@smartmemory/compose 0.2.6-beta → 0.2.7-beta

package/server/agent-spawn.js

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import path from 'node:path';
 
 import { getTargetRoot } from './project-root.js';
 import { gracefulKill } from './agent-health.js';
+import { resolveSpawnProfile } from './mcp-tool-policy.js';
 
 const PROJECT_ROOT = getTargetRoot();
 
@@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ export function attachAgentSpawnRoutes(app, { projectRoot = PROJECT_ROOT, broadc
   const _agents = new Map();
   // POST /api/agent/spawn — spawn a hidden Claude subagent
   app.post('/api/agent/spawn', requireSensitiveToken, (req, res) => {
-    const { prompt, id } = req.body || {};
+    const { prompt, id, profile, template } = req.body || {};
     if (!prompt || typeof prompt !== 'string') return res.status(400).json({ error: 'prompt is required and must be a string' });
 
     const agentId = id || `agent-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 6)}`;
@@ -49,6 +50,11 @@ export function attachAgentSpawnRoutes(app, { projectRoot = PROJECT_ROOT, broadc
 
     const cleanEnv = { ...process.env, NO_COLOR: '1' };
     delete cleanEnv.CLAUDECODE;
+    // COMP-MCP-ENFORCE-1: inject a TRUSTED, spawn-time MCP profile the subagent
+    // cannot rewrite (its compose-mcp child inherits this env). Only restrictive
+    // profiles are injected; an orchestrator/unspecified spawn stays unrestricted.
+    const spawnProfile = resolveSpawnProfile({ profile, template });
+    if (spawnProfile) cleanEnv.COMPOSE_SESSION_PROFILE = spawnProfile;
 
     const proc = spawn('claude', [
       '-p', prompt,

package/server/compose-mcp-tools.js

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import http from 'node:http';
 import path from 'node:path';
 import { ArtifactManager, ARTIFACT_SCHEMAS } from './artifact-manager.js';
 import { getTargetRoot, getDataDir, resolveProjectPath, switchProject, setCurrentWorkspaceId, loadProjectConfig } from './project-root.js';
+import { resolveProfile, isToolAllowed } from './mcp-tool-policy.js';
 
 /**
  * COMP-MCP-ENFORCE Slice 3 — kill the `force` escape hatch at the MCP tool
@@ -438,7 +439,7 @@ export async function toolValidateProject(args = {}) {
   });
 }
 
-export async function toolBindSession({ featureCode }) {
+export async function toolBindSession({ featureCode, profile } = {}) {
   let result;
   try {
     result = await _httpRequest('POST', '/api/session/bind', { featureCode });
@@ -452,6 +453,15 @@ export async function toolBindSession({ featureCode }) {
       : `HTTP ${status}: ${typeof body === 'string' ? body : JSON.stringify(body)}`;
     throw new Error(errMsg);
   }
+  // COMP-MCP-ENFORCE-1: record the bound feature (anchor for phase resolution)
+  // on any non-error reply — including `already_bound` — so reconnects/repeat
+  // binds keep the anchor. Use the server's AUTHORITATIVE featureCode from the
+  // reply (an `already_bound` reply returns the real bound feature, which may
+  // differ from the request arg) so the anchor never drifts. The trusted env
+  // profile is the floor; the bind `profile` arg may only NARROW it.
+  const boundCode = (body && typeof body === 'object' && body.featureCode) || featureCode;
+  if (boundCode) _boundFeatureCode = boundCode;
+  _sessionProfile = resolveProfile(process.env.COMPOSE_SESSION_PROFILE, profile);
   return body;
 }
 
@@ -627,3 +637,95 @@ export function toolGetWorkspace() {
 
 export function _getBinding() { return _binding?.id ?? null; }
 
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// COMP-MCP-ENFORCE-1 — phase-scoped MCP tool gate (profile × phase)
+//
+// Trusted profile = spawn-injected COMPOSE_SESSION_PROFILE (the agent cannot
+// rewrite its own launch env); bind_session may only NARROW it. The bound
+// feature anchor (_boundFeatureCode) lets the gate resolve the current phase
+// on-disk and check that re-permitted mutations target the bound feature.
+// All process-global by intent (one MCP child per session).
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+let _sessionProfile = resolveProfile(process.env.COMPOSE_SESSION_PROFILE, null);
+let _boundFeatureCode = null;
+
+export function _getSessionProfile() { return _sessionProfile; }
+export function _getBoundFeatureCode() { return _boundFeatureCode; }
+/** @internal test seam */
+export function _testOnly_setSessionContext({ profile, boundFeatureCode } = {}) {
+  if (profile !== undefined) _sessionProfile = profile;
+  if (boundFeatureCode !== undefined) _boundFeatureCode = boundFeatureCode;
+}
+
+/** The bound feature's current lifecycle phase from vision-state.json, or null. */
+export function resolveBoundPhase() {
+  if (!_boundFeatureCode) return null;
+  try {
+    const { items } = loadVisionState();
+    const item = items.find((i) => i.lifecycle?.featureCode === _boundFeatureCode);
+    return item?.lifecycle?.currentPhase ?? null;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/** Resolve a gated tool's target to a feature code (for the feature-scoped re-permit check). */
+function _resolveTargetFeatureCode(tool, args = {}) {
+  try {
+    if (tool === 'record_completion') return args.feature_code ?? null;
+    if (tool === 'set_feature_status' || tool === 'add_roadmap_entry' || tool === 'propose_followup') {
+      return args.code ?? null;
+    }
+    if (tool === 'complete_feature' || tool === 'kill_feature') {
+      const { items } = loadVisionState();
+      return items.find((i) => i.id === args.id)?.lifecycle?.featureCode ?? null;
+    }
+    if (tool === 'approve_gate') {
+      const { items, gates } = loadVisionState();
+      const gate = gates?.find((g) => g.id === args.gateId);
+      return items.find((i) => i.id === gate?.itemId)?.lifecycle?.featureCode ?? null;
+    }
+  } catch { /* fall through */ }
+  return null;
+}
+
+function _targetMatchesBoundFeature(tool, args) {
+  if (!_boundFeatureCode) return false;
+  const code = _resolveTargetFeatureCode(tool, args);
+  return code !== null && code === _boundFeatureCode;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Throw PHASE_TOOL_DENIED if the tool is not allowed for the current
+ * profile×phase. No-op when the capability is off (default) or on a valid
+ * override token. On unresolved CONTEXT the behavior is graduated, NOT blanket
+ * fail-open: an unresolved PROFILE (no/unknown env) normalizes to orchestrator →
+ * unrestricted; an unresolved PHASE only fails open the phase *refinement* — the
+ * profile BASE policy (implementer deny / reviewer allowlist) still applies
+ * (a restricted context with unknown phase stays restricted, which is the safe
+ * reading). `_testCtx` lets tests drive flag/profile/phase/target without disk/env.
+ */
+export function assertToolPhaseAllowed(tool, args = {}, _testCtx) {
+  const guardOn = _testCtx?.phaseScopedTools ?? (loadProjectConfig()?.capabilities?.phaseScopedTools === true);
+  if (!guardOn) return;
+  if (_overrideOk(args)) return;
+
+  const profile = _testCtx?.profile ?? _sessionProfile;
+  const phase = _testCtx?.phase ?? resolveBoundPhase();
+  const targetMatchesBoundFeature = _testCtx?.targetMatches ?? _targetMatchesBoundFeature(tool, args);
+
+  const verdict = isToolAllowed({ tool, profile, phase, targetMatchesBoundFeature });
+  if (!verdict.allowed) {
+    const e = new Error(
+      `${tool} is not available to profile '${profile}'` +
+      (phase ? ` in phase '${phase}'` : '') + `: ${verdict.reason}. ` +
+      `Supply a valid override_token to deviate.`,
+    );
+    e.code = 'PHASE_TOOL_DENIED';
+    e.profile = profile;
+    e.phase = phase;
+    throw e;
+  }
+}
+

package/server/compose-mcp.js

@@ -64,8 +64,12 @@ import {
   toolWriteCheckpoint,
   toolComposeResume,
   _getBinding,
+  assertToolPhaseAllowed,
+  _getSessionProfile,
+  resolveBoundPhase,
 } from './compose-mcp-tools.js';
-import { switchProject, getTargetRoot } from './project-root.js';
+import { isToolAllowed } from './mcp-tool-policy.js';
+import { switchProject, getTargetRoot, loadProjectConfig } from './project-root.js';
 import { resolveWorkspace } from '../lib/resolve-workspace.js';
 
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -627,15 +631,41 @@ const server = new Server(
   { capabilities: { tools: {} } }
 );
 
-server.setRequestHandler(ListToolsRequestSchema, async () => ({
-  tools: TOOLS,
-}));
+server.setRequestHandler(ListToolsRequestSchema, async () => {
+  // COMP-MCP-ENFORCE-1: best-effort surface filter by the session's profile×phase.
+  // The hard guarantee is the CallTool gate below; ListTools just hides what the
+  // current context can't use (no tools/list_changed dependency).
+  const enabled = loadProjectConfig()?.capabilities?.phaseScopedTools === true;
+  if (!enabled) return { tools: TOOLS };
+  const profile = _getSessionProfile();
+  if (profile === 'orchestrator') return { tools: TOOLS };
+  const phase = resolveBoundPhase();
+  // target match is unknowable at list time → list a tool if its profile base
+  // (ignoring the feature-scoped re-permit) would ever permit it in this phase.
+  const tools = TOOLS.filter((t) =>
+    isToolAllowed({ tool: t.name, profile, phase, targetMatchesBoundFeature: true }).allowed);
+  return { tools };
+});
 
 server.setRequestHandler(CallToolRequestSchema, async (request) => {
   const { name, arguments: args = {} } = request.params;
 
   const WORKSPACE_EXEMPT = new Set(['set_workspace', 'get_workspace']);
 
+  // COMP-MCP-ENFORCE-1: phase-scoped tool gate (hard guarantee). No-op when the
+  // capability is off, on a valid override token, or when context is unresolved.
+  try {
+    assertToolPhaseAllowed(name, args);
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (err && err.code === 'PHASE_TOOL_DENIED') {
+      return {
+        content: [{ type: 'text', text: `Error [PHASE_TOOL_DENIED]: ${err.message}` }],
+        isError: true,
+      };
+    }
+    throw err;
+  }
+
   try {
     if (!WORKSPACE_EXEMPT.has(name)) {
       const ws = resolveWorkspace({ getBinding: _getBinding });

package/server/design-routes.js

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import path from 'node:path';
 import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
 import { parseDecisionBlocks } from '../src/components/vision/designSessionState.js';
 import { StratumMcpClient } from '../lib/stratum-mcp-client.js';
+import { KNOWN_VERSIONS } from '../lib/build-stream-schema.js';
 
 // Lazy singleton — design conversations share one stratum-mcp connection
 // across the server process lifetime. Concurrent runs are correlation-id scoped.
@@ -144,7 +145,9 @@ ${formattedMessages}`;
     const subStepId = '_agent_run';
 
     const unsub = stratum.onEvent(correlationId, subStepId, (env) => {
-      if (!env || env.schema_version !== '0.2.5') return;
+      // Accept all KNOWN_VERSIONS (producer emits 0.2.6); pinning '0.2.5' dropped
+      // the current producer's events. Client already validated before dispatch.
+      if (!env || !KNOWN_VERSIONS.has(env.schema_version)) return;
       const m = env.metadata ?? {};
       switch (env.kind) {
         case 'agent_relay':

package/server/mcp-tool-policy.js

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+// server/mcp-tool-policy.js
+//
+// COMP-MCP-ENFORCE-1 — pure, declarative profile×phase policy for the compose
+// MCP tool gate. No I/O: callers supply the resolved {profile, phase} and whether
+// the tool's target matches the bound feature. See docs/features/COMP-MCP-ENFORCE-1/.
+
+/** Agent-template name (server/agent-templates.js) → MCP profile. */
+export const TEMPLATE_PROFILE_MAP = {
+  'read-only-reviewer': 'reviewer',
+  'read-only-researcher': 'reviewer',
+  'security-auditor': 'reviewer',
+  'implementer': 'implementer',
+  'orchestrator': 'orchestrator',
+};
+
+/**
+ * Tools that are NEVER gated — setup/query prerequisites. Denying these would
+ * strand a restricted session (e.g. workspace selection precedes feature binding).
+ * All read/`get_*`/`validate_*` tools are also implicitly safe but are listed in
+ * the reviewer allowlist; this set is the cross-profile exemption.
+ */
+export const SETUP_TOOLS = new Set([
+  'set_workspace', 'get_workspace', 'bind_session', 'get_current_session',
+]);
+
+/** Management/approval/completion tools an implementer context must not wield. */
+const IMPLEMENTER_DENY = [
+  'approve_gate', 'complete_feature', 'kill_feature',
+  'set_feature_status', 'add_roadmap_entry', 'record_completion', 'propose_followup',
+];
+
+/** Reviewer (read-only) may call only these. */
+const REVIEWER_ALLOW = [
+  'get_vision_items', 'get_item_detail', 'get_phase_summary', 'get_blocked_items',
+  'get_current_session', 'get_feature_lifecycle', 'get_feature_artifacts', 'get_feature_links',
+  'get_pending_gates', 'get_changelog_entries', 'get_journal_entries', 'get_completions',
+  'validate_feature', 'validate_project', 'roadmap_diff', 'assess_feature_artifacts',
+  'set_workspace', 'get_workspace', 'bind_session',
+];
+
+export const PROFILE_POLICY = {
+  orchestrator: { mode: 'unrestricted' },
+  implementer: { mode: 'deny', tools: new Set(IMPLEMENTER_DENY) },
+  reviewer: { mode: 'allowlist', tools: new Set(REVIEWER_ALLOW) },
+};
+
+/** phase → management tools re-permitted for DENY-mode profiles in that phase. */
+export const PHASE_REFINEMENT = {
+  ship: new Set(['complete_feature', 'record_completion']),
+};
+
+// Strictness ordering — a bind hint may only NARROW (raise strictness), never widen.
+const RANK = { orchestrator: 0, implementer: 1, reviewer: 2 };
+function _norm(p) {
+  return (p && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(RANK, p)) ? p : 'orchestrator';
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolve the effective profile. `envProfile` (spawn-injected COMPOSE_SESSION_PROFILE)
+ * is the trusted floor; `bindHint` (bind_session arg) may only narrow. Unknown
+ * strings normalize to orchestrator (fail-open).
+ */
+export function resolveProfile(envProfile, bindHint) {
+  const env = _norm(envProfile);
+  const hint = _norm(bindHint);
+  const rank = Math.max(RANK[env], RANK[hint]);
+  return Object.keys(RANK).find((k) => RANK[k] === rank);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolve the value to inject as COMPOSE_SESSION_PROFILE when spawning a
+ * subagent. Accepts an explicit MCP `profile` or an agent-template `template`
+ * (mapped via TEMPLATE_PROFILE_MAP). Returns the restrictive profile string to
+ * inject, or null when the result is unrestricted/unknown (inject nothing →
+ * the subagent runs as orchestrator, preserving current behavior).
+ */
+export function resolveSpawnProfile({ profile, template } = {}) {
+  let p = null;
+  if (profile && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(RANK, profile)) p = profile;
+  else if (template && TEMPLATE_PROFILE_MAP[template]) p = TEMPLATE_PROFILE_MAP[template];
+  return (p === 'implementer' || p === 'reviewer') ? p : null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decide whether a tool may be called in a context.
+ * @param {{tool:string, profile:string, phase?:string, targetMatchesBoundFeature?:boolean}} ctx
+ * @returns {{allowed:boolean, reason:string}}
+ */
+export function isToolAllowed({ tool, profile, phase, targetMatchesBoundFeature = false }) {
+  const prof = _norm(profile);
+  const policy = PROFILE_POLICY[prof];
+
+  if (policy.mode === 'unrestricted') return { allowed: true, reason: 'unrestricted profile' };
+  if (SETUP_TOOLS.has(tool)) return { allowed: true, reason: 'setup/query tool (never gated)' };
+
+  if (policy.mode === 'allowlist') {
+    // Phase NEVER widens an allowlist (reviewer stays read-only in every phase).
+    return policy.tools.has(tool)
+      ? { allowed: true, reason: `allowlisted for ${prof}` }
+      : { allowed: false, reason: `${tool} not in ${prof} allowlist` };
+  }
+
+  // deny-mode (implementer)
+  if (!policy.tools.has(tool)) return { allowed: true, reason: `not denied for ${prof}` };
+  const refinement = phase ? PHASE_REFINEMENT[phase] : null;
+  if (refinement && refinement.has(tool)) {
+    return targetMatchesBoundFeature
+      ? { allowed: true, reason: `phase '${phase}' re-permits ${tool} on the bound feature` }
+      : { allowed: false, reason: `phase '${phase}' re-permits ${tool} only for the bound feature (target differs)` };
+  }
+  return { allowed: false, reason: `${tool} denied for ${prof} in phase '${phase ?? 'unknown'}'` };
+}

package/dist/assets/channel-BD-5_hPW.js

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-import{ai as o,aj as n}from"./App-j8fWZcGr.js";const t=(a,r)=>o.lang.round(n.parse(a)[r]);export{t as c};

package/dist/assets/classDiagram-4FO5ZUOK-mSW5R7DY.js

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-import{s as a,c as s,a as e,C as t}from"./chunk-727SXJPM-kD07Sqp5.js";import{_ as i}from"./App-j8fWZcGr.js";import"./chunk-FMBD7UC4-Jti_und8.js";import"./chunk-ND2GUHAM-Ipx3noKz.js";import"./chunk-55IACEB6-Bnais1SK.js";import"./chunk-2J33WTMH-CrazA7xu.js";import"./mobile-CG5tLa2S.js";import"./index-uHKnp74B.js";import"./graph-CJVNlri5.js";var b={parser:e,get db(){return new t},renderer:s,styles:a,init:i(r=>{r.class||(r.class={}),r.class.arrowMarkerAbsolute=r.arrowMarkerAbsolute},"init")};export{b as diagram};

package/dist/assets/classDiagram-v2-Q7XG4LA2-mSW5R7DY.js

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-import{s as a,c as s,a as e,C as t}from"./chunk-727SXJPM-kD07Sqp5.js";import{_ as i}from"./App-j8fWZcGr.js";import"./chunk-FMBD7UC4-Jti_und8.js";import"./chunk-ND2GUHAM-Ipx3noKz.js";import"./chunk-55IACEB6-Bnais1SK.js";import"./chunk-2J33WTMH-CrazA7xu.js";import"./mobile-CG5tLa2S.js";import"./index-uHKnp74B.js";import"./graph-CJVNlri5.js";var b={parser:e,get db(){return new t},renderer:s,styles:a,init:i(r=>{r.class||(r.class={}),r.class.arrowMarkerAbsolute=r.arrowMarkerAbsolute},"init")};export{b as diagram};