (name, kind)
|
|
59
90
|
VALUES (user_data ->> 'name', 'human')
|
|
60
91
|
RETURNING user_id INTO v_user_id;
|
|
61
92
|
|
|
62
|
-
INSERT INTO user_communication_methods (user_id, communication_channel_id, code)
|
|
63
|
-
SELECT v_user_id, cc.communication_channel_id, m ->> 'code'
|
|
93
|
+
INSERT INTO user_communication_methods (user_id, communication_channel_id, code, qualifier)
|
|
94
|
+
SELECT v_user_id, cc.communication_channel_id, m ->> 'code', m ->> 'qualifier'
|
|
64
95
|
FROM jsonb_array_elements(user_data -> 'communication_methods') AS m
|
|
65
96
|
JOIN communication_channels cc
|
|
66
97
|
ON cc.name = m ->> 'channel' AND cc.deleted_at IS NULL;
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
name: auth_tenant_ids
|
|
2
|
+
language: plpgsql
|
|
3
|
+
volatility: stable
|
|
4
|
+
security: definer
|
|
5
|
+
# The set of tenant ids the current actor holds a live, tenant-scoped role in
|
|
6
|
+
# (wildcard grants — user_roles.tenant_id IS NULL — are NOT in this set; test
|
|
7
|
+
# them with auth_all_tenants()). Returns nothing when there is no actor.
|
|
8
|
+
#
|
|
9
|
+
# This is the set-based, planner-friendly counterpart to auth_in_tenant. Used in
|
|
10
|
+
# an *uncorrelated* subquery an RLS policy resolves ONCE per query rather than
|
|
11
|
+
# once per row:
|
|
12
|
+
#
|
|
13
|
+
# USING (
|
|
14
|
+
# (SELECT auth_all_tenants()) -- InitPlan, evaluated once
|
|
15
|
+
# OR tenant_id IN (SELECT auth_tenant_ids()) -- hashed SubPlan, materialized once
|
|
16
|
+
# )
|
|
17
|
+
#
|
|
18
|
+
# Because the membership set is independent of the scanned row, the planner
|
|
19
|
+
# folds it into a hashed SubPlan and probes it per row instead of re-running a
|
|
20
|
+
# SECURITY DEFINER function per row (auth_in_tenant's cost on large scans). Keep
|
|
21
|
+
# auth_in_tenant for scalar/one-off call sites; reach for this on hot scan paths.
|
|
22
|
+
returns: SETOF bigint
|
|
23
|
+
args: []
|
|
24
|
+
body: |
|
|
25
|
+
BEGIN
|
|
26
|
+
RETURN QUERY
|
|
27
|
+
SELECT ur.tenant_id
|
|
28
|
+
FROM user_roles ur
|
|
29
|
+
WHERE ur.user_id = current_user_id()
|
|
30
|
+
AND ur.deleted_at IS NULL
|
|
31
|
+
AND ur.tenant_id IS NOT NULL;
|
|
32
|
+
END;
|
|
33
|
+
comment: >
|
|
34
|
+
The set of tenant ids the current actor holds a live, tenant-scoped role in
|
|
35
|
+
(wildcard grants excluded — see auth_all_tenants). SECURITY DEFINER so RLS
|
|
36
|
+
policies can use it in an uncorrelated subquery — resolved once per query, not
|
|
37
|
+
per row — without recursing on user_roles.
|
|
@@ -25,6 +25,13 @@ columns:
|
|
|
25
25
|
type: boolean
|
|
26
26
|
nullable: false
|
|
27
27
|
default: true
|
|
28
|
+
checks:
|
|
29
|
+
# The slug IS the sub-domain (acme.app.com), so it must be a valid DNS label:
|
|
30
|
+
# lowercase alphanumerics and internal hyphens, no leading/trailing hyphen. An
|
|
31
|
+
# invalid slug is an unroutable host, so reject it at the DB rather than leave
|
|
32
|
+
# every consumer to re-declare this. NULL-safe: slug is optional.
|
|
33
|
+
- name: tenants_slug_format_check
|
|
34
|
+
expression: "slug IS NULL OR slug ~ '^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?$'"
|
|
28
35
|
indexes:
|
|
29
36
|
# Partial so a tenant name can be reused after the row is soft-deleted.
|
|
30
37
|
- columns: [name]
|
|
@@ -47,7 +54,14 @@ policies:
|
|
|
47
54
|
for: SELECT
|
|
48
55
|
to: app_rls
|
|
49
56
|
permissive: true
|
|
50
|
-
|
|
57
|
+
# Decorrelated scope test: the actor's reachable tenants are resolved once
|
|
58
|
+
# per query (InitPlan + hashed SubPlan) rather than once per row, so this
|
|
59
|
+
# scales on large scans. Equivalent to auth_in_tenant(tenants.tenant_id) —
|
|
60
|
+
# which stays for scalar call sites — but planner-friendly. See
|
|
61
|
+
# auth_tenant_ids / auth_all_tenants.
|
|
62
|
+
using: |-
|
|
63
|
+
(SELECT auth_all_tenants())
|
|
64
|
+
OR tenants.tenant_id IN (SELECT auth_tenant_ids())
|
|
51
65
|
- name: tenants_insert
|
|
52
66
|
for: INSERT
|
|
53
67
|
to: app_rls
|
|
@@ -23,6 +23,13 @@ columns:
|
|
|
23
23
|
- name: code
|
|
24
24
|
type: text
|
|
25
25
|
nullable: false
|
|
26
|
+
# Optional, consumer-defined free-text label distinguishing multiple methods
|
|
27
|
+
# of the same channel (e.g. "work" vs "home" phone). The library never
|
|
28
|
+
# interprets, requires, or populates it — it exists so consumers don't carry a
|
|
29
|
+
# ucm extend solely for this one column. NULL when unset.
|
|
30
|
+
- name: qualifier
|
|
31
|
+
type: text
|
|
32
|
+
nullable: true
|
|
26
33
|
indexes:
|
|
27
34
|
# Partial so a (channel, code) can be reused after the row is soft-deleted.
|
|
28
35
|
- columns: [communication_channel_id, code]
|