@smartledger/bsv 9.23.0 → 9.25.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +115 -0
- package/README.md +19 -19
- package/bsv-gdaf.min.js +1 -1
- package/bsv-smartcontract.min.js +1 -1
- package/bsv.bundle.js +2 -2
- package/bsv.min.js +2 -2
- package/docs/AUDIT_SCOPE.md +6 -6
- package/docs/MODULE_REFERENCE_COMPLETE.md +27 -27
- package/docs/advanced/UTXO_MANAGER_GUIDE.md +1 -1
- package/docs/audit-rfq/cure53.txt +1 -1
- package/docs/audit-rfq/ncc-group.txt +1 -1
- package/docs/audit-rfq/trail-of-bits.txt +1 -1
- package/docs/getting-started/INSTALLATION.md +23 -23
- package/docs/getting-started/QUICK_START.md +7 -7
- package/docs/migration/FROM_BSV_1_5_6.md +5 -5
- package/lib/notaryhash/index.js +86 -5
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/version.js +1 -1
package/CHANGELOG.md
CHANGED
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@@ -7,6 +7,121 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
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## [Unreleased]
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## [9.25.0] - 2026-10-07
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Two claims a certificate can carry that this library does not verify, and answered `valid` about
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anyway. Both found by the **block-penn-station session's differential fuzz** — 3,573 inputs, our
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`examples/gateway` adapter against an independent Python verifier written from the NotaryHash spec
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rather than from our code. Same verdict on 3,137 of them; the disagreements were ours.
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### Fixed — `anchor.seal` was not verified, and a certificate carrying one still verified
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A sealed record asserts it is the **one successor** of another: its transaction spends a
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one-satoshi seal output of the predecessor's transaction, and an output is spent once. That is
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checked by `@smartledger/notaryhash` (`verifySealedLink`, their SPEC 5b). **This library implements
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none of it**, and verified the 1.0 parts of such a certificate and answered `valid` — presenting an
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unchecked chain-of-custody claim as verified.
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319 fuzz inputs with a damaged seal verified here, including:
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- a certificate relabelled as the successor of a record it is not, naming a transaction its own
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transaction does not spend;
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- a seal signature of 64 zero bytes;
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- a seal replaced by `true`, `"x"` or `[]`;
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- the **first** record of a chain given an invented predecessor.
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Their verifier and the notaryhash SDK refuse every one. A certificate carrying `anchor.seal` is now
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refused, with `opts.allowUncheckedSeal` for a caller that wants the 1.0 verdict and will check the
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seal itself. An absent or `null` seal is no claim and is unaffected.
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### Fixed — a false `anchor.blockHeight` verified when `spv.blockHeight` was null
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`anchor.blockHeight` was compared with `spv.blockHeight` **only when both were present**, so nulling
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or deleting `spv.blockHeight` removed the only value it was ever checked against. A certificate
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claiming `anchor.blockHeight: 1` then verified against a mainnet block at height 970038 — the height
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was bound to nothing. `anchor.blockTime` was still checked, so this was the height alone.
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A present `anchor.blockHeight` must now be **checkable**: if the SPV envelope does not say which
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height it proves, the claim is refused rather than skipped. Introduced in 9.20.0 with the rest of
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the anchor checks; the guard was written as a consistency test when it needed to be a coverage test.
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### Fixed — `examples/gateway` broke its own three-state contract
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The adapter returned `invalid` for a certificate with **no `spv` member**. The service issues
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certificates in that state and fills the envelope when a block arrives, so "there is no proof of
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inclusion yet" is `indeterminate` — the same "I could not look" the file spends two paragraphs
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insisting on. It now returns `indeterminate` and says to re-fetch.
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The adapter also enumerated the two options it knew about when calling `NotaryHash.verify` and
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dropped everything else, which silently disabled `allowUncheckedSeal` and `allowUnknownSpvFormat`
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for its callers. It forwards them now.
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### The common rule
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Both library fixes are the one adopted in 9.24.0 for `spv.format`: **verifying a proof is not
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accepting a self-described certificate.** A statement the verifier never read cannot be covered by a
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verdict of `valid`. Each refusal has an opt-out, because a caller that checks the claim by other
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means should not be blocked by our inability to check it.
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## [9.24.0] - 2026-10-07
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### Changed — a certificate whose `spv.format` is not TSC is now refused
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`spv.format` names the format the inclusion proof is checked as. **No signature covers it**, and
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the proof is folded as TSC whatever the field says, so a certificate can carry a genuine proof, a
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genuine signature and a genuine root while declaring a format nobody implements. We accepted that;
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we now refuse it.
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The case is the NotaryHash service's own tamper vector T28: the genuine mainnet certificate with
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**exactly one unsigned field changed**, `"TSC"` → `"BUMP"`. Everything else — proof, signature,
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merkle root, headers — is untouched and verifies.
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The argument for accepting it was that every cryptographic fact checks out, and that refusing on an
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unsigned field lets anyone who can alter a certificate in transit turn a valid record into a
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rejection. That does not survive the distinction it elides: **verifying a proof is not accepting a
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self-described certificate.** We can establish that the proof folds as TSC to the committed root;
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we cannot return an unqualified `valid` for a document that says it is something we never read. The
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availability worry was overweighted too — an attacker who can rewrite the label can rewrite the
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proof, so refusing grants no capability that tampering did not already have.
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The divergence it prevents is not hypothetical. A caller could store or display our `valid: true`
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as verification of a BUMP-labelled certificate, which a BUMP-aware consumer then rejects; **the
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contradiction between two verdicts on one document is itself the failure**, and no successful BUMP
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fold is needed to reach it.
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- `proofIntegrity` still reports `true`, because the fold did succeed and a caller diagnosing this
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needs to know the proof is sound and only the label is wrong.
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- `TSC` is matched case-insensitively, and a certificate with no `spv.format` is unaffected.
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- `opts.allowUnknownSpvFormat` accepts it anyway, for a caller that knows the label is wrong and
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does not care.
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**Correction to this entry, same day.** It first said the real repair was to bring the field under
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the signature. That is impossible, and the notaryhash service session was right to say so: the SPV
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envelope does not exist until the block does and is replaced after a reorganisation, so no key that
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signed the record can ever cover it. Everything under `spv` and `anchor` is unsigned **by
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construction**. The remedy is therefore not a signature but what this check does — decline to
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return a verdict about evidence we did not read — and, better, to say what *was* checked, which is
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why `proofIntegrity` stays `true` here.
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### Added — the service's tamper vector, vendored
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`test/data/notaryhash-tamper-cases.json` is the NotaryHash service's own 32-case tamper set,
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single-field changes to one real mainnet batch certificate (block 954784), each with the service
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verifier's recorded verdict. Vendored with its provenance; the cases are not ours.
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A test asserts our verdict equals theirs on **31 of 32**. The exception is T27, which relabels
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`anchor.network`, because this library checks that label only when the caller passes `opts.network`
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— an opt-in since 9.21.0, and the test pins that it refuses once the caller does.
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Independently confirmed on the three newest cases: we refuse T29 (`anchor.type` relabelled), T30
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(`merkle` removed) and T31 (`createdAt` before 1970) — the last returning a verdict rather than
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throwing, which was a defect on the service side and never here.
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The vector's own harness note is worth repeating, because it caught a false finding of mine:
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`blockHashAtHeight` must come from a height-indexed chain source, never from
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`certificate.spv.blockHash`. Passing the certificate's own hash is circular and makes a height
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tamper (T26) pass.
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## [9.23.0] - 2026-10-07
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### Fixed — the GDAF class could not generate or verify a membership proof at all
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package/README.md
CHANGED
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Bitcoin SV library with an interpreter-verified script engine.
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[](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@smartledger/bsv)
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[](LICENSE)
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[](STABILITY.md)
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@@ -155,44 +155,44 @@ const bsv = require('@smartledger/bsv') // 128 modules
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### **Core Modules**
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| Module | Size | Use Case | CDN |
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|--------|------|----------|-----|
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| **bsv.min.js** | 1070KB | Core BSV + SmartContract | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **bsv.bundle.js** | 1070KB | Everything in one file | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **bsv.min.js** | 1070KB | Core BSV + SmartContract | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.25.0/bsv.min.js` |
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| **bsv.bundle.js** | 1070KB | Everything in one file | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.25.0/bsv.bundle.js` |
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### **W3C Verifiable Credentials**
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| Module | Size | Use Case | CDN |
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|--------|------|----------|-----|
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| **🟢 bsv-didweb.min.js** | 166KB | **DID:web generation** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **🟢 bsv-vcjwt.min.js** | 166KB | **VC-JWT issue/verify** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **🟢 bsv-statuslist.min.js** | 256KB | **StatusList2021 revocation** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **🟢 bsv-anchor.min.js** | 164KB | **BSV anchoring (hash-only)** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **🟢 bsv-didweb.min.js** | 166KB | **DID:web generation** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.25.0/bsv-didweb.min.js` |
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| **🟢 bsv-vcjwt.min.js** | 166KB | **VC-JWT issue/verify** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.25.0/bsv-vcjwt.min.js` |
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| **🟢 bsv-statuslist.min.js** | 256KB | **StatusList2021 revocation** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.25.0/bsv-statuslist.min.js` |
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| **🟢 bsv-anchor.min.js** | 164KB | **BSV anchoring (hash-only)** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.25.0/bsv-anchor.min.js` |
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### **Smart Contract & Development**
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| **bsv-smartcontract.min.js** | 141KB | Complete covenant framework | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **bsv-covenant.min.js** | 35KB | Covenant operations | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **bsv-script-helper.min.js** | 33KB | Custom script tools | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **bsv-security.min.js** | 32KB | Security enhancements | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **bsv-smartcontract.min.js** | 141KB | Complete covenant framework | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.25.0/bsv-smartcontract.min.js` |
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| **bsv-covenant.min.js** | 35KB | Covenant operations | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.25.0/bsv-covenant.min.js` |
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| **bsv-script-helper.min.js** | 33KB | Custom script tools | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.25.0/bsv-script-helper.min.js` |
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| **bsv-security.min.js** | 32KB | Security enhancements | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.25.0/bsv-security.min.js` |
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### **Legal & Compliance**
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| **bsv-ltp.min.js** | 544KB | Legal Token Protocol | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **bsv-gdaf.min.js** | 1070KB | Digital Identity & Attestation | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **bsv-ltp.min.js** | 544KB | Legal Token Protocol | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.25.0/bsv-ltp.min.js` |
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| **bsv-gdaf.min.js** | 1070KB | Digital Identity & Attestation | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.25.0/bsv-gdaf.min.js` |
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### **Advanced Cryptography**
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| **bsv-shamir.min.js** | 177KB | Threshold Cryptography | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.25.0/bsv-shamir.min.js` |
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### **Utilities**
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| Module | Size | Use Case | CDN |
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| **bsv-ecies.min.js** | 139KB | Encryption | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **bsv-message.min.js** | 34KB | Message signing | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **bsv-mnemonic.min.js** | 320KB | HD wallets | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **bsv-ecies.min.js** | 139KB | Encryption | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.25.0/bsv-ecies.min.js` |
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| **bsv-message.min.js** | 34KB | Message signing | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.25.0/bsv-message.min.js` |
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| **bsv-mnemonic.min.js** | 320KB | HD wallets | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.25.0/bsv-mnemonic.min.js` |
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```html
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<script src="https://unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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<script src="https://unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.25.0/bsv.min.js"></script>
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<script>
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const key = bsv.PrivateKey.fromRandom()
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</script>
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---
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**SmartLedger-BSV v9.
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**SmartLedger-BSV v9.25.0**
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