@smartmemory/compose 0.2.46-beta → 0.2.47-beta

package/server/auth-middleware.js

@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
+/**
+ * auth-middleware.js — COMP-MOBILE-REMOTE S01
+ *
+ * Express middleware for remote auth:
+ *   - createRateLimiter      — fixed-window per-IP limiter (no deps)
+ *   - requirePairingToken    — JWT-only gate, attaches req.device
+ *   - requireSensitiveOrPaired — composite: sensitive token OR valid JWT
+ *   - createAuthGate         — default-deny gate with allowlist
+ *   - wsUpgradeTokenOk       — check ?token= on WS upgrade requests
+ *
+ * @module server/auth-middleware
+ */
+
+import { parse as parseUrl } from 'node:url';
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Rate limiter
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Create a fixed-window per-IP rate limiter.
+ *
+ * @param {{ windowMs?: number, max?: number }} [opts]
+ * @param {number} [opts.windowMs=60000]  Window size in ms
+ * @param {number} [opts.max=10]          Max requests per window per IP
+ * @returns {function}  Express middleware
+ */
+export function createRateLimiter({ windowMs = 60_000, max = 10 } = {}) {
+  /** ip → { count: number, windowStart: number } */
+  const _windows = new Map();
+
+  function _sweep() {
+    const now = Date.now();
+    for (const [ip, entry] of _windows) {
+      if (now - entry.windowStart >= windowMs) _windows.delete(ip);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return function rateLimiter(req, res, next) {
+    const ip = req.ip || req.socket?.remoteAddress || 'unknown';
+    const now = Date.now();
+
+    // Opportunistic sweep (amortized)
+    if (_windows.size > 500) _sweep();
+
+    let entry = _windows.get(ip);
+    if (!entry || now - entry.windowStart >= windowMs) {
+      entry = { count: 0, windowStart: now };
+      _windows.set(ip, entry);
+    }
+
+    entry.count += 1;
+    if (entry.count > max) {
+      const retryAfter = Math.ceil((windowMs - (now - entry.windowStart)) / 1000);
+      res.set('Retry-After', String(retryAfter));
+      return res.status(429).json({
+        error: 'Too many requests',
+        code: 'RateLimited',
+      });
+    }
+
+    next();
+  };
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// requirePairingToken
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Middleware: require a valid pairing JWT.
+ *
+ * Reads from:
+ *   1. Authorization: Bearer <jwt>
+ *   2. x-compose-token: <jwt>  (back-compat)
+ *
+ * On success: attaches req.device = { id, name }, calls next().
+ * On failure: 401 { error, code: 'TokenExpired'|'TokenInvalid' }
+ *
+ * @param {object} store  Auth store from createAuthStore
+ * @returns {function}
+ */
+export function requirePairingToken(store) {
+  return function pairingTokenMiddleware(req, res, next) {
+    const jwt = _extractBearer(req);
+    if (!jwt) {
+      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Unauthorized', code: 'TokenInvalid' });
+    }
+    const result = store.verifyAccessToken(jwt);
+    if (!result.ok) {
+      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Unauthorized', code: result.code });
+    }
+    req.device = { id: result.device_id, name: result.name };
+    next();
+  };
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// requireSensitiveOrPaired
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Composite middleware factory: accepts EITHER the sensitive token OR a valid JWT.
+ *
+ * Behavior mirrors requireSensitiveToken exactly when no JWT is presented:
+ *   - 503 when COMPOSE_API_TOKEN is unset (existing tests depend on this)
+ *   - 401 when token mismatch
+ *
+ * @param {object} store  Auth store from createAuthStore
+ * @returns {function}    Express middleware
+ */
+export function requireSensitiveOrPaired(store) {
+  return function sensitiveOrPairedMiddleware(req, res, next) {
+    const expected = process.env.COMPOSE_API_TOKEN;
+
+    // Check if a JWT is presented first
+    const jwt = _extractBearer(req);
+    if (jwt) {
+      const result = store.verifyAccessToken(jwt);
+      if (result.ok) {
+        req.device = { id: result.device_id, name: result.name };
+        return next();
+      }
+      // JWT presented but invalid/expired — fall through to sensitive token check
+      // but only if no env token (503 parity): when no env token, the sensitive
+      // check would have returned 503, so we preserve that.
+    }
+
+    // Exact sensitive-token check — mirrors security.js requireSensitiveToken
+    if (!expected) {
+      return res.status(503).json({
+        error:
+          'Sensitive endpoint disabled: missing COMPOSE_API_TOKEN (run via supervisor or set it manually)',
+      });
+    }
+
+    const provided = req.get('x-compose-token');
+    if (provided && provided === expected) {
+      return next();
+    }
+
+    return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Unauthorized' });
+  };
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// createAuthGate
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Create the default-deny auth gate for remote mode.
+ *
+ * Mounted ONLY when COMPOSE_REMOTE_AUTH=enabled. When off, this is never called.
+ *
+ * Allowlist entries can be:
+ *   - Exact strings: '/api/health'
+ *   - Prefix strings ending with '/': '/assets/'
+ *   - Plain prefix strings (no trailing slash): '/m' matches '/m', '/m/', '/m/pair'
+ *
+ * Token sources accepted:
+ *   - x-compose-token header (sensitive token)
+ *   - Authorization: Bearer <jwt>
+ *   - x-compose-token: <jwt> (back-compat)
+ *   - ?token=<jwt or sensitive> query param ONLY for:
+ *       - GET requests with Accept: text/event-stream
+ *       - The SSE proxy path /api/agent/proxy/stream
+ *
+ * @param {{ store: object, allowlist: string[] }} opts
+ * @returns {function}  Express middleware
+ */
+export function createAuthGate({ store, allowlist = [], streamPaths = [] }) {
+  const _exactPaths = new Set();
+  const _prefixes = [];
+
+  for (const entry of allowlist) {
+    if (entry.endsWith('/')) {
+      _prefixes.push(entry.slice(0, -1)); // strip trailing slash for comparison
+    } else {
+      _exactPaths.add(entry);
+      // Also register as prefix for sub-paths (e.g. '/m' covers '/m/pair')
+      _prefixes.push(entry);
+    }
+  }
+
+  function _allowed(path) {
+    if (_exactPaths.has(path)) return true;
+    return _prefixes.some(
+      (p) => path === p || path.startsWith(p + '/') || path.startsWith(p + '?'),
+    );
+  }
+
+  return function authGate(req, res, next) {
+    const path = req.path || '/';
+
+    // 1. Allowlist check
+    if (_allowed(path)) return next();
+
+    // 2. Sensitive token check
+    const expected = process.env.COMPOSE_API_TOKEN;
+    const sensitiveHeader = req.get('x-compose-token');
+    if (expected && sensitiveHeader === expected) return next();
+
+    // 3. JWT check (Authorization: Bearer or x-compose-token back-compat)
+    const jwt = _extractBearer(req);
+    if (jwt) {
+      const result = store.verifyAccessToken(jwt);
+      if (result.ok) {
+        req.device = { id: result.device_id, name: result.name };
+        return next();
+      }
+      // JWT present but invalid — return its specific error code
+      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Unauthorized', code: result.code });
+    }
+
+    // 4. Query-param token — ONLY on the explicit stream-path allowlist.
+    // Never keyed on the Accept header: a spoofed `Accept: text/event-stream`
+    // must not let arbitrary GETs authenticate via URL (credentials would
+    // leak into URLs/logs that the header-only contract keeps out of band).
+    const isStreamPath = req.method === 'GET' && streamPaths.includes(path);
+
+    if (isStreamPath) {
+      const queryToken = _extractQueryToken(req);
+      if (queryToken) {
+        // Accept sensitive token or JWT
+        if (expected && queryToken === expected) return next();
+        const result = store.verifyAccessToken(queryToken);
+        if (result.ok) {
+          req.device = { id: result.device_id, name: result.name };
+          return next();
+        }
+        return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Unauthorized', code: result.code });
+      }
+    }
+
+    // 5. Default deny
+    return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Unauthorized', code: 'TokenInvalid' });
+  };
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// wsUpgradeTokenOk
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Check if a WS upgrade request carries a valid token in its query string.
+ *
+ * Accepts `?token=<sensitive token>` or `?token=<valid JWT>`.
+ * Called from the server's manual upgrade handler (server/index.js:143-156).
+ * Token value is never logged.
+ *
+ * @param {object} store  Auth store
+ * @param {object} req    Node http.IncomingMessage
+ * @returns {boolean}
+ */
+export function wsUpgradeTokenOk(store, req) {
+  const queryToken = _extractQueryTokenFromUrl(req.url || '');
+  if (!queryToken) return false;
+
+  const expected = process.env.COMPOSE_API_TOKEN;
+  if (expected && queryToken === expected) return true;
+
+  const result = store.verifyAccessToken(queryToken);
+  return result.ok === true;
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Internal helpers
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Extract JWT from Authorization: Bearer <jwt> or x-compose-token header.
+ * Returns null if not present or not in Bearer format.
+ */
+function _extractBearer(req) {
+  const auth = req.get('authorization') || req.get('Authorization') || '';
+  if (auth.startsWith('Bearer ')) {
+    return auth.slice(7).trim() || null;
+  }
+  // Back-compat: x-compose-token may carry a JWT (not the sensitive key)
+  // We let the caller decide what to do with it; return it here only if
+  // it does NOT look like the sensitive token (no env check here — store.verify handles it).
+  // Actually the design says x-compose-token back-compat for pairingToken — return it.
+  // requirePairingToken reads it; the gate handles the sensitive-token check separately.
+  const xt = req.get('x-compose-token') || '';
+  if (xt && xt !== (process.env.COMPOSE_API_TOKEN || '')) {
+    return xt;
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Extract ?token= from a parsed req (Express req has req.query).
+ */
+function _extractQueryToken(req) {
+  return (req.query && req.query.token) || _extractQueryTokenFromUrl(req.url || '');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Extract ?token= from a raw URL string (used for WS upgrade requests which
+ * are plain IncomingMessage, not Express req).
+ */
+function _extractQueryTokenFromUrl(url) {
+  try {
+    const parsed = parseUrl(url, true);
+    return parsed.query?.token || null;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}

package/server/auth-routes.js

@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+/**
+ * auth-routes.js — COMP-MOBILE-REMOTE S01
+ *
+ * Remote pairing and device management routes.
+ * Attach with attachAuthRoutes(app, { store, broadcast, requireSensitive }).
+ *
+ * Routes:
+ *   POST /api/auth/pair/init      — requires sensitive token
+ *   GET  /api/auth/pair/status    — requires sensitive token
+ *   POST /api/auth/pair/complete  — public, rate-limited 10/min
+ *   POST /api/auth/refresh        — public, rate-limited 10/min
+ *   GET  /api/auth/devices        — requires sensitive token
+ *   DELETE /api/auth/devices/:id  — requires sensitive token
+ *
+ * @module server/auth-routes
+ */
+
+import { createRateLimiter } from './auth-middleware.js';
+
+/**
+ * Attach auth routes to an Express app.
+ *
+ * @param {object} app             Express application
+ * @param {{ store: object,
+ *            broadcast?: function,
+ *            requireSensitive: function }} opts
+ *   - store:           auth store from createAuthStore
+ *   - broadcast:       optional function(msg) for WS broadcast (e.g. vision-server's broadcastMessage)
+ *   - requireSensitive: middleware that enforces COMPOSE_API_TOKEN (requireSensitiveToken or composite)
+ */
+export function attachAuthRoutes(app, { store, broadcast = null, requireSensitive, getPublicHost = () => null }) {
+  const publicLimiter = createRateLimiter({ windowMs: 60_000, max: 10 });
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // POST /api/auth/pair/init
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  /**
+   * Initiate a pairing session.
+   * Returns { code, expires_at, pair_url, public_host } — pair_url is composed
+   * server-side when a public_host is configured (.compose/compose.json
+   * remote.public_host, persisted by `compose remote pair --public-host=`),
+   * else null and the caller falls back/warns.
+   *
+   * BP-gate finding #2: only CLI/cockpit poll status; both hold the sensitive token.
+   * pair/init is NOT allowlisted.
+   */
+  app.post('/api/auth/pair/init', requireSensitive, (req, res) => {
+    const { code, expires_at } = store.createPairingCode();
+    const publicHost = getPublicHost();
+    const pair_url = publicHost
+      ? `${publicHost.replace(/\/$/, '')}/m/pair?code=${encodeURIComponent(code)}`
+      : null;
+    res.json({ code, expires_at, pair_url, public_host: publicHost });
+  });
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // GET /api/auth/pair/status?code=
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  /**
+   * Poll pairing code status (sensitive token required — not public).
+   * Returns { status: 'pending'|'consumed'|'expired' }
+   */
+  app.get('/api/auth/pair/status', requireSensitive, (req, res) => {
+    const code = req.query?.code;
+    if (!code) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Missing code parameter' });
+    }
+    const status = store.getPairingCodeStatus(code);
+    res.json({ status });
+  });
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // POST /api/auth/pair/complete
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  /**
+   * Consume a pairing code and create a device.
+   * PUBLIC (code is the auth), rate-limited.
+   * Body: { code, device_name? }
+   * Returns: { access_token, refresh_token, device_id, expires_in }
+   * Broadcasts: { type: 'devicePaired', device_id, name, timestamp } on success.
+   */
+  app.post('/api/auth/pair/complete', publicLimiter, (req, res) => {
+    const { code, device_name } = req.body || {};
+
+    if (!code) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Missing code', code: 'CodeInvalid' });
+    }
+
+    const ua = req.get('user-agent') || '';
+    const result = store.consumePairingCode(code, {
+      name: device_name || ua.slice(0, 80) || 'Unknown Device',
+      user_agent: ua,
+    });
+
+    if (result.error) {
+      const status = result.error === 'CodeExpired' ? 400 : 400;
+      return res.status(status).json({ error: result.error, code: result.error });
+    }
+
+    // Broadcast to cockpit watchers (null-safe)
+    if (typeof broadcast === 'function') {
+      try {
+        broadcast({
+          type: 'devicePaired',
+          device_id: result.device.id,
+          name: result.device.name,
+          timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
+        });
+      } catch {
+        // best-effort broadcast
+      }
+    }
+
+    res.json({
+      access_token: result.access_token,
+      refresh_token: result.refresh_token,
+      device_id: result.device.id,
+      expires_in: result.expires_in,
+    });
+  });
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // POST /api/auth/refresh
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  /**
+   * Rotate a refresh token and issue new tokens.
+   * PUBLIC (refresh token is the auth), rate-limited.
+   * Body: { refresh_token }
+   * Returns: { access_token, refresh_token, expires_in }
+   */
+  app.post('/api/auth/refresh', publicLimiter, (req, res) => {
+    const { refresh_token } = req.body || {};
+
+    if (!refresh_token) {
+      return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Missing refresh_token', code: 'TokenInvalid' });
+    }
+
+    const result = store.refresh(refresh_token);
+    if (result.error) {
+      return res.status(401).json({ error: result.error, code: 'TokenInvalid' });
+    }
+
+    res.json({
+      access_token: result.access_token,
+      refresh_token: result.refresh_token,
+      expires_in: result.expires_in,
+    });
+  });
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // GET /api/auth/devices
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  /**
+   * List all paired devices (without hash fields).
+   * Requires sensitive token.
+   */
+  app.get('/api/auth/devices', requireSensitive, (req, res) => {
+    res.json({ devices: store.listDevices() });
+  });
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // DELETE /api/auth/devices/:id
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  /**
+   * Revoke a device.
+   * Requires sensitive token.
+   * Returns { ok: true } or 404.
+   */
+  app.delete('/api/auth/devices/:id', requireSensitive, (req, res) => {
+    const found = store.revokeDevice(req.params.id);
+    if (!found) {
+      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Device not found' });
+    }
+    res.json({ ok: true });
+  });
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // POST /api/auth/rotate-secret
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  /**
+   * Rotate the JWT signing secret.
+   * Invalidates ALL outstanding access tokens immediately.
+   * Device records and refresh tokens are preserved (but re-paired access
+   * tokens must be re-issued under the new secret — clients will get 401s
+   * until they re-pair or refresh, which will now issue tokens signed with
+   * the new secret).
+   *
+   * Deviation note: S01 omitted this route; added in S03 for CLI support.
+   * Requires sensitive token.
+   */
+  app.post('/api/auth/rotate-secret', requireSensitive, (req, res) => {
+    store.rotateSecret();
+    res.json({ ok: true });
+  });
+}