@smonn/ids 0.13.1 → 0.14.1

package/dist/{rng-BHFxX1Fc.mjs.map → rng-6GyNT4zS.mjs.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"rng-BHFxX1Fc.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/wire/timestamp-bytes.ts","../src/codecs/_kernel/rng.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { decodeBase32 } from \"./base32.js\";\n\n// Timestamp byte layout: first N bytes of the plaintext payload encode a\n// big-endian Unix-ms timestamp. Shared by timestamp-family layouts.\nexport const timestampByteLength: number = 6;\n\nconst timestampBase32Length: number = Math.ceil((timestampByteLength * 8) / 5);\n\n/** Write the timestamp in big-endian; encoded via mod-256 to avoid 32-bit bitwise coercion. */\nexport function writeTimestamp(ms: number, buffer: Uint8Array): void {\n  if (Number.isNaN(ms)) throw new Error(\"timestamp is not a number\");\n  if (!Number.isInteger(ms)) throw new Error(\"timestamp is not an integer\");\n  if (ms < 0) throw new Error(\"timestamp is negative\");\n  if (ms >= 2 ** (timestampByteLength * 8)) {\n    throw new Error(\"timestamp exceeds 48-bit range\");\n  }\n  for (let i = timestampByteLength - 1; i >= 0; i--) {\n    buffer[i] = ms % 256;\n    ms = Math.floor(ms / 256);\n  }\n}\n\n/** Decode the first `timestampByteLength` bytes of a buffer as a big-endian unsigned millisecond timestamp. */\nexport function readTimestampMs(buffer: Uint8Array): number {\n  let ms = 0;\n  for (let i = 0; i < timestampByteLength; i++) ms = ms * 256 + buffer[i]!;\n  return ms;\n}\n\n/** Decodes ms from the first 10 base32 chars of a payload suffix (partial decode). */\nexport function readTimestampMsFromBase32Suffix(base32Suffix: string): number {\n  return readTimestampMs(decodeBase32(base32Suffix.slice(0, timestampBase32Length)));\n}\n","/** Default RNG: writes cryptographically random bytes via `crypto.getRandomValues`. */\nexport function defaultRng(target: Uint8Array): void {\n  crypto.getRandomValues(target as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>);\n}\n\n// hex charCode → 0–15 nibble, for harvesting bytes out of a UUIDv4 string.\n// Covers ['0'-'9' = 48–57] and ['a'-'f' = 97–102]; randomUUID is lowercase per spec.\nconst hexCharCodeToNibble = new Uint8Array(128);\nfor (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) hexCharCodeToNibble[48 + i] = i;\nfor (let i = 0; i < 6; i++) hexCharCodeToNibble[97 + i] = 10 + i;\n\n/**\n * Fast RNG for the 10-byte random tail shared by the plaintext timestamp layouts\n * (Timestamp and Reverse Timestamp codecs). Writes exactly `target[0..9]`.\n *\n * `crypto.randomUUID()` is ~7× faster than `crypto.getRandomValues` in Node 24\n * (~84 ns vs ~610 ns for a 16-byte fill — the UUID path has a tight fixed-format\n * fast path). A UUIDv4 string carries 122 cryptographically-random bits; we\n * harvest 10 fully-random bytes from positions where no version (hex 12) or\n * variant (hex 16) bits sit. String layout: `xxxxxxxx-xxxx-4xxx-yxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx`\n * — bytes 0–5 are string[0..7]+string[9..12], bytes 6–9 are string[24..31].\n *\n * Security-equivalent to `defaultRng` for a 10-byte tail (both are CSPRNG-backed,\n * fully-random bytes); the only difference is throughput.\n */\nexport function fastTenByteRng(target: Uint8Array): void {\n  const s = crypto.randomUUID();\n  target[0] = (hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(0)]! << 4) | hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(1)]!;\n  target[1] = (hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(2)]! << 4) | hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(3)]!;\n  target[2] = (hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(4)]! << 4) | hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(5)]!;\n  target[3] = (hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(6)]! << 4) | hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(7)]!;\n  target[4] = (hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(9)]! << 4) | hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(10)]!;\n  target[5] =\n    (hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(11)]! << 4) | hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(12)]!;\n  target[6] =\n    (hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(24)]! << 4) | hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(25)]!;\n  target[7] =\n    (hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(26)]! << 4) | hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(27)]!;\n  target[8] =\n    (hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(28)]! << 4) | hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(29)]!;\n  target[9] =\n    (hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(30)]! << 4) | hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(31)]!;\n}\n"],"mappings":";AAMA,MAAM,wBAAgC,KAAK,KAAA,KAAiC,CAAC;;AAG7E,SAAgB,eAAe,IAAY,QAA0B;CACnE,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,2BAA2B;CACjE,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,6BAA6B;CACxE,IAAI,KAAK,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,uBAAuB;CACnD,IAAI,MAAM,KAAA,IACR,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,gCAAgC;CAElD,KAAK,IAAI,IAAA,GAA6B,KAAK,GAAG,KAAK;EACjD,OAAO,KAAK,KAAK;EACjB,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG;CAC1B;AACF;;AAGA,SAAgB,gBAAgB,QAA4B;CAC1D,IAAI,KAAK;CACT,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,IAAA,GAAyB,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO;CACrE,OAAO;AACT;;AAGA,SAAgB,gCAAgC,cAA8B;CAC5E,OAAO,gBAAgB,aAAa,aAAa,MAAM,GAAG,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC;AACnF;;;;AC/BA,SAAgB,WAAW,QAA0B;CACnD,OAAO,gBAAgB,MAAiC;AAC1D;AAIA,MAAM,sCAAsB,IAAI,WAAW,GAAG;AAC9C,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,oBAAoB,KAAK,KAAK;AAC3D,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK,oBAAoB,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAgB/D,SAAgB,eAAe,QAA0B;CACvD,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,WAAW;CAC5B,OAAO,KAAM,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,MAAO,IAAK,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;CAC7F,OAAO,KAAM,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,MAAO,IAAK,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;CAC7F,OAAO,KAAM,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,MAAO,IAAK,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;CAC7F,OAAO,KAAM,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,MAAO,IAAK,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;CAC7F,OAAO,KAAM,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,MAAO,IAAK,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE;CAC9F,OAAO,KACJ,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAO,IAAK,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE;CACrF,OAAO,KACJ,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAO,IAAK,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE;CACrF,OAAO,KACJ,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAO,IAAK,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE;CACrF,OAAO,KACJ,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAO,IAAK,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE;CACrF,OAAO,KACJ,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAO,IAAK,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE;AACvF"}
+{"version":3,"file":"rng-6GyNT4zS.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/wire/timestamp-bytes.ts","../src/codecs/_kernel/rng.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { decodeBase32 } from \"./base32.js\";\n\n// Timestamp byte layout: first N bytes of the plaintext payload encode a\n// big-endian Unix-ms timestamp. Shared by timestamp-family layouts.\nexport const timestampByteLength: number = 6;\n\nconst timestampBase32Length: number = Math.ceil((timestampByteLength * 8) / 5);\n\n/** Write the timestamp in big-endian; encoded via mod-256 to avoid 32-bit bitwise coercion. */\nexport function writeTimestamp(ms: number, buffer: Uint8Array): void {\n  if (Number.isNaN(ms)) throw new Error(\"timestamp is not a number\");\n  if (!Number.isInteger(ms)) throw new Error(\"timestamp is not an integer\");\n  if (ms < 0) throw new Error(\"timestamp is negative\");\n  if (ms >= 2 ** (timestampByteLength * 8)) {\n    throw new Error(\"timestamp exceeds 48-bit range\");\n  }\n  for (let i = timestampByteLength - 1; i >= 0; i--) {\n    buffer[i] = ms % 256;\n    ms = Math.floor(ms / 256);\n  }\n}\n\n/** Decode the first `timestampByteLength` bytes of a buffer as a big-endian unsigned millisecond timestamp. */\nexport function readTimestampMs(buffer: Uint8Array): number {\n  let ms = 0;\n  for (let i = 0; i < timestampByteLength; i++) ms = ms * 256 + buffer[i]!;\n  return ms;\n}\n\n/** Decodes ms from the first 10 base32 chars of a payload suffix (partial decode). */\nexport function readTimestampMsFromBase32Suffix(base32Suffix: string): number {\n  return readTimestampMs(decodeBase32(base32Suffix.slice(0, timestampBase32Length)));\n}\n","/** Default RNG: writes cryptographically random bytes via `crypto.getRandomValues`. */\nexport function defaultRng(target: Uint8Array): void {\n  crypto.getRandomValues(target as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>);\n}\n\n// hex charCode → 0–15 nibble, for harvesting bytes out of a UUIDv4 string.\n// Covers ['0'-'9' = 48–57] and ['a'-'f' = 97–102]; randomUUID is lowercase per spec.\nconst hexCharCodeToNibble = new Uint8Array(128);\nfor (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) hexCharCodeToNibble[48 + i] = i;\nfor (let i = 0; i < 6; i++) hexCharCodeToNibble[97 + i] = 10 + i;\n\n/**\n * Fast RNG for the 10-byte random tail shared by the plaintext timestamp layouts\n * (Timestamp and Reverse Timestamp codecs). Writes exactly `target[0..9]`.\n *\n * `crypto.randomUUID()` is ~7× faster than `crypto.getRandomValues` in Node 24\n * (~84 ns vs ~610 ns for a 16-byte fill — the UUID path has a tight fixed-format\n * fast path). A UUIDv4 string carries 122 cryptographically-random bits; we\n * harvest 10 fully-random bytes from positions where no version (hex 12) or\n * variant (hex 16) bits sit. String layout: `xxxxxxxx-xxxx-4xxx-yxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx`\n * — bytes 0–5 are string[0..7]+string[9..12], bytes 6–9 are string[24..31].\n *\n * Security-equivalent to `defaultRng` for a 10-byte tail (both are CSPRNG-backed,\n * fully-random bytes); the only difference is throughput.\n */\nexport function fastTenByteRng(target: Uint8Array): void {\n  const s = crypto.randomUUID();\n  target[0] = (hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(0)]! << 4) | hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(1)]!;\n  target[1] = (hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(2)]! << 4) | hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(3)]!;\n  target[2] = (hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(4)]! << 4) | hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(5)]!;\n  target[3] = (hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(6)]! << 4) | hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(7)]!;\n  target[4] = (hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(9)]! << 4) | hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(10)]!;\n  target[5] =\n    (hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(11)]! << 4) | hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(12)]!;\n  target[6] =\n    (hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(24)]! << 4) | hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(25)]!;\n  target[7] =\n    (hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(26)]! << 4) | hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(27)]!;\n  target[8] =\n    (hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(28)]! << 4) | hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(29)]!;\n  target[9] =\n    (hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(30)]! << 4) | hexCharCodeToNibble[s.charCodeAt(31)]!;\n}\n"],"mappings":";AAMA,MAAM,wBAAgC,KAAK,KAAA,KAAiC,CAAC;;AAG7E,SAAgB,eAAe,IAAY,QAA0B;CACnE,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,2BAA2B;CACjE,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,6BAA6B;CACxE,IAAI,KAAK,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,uBAAuB;CACnD,IAAI,MAAM,KAAA,IACR,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,gCAAgC;CAElD,KAAK,IAAI,IAAA,GAA6B,KAAK,GAAG,KAAK;EACjD,OAAO,KAAK,KAAK;EACjB,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG;CAC1B;AACF;;AAGA,SAAgB,gBAAgB,QAA4B;CAC1D,IAAI,KAAK;CACT,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,IAAA,GAAyB,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO;CACrE,OAAO;AACT;;AAGA,SAAgB,gCAAgC,cAA8B;CAC5E,OAAO,gBAAgB,aAAa,aAAa,MAAM,GAAG,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC;AACnF;;;;AC/BA,SAAgB,WAAW,QAA0B;CACnD,OAAO,gBAAgB,MAAiC;AAC1D;AAIA,MAAM,sCAAsB,IAAI,WAAW,GAAG;AAC9C,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,oBAAoB,KAAK,KAAK;AAC3D,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK,oBAAoB,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAgB/D,SAAgB,eAAe,QAA0B;CACvD,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,WAAW;CAC5B,OAAO,KAAM,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,MAAO,IAAK,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;CAC7F,OAAO,KAAM,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,MAAO,IAAK,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;CAC7F,OAAO,KAAM,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,MAAO,IAAK,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;CAC7F,OAAO,KAAM,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,MAAO,IAAK,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;CAC7F,OAAO,KAAM,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,MAAO,IAAK,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE;CAC9F,OAAO,KACJ,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAO,IAAK,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE;CACrF,OAAO,KACJ,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAO,IAAK,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE;CACrF,OAAO,KACJ,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAO,IAAK,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE;CACrF,OAAO,KACJ,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAO,IAAK,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE;CACrF,OAAO,KACJ,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAO,IAAK,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE;AACvF"}

package/dist/{signed-BTz3ZFYE.mjs → signed-Dkdteu1y.mjs}

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import { t as IdsError } from "./error-Cp5qYZcv.mjs";
-import { a as toWireId, i as payloadBytesFromId, n as registerBrand, r as payloadBase32Length, s as validateBrand, t as wireMethods } from "./codec-shell-C2NKQEx2.mjs";
-import { a as writeTimestamp, i as readTimestampMsFromBase32Suffix, t as defaultRng } from "./rng-BHFxX1Fc.mjs";
-import { c as timingSafeEqual, i as encodeKeyMaterial, n as assertValidKeyring, o as deriveKey, r as decodeKeyMaterial, t as assertValidKeyMaterialByteLength } from "./key-material-DvjACe89.mjs";
+import { a as toWireId, i as payloadBytesFromId, n as registerBrand, r as payloadBase32Length, s as validateBrand, t as wireMethods } from "./codec-shell-BRZkuQeP.mjs";
+import { a as writeTimestamp, i as readTimestampMsFromBase32Suffix, t as defaultRng } from "./rng-6GyNT4zS.mjs";
+import { c as timingSafeEqual, i as encodeKeyMaterial, n as assertValidKeyring, o as deriveKey, r as decodeKeyMaterial, t as assertValidKeyMaterialByteLength } from "./key-material-1wOKJ1o-.mjs";
 const tagByteLength = 5;
 const randomOffset = 6;
 const tagOffset = 11;
@@ -176,10 +176,13 @@ function createSignedTimestampId(brand, opts) {
 		parse: wire.parse,
 		safeParse: wire.safeParse,
 		toJsonSchema: () => wire.toJsonSchema(brand, layout.exampleWireId()),
-		"~standard": wire["~standard"]
+		"~standard": wire["~standard"],
+		toUUID: wire.toUUID,
+		fromUUID: wire.fromUUID,
+		safeFromUUID: wire.safeFromUUID
 	};
 }
 //#endregion
 export { importSigningKey as i, decodeSigningKey as n, encodeSigningKey as r, createSignedTimestampId as t };
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=signed-BTz3ZFYE.mjs.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=signed-Dkdteu1y.mjs.map

package/dist/{signed-BTz3ZFYE.mjs.map → signed-Dkdteu1y.mjs.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"signed-BTz3ZFYE.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/codecs/signed/layout.ts","../src/codecs/signed/key.ts","../src/codecs/signed/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { webcrypto } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport type { Id, LayoutOps, Prefix } from \"../../types.js\";\nimport { timingSafeEqual } from \"../_kernel/crypto.js\";\nimport { payloadBytesFromId, toWireId } from \"../../wire/envelope.js\";\nimport { payloadBase32Length, payloadByteLength } from \"../../wire/invariants.js\";\nimport {\n  readTimestampMsFromBase32Suffix,\n  timestampByteLength,\n  writeTimestamp,\n} from \"../../wire/timestamp-bytes.js\";\n\nconst randomByteLength = 5;\nconst tagByteLength = 5;\nconst randomOffset = timestampByteLength; // 6\nconst tagOffset = randomOffset + randomByteLength; // 11\nconst signedContentByteLength = randomOffset + randomByteLength; // 11 (ts6 ‖ rand5)\n\nasync function computeTag(\n  hmacKey: webcrypto.CryptoKey,\n  brandBytes: Uint8Array,\n  signedContent: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const message = new Uint8Array(brandBytes.length + signedContent.length);\n  message.set(brandBytes, 0);\n  message.set(signedContent, brandBytes.length);\n  const signature = new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.sign(\"HMAC\", hmacKey, message as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>),\n  );\n  return signature.subarray(0, tagByteLength);\n}\n\nexport function createSignedTimestampLayoutOps<Brand extends string>(\n  prefix: Prefix<Brand>,\n  brand: Brand,\n  rng: (target: Uint8Array) => void,\n  hmacKeys: readonly webcrypto.CryptoKey[],\n): LayoutOps<Brand> & {\n  generateAt(ms: number): Promise<Id<Brand>>;\n  tryVerify(id: Id<Brand>): Promise<boolean>;\n  extractTimestamp(id: Id<Brand>): Date;\n  minIdForTime(ms: number): Id<Brand>;\n  maxIdForTime(ms: number): Id<Brand>;\n} {\n  const signKey = hmacKeys[0]!;\n  const brandBytes = new TextEncoder().encode(brand);\n  const syncBuffer = new Uint8Array(payloadByteLength);\n\n  return {\n    generateAt: async (ms: number): Promise<Id<Brand>> => {\n      const buffer = new Uint8Array(payloadByteLength);\n      writeTimestamp(ms, buffer);\n      rng(buffer.subarray(randomOffset, tagOffset));\n      const tag = await computeTag(\n        signKey,\n        brandBytes,\n        buffer.subarray(0, signedContentByteLength),\n      );\n      buffer.set(tag, tagOffset);\n      return toWireId(prefix, buffer);\n    },\n    tryVerify: async (id: Id<Brand>): Promise<boolean> => {\n      const payload = payloadBytesFromId(prefix, id);\n      const storedTag = payload.subarray(tagOffset, payloadByteLength);\n      const signedContent = payload.subarray(0, signedContentByteLength);\n      for (const hmacKey of hmacKeys) {\n        const expected = await computeTag(hmacKey, brandBytes, signedContent);\n        if (timingSafeEqual(storedTag, expected)) return true;\n      }\n      return false;\n    },\n    extractTimestamp: (id: Id<Brand>): Date =>\n      new Date(readTimestampMsFromBase32Suffix(id.slice(prefix.length))),\n    minIdForTime: (ms: number): Id<Brand> => {\n      writeTimestamp(ms, syncBuffer);\n      syncBuffer.fill(0x00, randomOffset, payloadByteLength);\n      return toWireId(prefix, syncBuffer);\n    },\n    maxIdForTime: (ms: number): Id<Brand> => {\n      writeTimestamp(ms, syncBuffer);\n      syncBuffer.fill(0xff, randomOffset, payloadByteLength);\n      return toWireId(prefix, syncBuffer);\n    },\n    exampleWireId: (_ms?: number): Id<Brand> =>\n      (prefix + \"0\".repeat(payloadBase32Length)) as Id<Brand>,\n  };\n}\n","import type { webcrypto } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport { deriveKey, timingSafeEqual } from \"../_kernel/crypto.js\";\nimport {\n  assertValidKeyMaterialByteLength,\n  assertValidKeyring,\n  decodeKeyMaterial,\n  encodeKeyMaterial,\n} from \"../_kernel/key-material.js\";\n\nexport { assertValidKeyring };\n\n/** Wire encoding for signing key raw key bytes (not Crockford base32). */\nexport type SigningKeyFormat = \"hex\" | \"base64url\";\n\nconst hmacInfo = new TextEncoder().encode(\"@smonn/ids/signed/hmac\");\n\ndeclare const signingKeyBrand: unique symbol;\n\n/**\n * Opaque imported handle for one operator signing key.\n *\n * Holds a single HMAC-SHA-256 key derived via HKDF under the domain-separation\n * label `@smonn/ids/signed/hmac`. The underlying `webcrypto.CryptoKey` is held\n * internally and never exposed to callers. Obtain handles via\n * {@link importSigningKey} and pass them to `createSignedTimestampId` as the\n * `keys` signing keyring.\n *\n * Distinct from both the **Opaque key** and the **Wrapping key** — the same\n * raw key material must not silently serve multiple codecs without an explicit import.\n */\nexport type SigningKey = {\n  readonly [signingKeyBrand]: \"SigningKey\";\n};\n\ntype SigningKeyInternals = {\n  keyDigest: Uint8Array;\n  hmacKey: webcrypto.CryptoKey;\n};\n\nconst internals = new WeakMap<SigningKey, SigningKeyInternals>();\n\n/**\n * Import raw operator key material into a {@link SigningKey} handle.\n *\n * Derives a single HMAC-SHA-256 key via HKDF under the domain-separation label\n * `@smonn/ids/signed/hmac`. Accepts 16, 24, or 32 bytes. To store or\n * transport key material, use {@link encodeSigningKey} / {@link decodeSigningKey}\n * (`\"hex\"` or `\"base64url\"` — not Crockford base32).\n *\n * @param bytes - 16, 24, or 32 raw key bytes.\n * @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_length` if `bytes.length` is not 16, 24, or 32.\n */\nexport async function importSigningKey(bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<SigningKey> {\n  assertValidKeyMaterialByteLength(bytes.length, \"signing\");\n  const [hmacKey, digestBuffer] = await Promise.all([\n    deriveKey(bytes, hmacInfo, { name: \"HMAC\", hash: \"SHA-256\", length: 256 }, [\"sign\", \"verify\"]),\n    crypto.subtle.digest(\"SHA-256\", bytes as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>),\n  ]);\n  const key = Object.freeze({}) as SigningKey;\n  internals.set(key, { keyDigest: new Uint8Array(digestBuffer), hmacKey });\n  return key;\n}\n\n/**\n * Encode raw signing operator key material for storage in env vars or secret managers.\n *\n * Supports `\"hex\"` (lowercase) and `\"base64url\"`. Output round-trips through\n * {@link decodeSigningKey} back to the original bytes.\n *\n * @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_format` if `format` is not `\"hex\"` or `\"base64url\"`.\n * @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_length` if `bytes.length` is not 16, 24, or 32.\n */\nexport function encodeSigningKey(bytes: Uint8Array, format: SigningKeyFormat): string {\n  return encodeKeyMaterial(bytes, format, \"signing\", \"signing\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode key material emitted by {@link encodeSigningKey} back to raw bytes.\n *\n * The result can be passed directly to {@link importSigningKey}.\n *\n * @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_format` if `format` is not `\"hex\"` or `\"base64url\"`.\n * @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_encoding` if the string is malformed for its format.\n * @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_length` if the decoded bytes are not 16, 24, or 32 bytes.\n */\nexport function decodeSigningKey(encoded: string, format: SigningKeyFormat): Uint8Array {\n  return decodeKeyMaterial(encoded, format, \"signing\", \"signing\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when two handles were imported from the same raw key material.\n *\n * Uses a constant-time comparison so duplicate detection over key material does\n * not leak the position of the first differing byte through a timing side channel.\n */\nexport function signingKeysEqual(a: SigningKey, b: SigningKey): boolean {\n  return timingSafeEqual(getSigningKeyInternals(a).keyDigest, getSigningKeyInternals(b).keyDigest);\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns the derived HMAC webcrypto.CryptoKey held inside the handle.\n *\n * Intentional module-internal escape hatch for codec implementations (e.g. `createSignedTimestampId`).\n * Not re-exported from `@smonn/ids/signed`; external callers cannot reach this.\n */\nexport function getSigningKeyHmacKey(key: SigningKey): webcrypto.CryptoKey {\n  return getSigningKeyInternals(key).hmacKey;\n}\n\nfunction getSigningKeyInternals(key: SigningKey): SigningKeyInternals {\n  const keyInternals = internals.get(key);\n  if (keyInternals === undefined) {\n    throw new Error(\"invalid signing key\");\n  }\n  return keyInternals;\n}\n","import { validateBrand } from \"../_kernel/brand.js\";\nimport { IdsError } from \"../../error.js\";\nimport { createSignedTimestampLayoutOps } from \"./layout.js\";\nimport { registerBrand } from \"../_kernel/registry.js\";\nimport { defaultRng } from \"../_kernel/rng.js\";\nimport type {\n  Id,\n  JsonSchema,\n  ParseError,\n  ParseResult,\n  Prefix,\n  StandardSchemaProps,\n  ValidBrand,\n} from \"../../types.js\";\nimport { wireMethods } from \"../../wire/codec-shell.js\";\nimport {\n  assertValidKeyring,\n  decodeSigningKey,\n  encodeSigningKey,\n  getSigningKeyHmacKey,\n  importSigningKey,\n  signingKeysEqual,\n  type SigningKey,\n  type SigningKeyFormat,\n} from \"./key.js\";\n\n/** {@link IdsError} class, {@link isIdsError} type guard, and {@link IdsErrorCode} union — re-exported from `\"@smonn/ids\"` for convenience. */\nexport { IdsError, isIdsError, type IdsErrorCode } from \"../../error.js\";\nexport {\n  decodeSigningKey,\n  encodeSigningKey,\n  importSigningKey,\n  type SigningKey,\n  type SigningKeyFormat,\n};\n\n/**\n * Configuration options for a Signed Timestamp codec instance.\n */\nexport type SignedTimestampOptions = {\n  /**\n   * Non-empty ordered signing keyring. The first entry is current — the only one\n   * `generate` / `generateAt` sign with. `verify` / `safeVerify` trial every entry\n   * until the tag matches. Duplicate raw secrets are rejected at construction.\n   */\n  keys: [SigningKey, ...SigningKey[]];\n  /** Returns the current timestamp in milliseconds. Defaults to `Date.now`. */\n  now?: () => number;\n  /** Writes 5 random bytes into `target` for the random tail. Defaults to `crypto.getRandomValues`. */\n  rng?: (target: Uint8Array) => void;\n  /** If true, silences the duplicate-brand warning in non-production environments. */\n  allowDuplicateBrand?: boolean;\n};\n\n/**\n * Result returned by {@link SignedTimestampCodec.safeVerify}.\n *\n * On success, `id` is the canonical {@link Id}.\n * On failure, `error` is a {@link ParseError} for structural problems or\n * `\"verification_failed\"` when the HMAC tag does not match any entry in the\n * signing keyring.\n */\nexport type SafeVerifyResult<Brand extends string> =\n  | { ok: true; id: Id<Brand> }\n  | { ok: false; error: ParseError | \"verification_failed\" };\n\n/**\n * Codec returned by {@link createSignedTimestampId}.\n *\n * Keeps the 6-byte millisecond timestamp **readable and sortable** like the\n * Timestamp codec, but replaces half of the 10-byte random tail with a truncated\n * HMAC tag, making IDs **tamper-evident and verifiable without a database lookup**.\n *\n * Byte layout: `ts6 ‖ rand5 ‖ tag5` where the 40-bit tag =\n * `trunc(HMAC-SHA256(hmacKey, brand ‖ ts6 ‖ rand5), 40)`.\n *\n * - Async (HMAC): `generate`, `generateAt`, `verify`, `safeVerify`.\n * - Sync (no key / plaintext timestamp): all other methods.\n */\nexport type SignedTimestampCodec<Brand extends string> = {\n  /** Produces a canonical ID signed with the current (first) key. */\n  generate(): Promise<Id<Brand>>;\n  /**\n   * Produces a canonical ID with timestamp from `date`, signed with the current key.\n   * Throws on invalid dates.\n   */\n  generateAt(date: Date): Promise<Id<Brand>>;\n  /**\n   * Recomputes the HMAC tag across every keyring entry.\n   *\n   * Throws `IdsError` with `code: \"verification_failed\"` if no entry matches.\n   * Tamper of the brand, timestamp bytes, or random bytes all fail here.\n   */\n  verify(id: Id<Brand>): Promise<void>;\n  /**\n   * Non-throwing path for untrusted input.\n   *\n   * Structurally parses `input` first (same rules as {@link safeParse}), then\n   * verifies the HMAC tag. Returns `{ ok: false, error }` on any failure —\n   * {@link ParseError} for structural problems or `\"verification_failed\"` for tag\n   * mismatch — without throwing.\n   */\n  safeVerify(input: unknown): Promise<SafeVerifyResult<Brand>>;\n  /**\n   * Decodes the creation `Date` from an `Id<Brand>`.\n   * Sync — the 6-byte timestamp is plaintext. Trusts the type; use `safeParse()` at boundaries first.\n   *\n   * Best-effort: the timestamp is returned **without checking the HMAC tag** — a tampered\n   * or unsigned ID yields the attacker-controlled timestamp without error. Call\n   * `verify()` / `safeVerify()` first if you need an authenticated timestamp.\n   */\n  extractTimestamp(id: Id<Brand>): Date;\n  /**\n   * Tight lower bound sentinel for range scans (`ts(t) ‖ 0x00×10`).\n   * **Not verifiable** — carries no valid tag.\n   */\n  minIdForTime(date: Date): Id<Brand>;\n  /**\n   * Tight upper bound sentinel for range scans (`ts(t) ‖ 0xff×10`).\n   * **Not verifiable** — carries no valid tag.\n   */\n  maxIdForTime(date: Date): Id<Brand>;\n  /**\n   * Strict type guard: `true` only for already-canonical `Id<Brand>` strings.\n   * For untrusted input, use `safeParse()` or `safeVerify()` instead.\n   */\n  is(value: unknown): value is Id<Brand>;\n  /** Normalise to canonical form, or throw on parse failure. */\n  parse(value: unknown): Id<Brand>;\n  /** Normalise to canonical form, or return `{ ok: false, error }`. */\n  safeParse(value: unknown): ParseResult<Brand>;\n  /**\n   * JSON Schema for the canonical wire form. The `pattern` matches the canonical stored\n   * form only and is deliberately stricter than `parse()`/`safeParse()`, which accept\n   * uppercase letters and Crockford aliases (`o`/`i`/`l`) before normalising. See ADR-0003.\n   */\n  toJsonSchema(): JsonSchema;\n  /** Standard Schema validate entry point. */\n  readonly \"~standard\": StandardSchemaProps<Brand>;\n};\n\n/**\n * Construct a {@link SignedTimestampCodec} for `brand`.\n *\n * `opts.keys` is a non-empty ordered signing keyring — the first entry is current\n * (used by `generate` / `generateAt`); all entries are tried on `verify` /\n * `safeVerify`; duplicate operator secrets are rejected at construction.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const key = await importSigningKey(new Uint8Array(32));\n * const usr = createSignedTimestampId(\"usr\", { keys: [key] });\n *\n * const id = await usr.generate();        // Id<\"usr\">\n * await usr.verify(id);                   // passes\n * usr.extractTimestamp(id);               // Date — sync, timestamp is plaintext\n * ```\n */\nexport function createSignedTimestampId<Brand extends string>(\n  brand: Brand & ValidBrand<Brand>,\n  opts: SignedTimestampOptions,\n): SignedTimestampCodec<Brand> {\n  validateBrand(brand);\n  registerBrand(brand, opts.allowDuplicateBrand);\n  assertValidKeyring(opts.keys, signingKeysEqual, \"signing\");\n\n  const hmacKeys = opts.keys.map(getSigningKeyHmacKey);\n  const now = opts.now ?? Date.now;\n  const rng = opts.rng ?? defaultRng;\n  const prefix: Prefix<Brand> = `${brand}_`;\n  const wire = wireMethods(prefix);\n  const layout = createSignedTimestampLayoutOps(prefix, brand, rng, hmacKeys);\n\n  return {\n    generate: () => layout.generateAt(now()),\n    generateAt: (date: Date) => layout.generateAt(date.getTime()),\n    verify: async (id) => {\n      const ok = await layout.tryVerify(id);\n      if (!ok) throw new IdsError(\"verification_failed\", \"verification failed\");\n    },\n    safeVerify: async (input) => {\n      const parsed = wire.safeParse(input);\n      if (!parsed.ok) return parsed;\n      const ok = await layout.tryVerify(parsed.id);\n      if (!ok) return { ok: false, error: \"verification_failed\" };\n      return { ok: true, id: parsed.id };\n    },\n    extractTimestamp: layout.extractTimestamp,\n    minIdForTime: (date: Date) => layout.minIdForTime(date.getTime()),\n    maxIdForTime: (date: Date) => layout.maxIdForTime(date.getTime()),\n    is: wire.is,\n    parse: wire.parse,\n    safeParse: wire.safeParse,\n    toJsonSchema: () => wire.toJsonSchema(brand, layout.exampleWireId()),\n    \"~standard\": wire[\"~standard\"],\n  };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;AAYA,MAAM,gBAAgB;AACtB,MAAM,eAAA;AACN,MAAM,YAAY;AAClB,MAAM,0BAA0B;AAEhC,eAAe,WACb,SACA,YACA,eACqB;CACrB,MAAM,UAAU,IAAI,WAAW,WAAW,SAAS,cAAc,MAAM;CACvE,QAAQ,IAAI,YAAY,CAAC;CACzB,QAAQ,IAAI,eAAe,WAAW,MAAM;CAI5C,OAAO,IAHe,WACpB,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,SAAS,OAAkC,CAE/D,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,GAAG,aAAa;AAC5C;AAEA,SAAgB,+BACd,QACA,OACA,KACA,UAOA;CACA,MAAM,UAAU,SAAS;CACzB,MAAM,aAAa,IAAI,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,KAAK;CACjD,MAAM,6BAAa,IAAI,WAAA,EAA4B;CAEnD,OAAO;EACL,YAAY,OAAO,OAAmC;GACpD,MAAM,yBAAS,IAAI,WAAA,EAA4B;GAC/C,eAAe,IAAI,MAAM;GACzB,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS,cAAc,SAAS,CAAC;GAC5C,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,WAChB,SACA,YACA,OAAO,SAAS,GAAG,uBAAuB,CAC5C;GACA,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,SAAS;GACzB,OAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,MAAM;EAChC;EACA,WAAW,OAAO,OAAoC;GACpD,MAAM,UAAU,mBAAmB,QAAQ,EAAE;GAC7C,MAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,SAAS,WAAA,EAA4B;GAC/D,MAAM,gBAAgB,QAAQ,SAAS,GAAG,uBAAuB;GACjE,KAAK,MAAM,WAAW,UAEpB,IAAI,gBAAgB,WAAW,MADR,WAAW,SAAS,YAAY,aAAa,CAC7B,GAAG,OAAO;GAEnD,OAAO;EACT;EACA,mBAAmB,OACjB,IAAI,KAAK,gCAAgC,GAAG,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;EACnE,eAAe,OAA0B;GACvC,eAAe,IAAI,UAAU;GAC7B,WAAW,KAAK,GAAM,cAAA,EAA+B;GACrD,OAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,UAAU;EACpC;EACA,eAAe,OAA0B;GACvC,eAAe,IAAI,UAAU;GAC7B,WAAW,KAAK,KAAM,cAAA,EAA+B;GACrD,OAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,UAAU;EACpC;EACA,gBAAgB,QACb,SAAS,IAAI,OAAO,mBAAmB;CAC5C;AACF;;;ACvEA,MAAM,WAAW,IAAI,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,wBAAwB;AAyBlE,MAAM,4BAAY,IAAI,QAAyC;;;;;;;;;;;;AAa/D,eAAsB,iBAAiB,OAAwC;CAC7E,iCAAiC,MAAM,QAAQ,SAAS;CACxD,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,gBAAgB,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,CAChD,UAAU,OAAO,UAAU;EAAE,MAAM;EAAQ,MAAM;EAAW,QAAQ;CAAI,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,QAAQ,CAAC,GAC7F,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO,WAAW,KAAgC,CAClE,CAAC;CACD,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;CAC5B,UAAU,IAAI,KAAK;EAAE,WAAW,IAAI,WAAW,YAAY;EAAG;CAAQ,CAAC;CACvE,OAAO;AACT;;;;;;;;;;AAWA,SAAgB,iBAAiB,OAAmB,QAAkC;CACpF,OAAO,kBAAkB,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS;AAC9D;;;;;;;;;;AAWA,SAAgB,iBAAiB,SAAiB,QAAsC;CACtF,OAAO,kBAAkB,SAAS,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS;AAChE;;;;;;;AAQA,SAAgB,iBAAiB,GAAe,GAAwB;CACtE,OAAO,gBAAgB,uBAAuB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,uBAAuB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;AACjG;;;;;;;AAQA,SAAgB,qBAAqB,KAAsC;CACzE,OAAO,uBAAuB,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;AACrC;AAEA,SAAS,uBAAuB,KAAsC;CACpE,MAAM,eAAe,UAAU,IAAI,GAAG;CACtC,IAAI,iBAAiB,KAAA,GACnB,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,qBAAqB;CAEvC,OAAO;AACT;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AC2CA,SAAgB,wBACd,OACA,MAC6B;CAC7B,cAAc,KAAK;CACnB,cAAc,OAAO,KAAK,mBAAmB;CAC7C,mBAAmB,KAAK,MAAM,kBAAkB,SAAS;CAEzD,MAAM,WAAW,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI,oBAAoB;CACnD,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK;CAC7B,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO;CACxB,MAAM,SAAwB,GAAG,MAAM;CACvC,MAAM,OAAO,YAAY,MAAM;CAC/B,MAAM,SAAS,+BAA+B,QAAQ,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ;CAE1E,OAAO;EACL,gBAAgB,OAAO,WAAW,IAAI,CAAC;EACvC,aAAa,SAAe,OAAO,WAAW,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC;EAC5D,QAAQ,OAAO,OAAO;GAEpB,IAAI,CAAC,MADY,OAAO,UAAU,EAAE,GAC3B,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,uBAAuB,qBAAqB;EAC1E;EACA,YAAY,OAAO,UAAU;GAC3B,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK;GACnC,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO;GAEvB,IAAI,CAAC,MADY,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,EAAE,GAClC,OAAO;IAAE,IAAI;IAAO,OAAO;GAAsB;GAC1D,OAAO;IAAE,IAAI;IAAM,IAAI,OAAO;GAAG;EACnC;EACA,kBAAkB,OAAO;EACzB,eAAe,SAAe,OAAO,aAAa,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC;EAChE,eAAe,SAAe,OAAO,aAAa,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC;EAChE,IAAI,KAAK;EACT,OAAO,KAAK;EACZ,WAAW,KAAK;EAChB,oBAAoB,KAAK,aAAa,OAAO,OAAO,cAAc,CAAC;EACnE,aAAa,KAAK;CACpB;AACF"}
+{"version":3,"file":"signed-Dkdteu1y.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/codecs/signed/layout.ts","../src/codecs/signed/key.ts","../src/codecs/signed/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { webcrypto } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport type { Id, LayoutOps, Prefix } from \"../../types.js\";\nimport { timingSafeEqual } from \"../_kernel/crypto.js\";\nimport { payloadBytesFromId, toWireId } from \"../../wire/envelope.js\";\nimport { payloadBase32Length, payloadByteLength } from \"../../wire/invariants.js\";\nimport {\n  readTimestampMsFromBase32Suffix,\n  timestampByteLength,\n  writeTimestamp,\n} from \"../../wire/timestamp-bytes.js\";\n\nconst randomByteLength = 5;\nconst tagByteLength = 5;\nconst randomOffset = timestampByteLength; // 6\nconst tagOffset = randomOffset + randomByteLength; // 11\nconst signedContentByteLength = randomOffset + randomByteLength; // 11 (ts6 ‖ rand5)\n\nasync function computeTag(\n  hmacKey: webcrypto.CryptoKey,\n  brandBytes: Uint8Array,\n  signedContent: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const message = new Uint8Array(brandBytes.length + signedContent.length);\n  message.set(brandBytes, 0);\n  message.set(signedContent, brandBytes.length);\n  const signature = new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.sign(\"HMAC\", hmacKey, message as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>),\n  );\n  return signature.subarray(0, tagByteLength);\n}\n\nexport function createSignedTimestampLayoutOps<Brand extends string>(\n  prefix: Prefix<Brand>,\n  brand: Brand,\n  rng: (target: Uint8Array) => void,\n  hmacKeys: readonly webcrypto.CryptoKey[],\n): LayoutOps<Brand> & {\n  generateAt(ms: number): Promise<Id<Brand>>;\n  tryVerify(id: Id<Brand>): Promise<boolean>;\n  extractTimestamp(id: Id<Brand>): Date;\n  minIdForTime(ms: number): Id<Brand>;\n  maxIdForTime(ms: number): Id<Brand>;\n} {\n  const signKey = hmacKeys[0]!;\n  const brandBytes = new TextEncoder().encode(brand);\n  const syncBuffer = new Uint8Array(payloadByteLength);\n\n  return {\n    generateAt: async (ms: number): Promise<Id<Brand>> => {\n      const buffer = new Uint8Array(payloadByteLength);\n      writeTimestamp(ms, buffer);\n      rng(buffer.subarray(randomOffset, tagOffset));\n      const tag = await computeTag(\n        signKey,\n        brandBytes,\n        buffer.subarray(0, signedContentByteLength),\n      );\n      buffer.set(tag, tagOffset);\n      return toWireId(prefix, buffer);\n    },\n    tryVerify: async (id: Id<Brand>): Promise<boolean> => {\n      const payload = payloadBytesFromId(prefix, id);\n      const storedTag = payload.subarray(tagOffset, payloadByteLength);\n      const signedContent = payload.subarray(0, signedContentByteLength);\n      for (const hmacKey of hmacKeys) {\n        const expected = await computeTag(hmacKey, brandBytes, signedContent);\n        if (timingSafeEqual(storedTag, expected)) return true;\n      }\n      return false;\n    },\n    extractTimestamp: (id: Id<Brand>): Date =>\n      new Date(readTimestampMsFromBase32Suffix(id.slice(prefix.length))),\n    minIdForTime: (ms: number): Id<Brand> => {\n      writeTimestamp(ms, syncBuffer);\n      syncBuffer.fill(0x00, randomOffset, payloadByteLength);\n      return toWireId(prefix, syncBuffer);\n    },\n    maxIdForTime: (ms: number): Id<Brand> => {\n      writeTimestamp(ms, syncBuffer);\n      syncBuffer.fill(0xff, randomOffset, payloadByteLength);\n      return toWireId(prefix, syncBuffer);\n    },\n    exampleWireId: (_ms?: number): Id<Brand> =>\n      (prefix + \"0\".repeat(payloadBase32Length)) as Id<Brand>,\n  };\n}\n","import type { webcrypto } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport { deriveKey, timingSafeEqual } from \"../_kernel/crypto.js\";\nimport {\n  assertValidKeyMaterialByteLength,\n  assertValidKeyring,\n  decodeKeyMaterial,\n  encodeKeyMaterial,\n} from \"../_kernel/key-material.js\";\n\nexport { assertValidKeyring };\n\n/** Wire encoding for signing key raw key bytes (not Crockford base32). */\nexport type SigningKeyFormat = \"hex\" | \"base64url\";\n\nconst hmacInfo = new TextEncoder().encode(\"@smonn/ids/signed/hmac\");\n\ndeclare const signingKeyBrand: unique symbol;\n\n/**\n * Opaque imported handle for one operator signing key.\n *\n * Holds a single HMAC-SHA-256 key derived via HKDF under the domain-separation\n * label `@smonn/ids/signed/hmac`. The underlying `webcrypto.CryptoKey` is held\n * internally and never exposed to callers. Obtain handles via\n * {@link importSigningKey} and pass them to `createSignedTimestampId` as the\n * `keys` signing keyring.\n *\n * Distinct from both the **Opaque key** and the **Wrapping key** — the same\n * raw key material must not silently serve multiple codecs without an explicit import.\n */\nexport type SigningKey = {\n  readonly [signingKeyBrand]: \"SigningKey\";\n};\n\ntype SigningKeyInternals = {\n  keyDigest: Uint8Array;\n  hmacKey: webcrypto.CryptoKey;\n};\n\nconst internals = new WeakMap<SigningKey, SigningKeyInternals>();\n\n/**\n * Import raw operator key material into a {@link SigningKey} handle.\n *\n * Derives a single HMAC-SHA-256 key via HKDF under the domain-separation label\n * `@smonn/ids/signed/hmac`. Accepts 16, 24, or 32 bytes. To store or\n * transport key material, use {@link encodeSigningKey} / {@link decodeSigningKey}\n * (`\"hex\"` or `\"base64url\"` — not Crockford base32).\n *\n * @param bytes - 16, 24, or 32 raw key bytes.\n * @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_length` if `bytes.length` is not 16, 24, or 32.\n */\nexport async function importSigningKey(bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<SigningKey> {\n  assertValidKeyMaterialByteLength(bytes.length, \"signing\");\n  const [hmacKey, digestBuffer] = await Promise.all([\n    deriveKey(bytes, hmacInfo, { name: \"HMAC\", hash: \"SHA-256\", length: 256 }, [\"sign\", \"verify\"]),\n    crypto.subtle.digest(\"SHA-256\", bytes as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>),\n  ]);\n  const key = Object.freeze({}) as SigningKey;\n  internals.set(key, { keyDigest: new Uint8Array(digestBuffer), hmacKey });\n  return key;\n}\n\n/**\n * Encode raw signing operator key material for storage in env vars or secret managers.\n *\n * Supports `\"hex\"` (lowercase) and `\"base64url\"`. Output round-trips through\n * {@link decodeSigningKey} back to the original bytes.\n *\n * @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_format` if `format` is not `\"hex\"` or `\"base64url\"`.\n * @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_length` if `bytes.length` is not 16, 24, or 32.\n */\nexport function encodeSigningKey(bytes: Uint8Array, format: SigningKeyFormat): string {\n  return encodeKeyMaterial(bytes, format, \"signing\", \"signing\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode key material emitted by {@link encodeSigningKey} back to raw bytes.\n *\n * The result can be passed directly to {@link importSigningKey}.\n *\n * @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_format` if `format` is not `\"hex\"` or `\"base64url\"`.\n * @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_encoding` if the string is malformed for its format.\n * @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_length` if the decoded bytes are not 16, 24, or 32 bytes.\n */\nexport function decodeSigningKey(encoded: string, format: SigningKeyFormat): Uint8Array {\n  return decodeKeyMaterial(encoded, format, \"signing\", \"signing\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when two handles were imported from the same raw key material.\n *\n * Uses a constant-time comparison so duplicate detection over key material does\n * not leak the position of the first differing byte through a timing side channel.\n */\nexport function signingKeysEqual(a: SigningKey, b: SigningKey): boolean {\n  return timingSafeEqual(getSigningKeyInternals(a).keyDigest, getSigningKeyInternals(b).keyDigest);\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns the derived HMAC webcrypto.CryptoKey held inside the handle.\n *\n * Intentional module-internal escape hatch for codec implementations (e.g. `createSignedTimestampId`).\n * Not re-exported from `@smonn/ids/signed`; external callers cannot reach this.\n */\nexport function getSigningKeyHmacKey(key: SigningKey): webcrypto.CryptoKey {\n  return getSigningKeyInternals(key).hmacKey;\n}\n\nfunction getSigningKeyInternals(key: SigningKey): SigningKeyInternals {\n  const keyInternals = internals.get(key);\n  if (keyInternals === undefined) {\n    throw new Error(\"invalid signing key\");\n  }\n  return keyInternals;\n}\n","import { validateBrand } from \"../_kernel/brand.js\";\nimport { IdsError } from \"../../error.js\";\nimport { createSignedTimestampLayoutOps } from \"./layout.js\";\nimport { registerBrand } from \"../_kernel/registry.js\";\nimport { defaultRng } from \"../_kernel/rng.js\";\nimport type {\n  Id,\n  JsonSchema,\n  ParseError,\n  ParseResult,\n  Prefix,\n  StandardSchemaProps,\n  ValidBrand,\n} from \"../../types.js\";\nimport { wireMethods } from \"../../wire/codec-shell.js\";\nimport {\n  assertValidKeyring,\n  decodeSigningKey,\n  encodeSigningKey,\n  getSigningKeyHmacKey,\n  importSigningKey,\n  signingKeysEqual,\n  type SigningKey,\n  type SigningKeyFormat,\n} from \"./key.js\";\n\n/** {@link IdsError} class, {@link isIdsError} type guard, and {@link IdsErrorCode} union — re-exported from `\"@smonn/ids\"` for convenience. */\nexport { IdsError, isIdsError, type IdsErrorCode } from \"../../error.js\";\nexport {\n  decodeSigningKey,\n  encodeSigningKey,\n  importSigningKey,\n  type SigningKey,\n  type SigningKeyFormat,\n};\n\n/**\n * Configuration options for a Signed Timestamp codec instance.\n */\nexport type SignedTimestampOptions = {\n  /**\n   * Non-empty ordered signing keyring. The first entry is current — the only one\n   * `generate` / `generateAt` sign with. `verify` / `safeVerify` trial every entry\n   * until the tag matches. Duplicate raw secrets are rejected at construction.\n   */\n  keys: [SigningKey, ...SigningKey[]];\n  /** Returns the current timestamp in milliseconds. Defaults to `Date.now`. */\n  now?: () => number;\n  /** Writes 5 random bytes into `target` for the random tail. Defaults to `crypto.getRandomValues`. */\n  rng?: (target: Uint8Array) => void;\n  /** If true, silences the duplicate-brand warning in non-production environments. */\n  allowDuplicateBrand?: boolean;\n};\n\n/**\n * Result returned by {@link SignedTimestampCodec.safeVerify}.\n *\n * On success, `id` is the canonical {@link Id}.\n * On failure, `error` is a {@link ParseError} for structural problems or\n * `\"verification_failed\"` when the HMAC tag does not match any entry in the\n * signing keyring.\n */\nexport type SafeVerifyResult<Brand extends string> =\n  | { ok: true; id: Id<Brand> }\n  | { ok: false; error: ParseError | \"verification_failed\" };\n\n/**\n * Codec returned by {@link createSignedTimestampId}.\n *\n * Keeps the 6-byte millisecond timestamp **readable and sortable** like the\n * Timestamp codec, but replaces half of the 10-byte random tail with a truncated\n * HMAC tag, making IDs **tamper-evident and verifiable without a database lookup**.\n *\n * Byte layout: `ts6 ‖ rand5 ‖ tag5` where the 40-bit tag =\n * `trunc(HMAC-SHA256(hmacKey, brand ‖ ts6 ‖ rand5), 40)`.\n *\n * - Async (HMAC): `generate`, `generateAt`, `verify`, `safeVerify`.\n * - Sync (no key / plaintext timestamp): all other methods.\n */\nexport type SignedTimestampCodec<Brand extends string> = {\n  /** Produces a canonical ID signed with the current (first) key. */\n  generate(): Promise<Id<Brand>>;\n  /**\n   * Produces a canonical ID with timestamp from `date`, signed with the current key.\n   * Throws on invalid dates.\n   */\n  generateAt(date: Date): Promise<Id<Brand>>;\n  /**\n   * Recomputes the HMAC tag across every keyring entry.\n   *\n   * Throws `IdsError` with `code: \"verification_failed\"` if no entry matches.\n   * Tamper of the brand, timestamp bytes, or random bytes all fail here.\n   */\n  verify(id: Id<Brand>): Promise<void>;\n  /**\n   * Non-throwing path for untrusted input.\n   *\n   * Structurally parses `input` first (same rules as {@link safeParse}), then\n   * verifies the HMAC tag. Returns `{ ok: false, error }` on any failure —\n   * {@link ParseError} for structural problems or `\"verification_failed\"` for tag\n   * mismatch — without throwing.\n   */\n  safeVerify(input: unknown): Promise<SafeVerifyResult<Brand>>;\n  /**\n   * Decodes the creation `Date` from an `Id<Brand>`.\n   * Sync — the 6-byte timestamp is plaintext. Trusts the type; use `safeParse()` at boundaries first.\n   *\n   * Best-effort: the timestamp is returned **without checking the HMAC tag** — a tampered\n   * or unsigned ID yields the attacker-controlled timestamp without error. Call\n   * `verify()` / `safeVerify()` first if you need an authenticated timestamp.\n   */\n  extractTimestamp(id: Id<Brand>): Date;\n  /**\n   * Tight lower bound sentinel for range scans (`ts(t) ‖ 0x00×10`).\n   * **Not verifiable** — carries no valid tag.\n   */\n  minIdForTime(date: Date): Id<Brand>;\n  /**\n   * Tight upper bound sentinel for range scans (`ts(t) ‖ 0xff×10`).\n   * **Not verifiable** — carries no valid tag.\n   */\n  maxIdForTime(date: Date): Id<Brand>;\n  /**\n   * Strict type guard: `true` only for already-canonical `Id<Brand>` strings.\n   * For untrusted input, use `safeParse()` or `safeVerify()` instead.\n   */\n  is(value: unknown): value is Id<Brand>;\n  /** Normalise to canonical form, or throw on parse failure. */\n  parse(value: unknown): Id<Brand>;\n  /** Normalise to canonical form, or return `{ ok: false, error }`. */\n  safeParse(value: unknown): ParseResult<Brand>;\n  /**\n   * JSON Schema for the canonical wire form. The `pattern` matches the canonical stored\n   * form only and is deliberately stricter than `parse()`/`safeParse()`, which accept\n   * uppercase letters and Crockford aliases (`o`/`i`/`l`) before normalising. See ADR-0003.\n   */\n  toJsonSchema(): JsonSchema;\n  /** Standard Schema validate entry point. */\n  readonly \"~standard\": StandardSchemaProps<Brand>;\n  /**\n   * Converts a trusted `Id<Brand>` to an RFC 9562 canonical (lowercase, hyphenated)\n   * UUID string by reinterpreting the 16-byte payload verbatim. Total — cannot fail.\n   * Returns a plain `string` (brand is shed). See ADR-0024.\n   */\n  toUUID(id: Id<Brand>): string;\n  /**\n   * Parses a UUID string into an `Id<Brand>`. Accepts case-insensitive `8-4-4-4-12`\n   * hyphenated form only. Throws `IdsError` with `code: \"invalid_id\"` on bad input.\n   * See ADR-0024.\n   */\n  fromUUID(value: string): Id<Brand>;\n  /**\n   * Non-throwing UUID parse. Returns `{ ok: true, id }` or\n   * `{ ok: false, error: \"not_string\" | \"invalid_uuid\" }`. See ADR-0024.\n   */\n  safeFromUUID(value: unknown): ParseResult<Brand>;\n};\n\n/**\n * Construct a {@link SignedTimestampCodec} for `brand`.\n *\n * `opts.keys` is a non-empty ordered signing keyring — the first entry is current\n * (used by `generate` / `generateAt`); all entries are tried on `verify` /\n * `safeVerify`; duplicate operator secrets are rejected at construction.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const key = await importSigningKey(new Uint8Array(32));\n * const usr = createSignedTimestampId(\"usr\", { keys: [key] });\n *\n * const id = await usr.generate();        // Id<\"usr\">\n * await usr.verify(id);                   // passes\n * usr.extractTimestamp(id);               // Date — sync, timestamp is plaintext\n * ```\n */\nexport function createSignedTimestampId<Brand extends string>(\n  brand: Brand & ValidBrand<Brand>,\n  opts: SignedTimestampOptions,\n): SignedTimestampCodec<Brand> {\n  validateBrand(brand);\n  registerBrand(brand, opts.allowDuplicateBrand);\n  assertValidKeyring(opts.keys, signingKeysEqual, \"signing\");\n\n  const hmacKeys = opts.keys.map(getSigningKeyHmacKey);\n  const now = opts.now ?? Date.now;\n  const rng = opts.rng ?? defaultRng;\n  const prefix: Prefix<Brand> = `${brand}_`;\n  const wire = wireMethods(prefix);\n  const layout = createSignedTimestampLayoutOps(prefix, brand, rng, hmacKeys);\n\n  return {\n    generate: () => layout.generateAt(now()),\n    generateAt: (date: Date) => layout.generateAt(date.getTime()),\n    verify: async (id) => {\n      const ok = await layout.tryVerify(id);\n      if (!ok) throw new IdsError(\"verification_failed\", \"verification failed\");\n    },\n    safeVerify: async (input) => {\n      const parsed = wire.safeParse(input);\n      if (!parsed.ok) return parsed;\n      const ok = await layout.tryVerify(parsed.id);\n      if (!ok) return { ok: false, error: \"verification_failed\" };\n      return { ok: true, id: parsed.id };\n    },\n    extractTimestamp: layout.extractTimestamp,\n    minIdForTime: (date: Date) => layout.minIdForTime(date.getTime()),\n    maxIdForTime: (date: Date) => layout.maxIdForTime(date.getTime()),\n    is: wire.is,\n    parse: wire.parse,\n    safeParse: wire.safeParse,\n    toJsonSchema: () => wire.toJsonSchema(brand, layout.exampleWireId()),\n    \"~standard\": wire[\"~standard\"],\n    toUUID: wire.toUUID,\n    fromUUID: wire.fromUUID,\n    safeFromUUID: wire.safeFromUUID,\n  };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;AAYA,MAAM,gBAAgB;AACtB,MAAM,eAAA;AACN,MAAM,YAAY;AAClB,MAAM,0BAA0B;AAEhC,eAAe,WACb,SACA,YACA,eACqB;CACrB,MAAM,UAAU,IAAI,WAAW,WAAW,SAAS,cAAc,MAAM;CACvE,QAAQ,IAAI,YAAY,CAAC;CACzB,QAAQ,IAAI,eAAe,WAAW,MAAM;CAI5C,OAAO,IAHe,WACpB,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,SAAS,OAAkC,CAE/D,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,GAAG,aAAa;AAC5C;AAEA,SAAgB,+BACd,QACA,OACA,KACA,UAOA;CACA,MAAM,UAAU,SAAS;CACzB,MAAM,aAAa,IAAI,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,KAAK;CACjD,MAAM,6BAAa,IAAI,WAAA,EAA4B;CAEnD,OAAO;EACL,YAAY,OAAO,OAAmC;GACpD,MAAM,yBAAS,IAAI,WAAA,EAA4B;GAC/C,eAAe,IAAI,MAAM;GACzB,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS,cAAc,SAAS,CAAC;GAC5C,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,WAChB,SACA,YACA,OAAO,SAAS,GAAG,uBAAuB,CAC5C;GACA,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,SAAS;GACzB,OAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,MAAM;EAChC;EACA,WAAW,OAAO,OAAoC;GACpD,MAAM,UAAU,mBAAmB,QAAQ,EAAE;GAC7C,MAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,SAAS,WAAA,EAA4B;GAC/D,MAAM,gBAAgB,QAAQ,SAAS,GAAG,uBAAuB;GACjE,KAAK,MAAM,WAAW,UAEpB,IAAI,gBAAgB,WAAW,MADR,WAAW,SAAS,YAAY,aAAa,CAC7B,GAAG,OAAO;GAEnD,OAAO;EACT;EACA,mBAAmB,OACjB,IAAI,KAAK,gCAAgC,GAAG,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;EACnE,eAAe,OAA0B;GACvC,eAAe,IAAI,UAAU;GAC7B,WAAW,KAAK,GAAM,cAAA,EAA+B;GACrD,OAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,UAAU;EACpC;EACA,eAAe,OAA0B;GACvC,eAAe,IAAI,UAAU;GAC7B,WAAW,KAAK,KAAM,cAAA,EAA+B;GACrD,OAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,UAAU;EACpC;EACA,gBAAgB,QACb,SAAS,IAAI,OAAO,mBAAmB;CAC5C;AACF;;;ACvEA,MAAM,WAAW,IAAI,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,wBAAwB;AAyBlE,MAAM,4BAAY,IAAI,QAAyC;;;;;;;;;;;;AAa/D,eAAsB,iBAAiB,OAAwC;CAC7E,iCAAiC,MAAM,QAAQ,SAAS;CACxD,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,gBAAgB,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,CAChD,UAAU,OAAO,UAAU;EAAE,MAAM;EAAQ,MAAM;EAAW,QAAQ;CAAI,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,QAAQ,CAAC,GAC7F,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO,WAAW,KAAgC,CAClE,CAAC;CACD,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;CAC5B,UAAU,IAAI,KAAK;EAAE,WAAW,IAAI,WAAW,YAAY;EAAG;CAAQ,CAAC;CACvE,OAAO;AACT;;;;;;;;;;AAWA,SAAgB,iBAAiB,OAAmB,QAAkC;CACpF,OAAO,kBAAkB,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS;AAC9D;;;;;;;;;;AAWA,SAAgB,iBAAiB,SAAiB,QAAsC;CACtF,OAAO,kBAAkB,SAAS,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS;AAChE;;;;;;;AAQA,SAAgB,iBAAiB,GAAe,GAAwB;CACtE,OAAO,gBAAgB,uBAAuB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,uBAAuB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;AACjG;;;;;;;AAQA,SAAgB,qBAAqB,KAAsC;CACzE,OAAO,uBAAuB,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;AACrC;AAEA,SAAS,uBAAuB,KAAsC;CACpE,MAAM,eAAe,UAAU,IAAI,GAAG;CACtC,IAAI,iBAAiB,KAAA,GACnB,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,qBAAqB;CAEvC,OAAO;AACT;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AC4DA,SAAgB,wBACd,OACA,MAC6B;CAC7B,cAAc,KAAK;CACnB,cAAc,OAAO,KAAK,mBAAmB;CAC7C,mBAAmB,KAAK,MAAM,kBAAkB,SAAS;CAEzD,MAAM,WAAW,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI,oBAAoB;CACnD,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK;CAC7B,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO;CACxB,MAAM,SAAwB,GAAG,MAAM;CACvC,MAAM,OAAO,YAAY,MAAM;CAC/B,MAAM,SAAS,+BAA+B,QAAQ,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ;CAE1E,OAAO;EACL,gBAAgB,OAAO,WAAW,IAAI,CAAC;EACvC,aAAa,SAAe,OAAO,WAAW,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC;EAC5D,QAAQ,OAAO,OAAO;GAEpB,IAAI,CAAC,MADY,OAAO,UAAU,EAAE,GAC3B,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,uBAAuB,qBAAqB;EAC1E;EACA,YAAY,OAAO,UAAU;GAC3B,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK;GACnC,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO;GAEvB,IAAI,CAAC,MADY,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,EAAE,GAClC,OAAO;IAAE,IAAI;IAAO,OAAO;GAAsB;GAC1D,OAAO;IAAE,IAAI;IAAM,IAAI,OAAO;GAAG;EACnC;EACA,kBAAkB,OAAO;EACzB,eAAe,SAAe,OAAO,aAAa,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC;EAChE,eAAe,SAAe,OAAO,aAAa,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC;EAChE,IAAI,KAAK;EACT,OAAO,KAAK;EACZ,WAAW,KAAK;EAChB,oBAAoB,KAAK,aAAa,OAAO,OAAO,cAAc,CAAC;EACnE,aAAa,KAAK;EAClB,QAAQ,KAAK;EACb,UAAU,KAAK;EACf,cAAc,KAAK;CACrB;AACF"}

package/dist/signed.d.mts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { a as StandardSchemaProps, i as ParseResult, n as JsonSchema, o as ValidBrand, r as ParseError, t as Id } from "./types-wplmOgOK.mjs";
-import { n as IdsErrorCode, r as isIdsError, t as IdsError } from "./error-Dqyho9vp.mjs";
+import { a as StandardSchemaProps, i as ParseResult, n as JsonSchema, o as ValidBrand, r as ParseError, t as Id } from "./types-hGBnCpJj.mjs";
+import { n as IdsErrorCode, r as isIdsError, t as IdsError } from "./error-CifcKKOG.mjs";
 
 //#region src/codecs/signed/key.d.ts
 /** Wire encoding for signing key raw key bytes (not Crockford base32). */
@@ -152,6 +152,23 @@ type SignedTimestampCodec<Brand extends string> = {
   */
   toJsonSchema(): JsonSchema; /** Standard Schema validate entry point. */
   readonly "~standard": StandardSchemaProps<Brand>;
+  /**
+  * Converts a trusted `Id<Brand>` to an RFC 9562 canonical (lowercase, hyphenated)
+  * UUID string by reinterpreting the 16-byte payload verbatim. Total — cannot fail.
+  * Returns a plain `string` (brand is shed). See ADR-0024.
+  */
+  toUUID(id: Id<Brand>): string;
+  /**
+  * Parses a UUID string into an `Id<Brand>`. Accepts case-insensitive `8-4-4-4-12`
+  * hyphenated form only. Throws `IdsError` with `code: "invalid_id"` on bad input.
+  * See ADR-0024.
+  */
+  fromUUID(value: string): Id<Brand>;
+  /**
+  * Non-throwing UUID parse. Returns `{ ok: true, id }` or
+  * `{ ok: false, error: "not_string" | "invalid_uuid" }`. See ADR-0024.
+  */
+  safeFromUUID(value: unknown): ParseResult<Brand>;
 };
 /**
 * Construct a {@link SignedTimestampCodec} for `brand`.

package/dist/signed.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/signed.mjs

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 import { n as isIdsError, t as IdsError } from "./error-Cp5qYZcv.mjs";
-import { i as importSigningKey, n as decodeSigningKey, r as encodeSigningKey, t as createSignedTimestampId } from "./signed-BTz3ZFYE.mjs";
+import { i as importSigningKey, n as decodeSigningKey, r as encodeSigningKey, t as createSignedTimestampId } from "./signed-Dkdteu1y.mjs";
 export { IdsError, createSignedTimestampId, decodeSigningKey, encodeSigningKey, importSigningKey, isIdsError };

package/dist/{timestamp-CleAIdZI.mjs → timestamp-RXXwHfHO.mjs}

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { a as toWireId, n as registerBrand, s as validateBrand, t as wireMethods } from "./codec-shell-C2NKQEx2.mjs";
-import { a as writeTimestamp, i as readTimestampMsFromBase32Suffix, n as fastTenByteRng } from "./rng-BHFxX1Fc.mjs";
+import { a as toWireId, n as registerBrand, s as validateBrand, t as wireMethods } from "./codec-shell-BRZkuQeP.mjs";
+import { a as writeTimestamp, i as readTimestampMsFromBase32Suffix, n as fastTenByteRng } from "./rng-6GyNT4zS.mjs";
 //#region src/codecs/timestamp/layout.ts
 const randomByteLength = 10;
 /** Writes a 16-byte timestamp-layout payload into codec-owned scratch. */
@@ -79,10 +79,13 @@ function createTimestampId(brand, opts = {}) {
 		minIdForTime: (date) => layout.minIdForTime(date.getTime()),
 		maxIdForTime: (date) => layout.maxIdForTime(date.getTime()),
 		toJsonSchema: () => wire.toJsonSchema(brand, layout.exampleWireId()),
-		"~standard": wire["~standard"]
+		"~standard": wire["~standard"],
+		toUUID: wire.toUUID,
+		fromUUID: wire.fromUUID,
+		safeFromUUID: wire.safeFromUUID
 	};
 }
 //#endregion
 export { createTimestampId as t };
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=timestamp-CleAIdZI.mjs.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=timestamp-RXXwHfHO.mjs.map

package/dist/{timestamp-CleAIdZI.mjs.map → timestamp-RXXwHfHO.mjs.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"timestamp-CleAIdZI.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/codecs/timestamp/layout.ts","../src/codecs/timestamp/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { Id, LayoutOps, Prefix } from \"../../types.js\";\nimport { toWireId } from \"../../wire/envelope.js\";\nimport { payloadByteLength } from \"../../wire/invariants.js\";\nimport {\n  readTimestampMsFromBase32Suffix,\n  timestampByteLength,\n  writeTimestamp,\n} from \"../../wire/timestamp-bytes.js\";\n\nconst randomByteLength: number = payloadByteLength - timestampByteLength;\n\n/** Writes a 16-byte timestamp-layout payload into codec-owned scratch. */\nfunction buildPayload(\n  ms: number,\n  rng: (target: Uint8Array) => void,\n  buffer: Uint8Array,\n  randomView: Uint8Array,\n): void {\n  writeTimestamp(ms, buffer);\n  rng(randomView);\n}\n\n/** Writes sentinel min/max random bytes into codec-owned scratch. */\nfunction buildSentinelPayload(\n  ms: number,\n  fill: number,\n  buffer: Uint8Array,\n  randomView: Uint8Array,\n): void {\n  writeTimestamp(ms, buffer);\n  randomView.fill(fill);\n}\n\n/** Decodes the creation timestamp from a trusted wire ID. */\nfunction extractTimestampFromId<Brand extends string>(prefix: Prefix<Brand>, id: Id<Brand>): Date {\n  return new Date(readTimestampMsFromBase32Suffix(id.slice(prefix.length)));\n}\n\n/** Layout ops binder for the Timestamp variant. `extractTimestampFromId` is module-private; the binder exposes `extractTimestamp` for the codec constructor. */\nexport function createTimestampLayoutOps<Brand extends string>(\n  prefix: Prefix<Brand>,\n  rng: (target: Uint8Array) => void,\n): LayoutOps<Brand> & {\n  generateAt(ms: number): Id<Brand>;\n  extractTimestamp(id: Id<Brand>): Date;\n  minIdForTime(ms: number): Id<Brand>;\n  maxIdForTime(ms: number): Id<Brand>;\n} {\n  // Per-codec scratch buffer. Shared across generateAt(), minIdForTime(),\n  // maxIdForTime(), and exampleWireId() — all are synchronous and overwrite both\n  // the timestamp and random slices before encoding, so successive callers see\n  // their own freshly-written bytes. toWireId reads the buffer and returns an\n  // independent string, so the caller never sees the buffer itself.\n  const buffer = new Uint8Array(payloadByteLength);\n  const randomView = new Uint8Array(buffer.buffer, timestampByteLength, randomByteLength);\n\n  return {\n    generateAt: (ms: number): Id<Brand> => {\n      buildPayload(ms, rng, buffer, randomView);\n      return toWireId(prefix, buffer);\n    },\n    extractTimestamp: (id: Id<Brand>): Date => extractTimestampFromId(prefix, id),\n    minIdForTime: (ms: number): Id<Brand> => {\n      buildSentinelPayload(ms, 0x00, buffer, randomView);\n      return toWireId(prefix, buffer);\n    },\n    maxIdForTime: (ms: number): Id<Brand> => {\n      buildSentinelPayload(ms, 0xff, buffer, randomView);\n      return toWireId(prefix, buffer);\n    },\n    exampleWireId: (ms?: number): Id<Brand> => {\n      buildPayload(ms ?? Date.now(), rng, buffer, randomView);\n      return toWireId(prefix, buffer);\n    },\n  };\n}\n","import { validateBrand } from \"../_kernel/brand.js\";\nimport { createTimestampLayoutOps } from \"./layout.js\";\nimport { registerBrand } from \"../_kernel/registry.js\";\nimport { fastTenByteRng } from \"../_kernel/rng.js\";\nimport type {\n  Id,\n  JsonSchema,\n  ParseResult,\n  Prefix,\n  StandardSchemaProps,\n  ValidBrand,\n} from \"../../types.js\";\nimport { wireMethods } from \"../../wire/codec-shell.js\";\n\n/**\n * Configuration options for a codec instance.\n */\nexport type TimestampOptions = {\n  /** Returns the current timestamp in milliseconds. Defaults to `Date.now`. */\n  now?: () => number;\n  /** Writes random bytes into `target` for ID generation. Defaults to a `crypto.randomUUID` fast path. */\n  rng?: (target: Uint8Array) => void;\n  /** If true, silences the duplicate-brand warning in non-production environments. */\n  allowDuplicateBrand?: boolean;\n};\n\ntype ResolvedTimestampOptions = Required<Pick<TimestampOptions, \"now\" | \"rng\">> &\n  Pick<TimestampOptions, \"allowDuplicateBrand\">;\n\n/**\n * A brand-scoped codec for generating and validating public-facing IDs.\n *\n * Wire format: `{brand}_` plus 26 lowercase Crockford base32 characters encoding a\n * 16-byte payload (6-byte ms timestamp + 10 random bytes). IDs sort by creation\n * time in ascending order.\n *\n * For encrypted IDs, use `createOpaqueTimestampId` from `@smonn/ids/opaque`.\n */\nexport type TimestampCodec<Brand extends string> = {\n  /** Produces a new canonical ID using the codec's `now` and `rng`. */\n  generate(): Id<Brand>;\n  /** Produces a new canonical ID with timestamp bytes from `date` and a fresh random tail. Throws on invalid dates. */\n  generateAt(date: Date): Id<Brand>;\n  /**\n   * Strict type guard: `true` only for already-canonical strings for this brand.\n   * For untrusted input, use `safeParse()` or `parse()` instead. See ADR-0003.\n   */\n  is(value: unknown): value is Id<Brand>;\n  /**\n   * Lenient parse: normalises case and Crockford aliases, returns canonical `Id<Brand>`, or throws.\n   */\n  parse(value: unknown): Id<Brand>;\n  /**\n   * Lenient parse without throwing: normalises to canonical form, or returns `{ ok: false, error }`.\n   */\n  safeParse(value: unknown): ParseResult<Brand>;\n  /**\n   * Decodes the creation `Date` from an `Id<Brand>`. Trusts the type — use `safeParse()` at boundaries first. See ADR-0002.\n   *\n   * Best-effort: decodes the timestamp bytes in the payload without any additional\n   * verification. An ID that bypassed `safeParse()` (e.g. via a type assertion)\n   * may return a plausible-looking but incorrect `Date`.\n   */\n  extractTimestamp(id: Id<Brand>): Date;\n  /** Tight lower bound for any ID generated at `date` (random portion `0x00`). Throws on invalid dates. */\n  minIdForTime(date: Date): Id<Brand>;\n  /** Tight upper bound for any ID generated at `date` (random portion `0xff`). Throws on invalid dates. */\n  maxIdForTime(date: Date): Id<Brand>;\n  /**\n   * JSON Schema for the canonical wire form. The `pattern` matches the canonical stored\n   * form only and is deliberately stricter than `parse()`/`safeParse()`, which accept\n   * uppercase letters and Crockford aliases (`o`/`i`/`l`) before normalising. See ADR-0003.\n   */\n  toJsonSchema(): JsonSchema;\n  /** Standard Schema validate entry point. */\n  readonly \"~standard\": StandardSchemaProps<Brand>;\n};\n\nconst defaultTimestampOptions: ResolvedTimestampOptions = {\n  now: Date.now,\n  // crypto.randomUUID harvest fast path (~7× faster than crypto.getRandomValues);\n  // see fastTenByteRng. The Reverse Timestamp codec shares the identical 10-byte\n  // random tail and the same default.\n  rng: fastTenByteRng,\n};\n\n/**\n * Creates a codec for `brand` (three lowercase a–z characters).\n *\n * @param brand - Entity type brand validated once at construction.\n * @param opts - Optional `now`, `rng`, and `allowDuplicateBrand` overrides.\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const users = createTimestampId(\"usr\");\n *\n * const id = users.generate();            // Id<\"usr\">\n * users.extractTimestamp(id);             // Date\n * ```\n */\nexport function createTimestampId<Brand extends string>(\n  brand: Brand & ValidBrand<Brand>,\n  opts: TimestampOptions = {},\n): TimestampCodec<Brand> {\n  validateBrand(brand);\n  registerBrand(brand, opts.allowDuplicateBrand);\n\n  const options = {\n    now: opts.now ?? defaultTimestampOptions.now,\n    rng: opts.rng ?? defaultTimestampOptions.rng,\n  } satisfies ResolvedTimestampOptions;\n\n  const prefix: Prefix<Brand> = `${brand}_`;\n  const wire = wireMethods(prefix);\n  const layout = createTimestampLayoutOps(prefix, options.rng);\n\n  return {\n    generate: () => layout.generateAt(options.now()),\n    generateAt: (date: Date) => layout.generateAt(date.getTime()),\n    is: wire.is,\n    parse: wire.parse,\n    safeParse: wire.safeParse,\n    extractTimestamp: layout.extractTimestamp,\n    minIdForTime: (date: Date) => layout.minIdForTime(date.getTime()),\n    maxIdForTime: (date: Date) => layout.maxIdForTime(date.getTime()),\n    toJsonSchema: () => wire.toJsonSchema(brand, layout.exampleWireId()),\n    \"~standard\": wire[\"~standard\"],\n  };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;AASA,MAAM,mBAAA;;AAGN,SAAS,aACP,IACA,KACA,QACA,YACM;CACN,eAAe,IAAI,MAAM;CACzB,IAAI,UAAU;AAChB;;AAGA,SAAS,qBACP,IACA,MACA,QACA,YACM;CACN,eAAe,IAAI,MAAM;CACzB,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI;AACtB;;AAGA,SAAS,uBAA6C,QAAuB,IAAqB;CAChG,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,gCAAgC,GAAG,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;AAC1E;;AAGA,SAAgB,yBACd,QACA,KAMA;CAMA,MAAM,yBAAS,IAAI,WAAA,EAA4B;CAC/C,MAAM,aAAa,IAAI,WAAW,OAAO,QAAA,GAA6B,gBAAgB;CAEtF,OAAO;EACL,aAAa,OAA0B;GACrC,aAAa,IAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,UAAU;GACxC,OAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,MAAM;EAChC;EACA,mBAAmB,OAAwB,uBAAuB,QAAQ,EAAE;EAC5E,eAAe,OAA0B;GACvC,qBAAqB,IAAI,GAAM,QAAQ,UAAU;GACjD,OAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,MAAM;EAChC;EACA,eAAe,OAA0B;GACvC,qBAAqB,IAAI,KAAM,QAAQ,UAAU;GACjD,OAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,MAAM;EAChC;EACA,gBAAgB,OAA2B;GACzC,aAAa,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK,QAAQ,UAAU;GACtD,OAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,MAAM;EAChC;CACF;AACF;;;ACGA,MAAM,0BAAoD;CACxD,KAAK,KAAK;CAIV,KAAK;AACP;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAeA,SAAgB,kBACd,OACA,OAAyB,CAAC,GACH;CACvB,cAAc,KAAK;CACnB,cAAc,OAAO,KAAK,mBAAmB;CAE7C,MAAM,UAAU;EACd,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,wBAAwB;EACzC,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,wBAAwB;CAC3C;CAEA,MAAM,SAAwB,GAAG,MAAM;CACvC,MAAM,OAAO,YAAY,MAAM;CAC/B,MAAM,SAAS,yBAAyB,QAAQ,QAAQ,GAAG;CAE3D,OAAO;EACL,gBAAgB,OAAO,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC;EAC/C,aAAa,SAAe,OAAO,WAAW,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC;EAC5D,IAAI,KAAK;EACT,OAAO,KAAK;EACZ,WAAW,KAAK;EAChB,kBAAkB,OAAO;EACzB,eAAe,SAAe,OAAO,aAAa,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC;EAChE,eAAe,SAAe,OAAO,aAAa,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC;EAChE,oBAAoB,KAAK,aAAa,OAAO,OAAO,cAAc,CAAC;EACnE,aAAa,KAAK;CACpB;AACF"}
+{"version":3,"file":"timestamp-RXXwHfHO.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/codecs/timestamp/layout.ts","../src/codecs/timestamp/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { Id, LayoutOps, Prefix } from \"../../types.js\";\nimport { toWireId } from \"../../wire/envelope.js\";\nimport { payloadByteLength } from \"../../wire/invariants.js\";\nimport {\n  readTimestampMsFromBase32Suffix,\n  timestampByteLength,\n  writeTimestamp,\n} from \"../../wire/timestamp-bytes.js\";\n\nconst randomByteLength: number = payloadByteLength - timestampByteLength;\n\n/** Writes a 16-byte timestamp-layout payload into codec-owned scratch. */\nfunction buildPayload(\n  ms: number,\n  rng: (target: Uint8Array) => void,\n  buffer: Uint8Array,\n  randomView: Uint8Array,\n): void {\n  writeTimestamp(ms, buffer);\n  rng(randomView);\n}\n\n/** Writes sentinel min/max random bytes into codec-owned scratch. */\nfunction buildSentinelPayload(\n  ms: number,\n  fill: number,\n  buffer: Uint8Array,\n  randomView: Uint8Array,\n): void {\n  writeTimestamp(ms, buffer);\n  randomView.fill(fill);\n}\n\n/** Decodes the creation timestamp from a trusted wire ID. */\nfunction extractTimestampFromId<Brand extends string>(prefix: Prefix<Brand>, id: Id<Brand>): Date {\n  return new Date(readTimestampMsFromBase32Suffix(id.slice(prefix.length)));\n}\n\n/** Layout ops binder for the Timestamp variant. `extractTimestampFromId` is module-private; the binder exposes `extractTimestamp` for the codec constructor. */\nexport function createTimestampLayoutOps<Brand extends string>(\n  prefix: Prefix<Brand>,\n  rng: (target: Uint8Array) => void,\n): LayoutOps<Brand> & {\n  generateAt(ms: number): Id<Brand>;\n  extractTimestamp(id: Id<Brand>): Date;\n  minIdForTime(ms: number): Id<Brand>;\n  maxIdForTime(ms: number): Id<Brand>;\n} {\n  // Per-codec scratch buffer. Shared across generateAt(), minIdForTime(),\n  // maxIdForTime(), and exampleWireId() — all are synchronous and overwrite both\n  // the timestamp and random slices before encoding, so successive callers see\n  // their own freshly-written bytes. toWireId reads the buffer and returns an\n  // independent string, so the caller never sees the buffer itself.\n  const buffer = new Uint8Array(payloadByteLength);\n  const randomView = new Uint8Array(buffer.buffer, timestampByteLength, randomByteLength);\n\n  return {\n    generateAt: (ms: number): Id<Brand> => {\n      buildPayload(ms, rng, buffer, randomView);\n      return toWireId(prefix, buffer);\n    },\n    extractTimestamp: (id: Id<Brand>): Date => extractTimestampFromId(prefix, id),\n    minIdForTime: (ms: number): Id<Brand> => {\n      buildSentinelPayload(ms, 0x00, buffer, randomView);\n      return toWireId(prefix, buffer);\n    },\n    maxIdForTime: (ms: number): Id<Brand> => {\n      buildSentinelPayload(ms, 0xff, buffer, randomView);\n      return toWireId(prefix, buffer);\n    },\n    exampleWireId: (ms?: number): Id<Brand> => {\n      buildPayload(ms ?? Date.now(), rng, buffer, randomView);\n      return toWireId(prefix, buffer);\n    },\n  };\n}\n","import { validateBrand } from \"../_kernel/brand.js\";\nimport { createTimestampLayoutOps } from \"./layout.js\";\nimport { registerBrand } from \"../_kernel/registry.js\";\nimport { fastTenByteRng } from \"../_kernel/rng.js\";\nimport type {\n  Id,\n  JsonSchema,\n  ParseResult,\n  Prefix,\n  StandardSchemaProps,\n  ValidBrand,\n} from \"../../types.js\";\nimport { wireMethods } from \"../../wire/codec-shell.js\";\n\n/**\n * Configuration options for a codec instance.\n */\nexport type TimestampOptions = {\n  /** Returns the current timestamp in milliseconds. Defaults to `Date.now`. */\n  now?: () => number;\n  /** Writes random bytes into `target` for ID generation. Defaults to a `crypto.randomUUID` fast path. */\n  rng?: (target: Uint8Array) => void;\n  /** If true, silences the duplicate-brand warning in non-production environments. */\n  allowDuplicateBrand?: boolean;\n};\n\ntype ResolvedTimestampOptions = Required<Pick<TimestampOptions, \"now\" | \"rng\">> &\n  Pick<TimestampOptions, \"allowDuplicateBrand\">;\n\n/**\n * A brand-scoped codec for generating and validating public-facing IDs.\n *\n * Wire format: `{brand}_` plus 26 lowercase Crockford base32 characters encoding a\n * 16-byte payload (6-byte ms timestamp + 10 random bytes). IDs sort by creation\n * time in ascending order.\n *\n * For encrypted IDs, use `createOpaqueTimestampId` from `@smonn/ids/opaque`.\n */\nexport type TimestampCodec<Brand extends string> = {\n  /** Produces a new canonical ID using the codec's `now` and `rng`. */\n  generate(): Id<Brand>;\n  /** Produces a new canonical ID with timestamp bytes from `date` and a fresh random tail. Throws on invalid dates. */\n  generateAt(date: Date): Id<Brand>;\n  /**\n   * Strict type guard: `true` only for already-canonical strings for this brand.\n   * For untrusted input, use `safeParse()` or `parse()` instead. See ADR-0003.\n   */\n  is(value: unknown): value is Id<Brand>;\n  /**\n   * Lenient parse: normalises case and Crockford aliases, returns canonical `Id<Brand>`, or throws.\n   */\n  parse(value: unknown): Id<Brand>;\n  /**\n   * Lenient parse without throwing: normalises to canonical form, or returns `{ ok: false, error }`.\n   */\n  safeParse(value: unknown): ParseResult<Brand>;\n  /**\n   * Decodes the creation `Date` from an `Id<Brand>`. Trusts the type — use `safeParse()` at boundaries first. See ADR-0002.\n   *\n   * Best-effort: decodes the timestamp bytes in the payload without any additional\n   * verification. An ID that bypassed `safeParse()` (e.g. via a type assertion)\n   * may return a plausible-looking but incorrect `Date`.\n   */\n  extractTimestamp(id: Id<Brand>): Date;\n  /** Tight lower bound for any ID generated at `date` (random portion `0x00`). Throws on invalid dates. */\n  minIdForTime(date: Date): Id<Brand>;\n  /** Tight upper bound for any ID generated at `date` (random portion `0xff`). Throws on invalid dates. */\n  maxIdForTime(date: Date): Id<Brand>;\n  /**\n   * JSON Schema for the canonical wire form. The `pattern` matches the canonical stored\n   * form only and is deliberately stricter than `parse()`/`safeParse()`, which accept\n   * uppercase letters and Crockford aliases (`o`/`i`/`l`) before normalising. See ADR-0003.\n   */\n  toJsonSchema(): JsonSchema;\n  /** Standard Schema validate entry point. */\n  readonly \"~standard\": StandardSchemaProps<Brand>;\n  /**\n   * Converts a trusted `Id<Brand>` to an RFC 9562 canonical (lowercase, hyphenated)\n   * UUID string by reinterpreting the 16-byte payload verbatim. Total — cannot fail.\n   * Returns a plain `string` (brand is shed). See ADR-0024.\n   */\n  toUUID(id: Id<Brand>): string;\n  /**\n   * Parses a UUID string into an `Id<Brand>`. Accepts case-insensitive `8-4-4-4-12`\n   * hyphenated form only. Throws `IdsError` with `code: \"invalid_id\"` on bad input.\n   * See ADR-0024.\n   */\n  fromUUID(value: string): Id<Brand>;\n  /**\n   * Non-throwing UUID parse. Returns `{ ok: true, id }` or\n   * `{ ok: false, error: \"not_string\" | \"invalid_uuid\" }`. See ADR-0024.\n   */\n  safeFromUUID(value: unknown): ParseResult<Brand>;\n};\n\nconst defaultTimestampOptions: ResolvedTimestampOptions = {\n  now: Date.now,\n  // crypto.randomUUID harvest fast path (~7× faster than crypto.getRandomValues);\n  // see fastTenByteRng. The Reverse Timestamp codec shares the identical 10-byte\n  // random tail and the same default.\n  rng: fastTenByteRng,\n};\n\n/**\n * Creates a codec for `brand` (three lowercase a–z characters).\n *\n * @param brand - Entity type brand validated once at construction.\n * @param opts - Optional `now`, `rng`, and `allowDuplicateBrand` overrides.\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const users = createTimestampId(\"usr\");\n *\n * const id = users.generate();            // Id<\"usr\">\n * users.extractTimestamp(id);             // Date\n * ```\n */\nexport function createTimestampId<Brand extends string>(\n  brand: Brand & ValidBrand<Brand>,\n  opts: TimestampOptions = {},\n): TimestampCodec<Brand> {\n  validateBrand(brand);\n  registerBrand(brand, opts.allowDuplicateBrand);\n\n  const options = {\n    now: opts.now ?? defaultTimestampOptions.now,\n    rng: opts.rng ?? defaultTimestampOptions.rng,\n  } satisfies ResolvedTimestampOptions;\n\n  const prefix: Prefix<Brand> = `${brand}_`;\n  const wire = wireMethods(prefix);\n  const layout = createTimestampLayoutOps(prefix, options.rng);\n\n  return {\n    generate: () => layout.generateAt(options.now()),\n    generateAt: (date: Date) => layout.generateAt(date.getTime()),\n    is: wire.is,\n    parse: wire.parse,\n    safeParse: wire.safeParse,\n    extractTimestamp: layout.extractTimestamp,\n    minIdForTime: (date: Date) => layout.minIdForTime(date.getTime()),\n    maxIdForTime: (date: Date) => layout.maxIdForTime(date.getTime()),\n    toJsonSchema: () => wire.toJsonSchema(brand, layout.exampleWireId()),\n    \"~standard\": wire[\"~standard\"],\n    toUUID: wire.toUUID,\n    fromUUID: wire.fromUUID,\n    safeFromUUID: wire.safeFromUUID,\n  };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;AASA,MAAM,mBAAA;;AAGN,SAAS,aACP,IACA,KACA,QACA,YACM;CACN,eAAe,IAAI,MAAM;CACzB,IAAI,UAAU;AAChB;;AAGA,SAAS,qBACP,IACA,MACA,QACA,YACM;CACN,eAAe,IAAI,MAAM;CACzB,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI;AACtB;;AAGA,SAAS,uBAA6C,QAAuB,IAAqB;CAChG,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,gCAAgC,GAAG,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;AAC1E;;AAGA,SAAgB,yBACd,QACA,KAMA;CAMA,MAAM,yBAAS,IAAI,WAAA,EAA4B;CAC/C,MAAM,aAAa,IAAI,WAAW,OAAO,QAAA,GAA6B,gBAAgB;CAEtF,OAAO;EACL,aAAa,OAA0B;GACrC,aAAa,IAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,UAAU;GACxC,OAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,MAAM;EAChC;EACA,mBAAmB,OAAwB,uBAAuB,QAAQ,EAAE;EAC5E,eAAe,OAA0B;GACvC,qBAAqB,IAAI,GAAM,QAAQ,UAAU;GACjD,OAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,MAAM;EAChC;EACA,eAAe,OAA0B;GACvC,qBAAqB,IAAI,KAAM,QAAQ,UAAU;GACjD,OAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,MAAM;EAChC;EACA,gBAAgB,OAA2B;GACzC,aAAa,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK,QAAQ,UAAU;GACtD,OAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,MAAM;EAChC;CACF;AACF;;;ACoBA,MAAM,0BAAoD;CACxD,KAAK,KAAK;CAIV,KAAK;AACP;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAeA,SAAgB,kBACd,OACA,OAAyB,CAAC,GACH;CACvB,cAAc,KAAK;CACnB,cAAc,OAAO,KAAK,mBAAmB;CAE7C,MAAM,UAAU;EACd,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,wBAAwB;EACzC,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,wBAAwB;CAC3C;CAEA,MAAM,SAAwB,GAAG,MAAM;CACvC,MAAM,OAAO,YAAY,MAAM;CAC/B,MAAM,SAAS,yBAAyB,QAAQ,QAAQ,GAAG;CAE3D,OAAO;EACL,gBAAgB,OAAO,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC;EAC/C,aAAa,SAAe,OAAO,WAAW,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC;EAC5D,IAAI,KAAK;EACT,OAAO,KAAK;EACZ,WAAW,KAAK;EAChB,kBAAkB,OAAO;EACzB,eAAe,SAAe,OAAO,aAAa,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC;EAChE,eAAe,SAAe,OAAO,aAAa,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC;EAChE,oBAAoB,KAAK,aAAa,OAAO,OAAO,cAAc,CAAC;EACnE,aAAa,KAAK;EAClB,QAAQ,KAAK;EACb,UAAU,KAAK;EACf,cAAc,KAAK;CACrB;AACF"}

package/dist/typeorm.d.mts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { n as IdColumnCodec } from "./adapter-types-CIc-4O-P.mjs";
-import { n as IdsErrorCode, r as isIdsError, t as IdsError } from "./error-Dqyho9vp.mjs";
+import { n as IdColumnCodec } from "./adapter-types-Bia_w9sg.mjs";
+import { n as IdsErrorCode, r as isIdsError, t as IdsError } from "./error-CifcKKOG.mjs";
 import { ValueTransformer } from "typeorm";
 
 //#region src/adapters/typeorm.d.ts

package/dist/{types-wplmOgOK.d.mts → types-hGBnCpJj.d.mts}

@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ declare const idBrand: unique symbol;
 type Id<Brand extends string> = `${Prefix<Brand>}${string}` & {
   readonly [idBrand]: Brand;
 };
-/** Parse failure reason returned by `safeParse()`. */
-type ParseError = "not_string" | "invalid_prefix" | "invalid_base32";
+/** Parse failure reason returned by `safeParse()` and `safeFromUUID()`. */
+type ParseError = "not_string" | "invalid_prefix" | "invalid_base32" | "invalid_uuid";
 /** Result of `safeParse()`: canonical `Id<Brand>` or a `ParseError`. */
 type ParseResult<Brand extends string> = {
   ok: true;
@@ -60,4 +60,4 @@ type StandardSchemaProps<Brand extends string> = {
 };
 //#endregion
 export { StandardSchemaProps as a, ParseResult as i, JsonSchema as n, ValidBrand as o, ParseError as r, Id as t };
-//# sourceMappingURL=types-wplmOgOK.d.mts.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=types-hGBnCpJj.d.mts.map

package/dist/{types-wplmOgOK.d.mts.map → types-hGBnCpJj.d.mts.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"types-hGBnCpJj.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../src/types.ts"],"mappings":";KAAK,SAAA;;;;;AAAA;AA0CL;;;;;;;;;KAAY,UAAA,oCAA8C,CAAA,GACtD,CAAA,GACA,CAAA,6BAA8B,SAAA,oBAA6B,SAAA,oBAA6B,SAAA,KACtF,CAAA;;KAIM,MAAA,4BAAkC,KAAA;AAAA,cAEhC,OAAA;;KAGF,EAAA,4BAA8B,MAAA,CAAO,KAAA;EAAA,UACrC,OAAA,GAAU,KAAA;AAAA;;KAIV,UAAA;;KAGA,WAAA;EACN,EAAA;EAAU,EAAA,EAAI,EAAA,CAAG,KAAA;AAAA;EACjB,EAAA;EAAW,KAAA,EAAO,UAAA;AAAA;;KAGZ,UAAA;EAAA,SACD,IAAA;EAAA,SACA,OAAA;EAAA,SACA,WAAA;EAAA,SACA,OAAA;AAAA;;KASC,mBAAA;EAAA,SACD,OAAA;EAAA,SACA,MAAA;EAAA,SACA,QAAA,GACP,KAAA,WACA,OAAA;IAAA,SAAqB,cAAA,GAAiB,MAAA;EAAA;IAAA,SAEzB,KAAA,EAAO,EAAA,CAAG,KAAA;IAAA,SAAiB,MAAA;EAAA;IAAA,SAC3B,MAAA,EAAQ,aAAA;MAAA,SAAyB,OAAA;IAAA;EAAA;EAAA,SACvC,KAAA;IAAA,SAAmB,KAAA;IAAA,SAAyB,MAAA,EAAQ,EAAA,CAAG,KAAA;EAAA;AAAA"}

package/dist/{wrapped-DPlsv1x-.mjs → wrapped-Oj2hC1vB.mjs}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { t as IdsError } from "./error-Cp5qYZcv.mjs";
-import { a as toWireId, i as payloadBytesFromId, n as registerBrand, r as payloadBase32Length, s as validateBrand, t as wireMethods } from "./codec-shell-C2NKQEx2.mjs";
-import { a as decryptPayload, c as timingSafeEqual, i as encodeKeyMaterial, l as writeLen32, n as assertValidKeyring, o as deriveKey, r as decodeKeyMaterial, s as encryptPayload, t as assertValidKeyMaterialByteLength } from "./key-material-DvjACe89.mjs";
+import { a as toWireId, i as payloadBytesFromId, n as registerBrand, r as payloadBase32Length, s as validateBrand, t as wireMethods } from "./codec-shell-BRZkuQeP.mjs";
+import { a as decryptPayload, c as timingSafeEqual, i as encodeKeyMaterial, l as writeLen32, n as assertValidKeyring, o as deriveKey, r as decodeKeyMaterial, s as encryptPayload, t as assertValidKeyMaterialByteLength } from "./key-material-1wOKJ1o-.mjs";
 //#region src/codecs/wrapped/layout.ts
 const laneByteLength = 8;
 const tagByteLength = 8;
@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ const internals = /* @__PURE__ */ new WeakMap();
 * {@link decodeWrappingKey} (`"hex"` or `"base64url"` — not Crockford base32).
 *
 * @param bytes - 16, 24, or 32 raw key bytes.
+* @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_length` if `bytes.length` is not 16, 24, or 32.
 */
 async function importWrappingKey(bytes) {
 	assertValidKeyMaterialByteLength(bytes.length, "wrapping");
@@ -165,6 +166,9 @@ async function importWrappingKey(bytes) {
 *
 * Supports `"hex"` (lowercase) and `"base64url"`. Output round-trips through
 * {@link decodeWrappingKey} back to the original bytes.
+*
+* @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_format` if `format` is not `"hex"` or `"base64url"`.
+* @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_length` if `bytes.length` is not 16, 24, or 32.
 */
 function encodeWrappingKey(bytes, format) {
 	return encodeKeyMaterial(bytes, format, "wrapping", "wrapping");
@@ -173,6 +177,10 @@ function encodeWrappingKey(bytes, format) {
 * Decode key material emitted by {@link encodeWrappingKey} back to raw bytes.
 *
 * The result can be passed directly to {@link importWrappingKey}.
+*
+* @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_format` if `format` is not `"hex"` or `"base64url"`.
+* @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_encoding` if the string is malformed for its format.
+* @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_length` if the decoded bytes are not 16, 24, or 32 bytes.
 */
 function decodeWrappingKey(encoded, format) {
 	return decodeKeyMaterial(encoded, format, "wrapping", "wrapping");
@@ -290,10 +298,13 @@ function createWrappedKeyId(brand, opts) {
 		parse: wire.parse,
 		safeParse: wire.safeParse,
 		toJsonSchema: () => wire.toJsonSchema(brand, layout.exampleWireId()),
-		"~standard": wire["~standard"]
+		"~standard": wire["~standard"],
+		toUUID: wire.toUUID,
+		fromUUID: wire.fromUUID,
+		safeFromUUID: wire.safeFromUUID
 	};
 }
 //#endregion
 export { importWrappingKey as i, decodeWrappingKey as n, encodeWrappingKey as r, createWrappedKeyId as t };
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=wrapped-DPlsv1x-.mjs.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=wrapped-Oj2hC1vB.mjs.map

package/dist/wrapped-Oj2hC1vB.mjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"wrapped-Oj2hC1vB.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/codecs/wrapped/layout.ts","../src/codecs/wrapped/key.ts","../src/codecs/wrapped/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { webcrypto } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport type { Id, LayoutOps, Prefix } from \"../../types.js\";\nimport { decryptPayload, encryptPayload, timingSafeEqual } from \"../_kernel/crypto.js\";\nimport { writeLen32 } from \"../_kernel/bytes.js\";\nimport { payloadBytesFromId, toWireId } from \"../../wire/envelope.js\";\nimport { payloadBase32Length, payloadByteLength } from \"../../wire/invariants.js\";\n\nconst laneByteLength = 8;\nconst tagByteLength = 8;\n\ntype LayoutWrappingKey = {\n  aesKey: webcrypto.CryptoKey;\n  hmacKey: webcrypto.CryptoKey;\n};\n\ntype LayoutWrappedKind = \"u32\" | \"i32\" | \"u64\" | \"i64\";\ntype LayoutLookupKey<K extends LayoutWrappedKind> = K extends \"u32\" | \"i32\" ? number : bigint;\n\nfunction writeU32Lane(value: number, lane: Uint8Array): void {\n  lane[0] = 0;\n  lane[1] = 0;\n  lane[2] = 0;\n  lane[3] = 0;\n  lane[4] = (value >>> 24) & 0xff;\n  lane[5] = (value >>> 16) & 0xff;\n  lane[6] = (value >>> 8) & 0xff;\n  lane[7] = value & 0xff;\n}\n\nfunction readU32Lane(lane: Uint8Array): number | null {\n  for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) {\n    if (lane[i] !== 0) return null;\n  }\n  return ((lane[4]! << 24) | (lane[5]! << 16) | (lane[6]! << 8) | lane[7]!) >>> 0;\n}\n\nfunction writeI32Lane(value: number, lane: Uint8Array): void {\n  lane.fill(value < 0 ? 0xff : 0x00, 0, 4);\n  new DataView(lane.buffer, lane.byteOffset, lane.byteLength).setInt32(4, value, false);\n}\n\nfunction readI32Lane(lane: Uint8Array): number | null {\n  const signExtension = (lane[4]! & 0x80) === 0 ? 0x00 : 0xff;\n  for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) {\n    if (lane[i] !== signExtension) return null;\n  }\n  return new DataView(lane.buffer, lane.byteOffset, lane.byteLength).getInt32(4, false);\n}\n\nfunction writeU64Lane(value: bigint, lane: Uint8Array): void {\n  new DataView(lane.buffer, lane.byteOffset, lane.byteLength).setBigUint64(0, value, false);\n}\n\nfunction readU64Lane(lane: Uint8Array): bigint {\n  return new DataView(lane.buffer, lane.byteOffset, lane.byteLength).getBigUint64(0, false);\n}\n\nfunction writeI64Lane(value: bigint, lane: Uint8Array): void {\n  new DataView(lane.buffer, lane.byteOffset, lane.byteLength).setBigInt64(0, value, false);\n}\n\nfunction readI64Lane(lane: Uint8Array): bigint {\n  return new DataView(lane.buffer, lane.byteOffset, lane.byteLength).getBigInt64(0, false);\n}\n\nfunction writeLane<K extends LayoutWrappedKind>(\n  kind: K,\n  value: LayoutLookupKey<K>,\n  lane: Uint8Array,\n): void {\n  if (kind === \"i32\") {\n    writeI32Lane(value as number, lane);\n    return;\n  }\n  if (kind === \"u64\") {\n    writeU64Lane(value as bigint, lane);\n    return;\n  }\n  if (kind === \"i64\") {\n    writeI64Lane(value as bigint, lane);\n    return;\n  }\n  writeU32Lane(value as number, lane);\n}\n\nfunction readLane<K extends LayoutWrappedKind>(\n  kind: K,\n  lane: Uint8Array,\n): LayoutLookupKey<K> | null {\n  if (kind === \"u64\") return readU64Lane(lane) as LayoutLookupKey<K>;\n  if (kind === \"i64\") return readI64Lane(lane) as LayoutLookupKey<K>;\n  const value = kind === \"i32\" ? readI32Lane(lane) : readU32Lane(lane);\n  return value as LayoutLookupKey<K> | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Precomputed HMAC-message template for a fixed (brand, kind) pair.\n *\n * The message is `len32(brand) ‖ brand ‖ len32(kind) ‖ kind ‖ lane`. Everything\n * except the trailing 8-byte lane is constant for the life of the codec, so we\n * build it once at construction. `brand`/`kind` are never re-encoded and no\n * `TextEncoder` is allocated on the `wrap` / `unwrap` hot paths.\n */\ntype HmacMessageTemplate = {\n  /** Full-length buffer with the constant prefix written and the lane region zeroed. */\n  readonly buffer: Uint8Array;\n  /** Byte offset where the lane is copied in on each call. */\n  readonly laneOffset: number;\n};\n\nfunction createHmacMessageTemplate(brand: string, kind: LayoutWrappedKind): HmacMessageTemplate {\n  const encoder = new TextEncoder();\n  const brandBytes = encoder.encode(brand);\n  const kindBytes = encoder.encode(kind);\n  const laneOffset = 4 + brandBytes.length + 4 + kindBytes.length;\n  const buffer = new Uint8Array(laneOffset + laneByteLength);\n  let offset = 0;\n  writeLen32(brandBytes.length, buffer, offset);\n  offset += 4;\n  buffer.set(brandBytes, offset);\n  offset += brandBytes.length;\n  writeLen32(kindBytes.length, buffer, offset);\n  offset += 4;\n  buffer.set(kindBytes, offset);\n  return { buffer, laneOffset };\n}\n\n/** Materialise the HMAC message for `lane`. Fresh buffer per call → safe under concurrent async signs. */\nfunction hmacMessage(template: HmacMessageTemplate, lane: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {\n  const message = template.buffer.slice();\n  message.set(lane, template.laneOffset);\n  return message;\n}\n\nasync function computeTag(\n  key: LayoutWrappingKey,\n  template: HmacMessageTemplate,\n  lane: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const signature = new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.sign(\n      \"HMAC\",\n      key.hmacKey,\n      hmacMessage(template, lane) as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>,\n    ),\n  );\n  return signature.subarray(0, tagByteLength);\n}\n\nfunction buildPlaintext(lane: Uint8Array, tag: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {\n  const plaintext = new Uint8Array(payloadByteLength);\n  plaintext.set(lane, 0);\n  plaintext.set(tag, laneByteLength);\n  return plaintext;\n}\n\nasync function wrapLookupKey<Brand extends string, Kind extends LayoutWrappedKind>(\n  prefix: Prefix<Brand>,\n  template: HmacMessageTemplate,\n  key: LayoutWrappingKey,\n  kind: Kind,\n  lookupKey: LayoutLookupKey<Kind>,\n): Promise<Id<Brand>> {\n  const lane = new Uint8Array(laneByteLength);\n  writeLane(kind, lookupKey, lane);\n  const tag = await computeTag(key, template, lane);\n  const encrypted = await encryptPayload(key.aesKey, buildPlaintext(lane, tag));\n  return toWireId(prefix, encrypted);\n}\n\nasync function tryUnwrapLookupKey<Brand extends string, Kind extends LayoutWrappedKind>(\n  prefix: Prefix<Brand>,\n  template: HmacMessageTemplate,\n  key: LayoutWrappingKey,\n  kind: Kind,\n  id: Id<Brand>,\n): Promise<LayoutLookupKey<Kind> | null> {\n  const plaintext = await decryptPayload(key.aesKey, payloadBytesFromId(prefix, id));\n  const lane = plaintext.subarray(0, laneByteLength);\n  const tag = plaintext.subarray(laneByteLength, payloadByteLength);\n  const expected = await computeTag(key, template, lane);\n  if (!timingSafeEqual(tag, expected)) return null;\n  return readLane(kind, lane);\n}\n\nfunction schemaExample<Brand extends string>(prefix: Prefix<Brand>): string {\n  return prefix + \"0\".repeat(payloadBase32Length);\n}\n\nexport function createWrappedLayoutOps<Brand extends string, Kind extends LayoutWrappedKind>(\n  prefix: Prefix<Brand>,\n  brand: Brand,\n  kind: Kind,\n  keys: readonly LayoutWrappingKey[],\n): LayoutOps<Brand> & {\n  wrap(lookupKey: LayoutLookupKey<Kind>): Promise<Id<Brand>>;\n  tryUnwrap(id: Id<Brand>): Promise<LayoutLookupKey<Kind> | null>;\n} {\n  const wrapKey = keys[0]!;\n  // brand + kind are fixed for the codec's lifetime; encode them and build the\n  // HMAC-message prefix once instead of on every wrap / unwrap-trial.\n  const template = createHmacMessageTemplate(brand, kind);\n  return {\n    wrap: (lookupKey: LayoutLookupKey<Kind>): Promise<Id<Brand>> =>\n      wrapLookupKey(prefix, template, wrapKey, kind, lookupKey),\n    tryUnwrap: async (id: Id<Brand>): Promise<LayoutLookupKey<Kind> | null> => {\n      for (const key of keys) {\n        const lookupKey = await tryUnwrapLookupKey(prefix, template, key, kind, id);\n        if (lookupKey !== null) return lookupKey;\n      }\n      return null;\n    },\n    exampleWireId: (_ms?: number): Id<Brand> => schemaExample(prefix) as Id<Brand>,\n  };\n}\n","import type { webcrypto } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport { deriveKey, timingSafeEqual } from \"../_kernel/crypto.js\";\nimport {\n  assertValidKeyMaterialByteLength,\n  assertValidKeyring,\n  decodeKeyMaterial,\n  encodeKeyMaterial,\n} from \"../_kernel/key-material.js\";\n\nexport { assertValidKeyring };\n\n/** Wire encoding for wrapping operator secret bytes (not Crockford base32). */\nexport type WrappingKeyFormat = \"hex\" | \"base64url\";\n\nconst aesInfo = new TextEncoder().encode(\"@smonn/ids/wrapped/aes\");\nconst hmacInfo = new TextEncoder().encode(\"@smonn/ids/wrapped/hmac\");\n\ndeclare const wrappingKeyBrand: unique symbol;\n\n/**\n * Opaque imported handle for one operator wrapping secret.\n *\n * Holds derived AES and HMAC subkeys internally; callers never access subkeys\n * or raw `webcrypto.CryptoKey` values directly. Obtain handles via {@link importWrappingKey}\n * and pass them to `createWrappedKeyId` as the `keys` wrapping keyring.\n *\n * Distinct from the **Opaque key** used by `@smonn/ids/opaque` — one raw\n * secret must not silently serve both codecs without an explicit import.\n */\nexport type WrappingKey = {\n  readonly [wrappingKeyBrand]: \"WrappingKey\";\n};\n\ntype WrappingKeyInternals = {\n  keyDigest: Uint8Array;\n  aesKey: webcrypto.CryptoKey;\n  hmacKey: webcrypto.CryptoKey;\n};\n\nexport type WrappingKeyMaterial = {\n  aesKey: webcrypto.CryptoKey;\n  hmacKey: webcrypto.CryptoKey;\n};\n\nconst internals = new WeakMap<WrappingKey, WrappingKeyInternals>();\n\n/**\n * Import raw operator secret bytes into a {@link WrappingKey} handle.\n *\n * One raw secret derives into AES and HMAC subkeys held inside the returned\n * handle. Accepts 16, 24, or 32 bytes (AES-128 / AES-192 / AES-256 strength).\n * To store or transport key material, use {@link encodeWrappingKey} /\n * {@link decodeWrappingKey} (`\"hex\"` or `\"base64url\"` — not Crockford base32).\n *\n * @param bytes - 16, 24, or 32 raw key bytes.\n * @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_length` if `bytes.length` is not 16, 24, or 32.\n */\nexport async function importWrappingKey(bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<WrappingKey> {\n  assertValidKeyMaterialByteLength(bytes.length, \"wrapping\");\n  const [aesKey, hmacKey, digestBuffer] = await Promise.all([\n    deriveKey(bytes, aesInfo, { name: \"AES-CBC\", length: 256 }, [\"encrypt\", \"decrypt\"]),\n    deriveKey(bytes, hmacInfo, { name: \"HMAC\", hash: \"SHA-256\", length: 256 }, [\"sign\", \"verify\"]),\n    crypto.subtle.digest(\"SHA-256\", bytes as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>),\n  ]);\n  const key = Object.freeze({}) as WrappingKey;\n  internals.set(key, {\n    keyDigest: new Uint8Array(digestBuffer),\n    aesKey,\n    hmacKey,\n  });\n  return key;\n}\n\n/**\n * Encode raw wrapping operator secret bytes for storage in env vars or secret managers.\n *\n * Supports `\"hex\"` (lowercase) and `\"base64url\"`. Output round-trips through\n * {@link decodeWrappingKey} back to the original bytes.\n *\n * @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_format` if `format` is not `\"hex\"` or `\"base64url\"`.\n * @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_length` if `bytes.length` is not 16, 24, or 32.\n */\nexport function encodeWrappingKey(bytes: Uint8Array, format: WrappingKeyFormat): string {\n  return encodeKeyMaterial(bytes, format, \"wrapping\", \"wrapping\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode key material emitted by {@link encodeWrappingKey} back to raw bytes.\n *\n * The result can be passed directly to {@link importWrappingKey}.\n *\n * @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_format` if `format` is not `\"hex\"` or `\"base64url\"`.\n * @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_encoding` if the string is malformed for its format.\n * @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_length` if the decoded bytes are not 16, 24, or 32 bytes.\n */\nexport function decodeWrappingKey(encoded: string, format: WrappingKeyFormat): Uint8Array {\n  return decodeKeyMaterial(encoded, format, \"wrapping\", \"wrapping\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when two handles were imported from the same raw operator secret.\n *\n * Uses a constant-time comparison so duplicate detection over key material does\n * not leak the position of the first differing byte through a timing side channel.\n */\nexport function wrappingKeysEqual(a: WrappingKey, b: WrappingKey): boolean {\n  return timingSafeEqual(\n    getWrappingKeyInternals(a).keyDigest,\n    getWrappingKeyInternals(b).keyDigest,\n  );\n}\n\nexport function getWrappingKeyMaterial(key: WrappingKey): WrappingKeyMaterial {\n  const keyInternals = getWrappingKeyInternals(key);\n  return {\n    aesKey: keyInternals.aesKey,\n    hmacKey: keyInternals.hmacKey,\n  };\n}\n\nfunction getWrappingKeyInternals(key: WrappingKey): WrappingKeyInternals {\n  const keyInternals = internals.get(key);\n  if (keyInternals === undefined) {\n    throw new Error(\"invalid wrapping key\");\n  }\n  return keyInternals;\n}\n","import { validateBrand } from \"../_kernel/brand.js\";\nimport { IdsError } from \"../../error.js\";\nimport { createWrappedLayoutOps } from \"./layout.js\";\nimport { registerBrand } from \"../_kernel/registry.js\";\nimport type {\n  Id,\n  JsonSchema,\n  ParseError,\n  ParseResult,\n  Prefix,\n  StandardSchemaProps,\n  ValidBrand,\n} from \"../../types.js\";\nimport { wireMethods } from \"../../wire/codec-shell.js\";\nimport {\n  assertValidKeyring,\n  decodeWrappingKey,\n  encodeWrappingKey,\n  getWrappingKeyMaterial,\n  importWrappingKey,\n  type WrappingKey,\n  type WrappingKeyFormat,\n  wrappingKeysEqual,\n} from \"./key.js\";\n\n/** {@link IdsError} class, {@link isIdsError} type guard, and {@link IdsErrorCode} union — re-exported from `\"@smonn/ids\"` for convenience. */\nexport { IdsError, isIdsError, type IdsErrorCode } from \"../../error.js\";\nexport {\n  decodeWrappingKey,\n  encodeWrappingKey,\n  importWrappingKey,\n  type WrappingKey,\n  type WrappingKeyFormat,\n};\n\n/**\n * Integer kind for a {@link WrappedKeyCodec}, fixed at construction time.\n *\n * - `\"u32\"` — unsigned 32-bit integer; JS type `number`, range `[0, 4 294 967 295]`.\n * - `\"i32\"` — signed 32-bit integer; JS type `number`, range `[-2 147 483 648, 2 147 483 647]`.\n * - `\"u64\"` — unsigned 64-bit integer; JS type `bigint`, range `[0n, 18 446 744 073 709 551 615n]`.\n * - `\"i64\"` — signed 64-bit integer; JS type `bigint`, range `[-9 223 372 036 854 775 808n, 9 223 372 036 854 775 807n]`.\n *\n * 32-bit kinds use safe JavaScript `number` values; 64-bit kinds always use `bigint`\n * even when the magnitude would fit in a `number`, preventing silent truncation or sign erasure.\n */\nexport type WrappedKind = \"u32\" | \"i32\" | \"u64\" | \"i64\";\n\ntype LookupKeyForKind<K extends WrappedKind> = K extends \"u32\" | \"i32\" ? number : bigint;\n\n/**\n * Result returned by {@link WrappedKeyCodec.safeUnwrap}.\n *\n * On success, `id` is the canonical {@link Id} and `lookupKey` is the recovered\n * integer (`number` for 32-bit kinds, `bigint` for 64-bit kinds).\n * On failure, `error` is a {@link ParseError} for structural problems or\n * `\"verification_failed\"` when the payload is structurally valid but the\n * verification tag does not match any entry in the wrapping keyring.\n */\nexport type UnwrapResult<Brand extends string, Kind extends WrappedKind> =\n  | { ok: true; id: Id<Brand>; lookupKey: LookupKeyForKind<Kind> }\n  | { ok: false; error: ParseError | \"verification_failed\" };\n\n/**\n * Codec returned by {@link createWrappedKeyId}.\n *\n * Wraps a caller-owned integer **lookup key** into a public {@link Id} and\n * recovers it on unwrap. The codec is deterministic under fixed key material:\n * the same lookup key always yields the same public ID (**equality leakage**).\n *\n * - `wrap` / `unwrap` / `safeUnwrap` are async (WebCrypto).\n * - `is`, `parse`, `safeParse`, and `toJsonSchema` are synchronous and require\n *   no key material — they validate prefix and base32 shape only.\n * - The `Kind` type parameter drives value types at the TypeScript boundary:\n *   `u32` / `i32` → `number`; `u64` / `i64` → `bigint`.\n *\n * @remarks\n * **Security properties (correctness-grade verification, not AEAD):**\n *\n * - The construction is deterministic — the same lookup key always yields the\n *   same public ID (**equality leakage**).\n * - The verification tag is a fixed **64-bit (8-byte) truncation** of a\n *   domain-separated HMAC over the brand, kind, and lookup key lane.\n * - False-accept rate is approximately `keyring_size / 2^64` per `unwrap`\n *   trial — correctness-grade verification, not AEAD-strength origin\n *   authentication.\n * - Consumers requiring full AEAD guarantees must use a different construction.\n */\nexport type WrappedKeyCodec<Brand extends string, Kind extends WrappedKind> = {\n  /**\n   * Wrap `lookupKey` into a public ID using the current (first) wrapping key.\n   *\n   * Throws if `lookupKey` is out of range or the wrong JS type for `Kind`.\n   */\n  wrap(lookupKey: LookupKeyForKind<Kind>): Promise<Id<Brand>>;\n  /**\n   * Verify the payload of a trusted `Id<Brand>` and return the lookup key.\n   *\n   * Throws `IdsError` with `code: \"verification_failed\"` if no entry in the\n   * wrapping keyring matches the payload tag. Use {@link safeUnwrap} for\n   * untrusted input.\n   */\n  unwrap(id: Id<Brand>): Promise<LookupKeyForKind<Kind>>;\n  /**\n   * Non-throwing path for untrusted input.\n   *\n   * Structurally parses `input` first (same rules as {@link safeParse}), then\n   * verifies the payload. Returns `{ ok: false, error }` on any failure —\n   * `ParseError` for structural problems or `\"verification_failed\"` for tag\n   * mismatch — without throwing. Tamper, wrong keyring, and revoked-key cases\n   * all surface as `\"verification_failed\"`.\n   */\n  safeUnwrap(input: unknown): Promise<UnwrapResult<Brand, Kind>>;\n  /** Strict type guard: `true` only for already-canonical `Id<Brand>` strings. */\n  is(value: unknown): value is Id<Brand>;\n  /** Normalise to canonical form, or throw on parse failure. */\n  parse(value: unknown): Id<Brand>;\n  /** Normalise to canonical form, or return `{ ok: false, error }`. */\n  safeParse(value: unknown): ParseResult<Brand>;\n  toJsonSchema(): JsonSchema;\n  readonly \"~standard\": StandardSchemaProps<Brand>;\n  /**\n   * Converts a trusted `Id<Brand>` to an RFC 9562 canonical (lowercase, hyphenated)\n   * UUID string by reinterpreting the 16-byte payload verbatim. Total — cannot fail.\n   * Returns a plain `string` (brand is shed). See ADR-0024.\n   */\n  toUUID(id: Id<Brand>): string;\n  /**\n   * Parses a UUID string into an `Id<Brand>`. Accepts case-insensitive `8-4-4-4-12`\n   * hyphenated form only. Throws `IdsError` with `code: \"invalid_id\"` on bad input.\n   * See ADR-0024.\n   */\n  fromUUID(value: string): Id<Brand>;\n  /**\n   * Non-throwing UUID parse. Returns `{ ok: true, id }` or\n   * `{ ok: false, error: \"not_string\" | \"invalid_uuid\" }`. See ADR-0024.\n   */\n  safeFromUUID(value: unknown): ParseResult<Brand>;\n};\n\n/**\n * Construction options for {@link createWrappedKeyId}.\n */\nexport type WrappedKeyOptions<K extends WrappedKind> = {\n  /** Integer kind for the codec — fixed for the lifetime of the codec. Drives the JS value type (`number` for 32-bit, `bigint` for 64-bit). */\n  kind: K;\n  /** Non-empty ordered wrapping keyring. The first entry is current (used by `wrap`); all entries are tried on `unwrap`. Duplicate operator secrets are rejected at construction. */\n  keys: [WrappingKey, ...WrappingKey[]];\n  /** If true, silences the duplicate-brand warning in non-production environments. */\n  allowDuplicateBrand?: boolean;\n};\n\nconst u32Max = 0xffff_ffff;\nconst i32Min = -0x8000_0000;\nconst i32Max = 0x7fff_ffff;\nconst u64Max = 0xffff_ffff_ffff_ffffn;\nconst i64Min = -(1n << 63n);\nconst i64Max = (1n << 63n) - 1n;\n\nfunction assertSupportedKind(kind: WrappedKind): asserts kind is WrappedKind {\n  if (kind !== \"u32\" && kind !== \"i32\" && kind !== \"u64\" && kind !== \"i64\") {\n    throw new IdsError(\"invalid_kind\", \"invalid wrapped key kind: expected u32, i32, u64, or i64\");\n  }\n}\n\nfunction assertU32LookupKey(lookupKey: unknown): asserts lookupKey is number {\n  if (\n    typeof lookupKey !== \"number\" ||\n    !Number.isInteger(lookupKey) ||\n    Object.is(lookupKey, -0) ||\n    lookupKey < 0 ||\n    lookupKey > u32Max\n  ) {\n    throw new IdsError(\n      \"invalid_lookup_key\",\n      `invalid u32 lookup key: expected integer in [0, ${u32Max}], got ${lookupKey}`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nfunction assertI32LookupKey(lookupKey: unknown): asserts lookupKey is number {\n  if (\n    typeof lookupKey !== \"number\" ||\n    !Number.isInteger(lookupKey) ||\n    Object.is(lookupKey, -0) ||\n    lookupKey < i32Min ||\n    lookupKey > i32Max\n  ) {\n    throw new IdsError(\n      \"invalid_lookup_key\",\n      `invalid i32 lookup key: expected integer in [${i32Min}, ${i32Max}], got ${lookupKey}`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nfunction assertU64LookupKey(lookupKey: unknown): asserts lookupKey is bigint {\n  if (typeof lookupKey !== \"bigint\" || lookupKey < 0n || lookupKey > u64Max) {\n    throw new IdsError(\n      \"invalid_lookup_key\",\n      `invalid u64 lookup key: expected bigint in [0, ${u64Max}], got ${lookupKey}`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nfunction assertI64LookupKey(lookupKey: unknown): asserts lookupKey is bigint {\n  if (typeof lookupKey !== \"bigint\" || lookupKey < i64Min || lookupKey > i64Max) {\n    throw new IdsError(\n      \"invalid_lookup_key\",\n      `invalid i64 lookup key: expected bigint in [${i64Min}, ${i64Max}], got ${lookupKey}`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nfunction assertLookupKey<Kind extends WrappedKind>(\n  kind: Kind,\n  lookupKey: unknown,\n): asserts lookupKey is LookupKeyForKind<Kind> {\n  if (kind === \"i32\") {\n    assertI32LookupKey(lookupKey);\n    return;\n  }\n  if (kind === \"u64\") {\n    assertU64LookupKey(lookupKey);\n    return;\n  }\n  if (kind === \"i64\") {\n    assertI64LookupKey(lookupKey);\n    return;\n  }\n  assertU32LookupKey(lookupKey);\n}\n\n/**\n * Construct a {@link WrappedKeyCodec} for `brand` and the given `kind`.\n *\n * `opts.kind` fixes the integer type at construction time — one brand, one\n * kind. `opts.keys` is a non-empty ordered wrapping keyring: the first entry\n * is current (used by `wrap`); all entries are tried on `unwrap`; duplicate\n * operator secrets are rejected at construction.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const key = await importWrappingKey(new Uint8Array(32));\n * const invoices = createWrappedKeyId(\"inv\", { kind: \"u32\", keys: [key] });\n *\n * const id = await invoices.wrap(42);      // Id<\"inv\">\n * await invoices.unwrap(id);               // 42\n * ```\n */\nexport function createWrappedKeyId<Brand extends string, Kind extends WrappedKind>(\n  brand: Brand & ValidBrand<Brand>,\n  opts: WrappedKeyOptions<Kind>,\n): WrappedKeyCodec<Brand, Kind> {\n  validateBrand(brand);\n  registerBrand(brand, opts.allowDuplicateBrand);\n  assertSupportedKind(opts.kind);\n  assertValidKeyring(opts.keys, wrappingKeysEqual, \"wrapping\");\n  const layoutKeys = opts.keys.map(getWrappingKeyMaterial);\n\n  const prefix: Prefix<Brand> = `${brand}_`;\n  const wire = wireMethods(prefix);\n  const layout = createWrappedLayoutOps(prefix, brand, opts.kind, layoutKeys);\n\n  return {\n    wrap: async (lookupKey) => {\n      assertLookupKey(opts.kind, lookupKey);\n      return layout.wrap(lookupKey);\n    },\n    unwrap: async (id) => {\n      const lookupKey = await layout.tryUnwrap(id);\n      if (lookupKey === null) {\n        throw new IdsError(\"verification_failed\", \"verification failed\");\n      }\n      return lookupKey;\n    },\n    safeUnwrap: async (input) => {\n      const parsed = wire.safeParse(input);\n      if (!parsed.ok) return parsed;\n      const lookupKey = await layout.tryUnwrap(parsed.id);\n      if (lookupKey === null) return { ok: false, error: \"verification_failed\" };\n      return { ok: true, id: parsed.id, lookupKey };\n    },\n    is: wire.is,\n    parse: wire.parse,\n    safeParse: wire.safeParse,\n    toJsonSchema: () => wire.toJsonSchema(brand, layout.exampleWireId()),\n    \"~standard\": wire[\"~standard\"],\n    toUUID: wire.toUUID,\n    fromUUID: wire.fromUUID,\n    safeFromUUID: wire.safeFromUUID,\n  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package/dist/wrapped.d.mts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { a as StandardSchemaProps, i as ParseResult, n as JsonSchema, o as ValidBrand, r as ParseError, t as Id } from "./types-wplmOgOK.mjs";
-import { n as IdsErrorCode, r as isIdsError, t as IdsError } from "./error-Dqyho9vp.mjs";
+import { a as StandardSchemaProps, i as ParseResult, n as JsonSchema, o as ValidBrand, r as ParseError, t as Id } from "./types-hGBnCpJj.mjs";
+import { n as IdsErrorCode, r as isIdsError, t as IdsError } from "./error-CifcKKOG.mjs";
 
 //#region src/codecs/wrapped/key.d.ts
 /** Wire encoding for wrapping operator secret bytes (not Crockford base32). */
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ type WrappingKey = {
 * {@link decodeWrappingKey} (`"hex"` or `"base64url"` — not Crockford base32).
 *
 * @param bytes - 16, 24, or 32 raw key bytes.
+* @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_length` if `bytes.length` is not 16, 24, or 32.
 */
 declare function importWrappingKey(bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<WrappingKey>;
 /**
@@ -34,12 +35,19 @@ declare function importWrappingKey(bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<WrappingKey>;
 *
 * Supports `"hex"` (lowercase) and `"base64url"`. Output round-trips through
 * {@link decodeWrappingKey} back to the original bytes.
+*
+* @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_format` if `format` is not `"hex"` or `"base64url"`.
+* @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_length` if `bytes.length` is not 16, 24, or 32.
 */
 declare function encodeWrappingKey(bytes: Uint8Array, format: WrappingKeyFormat): string;
 /**
 * Decode key material emitted by {@link encodeWrappingKey} back to raw bytes.
 *
 * The result can be passed directly to {@link importWrappingKey}.
+*
+* @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_format` if `format` is not `"hex"` or `"base64url"`.
+* @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_encoding` if the string is malformed for its format.
+* @throws {IdsError} `invalid_key_length` if the decoded bytes are not 16, 24, or 32 bytes.
 */
 declare function decodeWrappingKey(encoded: string, format: WrappingKeyFormat): Uint8Array;
 //#endregion
@@ -129,6 +137,23 @@ type WrappedKeyCodec<Brand extends string, Kind extends WrappedKind> = {
   safeParse(value: unknown): ParseResult<Brand>;
   toJsonSchema(): JsonSchema;
   readonly "~standard": StandardSchemaProps<Brand>;
+  /**
+  * Converts a trusted `Id<Brand>` to an RFC 9562 canonical (lowercase, hyphenated)
+  * UUID string by reinterpreting the 16-byte payload verbatim. Total — cannot fail.
+  * Returns a plain `string` (brand is shed). See ADR-0024.
+  */
+  toUUID(id: Id<Brand>): string;
+  /**
+  * Parses a UUID string into an `Id<Brand>`. Accepts case-insensitive `8-4-4-4-12`
+  * hyphenated form only. Throws `IdsError` with `code: "invalid_id"` on bad input.
+  * See ADR-0024.
+  */
+  fromUUID(value: string): Id<Brand>;
+  /**
+  * Non-throwing UUID parse. Returns `{ ok: true, id }` or
+  * `{ ok: false, error: "not_string" | "invalid_uuid" }`. See ADR-0024.
+  */
+  safeFromUUID(value: unknown): ParseResult<Brand>;
 };
 /**
 * Construction options for {@link createWrappedKeyId}.

package/dist/wrapped.d.mts.map

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package/dist/wrapped.mjs

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 import { n as isIdsError, t as IdsError } from "./error-Cp5qYZcv.mjs";
-import { i as importWrappingKey, n as decodeWrappingKey, r as encodeWrappingKey, t as createWrappedKeyId } from "./wrapped-DPlsv1x-.mjs";
+import { i as importWrappingKey, n as decodeWrappingKey, r as encodeWrappingKey, t as createWrappedKeyId } from "./wrapped-Oj2hC1vB.mjs";
 export { IdsError, createWrappedKeyId, decodeWrappingKey, encodeWrappingKey, importWrappingKey, isIdsError };

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@smonn/ids",
-  "version": "0.13.1",
+  "version": "0.14.1",
   "license": "MIT",
   "author": "Simon Ingeson (https://github.com/smonn)",
   "repository": {
@@ -11,7 +11,8 @@
     "ids": "./dist/cli.mjs"
   },
   "files": [
-    "dist"
+    "dist",
+    "spec/vectors.json"
   ],
   "type": "module",
   "types": "./dist/index.d.mts",