@smartledger/bsv 9.22.1 → 9.24.0

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -7,6 +7,112 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+## [9.24.0] - 2026-10-07
+
+### Changed — a certificate whose `spv.format` is not TSC is now refused
+
+`spv.format` names the format the inclusion proof is checked as. **No signature covers it**, and
+the proof is folded as TSC whatever the field says, so a certificate can carry a genuine proof, a
+genuine signature and a genuine root while declaring a format nobody implements. We accepted that;
+we now refuse it.
+
+The case is the NotaryHash service's own tamper vector T28: the genuine mainnet certificate with
+**exactly one unsigned field changed**, `"TSC"` → `"BUMP"`. Everything else — proof, signature,
+merkle root, headers — is untouched and verifies.
+
+The argument for accepting it was that every cryptographic fact checks out, and that refusing on an
+unsigned field lets anyone who can alter a certificate in transit turn a valid record into a
+rejection. That does not survive the distinction it elides: **verifying a proof is not accepting a
+self-described certificate.** We can establish that the proof folds as TSC to the committed root;
+we cannot return an unqualified `valid` for a document that says it is something we never read. The
+availability worry was overweighted too — an attacker who can rewrite the label can rewrite the
+proof, so refusing grants no capability that tampering did not already have.
+
+The divergence it prevents is not hypothetical. A caller could store or display our `valid: true`
+as verification of a BUMP-labelled certificate, which a BUMP-aware consumer then rejects; **the
+contradiction between two verdicts on one document is itself the failure**, and no successful BUMP
+fold is needed to reach it.
+
+- `proofIntegrity` still reports `true`, because the fold did succeed and a caller diagnosing this
+  needs to know the proof is sound and only the label is wrong.
+- `TSC` is matched case-insensitively, and a certificate with no `spv.format` is unaffected.
+- `opts.allowUnknownSpvFormat` accepts it anyway, for a caller that knows the label is wrong and
+  does not care.
+
+The real repair belongs upstream — bring the field under the signature — which is a service and
+spec change, not one a verifier can make.
+
+### Added — the service's tamper vector, vendored
+
+`test/data/notaryhash-tamper-cases.json` is the NotaryHash service's own 32-case tamper set,
+single-field changes to one real mainnet batch certificate (block 954784), each with the service
+verifier's recorded verdict. Vendored with its provenance; the cases are not ours.
+
+A test asserts our verdict equals theirs on **31 of 32**. The exception is T27, which relabels
+`anchor.network`, because this library checks that label only when the caller passes `opts.network`
+— an opt-in since 9.21.0, and the test pins that it refuses once the caller does.
+
+Independently confirmed on the three newest cases: we refuse T29 (`anchor.type` relabelled), T30
+(`merkle` removed) and T31 (`createdAt` before 1970) — the last returning a verdict rather than
+throwing, which was a defect on the service side and never here.
+
+The vector's own harness note is worth repeating, because it caught a false finding of mine:
+`blockHashAtHeight` must come from a height-indexed chain source, never from
+`certificate.spv.blockHash`. Passing the certificate's own hash is circular and makes a height
+tamper (T26) pass.
+
+## [9.23.0] - 2026-10-07
+
+### Fixed — the GDAF class could not generate or verify a membership proof at all
+
+`bsv.GDAF` exposes what `index.js` calls "Direct Access Methods (for easier developer experience)":
+thin wrappers that forward to the `ZKProver` module. **Four of them forwarded the wrong arguments**,
+so the documented class-level API was inert.
+
+| call through `new bsv.GDAF()` | before | now |
+|---|---|---|
+| `generateMembershipProof(set, value)` | threw `Set must be array` | returns a proof |
+| `verifyMembershipProof(proof, opening, set)` | `false` for every proof | verifies |
+| `verifyRangeProof(proof, min, max, opening)` | `false` for every proof | verifies |
+| `verifyAgeProof(proof, requiredAge, opening)` | an issuer DID arrived as the opening | verifies |
+
+Two separate drifts, both between a wrapper and the module it delegates to:
+
+- `generateMembershipProof` has taken `(set, value, salt)` in the module **since v5.4.0**, while the
+  wrapper passed `(value, validSet, nonce)` — the first two arguments swapped. The set arrived as the
+  value, so `checkArgument(Array.isArray(set))` threw and **no proof could be generated through the
+  class at any version since 5.4.0**.
+- `verifyMembershipProof` and `verifyRangeProof` gained the verifier-supplied set and the opening in
+  **9.20.0**, when the forgeable verifiers were fixed. The wrappers were not updated, so the module
+  received `set`/`opening` as `undefined` and its own guard — *"without a verifier-supplied set and an
+  opening there is nothing to check the prover's array against"* — answered `false` for **every**
+  proof, genuine or forged.
+
+**Nothing was accepted that should have been refused.** All four failed closed: three returned
+`false` and one threw. The 9.20.0 and 9.22.0 security fixes are unaffected, and the original
+forgery is still refused through both paths. The defect was that the class API verified nothing
+rather than that it verified wrongly.
+
+**Why no test caught it:** every proof test called the module directly
+(`require('lib/gdaf/zk-prover')`), never the class wrapper, so the wrappers had no coverage at all.
+The new `test/gdaf/wrapper_signatures.js` closes that two ways — five tests exercise the class path
+end to end, and a **general guard compares every delegating wrapper to its target by parameter
+name**, so the next signature change on either side fails the suite instead of silently disabling a
+verifier.
+
+Found while answering a consumer session's question about which version to pin.
+
+### Changed — the class-path signatures now mirror the module
+
+`bsv.d.ts` documented the broken shapes and is corrected. The affected declarations are
+`generateMembershipProof(set, value, salt?)`, `verifyMembershipProof(proof, opening, set)`,
+`verifyRangeProof(proof, min, max, opening)` and `verifyAgeProof(proof, requiredAge, opening)`.
+`api-surface.json` records the two arity changes.
+
+This is a minor release because those public signatures change, but no working call can break: the
+old shapes threw or returned `false` unconditionally, so nothing could have depended on a correct
+result from them.
+
 ## [9.22.1] - 2026-10-06
 
 ### Changed — signing many inputs is no longer quadratic in the number of inputs

package/README.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 Bitcoin SV library with an interpreter-verified script engine.
 
-[![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/version-9.22.1-blue.svg)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@smartledger/bsv)
+[![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/version-9.24.0-blue.svg)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@smartledger/bsv)
 [![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-green.svg)](LICENSE)
 [![Stability](https://img.shields.io/badge/9.x%20stable%20until-2027--09--01-brightgreen.svg)](STABILITY.md)
 
@@ -155,44 +155,44 @@ const bsv = require('@smartledger/bsv')                 // 128 modules
 ### **Core Modules**
 | Module | Size | Use Case | CDN |
 |--------|------|----------|-----|
-| **bsv.min.js** | 1070KB | Core BSV + SmartContract | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv.min.js` |
-| **bsv.bundle.js** | 1070KB | Everything in one file | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv.bundle.js` |
+| **bsv.min.js** | 1070KB | Core BSV + SmartContract | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.24.0/bsv.min.js` |
+| **bsv.bundle.js** | 1070KB | Everything in one file | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.24.0/bsv.bundle.js` |
 
 ### **W3C Verifiable Credentials**
 | Module | Size | Use Case | CDN |
 |--------|------|----------|-----|
-| **🟢 bsv-didweb.min.js** | 166KB | **DID:web generation** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-didweb.min.js` |
-| **🟢 bsv-vcjwt.min.js** | 166KB | **VC-JWT issue/verify** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-vcjwt.min.js` |
-| **🟢 bsv-statuslist.min.js** | 256KB | **StatusList2021 revocation** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-statuslist.min.js` |
-| **🟢 bsv-anchor.min.js** | 164KB | **BSV anchoring (hash-only)** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-anchor.min.js` |
+| **🟢 bsv-didweb.min.js** | 166KB | **DID:web generation** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.24.0/bsv-didweb.min.js` |
+| **🟢 bsv-vcjwt.min.js** | 166KB | **VC-JWT issue/verify** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.24.0/bsv-vcjwt.min.js` |
+| **🟢 bsv-statuslist.min.js** | 256KB | **StatusList2021 revocation** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.24.0/bsv-statuslist.min.js` |
+| **🟢 bsv-anchor.min.js** | 164KB | **BSV anchoring (hash-only)** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.24.0/bsv-anchor.min.js` |
 
 ### **Smart Contract & Development**
 | Module | Size | Use Case | CDN |
 |--------|------|----------|-----|
-| **bsv-smartcontract.min.js** | 141KB | Complete covenant framework | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-smartcontract.min.js` |
-| **bsv-covenant.min.js** | 35KB | Covenant operations | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-covenant.min.js` |
-| **bsv-script-helper.min.js** | 33KB | Custom script tools | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-script-helper.min.js` |
-| **bsv-security.min.js** | 32KB | Security enhancements | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-security.min.js` |
+| **bsv-smartcontract.min.js** | 141KB | Complete covenant framework | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.24.0/bsv-smartcontract.min.js` |
+| **bsv-covenant.min.js** | 35KB | Covenant operations | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.24.0/bsv-covenant.min.js` |
+| **bsv-script-helper.min.js** | 33KB | Custom script tools | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.24.0/bsv-script-helper.min.js` |
+| **bsv-security.min.js** | 32KB | Security enhancements | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.24.0/bsv-security.min.js` |
 
 ### **Legal & Compliance**
 | Module | Size | Use Case | CDN |
 |--------|------|----------|-----|
-| **bsv-ltp.min.js** | 544KB | Legal Token Protocol | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-ltp.min.js` |
-| **bsv-gdaf.min.js** | 1070KB | Digital Identity & Attestation | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-gdaf.min.js` |
+| **bsv-ltp.min.js** | 544KB | Legal Token Protocol | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.24.0/bsv-ltp.min.js` |
+| **bsv-gdaf.min.js** | 1070KB | Digital Identity & Attestation | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.24.0/bsv-gdaf.min.js` |
 
 ### **Advanced Cryptography**
 | Module | Size | Use Case | CDN |
 |--------|------|----------|-----|
-| **bsv-shamir.min.js** | 177KB | Threshold Cryptography | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-shamir.min.js` |
+| **bsv-shamir.min.js** | 177KB | Threshold Cryptography | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.24.0/bsv-shamir.min.js` |
 
 ### **Utilities**
 | Module | Size | Use Case | CDN |
 |--------|------|----------|-----|
-| **bsv-ecies.min.js** | 139KB | Encryption | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-ecies.min.js` |
-| **bsv-message.min.js** | 34KB | Message signing | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-message.min.js` |
-| **bsv-mnemonic.min.js** | 320KB | HD wallets | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-mnemonic.min.js` |
+| **bsv-ecies.min.js** | 139KB | Encryption | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.24.0/bsv-ecies.min.js` |
+| **bsv-message.min.js** | 34KB | Message signing | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.24.0/bsv-message.min.js` |
+| **bsv-mnemonic.min.js** | 320KB | HD wallets | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.24.0/bsv-mnemonic.min.js` |
 ```html
-<script src="https://unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv.min.js"></script>
+<script src="https://unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.24.0/bsv.min.js"></script>
 <script>
   const key = bsv.PrivateKey.fromRandom()
 </script>
@@ -240,4 +240,4 @@ MIT
 
 ---
 
-**SmartLedger-BSV v9.22.1**
+**SmartLedger-BSV v9.24.0**